written submission by oxford research groupoxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/org...

Labour’s Defence Policy Review

Written Submission by Oxford Research Group

Part One: Sustainable Security & Responsible Global Citizenship

April 2016

Executive Summary

Oxford Research Group (ORG) submits the following evidence to Labour’s Defence Policy

Review in regard to what the authors believe would further a future UK defence policy and

international engagement that:

Prioritises prevention and resolution of conflicts over geopolitical control strategies;

Honours the UK’s international treaty and legal obligations;

Responds to the real threats to UK and common global security;

Maintains British jobs and industrial capacities;

Captures the public’s imagination and increases its participation in decision-making.

In so doing, we attempt to articulate the concepts of responsible global citizenship and

sustainable security.

1. Britain’s Place in the World

1.1 Values and principles underpinning sustainable common security

Acting as a responsible global citizen is vital to build common security and advance social justice, sustainable development and international stability. The UK’s capabilities and influence mean that it can and should, as a priority, be co-ordinating policy to address and mitigate the existential threats of climate change and nuclear war.

Transitioning towards a Sustainable Security approach means promoting ‘national’ security policies that:

o are not at the expense of other states’ or peoples’ security; o prioritise long-term peace over short-term ‘security’ (control); o are ecologically sustainable; o address the root causes of conflict rather than suppressing its symptoms.

Successive UK governments have not learned the lessons of UK military adventurism in the post-Cold War era. Projecting military power to protect commercial interests and ensure political control in key regions, such as the Middle East, has proved counter-productive for regional, global and UK security.

The UK’s junior, uncritical and dependent relationship with the US in security affairs complicates Britain’s ability to move towards a more sustainable approach to global security, a situation which is likely to become more difficult in the post-Obama presidency.

Oxford Research Group, April 2016

2

Transitioning towards sustainable security is a long-term project which will require joined-up action across government. The new approach will need to deal with the ways decisions are made and implemented. Decision-making on defence and foreign policy needs to be made more accountable, democratic and transparent.

1.2 The UK’s contribution to a fair rules-based international system

While the 2015 SDSR identifies the strengthening of a ‘rules-based system’ of international norms as crucial to UK and Western security, it must be recognised that the UK and its major allies have both created the current rules to uphold their own interests and dominance, and used their power to break those rules with impunity.

Genuinely promoting a fairer rules-based system requires the UK to commit to several actions:

o Recommitting to the UN, its mandates and its peacekeeping role;

o Making unambiguous progress towards reforming the UN Security Council;

o Honouring international obligations on nuclear disarmament;

o Honouring human rights commitments, including through arms trade controls and rethinking ‘defence diplomacy’;

o Improving security relationships and partnerships with democracies outside of the NATO area.

As a P5 power, the UK should lead by example in committing its armed forces to UN peacekeeping operations, with at least the battalion-level commitments demonstrated by other major European allies such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. UK niche capabilities such as intelligence/reconnaissance, health provision and airlift/sealift would greatly bolster UN capabilities.

Despite, or because of, its massive advantages in terms of the quality and quantity of its

military resources, NATO’s experience of ‘out of area’ operations such as in Afghanistan

and Libya has been deeply problematic for the alliance and ‘host’/target countries alike.

While NATO may be seen as important to many and thus politically unassailable, the

alliance’s democratic deficit and record of illegally using force means that the UK’s leading

role in NATO needs to be subject to careful and rigorous review. Moreover, the UK will

require other partnerships and a UN mandate to operate effectively and legitimately in

any future commitments in or beyond the North Atlantic/Mediterranean.

As well as cooperation with its EU partners (whether or not the UK exits the EU, it can still opt into the European Defence Agency), the UK has an opportunity to bolster its South-North partnerships through mutually beneficial peacekeeping partnerships with other Commonwealth countries which share the English language, British military doctrine and a strong commitment to UN peacekeeping.

2. Threats to UK and Global Security

The UK needs to rethink its existing policies so that they decrease rather than increase the likelihood of social and environmental catastrophe. Presently the UK contributes to rising existential dangers for humanity through its continued reliance on:

o i) nuclear weapons;


3

o ii) overseas power projection; o iii) (increasingly imported) fossil fuels.

Public opposition to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, discontent about the use of force and support for alternative approaches highlight the possibility of building a new direction for the UK’s national security strategy. Business interests must not trump human rights and security concerns when it comes to determining defence and foreign policy.

The current government has said and done little to enable the UK to move away from its dependence on fossil fuels and transition to a low carbon economy, reducing resource consumption and increasing energy efficiency. The UK should reprioritise military R&D towards green energy technologies and their uptake in developing economies. This will help safeguard British jobs while making UK industry more economically and environmentally beneficial.

Focusing on developing human resources and skills is crucial and is likely to benefit from a reduction in military capital expenditure. Developing diplomatic, peacekeeping, intelligence and cyber capabilities in the UK should be prioritised over large, inflexible and hugely expensive military platforms.

Transitioning away from control-based strategies would enable the UK to develop alternative, non-nuclear, non-expeditionary defence postures focused on territorial/collective defence, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. This should be developed as part of a joined up strategy that respects international law regarding the use of force.

3. Capabilities, Spending and Choices

3.1 Defence spending

The current government’s commitment to spend 2.0% of GDP on defence until 2020 is low by modern British standards but still about 50% above the typical/mean rate (1.3 to 1.4%) spent by its European allies and democracies globally.

Attempting to maintain ‘full spectrum’ capabilities to intervene militarily anywhere in the world has huge cost implications for the UK, not least through the inflating Major Equipment Plan. Such exquisite kit is largely irrelevant to current security threats and the UK’s position of relative decline as a world power.

The big military systems that the UK is currently committed to, such as aircraft carriers and joint strike fighters, are both hugely costly and inherently limiting of the flexibility of the armed forces because of their very small numbers.

Nuclear weapons are expensive in their own terms but also commit the UK to a costly ‘ladder of escalation’ – i.e. a range of conventional capabilities, including a blue water navy and strategic-range air force. These capabilities have been maintained and promoted even at the expense of the global diplomatic capacities necessary to avoid the use of force.

Coordinating UK international policy towards common strategic ends and around common values has not been effective through the existing National Security Council structure. A super-ministerial role, possibly under a deputy prime minister, might be considered above future secretaries of state for defence, foreign affairs/intelligence,


4

development and climate change, managing UK international commitments from a common budget.

3.2 Britain’s nuclear capability and its international disarmament obligations

The current government’s (and Labour party) plans to modernise and replace the UK’s nuclear arsenal run counter to the UK’s dual responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - i.e. to eliminate its nuclear weapons and support the creation of a nuclear weapons free world (NWFW). There are a range of possible measures the UK could now take to realise these obligations. The most direct would be to opt for unilateral nuclear disarmament.

The UK also made a commitment at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. Rethinking the UK’s role in the world in line with sustainable approaches to security would expedite a rethinking of the UK’s minimum deterrence requirements, so that nuclear and other offensive forms of power are replaced by conventional and defensive capabilities.

If disarmament is deemed to be politically unacceptable at present, other options are open which could make nuclear weapons less salient for the UK. These include the possibility of re-configuring the UK’s nuclear weapons system so that it is ‘recessed’ or of reduced readiness rather than continually operational.

The UK should also consider changes to the other policies governing nuclear weapons, including moving to a no first use policy. This may require greater independence from the US and NATO-tasking, however.

In the case of building a NWFW, as well as national nuclear disarmament, relevant UK policies requiring review include its arms sales and nuclear energy exports to countries and regions of concern, as well as its military capabilities and use of power projection.

In the short-term, it is vital that parliament ensures that the costs and risks of possessing and replacing nuclear weapons—including contracts with industrial suppliers and safety and security incidents at nuclear facilities—are brought to light as soon as possible to ensure full accountability.

3.3 Towards a NWFW: Promoting Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Regarding multilateral nuclear disarmament efforts, it is important to consider how the UK may act responsibly in terms of its international actions, conventional and nuclear military capabilities and posture, both to enable nuclear possessors to move towards disarmament and to reduce the incentives for others to seek non-conventional deterrents.

It is imperative that the UK acts in ways that reduce rather than increase the risk of nuclear war between NATO and Russia. De-escalation measures and a return to diplomacy with action on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament is necessary rather than a new Cold War and nuclear exercises.

If progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is to be made, the UK must also avoid actions—such as the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, or the heavy militarisation of Gulf Arab states and Israel—which lead countries such as Iran and North Korea to believe they need nuclear weapons to prevent regime change.


5

1. Britain’s Place in the World

1.1 Building Common Security: the UK as a responsible global citizen

1.1.1 The world is currently facing a range of interconnected and severe environmental, social and political challenges—including climate change and regional conflict that could escalate to nuclear war—which could lead to the destruction of the conditions necessary for a habitable planet. In an age of emerging powers it is tempting for states whose position is one of relative decline, such as the UK, to maintain the status quo wherever possible. Yet the UK’s history and current standing as a state with still significant capabilities and influence on the world stage means that the UK should be co-ordinating all its tools of national power to urgently mitigate these existential risks, as well as other pressing concerns, in partnership with the international community. Such action should be at the core of a truly internationalist approach so that the UK builds common security and behaves as a responsible global citizen, prioritising and protecting the rights and needs of the majority of people, in Britain and the world, to advance social justice, sustainable development and global stability: sustainable security.

1.1.2 In practice, building common security and acting responsibly will require the UK to transition away from the existing counter-productive and unsustainable approach to international affairs. The current approach, dubbed the ‘control paradigm’ by Professor Paul Rogers, involves the UK — as junior partner to the US — projecting military power to ensure political control in regions of key strategic importance such as the Middle East. The US’s strategy, which the UK endorses, involves the use of unrivalled military strength to ensure open markets and the control of energy supplies and strategic resources. However, trade liberalisation and resource exploitation often hurts poor countries’ economies and chances for development. Moreover, as Rogers outlines, Western attempts to keep the lid on efforts by the poor and marginalised to resist the status quo—rather than addressing the root causes of conflict and political violence—are bound to fail1. Overseas power projection has, in fact, often helped create the threats from state or non-state actors, including terrorists, which the West then seeks to contain, deter or destroy.

1.1.3 The government was thus wrong to assert in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) that ‘Over the last five years, we have learned lessons from operations in Libya, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Sierra Leone and elsewhere’. This is clearly not the case given that military power rather than political cooperation continues to be the principle means by which the UK plans to address problems of world order and security. The SDSR emphasised that the UK will maintain a ‘global role’ through possessing ‘the full range of military capabilities and the political will to protect our interests globally’, with the Ministry of Defence becoming a protected department and enjoying annual real-terms budget increases of 0.5% per year up to 2020/21 and allocations for new equipment over the next decade rising £12 billion to £178 billion.

1.1.4 Instead of clinging to traditional control-based and military solutions to political problems, the UK should focus on using its capabilities and resources to develop cooperative and peaceful relations in and between states. British obligations to the international

1 Rogers, Paul (2010), Losing Control: Global Security in the 21st Century (London: Pluto)


6

community are enshrined in a series of agreements, conventions and treaties which are bound up with the UK’s partnerships and alliances. In moving towards a more progressive approach, the UK will need to consider which of these arrangements and relationships are compatible with sustainable security and what action should be taken to align the UK’s policies with its values. This should include an assessment of what international treaties and institutions the UK should stay in, leave or attempt to reform and what new arrangements might be necessary. For example, key agreements which the UK needs to live up to if it is to achieve a sustainable approach to security include the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), the Paris climate change agreement (COP21), international humanitarian law and the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

1.1.5 Developing a new national consensus on the UK’s ambitions, responsibilities and role in the world so that the UK transitions away from a dangerous and failed ‘business as usual’ approach towards sustainable security is a long-term project that will require the UK to enact a comprehensive strategy across government. This new approach will need to deal with the ways decisions are made and implemented as much as the content of the policies themselves. For example, if the UK is to both reduce its reliance on military solutions to political problems and tackle the root causes of instability and insecurity through effective, just and legitimate means, then institutional changes are vital so that decision-making is made more accountable, democratic and transparent.

1.1.6 Numerous imaginative and progressive initiatives have been proposed to reform the UK’s institutions. For example, research by Dr Daniel Stevens and Dr Nick Vaughan Williams found a significant gap between the British government’s and the public’s priorities for and understanding of national security2. This suggests that any future Labour government needs to make defence and foreign policy-making more inclusive, taking the time and space to consult with a diverse range of people. This approach, Stevens and Vaughan Williams argue, would ‘not only increase the democratic legitimacy of the NSS: in the longer term it would provide the footing for a more sustainable National Security Strategy, offer better value for money, and contribute towards greater societal resilience’.

1.1.7 Such short-term measures would support longer-term efforts to democratise state institutions so that the British people and their representatives have greater control over decisions affecting national security. For example, the recently abolished Political and Constitutional Reform Committee should be reinstated so that the government is held to account and made to follow through on its commitment to democratise war-making decisions3. In order that the public is able to participate in decision-making, it is essential that the Freedom of Information Act is protected and extended so that UK citizens have access to important data.

1.1.8 Increased democracy, transparency and accountability in defence and foreign policy decision-making are also vital in the long-term if the UK is to realise its international obligations to disarm, make the transition to being a former nuclear weapon state and contribute to the creation of a nuclear weapons free world. Moreover, if the national interest in preventing runaway global warming is to be achieved, British people and their

2 Stevens, Daniel and Vaughan-Williams, Nick (2014), Written evidence, Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, The Next National Security Strategy 3 BBC (2014), MPs renew demand for Commons votes on use of war-making powers, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26754077, 27th March

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-26754077


7

representatives need to resist corporate and other vested interests’ efforts to prolong the UK’s addiction to fossil fuels, regulating the influence such actors have on policy-makers.

1.2 The UK’s Contribution to a Fair Rules-based International System

1.2.1 While the 2015 SDSR identifies the strengthening of a ‘rules-based international order’ of international laws and norms as crucial to UK and Western security, it must be recognised that the UK and its major allies have both created the current rules to uphold their own interests and dominance, and used their power to break those rules with impunity. The UN-based international governance system combines elements of fairness or democracy (e.g. in the UN General Assembly) with checks in favour of the most powerful states (e.g. the UN Security Council (P5) veto-wielders) and elements of voluntarism such as the opt-in/out International Criminal Court. As global power shifts from North to South, West to East, it is inevitable that more states outside of Europe will resent and oppose the privileged position of the UK, France and Russia within the post-1945 institutions.

1.2.2 Genuinely promoting a fairer rules-based system requires the UK to strengthen international and national security and requires the UK to commit to several actions:

i) Recommitting to the UN, its mandates and its peacekeeping role;

ii) Making unambiguous progress towards reforming the UN Security Council;

iii) Honouring international obligations on nuclear disarmament (see below and Part Two: The UK’s Nuclear Future submission);

iv) Honouring human rights commitments and rethinking security alignments with repressive regimes, including through arms trade controls and revised commitments to train and embed personnel;

v) Improving security relationships and partnerships with democracies outside of the NATO area.

1.2.3 Despite, or because of, its massive advantages in terms of the quality and quantity of

its military resources, NATO’s experience of ‘out of area’ operations such as in Afghanistan

and Libya has been deeply problematic for the alliance and ‘host’/target countries alike. While

NATO may be seen as important to many and thus politically unassailable, the alliance’s

democratic deficit and record of illegally using force means that the UK’s leading role in NATO

needs to be subject to careful and rigorous review. Moreover, the UK will require other

partnerships and a UN mandate to operate effectively and legitimately in any future

commitments in or beyond the North Atlantic/Mediterranean’.

1.2.4 The relationship between the UK, France, US and NATO and the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) states in particularly appears to be intensifying in recent years, including a

build-up of Western military equipment and bases in the Persian/Arabian Gulf and western

Indian Ocean. While there is no formal UK defence pact with such states, the concentration

of UK ‘defence diplomacy’ (including arms sales, embedded advisors and trainers) and basing

arrangements in the region is deeply problematic in relation to the UK’s human rights

commitments and reputation.

1.2.5 As a P5 power, the UK should lead by example in committing its armed forces to UN peacekeeping operations, with at least the battalion-level commitments demonstrated by


8

other major European allies such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. UK niche capabilities such as intelligence/reconnaissance, health provision and airlift/sealift would greatly bolster UN capabilities. Other than in Cyprus, the UK has not committed any significant forces to UN-run peacekeeping operations since the mid-1990s, when it was briefly the UN’s largest troop contributing country. Despite the UK paying 6.68% of the UN’s peacekeeping budget (about £377 million in 2015-2016), only 0.28% of UN peacekeepers are currently British.

1.2.6 The UK currently backs proposals to expand the permanent membership of the Security Council to include the main four claimants: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. While this proposal would go some way to accommodating the largest current claimants in terms of economic power, it fails to address the feelings of geopolitical marginalisation in the Arab, African and Islamic worlds in particular, strengthens the image of entrenched Western power, and is anyway likely to be gridlocked by Chinese opposition. Fairer proposals, including relating to the removal or qualification of veto powers are urgently needed if this pillar of the ‘rules-based system’ is to survive and function effectively and fairly.

1.2.7 As well as cooperation with its EU partners (whether or not the UK exits the EU, it can still opt into the European Defence Agency), the UK has an opportunity to bolster its South-North partnerships through mutually beneficial peacekeeping partnerships with other Commonwealth countries, such as Canada, Ghana, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa. These all share the English language, British-derived military doctrine and a strong commitment to UN peacekeeping. There is an opportunity for active learning and a degree of complementarity between British capacities and those of some of these states.

2. Threats to British and Global Security: Sustainable responses

2.1 Oxford Research Group’s research over the last decade has identified four interconnected

trends that are most likely to lead to substantial global and regional instability, and large-scale

loss of life, of a magnitude unmatched by other potential threats:

Climate change: Loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples, leading to civil unrest, intercommunal violence and international instability.

Competition over resources: Competition for increasingly scarce resources – including food, water and energy – especially from unstable parts of the world.

Marginalisation of the majority world: Increasing socio-economic divisions and the political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the vast majority of the world’s population.

Global militarisation: The increased use of military force as a security measure and the further proliferation of military technologies, not least the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.

While there are many other factors that can threaten the security of humans around the world – such as radicalisation (often being a result of marginalisation), rapid increases in the global population, the shortcomings of current forms of global governance institutions, etc. – these four drivers represent something new. Humanity faces a world interconnected yet


9

socio-economically divided, where environmental limits are obvious and traditional approaches to war-fighting and the use of force are clearly counter-productive.

2.2 The approach to risk taken by the 2015 SDSR fails to consider properly the ways in which the government’s existing and proposed policies may increase the likelihood of social and environmental catastrophe. Specifically, the UK contributes to rising existential dangers for humanity through its continued reliance on:

i) nuclear weapons – and thus the risk of accidental or deliberate nuclear detonations or warfare;

ii) fossil fuels—and thus the exacerbation of climate chaos and environmental change, as well as the geopolitical tensions that accompany growing energy import dependence;

iii) military power projection, including to control and secure energy supplies, which fuels arms races and hot, cold and proxy wars.

The UK’s current economic model also contributes to:

i) unsustainable levels of resource consumption, which increases resource competition and the risk of conflict;

ii) the marginalisation of the majority of the world’s population, within rich as well as poor countries, which drives ‘terrorism’ and other violent forms of ‘revolt from the margins’.

2.3 These are not discrete or easily disentangled factors. Britain’s economic dependence on fossil fuels is a major driver of its reliance on military power projection and aggressive security alliances and policies, including arms sales and ‘defence diplomacy’. These control-based policies, in turn, incentivise poor or repressive governance and anti-Western revolts in the global South. They also contribute to a logic of alliances, containment and confrontation that legitimises nuclear ‘deterrence’ as a force-equaliser the weak can deploy against the strong. Overall, it is often easier to trace how UK or multinational corporate interests – not least our world-leading oil/gas and arms industries – benefit from current security frameworks than the UK state and people.

2.4 In terms of human security, climate change is one of the most important threats to the wellbeing of the UK and the world as it is likely—according to the Pentagon, among others—to exacerbate poverty, political instability and social tensions. For example, many analysts foresee that the impacts of climate change will cause increases in conflict, humanitarian crises and refugee flows. The latest SDSR is notable for acknowledging that ‘climate change is one of the biggest long-term challenges for the future of our planet’ whilst saying nothing about how the UK could move away from its reliance on fossil fuels and transition to a low carbon economy, reducing resource consumption and increasing energy efficiency. In order to address this shortcoming, expenditure on military R&D could be substantially refocused upon cheap, renewable, ultra-low carbon energy provision and its uptake in North and South alike.

2.5 Developing accountable, democratic and transparent institutions and working with responsible international partners (e.g. those meeting minimum standards of democracy, governance and respect for human rights and international law) can allow the UK government to improve its ability to identify, predict and act upon underlying threats to national security and prevent them from worsening. Evidence of the need for reform can be seen in:


10

i) failures of the National Security Council (NSC) to predict, prioritise or prevent conflicts that affect the UK and its interests, or to coordinate policy;

ii) the UK’s inability to make independent national strategy given its position within NATO and as junior, uncritical ally of the US;

iii) how large hi-tech equipment and platforms from aircraft carriers to Trident determine policy responses;

iv) how large bureaucracies and institutional conservatism prevent progressive reforms.

The UK would therefore benefit from:

A) moving to threat-based planning, addressing the specific threats outlined above;

B) focusing on developing human resources and skills for conflict prevention and resolution, including diplomatic, peacekeeping, intelligence and cyber capabilities, as an alternative to hugely expensive, inflexible military platforms;

C) coordinating international policy, expenditure and strategy through a much more empowered and transparent NSC or equivalent body.

2.6 Transitioning away from control-based strategies would enable the UK to develop alternative, non-nuclear, non-expeditionary defence postures focused on territorial and collective (European/Atlantic) defence, peacekeeping and conflict prevention. This should be developed as part of a joined-up strategy that respects international law regarding the use of force and understands that military-first policies threaten long-term UK security more than they uphold it. This requires a real shift of focus and dynamic, empowered leadership in the NSC or other policy coordination body to direct UK hard and soft power and influence towards upstream conflict prevention and a sustainable security strategy.

3. Capabilities, Spending and Choices

This section focuses on three of the six questions posed by the Defence Policy Review’s ToR under Britain’s Military and Security Forces: Capabilities, Spending and Choices:

1) What level of defence spending is required to keep Britain safe and help us promote a more peaceful and safer world?

5) Will renewal of Britain’s nuclear capability aid us in protecting Britain’s security and pursuing the values that guide our foreign and defence policy?

3) How can Britain help to effectively stem the flow of weapons – chemical, nuclear and military – around the world and promote non-proliferation and disarmament?

ORG has submitted a separate document – Part Two: The UK’s Nuclear Future – to the Defence Policy Review which looks in more depth at the issues surrounding the Successor programme and the UK’s status as a nuclear weapons state, including options for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in the UK’s security policy.

3.1 Defence spending and international policy coordination

3.1.1 The current government’s commitment to spend 2.0% of GDP on defence until 2020 is low by modern British standards but still about 50% above the typical/mean rate spent by its European allies (1.3%) and democracies globally (1.4%). As figure 1 shows, the UK and


11

France are the two main outliers among Western European democracies in terms of their defence spending. Among other Western European NATO states, there is a remarkable convergence of defence spending between 1.0 and 1.5% of GDP, notwithstanding the NATO commitment to a minimum of 2.0% of GDP. As a proportion of GDP, therefore, the UK is spending about 50% more than the rate typical of its rather secure region.

Figure 1: The Correlation of Military Expenditure to Democracy in Europe (2014)

Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2014; SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, figures for 2014. The higher the score on the X axis, the higher the standard of democracy. Countries labelled in white are NATO members. Countries in green are constitutionally neutral. Countries in blue are other non-NATO states. Non-NATO ex-USSR states not included.

3.1.2 Most of this ‘power premium’ (currently equivalent to about £12 billion per year) is spent on equipping expeditionary forces for a global intervention role and, to a lesser extent, on nuclear weapons. Much of the debate on whether or not the UK should renew/replace its submarine-based nuclear weapons system has rightly focused on the enormous cost of the Successor programme (currently estimated by HMG at £31 billion + £10 billion contingency for development and build costs alone). By our estimates, this is equivalent to between 42% and 49% of the Royal Navy’s entire capital procurement costs over a 30 year period, rising to about 60% if the associated Astute-class submarines are included. In other words, for the price of Successor, the government could double the Royal Navy’s surface fleet, including the new aircraft carriers and associated aircraft, or, more desirably, triple its spending on the Foreign Office (currently £1.1 billion annually). If continued, Successor will put a major squeeze on the rest of the already inflated major procurement budget between now and the early 2030s envisaged service-entry date of the new Successor-class submarines.


12

Figure 2: HM Naval Service Capital Procurement Costs, c.2000-2030

Note: Figures are a mix of confirmed (NAO) and estimated (MoD) costs, excluding in-service upgrade costs. Successor SSBN capital costs are likely to extend slightly beyond 2030.

3.1.3 However, capital costs are not everything. Procuring and sustaining at high readiness armed forces whose posture is explicitly envisaged for expeditionary operations far from the UK and Europe, often multiple and simultaneous, is also enormously expensive. Thus the UK puts high emphasis on a blue water navy (carrier battle groups, nuclear-powered submarines, strategic replenishment and associated basing) and an air force enabled to deploy offensively almost anywhere in the world. Compared to Successor, the procurement of such systems as Astute submarines (£9.6 billion), the two supercarriers (£6.2 billion) and F-35 strike fighters (perhaps £12 billion) is lower cost, but their long-term sustainment costs may be higher than Successor.

3.1.4 Big conventional weapons platforms to which the UK is currently committed, such as aircraft carriers and F-35 joint strike fighters, have great potential to project British hard power but are both hugely costly and inherently limiting of the flexibility of the armed forces because of their very small numbers. Putting to sea a carrier battle group, for example, effectively renders the Royal Navy a one-ship fleet in operational terms since it requires one-third of the surface and submarine fleet to accompany it. This is untenable given the Navy’s current global commitments from Falklands to the Gulf via the Caribbean, North Atlantic and Somalia. In terms of what the armed forces are actually called upon to do, such exquisite kit or ‘baroque arsenals’ have very little relevance.

3.1.5 There is an important linkage between maintaining full spectrum arsenals of such cutting edge technology at high readiness for expeditionary operations and the UK’s status as

£-

£5,000

£10,000

£15,000

£20,000

£25,000

£30,000

£35,000

£40,000

£45,000

£M

EST

.

HM Naval Service Capital Procurement Costs, c.2000-2030

Ship Cost Aircraft Contingency


13

a nuclear weapons state. The UK (like France) is effectively required to maintain a spectrum of conventional deterrent capabilities to underpin its nuclear deterrent so that the nuclear option is very much its last resort. Thus, as long as the UK government believes that it must retain an independent nuclear capability on, or similar to, the scale of Trident, it will be difficult – some would say irresponsible – for it to reduce its maintenance of frontline conventional systems, notwithstanding the possibility of reducing the ability of these systems to be deployed beyond the NATO collective defence area. (see ORG’s separate submission on nuclear weapons for more on this).

Figure 3 – UK International Spending, 2013-2016

Sources: UK Budgets, 2014 and 2015 – Departmental Expenditure Limits Figures for 2013-14 and 2014-15 are estimates; 2015-16 is planned expenditure, including Special Reserve in defence.

3.1.6 The last two governments made some progress towards coordinating government foreign and security policy and conflict analysis across Whitehall, including through the establishment of a National Security Council (NSC). Yet the NSC is still a very weakly resourced body and has a limited capacity for conducting real strategic thought about how the UK can act in the long-term to prevent conflict overseas and uphold human rather than narrowly defined national security. There remains an enormous imbalance of resources between the MOD (over 70% of financing) and other departments, the FCO (now just 2%) in particular, which helps to condition the policies and responses that the UK makes towards conflict and crises.

3.1.7 One way to mitigate this, and to maximise the use of the UK’s resources, would be to think in terms of an overall envelope of funding for Britain’s international influence to be spread between defence, development, diplomacy and intelligence. Elements of energy and climate change, as well as culture and education, would also be relevant. Currently this envelope is around £50 billion, or 2.75% of GDP. This could be overseen by a single minister, perhaps a deputy prime minister, through a restructured NSC. This would allow for the


14

development of clearer strategy for managing long-term risks and the coordination of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power approaches. However, this needs to be done as part of a rethinking of British interests and objectives, not as part of the current trend to securitising all aspects of the UK’s engagement with the wider world. At a minimum, this should entail some commitment to reallocating resources from the military to diplomacy and the mitigation of climate change.

3.2 Britain’s nuclear capability and its international obligations

3.2.1 The UK contributes to rising existential dangers for humanity through its continued reliance on nuclear weapons, as part of a wider commitment to overseas power projection, whereby it plans to build a new generation of nuclear-armed submarines through the Successor programme. Instead of modernising and replacing its nuclear arsenal the UK should be taking measures to realise its dual responsibilities under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)—to eliminate its nuclear weapons and support the creation of a nuclear weapons free world (NWFW).

3.2.2 The potential for what UK might do in this area could be highly significant in terms of its practical and normative value- at both a regional and global level. In order for the UK to meet its responsibilities, action needs to be taken across a range of areas. In the case of national nuclear disarmament, these include the still-operational Vanguard programme, the nascent Successor programme and the wider infrastructure belonging to the UK’s nuclear weapons establishment. In the case of building a NWFW, as well as national nuclear disarmament, relevant UK policies which need to be reviewed include its arms sales and nuclear energy exports to countries and regions of concern, as well as its military capabilities and use of power projection.

3.2.3 Beginning with the UK’s nuclear weapons and disarmament obligations, under the NPT the UK is committed to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’, an objective reaffirmed in 1996 by the International Court of Justice.

3.2.4 The UK also made a commitment at the 2010 NPT Review Conference to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. There are a range of possible measures the UK could now take to realise these obligations. The most straightforward approach would be to opt for full disarmament which would, on a material level, entail: i) de-activating and dismantling the UK’s nuclear weapons system using a phased approach which would cover the submarines, missiles and warheads and last for several years ii) diversifying the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and nuclear weapons-related industry into civil sector work or closing these facilities iii) cancelling Successor.

3.2.5 If full disarmament is deemed to be politically unacceptable at the present time, then a changed conception of what is required for ‘minimum deterrence’ would open up alternatives to the current Trident system that could reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the UK’s defence and foreign policy. Alternatives to the Trident system and Successor that could help the UK begin to descend the nuclear ladder towards zero, include: i) fewer new submarines and/or missiles and/or warheads ii) reducing existing and future submarine’s operational readiness iii) using dual-use nuclear/conventional-capable submarines. Other options that should be considered include: i) delaying a decision on Successor ii) opting for a ‘recessed deterrent’ capability. Further analysis of these intermediate options and their


15

relevance to the reduced salience obligation is given in a second evidence submission from ORG to the policy review.

3.2.6 As well as progressive and responsible steps that may be taken concerning acquisition, the UK should considering changes to the other policies governing nuclear weapons. This includes declaratory and employment policies, such as moving to a no first use policy. In the short-term, it is also important that parliament ensures that the costs and risks of possessing and replacing nuclear weapons—including contracts with industrial suppliers and safety and security incidents at nuclear facilities—are brought to light as soon as possible to ensure full accountability.

3.2.7 Any significant change to the UK’s nuclear weapons policy would have wider political implications given the nature of the UK’s close nuclear relationships with the US, NATO (and thus the alliance’s nuclear posture which does not rule in or rule out first use of nuclear weapons) and also France, with which the UK signed a far-reaching nuclear co-operation agreement in 2010. Given the consequences of nuclear disarmament, moves towards it will likely require harnessing and deepening the public’s opposition towards the UK’s nuclear status, alongside Britain making a radical shift away from ‘control’-based strategies. Rethinking the UK’s role in the world in line with sustainable approaches to security would thus expedite a rethinking of the UK’s minimum deterrence requirements, so that nuclear and other offensive forms of power are replaced by conventional and defensive capabilities.

3.3 Towards a NWFW: Promoting Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

3.3.1 As for multilateral disarmament efforts, the NPT makes clear that the elimination of nuclear arsenals and the achievement of general and complete disarmament will be facilitated by ‘the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States’. It is therefore important to consider how the UK—as a depository state of the NPT and member of the UN Security Council—may act responsibly in terms of its international actions, military capabilities and posture, both to enable nuclear possessors to move towards disarmament and reduce the incentives for others to seek non-conventional deterrents.

3.3.2 Progressive policies in this area should be based on an understanding of other state’s threat perceptions. For example, China and Russia primarily see their nuclear weapons as deterrents against the West’s overwhelming conventional military superiority and policies of containment and expansion. In the short-term it is therefore imperative that, Britain—as a leading NATO power—acts in ways that reduce rather than increase the risk of nuclear war between NATO and Russia. This is not least because any escalation to nuclear conflict would potentially involve the UK’s nuclear force, and would have the direst consequences for this country and the world.

3.3.3 NATO’s bombing and overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, along with the prior regime change operation against Saddam Hussein, greatly complicated the task of persuading other states such as Iran and North Korea to halt or reverse their nuclear programs. The lesson Tehran and Pyongyang took from this episode was thus that because Gaddafi had voluntarily ended his nuclear and chemical weapons programmes, the West now felt free to pursue regime change.

3.3.4 Overall, if progress on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament is to be made, short-term economic and political goals must not be allowed to trump critical national and


16

international security concerns. Advocates of multilateral disarmament therefore need to produce and enact policies that make sense across government. For example, the UK needs to consider how its arms transfers to countries in regions of conflict such as the Middle East contribute to tensions and reduces the chances of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone, which the UK has an obligation to help create.

3.3.5 Another key concern is the UK’s nuclear relationship with India, including the 2010 agreement for the export of civil nuclear technology, which continues to this day. This move raised fears of leakage to India’s nuclear weapons programme, meaning the UK would be engaged in blatant vertical proliferation, leading to responses from Beijing and Islamabad. Again, if the UK government is to act responsibly it must cease acting in ways which drive nuclear proliferation and understand the various economic, psychological and strategic factors that might enable nuclear possessors to disarm.

About Oxford Research Group

Oxford Research Group (ORG) is a UK-based think-and-action tank, founded in 1982, that provides information, analysis, methodology, policy advice and mediation in order to promote a more sustainable approach to global security. ORG currently runs or hosts programmes working on: sustainable security and alternatives to militarisation; the implications of ‘remote control’ warfare; preventive diplomacy and track II mediation of several conflicts in the Middle East. ORG is independent of all political parties and seeks to work with all actors to enlarge the space for alternatives to military confrontation and violence.

This submission was researched and written by Richard Reeve, Director of ORG’s Sustainable Security Programme, and Tim Street, Senior Programme Officer with ORG’s Sustainable Security Programme.

written submission by oxford research groupoxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/org...

Documents