wtj 74 (2012): 169-203 is there a reformed objection …in order to bolster his philosophical...

WTJ 74 (2012): 169-203

IS THERE A REFORMED OBJECTION TO NATURAL THEOLOGY?

K. H9 E I I E B ?F > ?D I

In discussing the so-called Reformed objection to natural theology, Michael Sudduth concludes:

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Sudduth’s book The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, like so much of theological philosophy today, takes its cue from Alvin Plan tinga; the title of the book itself came from an article written by Plantinga.1 Unlike Plantinga, however, Sudduth has included a good bit of material—both historical and theological— in order to bolster his philosophical analysis and critique. For those interested in the question of natural theology and its relationship to Reformed theology and apologetics, this is the book to read. It is unique both in its scope and its depth.

I. Analysis

1. Introduction

In order to do justice to Sudduth’s argument, it seems best to work through his argument in some detail, so that we can focus this review on the overall case that Sudduth makes for the legitimacy of the project of natural theology. I will attempt, therefore, to set out the central contours of Sudduth’s case, after which I will offer some of my own reflections, from the perspective of a Covenantal approach to apologetics.

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169

WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL170

Before getting into the substance of the book, one m inor alteration must be broached here, as it will affect the rest of what is said. Typical of philosophy in the analytic tradition are symbolic locutions that are m eant to clarify or sum- marize a given proposition, concept, or point. These can be helpful (and will be used below) and there can be no question that analytic philosophers are quite fond of trotting them out aplenty in virtually every essay.

However, it seems a good argument can be made that these “symbolocutions” can sometimes tend to confuse rather than clarify. In this book, Sudduth wants to make a distinction between the natural knowledge of God that is gained without any conscious process of reasoning,2 on the one hand, and theistic arguments, on the other. Instead of calling them “natural knowledge of God,” and “theistic argum ents,” Sudduth denom inates them as natural theology a and natural theology ß, respectively. There may be good reasons for doing this, not the least of which is the fact that the Reformed objection is to natural theology. Thus, distinguishing two kinds of natural theology may make some sense. How- ever, given that the standard articulation of these two aspects of our knowledge of God seems fairly straightforward, we will simply use the typical phrases in place of Sudduth’s a and ß. So, unless otherwise noted, when the subject matter discussed or cited below is an intuited or implanted natural knowledge of God, we’ll denominate it as “natural knowledge of God” (instead of his natural theology a) and when the subject matter is theistic arguments, we’ll denominate it as “theistic argum ents” (instead of his natural theology ß). It seems to me this change of locution is clearer and should produce less confusion with respect to his arguments.

Next, there are a num ber of distinctions that are laid out in the opening ch ap ters which need to be kept straight as the argument progresses.

Sudduth is aware of the vast differences that obtain am ong those who call themselves “Reformed.” Initially, the adjective “Reformed” is taken to include most Protestant denominations, as well as those who engage the Protestant tradition. In the process of his analysis, however, there is a particular focus on the Dutch Reformed tradition, in its various modes, with some scrutiny given as well to Barth and Brunner. To his credit (and rarely seen in philosophical discussions of this sort) Sudduth recognizes that Barth and Brunner, though interacting with Reformed theology, stand in a radically different tradition; they should not be included in the tradition of Reformed orthodoxy (e.g., pp. 46,113). They are brought into Sudduth’s discussion due to their own respective analyses of natural theology in the Reformed tradition.

With respect to natural knowledge of God, the typical understanding of such is that it does not arise as a result of some conscious process of reasoning. This does not, according to Sudduth, mean that there is no inference involved. Given this natural knowledge of God, theistic arguments involve “the conceptual clarification and reflective developm ent of natural knowledge of God, a kind of

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171IS THERE A REFORMED OBJECTION TO NATURAL THEOLOGY?

formalization of an innate or spontaneously acquired knowledge of God. Hence, we can think of theistic arguments as grounded in the natural knowledge of God. Moreover, to the extent that Scripture itself affirms the natural knowledge of G od . . . , we could view theistic arguments as a clarification, development, and defense of a datum of Scripture. In this way, the project of theistic arguments would have biblical warrant, in much the same way that the systematic develop- m ent of other biblical doctrines is warranted” (p. 4).

This leads to an im portant and helpful distinction that Sudduth initially makes between what he calls a dogmatic approach to theistic arguments, on the one hand, and a pre-dogmatic approach, on the other. He notes that such a distinction has not been made clear in the literature (p. 6), by which I take him to mean the more current, twentieth-century literature in philosophy of religion. The dogmatic approach is the use of theistic arguments within the context of Reformed theology; the pre-dogmatic approach sees “theistic arguments as something external to dogmatic theology, a purely rational prolegomenon to our rational foundation for dogmatic theology” (p. 5, my emphasis).

W hen discussing the “Reformed objection to natural theology,” it is useful to be clear, not only on what the objection is, but on what kinds of objections there are. Sudduth distinguishes between what he calls “model-specific” objections to theistic arguments and a “project objection.” Sudduth’s concern is primarily with whether or not there is a project objection to theistic arguments, the kind o f objection that would dismiss any theistic argumentation as illegitimate. O f less concern is w hether or not there are model-specific objections to theistic arguments—the kinds of theistic arguments that are meant to provide a rational ground for theology, for example. Model-specific forms of theistic arguments include a pre-dogmatic model, a dogmatic model, and an apologetic model. So, while some may have objections to theistic arguments, as those arguments are incorporated into some specific model, such objections do not necessarily provide a project objection to theistic arguments. “‘Project objections’ to theistic arguments are those that object to all models of theistic arguments; model-specific objections are those that object to one or more of the dogmatic, pre-dogmatic or apologetic models of theistic arguments” (p. 54). That is, rejecting a particular use of theistic arguments does not thereby reject every use of such arguments. Sudduth’s main thesis is that there are no Reformed project objections to natural theology. Just for the record, and before we explore the details of his discussion, I think he’s right.

2. The History

Much of the material in the historical section of the book is quite helpful as a concise summary of the Reformed tradition’s view(s) on theistic arguments. It is not necessary to repeat those here. There are, though, a few points worth not- ing. First, “By the end of the second phase of early orthodoxy the apologetic use of theistic arguments was deeply entrenched in Reformed theology” (p. 22). Sudduth also rightly points out that “[t]he Reformed countered the Arminian


position, no t by denying natural theology, bu t by underscoring the limits imposed by the effects of sin on the powers of human reason and consequendy the non-saving character of all natural knowledge of God. In fact, when Socin- ians rejected natural theology, Reformed theologians were quick to challenge their denial” (p. 43) !

Even Jonathan Edwards, who, Sudduth points out, clearly stipulates that “we first ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there must be an eternal cause . . . nevertheless maintains “that in fact all such knowledge depends on our moral temperament or the proper orientation of our passional nature. . . . So like many other Reformed thinkers, he viewed natural theology as operating most effectively in the context of the Christian life” (p. 29-30).

There was, however, a shift in thinking about theistic arguments that took place beginning (roughly) in the eighteenth century. According to Sudduth, the shift was “from Scripture to reason as the principium, cognoscendi theologiae. Consequently, natural theology acquired the status of a prolegomenon to revealed theology” (p. 31). This latter historical point is central and im portant in this entire discussion. According to Sudduth,

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Not only does Sudduth see Edwards as an exception to this shift, he also notes that some Reformed theologians in the nineteenth century escaped this Enlight- enm ent ethos as well. Notably, Hodge

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So also for the Southern Presbyterians, and for Shedd and Girardeau. They all “emphasized that theistic arguments are not the source of belief in God, nor do these argum ents presuppose that G od’s existence is in some sense initially doubtful” (p. 39). In the Dutch context, “Bavinck and Kuyper each affirm the importance of developing theistic arguments, and even using them in Christian apologetics. They simply deny their role as a pre-dogmatic foundation for faith. They do not reject them perse” (pp. 46-47).


It seems to me that Sudduth’s distinction between the dogmatic and pre- dogmatic use of theistic argum ents is not only conceptually helpful, but in general is an accurate way to ferret out some of the primary historical differences that obtain with respect, not necessarily to the structure of theistic arguments per se, but to their intended use and place for the Christian. For example, according to Richard Muller:

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Historically, therefore, there is, in the nascent stage of the Reformation, a significant and radical shift with respect to theological prolegomena, generally, and natural theology, more specifically. Because of the Reformed notion of the noetic effects of sin (of which more below), the Reformed saw a need to adjust the medieval notion of natural theology such that its conclusions, apart from the Christian context, were basically idolatrous. That is, the best that one could do, outside of Christ, with theistic arguments was to conclude for a god, who was not the true God of Christianity. This, I think, Sudduth captures well in his dogmatic/pre-dogmatic distinction. Just how exactly this might relate to the apologetic use of such arguments we will discuss in our “Reflections” below.

Complicating the issue, however, is not simply that the early Reformers, looking backwards, were compelled to revise the standard medieval prolegomena. It was also the case, looking forward, that the all-too-persistent pest of rationalism pressed its way back into Protestant discussions and articulations of prolegomena, and of natural theology. So, says Muller,

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Muller goes on to point out the transition that took place, in Germany and elsewhere, from the orthodoxy of F. Turretin, through the rationalizing tendencies of Pictet and J. A. Turretin, to the “necessity of a natural theology grounded in the proofs to any system of revealed theology” in Wolf and Wyttenbach.5 Thus, the dogmatic model of natural theology, including its apologetic use, is bounded on both historical sides by a rationalism that, in principle, underm ined that model. This, perhaps more than any other datum, accounts for what has come to be known as “the Reformed objection to natural theology.” But this should not detract from the fact, as Sudduth argues and as Muller explains, that there was, is, and can be a proper and biblical use o í theistic arguments within a robust, orthodox Reformed theology.

Sudduth points out that, with respect to the Reformed, the classic text in dis- eussions of this sort, Rom l:18ff., was rarely taken to affirm theistic arguments. Rather, the text is typically taken to affirm that all men have true knowledge of God by way of natural revelation. That natural knowledge may be “confirmed, clarified, and developed by theistic proofs” (p. 52). This confirmation, clarification, and development of theistic proofs, based as they are in the natural knowledge of God, includes an apologetic function.

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3. The Objections

In Part 2 of the book, Sudduth moves from historical considerations to an analysis of ju st what exacdy might constitute an objection to natural theology, given that all m en know God by way of natural revelation. How, then, are theistic arguments related to the natural knowledge of God in a way that might prove objectionable? In answering this question, we must first get straight another of Sudduth’s distinctions (pp. 58-59). Does the fact that natural knowledge of God is immediate bring about an objection to theistic arguments? Is it the case, in other words, that, given the universal knowledge of God, theistic arguments are either superfluous (i.e., irrelevant) or unable to give us a knowledge of God?

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The first option is Sudduth’s SI thesis. The SI thesis maintains that the immediate, natural knowledge of God is sufficient such that theistic arguments are superfluous, or irrelevant. Here the idea is that the knowledge of God that all m en have, as described for us in Rom 1, is sufficient for all; no theistic arguments are needed.

Perhaps I’ve missed something in Sudduth’s explanation of the SI thesis, but it is not clear to me just exactly what is m eant by the sufficiency o f the immediate natural knowledge of God. It is clear that what Sudduth means is “sufficient so that theistic arguments are irrelevant,” but this does not help with the notion of sufficiency itself. No one would argue that the knowledge of God given in natural revelation is all that is needed per se. That knowledge was always, from the beginning, m eant to go hand-in-hand with the knowledge of God given in special revelation. Moreover, as Scripture testifies in Rom 1, the immediate natural knowledge of God is sufficient (1) for knowledge and, therefore, (2) to render all m en inexcusable before God. Just exacdy how this sufficiency fits into Sud- duth’s notion is not clear. Fortunately, Sudduth proposes to focus on the second distinction.

Along with the SI thesis, there is also the notion that im m ediate natural knowledge of God is all that there is with respect to this kind of knowledge of God. There can be no other kind, or m ethod of acquisition, with respect to the natural knowledge of God. Thus, theistic arguments cannot provide knowledge of God; in Sudduth’s terms, given the immediate natural knowledge of God, theistic arguments cannot be epistemically efficacious. This latter distinction, since its focus is on the exclusivity of the immediate natural knowledge of God as alone epistemically efficacious, is denominated as the El thesis. So the question in this section centers around whether there is a Reformed notion of the natural knowledge of God that entails either SI or El, and thus constitutes a project objection to natural theology.

After analyzing three models with respect to the im planted knowledge of God—the Reformation model, the scholastic model, and the nineteenth-century theistic intuitionist model (e.g., Hodge, Shedd)—Sudduth concludes that none of them entails or implies either the SI or the El thesis. As a matter of fact, “ [The- istic arguments are] a desideratum because of the importance of a systematic doctrine of God, which requires the careful articulation of the contents of natural revelation. In this way, the project of [theistic arguments] is grounded in, not undercut by, the fact o f a naturally implanted knowledge of God” (p. 75).

There is, however, a significant and radical problem that needs to be addressed—the problem of sin. Sudduth, to his credit, devotes an entire section of the book to this problem.

Initially, Sudduth notes the Barthian assessment (of Calvin’s view) that the natural knowledge of God is completely eradicated by sin (p. 113). Given that such an assessment can be supported neither theologically nor exegetically, its conclusions can be ignored.

In his discussion of Calvin’s view of the natural knowledge of God, Sudduth contends that such knowledge, for Calvin, has both propositional content as


well as an affective/moral aspect to it (p. 114). In his analysis of Calvin’s sensus divinitatis, Sudduth argues that the noetic effects of sin have a detrimental effect on the propositional content of the knowledge of God. Such an effect, that “perhaps little more than knowledge that there is some creator and that he ought to be worshipped,” remains in man. Thus, “what all unregenerate minds grasp by nature is fairly general” (p. 117).

4. Sin, Warrant, and Knowledge

W ithout embarking on an exegesis o f Calvin at this point (more on this below), there are a couple of aspects to Sudduth’s discussion here that need more attention. First, we should recognize that Calvin’s understanding of the sensus divinitatis has its origins in (at least) Rom l:18ff. The question, then, according to Sudduth, has its focus on whether the Reformed view of total depravity is logically inconsistent with

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It is at this point in the discussion that things begin to become somewhat confused. Sudduth proposes to deal with the question of the noetic effects of sin byway of (at least) two suspect notions—suspect, that is, with respect to a biblical and theological understanding of Rom 1. The first suspect notion includes the idea that knowledge is true belief plus something else (e.g., justification or war- ran t). In order for one to know God, therefore, one must believe a true proposition with respect to God, and be justified or warranted in believing such a thing. The second suspect notion includes Sudduth’s adopting and adapting of “warrant” as that property, enough of which converts true belief into knowledge.

Discussions abound in philosophy and epistemology with respect to this understanding of knowledge. It arguably goes back to Plato, but has had such an ascendancy in the m odem period, and into the present, as to constitute the Law of the Medes and the Persians in epistemology. No (or few) serious epistemolo- gist would question the notion that knowledge is justified, or warranted, true belief (together with other codicils and qualifiers that need not detain us here). There are a host of questions and assumptions here. Is it the case, for example, that one mi«¿ have a belief and move, from there, to knowledge in order to know anything We will discuss this below in the “Reflections” section.

In this chapter on the noetic effects of sin, Sudduth proposes to “draw on the insights from contemporary epistemology to examine the prospects for a case against propositional natural knowledge of God based on the noetic effects of sin” (p. 125). Though the mode of discussion here, as m entioned above, takes the “justified (or warranted) true belief’ form and thus may not be as helpful overall in assessing the topic at hand, Sudduth’s explanation of reliability with respect to our cognitive processes is quite helpful, and worth quoting in full.

He broaches the reliability question in the context of what he calls a “Strong Unreliability Thesis.” That thesis is denominated as


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Here Sudduth describes what m ight be m eant by a reliable belief-producing process, or lack thereof:

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Because Sudduth wants to assess the relevance of the Reformed view of sin by way of concerns in contemporary epistemology, he discusses the relevance of [N] to externalist and internalist accounts of knowledge.

Two examples of externalist accounts of knowledge are mentioned—reliabilism and proper function. In both cases, the conjunction of each with [N] renders [K] false. That is, if reliabilism is true, for example, then [N ], which attempts to give an account of the noetic effects of sin, together with reliabilism will have to conclude that there is not, in fact, a reliable belief-producing process that obtains with respect to a belief in, or knowledge of, God. Thus, [K] is false.

With respect to intemalism, Sudduth highlights the Gettier-induced aspect of veritic luck with respect to epistemology (for his helpful discussion of this, see pp. 131-33). Because of this, any true proposition one might obtain could just as easily have been a false proposition. “Given [N] humans are not simply lucky to have the evidence they possess, they are lucky to get it right given the evidence they have. They might just as easily have acquired a false belief about God” (p. 133). The conclusion for internalism is the same as for externalism, “If [N] is true, there can be no prepositional natural knowledge of God for fallen, unregenerate persons” (p. 133).

The problem, however, may be with [N]. Sudduth proposes a modified version of [N], based on discussions of total depravity in Hoeksema, Masselink, and others. It may be the case that what is rejected in the Reformed notion of total depravity is inferential knowledge of God. Thus,

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In support of [N*], Sudduth turns to Bavinck and Berkhof. According to them (according to Sudduth), the difference between that knowledge of God which is implanted in us and that which is inferred is focused on our witL

If this is true, then we can begin to see how it can be that [N*] and [K] can be logically consistent. Since [K] is not specific with respect to the process of the knowledge of God that unregenerate persons possess, it can certainly be the case that the unregenerate can possess knowledge of God without that knowledge being inferred by them.

Not only so, but in his assessment of theistic proofs, Sudduth returns again to the question of whether there is a project objection to such proofs. “For example, the dogmatic conception of [theistic proofs] presupposes a theologia naturalis regenitorum, a natural theology of the regenerate” (p. 140). So, given that regen- eration serves to reverse the effects of sin in us, it can easily be argued that the implanted knowledge of God, together with the inferences from creation with respect to God, can combine in the Christian to produce true knowledge.

This may not be so with respect to all models of natural theology. Perhaps [N] or [N*] provides an objection to the apologetic use of theistic arguments (p. 141). This would be the case “only if the task of apologetics presupposes that rational inference is a source of knowledge of God in the unregenerate. But the apologetic presentation of theistic arguments need not involve this presupposition” (p. 141).

H ere Sudduth discusses the legitimacy of so-called negative apologetics— what might be called mere defense. In these kinds of arguments, one does not advocate for the truth of Christianity or Christian theism. Rather, one sets out to weaken, undermine, or otherwise subvert the objection or attack against Chris- tian theism. Sudduth quotes Bavinck (among others), “The arguments for the existence of God may be weak, but in any case they are stronger than those ad- vanced for its denial” (p. 141).

Also of importance is the way in which theistic arguments might be useful as supporting grounds for the knowledge of God that unregenerate people have. So, says Sudduth, “if we suppose that unregenerate persons have an intuitive knowledge of God, we can view theistic arguments as a way of adding warrant to antecedent religious convictions which have some warrant on grounds other than inference” (p. 142). This way of viewing theistic arguments is perfectly consistent with a Reformed apologetic approach and, perhaps, has been under-uti- lized in the contemporary Reformed context.

The final chapter in Part 3 is entitled, “The Dogmatic Model of Natural The- ology.” In this chapter, Sudduth discusses the reversal of the noetic effects of sin, and the influence of Scripture in the development of theistic arguments. Here he righdy notes one of the primary differences between the dogmatic model of theistic proofs/argum ents and the pre-dogmatic model.

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As Sudduth references a num ber of Reformed sources that affirm this view—in- eluding Lecerf, Kuyper, and Bavinck—he also brings Barth into this discussion. As noted above, Sudduth is aware of B runner’s and Barth’s anomalous status with respect to Reformed theology. Bringing in Barth’s critique at this point, therefore, serves to confuse the discussion. Given that Barth’s views of God and of Scripture are wholly unique and unorthodox, and not aligned with Reformed orthodoxy, to include him here is curious, at best.

O f particular interest in this chapter is Sudduth’s analysis of the interplay between truths revealed in Scripture and truths revealed in nature, especially as those truths relate to the discipline of apologetics. In a subheading entitled, “Functional Guidance,” Sudduth discusses the guidance of Scripture in the apologetic use of theistic arguments. He recognizes that 1 Pet 3:15 provides the biblical warrant for Christian apologetics, though it is not specific on what kinds of reasons one might provide. However, in “Acts 14 and 17 the Apostle Paul il- lustrâtes the apologetics use of theistic arguments. Here we find Paul reasoning with the Gentiles on the basis of observations from publicly observable phenom- ena and citing passages from Greek literature” (pp. 156-57). Though Paul does not, in these examples, try to prove the existence of God, he does seek to “make points about the nature of God and the implications of the nature of God for worship” (p. 157). Given that Scripture teaches that all m en know God, the purpose of theistic arguments “in the apologetic encounter is not so much to persuade the unbeliever of what she does not know but to bring to conscious- ness what she implicitly already knows. The apologist does not attempt to help the unbeliever reach God by way of reason, but rather he attempts to bring clarity to how God has already reached the unbeliever in the unbeliever’s own rational and moral constitution” (p. 157).

This, it seems, is a fair representation of the matter, though a comment or two will be offered below.

5. The Logic

In Part 4, Sudduth deals with “The Logic of Natural Theology.” Here, the os- tensive Reformed objection to natural theology targets the logic of the arguments themselves. In this context, theistic arguments are thought to be logically inadequate; they fail as demonstrations of the existence of God. This, according to Sudduth, has been the most prom inent objection to natural theology in the western philosophical tradition, as well as the Reformed tradition, since the eighteenth century (p. 167).

Sudduth notes a num ber of writers who have lodged objections to theistic arguments as proofs, among which are William Josiah Irons, Johannes Van Ooster- zee, A. Lecerf, L. Berkhof, H. Hoeksema, H. Bavinck, and Gordon Clark. All of


these reject the notion that theistic arguments are able to prove that the true God exists. Im portant in this discussion, as Sudduth notes, is that these authors seem to agree that “a proposition that has been logically demonstrated has extremely high epistemic credentials: proven in an irrefutable m anner (Irons), beyond all possible doubt (Berkhof), following necessarily from indisputable propositions (Van Oosterzee), possessing certainty analogous to mathematical proofs (Lecerf, Bavinck)” (p. 170). These high epistemic credentials also form the foundation for H um e’s and Kant’s refutation of theistic proofs, with which some of these Reformed authors agree.

Sudduth goes on to construct three propositions that constitute DAF, that is, a “demonstrative argum ent failure” with respect to theistic arguments: “(1) A proposition p is logically demonstrated just if it is a valid, non-circular inference from true and rationally compelling premises; (2) No theistic argum ent can satisfy the conditions of dem onstration stipulated in (1); and (3) No theistic argum ent constitutes a logical demonstration of the existence of God” (p. 171). He concludes that while DAF might constitute a good model objection to theistic arguments, it does not constitute a project objection.

But what if DAF is construed to be a project objection? It would then require

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Epistemic deficiency, according to Sudduth, relates directly to the degree of warrant conferred on the belief that p. If the basis is epistemically deficient, either no warrant is conferred on p, or there is not enough warrant so that the belief can be said to approach knowledge. Sudduth then turns to relate demonstration to inferential knowledge by way of

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Sudduth finds (5) to be implausible, especially given (a) the fact that we believe many inferentially derived propositions without restricting them to the conditions stipulated in (5), and (b) both internalist and externalist accounts of warrant deny (5) in their respective accounts.6

Most decisive with respect to DAF, however, is Sudduth’s third point, namely, “the project of [theistic argum ents] does n o t require tha t [they] confer enough warrant for knowledge” (p. 174). To p u t this m ore generically, we need not suppose that theistic arguments alone provide the requisite knowledge of God. Here Sudduth relies on an earlier distinction he made between theistic argum ents being either strongly or weakly epistemically loaded. If strongly epistemically loaded, then we should suppose that theistic arguments,

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in and of themselves, provide the requisite knowledge. But, if weakly epistemically loaded (which is all that is needed if the project o f natural theology is sustained), then theistic argum ents may supplement that which is already known or believed; they may be grounded in a way that does not require that they alone provide the requisite knowledge. “So the epistemic success of theistic arguments need not depend on such arguments being sufficient to produce knowledge of God” (p. 174).

Perhaps of more interest to those committed to Reformed theology is Sud- duth’s helpful analysis of some Reformed theologians who would, with him, affirm DAF, and who would also retain some value for theistic arguments. Here again Sudduth brings in Van Oosterzee, Berkhof, Lecerf, Bavinck, and others in order to show their support of theistic arguments, not as demonstrative arguments, but as testimonies to divine revelation. According to Sudduth, the Reformed objection to theistic arguments voiced by these theologians “is an objection to a particular model of [theistic arguments] which takes [them] to be logical demonstrations” (p. 176). Also, many of these Reformed thinkers who object to theistic arguments—thinkers such as Kuyper, Bavinck, and Berkhof—were objecting “to the pre-dogmatic model of [theistic argum ents]. The pre-dogmatic model, which came into prominence during the heyday of classical foundationalism, typically construed theistic arguments as demonstrative arguments especially where dog- matics came under the influence of Cartesian and Wolffian rationalism.” So, continues Sudduth, “the contention that theistic arguments do not constitute logical demonstrations should be viewed as part of a package critique of the pre-dogmatic model of natural theology” (p. 177).

There is much more to be said of Sudduth’s work, but space allows only two final points before we move to our reflections.

First, in a section dealing with an inductive approach to theistic arguments, Sudduth argues for a positive use of probable arguments. Specifically, with respect to an apologetic use of theistic arguments, he notes that one’s apologetic appeal to, say, evidences of God’s existence from creation (though such an appeal might conclude with the probability of theism), does not thereby attest to the ground of one’s actual belief in God. In other words, a probable argument for belief in God does not entail the notion that God only probably exists. “Hence, the Chris- tian’s use of probabilistic reasoning does not place the Christian in the position of undermining his own faith by carrying an implicit concession that '1. . . can only have probability with respect to Christian belief” (pp. 181-82).

Sudduth goes on to argue, in this case specifically against Cornelius Van Til, that an acknowledgment of the clarity of general revelation does not thereby rule out or otherwise negate the use of probable theistic arguments.

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Second, in what seems to me to be one of the least compelling sections of the book, Sudduth notes references by some Reformed theologians to the arguments of Hume and Kant. Sudduth critiques some of the Reformed objections to natural theology to the extent that they use or reference Kant and Hume. He thinks that in doing that they also set themselves up for denying knowledge altogether, or at least knowledge of God. But, typically in Reformed literature, the use of H um e/K ant is for purposes of showing that such proofs cannot be used or be helpful if they are based on an empiricist or Kantian epistemology, or one that resembles those. It is not that the Reformed are adopting H um e/K ant as their position in order then to dismiss theistic argument. Rather, they are advocating that a H um ean/Kantian epistemology will lead to the denial of a true, theistic argument. According to Van Til,

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In other words, what Hume and Kant have shown is that any attem pt to prove God’s existence based on their empirical (H um e), or semi-empirical (Kant), epistemology, will inevitably end badly. W ithout a Hum ean or Kantian epistemology, and in line with an epistemology based on revelation, we can affirm Sudduth,s contention: “But if the knowledge of infinite being is an intuitive truth or otherwise grasped immediately, inference simply does not have the burden of proving an infinite cause, only of linking our intuitive conception of infinite being with the being revealed in the cosmos. What this shows . . . is that the immediate knowledge of God can supplement theistic proofs” (p. 209).

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183IS THERE A REFORMED OBJECTION TO NATURAL THEOLOGV?

II. Reflections

Sudduth’s proposal is a modest one. He aims to show that, while there may be certain specific model objections to natural theology, there is no Reformed project objection to natural theology. It seems to me that he is successful in his proposal, and that his thesis will go a long way in clarifying such notions among analytic philosophers of religion. Among such philosophers, Sudduth has done what is rarely attempted. He has engaged the historical and theological literature that deals with the subject matter at hand, and has sought to understand the problem within its original context. He has not, as is often the case, taken the objection out of its theological context; he has not assumed that the objectors were themselves speaking the language of analytic philosophers. He gives due attention to the actual objections to natural theology, construes those objections properly, and then works with its principles, as an analytic philosopher. Because of his uniquely helpful approach, no philosopher of religion who deals with these particular matters will be able to do so without first understanding Sudduth’s argument. He has laid the groundwork for further discussion and debate on Reformed objections to natural theology. This book is needed for anyone who wants to interact deeply with natural theology.

My own concerns about the book center around what seems to me to be the central point of debate with respect to natural theology in the Reformed tradition, that is, the use of such arguments in apologetics. The point o f discussion in Reformed theology, historically and at present, and which Sudduth himself recognizes, has little interest in how natural theological arguments can be used by Christians—Sudduth’s “dogmatic” model. These are important questions and can be pursued with profit. But the question that evokes the most heat is the apologetic question—whether or not, and if so how, natural theological argu- m ents can be used in defense o f Reform ed Christianity. As we have seen, Sudduth does address these concerns in various places. Much of what he says is in line, generally speaking, with the Reformed tradition and is both accurate and very helpful. But there are emphases and aspects of this central apologetic question that could use more clarification and development. In the interest of space, I will discuss what I judge to be two primary, and interrelated, aspects of his thesis, as those aspects relate to the apologetic use of natural theology.

1. Natural Theology a and Image of God

The first aspect that needs a bit more clarification is Sudduth’s natural theology a , or the natural knowledge of God that comes to us by way of God’s revelation. Historically, we can affirm the following:

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*3V39M36 Y’3KMKWF 09E36 K] Y’3 9:’H3V3[3]YE K z *39EK]a 7’HE [ K63M JK_M6 9UU39* H] Y’3 3HW’Y33]Y’ :3]Y_*F _]63* Y’3 H[U9:Y K z OKMzzH9] *9YHK]9MHE[ 0_Y HY HE à_HY3 zK*3HW] YK Y’3 [ H]6 K z G*KY3EY9]Y K*Y’K6K&Fab

As Sudduth points out (p. 31), natural theology must have its p roper place within the context of revealed theology. It presupposes that theology and is able to thrive only in its light. Any use of natural theology for apologetic purposes, therefore, will need to take account of its proper place in order to its proper use. So far, so good.

However, as Sudduth recognizes in various places, the proper use of natural theology will require a proper understanding of the sensus divinitatis, as that is given to us, most explicitly, in Rom 1:18ff. The sensus divinitatis is itself central to Sudduth’s notion of natural knowledge of God (i.e., his natural theology a ), and, given that it provides a proper foundation for theistic arguments, must take its proper place in terms of Scripture’s teaching on the matter. Perhaps some clarification here will help advance our understanding of the apologetic use of natural theology.

First, contrary to Sudduth’s claim, the notion of man made in God’s image is crucial to anything else we might say about the sensus divinitatis, specifically, and knowledge in general. Sudduth thinks an appeal to the doctrine of man as image in the context of the natural knowledge of God is a “dubious assumption,” an “unhelpful digression from the question of whether the effects of sin render our rational faculties epistemically im potent” (pp. 125-26). On the contrary, the truth that man is image of God is neither dubious nor a digression with respect to m an’s knowledge of God, but is determinative for that knowledge and the effects that it produces in us.

Calvin, for example, in line with the structure of Paul’s epistle to the Romans,9 begins the Institutes this way:

-Y HE :3*Y9H] Y’9Y [ 9] ]3V3* 9:’H3V3E 9 :M39* —]KJM36W3 Kz ’H[E3Mz _]M3EE ’3 ’9E zH*EY MKK—36 _UK ] T K6#E z9:3r 9]6 Y’3] 63E:3]6E z*K[ :K]Y3[ UM9YH]W ’H[ YK E:*_YH]HD3 ’H[E3Mz tdadaRha I _* —]KJM36W3 E’K_M6 E3*V3 zH*EY YK Y39:’ _E z39* 9]6 *3V3*3]:3l E3:' K]6MFr JHY’ HY 9E K_* W_H63 9]6 Y39:’3*r J3 E’K_M6 M39*] YK E33— 3V3*F WKK6 z*K[ ’H[ tdaRaRha 2H]:3r Y’3*3zK*3r [ 3] K]3 9]6 9MM U3*:3HV3 Y’9Y Y’3*3 HE 9 TK6 9]6 Y’9Y ’3 HE Y’3H* B9—3*r Y’3F 9*3 :K]63[ ]36 0F Y’3H* KJ] Y3EYH[K]F 03:9_E3 Y’3F ’9V3 z9HM36 YK ’K ] K * ’H[ 9]6 YK :K]E3:*9Y3 Y’3H* MHV3E YK ’HE JHMM tdafadha BHE3*90M3 [ 3] 6K ]K Y *HE3 90KV3 Y’3[E3MV3E 9E Y’3F E’K_M6r 0_ Y [39E_*3 ’H[ 0F Y’3 F9*6EYH:— K z Y’3H* KJ] :9*]9M EY_UH6HYFr 9]6 ]3WM3:Y EK_]6 H]V3EYHW9YHK]l Y’_E K_ Y K z :_*HKEHYF Y’3F zMF Kzz H]YK 3[UYF EU3:_M9YHK]E tdamadha 13Y ’3]:3 HY 9UU39*E Y’9Y Hz [ 3] J3*3 Y9_W’Y K]MF 0F ]9Y_*3r Y’3F

b (H:’9*6 ?a B_MM3*r TbxáSWV:b-Duá9bG WV:b-DVB Pb2Duá9Rxp v0V W9xV uGB PV7VCbkDVGá b: WV:b-DVB m-á0bBbjI. Ruc tlOo áb Ruc t'Ol. VKMa d u T-bCV2bDVGu áb v0VbCb2I tT*9]6 (9UH6Eu N9—3*r R**fhr fRfa

n .K* 9] 3&Y3]636 6HE:_EEHK] Kz Y’3 EY*_:Y_*3 9]6 :K]Y3]Y Kz Y’3 03WH]]H]W Kz ;9MVH]#E gGxá9á1áVx 9]6 HYE *3M9YHK]E’HU YK Y’3 0KK— Kz (K[9]Er E33 Aa 2:KYY IMHU’H]Yr "? G*H[9M 9]6 2H[UM3 A]KJM36W3rí H] h v0VbCb29RuC e19BV áb suC79GNx gGxá9á1áVxp rxxuIx uGB hGuCIx9x t36a x9VH6 ,9MM 9]6 G3Y3* ?a vHMM09:—l G’HMMHUE0_*Wr Cawau G*3E0FY3*H9] s (3zK*[36r R**bha


JK_M6 ’KM6 YK ]KY’H]W :3*Y9H] K * EKMH6 K * :M39*':_Yr 0_ Y JK_M6 03 EK YH36 YK :K]z_E36 U*H]:HUM3E 9E YK JK*E’HU 9] _]—]KJ] WK6 tdapadRhad*

If we read the subject matter of chapters 1-5 of the Institutes through the lens of Romans, it is evident that Rom 1:18fF. determines the order and content of these initial chapters in the Institutes. Why, given these verses, does Calvin begin with the mutual dependence of knowledge of God and knowledge of self? One expia- nation would be that Calvin has in mind here, implicitly, ju st exacdy what the apostle Paul has in mind in these verses in Romans, that is, the image of God. This point seems clear enough, especially since Calvin reiterates this twofold knowledge later in the Institutes as he begins to discuss the image of God:

O3 [ _EY ]KJ EU39— Kz Y’3 R-Vuá9bG b: DuGc ]K Y K]MF 03:9_E3 9[ K]W 9MM T K6#E JK*—E ’3*3 HE Y’3 ]K0M3EY 9]6 [KEY *3[9*—90M3 3&9[UM3 K z ’HE q_EYH:3r JHE6K[r 9]6 WKK6]3EEl 0_Y 03:9_E3r 9E J3 E9H6 9Y Y’3 03WH]]H]Wr EV RuGGbá 0u7V u RCVu- uGB RbDkCVáV $GbECVB2V b : ebB 1GCVxx 9á 9x uRRbDkuG9VB ,I u Rb--VxkbGB9G2 $GbECVB2V b : b1-xVC7Vxcdd t3[U’9EHE [H]3h

The reason, in other words, that God’s wrath is revealed, and that all people know God, is because man is made in the image of God. Though Paul does not state this explicitly in this section of Romans, there can be little doubt that what Paul is describing here is an essential part of what it means to be image of God.12 It is just because we are image that we know God, and it is our reaction to that knowledge that motivates God’s wrath toward those who remain in Adam. As image, it is impossible to know ourselves aright without, at the same time, knowing the One whose image we are. Calvin reiterates this point in his comments on Acts 17:28:

CKJr J3 E33 Y’9Y 9MM Y’KE3 J’K —]KJ ]K Y TK6 —]KJ ]K Y Y’3[E3MV3El 03:9_E3 Y’3F ’9V3 TK6 U*3E3]Y JHY’ Y’3[ ]KY K]MF H] Y’3 3&:3MM3]Y WHzYE Kz Y’3 [H]6r 0_ Y H] Y’3H* V3*F 3E' E3]:3l 03:9_E3 HY 03MK]W36S YK TK6 9MK]3 YK 03r 9MM KY’3* Y’H]WE ’9V3 Y’3H* 03H]W H] ’H[ adf

d* ?MM à_KY9YHK]E 9*3 z*K[ wK’] ;9MVH]r gGxá9á1áVx b: á0V s0-9xá9uG WVC929bG t36a wK’] 7a B:C3HMMl Y*9]Ea .K*6 v3JHE N9YYM3El G’HM963MU’H9u O3EY[H]EY3*r dnj*ha

dd -0H6ar dadpadadR ?MM_EHK]E H] Y’HE E3:YHK] Kz (K[9]E YK Y’3 :*39YHK] 9::K_]Y 9*3 ]_[3*K_Er E_:’ Y’9Y Y’3*3 :9]

03 ]K à_3EYHK] Y’9Y G9_M ’9E Y’9Y 9::K_]Y H] [H]6a CKY3r 3aWar ;9MVH]#E :K[[3]Y K] (K[ dudbu "?]6 ’3 0*H]WEr 9E Y’3 zH*EY U*KKz Kz :K]63[]9YHK]r Y’3 z9:YrωY’9Y Y’K_W’ Y’3 EY*_:Y_*3 Kz Y’3 JK*M6r 9]6 Y’3 [KEY 039_YHz_M 9**9]W3[3]Y Kz Y’3 3M3[3]YEr K_W’Y YK ’9V3 H]6_:36 [9] YK WMK*HzF TK6r F3Y ]K K]3 6HE:’9*W36 ’HE U*KU3* 6_YFí twK’] ;9MVH]r sbDDVGáu-I bG á0V rk9xáCV b: Tu1C á0V hkbxáCV áb á0V WbDuGx P36a ,3]*F N3V3*H6W3l ;72l T*9]6 (9UH6Eu N9—3*r dncnhr jcl 9]6 K] dudnr "NF E9FH]Wr Y’9Y TK6 ’9E [963 HY [9]Hz3EYr ’3 [39]Er Y’9Y [9] J9E :*39Y36 YK 03 9 EU3:Y9YK* Kz Y’HE zK*[36 JK*M6r 9]6 Y’9Y 3F3E J3*3 WHV3] ’H[r Y’9Y ’3 [HW’Yr 0F MKK—H]W K] EK 039_YHz_M 9 UH:Y_*3r 03 M36 _U YK Y’3 ?_Y’K* ’H[E3Mz# tH0H6ar c*ha .K* 9 6HE:_EEHK] Kz G9_M#E 9MM_EHK]E YK :*39YHK]r E33 Aa 2:KYY IMHU’H]Yr "7’3 -**9YHK]9MHYF Kz 8]03MH3zrí H] WV7VCuá9bG uGB WVuxbGp yVE rxxuIx 9G WV:b-DVB hkbCb2Vá9Rx t36a Aa 2:KYY IMHU’H]Y 9]6 v9]3 Ta 7HUYK]l G’HMMHUE0_*Wr Cawau G*3E0FY3*H9] s (3zK*[36r R**chr pn'cfa

dfwK’] ;9MVH]r sbDDVGáu-I bG á0V hRáx b: á0V hkbxáCVx t36a ,3]*F N3V3*H6W3l R VKMEal ;72l T*9]6 (9UH6Eu N9—3*r dncnhr Rudjb'jna


Thus, we see the necessary affirmation of Calvin that the two “knowledges” are inextricably linked. They are inextricably linked because m an is ineradicably and eternally image of God.14

This emphasis on image is highlighted by Bavinck as well. With respect to our natural knowledge of God, Bavinck notes: “And humans, having been created in the divine image, were gifted with the capacity to receive the impressions of this revelation and thereby to acquire some sense and knowledge of the Eternal Being.”15

The reason it is crucial and central in any discussion on the natural knowledge of God to emphasize the relationship of man as image of God to that knowledge is that the notion of image is a fundamental ontological notion with respect to our identity as hum an beings. W ithout detailing the discussion here, it is the fact that we are image that makes us either covenant-breakers or covenant-keepers; it is image in man that renders man a covenant being. It is the fact that we are image that entails our eternal existence, either in the new heaven and the new earth, or in hell. It is the fact that we are image that entails the fact that we all, from the fall and into eternity, reside either under God’s wrath, if we remain in Adam, or under his grace, if we are in Christ. Underlying the entirety of our existence, therefore, including our knowledge of God and everything else, is the fact that we are and will forever remain, image of God. To put the m atter philosophically, there is no possible world in which we could be human and not be image of God.16 W hat this means, as we will see, is that there is no possible world in which a hum an being, as image, can know something and not know the true and living God.

2. Sensus as Knowledge

For Sudduth, however, perhaps because the image of God is thought to be tangential to a discussion of natural knowledge of God, the sensus divinitatis, in places in the book, takes its place within the context of current analytic discussions in epistemology.17 Not only so, but Sudduth indicates that the knowledge given by way of natural revelation is minimal (e.g.,see pp. 114-16). Both of these notions may fit well within the context o f analytic philosophy, bu t they seem to do an injustice to a biblical and theological discussion of the natural knowledge of God.18

dm -z J3 Y’H]—r YK _E3 K]3 3&9[UM3r Kz 9 [H**K* H[9W3r Y’3 H[9W3 H] Y’3 [H**K* HE 63U3]63]Y zK* HYE V3*F 03H]W 9]6 3&HEY3]:3 K] Y’3 *39MHYF Y’9Y EY9]6E 03zK*3 HYa CKY K]MF EKr 0_Y HY HE 63zH]36 9]6 HYE U*KU3*YH3E 9*3 63Y3*[H]36 9::K*6H]W YK Y’9Y *39MHYFa 2K HY HE JHY’ [9]a -zr U3* H[UKEEH0M3r Y’3 *39MHYF tTK6h J3*3 3V3* *3[KV36 z*K[ _Er J3 JK_M6 :39E3 YK 3&HEYa ;K]V3*E3MFr K_* "*39MHYFí HE E_:’ K]MF H] Y’3 MHW’Y Kz ’HEa

dp ,3*[9] N9VH]:—r WV:b-DVB Pb2Duá9Rx. VKMa Ru ebB uGB s-Vuá9bG t36a wK’] NKMYl Y*9]EawK’] )*H3]6l T*9]6 (9UH6Eu N9—3* ?:963[H:r R**mhr cfl [F 3[U’9EHEa

dj ?EE_[H]Wr Kz :K_*E3r Y’9Y UKEEH0HMHYF HE H]63&36 YK 9:Y_9MHYFr 9]6 Y’9Y TK6 HE HYE 9_Y’K*adc ?Y M39EY H] EK[3 UM9:3Ea 2_66_Y’ 6K3E 9zzH*[ Y’9Y J’9Y G9_M Y39:’3E H] (K[ d HE Y’9Y Y’3*3 HE

xbDV tY’K_W’ E:9]Yh —]KJM36W3 Kz TK6adb B_:’ Kz Y’3 [9Y3*H9M H] Y’3 ]3&Y z3J U9*9W*9U’E HE 9] 36HY36 V3*EHK] Y9—3] z*K[ IMHU’H]Yr "7’3

-**9YHK]9MHYF Kz 8]03MH3zaí .K* Y’3 [K*3 :K[UM3Y3r 3&3W3YH:9M :K]:3*]E Kz Y’HE Y3&Yr E33 Y’9Y 9*YH:M3a


As Paul begins his discussion of the revelation of God’s wrath from heaven,19 he has two primary aspects of that wrath in view—the cause and the effects. He gives the universal scope of the cause itself in v. 18. God’s wrath is revealed from heaven “against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of m en, who by their unrighteousness suppress the tru th .” It is ungodliness and unrighteousness against which God’s wrath is revealed. But Paul goes on to define, in a striking way, just what it is that motivates God’s wrath toward all who are in Adam, all who are covenant-breakers. He introduces a specificity to this unrighteousness; it is an unrighteousness that is defined essentially as a suppression of the truth.

Verse 18, then, is a general announcem ent of the fact that God’s wrath is revealed, and of the reason for that wrath. The cause of God’s wrath toward us is our unrighteous suppression of the truth. In other words, God’s wrath is revealed from heaven because, in our wickedness and unrighteousness (in Adam), we hold down (in our souls) that which we know to be the case.20 Within the context o f this general announcem ent, however, Paul knows that he has introduced two concepts, suppression and truth, that will necessarily need clarification. In w. 19-23 (and, to some extent, v. 25 as well), Paul develops and amplifies the notions of “suppression” and of “truth.”

If we take w. 18-32 as a unit,21 we can see how Paul puts flesh on his (so far skeletal) notion of “truth” as he reiterates what he means by truth in w. 19, 20, 23, and 32 (with v. 25 simply repeating the notion of “the truth of God”) . In each of these verses, Paul gives more specificity to the concept of truth mentioned in v. 18. We shall take these verses together in order to understand what Paul means by “the truth” which is suppressed.

In v. 19, Paul tells us that by “tru th” he means “that which is known about God.” The truth that is suppressed, therefore, is specifically truth about God. The way in which we come to know this truth is two-fold. We come to know it, in the first place, because it is evident in or among us. Paul will expand this idea in the next verse. Before that, however, he wants us to understand just how this truth, this knowledge of God is evident, or clear, among us.

This is vitally im portant for Paul. It is vitally im portant both because Paul is concerned with God’s activity in revealing himself (more specifically, his wrath), and because Paul wants to highlight the contrast between what God is doing in this revelation, on the one hand, and what we (in Adam) do with it, on the other.

dn 7’3 J*9Y’ Kz TK6 z*K[ ’39V3] t9E H] "Y’3 *HW’Y3K_E]3EE Kz TK6íh E’K_M6 03 E33] 9E Y’9Y J’H:’ :K[3E z*K[ TK6 YK ’HE :*39Y_*3Er *3E_MYH]W H] Y’3 3zz3:YE J’H:’ G9_M JHMM K_YMH]3 H] Ja Rm'fRa

R* 7’3 JK*6 Y*9]EM9Y36 "E_UU*3EEí ’3*3 HE Y’3 U9*YH:HUH9M zK*[ Kz Y’3 V3*0 ~«¡/ÄÅa 7’HE V3*0 :9] [39] E_UU*3EEr 0_Y HY :9] 9MEK 03 Y*9]EM9Y36 "UKEE3EEí K* "*3Y9H]ao O’HM3 "E_UU*3EEí HE Y’3 03EY Y*9]E!9' YHK] Kz Y’HE V3*0r WHV3] Y’9Y Y’3 H]EY*_[3]Y Kz Y’HE 9:YHVHYF HE K_* _]*HW’Y3K_E]3EEr HY E33[E MH—3MF 9E J3MM Y’9Y J3 E’K_M6 H]:M_63r 9MK]W JHY’ Y’HE E_UU*3EEHK]r Y’3 ]KYHK]E Kz *3Y3]YHK] 9]6 UKEE3EEHK]a 7’3*3 HEr U3*’9UEr ’3*3 9 U_*UKE3z_M 9[0HW_HYF E_:’ Y’9Y 9MM 9EU3:YE Kz Y’HE V3*0 9*3 [39]Y YK 03 H]:M_636a G9_M#E KJ] 9]9MFEHE Kz E_UU*3EEHK] JHMM ]3:3EE9*HMF H]:M_63 Y’3 z9:Y Y’9Y Y’3 Y*_Y’ Y’9Y J3 E_UU*3EE J3 ]3V3*Y’3M3EE :K]YH]_3 YK *3Y9H] 9]6 UKEE3EEa

Rd 7K 0*39— Y’3 U9EE9W3 Kzz 9Y Va fR HE EK[3J’9Y 9*YHzH:H9M EH]:3 :*_:H9M 9EU3:YE Kz G9_M#E 9*W_[3]Y :K]YH]_3 H] :’Ea R 9]6 fa .K* K_* U_*UKE3E ’3*3r ’KJ3V3*r J3 ]336 ]KY WK 03FK]6 Y’3 zH*EY :’9UY3*a


So, Paul says immediately (even before he explains the sweeping scope of that which is evident am ong us) that the reason that G od’s revelation is evident among us is that God has made it evident to us.

We should be clear here about Paul’s emphasis. What Paul is concerned to deny, in this context, is that we, in our sins, as covenant-breakers in Adam, would ever, or could ever, produce or properly infer this truth that we have, this knowledge of God, in and of ourselves. Paul wants to make sure that we are not tempted to think that the truth of God, as evident among us, is evident because we have marshaled the right arguments or have set our minds in the proper di- rection. His point, at least in part, in this entire section, is to rem ind us of the devastating effects sin continues to have on our thinking (in Adam). The truth that we know, that we retain, possess, and suppress, therefore, is truth that is, fundamentally and essentially, given by God to us. God is the One who ensures that this truth will get through to us. It is his action, not ours, that guarantees our possession of this truth.

The truth which we all, as creatures in Adam, know and suppress is a truth about God. Even more specifically (v. 20), it is a truth concerning the “invisible things” of God, that is, his eternal power and deity. These words are categories that are m eant to envelope a host o f divine attributes. What might Paul mean by this description? While it is perhaps not possible to be absolutely definitive, it seems that Charles Hodge is right in his assertion that what Paul has in mind here are “all the divine perfections.”22 Had Paul wanted to limit his description, he would more likely have delineated just exacdy what characteristics of God were known through creation. This notion of a fuller and deeper knowledge of God moves much further than what Sudduth wants to affirm. He has precedence in his affirmation, but it does not easily comport with the biblical teaching on this matter.

This truth that we all know, then, is the truth of God’s existence, infinity, eternity, immutability, glory, wisdom, and so forth .23 As Paul is developing this thought in v. 23, he speaks of this knowledge of the truth as “the glory of the in- corruptible God.” It is this that we all know as creatures of God. It is this that God gives, and that we necessarily “take,” as knowledge, that comes to us by virtue of his natural revelation.

There are two im portant aspects to this knowledge of God that are crucial to see. First, we should be clear about the context for this knowledge. It is not

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Rf ?E 9 [9YY3* Kz z9:Yr HY JK_M6 03 6HzzH:_MY YK H[U*KV3 K] Y’3 O3EY[H]EY3* v9*W3* ;9Y3:’HE[#E 63E:*HUYHK] Kz TK6 ti ch 9E 9] 9UY 63E:*HUYHK] Kz J’9Y J3 —]KJ 0F VH*Y_3 Kz TK6#E ]9Y_*9M *3V3M9YHK]u "TK6 HE 9 2UH*HYr H] 9]6 Kz ’H[E3Mz H]zH]HY3 H] 03H]Wr WMK*Fr 0M3EE36]3EEr 9]6 U3*z3:YHK]l 9MM'E_zzH:H3]Yr 3Y3*]9Mr _]:’9]W390M3r H]:K[U*3’3]EH0M3r 3V3*F J’3*3 U*3E3]Yr 9M[HW’YFr —]KJH]W 9MM Y’H]WEr [KEY JHE3r [KEY ’KMFr [KEY q_EYr [KEY [3*:Hz_M 9]6 W*9:HK_Er MK]W'E_zz3*H]Wr 9]6 90_]69]Y H] WKK6]3EE 9]6 Y*_Y’aí 7’HE 6K3E ]KYr Kz :K_*E3r [39] Y’9Y 3V3*F H]6HVH6_9M —]KJE 39:’ 9]6 3V3*F K]3 Kz Y’3E3 :’9*9:Y3*HEYH:E Kz TK6 9Y 9MM YH[3Ea O’9Y HY 6K3E [39] HE Y’9Y Y’3F 9*3 9MM *3V39M36 H] 9]6 Y’*K_W’ :*39YHK]a G9_M 63[K]EY*9Y3E ’KJ K]3 [HW’Y 9UUMF Y’HE *3V3M9YHK]9M —]KJM36W3 Kz TK6 H] ’HE ?3*3KU9W_E 966*3EE H] ?:YE dcudj'fma


knowledge in the abstract of which Paul speaks. He is speaking here of a knowledge that ensues on the basis of a real relationship. It is not the kind of knowledge we might get through reading about someone or something in a book or in the newspaper. The text o f Romans is referring to relational, covenantal knowledge. It is knowledge that comes to us because, as creatures of God made in his image, we are, always and everywhere, confronted with God himself. We are, even as we live in God’s world every day, set squarely before the face of the God who made us, and in whom we live, and move and exist. This, then, is decidedly personal knowledge. It is knowledge from a Person (the Triune God), to a person (us), and of a person, of the Person whom we have come to know by virtue of his constant and consistent revealing of himself to us.

This personal aspect o f the knowledge that we have is made all the m ore prom inent in v. 32. This verse serves as a transition between Paul’s exposition of God’s wrath revealed in ch. 1, and the natural revelation of God’s law in ch. 2. Notice that Paul can affirm that those who are in Adam “know the ordinance of God.” This knowledge of the ordinance of God is coterminous with our knowledge of God. To know God, in the way that Paul is affirming here, is to know (at least som ething of) his requirem ents. Along with the knowledge of God, in o ther words, comes the knowledge “that those who practice such things are worthy of death.” Instead of repenting, however, we, in Adam, rejoice in our disobedience and attem pt to gather together others who share in our rebellion. Therefore, because this knowledge is a relational knowledge, and because the relationship is between God and his hum an creatures, God ensures that we all know that the violations of his law in which we, in Adam, willingly and happily participate are capital offenses; they place us under the penalty of death. O ur knowledge of God is a responsible, covenantal knowledge which brings with it certain demands of obedience (e.g., Rom 2:4).

Second, Paul is emphatic about the fact that this knowledge of God that we have is abundantly clear and is understood. There is no obscurity in God’s revelation. It is not as though God masks himself in order to keep himself hidden from his hum an creatures.24 The problem with the natural revelation of God, and on this we need to be as clear as possible, is not from God’s side, but from ours.

With the preceding discussion in mind, and in the background, we can move to the material in Rom 1 that bears more directly on what we might call the irrationality of unbelief (this notion of irrationality will be a related point in our discussion of probability below). In clarifying what is m eant by “truth” in v. 18, Paul, at the same time, begins to clarify what he means when he says that, in Adam, we suppress that truth. It is this suppression that is the cause of, and the impetus behind, the irrationality that is our sin.

As Paul is explaining what he means by “truth,” he is also pouring content into the notion of “suppression” that he introduced in v. 18. It is in w. 22, 23, and 25

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that we see Paul explaining just what suppression is. What we immediately notice in these verses is that the notion of suppression is characterized by what Paul calls an exchange. The suppression, which is part and parcel of our own sinful- ness, is worked out, says Paul, by the fact that we take this glory of God (which is the truth we have from him) and exchange it for an image.25

This begins to explain the utter irrationality of creatures who remain in Adam. We have, as creatures m ade in God’s image, the tru th of God. To use Paul’s strong and decisive terminology, we know God.26 We have this knowledge of the truth by virtue of his (merciful) revelation to us. This knowledge of God comes to us through everything that God has made (which is as universal as one can imagine since it includes everything but God himself). Yet, instead of acknowledging God’s revelation, instead of honoring him and giving thanks, we twist and pervert it, turning it into (exchanging it for) something false, a lie, something of our own imagining, something that we ourselves have invented. We take this truth, which should cause us to bow down and worship God, and we fashion it into an idol. It is necessarily the case, then, that all o f us, in Adam, are experts in utter self-deception with respect to God, opting for lies and inventing idols.

We should remember here that our idolatry stems, not from ignorance, nor from a futile attempt to fill a void in our lives. It results, always, from a perversion of the truth, a twisting of reality.27 It stems from denying “the way things are” and attempting to create a world of our own making. It is idolatry, therefore, which lies at the root of our sin, and thus at the root of our irrationality. In Adam, we convince ourselves that what we know to be the case is actually not the case. What we necessarily understand, we sinfully attem pt to hold down. We willfully exchange our true knowledge of God, which he graciously gives, for false gods, lies, and images.

Enough has been said about Scripture’s teaching in Rom 1 to mention some initial concerns about some of Sudduth’s formulations. At points, Sudduth vacil- lates between the natural knowledge of God as knowledge, on the one hand, and as belief, on the other. For example, in a discussion of Plantinga’s epistemological model, Sudduth notes:

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Sudduth affirms in other places that the sensus divinitatis is itself knowledge. Why the differences? Why affirm that it is knowledge, but also think it plausible that it

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produces something less than firm belief in some people? This is likely because, in his use of analytic epistemology, no real categories exist for what Scripture is teaching us in Rom 1 and elsewhere. Epistemology, of late and historically, has bound itself to an understanding of knowledge such that it must always include its lesser cousin, belief. But we need to be all the more clear here that what God is telling us in Rom 1 is decidedly opposed to any notion of mere, or “less than firm,” belief; and it is opposed to defining all knowledge as (some version of) justified true belief.

It seems to me high time, however, if one is concerned to articulate a decidedly Christian epistemology,28 to recognize the efiistemobgical importance of man as image of God and, thus, the knowledge of God that comes to all by way of natural revelation. Because this knowledge includes at least the following characteristics, a Christian epistemology should take these points as central to its development. With respect to the natural knowledge of God, as it comes to us by way of creation, we should affirm:

(1) It is clear. As Rom 1 indicates, this knowledge that we have of God is such that it renders us inexcusable before God (v. 20). If it was ambiguous, o r produced a “less than firm belief in God,” we would have an excuse before him.

(2) It is true. The knowledge that we have need not, and does not, sift through the philosophical paradigm of justified, or warranted, true belief. It does not partake of the notion of belief at all, but it comes to us, through all that is made, as knowledge. And because God is the one who implants this knowledge within us such that we are, in Adam, without excuse, there is no possibility of error for us. No one will be able to stand before God in judgm ent and say they were mistaken on what God revealed to them through creation. As with his special revelation, his natural revelation hits its mark every time.

(3) It entails knowledge of creation. It is God’s activity that ensures that we, always and everywhere, know him, but it is also that activity that ensures that we will know his creation; it is through that creation, and because of it that we know what we do know about God.

(4) It is non-propositional. The knowledge that we have of God, given Paul’s description of it, could, perhaps, be better characterized as (what Bertrand Russell called) a “knowledge by acquaintance.” W ithout inheriting the attendant problems of Russell’s category, we can at least affirm that what Romans is teaching us is that we have this knowledge just by virtue of the fact that we live and move in God’s world, a world in which he is perpetually and in every place making himself known to us in such a way that we intuitively, always and everywhere, know him. Because God is always and everywhere present to us, dynamically revealing himself and his character, we are always and everywhere “acquainted” with him, even if we devote ourselves to an instant and constant suppression of that knowledge. This does not mean that such knowledge cannotbe prepositional;

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it only means that it need not be and likely is not in its initial im planting by God (cognitio ínsita).

(5) It is universal There has never been a time, nor will there be, even in eternity, when God’s human creatures do not know him. Because entailed in being image of God is knowledge of God, all humans will always and in all places know him.

(6) It is the catalyst for self-deception for all who remain in Adam. This last point is serious, but we have neither the time nor space to develop it. At this point, we need only note that that which provides the ground for our knowledge is both known and denied by any who are no t redeem ed in Christ. This means that any notion of proper function in epistemology needs some significant revision and fine-tuning if it is going to be used at all in these discussions.

These five points (and there are likely others) with respect to knowledge could go a long way in revising and articulating just what human knowledge is, at least initially. What is sometimes sought by philosophers in epistemology is a “clear and distinct idea” such that one can begin to explain just how it is that humans know anything at all. If the exposition of Rom 1 above is correct, that “clear and distinct idea” is actually clear and distinct knowledge of God. And, as we have said, because such knowledge comes through the things that are made, entailed in this knowledge of God is knowledge of the creation through which it is given. Such knowledge comes from the outside, in. It is not self-produced, nor does it originate with us. Rather, it forms the foundation for anything and everything else that we know, and it places knowledge within its proper context—the context o f God revealing himself to his hum an creatures, always and everywhere, throughout all o f history and into eternity. In other words, whereas virtually all of philosophical epistemology wants to begin with beliefs and attempts to move from there to a notion of knowledge, it seems the better way to begin is with true, clear, and universal knowledge, given by God, which then provides the foundation for anything else that we claim to believe or know.29

This notion of the natural knowledge of God may not radically affect much of what Sudduth has proposed and argued in his book. Much of what he says is consistent with what we have detailed above. What it may do, perhaps, is call into question an epistemological model that attempts to adapt a notion of warrant and proper function for its exposition of knowledge generally, and of knowledge of God, more specifically.

3. A Probable Problem

The second aspect of Sudduth’s proposal, worthy of much more discussion than can be given here, is his notion of the legitimate employment or use of

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probability in the apologetic presentation of theistic arguments. We have noted this above, but in order to get the central idea of Sudduth’s contention, it will be helpful to set out his reasoning:

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It is no t possible to know exactly what Sudduth means here by “probabilistic reasoning.” The literature is replete with differences about just what probability is, in various circumstances, and how it m ight be employed. So, it may be that our discussion below is wide of the mark of what Sudduth means to affirm. It may be the case that, like Joseph Buder, for example, Sudduth is using the notion in a more generic way such that more precision is not immediately needed. In any case, given the importance of this discussion in apologetics, it deserves at least an initial attempt at clarification.

Given that the entire discussion in this book is on natural theology, it is likely that by “probabilistic reasoning” Sudduth has in mind, at least, arguments that seek to demonstrate the relationship of available evidence to one’s belief or dis- belief in God. Perhaps, for example, as some have argued, the existence of so much evil in the world offers powerful evidence against God’s existence. Some would say, then, that the existence of God is unlikely or improbable with respect to the evidence of evil in the world. So, while it may not be that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of God, it could be that the presence of evil offers strong evidential support against the existence of God, or it points to a low probability that God exists. Perhaps one approach to such an objection, as advocated by Sudduth, would be to set forth theistic arguments in such a way that they are probable rather than demonstrable, or certain, with respect to theism. Sudduth presumably wants to affirm that arguments that are only able to con- elude for the probability of God’s existence may, nevertheless, be useful natural theological arguments in cases like this. Perhaps, as he indicates, theistic arguments, even if probable, can go a long way toward supporting what people know, but deny or suppress, with respect to God. Is this a tenable apologetic notion for a Reformed, Covenantal approach?

It should be noted, as we attem pt to answer that question, that probability is a notoriously difficult notion to pin down or precisely delineate in situations like these. Though it may be the case that a specific probability calculus is ex- act in its own formulations, the content poured into such equations can be


elusive. There are (at least) three kinds of probability that could be (more or less) relevant to this kind of discussion. It may be helpful to take note of them as we think about the evidential (or probable) objection to, or arguments for, belief in God.

The first kind of probability might be called frequency probability. Here probability is determ ined by the frequency of truths in certain reference classes. The reference class chosen is relative to the person’s noetic structure or set of beliefs. And there is no reason to think that the theist and atheist or nontheist have the same noetic structure. I judge that this is likely not the kind of probability to which Sudduth refers.

The second kind of probability is often called logical probability. This kind would express a logical relation between A and Q. If P(A /Q ) = 0, there would be complete inconsistency between A and Q; if P(A /Q ) = 1 then entailment is ex- pressed between A and Q. But if the relation is between 0 and 1, then the relationship between A and Q is probable. This kind of probability may have some application to Sudduth’s proposal, but we will not pursue that here.

The third kind of probability is most likely what Sudduth has in mind. It is often called subjective, o r personalist, o r epistemic probability. This kind of probability, like the logical form, utilizes an inductive process for the sake of belief support, or belief revision. Here the idea is that one’s belief, A, may be shown to be more or less probable, given Q, and given as well a person’s background knowledge (K). In other words, Ps(A /Q & K) is the strength of S’s belief in A, given that S now has come to learn Q, and given K. Because this kind of probability deals more directly with the degree or strength of belief, it has central epistemic implications and is likely more conducive to the kind of probabilistic reasoning to which Sudduth alludes. In cases like this, for example, a person, S, would assign to a particular proposition a real num ber between 0 and 1. So, the probability of A on Q fo r S—PS(A / Q & K)—would have a value indicating how likely A would be for S if Q w ere the available evidence, and given K. If S’s claim is that the probability of the existence of God based on available evidence and S’s background knowledge is less than .5—P(G /E & K) < .5—then what we would know about the existence of God in relation to the available evidence would, in this kind of probabilistic reasoning, be a piece of S’s autobiography (since the probability here is probability /or S) .

But there are significant problems with this kind of probability. At least two come to mind. The first problem is that there is no objective way to assign values to probabilities in such cases. And if values are assigned, there is no reason to think they are what the arguer says they are. Second, subjective, epistemic, personalist notions of probability require that the person assigning probability is rational. “Of course, subjective probability varies from person to person. Also, in order for this to be an interpretation of probability, so that the relevant axioms are satisfied, not all persons can count—only rational, or ‘coherent’ persons should count.”30 This

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becomes a problem as we begin to think clearly about just what it means to be rational, of which, more below.

Included in this notion of probability is some notion of epistemic certainly, as well. As with probability, this notion is without firm definition, but it likely in- eludes the idea that a proposition is epistemically certain to the degree that it is warranted and no other propositions that we know of underm ine or otherwise negate it. In such cases, however, just what is warranted will depend to a large extent on what we include or exclude in our evidential set of propositions, given our background knowledge.

And now our clarification and discussion of the sensus divinitatis above becomes inextricably linked with our discussion of probability. “How?” you might ask. H ere we can consult and adapt the penetrating discussion of probability given by Plantinga.

In chapter 14 o f Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga evaluates certain evidential arguments against theism based on the problem or persistence of evil. We need not enter the details of his entire evaluation, but there are certain aspects of it that could help us clarify notions o f epistemic probability and certainty.

In his evaluation of certain atheological, evidential argum ents from evil, Plantinga says:

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It is im portant that we state again just what the sensus dwinitatis is. It is not, in the first place, what we do with what God reveals. That is an im portant matter, and is taken up by Paul centrally in Rom 1:18ff. If one takes the sensus to be our response to God’s revelation, as Plantinga seems to, then problems persist with respect to Paul’s own argument, not to m ention with respect to theology generally. Yet, this seems to be what Plantinga takes the sensus to be. Note again:

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This notion of the sensus seems wide of the mark of what Scripture teaches about it and of what Calvin has in mind. Perhaps we could say that, indeed, there has been “damage” to the knowledge of God that we have by way of God’s natural revelation. But the “damage” is not with the knowledge/truth per se, but with what we do with it as/when we have it.33 The damage presupposes our possession of knowledge/truth itself; it does not, nor could it, negate such knowledge. Paul’s point is that we suppress the truth, which just is the knowledge of God. Because this knowledge comes to us byway of God’s activity, and not ours, it gets through, always and everywhere, as truth and as knowledge. We take that knowledge that we have and culpably suppress it by way of exchange and idolatry. It seems that, at least in places where Sudduth wants to adapt Plantinga’s epistemological project, he falls prey to the kind of weakened notion of the sensus that denies the universal possession of real and true knowledge of God, and thus may not be able to do justice to the relationship between the sensus and a Reformed, Covenantal apologetic approach to natural theology.

Let’s attempt to flesh out the possible problems with probabilistic reasoning and theistic arguments. Here we may be able to follow and adapt an argum ent cited and analyzed by Plantinga, an argum ent against theism based on the evidence of evil in the world.34 In this case, however, what we will eventually need is an evidential argument for theism, one that is epistemically more probable than not.

Initially, let’s make sure we understand that to which the theistic argum ent is addressed, that is, the non-theism of S. Here, we could say, to use just one example, S affirms that statements reporting the observations and testimonies upon which knowledge of, say, design and order in the universe is based, bears a certain significant negative evidential relation to theism. That is, S thinks that statements and testimonies reporting observations of design and order are best explained without reference to theism. If so, then we have a good prima facie epistemic reason to reject theism—that is, a reason that is sufficient for rejecting theism unless overridden by other reasons for accepting theism.

But just what are those “statements and testimonies” and what is the “significant negative evidential relation” that it bears to theism? We could let “O ” stand for statements reporting the abundance and complexity of order and design in the universe and the testimonies one has encountered concerning observations

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others have made of the complexity and design in the universe. So, we could say, “O ” is that which bears a significant negative evidential relation to theism.

As Plantinga notes, and as we saw above, however, with respect to epistemic probability, “O is person relative: each of us will have her own O, and my O may differ from yours.”35 In many cases where theistic arguments are relevant, it is the case, therefore, that my “O ” is not the “O ” of S (the non-theist). In such cases, S may have his own O, which he thinks bears a significant negative relation to theism.

But what is this “significant negative evidential relation to theism?” Let’s say S is committed to a Humean notion such that “the im portant question is whether or not any serious hypothesis that is logically inconsistent with theism explains some significant set of facts about order and design much better than theism does.”36 It seems, thinks S, that there is such a serious hypothesis—naturalistic evolution (NE) ; it is NE that accounts for the abundance of design and order in our universe. So, for S, we have another claim, C:

;u Ck 3&UM9H]E Y’3 z9:YE I *3UK*YE [ _:’ 03YY3* Y’9] Y’3HE[ 6K3Ea

At this point, we need a rough and ready explanation of the kind of probability that is relevant to our discussion. As we noted above, we can call it epistemic probability. It just so happens that we have one:

(3M9YHV3 YK Ar U HE 3UHEY3[H:9MMF [ K*3 U*K090M3 Y’9] àr J’3*3 A HE 9] 3UHEY3[H: EHY_9YHK] 9]6 U 9]6 à 9*3 U*KUKEHYHK]Er q_ EY H] :9E3 9]F z_MMF *9YHK]9M U3*EK] H] A JK_M6 ’9V3 9 ’ HW’3* 63W*33 K z 03MH3z H] U Y’9] H] àafc

Given the difficulty of adequately defining epistemic probability, it is best simply to take this explanation as initially adequate, with one more clarification.

O ’9Y 6K3E A H]:M_63y O ’9Y WK3E H]YK 9] 3UHEY3[H: EHY_9YHK]y a a a Pv” 3 Y#E E9F H]HYH9MMF Y’9Y Ar zK* 9 WHV3] U3*EK] 2r JK_M6 H]:M_63 9Y M39EY EK[3 K z Y’3 K Y’3* U*KUKEHYHK]E 2 03MH3V3Er 9E J3MM 9E Y’3 3&U3*H3]:3E 2 HE _]63*WKH]W 9]6 U3*’9UE ’9E _]63*WK]3l HY JK_M6 9MEK H]:M_63 J’9Y 2 *3[3[03*Er UKEEH0MF 9 EU3:HzH:9YHK] K z 2#E 3UHEY3[H: 3]VH*K][ 3]Yr 9]6 ]K 6K_0Y [ K*3 03EH63Eafb

So, the argum ent consists of C—NE explains the facts O reports much better than theism does—and, if C is true, then we have a prima facie good reason for rejecting theism. The claim, in other words, is that the antecedent epistemic probability of O on NE is much greater than on theism, and because NE is a serious hypothesis and is inconsistent with theism, we can reject theism.

fp -0H6ar mc*afj -0H6afc -0H6ar mcRa GM9]YH]W9 HE H]Y3*9:YH]W JHY’r 9]6 à_KYH]W ’3*3r G9_M x*9U3*#E 3VH63]YH9M 9*W_[3]Y

z*K[ 3VHMafb -0H6a THV3] K_* 6HE:_EEHK] Kz 3UHEY3[H: U*K090HMHYF 90KV3r A :K_M6 03 2#E 09:—W*K_]6

—]KJM36W3a


Since the claim is that the truth of C gives S a prima facie good reason to believe that theism is less probable than not, the natural question is, “less probable with respect to what?”

7 ’3 9]EJ3* [ _EY 03 Aa 7 ’3 H639 HE Y’ 9 Y Y’3 Y*_ Y’ K z ; WHV3E [ 3 9 k-9Du :uR9V WKK6 *39EK] zK * Y’ H]—H]W Y’9Y Y’3HE[ HE H[ U*K090M3 JHY’ *3EU3:Y YK [F ]K3YH: EHY_9YHK]l ’3]:3r _]M3EE - :9] zH]6 EK[3 *39EK]E :b - Y’3HE[r Y’3 *9YHK]9M Y’H]W YK 6K HE YK WHV3 HY _Ua O3 :K_M6 U _ Y Y’HE 0F E9FH]W Y ’ 9 Y a a a [F —]KJM36W3 K z Y’3 Y*_ Y’ K z ; WHV3E [ 3 9 63z39Y3* zK* Y’3HE[ r _]M3EE - :9] zH]6 EK[3 *39EK]E zK* HYl 9MY3*]9YHV3MFr HY WHV3E [ 3 9 UKY3]YH9M 63z39Y3* zK* Y’3HE[r 9 UKY3]YH9M 63z39Y3* Y’9Y JHMM 03 uRá1uC _]M3EE - :9] zH]6 Y’KE3 *39EK]E zK* Y’3HE[ afn

So much for S’s commitment to non-theism. He thinks that NE, given O, is more probable than theism. In such a case, is it a probable apologetic argument that is needed? Is this the point where we attempt to insert probable reasons for theism?

Now Sudduth thinks that apologetic arguments are not aimed at producing belief in God in anyone; rather, they are aimed at showing theistic belief to be justified or warranted for a theist (p. 106). If Sudduth is correct, it is the purpose of theistic arguments, at least in part, to show that

xu 7’3HE[ 3&UM9H]E Y’3 z9:YE I *3UK*YE [ _:’ 03YY3* Y’9] Ck

is more probable than C for the theist (T). So, our theistic argum ent is m eant to provide epistemic support for T ’s belief that D, such that S’s belief that C need not accrue to T, or such that S’s belief that C is not probable for T. That belief, C, we could say, rests in the claim that the antecedent epistemic probability of O given NE is m uch greater than the antecedent probability of O given theism. O ur theistic argum ent from design is m eant to call C into question, to give reasons for theism, thus providing for the probability of some degree of warrant for T, byway of epistemic probability. How might such an argum ent proceed?

Suppose that one of the keys to S’s belief that C is the literature available from those who hold to NE, and who have argued the existence of so-called “Junk DNA.” That literature, we could say, is a central part o f O for S. It argues that, given that upwards of 95 percent of hum an DNA does not encode proteins, the notion of an intelligent designer seems ludicrous; more probably, no intelligent designer would design such a vast am ount of useless, “ju n k ” DNA in a human. However, the good news for T is that there is an increasing am ount of current scientific literature that now argues that much of our non-encoding DNA provides other essential functions for hum an beings. To call such DNA ‘junk” would be scientifically unfeasible, given these latest arguments. So, T contends that O for S needs significant revision; and, once revised, O now tends m ore toward theism than its denial. Or, minimally, T contends that theism, given O for T, is more probable than not, and thus a rational option for T such that S cannot level the charge of irrationality against T based on T’s theism.

39 Ibid., 473.


Given this scenario, at least one thing is obvious: the arguments on both sides are surely based on some kind of probability, as are so many scientific arguments, contrary to popular belief. The findings of ten years ago are now being under- m ined and negated by (some) curren t scientific research. Assuming some consistency in research methodology, this must mean that both theories partake of (some version of) epistemic probability; beliefs are negated or revised based on what scientific hypotheses one accepts. But is it the case, in this example, that T is offering a probable argum ent for theism to S?

If it is the case, then at least the following would have to be true. If A is theism and Q is the discovery of useful, rather than “junk,” DNA, then T is arguing that PT(A /Q & K) > .5. That is, T is arguing that the discovery that so-called “ju n k ” DNA is, as a matter of fact, useful, should allow that O changes the probability quotient for T. Theism could obtain a higher degree of warrant, for T, given that “ju n k ” DNA is no longer considered to be junk. The design o f what had been considered “junk” DNA increases the probability of the existence of an intelligent designer, rather than the probability of NE.

This kind of argum ent surely falls under the “showing and knowing” distinction that Sudduth affirms. T is attempting to show S that the probability of theism is greater than S concedes, given the latest research on the (probable) usefulness of what was considered to be “ju n k ” DNA. That is, T is arguing that O should be adjusted for S, or at least that T ’s O, which includes the testimony of scientists on the usefulness of what was thought to be “ju n k ” DNA, is properly included in T ’s O, and thus gives some (probable) degree of warrant to theism for T. However, it would also be the case that, if T were asked, he would be clear about the fact that the use or lack thereof of hum an DNA was not the foundation of, or basis for, his believing in God. Thus, T ’s showing is not in any direct way related to his knowing. T ’s probabilistic reasoning is no t the basis for his belief in God.

But the problems that plague this kind of “showing and knowing” example might be too weighty to make such an argum ent tenable, from a Reformed perspective. For example, as we have already seen, “O ” itself is person relative. S might simply judge that the jury is still out on “ju n k ” DNA, given the vast differ- enees that obtain in scientific evidence of the usefulness of hum an DNA over the past decade. This might mean that S will have to adjust O, but there is plenty of research out there from scientists who still argue for NE as the only viable option. Will S now hold that T ’s belief in God is justified or warranted, given Q? Perhaps, but if he does, the best S could say is that theism is warranted forT, though not for him. Perhaps, in this case, T may hold theism without the charge of irrationality from S. So, T ’s theism is judged rational for T, though S will continue to hold his non-theistic beliefs, and hold those as rational for himself. But, if such is the case, the question of truth seems tangential, at best, to one’s belief. If NE is deemed rational for S, while theism is deemed rational for T, what might be the relation between what is rational and what is true? Does this mean that rationality itself is person-relative? Furtherm ore, is this what Christian apologetics is really m eant to do in such circumstances?


It seems that, as with Plantinga and Sudduth, if the smsus divinitatis is dam- aged or otherwise weakened and inefficient, then perhaps the best one can hope for is a granting of a degree of warrant for theistic belief from those who do not believe in God. Perhaps our highest hopes, given sin’s effects, are that other non-believers will not call us foolish for believing in God, bu t will allow to us some kind of person-relative rationality. Maybe the best we can hope for is a level playing field of rationality; my belief is warranted (to some degree) for me, and your opposing belief is warranted (to some degree) for you. But neither this view of the sensus divinitatis nor of apologetics can stand up to biblical scrutiny.

Let’s think about this another way. Suppose Christian apologetics is aimed at defending the Christian faith as true. Suppose the defense offered is not simply m eant to provide warrant for the one believing, but is rather m eant to explain and testify to the very tru th of Christianity itself in order, if God so wills, to change the mind and heart o f the unbeliever. Suppose, as well, that the sensus divinitatis is what Scripture says it is. That is, suppose that all people everywhere know the true God, but, in Adam, continually and earnestly seek to suppress that truth in unrighteousness.

If this is the case, then, as we have said, any notion of proper function with respect to our cognitive faculties needs a serious and radical revision. Remember our statement above, that epistemic notions of probability require that the person assigning probability is rational. But if all of us, in Adam, always and everywhere suppress the tru th in unrighteousness, then our cognitive faculties, at root, are fundamentally irrational.40 If, say, PS(A /Q & K) < .5, even after S notes the current research against the idea of ‘ju n k ” DNA, this will be the case, not only because of what S takes O to be, but, fundamentally, it will be the case because K includes the fact of S’s suppression of the truth in unrighteousness. That is, given Scripture’s account of our natural knowledge of God, included in K for everyone who remains in Adam is the fact that they will refuse to have God in their thoughts and lives; this refusal is, at bottom, irrational. It opposes the truth of the matter. It is contrary to the way things really are. So, any current research on ‘junk” DNA that shows it not to be junk will either be held in abeyance by S in hopes that other research negates it, or it will be deemed virtually irrelevant, or there will be some other form of rejection and suppression of the truth, given O, for S, and K In other words, S will always and everywhere hold to the improb- ability (or impossibility41) of theism, no m atter what facts are presented, given

m* ?E GM9]YH]W9 ]KY3E JHY’ *3EU3:Y YK Y’3 z_]:YHK] Kz Y’3 xVGx1x. "2K[3K]3 H] J’K[ Y’HE U*K:3EE J9E z_]:YHK]H]W U*KU3*MF JK_M6 ’9V3 9] H]YH[9Y3r 63Y9HM36r VHVH6r 9]6 3&UMH:HY —]KJM36W3 Kz TK6l E’3 JK_M6 ’9V3 9] H]Y3]E3 9J9*3]3EE Kz ’HE U*3E3]:3r WMK*Fr WKK6]3EEr UKJ3*r U3*z3:YHK]r JK]63*z_M 9YY*9:YHV3]3EEr 9]6 EJ33Y]3EE a a t Mu--uGáVB s0-9xá9uG nVC9V:. mbpha 7’3 U*K0M3[r 9E J3 ’9V3 E9H6r HE ]KY Y’9Y Y’3 xVGx1x HE [9Mz_]:YHK]H]Wr 0_Y Y’9Y J3 E_UU*3EE Y’HE H]YH[9Y3r 633Ur 9]6 U3*EK]9M —]KJM' 36W3 Kz TK6 Y’9Y ’3 *3V39ME YK _Ea 7’3 H**9YHK]9MHYFr Y’3*3zK*3r HE ]KgJHY’ *3EU3:Y YK Y’3 xVGx1x U3* E3r 0_Y YK K_* :KW]HYHV3 z9:_MYH3E Y’9Y Y9—3 Y’9Y —]KJM36W3 9]6 ’KM6 HY 6KJ] 9]6 3&:’9]W3 HY zK* 9 MH3r *3]63*H]W K_* Y’H]—H]W zKKMHE’ 9]6 K_* ’39*YE 69*—3]36a

md .K* 9] 9*W_[3]Y 9W9H]EY Y’3 H[UKEEH0HMHYF Kz Y’3HE[r E33 Aa 2:KYY IMHU’H]Yr "2K[3Y’H]W B_:’ 7KK GM9H] YK 29Frí H] WVx1--VRá9bG uGB rxR0uábCb2Ip v0VbCb2I 9G HV-79RV b: á0V s01-R0* rxxuIx 9G AbGb- b:


that his background knowledge will inevitably include a suppression of the knowledge of God that he has. He will start in the wrong place, so will invariably end in the wrong place. As Plantinga notes (with respect to the problem of evil as a defeater for Christian belief), “The atheologian can properly claim that evil constitutes a defeater for Christian belief, therefore, only if he already assumes that Christian belief is false.”42 Once one begins with the assumption that the Christian God does not exist, an argument from probability will merely state that assumption in other ways. So also, once S begins with the suppression of the truth and knowledge of God in unrighteousness, S’s arguments will be different ways of stating that suppression, not of establishing or considering its contrary.

But maybe we’ve chosen an example that is too restrictive or narrow to serve the larger purpose. Maybe there are probable arguments of another sort that can com port with a defense of Christianity. W hat about one of the standard, more general arguments from design? Suppose the Reformed apologist argues that O is the set of propositions, statements, and testimonies to the fact that the universe is so complex in its design that theism must be more probable than not. Rather than pointing to a specific datum, such as the presence, or not, o f ‘junk” DNA, the apologist is pointing to more of a cumulative case for design, a case that includes the larger scope of the universe itself. In that case, the argument might look something like this:

da , _[ 9] 9*YHz9:YE 9*3 U*K6_:YE K z H]Y3MMHW3]Y 63EHW] K * U_*UKE3aRa 7’3 _]HV3*E3 *3E3[0M3E Y’3E3 ’_[ 9] 9*YHz9:YEafa 7’3*3zK*3r Y’3 _]HV3*E3 HE tU*K090MFh 9 U*K6_:Y K z H]Y3MMHW3]Y 63EHW] K * U_*UKE3ama N_Y Y’3 _]HV3*E3 HE V9EYMF [ K*3 :K[UM3& 9]6 WHW9]YH: Y’9] 9 ’_[ 9] 9*YHz9:Yapa 7’3*3zK*3r Y’3*3 U*K090MF HE 9 UKJ3*z_M 9]6 V9EYMF 0HWW3* 9]6 [ K*3 H]Y3MMHW3]Y

63EHW]3* J’K 63EHW]36 Y’3 _]HV3*E3a

Or, in terms of our probability formula, the probability of theism, given the design and complexity of the universe, is greater than .5.

There are at least two problems with this argument, which, by now, should be familiar to us. First, the epistemic probability of 3 above depends on one’s background knowledge, K If, embedded in one’s background knowledge is a fundamental ¿)»function with respect to one’s acknowledging the knowledge of God that is resident in every one of us, then the clear implication will be the rejection of 3, given K. Second, what is needed for 3 is a notion of epistemic certainty. If, as we noted above, a proposition is epistemically certain to the degree that it is warranted and no other propositions that we know of underm ine or otherwise negate it, that certainty is dependent on what propositions are warranted for us. Given Rom 1 and our rebellious commitment to suppress and hold down what we know to be the case with respect to God, we will not ascribe warrant to any proposition that moves toward an affirmation of the true God.

W9R0u-Bnc eu::9G5-c t36a v9]3 Ta 7HUYK] 9]6q3zz*3F ;a O966H]WYK]l G’HMMHUE0_*Wr Cawau G*3E0FY3*H9] s (3zK*[36r R**bhr fjd'bRa

mR GM9]YH]W9r Mu--uGáVB s0-9xá9uG nVC9V:. mnRa


“But wait,” you rightly protest, “haven’t theistic proofs such as this been employed by the Reformed in order, at least, to answer the atheist and skeptic? And isn’t it true that God is the designer and orderer o f the universe? Aren’t we just arguing the plain truth of the m atter in such cases?”

The answer to all of these questions is yes. The problem, however, is that while 3 is epistemically certain for the Christian apologist, it is, at best, only probable, and probable to a less than .5 degree for the unbeliever, given the dynamic of the suppression of truth, which is included in K; given, in other words, the radical cognitive disfunction that unbelief entails. Is it the case, then, that because such propositions are improbable for the unbeliever they should never be used? Sudduth’s book addresses that question, o f course, but the difference here is that the probability that inheres in such arguments does so due to the cognitive dysfunction of S, in the first place, and therefore is probable with respect to S, not with respect to the Christian apologist.

In other words, since it is the case, as Sudduth notes in places, that the sensus divinitatis just is knowledge of God, could it be that the probability argum ent above could be offered to S in support o f that natural knowledge that is had but suppressed? If so, then Ps(A /Q & K) being .5 or less would be m eant to support what is naturally known (though suppressed), and thus testify explicitly to that which is already known (but suppressed) by S.

Perhaps it could, but what would the status of that argum ent be if, in fact, 3 were only probable both for T and for S? Sudduth would likely say that, since the argument was about showing and not knowing, nothing with respect to the foundation of our belief would be affected. But would the argum ent itself betray ideas contrary to Christian truth in this case? It seems that they would. If the “showing” partakes of epistemic probability for T and for S, whereas the “knowing” does not, how might the two ever meet? That which is probable cannot be, by definition, epistemically certain, whereas Christianity, and propositions entailed by it (e.g., the universe is designed by God) must be. In other words, K is determinative in any and all such arguments.

Not only so, bu t if K is going to undergo any kind of radical change in S, then S must move from one who is in Adam to one who is in Christ. To put the m atter m ore in Sudduth’s terms, one must move from improperly function- ing, o r dysfunctional cognitive faculties, to cognitive faculties that are, in principle, restored to their p roper function. T hat movement is only possible if S is given the opportunity to “connect” his true knowledge of God, which he suppresses, by way of natural revelation with the true knowledge of God as it is given in Jesus Christ. Only the Holy Spirit can “connect” the two kinds of knowledge, but he uses the tru th to do that. There can be no true and right “belief in God,” therefore, unless it is belief in the Lord Jesus Christ (John 17:3). Any theistic belief o ther than faith and trust in the true God through

Jesus Christ, then, is ju st m ore suppression of the true knowledge of God in unrighteousness.


In other words, theism is unwarranted in every form, save that which is had in and through Jesus Christ.43 Given that all men know the true God, any acknowl- edgm ent of a god that is not the Triune God of Scripture is a perversion of that knowledge, a suppression, an exchange of the truth for a lie. Since that is true, apologetics should be less concerned about the warrant o f theistic beliefs (since no theistic belief has warrant unless it is Christian theistic belief) and more centrally focused on presenting and arguing for the truth as it is found in Christ. T hat will include presentations of ju st who this true God is, but it must also include the sure and certain truth that is found only in Christ. The only way to “connect” natural revelation with special revelation is in the presentation of the Revelation, which is Christ himself. In that case, there is no room available for a Reformed apologist for an appeal to that which is, for him, probable, in a proper defense o f Christianity.

It is long past time to bring these reflections to a close. Sudduth’s book surely allows for much more discussion than I have been able to include here. Hope- fully, much more will be produced. In the end, as I stated earlier, this book is the finest available for a fascinating and helpful analysis of discussions in philosophy of religion on the Reformed objection to natural theology. Someday, perhaps, volume two could include a collaborative effort between the best of theology in this area and the best of philosophy on this subject.44

mf 7’HE HE 9 EJ33UH]W EY9Y3[3]Y Y’9Y ]336E 9]6 63E3*V3E [_:’ [K*3 6HE:_EEHK] Y’9] - :9] WHV3 HY ’3*3a N*H3zMFr Y’K_W’r HY HE UKEEH0M3r 3V3] MH—3MFr Y’9Y - 9[ _EH]W Y’3 ]KYHK] Kz "J9**9]Yí ’3*3 H] 9 6Hzz3*3]Y J9F Y’9] HY HE KzY3] _E36 H] U’HMKEKU’Fa 7’3 ]KYHK] Kz J9**9]Y Y’9Y - 9[ _EH]W H]:M_63E JHY’H] HY Y’3 9:Y_9M Y*_Y’ Kz Y’3 [9YY3*r EK Y’9Y HY YH3E Y’3 *9YHK]9MHYF Kz K]3#E —]KJM36W3 YK J’9Y HE 9:Y_9MMF Y’3 :9E3a -Y [9F 03r K] Y’3 KY’3* ’9]6r H] EK[3 U’HMKEKU’H:9M 6HE:_EEHK]Er Y’9Y U*KUKEHYHK]E :9] ’9V3 J9**9]Yr 9Y M39EY YK EK[3 63W*33r Y’K_W’ Y’3F [9F ]KY 03 Y*_3a O’9Y - 9[ :K]:3*]36 YK [9H]Y9H] HE Y’9Y K]3 J’K ’KM6E YK 9 Y’3HE[ Y’9Y HE ]KY ;’*HEYH9] Y’3HE[ HE ’KM6H]W YK 9] H6KM9Y*K_E ]KYHK]r WHV3] J’9Y 2:*HUY_*3 Y39:’3E H] (K[ Mudbzza 9]6 3ME3J’3*3a

mm 7’9]—E YK BH:’93M 2_66_Y’ zK* ’3MUz_M :K[[3]YE K] 9] 39*MH3* 6*9zY Kz Y’HE 9*YH:M3a -Y E’K_M6 03 ]KY36 Y’9Yr EK[3 [K]Y’E E_0E3à_3]Y YK Y’3 J*HYH]W Kz Y’HE *3VH3Jr 2_66_Y’ 9]]K_]:36 ’HE :K]V3*' EHK] YK )9HE’]9V9 )369]Y9a

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