XenoTec Incorporated

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XenoTec Incorporated (A)

Scene 1: The Office of the CEO

Paul Johnson, Chief Information Officer: Les, Im really worried about our ability to carry out our long range systems plan. I just dont think we have the human and financial resources to do everything in the plan. In my view, migrating to the client/server hardware environment, beginning installation of the network PCs, and implementing the Professional Services System (PSS) and two other applications is just too much. I recommend holding off on the PSS until I can free up more of our staff.

Les Wanninger, Chief Executive Officer: I hear you, Paul, but Im getting some pressure from Tom Anderson and his staff to make a core business application like PSS a priority instead of, according to them, just spending money on IT infrastructure that has no immediate bottom line payoff. Still, besides what youre telling me, I have some concerns about the relationship between XenoTecs strategy and how the PSS fits into it.

Scene 2: The Office of the Senior Vice President of Marketing

Mike Duffy, Vice President of Sales: Im really excited that we can go ahead and pilot the Professional Services System. Were finally going to bring our sales force and selling methods into the modern world. I think the system is going to make a huge difference in our ability to compete and operate in the same technical world as our doctor/customers.

Tom Anderson, Senior Vice President of Marketing: Yes, if we can pull it off, youre right. However, the amount of money were spending, getting the needed support from Pauls IT group, and having our set in their ways sales force use the new technology all are big risks in pulling off the system. Heck, Ill bet 90% of the sales reps dont even type. Were asking them to make a major leap in how they do their job.

Introduction

The meeting in the CEOs office occurred in January, 1997 when Paul Johnson, manager of information technology for XenoTec, was reviewing his long range systems plan with XenoTecs president, Les Wanninger. Prior to joining XenoTec in November, Paul had been the project manager for the consulting firm that had helped XenoTec develop the hardware architecture for the systems plan he was now beginning to implement. An additional element of the total systems plan was to equip XenoTecs field sales representatives with laptop computers that would support the selling process and sales management. Sales and marketing executives at XenoTec felt that the benefits of this project were substantial but difficult to quantify. Full implementation of the system would require a capital investment of approximately $1,000,000 over a period of two years.

About the same time, Mike Duffy,in charge of the salesforce who sell XenoTecs two key products, was also preparing for a meeting with Wanninger. The proposed field sales support system was a key element in XenoTecs marketing plans and Duffy had been given responsibility for planning the system and managing its implementation. XenoTecs sales had been growing at over a 30% rate a year for the past 7 years. He knew that one of Wanningers major concerns was how the new laptop-based system would support XenoTecs strategy.

Company Background

In 1982, XenoTec was formed by two medical researchers from the Duke University Medical Center in Durham, North Carolina. They had developed a new anesthetic, Xenane. Funded by a local venture capital firm, XenoTec was remarkably successful, and by 1990 almost half the surgeries using general anesthesia performed in the U.S. were done using Xenane as the anesthetic. In late 1994, with its corporate headquarters located in Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, XenoTec was in the final stages of clinical testing for a new anesthetic, Trasnane, and was about to release the product for general use. Trasnane was clinically superior to Xenane in many respects and was expected to generate significant sales. XenoTec held the patents on both products.

By early 1997, Trasnane had been successfully introduced and together with Xenane was used in 63% of the 21.2 million surgeries of all types performed in the United States at that time. Sales in 1995 were $75 million, up $30 million from 1993. Some of the product characteristics that accounted for the success of Xenane and Trasnane were the speed with which patients responded to the anesthetic, the minimal side effects of the drugs, it cardiovascular and neurological stability, and the speed with which patients recovered after surgery.

Les Wanninger had been brought in as CEO of XenoTec in 1995, allowing the company founders to spend most of their time in the laboratory working on product improvements and planning product tests. Wanninger brought professional management to XenoTec, and had developed a reputation as a very competent manager in building a company almost from scratch to one which was very successful. In 1997, Wanninger identified three critical success factors for XenoTec as it faced the future. These were to:

1. Bring manufacturing costs under control

2. Exploit the market potential of XenoTecs existing products

3. Further expand the R&D capability to create and commercialize new products for XenoTec

Early in 1997, XenoTec was completing both a 2-year strategic plan and an information technology strategic plan. XenoTec had a small staff function and the strategic plans were developed by line management. Wanninger stated XenoTecs mission as follows:

Our reason for being in business is to become a dominant force in the research, development, manufacturing, and sales of pharmaceutical products for anesthesia and acute care, on a worldwide basis.

Anesthesia

Prior to the introduction of ether and nitrous oxide (laughing gas), a good surgeon was a quick surgeon. With the introduction of anesthesia modern surgical techniques became possible.

Anesthesia can be divided into general and regional anesthetics. A general anesthetic makes the patient unconscious and insensitive to pain. A regional or local anesthetic makes a particular portion of the patients body insensitive to pain. General anesthetics can be further divided into inhahalational and narcotic agents. An inhalational anesthetic is a gas that the patient breathes in; a narcotic anesthetic is a drug that is generally administered by means of an injection. Trasnane (and Xenane before it) is an inhalational anesthetic. In the hospital, anesthesia is administered by an anesthesiologist or a nurse anesthetist. An anesthesiologist is a medical doctor with approximately seven years of specialized training in the use of anesthetics and other acute care drugs. A nurse anesthetist has specialized training in anesthesia and generally operates under the supervision of an anesthesiologist.

A surgical patient may receive up to 20 different drugs before, during, and after an operation. The anesthesiologist is responsible for choosing the correct drugs, administering them, and monitoring the patients vital signs throughout the process. The anesthesiologist divides the use of anesthesia into four distinct phases: preoperative, induction, maintenance, and postoperative. During the preoperative phase the anesthesiologist will generally administer drugs that ensure the patients body is prepared for the anesthesia that will be administered during the operation. Induction is the first phase of actual anesthesia where the anesthesiologist actually puts the patient to sleep. During the maintenance phase the anesthesiologist monitors a patients vital signs (e.g. blood pressure, heart rate, and respiration) and administers anesthetics to keep the patient asleep. During the postoperative phase the anesthesiologist will administer drugs to reverse the action of drugs administered during the surgery and will monitor the patient in the recovery room until the patient has regained consciousness.

XenoTecs Senior Vice President of Marketing, Tom Anderson, made the following observation about XenoTec products:

The claims we make about our products can be evaluated almost immediately for their accuracy and forthrightness. The actions of a drug used in anesthesia are recognizable not over a period of monthsas they might be with an orally administered medication in office practicebut in minutes. The professional user of our products routinely measures blood pressure, heart rate, and respiration at intervals of five minutes or less. Heart rhythm, brain waves, blood oxygen, and carbon dioxide also are continuously or repeatedly monitored before, during, and after the operation. These key data provide the anesthetist with immediate feedback on the efficacy, safety, and reliability of our products, and, of course, on the accuracy of the information our representatives provide. What other productsand product informationundergo that kind of scrutiny on a daily basis?

Market Environment

Approximately 6,000 hospitals in the U.S. performed surgery in 1996. These ranged from large teaching hospitals in major metropolitan areas to small, private hospitals in isolated areas of the country.

In the early 1980s, a significant shift occurred in U.S. health care. Health care costs had been growing rapidly, mostly absorbed by the federal government or by private health insurance. The federal government and private insurance companies were beginning to exert pressure on hospitals to reduce costs. The federal government, as part of its Medicare program, had begun to reimburse hospitals on the basis of regional average costs, rather than a particular hospitals actual costs. Hospital administrators were beginning to pay more attention to the actual costs incurred for specific types of surgeries and to identify alternatives for reducing the costs of health care. For example, there was a trend toward performing more surgery on an outpatient basis; a patient would arrive on the day that the surgery was to be performed and, barring complications, be released that same day.

During the development of its annual market plans, XenoTec discovered that the costs of Trasnane were poorly understood. Anesthesiologists felt they had a good sense of the cost of other anesthetics but perceived Trasnane to be about twice as expensive to use as it actually was. This difficulty was the result of how an inhalation anesthetic was packaged and used compared to a narcotic anesthetic. Narcotics were sold in vials and administered directly. The cost of a vial was known and the cost of a single dose could be understood immediately. Inhalation anesthetics were sold as a bottle of liquid and administered by vaporizing the liquid to create a gaseous mixture of the anesthetic with oxygen or a mixture of oxygen and nitrous oxide. The anesthetic was administered as a percentage concentration of the agent in oxygen (e.g. a 1% concentration of Trasnane). A single bottle of Trasnane might be used over a number of operations, so calculating the actual amount of Trasnane used for any given patient required a certain amount of measurement and computation to convert a percentage concentration of a gas into the amount of liquid that was consumed.

XenoTecs research also discovered that their competitors were exploiting this difficulty by emphasizing the cost of a bottle of Trasnane (about $75 in 1996) compared to the cost of a vial of narcotic anesthetic. In some hospitals the use of Trasnane had been restricted to only those cases where it was specifically clinically indicated (e.g., neurosurgery, abdominal procedures). The perceived cost issue was also a problem in a number of teaching hospitals whose budgets were generally tighter than those found in private hospitals. XenoTecs own calculations indicated that the actual costs of Trasnane in use were lower than competing products when the total costs of anesthesia were considered. One of Transnanes key clinical strengths was that it increased the potency of several other drugs commonly used in surgery and therefore allowed lower doses to be used. This clinical strength was also an economic benefit of Trasnane in a total cost analysis.

The complex interactions of drugs used before and during surgery made XenoTecs competitive environment equally complex. A tranquilizer administered the morning before surgery might decrease the amount of Trasnane required during surgery by 10% or more. Most anesthesiologists preferred to use a balanced technique that combined both narcotic and inhalational anesthetics. The marketing challenge was to shift the balance in XenoTecs favor.

XenoTec had a number of competitors in the market. XenoTec was the market leader in terms of 1996 sales with approximately $75 million. The next largest firm in the market had $57 million, and three other competitors had between $30 and $50 million in sales. XenoTec considered Janssen Pharmeceutica, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson to be their key competitor ($31 million in 1996 sales). Janssen sold the leading narcotic anesthetic, Fentanyl and a variety of other drug products besides Fentanyl. Their sale force was two to three times the size of XenoTecs.

In 1996, XenoTec had 46 sales representatives in 6 regions (U.S. plus Canada) calling directly on anesthesiologists to promote the use of Xenane and Trasnane. XenoTec representatives frequently covered a broad geographic region (each representative covered an area in which 300-450 thousand surgeries were performed each year). Sales calls would be made in the hospital and, at times, representatives would put on surgical gowns and meet with an anesthesiologist as the doctor moved between operating rooms. The XenoTec sales staff was very stable. On average, representatives had 8 years with the company. The average age of the sales force was 49. Partly because of the age of the sales force, college degrees were uncommon. In fact, only 4 of the sales representatives having greater than the average length of service with the company had college degrees. Twelve of the sales representatives with less than 8 years with the company had college degrees. The bulk of the representatives compensation was from commissions.

Historically, the anesthesiologist had been the key decision maker in purchasing anesthesia-related products. Sales representatives from various companies would call on the anesthesiologist in the hospital, presenting product detail pieces such as brochures, reprints of journal articles, and marketing films describing the products in use. The anesthesiology department would place an order for a product with the hospital pharmacy specifying the products and packaging they desired. With the increasing emphasis on cost control, the pharmacy had begun to take on a greater role in product evaluation. Many of the cost pressures that XenoTec had experienced in the recent past had come from pharmacy departments. Clinical differences between different anesthesias did not always dictate a specific choice and a poor understanding of XenoTecs product economics was a growing problem, particularly among pharmacists.

Information Technology at XenoTec

Information technology had begun at XenoTec in a rather traditional manner with standard applications such as payroll, accounts payable and receivable, etc., all run on an IBM AS 400 system. In 1996, XenoTec hired a consulting firm to study XenoTecs use of its computing resources. Their report recommended moving from the AS 400 to a client/server-based system utilizing IBMs RS/6000 AIX technology. In addition, to control future IT costs, the consulting firm recommended replacing the current full function personal computers used at headquarters with new network PCs. These machines would be more easily controlled, supported, and serviced centrally, thus avoiding many costs that were rapidly escalating with the present types of personal computers used in the company. In addition, the consultants recommended making the use of IT more strategic in the firm by integrating the incompatible islands of automation that had grown up through the years, and preparing the company to operate globally with more of a network form of organization.

Paul Johnson was involved in the development of the new IT plan (he had been the designer of the proposed hardware architecture recommended in the consultants report) and, early November, 1996, was hired by XenoTec to lead the implementation of the plan with the CIO job title. At the corporate level, all processing was being shifted to a client/server environment based upon the IBM RS/6000 hardware. Oracle database management software was a cornerstone of the development of new applications.

At the local level, several local area networks existed in the firm and a variety of software had proliferated on these systems. For example, three email systems (all incompatible with each other) existed at XenoTec, Pegasus Mail, MS Outlook, and Lotus Notes. Under the new plan, a commitment was made to Microsoft products with local area networks using the Windows NT operating system. Microsoft Office products would be adopted as the standard for local operations. In late 1996, the firm implemented its own Intranet. As mentioned, network computers were planned to replace most of the existing full function PCs on the network over the two-year period covered by the systems plan.

One of Johnsons major tasks was hiring new information systems professionals and contractors to assist with the migration from the AS 400 to the RS/6000. In the late 1990s, the IS labor market was very tight. By early 1997, many applications had been switched to the RS/6000, but there was still substantial effort in the IS group being devoted to the systems conversion project.

The mission statement of the management information system group at XenoTec was to be:

1. A facilitator of systems change

2. A technical resource to be called upon for solutions to automated and manual systems-related problems

3. Responsible for the protection of data and ensuring against the loss of the organizations assets stored in the corporate database

4. Supporting the firms strategy with information technology

5. A supporter of user-friendly systems and technology

6. Able to create a technical environment which supports connectivity and coordination of the workforce

Paul Johnson, the firms Chief Information Officer (CIO), reported directly to the CEO, Les Wanniger. Other than the hardware migration projects in the systems plan, three application projects were included. In addition to the Professional Services Project discussed below, two other projects were underway. One was a complete product tracking system to allow any lot of anesthesia to be tracked to the customer, and ultimately, to specific patients. The other was the creation of a data warehouse allowing corporate analysts to explore the use of Xenane and Trasnane by attributes of the hospital, anesthesiologist, and use of other medical products. The source of the data used by this system was from Medidata, Inc., a firm drawing upon a consortium of hospitals and selling data to users such as XenoTec for their analysis.

The Professional Services Systems Project (PSS)

XenoTec staff at headquarters had a long history in learning and using personal computers and personal productivity software. From its inception, XenoTec had used personal computers. Word processing (originally WordPerfect) and spreadsheets (originally Lotus 1-2-3) had been used since the mid-1980s. The local area networks came in the late 1980s and some users migrated to MS products such as MS Word, and MS Excel.

The use of computing by the sales representatives, however, was another matter. Three or four sales representatives were advanced users of personal computing, but others made no use of computing at all. Those who were advanced users had purchased their own equipment and learned on their own. Selling the XenoTec products was felt by most of the sales representatives to be highly related to building strong personal relationships with key individuals at each sales location.

In late 1995, Mike Duffy promoted the idea of equipping each sales representative with a portable computer. He had joined the company as one of its first sales representatives in the 1980s. He was remarkably successful and soon was promoted to a regional sales manager and, in 1990, became Vice President of Sales and relocated to company headquarters. At headquarters, Duffy quickly adapted to the use of information technology and became active in thinking about new ways to use IT in sales and the management of the sales process.

By 1995, Duffy believed that portable personal computing technology was stable and portable and that great potential existed for supporting the selling process with computers. He began to plan and champion a concept he called the Professional Services Project. Working with his staff, he identified about 30 specific applications that would be potentially useful to a sales representative. These applications fell into five groups: clinical, territory management, new product launch, internal communications, and personal productivity (See Exhibit I).

During the development of the PSS concept, one of the major frustrations for Duffy and his staff was the lack of interest, involvement, and support on the part of the corporate information technology group. He had hoped with the consulting study and the hiring of Paul Johnson that this situation would change, but he was concerned that such was not the case. In fact, only by much behind the scenes work and convincing his boss, Tom Anderson, was Duffy able to get the PSS included in the new XenoTec systems plan.

One area of tension between Duffys sales group and the corporate IT staff was the fact that the laptop computer hardware and software to support the PSS had been established by the sales group working on the project. The corporate IT group had battled to make this decision, but Tom Andersons arguments in favor of sales being allowed to make the decision carried the day with Les Wanninger. At the time, Wanninger had been persuaded by the position that the sales organization was most involved in using the technology and, as a profit center, should be allowed to choose what, in their opinion, was best to do their job.

The analysis by the PSS project staff resulted in the hardware platform selected to support the PSS being a Dell Inspiron laptop computer with Windows-95 and MS Office-97 Professional. The details of the configuration, software, and costs are shown in Exhibit II. To allow for future growth, the decision was made to acquire the newly introduced Dell Inspiron model, which at the time, was a state-of-the-art laptop computer. Duffy had negotiated a very attractive price for the bundled hardware and software because of a quantity purchase (approximately 75 laptops for the sales force, spares, and for support personnel). The price of $3,750/laptop (including software) was negotiated which was a saving of approximately $300 under what such units would cost if purchased individually.

In preparing to present the PSS to management for an approval decision, the sales organization estimated a total investment of $1million in order to develop and implement the system. Exhibit III is a summary of these costs. Although the greatest costs would be expenditures with the corporate IT group for the specialized applications shown in Exhibit I, the costs for training and support and the costs for hardware and personal productivity software were at approximately the same level. The plan was for all the sales representatives to attend training sessions in North Carolina. Because of the substantial amount of software and a phased rollout of applications, the plan called for each sales representative to attend four training sessions over a two-year period. Thus, travel and lodging costs for the 40 sales representatives to receive this training was substantial. The specialized application costs were based upon three analyst/programmers working on the project for two years.

The tangible benefits of the PSS were somewhat difficult to identify or even estimate. Instead, XenoTec executives from finance, sales, and marketing met to estimate the potential incremental sales revenue that the system would generate. After a series of meetings the consensus was that the PSS would increase sales volume by $1.5 million annually by 1999. Exhibit IV lists these anticipated benefits.

Meeting in February, 1997

Based upon input from Paul Johnson regarding the inability of his IT group to complete all the items called for in the IT Strategic Plan, Les Wanninger called a meeting of the IT Steering Committee in February, 1997. In addition to Johnson and Wanninger, the committee was composed of the senior vice presidents of finance, administration and human resource management, research and development, and operations. Tom Anderson represented the marketing function on the committee.

Two key viewpoints were expressed at the meeting. Paul Johnson argued that the PSS should be dropped from the systems plan for three reasons. First, his IT group simply did not have the personnel resources to work on, what was his first priority, the major hardware and software migration project. Second, of the three applications projects in the plan, the PSS took the most resources and was vague enough that the resource estimates were probably low. Third, he pointed out that the benefits from the PSS were uncertain and that the rate of return on this project was subject to much uncertainty.

Tom Anderson countered by saying, Its fine to build infrastructure for the future, but we need to support our core business with information technology. Marketing and sales are at the heart of what we are doing and, since these activities contribute directly to our corporate profit, they should be our highest priority.

The meeting got hot and heavy arguing priorities, the accuracy of estimates, and relationships between line and staff groups. When, after about half an hour of heated debate Paul Johnson said, Hell, why spend our valuable resources on the PSS anyway since your sales reps cant even type let alone use models and high technology, Wanninger terminated the meeting and said that his decision about what to do about the PSS would be forthcoming in few days.

The Decision and a Direction for the Future

Two days later, Wanninger asked Tom Anderson to come over for a meeting to hear his decision. Shortly thereafter, Anderson met with Mike Duffy to inform him of what had been decided about the PSS. The following dialog is representative of what went on during the meeting.

Anderson: Ive got good news and bad news about the PSS. The good news is that the project has been approved. The bad news is that the approval is only for a one-year pilot project with a budget of $300,000. More bad news, depending on how you look at it Mike, is that for the next year youre a project manager with complete responsibility for the PSS pilot.

Duffy: What? You mean Ive got total control including the software development and the training and implementation and only a third of the budget we requested for the project?

Anderson: Yep, but were only talking a pilot here. Whats more, weve got the complete control and Im putting you in charge of the project. And even more interesting is that were completely divorced from IT. Youve got to handle all the applications development yourself.

Duffy: You mean Ive got to find some way of getting the applications built? I thought that Johnson was putting three of his people on this.

Anderson: Not anymore.

Duffy: Wow, you mean that Im a software developer, systems integrator, trainer, and change agent for the next year?

Anderson: You got it, Mike. And, not only do we have to produce a pilot system, but one that better be successful if we want to go ahead and implement the system for all the sales force.

Duffy: Well we, and especially me, are really are on the spot arent we? Ive got to make sure that if we spend the $300K that we get a system that pays off. My first concern, of course, has always been getting our sales reps to use the system and to use it effectively. If this doesnt happen, even if Im able to pull off the systems development, were dead. The only difference is that now Ive also got the job of building the system as well as getting it used.

Anderson: I agree, Mike, but remember the customers buying our products are another key and shouldnt be forgotten. Even if we can get buy-in from the sales reps, the PSS will not achieve its objectives unless the customer sees some value in what it offers.

Duffy: Yeah, I agree, and I guess Id better get my staff together and let them in on this. And, Id better start looking for some software developers.

Anderson: We just have a total project budget of $300,000. I think its safe to assume that we can reallocate the percentage of expenditures in the original categories if we think its necessary. On the good side of things, Ill cover you and your staff on my budget so you can work full time on the PSS and not be charged against the $300,000.

Duffy: What do you think about spending some on hiring a consultant that knows something about systems building and implementation?

Anderson: Fine, just keep within the budget.

Exhibit 1. PSS Applications

Clinical

1. Database of all XenoTec material cross-referenced by type of surgery, patient status, location of surgery, and complications to provide immediate summaries of clinical material to customers

2. Educational training programs such as a model of the uptake and distribution of anesthetic to a patients body, cardiovascular performance following administration of a neuro-muscular reversal agent, etc.

3. Database of clinical information on competitive products

4. Database of compendium references for all anesthesia products (XenoTecs and competitors)

5. Communications access to Medline and BRS/After Dark (commercially available databases with references to a wide range of medical literature)

6. Database profiling customers and residents to assist representatives when customers switch territories

7. Database on specialty chemical capabilities

Territory Management

1. Comparative pricing data and models to allow cost comparisons on a customer specific technique basis

2. Exception triggering system on orders for follow-up

3. Daily sales order reporting. (Orders for XenoTec products were placed directly by customers with XenoTec headquarters. This application would allow reps to know what orders had been placed by their accounts)

4. Remaining potential by account model

5. Commission calculations and incentive projections

6. Access to P&L statements by territory

7. Performance in key accounts and teaching institutions

8. Time management performance vs. budget

New Product Launch

1. Comparative pricing information to facilitate thiopental launch with pharmacist/customer (Thiopental is a generic barbituate induction agent)

2. Database on veterinary clinical information

3. Neuromuscular agents

Internal Communications

1. Electronic call reporting

2. Electronic mail

3. Convention scheduling

4. Literature ordering/availability

Personal Productivity

1. Word processing (with letter quality printing at home)

2. Spreadsheets

3. Presentation software

4. Database software

Exhibit II. PSS Laptop Configuration

PRODUCT

Dell Inspiron 3000

SCREEN

13.3 Active Matrix

PROCESSOR

233 MHz Intel Pentium

MEMORY

32 Mbyte SDRAM

HARD DRIVE

2.1 Gbyte ATA

CACHE

512 Kbyte Piplined Burst

CD-ROM

20X Max CD-ROM

DISKETTE DRIVE

3.5 1.44 Mbyte Diskette Drive

MODEM, MOUSE, AUDIO

56Kbit capable modem, touch pad. Yamaha Wavetable Speakers

BATTERY

Smart Lithium Ion

SOFTWARE

MS Windows-95, MS Office Professional

PRICE

$3, 750

Exhibit III. PSS Cost Estimates

Computer Hardware,

Operating System &

Personal Productivity Software

$300,000

Specialized Software Development

320,000

Training and Support (Inc. Travel)

280,000

Staff Administration

100,000

Total Cost

$1,000,000

Exhibit IV. PSS Benefit Analysis

Clinical

Territory Management

New Products

Internal Communications

Increase sales volume by $1.5 million annually by 1999

Assist in implementing dollar benefits associated with sales analysis and territory management task force particularly regarding route planning and exception reporting

Assist in successfully launching new drugs

Increase frequency and quality of customer mailings

Heighten XenoTecs image as a high quality education oriented organization

Assist in minimizing the impact of DRGs on XenoTec sales

Provide customers with clinical information not presently available on some generic products

Rapid and readable transfer of field intelligence

Provide customers with a relocation service

Provide immediate feedback required to make commission and incentive system really go

Improve efficiency of literature distribution

Provide a means to improve efficiency of exiting promotional materials

Rev 11/00

This case is adapted from Anaquest: The Professional Services Project (A) and (B) by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, 1986. The case was developed for instructional purposes only and is not presented as an evaluation of management practice.