Detail of Sneden, Topographical map of Washington D.C. and Vicinity showing the Union forts and Defenses -- 1861-63 -- Union and Rebel positions plotted w/ ref to V.P. Corbet, Map of the Seat of War Showing the Battles

of July 18th and 21

st, 1861 (Library of Congress)

In the month or two before the First Battle of Bull Run (or Manassas

Junction), Rebel forces have approached close enough to pose a serious

threat to the Nation’s Capital – from territory within the Sacred State of

Virginia !! But the Rebel strongholds and outposts – notably at Manassas

Jct -- aka Bull Run !! -- Fairfax and Annandale, Virginia – along with some

advance picket posts, are called “defensive positions” by the Confederate

Command. I know!! Lincoln didn’t believe it either. So, as can be seen

from the map, preceding page, the Rebs are being held back from

Washington City, at Manassas at 31 miles out, Fairfax at 22 mi., etc. and

Annandale at 13 miles from the capital! Other Rebel actions, such as the

seizure of the Federal arsenal at Harper’s Ferry, on April 18th

, and the

April 20th

burning of the railroad bridges along the PW&B RR leading

from New England into Baltimore, on, serve to consolidate the South’s

“defensive posture.” See, YANKEE SCOUT – Outbreak Of War!!

Pvt. Drew had reported that his 6th

Maine regiment, reaching Baltimore

on July 19th

, 1861, were the first Washington D.C.-bound troops to be

transported by train from Philadelphia through Baltimore to Washington

since the mob riots of that April 19th

– three month prior!! Restoration of

the PW&B rail line was eventually completed by the middle of May, 1862,

but meanwhile U.S. troops had to be transported to D.C. by an alternate

route: by steamer down the Delaware River, then through the Chesapeake

& Delaware Canal to Chesapeake Bay….

Those other troops then took a detour around Baltimore --

an extended cruise down Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the

Potomac, and then all the way back up the Potomac again to

Washington City !! Ferries docked at the Navy Yard in

Washington, and the men went into camp or were housed in

government offices…..

[P. 18] “After paying our bill we started to find the building where the Reg't was, when near the House we found a

police man looking for us.”

Detail, E. Sachse & Co., lithograph, U.S. House chambers (1866)

Pvts. C. N. Drew and Dan Bagley and the rest of the 6th

Maine Inf. were housed in the old Hall of Congress. See

the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Outbreak of War!! The New York troops – the Fire Zouaves and others –

got the fancy new lodgings: shown here during a regular session, the new House Chamber opened in 1857.

“We were in time to get in line for a march to Chain Bridge. Chain Bridge crosses the Potomac River 6 miles

from Washington. We took a route through the growns of the White House, and Pres. Lincoln + wife + some

others stood on the stoop as we passed.”

Rooming in the old House chambers? Parading through the White House grounds?

“

E. Sachse & Co., Washington president’s house [sic] (ca. 1861) (Library of Congress)

“We went throgh Georgetown to camp grown, the tents were all pitched, coffee + hard-tack, pork + beans awaiting

for us. The camp was laid out according to Army regulations.”

Detail of E. Sachse & Co. lithograph, View of Georgetown, D.C. (1855). The arrow at the left along the Maryland

shore of the Potomac, indicates the tree-line of the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal towpath, running about parallel with

the Washington Aqueduct (W.A.*) which was under construction at the time Pvt. Drew and the 6th

Maine Infantry

regiment arrived -- and which features later in our story! Leaving Georgetown, the troops are taking the C&O

towpath road north along the Potomac, to the perimeter of the District of Columbia. See following page ….

At right, this William M. Smith

photograph approximates the

view of Chain Bridge at Little

Falls from Pvt. Drew’s new

training camp, in the vicinity of

Battery Martin Scott on the

Maryland hillside and looking

back across the Potomac to the

Virginia side.

Union Army sentries line the

pedestrian gangway flanking the

carriage route. In this phase of

its history, the Bridge was a

structure of heavy timbers,

connected with iron bolts and

fittings. In the foreground under

the Maryland abutment of the

bridge, the waters of the

Chesapeake & Ohio Canal

surge by.

“We stacked arms in the Co. Street, and and made up our tent crews. 16 to a tent, we had the Cibley Tents,

[ Look it up ! – Ed.] everything on the grown except the guns. They had a rack [P. 19 ] around the tent-pole, a lot

of straw to sleep on we laid in circles feet to the pole.”

“The next day, July the 21st we listened all the P.M. to the Battle of Bull Run. We listened to the cann[on]ade of

that battle -- they quite in the A.M. The first report came about 10:15 A.M. that our men had got the best of it.”

Detail of C. Magnus, Topographical Map of Virginia between Washington and Manassas Junction, 1861 (LoC)

Drew doesn’t say whether he and the other men of Co. K could see anything from the top of that hill.. but its

probable they could see some smoke from the battle. It was the reports of the artillery that could not be ignored:

at a distance of 31 miles the thundering percussions of the cannonades of the two opposed armies now engaged

must have made an unmistakable first impression on the troops. They were listening to some of the handiwork of

a master artillerist: a professor of artillery from Virginia Military Institute … name of Jackson.

“ 3 of us got permission from Capt. Carey to go up on a high hill a short ways from camp to see if we could see

the smoke of battle….”

The dramatic lithograph print by Kurz & Allison portrays the first day of combat on Bull Run – the smoke of the

cannon mingling with the fog. Drew’s notes also accurately followed the tide of the Battle of Bull Run: the Grand

Army held sway for the better part of the day: Bishop's Concise History of the War (1864) p. 24 notes, “… after a

severe fight of over six hours, when the federals had nearly won the field, the enemy almost disheartened were

reinforced by Johnston’s army ....”

VMI Professor of Artillery, Thomas J. Jackson, first demonstrated his tactical skills here at Manassas, and earned

his nickname “Stonewall.” He also commanded artillery that Pvt. Drew could hear all the way from Washington.

Jackson had a professional & scientific grasp of artillery and ballistics, as did his VMI colleague, Gen. Daniel Harvey

Hill. Prof. Hill’s book on Elements of Algebra https://archive.org/details/elementsofalgebr00hillrich (1857), was

endorsed by Prof. Jackson. Along with algebra problems, the textbook includes unique number puzzles on dates

in American history (see pp. 316-318), as well as questions on metal alloys used in artillery, computation of ballistics

trajectories, etc. Try No. 354, “the Problem of Lights” on p. 329. Prof. Hill uses a Newtonian physics to

demonstrate applied algebra. In one problem Hill offers to explain a cannonball’s decelerating flight as a string of

incremental algebraic points mediated by the Newtonian proposition of the fluxion and the fluent. At his p. 350:

Suppose a cannonball to leave the mouth of a piece with a velocity of 2000 feet per second, and that this

velocity is reduced to 1200 feet per second, at the end of the third second. It is plain, that the difference

between the spaces passed over in any two consecutives instants of time will not be equal to the difference

between the distances passed over in any other two consecutive instants, unless those instants are inappreciably

small. But for the millionth part of a second, the velocity might be regarded as constant. If the instant was

then taken thus small, the difference between the spaces in two consecutive instants would be constant.

For more intriguing story problems of Prof. Jackson & Hill, check out YANKEE SCOUT – White Oak Swamp!!

“In the P.M. we got word that the Union Army had been defeated and was in full retreat for the North Side of

Potomac, + the Rebels were in hot pursuit, we stood in line of battle for an hour thinking that we might be wanted.

“We put out pickets across the Bridge; after dark the Union men began to come cross the Bridge, we had no

orders to stop them at the bridge + they kept coming in squad of 10, 20 + more all night, each crowd swore they twere all that was left of their regiment and laid the defeat to the Black Horse Cavalry and the Masked Battery of

the Rebs. [Look ‘em up! – Ed.] That was All we could learn.”

“We felt that if the 6th ME. had been there [ at Bull Run ], with tham old muskets + buck + ball cartridges that

might have been a harder fight.”1

Edmund C. Stedman, a correspondent for the New York World, submitted a lengthy report on the battle, as of July

29, and reprinted it in August of that year, as a short pamphlet. It gives his intelligent eye-witness observations of

the battle and the Federal retreat. Read the full text here: https://archive.org/details/battleofbullrun00sted

“By the time I reached the top of the hill, the retreat, the panic, the hideous headlong confusion, were

now beyond a hope. I was near the rear of the movement with the brave Capt. Alexander, who endeavored

by the most gallant but unavailable exertions to check the onward tumult. It was difficult to believe in the

reality of our sudden reverse. “What does it all mean?” I asked Alexander. “It means defeat,” was his

reply. “We are beaten; it is shameful, a cowardly retreat! Hold up, men!” he shouted, “don’t be such

infernal cowards!” And he rode backwards and forwards, placing his horse cross the road and vainly trying

to rally the running troops. The teams and wagons confused and dismembered every corps. We were

now cut off from the advance body by the enemy’s infantry who had rushed on the slope just left by us,

surrounded the guns and sutler’s wagons, and were apparently pressing up against me. “It’s no use

Alexander,” I said, “you must leave with the rest.” * * *

“Meantime I saw officers with leaves and eagles on their shoulder straps, majors and colonels who had

deserted their commands, pass me galloping as if for dear life. No enemy pursued just then; but I suppose

all were afraid that his guns would be trained down the long, narrow avenue, and mow the retreating

thousands, and batter to pieces army wagons and everything else which crowded it. Only one field officer,

so far as my observation extended, seemed to have remembered his duty. Lieut-Col. Speidel, a foreigner

attached to a Connecticut regiment, strove against the current for a league. I positively declare that, with

the two exceptions mentioned, all efforts made to check the panic before Centreville was reached, were

confined to civilians. * * * [ Centreville is seven miles north of Manassas– Ed.]

“But what a scene! And how terrific the onset of the tumultuous retreat. For three miles, hosts of federal

troops – all detached from their regiments, all mingled in one disorderly route, were fleeing along the road,

but mostly through the lots on either side. Army wagons, sutler’s teams, and private carriages, choked the

passage, tumbling against each other, amid clouds of dust, and sickening sights and sounds. Hacks,

containing unlucky spectators of the late affray, were smashed like glass, and the occupants were lost sight

of in the debris. Horses flying wildly from the battle-field, many of them in death-agony, galloped at

random forward, joining in the stampede. Those on foot who could catch them, rode them bare-back, as

much to save themselves from being run over, as to make quicker time. Wounded men, lying along the

banks – the few neither left on the field nor taken to the captured hospitals – appealed with raised hands

to those who rode horses, begging to be lifted behind …. but few regarded such petitions. Then the artillery,

such as was saved, came thundering along, smashing and overpowering everything. The regular cavalry, I

record it to their shame, joined in the melee, adding to its terrors, for they rode down footmen without

mercy. One of the great guns was overturned, and lay amid the ruins of a caisson as I passed it. I saw an

artillery man running between the ponderous fore and after wheels of his gun-carriage, hanging on with

both hands, and vainly striving to jump upon the ordnance …”

1

Pvt. Drew and the Maine regiments are still in their State of Maine volunteer uniforms and equipped with the best

weaponry that could be found: in Drew’s case, this could mean some trusty old Model 1816 muskets from the War

of 1812, that they were issued at Fort Sullivan – see the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT !! More likely, however,

is that they had been issued a Springfield Model 1835 musket, or if, they’re lucky, their 1842 smoothbore musket.

The “buck and ball” cartridges were standard in the U.S. Army beginning in 1835, but were eliminated with the

introduction of the Springfield rifle in 1861… Know your history of small arms !! See below…

“Bull Run was a lamentable demonstration of the awful calamities invariably attending nations that lack or neglect an army.” – R.M. Johnston, Bull Run Its Strategy and Tactics (1913)

President Lincoln’s first appeal for volunteers, in April, 1861 was for a turnout of 75.000 men to serve only three

months. Due to legal limitations, and for political reasons – since there had not yet been an armed revolt of the

Sothern masses to suppress, the Army had to accept what it could, in order to grow: thus, terms of only two months

were granted to some volunteers. But these volunteers, whom Drew calls two-month’s-men and three months-

men – had a commitment to serve that was perhaps as deep as their term was long. They were not only newcomers

into an Army yet in the process of organization, and still inadequately organized; but they were men who had

volunteered for an in-and-out tour of duty, while entertaining necessarily vague ideas of what might be in store, and

often harboring romanticized expectations of their service, as something on the order of a summer-long excursion.

And then back home to impress the girls.

In fact, in early 1861, no one knew what the war might develop into, or even the process of revolt might be

successfully and peacefully negotiated away.. The vague image of Army service, then, as if it were a tour with French

Foreign legion, held as the common concept: a concept that had in fact been carefully cultivated by the first Army

recruiters, who organized each these first regiments in their communities, man-to-man. “The loafer was encouraged

to believe he was off or a military picnic.” Johnston, Bull Run, p. 5

The most notable instance of this mindset was Elmer Ellsworth, a law clerk and friend of Abraham Lincoln’s who

had early caught the martial bug, and was drilling volunteer regiments as early as 1857 – Thus, when Lincoln’s call

for volunteers went out in April, 1861, Ellsworth had men already in training, and quickly organized the 11th

New

York Volunteer Infantry Regiment: the famous Fire Zouaves, who are so much associated with the history and

imagery of Bull Run. But their dramatic costuming was like something fresh off the Broadway stage; and while this

sense of romantic pageantry had proven valuable in drawing in new and enthusiastic recruits from the streets, it

proved to be a poor excuse for target practice and tactical drilling ….

New York Fire Zouaves charge at Big Bethel

“The transition from political persuasion to the practice of military discipline

could not be said to have been entered on before the Battle of Bull Run was

fought.” Johnston, id, p. 6. And, meanwhile, it was certainly no help to the

morale of the decked-out New York 11th

Fire Zouaves that their same

commander, Elmer Ellsworth, was killed by Confederate gunfire during the

occupation of Alexandria, on May 24, 1861, before the troops ever reached

a battlefield. Elmer Ellsworth had drilled the Zouaves using French field

manuals… Now what?

Thereafter, the first field exercise in demonstration of the limited tactical

training of these otherwise patriotic and heroic troops, was at Big Bethel, on

June 9-10, 1861: an engagement in which 86 Union troops were killed – some

by friendly fire – and only 8 Rebels. The second was here at Manassas

Junction… along the banks of the meandering Bull Run.

Gen. Winfield Scott’s program for the organization of these new recruits into

a competent fighting force had been limited by his own flagging energies, and

residual uncertainty as to what the coming war would entail. There was not

yet even a tactical manual for the troops to drill to. Recall, that in the case of

Drew’s 6th

Maine regiment, tactical drilling had begun at Fort Sullivan, in

Maine, back in April, on the pattern of Scott’s own out-dated Infantry Tactics of 1817. See the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Outbreak of War!! And Gen. Hardee’s Confederate Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics, would only

appear in 1861 -- but after Bull Run. Also, as noted in the Last Issue, General

Casey’s manual was not approved for use until August of 1862, and his

revisions probably not even in development until after Bull Run. So there

was simply no current tactical manual… but it might help the union volunteers

if the drillmaster could also parlay and shout commands in French.

Thus, for instance, Johnston, at p. 7, writes of the Zouaves and other volunteers at Bull Run, “In loading, aiming

and firing properly, they showed little proficiency, either not charging their musket at all, charging it improperly, or

charging it over and over again. When by chance or by application, they succeeded in discharging it, they generally

missed the object aimed at, for it is calculated that from 8,000 to 20,000 bullets were fired [during the battle of Bull

Run ] for every man killed or wounded, which is probably a conservative estimate.” At this point, there was simply

not an army, and it could be argued, there was not even a “well-regulated militia” in the sense of the term as used

by the American colonials and the Second Amendment of the Constitution. It was mostly the trappings of an

Army. Army supplies and logistics were likewise only in a preparatory stage of organization.

But note the date of the battle of Bull Run -- on July 21 -- and the date of Lincoln’s call for 75,000 volunteers of

April 15: a period of very nearly three months, matching the term of the enlistment of the three months volunteers.

The time-span is no coincidence: with enlistments about to expire -- seven regiments were due to have their terms

expiring between July 22 and 30th

-- and every regiment in most units claiming their discharge, “Something must be

accomplished, whatever the cost, before the three months’ army went home again, and that something must be an

advance to Manassas…” Johnston, id. P. 54. Thus, Manassas was a disaster foreordained by the 3-month

enlistments – the maximum Lincoln could require under controlling law, the 1795 Militia Act.

However, this was not widely recognized at the time! For an eye-opening expose of how the Congress and many

among the public at large interpreted the Union Army defeat at Manassas, see Bruce Tap, Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: the Committee on the Conduct of the War (1998), esp. Chapter 2: “Investigating Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff.”

The disaster of Manassas also throw a dramatic contrasting light on the achievements of the Army of the Potomac

the following spring, and in particular the total discipline of General Winfield Scott Hancock’s First Brigade, under

fire by charging Rebel regiments beneath the wall of Fort Magruder, at Williamsburg. See YANKEE SCOUT –

Williamsburg!! And Hancock will set to work on this project, at the end of our story this time …!!

A Court of Inquiry later scapegoated Colonel Dixon S. Miles, finding him

guilty of drunkenness on the morning of the Battle of Bull Run, but

recommended taking no further action. See, Bishop’s Concise History of the Civil War, p. 36. But the causes of this debacle could be located only much

higher up the chain of command. Edwin Stanton, later Secretary of War,

more correctly wrote: "The dreadful disaster of Sunday [Battle of Bull Run]

can scarcely be mentioned. The imbecility of this administration has

culminated in that catastrophe, and irretrievable misfortune and national

disgrace are to be added to the ruin of all peaceful pursuits and national

bankruptcy as the result of Lincoln's 'running the machine' for five months."

President Lincoln, once a captain in the volunteer militia during the Illinois Blackhawk wars, was also immediately

aware that “the buck” had to stop in the White House. Bull Run was more than an early or isolated battlefield

defeat: it was an Army-wide crisis of discipline the origins of which undeniably lay within the very Army command

itself, and in the Administration. So, on the next day, July 22, 1861, President Lincoln recalled Gen. Geo B.

McClellan from the western theatre – meaning West Virginia -- and appointed him commander of the Army of the

Potomac, charged with creating a professional army out of the militias and volunteer forces.

McClellan tackled his new field of responsibilities with comprehensive expertise, ordering the construction of new

defensive works to ring D.C., requiring new weapons and the development of coordinate new tactics, and

reorganizing the Army into corps and divisions: quickly searching out former West Point classmates and fellow

Mexican War veterans, whom he deemed most competent to hold a brigade command. Among these were

Winfield S. Hancock – see below, in This Issue of YANKEE SCOUT -- and George Gordon Meade. Drew would

serve under each man as a regular soldier and scout, both. McClellan tapped Fitz John Porter and Joseph Hooker

for new brigade commands in the Army.

HOWEVER, something in McClellan’s makeup – certainly arising from

his Democratic sympathies and his pro-slavery politics – was soon to

produce a heel-dragging resistance against cooperation with his new

Commander and Administration colleagues.

Like Stanton, McClellan harbored an early prejudice against Lincoln: a

prejudice he actively cultivated in an imagination that went in overdrive.

McClellan’s strong sense of destiny (and of self-importance) would,

already within just a month after accepting his command, authorize in

McClellan’s mind, his well-known penchant for fabricating exaggerated

figures of Confederate troop-strength -- generally against the weight of the

evidence. The bigger McClellan’s opponents, the greater becomes

McClellan’s challenge, and the more important McClellan’s own role.

See, e.g., Edwin Fishel, “Outnumbered on the Peninsula,” Chapt. 6, in,

The Secret War for the Union (1996). McClellan’s fancies of enemy

strength of course “surpassed” the understanding of Secretary of War

Stanton and President Lincoln himself: and their incredulity was a thing

which, for McClellan, justified his low opinion of his superiors. So, from

such initial self-delusion as to material facts, McClellan will go on to

construct a mental model of the progress of the war, in which at every key

juncture, only his own military judgment is to be trusted! But this state of

mind -- in a soldier -- is one which must lead, all but inexorably, to a

mindset by which the soldier will vindicate mutiny. And thus, a new

theater of engagement in the Civil War has opened: McClellan’s Mutiny!!

COMING UP !! -- Only in YANKEE SCOUT in the Civil War!!

Detail of Sneden, Topographical Map of D.C. showing Forts, etc.; positions plotted w.r.t. Sneden, Map Shewing Positions of Union and Rebel Forces, Septr, 1861. Following their success at Manassas Junction, the Confederates

advanced into Fairfax County and set up housekeeping at Lewinsville and Falls Church, Virginia, and fortify nearby

Munson’s Hill and Minor’s Hill, and patrol the roads connecting them. Recon parties from both armies are about,

and likely to run into one another … and a certain YANKEE SCOUT …. Maybe as early as our Next Issue !!! ??

Col. Hiram Burnham

commanding the 6th Maine Volunteers

The next morning [ca. July 22, 1861] Dan + I asked the Capt. to let us go down by the river and discharge our

guns. "Wait a while," he [said],"We are going to have some target practice."

“One morning the Regt fell in in light marching with armes only, each Co. took a different rout, Co. K went up

the [Potomac] river a mile or so. Set up our target, we had five cartridges each, our Capt. put up a prize of $1.00

for any one who would put the 5 balls into mark as large as a $5 bill -- he was out only $5 with 90 men shooting.2

After witnessing the Union Army in pell-mell flight from the banks of Bull Run, Pvt. Drew and his companions are

now more eager than ever to improve their marksmanship. But at this stage of their training, only five men out of

ninety have the experience shooting, to be able to group their shots. With regular target practice, the soldiers’

control and accuracy will improve dramatically through the winter, until by next Spring, at the battle of Williamsburg,

Drew and others will comment, that it seemed like “every man in the company had picked his victim.” By reciting

this vignette, Drew is definitely implying that he was among this group of backwoods Maine marksmen who made

the grouping … and this seems inference is validated by what follows next, in the Memoir of Pvt. Calif Newton Drew

– YANKEE SCOUT in the Civil War !!

Got Acquainted With Burnham -- New Guns

“The next morning at Guard mount [P. 20 ] I was appointed

Conol's Orderly to the conolel for the day -- [Capt. Percival]

Knowles was in Washington on business, Burnham was in

command, when I reported he asked me into his tent, told me to sit

down, asked my name + Co.3

He said he knew an old maid named

Lucy Drew:

"That's my Aunt, Conal. and you'd better go slow.."

“He was short, stought, heavy bluff lumberman had served in the

Maine + Aroostook War, knew my father 4

wore a wig, had a voice

that could be heard a mile.

“There wasn't much to do around Head Quarters, so we put in most

of the day talking about the war. He said he thought it would last

the whole of the three years or more and he expected the Reg't

would be in some hard fighting, he asked if I had been to target

practicing the day before. I opened my shirt, showed him my

shoulder it was black and blue and some swolen. He said those

guns was made to kick so a man would know when they went off, so

he would not load them until time.”

2

If Burnham was investing his own $5 to incentivize his troops’ marksmanship, he knew how to build a regiment. 3

After the targets have been examined, Pvt. Drew, evidently one of the five shooters to group his shots as challenged,

is invited to the Headquarters tent of Col. Burnham … who now begins singling out Pvt. Drew for special mentoring. 4 Pvt. Drew's father, George W. Drew, had also served in this war. See the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT !!

“We were drilling at Casey's Manual, the regular Army drill. Each Co.

had a drill master. We all were anxious to become perfect.”

According to Drew, the troops have now begun drilling to the manual of Gen.

Silas J. Casey, shown here in an edition from 1863. Drew refers to this as

“the regular army drill;” however, all sources concur that Casey’s Infantry Tactics were only officially adopted the following year – pursuant to an order

of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton dated August 11, 1862: so, if he’s correct,

Drew must be referring to drilling done according to some advance text

undergoing field testing by Gen. Casey, as a replacement for Winfield Scott’s

Tactics. Meanwhile, however, in Hooker’s Division before Yorktown, the

troops are drilling according to General Hardee’s Confederate Manual

during the month of April, 1861, as a replacement for Scott !! See, B.K.

Benson, Who Goes There?, p, 102. So, there was yet no uniformity in the

drilling … although Hardee differed from Scott in just a few particulars.

Casey was promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteers as of August 31,

1861, as part of McClellan’s reforms following Bull Run: suggesting that his

promotion came with the duty to develop just such a tactics, to bring about

requisite uniformity. But is there already some pre-publication “field-testing”

of Casey’s Manual going on, as Drew implies? The Editor thinks this very

likely –the Army’s tactics must undergo such field trials before approval …

“ One morning we fell in light marching order -- as we struck the road heading toards Washington the order he

gave was "Come on you leatherheads -- if you want New Guns they are waiting for you at Washington!" We made

that 6 miles in less than 1 1/2 hour. At the depot we stacked the old muskets and hung the equipment on the

bayonets and bid them a fond fairwell.

Now Comes the Springfield Rifle

“... which we found in another part of yard with the U.S. equipment. Some two-month's men's time had expired.5

No leaving the ranks or stragling was the order. The Lieut. Conol. was to take the men back to camp. Any man

not in camp at evening roll [P. 21] call will be serverly punished, all were on hand at roll call.

The Springfield Co. won the contract for supplying the Union Army long-barreled rifled

musket – now just a ‘rifle” – which fired a “Minie-ball” or a regular .58 ball This new weapon was

reliable and accurate, for sure, but this gun with its caps lock could be readily set-up with a trip-wire,

to booby-trap nocturnal stalkers attacking the Union picket line. See, for instance, the Next Issue

of YANKEE SCOUT -- Death on the Picket Line!!

5

As discussed above, pp. 13-14, the first Union Army volunteers were short-timers, who usually enlisted for just a

three-months term – as did many of the soldiers who recently fled the battlefield at Bull Run. But Pvt. Drew writes

specifically of “two-months’ men’s time” – and if this is accurate, it would again reflect the desperation of Army

recruiters to negotiate to get anyone onto the muster rolls, regardless of the terms of their contract.

C.S.A. Gen. John Bankhead Magruder

Try finding this atrocity covered on Wikipedia !!

Civil War historians may neverendingly lament the actions of General

Sherman in the burning of Atlanta, as one of the great atrocities of the

Civil War: but rarely do they treat the actions of C.S.A. General John

Magruder and 1,000 Confederate soldiers out of Yorktown in setting

the torch to the early colonial city of Hampton, on the night of August

7, 1861… burning much of it to the ground ….

Gen. Magruder’s action was in retaliation for new Union Army policies intended to address the liberation of African-

American slaves from Southern slave-owners, as hostilities broke out across northern Virginia in 1861. In

particular, in July of 1861 Union General Benjamin F. Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe, had accepted a

few fugitive slaves into protective custody as “contraband of war” – and this new legal fiction caught on. Southern

slaves were soon declared to be enemy “contraband” under the laws of war, and thus subject to seizure by Union

forces. Negro slaves escaping from the south gladly accepted this new protected status, and soon thousands of

“contrabands” were making their way north. To accommodate and resettle this new population, the Union Army

established “Contraband Camps” – and some effort was made to select those locations which Confederate officials

would find the most offensive. One of the first of these was in elegant colonial City of Hampton, Virginia, which

became such a Contraband Camp in July, 1861: but, in order to prevent this dramatic early act of de-segregation

Gen. Magruder led a brigade of Confederates and set fire virtually to the entire city of Hampton – leaving it in ashes.

Nevertheless, Hampton as a contraband camp thrived, and one tree became the site of the first Negro college in

the nation.

C.S.A. Gen. John B. Magruder

[First] Brigade Formed

“One day the 5th Vermont Regt. came 6

and camped on the left of us, then the 79 New York; thir was a regt of the

Hiland Scotts in their Kilt and plaid uniforms and the Bagpipes. I wondered would their legs get cold in winter

and how did they keep the mosquitoes from bothering.7

“The Seventy-Ninth Regiment (Highlanders) New York

State Militia,” Harper’s Weekly, Mar 25, 1861

“A Battery of Light Artillery camped at the head of Chain

Bridge.

“One evening at dress paraade we were informed that Genl.

F. W. Smith was the Brigade Commander and was to [be]

honored and obeyed as such.”

6 The 5

th

Vermont Regiment was mustered into service on September 16, 1861, and probably reached Washington

D.C. within a few days thereafter, ca. Sept. 18, and made camp first on Meridian Hill, then moved out towards

Chain Bridge, ca. Sept. 20. See the map on the following page of this issue, which shows “Battery Vermont” located

in the hills beyond Chain Bridge. 7

The 79th

New York is the famous -- and fractious -- New York Highland Guard Regiment of Scots. This regiment

has already served and fought in the battle of Bull Run, where their numbers were decimated. Following the battle

they have been re-assigned to the camps behind Chain Bridge, and also tasked with the construction of McClellan’s

new fortifications around Washington, D.C. As with other of the first-formed New York regiments, including the

famous Fire Zouaves, the Highland Guard emphasized the “swag” of their highly distinctive uniforms. These lucky

Scots had committed to dress uniforms with kilts; meanwhile the plaid material for making them “tartan trousers”

was slow in reaching Union Army seamstresses. The concept of camouflage uniforms was unknown.

Gen. W. F. “Baldy” Smith

“Then one day, President Lincoln, Vice President Hamlin from our state, Gen. W. Scott, and Genl. Geo. B.

McClelland came out to see what we looked like on review. I was told we did credit to the Army. Lincoln and

Scott were in the back seat of an open carriage behind a fine large pair of blackes drove by a negro in a uniform

that took the shine off the Commander in Chief. We were kept at the drill all the time 6 + 8 hour per day and

was getting tired of so much of it.8

“The Long Roll was beat one night at the midnight hour -- it was the first time we had heard it and we were shure

the Rebels were right on top of us. We didn't stop to put on coats or to tie our shoes, we slung our equipments

on grabed the guns and got into line on more than the double-quick. As we moved out of camp each company

took a different route Co. K went up the River along the canal a couple of miles formed line facing the River, told

to be very quiet and watchful.

Not a Gun was Loaded.”

“Up the River some two miles was [P. 22] Cabbin John's Bridge a stone structure we were told it was the largest

single arch in the world, it was built for the aqueduct that furnished water to the City of Washington. At daylight

we climbed the hill to the road and went to camp.”

Pvt. Drew and his Brigade have been

encamped around Battery Martin Scott, -

- circled in blue – near Battery Vermont,

overlooking the Potomac River at Chain

Bridge, and defending the northwest

perimeter of Washington D.C. from

possible Confederate attack across Chain

Bridge.

The recruits have broken camp and

moved two miles up the Potomac, to the

oddly-named Cabin John’s Bridge, in

Montgomery County, Maryland, here

circled in green. The bridge is actually a

key span for the Washington Aqueduct –

a project for supplying fresh water to

Washington D.C., that has been being

supervised by the United States War

Department !!

8 While this entry is not dated in the

Memoir, the review is clearly not the

Grand Review at Bailey’s Crossing of

November 20, 1861: General Winfield

Scott resigned as Army Commander as of

October 31.

.

This image of Cabin John Bridge is dated August 12, 1861 – so it shows the bridge as it was under construction,

when Pvt. Drew and Lincoln’s volunteers saw it the following month of September, 1861. As soon as possible

after the span was stable the wood truss-work supporting it was pulled to prevent arson, which would have burned

the mortar and collapsed the span. So it’s near certain that a guard was being posted here from among the 6th

Maine.

Think them Confederates wouldn’t have burnt a bridge supplying water to the population of Washington? Well…

better think again!! See above p. 19, on Hampton, or the Last Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Outbreak of War!!

As Drew writes, this arch was, upon completion, the largest single-span masonry arch in the world – and held that

prestige until 1903. As noted, the bridge – actually a section of the Washington Aqueduct, or Washington Canal -

- had the official name of Union Arch but took its popular name from Cabin John Creek, which runs underneath

it. It still serves today, over 150 year later, as a section of the aqueduct.

Construction started in 1853, by the Army Corp of Engineers during the tenure of then-Secretary of War Jefferson

Davis. Davis’ term as War Secretary concluded in 1857, and he returned to Mississippi, to become Senator of that

state, resigning this office in January, 1861, to soon become President of the Confederated States of America.

The design-engineer of this central span of masonry was one Alfred Landon Rives, who was also appointed by

Congress to undertake construction of the Cabin John Bridge. Rives began construction in 1857, and work was still

underway when, in May, 1861, Virginia seceded from the Union and Rives soon returned home to join the

Confederacy-- abandoning construction on Cabin John’s Bridge at the stage achieved in the photo above. Rives

began work as an engineer in Virginia, and eventually rose to the position of acting chief of the Engineering Bureau

of the Confederacy … where he began engineering computations on a NEW UNION ARCH which would span

the two eternal pillars of the Confederacy …

Alfred Landon Rives was the

youngest of three sons of Virginia

Democratic Senator William C.

Rives – who supported President

Tyler in his 1841 veto of Whig party

National Banking legislation, and was

alleged by Whigs to be a member of

a Van Buren “cabal” to sink the

banking bill. In his third race for

Virginia Senator, Rives ran as a Whig

himself, and won.

In 1860 William C. Reeves was a

supporter of the Constitutionalist

Union Party, and was balloted as the

party’s nominee for President. He

voiced opposition to Secession, but

quickly joined Virginia after she

seceded. His son Alfred L. Rives

soon followed.

Alfred L. Rives new position in the Confederate Engineering Bureau required him

compute labor costs on C.S.A. construction projects, using slave labor rates with

receipts payable to Confederate slave-owners, and manufacturers like Tredegar Iron

Works, who relied on slave-labor and stood to “clean up” in the war. For more on

TIW, see YANKEE SCOUT – Stranger in Richmond!! In the context of his new

position with the C.S.A., Rives also made some interesting preliminary computations

which probably qualify as the first professional estimate of monies due and to be

appropriated by Congress, as Reparations for Slavery – although in Rives’ calculations,

the slaves were not the ones who were going to get compensated:

For an accurate in-depth treatment of

the Southern Slave economy vs. the

American Economic System, see W.

Allen Salisbury, The Civil War and the American System (EIR, 1993)

Alfred L. Rives

“One day when looking for a target range, we found a mile of streight level road above the big arch bridge a

milestone at each end. We got permission from Conol Burnham to go up there for target practice. Our guns was

good for 1000 yards so the sights said -- but it took three charges of powder to the bullet, [to fire] from one mile

post to the other -- then the guns would kick like Old muskets: 100 yards was the best distant for the government

charge. We became quite expert and that winter took a number of prizes in the Rifle contests of the Regt. and also

of the Brigade.

“One day Congressman Pike from our [state] Came

to see us and we keept him franking envelopes

nearly all day.

Frederick Augustus Pike was a hometown boy, from East

Machias, Maine who – like Drew, had attended the

Washington Academy, and was a resident of Calais. He’s

welcome in camp because he’s brought along his

Congressman’s “free postage” stamp, and is putting it to

good use in service of the troops sending letters home!

“About the middle of September we struck tents and invaded the sacret soil of Virginia. A large earthwork or fort

was built, rifle pitts dug, it seemed to me the Army was trying to dig its way to Richmond. 9

“The 6th Maine did not do so much of the digging. We were given axes and put to felling timber in front of the

fort and laid other traps to catch the enemy, when they [made] the attack they were supposed to make, but they

never did attack that fort. Day after day we choped down trees untill it became the saying that the 6th Maine was

axeing the way to Richmond. And such timber I had never seen, great big chestnuts three foot in diameter, oaks,

hickory and black walnuts. 10

Our First Thunder storm & Genl Hancock

“One day when we were in the woods there came up a thunder shower, I thought Maine could do something [P.

23] along that line, but I had never seen a Thunderstorm before the rain. Hailstones two inches across came

down in sheets of thunder crash on crash, the lightning one steady flash, the wind roared like breakers on a rocky

shore. When we got to camp the tents were in Rags, nothing left but poles and guy-ropes, and so we done with

the Sibley tents.

9

Probably Pvt. Drew is referring to the Army construction of Fort Marcy or Fort Ethan Allen on the opposite bank

of the Potomac, overlooking the Virginia abutments of Chain Bridge and the Dolly Madison Turnpike ! There’s

no room to cover this here, though! Just grab the Next Issue of YANKEE SCOUT – Death on the Picket Line !!

10

See, K. Link. “Potomac Fever; the Hazards of Camp Life,” in Vermont History, Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 70 (Spring,

1983): “Officers shared the men’s excitement and eagerness. While lumbermen from the Sixth Maine boisterously

chopped oak near Fort Marcy, General W. F. Smith rode up to General Winfield Scott Hancock, their brigade

commander, and asked what the uproar meant. “Oh,” replied Hancock, “that is my Sixth Maine regiment axing its

way to Richmond.”

“We camped in the timber until the little “A” tents was given us, and with

them came Genl. W. S. Hancock to command the Brigade. Genl. Smith

was put in command of the Division.

“We pitched the new tents a short distant from the Fort 4 or 6 men were

put in each tent. My tent mates were Bagley, Brown, Brooks, Dingee and

Walton -- a jolly good-nature happy set of boys.11

“There was a small peace of timber to be cut, the engeneers had blased

[blazed -- Ed.] out the work, it was quite a little job, they wanted it to be

done by 5 o'cl that P.M. and it was given to Co. K. We concluded to make

a drive of it, not a tree was fall -- all were cut so a slight push would send

them down.

“At 4 o'cl P.M. we came out in the opening redy to cut the Drivers. Gen'l

Hancock, Conl Burnham, Capt. Carey several other officers in a group

talking, when they saw us they all came to us. Burnham asked, "What's the

matter? You ain't knocking down that ..?"

Saluting, "We have an hour yet, Conol," I said.

“And will it go on time, my men?" said Genl. Hancock.

"My boys, this is Genl Hancock, he is the Brigade Commander. There is to be a change in the Brigade and a

move of camp soon," said Burnham. We gave three cheers, and fell to work on drive: in 10 minutes there [was a]

noise, a roar and a rush of falling timber a cloud of dust and leaves shut out the sun and the thing [was] over.

The Genl remarked, "I know where I can get men to cut firewood this winter."

11

This rare Maine timber drive occurred in Virginia woods being cleared for Fort Marcy, shown on the map, p. 21.

Drew’s new tent-mates are Pvt. Dan Bagley of East Machias, Pvt. George Brown of Centerville, Pvt. Thomas Brooks

of Lubec, Maine. Pvt. James H. Dingee of Calais and (probably) William Warton of Buffalo, N.Y.

Brig.- Gen. Winfield. S. Hancock