In the wake of the pivotal battle of Gettysburg, July 2-4, 1863, the Union

Army commanded by General Meade, now marches south in pursuit of

the retreating Rebel Army of Northern Virginia, under command of

Gen. Robert E. Lee. The two armies are pursuing approximately

parallel tracks, with Lee’s forces marching to the west of South Mountain

in the direction of the old Antietam battlefield and Williamsport, while

Meade’s forces, to the east of South Mtn., proceed south towards

Fredericksburg. Rebel Gen’l Lee, hoping to delay the Union Army in its

march, sends out cavalry regiments led by the likes of J. E. B. Stuart and

Col. Moseby, to harass the U.S. troops, dropping down on them over

the South mountain range separating the armies in their movement; U.S.

forces return the favor with their own cavalry raids. Engagements and

skirmished take place at Funkstown, Hagerstown, and finally

Williamsport, before Lee retreats to the Rappahannock River.

Lee had selected this bridgehead on the Orange & Alexandria RR, as his

Winter Quarters, and ordered his main army into camp on the southern

banks of the Rappahannock, in Culpeper County, taking possession of

former Union Army battlements and earthworks, while a contingent of

Confederate forces under Brig. Gen’l Jubal Early was ordered to man

the abandoned Union fort and earthworks on the north side of the river,

proximate to the Rappahannock Station of the same railroad:

Detail: Sneden, Plan of the Battles of Kelley’s Ford and Rappahannock Station, Va., Nov. 7th, 1863

So, situated, Lee is now confident that he has eluded Meade, and has

found permanent lodgings wherein to wait out the Winter Season

Then -- in our last episode, YANKEE SCOUT -- Rappahannock

Station!!, Pvt. Calif Newton Drew had found himself tasked with a little

something in the way of “extra duty” in the scouting department: assigned

by Gen. H.A.G. Wright with the penetration of Confederate lines at

General Lee’s new Winter Quarters at Rappahannock Station, as shown

above, along the Orange & Alexandria RR. Drew left alone, crossing the

Rappahannock that night – alone.

Pvt. Drew, probably wearing a “turncoat” uniform of gray ( with a Union

blue inner lining) supplied by U.S. Army intelligence -- and spent the

next days in the enemy’s camp: “I staid with the enemy and ate their

grub.” Drew then reported back enemy entrenchments, weaponry and

troop strength Based upon his report, Gen. Sedgwick ordered an

advance on Rappahannock Station, and the Union Attack very late in

afternoon of Saturday, November 7, 1863, with dusk approaching.

Harper’s illustrator Alfred R. Waud depicted the scene in a dramatic sketch – even showing a daylight-moon, or

dusk moonrise, with the occulted crescent of the moon dark against a twilight sky (looking like a paper punch-out):

Detail: Waud, Capture of Fortifications on the Rappahannock at the Railway Bridge by the Right Wing

commanded by Sedgwick

Fox, in his compendious Regimental Losses in the Civil War, p. 128, (1889) selected the Rappahannock Station

action as the representative engagement for the Sixth Maine, writing:

C.S.A. Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays

There was no more brilliant action in the war than the affair of Rappahannock Station, Va., Nov. 7, 1863.

The Sixth Maine was the most prominent in that successful fight, although gallantly assisted by the other

regiments of the brigade. The enemy, about 2,000 strong, occupied an intrenched position; the Sixth

Maine, with uncapped muskets, supported by the Fifth Wisconsin stormed their works, and springing over

them were engaged in a separate struggle, some of the fighting being hand to hand; bayonets were freely

used, and in once case an officer thrust his sabre through an antagonist. Good fighting was also done at

other points of the line, the total result being a brilliant victory, with large captures of men and material.

But the brunt of the fight fell upon the Sixth…

Clark, Campaigning with the Sixth Maine, p. 49, tallies the losses:

The Sixth Maine at Rappahannock Station lost more than 43 per cent of the entire force which ti took into

the action, while among the officers of that regiment engaged, the loss was more than 76 percent, a mortality

among officers in battle which it is believed has no parallel in modern warfare.

The dramatic events at Lee’s defensive works at Kelley’s Ford on the Rappahannock River, and at Rappahannock

Station on the Orange & Alexandria RR line, led to an important victory for the Grand Army of the Potomac, also

marking a historic first time the Union forces were able to overcome a fortified Confederate position on the first

assault. And not just any fortified position: with General Jubal Early in command, the rebel works at Rappahannock

Station were being held by General Harry T. Hays’ 7th Louisiana Infantry – the famous Louisiana Tigers . In

addition, Capt. Charles Green’s Louisiana guard Artillery (four guns) were reinforced by three Louisiana regiments

led by Col. Archibald Godwin … A total of some 2,000 men defended the works, in fact: very nearly the number

reported back by Pvt. Drew after scouting the rebel defensive works, during the first week of November, 1863 !!

Col. Thomas W. Hyde, of the 7th

Maine Infantry, described the scene the morning after, on the banks of the

Rappahannock, after the surprise Yankee assault

“The next morning I counted forty of the 6th

Maine, great stalwart

fellows, lying dead, close to each other.1 I was up all night caring for

the prisoners. I regaled the two brigade commanders with the best

I had to eat and army whiskey galore, and an hour afterward, when

Col. Scofield, our corps commissary, received them at his camp an

offered refreshments, one of them answered, “Not a mouthful, sir,

till my men are fed!” I strolled among the prisoners and marked

their angry looks, and though somewhat ragged, they were a fine,

hardy lot of soldiers, intensely mortified to have been taken behind

works, by an attack of two brigades only.”2

Of the 2,000 Confederate defenders, almost all were also captured --

including Gen. Hays himself. some 1,670 were taken prisoner. Hays –

who escaped his Union captors not long after -- would later claim that his

forces were overrun by at least 20,000 to 25,000 Union soldiers — a figure

ten times their actual number. The taking of the Rappahannock Station

works also amounted to a serious and immediate strategic setback for Lee,

who had held the Station fortifications in order to defend the bridgehead

of the Orange & Alexandria RR – by which he planned to launch a

northern offensive later.

1 Pvt. Drew had counted 43 of his comrades-in-arms were killed in the assault on the Rebel-held works at

Rappahannock Station that November afternoon. Among these “great, stalwart fellows” were not only the 6th

Maine’s gallant flag-bearer John Gray, but some of Pvt. Drew’s own closest friends, including a young German

immigrant, Emile Hanneman, whom Drew himself sang over “to the other side” the night before, there on the

banks of the Rappahannock. See Last Issue – YANKEE SCOUT – Rappahannock Station!! 2 Thomas Worcester Hyde, Following the Greek Cross, of Memories of the Sixth Army Corp, pp. 170-171 (1894).

The Union Army destroyed the bridgehead, ending Lee’s plans for a northern offensive, and cutting off Lee’s Army

on the exposed fields of Culpeper County. Suddenly, Gen. Lee has no choice now but to move his Army south –

with some urgency …

A. R. Waud, Works Thrown up near the Railroad Bridge over the Rappahannock

It is a surprise follow-up blow to General Lee, in the aftermath of Gettysburg. This is a good place to look at the

Confederate’s key defeat at Rappahannock Station as viewed by General Lee himself, in his official report:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, November 20, 1863.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that after the return of the army of the Rappahannock it was disposed on

both sides of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, General Ewell’s corps on the right and General Hill’s on the left,

with the cavalry on each flank. The troops were placed as near the river as suitable ground for encampment could

be found, and most of the artillery sent to the nearest point in the rear where the animals could be foraged. To hold

the line of the Rappahannock at this part of its course, it was deemed advantageous to maintain our communication

with the north bank; to threaten any flank movement the enemy might make above or below, and thus compel him

to divide his forces, when it was hoped that an opportunity would be presented to concentrate on one or the other

part. For this purpose a point was selected a short distance above the site of the railroad bridge, where the hills on

each side of the river afforded protection to our pontoon bridge and increased the means of defense.

The enemy had previously constructed some small earth-works on these hills to repel an attack from the south.

That on the north side was converted into a tete-de-pont, and a line of rile trenches extended along the crest on the

right and left to the river bank. The works on the south side were remodeled, and sunken batteries for additional

guns constructed on an adjacent hill to the left. Higher up on the same side and east of the railroad near the river

bank, sunken batteries for two guns and rifle-pits were arranged to command the railroad embarkment, under cover

of which the enemy might advance. These works were slight, but were deemed adequate to accomplish the object

for which they were intended.

The pontoon bridge was considered a sufficient means of communication, as in the event of the troops north of the

river being compelled to withdraw, their crossing could be covered by the artillery and infantry in the works on the

south side. Four pieces of artillery were placed in the tete-de-pont and eight others on the works opposite. The

defense of this position was instructed to Lieutenant-General Ewell’s corps and the troops of Johnston’s and Early’s

divisions guarded them alternately, Rodes’ division being stationed near Kelly’s Ford.

The enemy began to rebuilt the railroad as soon as we withdrew from Bristoe Station, his army advancing as the

work progressed. His movements were regularly reported by our scouts, and it was known that he had advanced

from Warrenton Junction a few days before the attack.

His approach toward the Rappahannock was announced on November 6, and about noon next day his infantry was

discovered advancing to the bridge, while a large force moved in the direction of Kelly’s Ford, where the first attack

was made. At the later point the ground on the north side of the Rappahannock commands that on the passage of

the river as would suffice to gain time for putting the troops in a a position selected in rear of the ford, with a view

to contest the advance of the enemy after crossing. In accordance with this intention, General Rodes had one

regiment (the Second North Carolina) on picket along the river, the greater part of it being at Kelly’s, with the

Thirtieth North Carolina in reserve supporting a battery.

As soon as he perceived that the enemy was in force, he ordered his division to take the position referred to in rear

of the ford. While it was getting into line the enemy’s artillery opened upon the Second North Carolina and soon

drove it to shelter, except a few companies near the ford, which continued to fire from the rifle-pits. The Thirtieth

was advanced to the assistance of the Second, but in moving across the open ground was broken by the concentrated

fire of the enemy’s artillery, and took refuge behind some buildings at the river. The enemy, being unopposed

except by the part in the rifle-pits, crossed at the rapids above the ford and captured the troops defending it, together

with a large number of the Thirtieth North Carolina, who refused to leave the shelter of the houses. A pontoon

bridge was then laid down, on which a large force crossed to the south bank.

General Rodes in the meantime had placed his division in position, the resistance of the Second North Carolina

having delayed the enemy sufficiently for this purpose. The advance of the Thirtieth does not appear to have

contributed to this result, which, as previously stated, was the object of contesting the passage. It was not intended

to attack the enemy until he should have advanced from the river, where it was hoped that by holding in check the

force at the bridge, we would be able to concentrate upon the other. With this view General Johnson’s division was

ordered to re-enforce General Rodes.

In the meantime a large force was displayed in our front at the bridge, upon receiving information of which General

A. P. Hill was ordered to get his corps in readiness, and Anderson’s division was advanced to the river on the left

of the railroad. The artillery was also ordered to move to the front. General Early put his division in motion toward

the bridge and hastened thither in person. The enemy’s skirmishers advanced in strong force with heavy supports,

and ours were slowly withdrawn into the trenches.

Hoke’s brigade, of Early’s division, under Colonel Godwin (General Hoke being absent with one regiment on

detached service), re-enforced General Hays, whose brigade occupied the north bank. No other troops were sent

over, the two brigades mentioned being sufficient to man the works; and though inferior to the enemy in numbers,

the nature of the position was such that he could not attack with a front more extended than our own. The remainder

of Early’s division was placed in supporting distance, one regiment being stationed in the rifle trenches on the south

bank east of the railroad. A gun from the works on the left of the road was also ordered to be placed in the battery

at this point, to command the approach by the railroad embankment on the opposite side, but the enemy’s

sharpshooters had advanced so near the river that the order was countermanded, the preparations already made

being deemed sufficient.

The enemy placed three batteries on the hills from which our skirmishers had been forced to retire, and maintained

an active fire upon our position until dark, doing no damage, however, so far as has been reported. Our batteries

replied from both sides of the river, but with so little effect that the two on the south bank were ordered to cease

firing.

Light skirmishing took place along the line. It was not known whether this demonstration was intended as a serious

attack or only to cover the movement of the force that had crossed at Kelly’s Ford, but the lateness of the hour and

the increasing darkness induced the belief that moving would be attempted until morning. It was believed that our

troops on the north side would be able to maintain their position if attacked, and that in any case they could withdraw

under cover of the guns on the south, the location of the pontoon bridge being beyond the reach of a direct fire

from any position occupied by the enemy.

As soon, however, as it became dark enough to conceal his movements the enemy advanced in overwhelming

numbers against our rifle trenches, [only two brigades, in fact! – Ed.] and succeeded in carrying them in the manner

described in the reports of Generals Early and Hays. It would appear from these reports and the short duration of

the firing, that the enemy was enabled to approach very near the works before being seen. [ Or just scared the piss

out of them Rebs – Ed.]

The valley in our front aided in concealing his advance from view and a strong wind effectually prevented any

movement from being heard. It was essential to the maintenance of the position under these circumstances that

sharpshooters should have been thrown forward to give early information of his approach, in order that he might

be subjected to a fire as long as possible, but it is not stated that this precaution was taken. The breaking of the

enemy’s first line and the surrender of part of it, as described in the reports, also contributed to divert attention

from the approach of the second and third, and enable them to press into the works. No information of the attack

was received on the south of the river until too late for the artillery there stationed to aid in repelling it; and it does

not appear that the result would have been affected, under the circumstances, by the presence of a large number of

guns.

The artillery in the works at the south end of the bridge was relied upon to keep it open for the retreat of the troops,

as it could sweep the crest of the opposite hill at a short range. The darkness of the night and the fear of injuring

our own men who had surrendered, prevented General Early from using it. The bridge, however, seems to have

remained accessible to the troops on the left up to the last moment, as Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, with a few men,

crossed just before it was fired by order of General Early.

The suggestions above mentioned afford the only explanation I am able to give of this unfortunate affair, as the

courage and good conduct of the troops engaged have been too often tried to admit of question.

The loss of this position made it necessary to abandon the design of attacking the force that had crossed at Kelly’s

Ford, and the army was withdrawn to the only tenable line between Culpeper Court-House and the Rappahannock,

where it remained during the succeeding day. The position not being regarded as favorable, it returned the night

following to the south side of the Rapidan.

The loss of General Rodes at Kelly’s Ford was 5 killed, 59 wounded, and 295 missing. General Early’s loss, including

that of the artillery, was 6 killed, 39 wounded, and 1,629 missing. Some reported as missing were probably killed or

wounded, and left in the hands of the enemy, and others failed to report to their commands. Among the wounded

were Colonel Cox, of the Second North Carolina, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sillers, of the Thirtieth – the latter, it is

feared, mortally. I forward herewith the reports of Generals Rodes and Early, the latter inclosing those of General

Hays and Lieutenant-Colonel Tate, of Hoke’s brigade. A map of the locality is also annexed.*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, General.

General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.

Lee, beaten, now retreats. He is now not only south of the Rappahannock – the “Dare-Mark” line 3 -- but, with both

the fords and the O & A bridgehead under Sedgwick’s control, and there being no immediate defensible position

on the South bank of the Rappahannock, he must retreat further – as he states, to the south back of the Rapidan.

They say that Victory usually has a thousand fathers, but the Battle of Rappahannock Station is only lightly covered

by Civil War historians, but Pvt. Drew’s account alone could more than compensate for that neglect, and in fact he

appears happy to fill in the spaces which historians had left blank, certainly in works published before his own

Memoir was written (ca. 1920). Drew fill up the page yet again in this issue of YANKEE SCOUT and generously

so -- see below, pp. 8-9!!

Maybe it was because, as Drew reports, the Union Army’s achievement of the works at Rappahannock Station was

more the outcome of miscommunication among the Union generals ( followed by outrageous heroics by the men

of the “Fighting Sixth” of Maine, the Fifth Wisconsin, two companies of the One Hundred and Twenty-first New

York, and others) that official reports tended to sweep the facts under the rug. General Hays’ own official report,

referenced by Lee above, is here: http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/rappahannock-station/the-battle-of-

rappahannock.html at the Civil War Trust website. Earley’s version, in his memoirs, is characteristically self-

serving, and unreliable. In particular the report of General Sedgwick I have fond impossible to locate.

Regardless, at the time, there was no doubt that laurels were due to someone. And thus, meanwhile, among the

Union troops at Rappahannock Station, there is snatching and grabbing at the bruited glory associated with the

victory. Drew has to round up some of these mis-appropriated battle flags, captured from the Rebs. ….

In the days that followed, as seems too often to happen, the Union Army does not press the advantage against Lee,

but instead takes its time pursuing Lee across the Rappahannock. The Army first pauses to bury the Union dead –

including 38 men from Drew’s Co. K. 6th

Maine infantry. And there was another order of business: there is another

process to complete … a battlefield Board of Inquiry is convened, to examine the events surrounding the

momentous surprise victory. It extends over the next 2-3 days. It is, I suppose, fair to assume for now, that Gen.

Sedgwick’s Official Report must include some account of the Battlefield Board of Inquiry he ordered, and at which

Drew testified (See Last Issue -- Ed.) , and perhaps it would include records corroborating the account of Pvt. Drew.

3 See, Clark B. Hall, Upper Rappahannock River Front, the Dare-Mark Line” http://www.brandystationfoundation.com/places/Rappahannock%20Front.pdf

The military last rites and court martial proceedings accomplished, it is only on the 11th

of November – four days

following the battle -- that the Army crosses the Rappahannock River. General Meade sets a guard at Rappahannock

Station, so the Union Army is now occupying Lee’s one-time defensive works there; and, also on at Lee’s former

works on the south bank of the Rappahannock River at Kelley’s Ford: with these positions on the Rappahannock

Lee had intended to defend his Winter Quarters, around Culpepper Court House.

Thus, as noted, in moving south into Culpepper County, General Meade is also pushing into Lee’s planned or

former winter quarters, “toward Culpepper”. And with the Grand Army of the Potomac at his heels, Lee is forced

to retreat, even south of the Culpepper County line, into Orange County, Virginia. Col. Walter H. Taylor of Lee's

staff called it, "the saddest chapter in the history of this army," the result of "miserable, miserable management."

Meanwhile, it is still early in November, and the Union Army “takes the field”: Meade is planning another attack,

and makes camp on farm of Virginia Rep John Minor Botts and presumably also occupies his home, Auburn

House. With owner John Minor Botts in Confederate prison, some Union Army use of the farmstead was

inevitable. [ Later, upon his arrival, Gen. U.S. Grant made his own H.Q. at Barbour House –per Clark B. Hall. ]

Can there be any doubt that Auburn House is the “disputed territory” of Culpepper County? And this, not least

because Botts was a most outspoken and aggressive opponent of Southern Secession. Read his book, The Great Rebellion, It’s Secret History, Rise, Progress and Disastrous Failure (1866) https://archive.org/details/greatrebellion00bottrich or this short,

brilliant cautionary speech, Union or Disunion, Lincoln no Abolitionist (1860) https://archive.org/details/unionordisunionu00bott

So, with winter coming on, Lee, hounded out of Culpepper, has established new Winter Quarters a full 5 miles

south, in Orange County, on a low hill amidst lands overflown with the rising waters of the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, and their numerous tributary waterways. He occupies and fortifies a ridge, near Mine Run creek,

and his troops have slashed the timber thereabouts to create a barrier nearly impenetrable to the loyalist forces.

Sneden’s Map of the Field of Operations … Battle of Mine Run –November 1863, shows (here enlarged) at the

top, “Rebel Works captured by 6th

Corps” at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange & Alexandria R.R. line. Brandy

Station, which will soon become the Union Army’s Winter Quarters, also fits in the magnifying lens – as would

Bott’s farm, or Auburn House. Lee, meanwhile, has moved the Army of Northern Virginia much farther south, beyond the Rapidan and into Orange County. His flag is at the lower left of the map: Once his new works have

been fully reconnoitered by Denbo & Drew, the two scouts return to the Army camp at Bott’s Auburn Farm.

“The weather was getting chilly, and a snow-squall had now past over……

[P. 126] “Denbo and I was sent out on a scout was gone three days doing most of our work at night. We made a

complete investigation of Lee’s Army, and found his two corps about five miles apart, his troops holding the

advantage in a strong position a ridge behind a small creek called Mine Run and was fortifying the line.

“We pronounced it a hard place to tackle.”

New Tactics

“When we got back to the regiment we found a new tactics had been introduced by our [Col. Emory ] Upton.”

Col. Emory Upton, just 24 years old at this time, was commander of the 2nd

Brigade of the VI corps’ 1st

Division: a West Point graduate, class of ’61. His

conduct and demeanor in battle, especially at Gettysburg, was said to have been

exemplary, and his intellect keen, to recognize that the introduction of new high

precision weaponry on the battlefield -- including the Spencer seven-shot

carbine (see p. 17, below) -- enabled the adoption of a new tactics.

Upton drew heavily on his experience in the Civil War for the improvisation of

a new tactics – though in Pvt. Drew’s estimation, his reforms were limited. The

first (1866) edition of Upton’s A New System of Infantry Tactics Adapted to American Topography and Improved Firearms, was effectively a proposal to the

U.S. War Department, which, upon review by a commission consisting of Gen’s

Grant & others, in 1867, was adopted, resulting in the official publication of

Upton’s Tactics “By Authority” in 1868 (Image at left).

But Pvt. Drew is describing his experience of the drills

conducted by Colonel Upton, at Botts Farm as early as mid-

November, 1863, and continuing thereafter. Drilling continued

through the Winter at Brandy Station (see below) – until Upton’s

new tactics were field-debuted with the opening of the 1864

spring offensive, at the Battle of Spottsylvania. There, “Upton’s

Charge” of the

Mule Shoe on

May 10, is famous

for its dubious

outcome. But I

think we’re getting

ahead of our

story!! For further

details, see the

upcoming

YANKEE

SCOUT –

Spottsylvania !!

However, Pvt. Drew shows skepticism of the originality and utility

of Upton’s changes. He writes:

“Casis [ Casey ] and Hardee were boath rebels, so we must have a Union tactics, we drilled at it morning, noon

and night, it’s no improvement on the old one, only a little harder on the line officers.”

Pvt. Drew was wrong here: Brigadier-General Silas Casey was anything but a rebel. Otherwise, Thomas Noxon

Toomey, author of “The History of Infantry Drill Regulations of the United States Army” at p. 3, confirms Drew

on this point: “At the outbreak of the Civil War Hardee joined the Confederacy and his tactics were used by the

Confederate Armies throughout the war. During the first year and a half of the war the Federal troops, under order

of May 1, 1861, used an exact reprint of Hardee’s work, which did not however mention his name. Casey’s drill

regulations were superceded by General Upton’s system on August 1, 1867.”

Toomey writes: :

“Upton modelled his tactics upon the foot drill for the artillery prepared by Barry and Hunt. In this drill,

inversions were dispensed with and the squad of four files was introduced. Upton’s plan of drill contained

several innovations of value such as the introduction of bayonet exercises, platoon movements and the

deploying of skirmishers from the column. In it we find many of the essentials of our present drill.

Unfortunately, the descriptions of movements as given in the first edition of Upton’s text were not lucidly

written. The ambiguities necessitated many official interpretations, and most of his text underwent minute

dissection and criticism. * * * Upton published in 1873 a revision of his drill regulations. This revision

chiefly effected a simplification in the turnings by squads, and his close order drill continued to draw-forth

many suggestions for its improvement. At the time of his death in 1881 Upton had nearly finished a second

revision. This revision, completed by General Alexander, was laid before a board, convened in

Washington D.C. in February, 1888, to revise the drill of the light artillery, infantry and cavalry. Probably

from Upton’s last revision was adopted the twelve company-three battalion regiment, movements by

sections of two squads and mass formations in battalion movements. After working for three years this

Board composed a system of infantry drill that was ordered by the Secretary of War to supercede Upton’s

tactics on Oct. 3, 1891.” Toomey, pp 3-4. Available at https://archive.org/details/cu31924030749281

General Winfield Scott

But Drew differs from Toomey and is unambiguous regarding Upton’s drilling on a new tactics at Brandy Station.

If so, then why was Casey’s very recent tactics, being set-aside and supplanted by Upton? Under what authority?

Casey’s Infantry Tactics, vols I and II, had only very recently been published by the Army, on August 11, 1862!

They were fresh off the presses. But according to Pvt. Drew, Upton’s development of a new infantry tactics began

initial “field-testing” almost within the next year: in the form of troop drills conducted by Upton during the wintering

of the Army of the Potomac at Mine Run, Va., and as early as November, 1863.

To believe Drew here, it’s clear that Upton was already revising, improving and “field-testing” his tactics during the

enforced isolation and inactivity of the long winter at Brandy Station. And it is thus all but unquestionable, that this

was with Army approval. Likewise it is open to speculation, whether these tactics may have been shaped and reshaped with some conference & consultation with other Union officers encamped there -- including perhaps

General Ulysses S. Grant, who arrived at Brandy Station March 10, 1864, and General Meade, whom Grant had

left in charge of tactical operations … Indeed, if Drew’s account can be trusted here, the system of Upton’s Tactics might be considered to be, in part, a collegial effort of the U.S. generals – or perhaps at least the beneficiary of

some fireside bull sessions and brainstorming by the brass: indeed this might help account for their later unanimous

endorsement by the commission, as well as Grant’s famous promotion of Upton, immediately after “Upton’s

charge” on the “Mule Shoe” salient at Spottslyvania. But why? Why was Casey’s Tactics being discarded?

Drew also does not address the discarding of the “classic” text on American

Infantry tactics, General Winfield Scott’s “Militia Tactics; Comprising the Duty of Infantry, Light-Infantry and Rifelemen…” shown here in its 1821 printing

from Connecticut, and which had been established by Congress for tactical

training just like this.

Longtime readers of YANKEE SCOUT will

readily recall that after being mustered into the

Volunteer Militia of Maine, the recruits’ first

tactical drills at Fort Sullivan near Eastport,

Maine, were ordered according to the “old Scott”

manual. For more on these tactics, see

YANKEE SCOUT – Outbreak of War!! So,

obviously Scott’s Militia Tactics had just recently

been superseded by Casey’s Infantry Tactics –

with the approval of President Lincoln and

Secretary of War Edwin Stanton. And now…

Casey is already being replaced with Upton’s

initiative?

To figure out why, take a look at YANKEE SCOUT – White Oak Swamp!! … and

YANKEE SCOUT – The Wilderness!!

Denbo – A.W.O.L.

“Denbo reported absent without leave at roll call this morning Nov. 19th

.

“Then orders came to be redy for a move and we thought of winter quarters.

“The morning of the 25th

Denbo came back to the Co. with a Rebel cavalry horse, sabre, carbine and fresh pork

enough for the whole company. He said he was getting redy for Thanksgiving.”

General William H. French

“The next morning we was on the march before

daylight. We crossed the Rappadan at a ford named

after Jacob, late that P.M. water waist-deep, the night

was cold we was [ P. 127 ] not allowed to make any

fires the suffering of some of the men was severe….

“But something had gone wrong with the 3rd

Corps

that was in the lead. “Gen’l French the Commander

of the Corps has the name with us of Old Slow.

Above: deatail from Sneden, Plan of the Battle of Mine Run, Virginia, -- fought Monday, 30

th November, 1863 ,

showing the track of the III Corps crossing at Jacobs Ford.

Note “Custer’s cavalry” nearby at Jacob’s Ford ….

“We moved close up to the rebel’s line of works. A scout from each Brigade was sent out, I went with a 49th

Pa man,

it was a cold bright night. We found the lowland overflowed. The timber on the opposite bank felled. We could

see new earthworks on the hill with artillery in place.

“We cruised down the creek, found a dam guarded by 50 or more rebels. The top of the dam was wide enough

for wagons to cross on. It was near daylight when we got back to Division Headquarter and reported. I got a lunch

then went to the regiment at sunrise. We formed line of battle in light order, the pioneers was to guard the

knapsacks and overcoats. We moved forward close to the edge of an open field ¾ mile. I [ cruzed] ??? from the

Rebel works could see them plain.

“The skirmishers in front reported a lake between them and the line of the foe.

“Orders came along the line to charge the rebs works at 9 o’cl. A.M. we was redy.

“While waiting for we knew not what, there was a movement started by some one of writing names and the address

of their parents or people at home and pinning it to the coat. I think none of Co. K. done so.

“At 8:30 A.M. our artillery opened the

bombardment, the rebels artillery returned

the fire, and often gave us a dose of shell

where we lay. Was it possible that Gen’l

Sedgwick [would] send his men across that

open field, and ask them to wade or swim that

pond. He like us must obey orders. “The

sooner we get killed off the shorter time will

have to eat hard-tack and salt-horse,” said

some one.

[ P. 128 ] “Well the time is up. Here comes

the aide with the order to move,” “Get redy

for your swim!” But the order we got was to

go back and get your knapsacks.

“Someone remarked, “We are to be put in

under heavy marching orders so we can wade

better.”

“But Gen’l Sedgwick had refused to charge

the enemy’s works.

“The different brigades and divisions moved

to the rear. We built a big fire to warm up

and cook by. We put out pickets just before

dark. It was near midnight when the pickets

[were] withdrawn. We marched back to the

Rappadan – recrossed it in a pontoon bridge

and stacked armes.

“We was a guard to the engeneeres taking up

the pontoon bridge.

“This was the end of the Mind Runn

campaign and the end of November, 1863.”

General John Sedgwick

In Drew’s account, his favorite General, John Sedgwick, apparently defies the Commanding General, and – at the

last minute -- refuses to execute an attack ordered by Gen. Meade, for that same morning of November 30, 1863.

According to Drew, he and his companion Pvt. Henry C. Denbo, YANKEE SCOUTS, had pronounced Lee’s

Mine Run defenses “a hard place to tackle” – implying that a carefully planned and executed assault could be

effective. And Meade’s plans and movements on the morning of the 30th

would confirm, that the Denbo & Drew

intel had been accepted. After all, Drew’s report had proven accurate just weeks before at Rappahannock Station.

So what happened to the attack? In fact, Denbo & Drew were not the only scouts reconnoitering behind enemy

lines. Gen. Meade had more than one covert operator, and had another spy working behind the lines at Mine Run.

It was this other spy, unknown to Pvt. Drew, who reached Meade early on the morning of the 30th

, and delivered

the intel which dissuaded Meade from executing his plans. It was Meade who called off the attack at Mine Run.

So at least it would appear. Two most remarkable books by Blackwood Ketcham Benson, the first titled Who Goes There? A Spy in the Civil War (1900) and the second, A Friend with the Countersign (1901) recount with an

uncanny exactitude of detail, the story of a Unionist Southerner from South Carolina, working as a Union spy in

Meade's Army. Both volumes are at the Internet Archive. The protagonist and narrator here, named Berwick Jones in the north, and Jones Berwick in the South, is no brash youngster like Drew, but a mature man of more

than 30 years. He tells an incredible tale of espionage and intelligence-gathering, set against which the

accomplishments of Pvt. Denbo & Drew shrink in overall significance – though in some instances – as with the case of Mine Run -- they were scouting the same enemy terrain.

The key to the fascination of these remarkable books, lies in the psychology of the narrator/spy, Berwick, whose

unique mind alone accounts for his qualifications as an undercover agent. Because of some unidentified childhood

disease, the narrator Berwick was afflicted with selective amnesia for speculative topics on the one hand, but gifted

with a photographic memory for tangible and forensic fact, on the other: the resulting modified intelligence was

somehow optimally adjusted for spying. From the introduction to Who Goes There?:

And now I realized with wonder one of the marvellous compensations of nature. My brain reproduced

form, size, colour -- any quality of material thing seen in the hiatus, so vividly that the actual object seemed

present to my senses, while I could feel dimly, what I know now more thoroughly, that my memory during

the interval had operated weakly, if at all, on matters speculative, so called -- questions of doubtful import,

questions of a kind upon which there might well be more than one opinion, being as nothing to my mind..."

But this is no parlor trick, or artifice of storytelling: because the narration of Jones’ espionage activities is delivered

with a topographical, temporal, military, social and economic exactitude that is something like witnessing a laser

photogrammetric grid being overlain on the entirety of the theatre of Northern Virginia, along the Rappahannock,

in particular, outfitted with a comprehensive reconstruction of events from the Mine Run campaign in late 1863,

through to the conflict at “the Salient” of Spottsylvania, in the Spring offensive of 1864, and on… Through it all,

Berwick is behind the rebel lines, returning to the Union fold only long enough to provide key intelligence to

General Meade; then he is off again on another mission, never actually taking up arms with the Union troops.

To pull all this off, a mysterious Dr. Khayme, in the Union Army infirmary, who doubles as a spy-handler, provides

Berwick with some trade tricks -- such as hollow buttons with screw-tops and the reversible uniform of the "turn-

coat" -- probably also worn by Pvt. Drew. Thereby Berwick Jones repeatedly infiltrates Confederate lines with such

effectiveness, he is obliged to fight as a Confederate soldier for weeks at a time, deftly befriending rebel soldiers,

and becoming their familiar, while sizing up troop strength, morale and material support, and reconnoitering enemy

lines – with such effectiveness that his loyalty to the Union cause is sometimes called into question …

The first volume, Who Goes There? covers the period from Bull Run to the end of the Gettysburg campaign.

The second volume, A Friend with the Countersign, opens with reference to Lee’s frustrated Bristoe campaign in

November 1863. While Benson passes over the momentous combat at Rappahannock Station in a single sentence

(opening chapter V), “in which [Jones] played no part”, his story then focuses on the infiltration by Jones into the

Wilderness, and then, beginning with Chapter IX, into this very challenging and ambiguous terrain around Mine

Run. It is at this point that the reader can begin to appreciate the high-definition accuracy of the narrative, by cross-

referencing the progression of Benson’s story, with Robert Knox Sneden’s battlefield plans of Mine Run, used in

this issue of YANKEE SCOUT, and also available at http://www.loc.gov/item/gvhs01.vhs00229/ the Library of

Congress site; or at Fold3.com. Benson’s story can also be followed moment by moment using Union Army maps

of Orange and Culpepper Counties, Va. – which can also be found online. It was “Berwick Jones” who informed

Meade on the morning of November 30th

, 1863, that “the position of the enemy is impregnable” – thus persuading

Meade to abandon the campaign. See, A Friend with the Countersign, p. 113. It was not Sedgwick defying an

order, but Meade himself who cancelled the attack, in response to last minute intel delivered by “Berwick Jones. ”

These two volumes, which seem to have for many years gone almost unread, form an incomparable narrative of

one man’s sacrifice as a Union Army spy during the Civil War. While masterfully written as romantic fiction, they

are constructed of factual details, and real history infiltrates every sentence. Indeed, one has to wonder whether

Berwick Jones did not in fact have the very photographic memory described – else how could he, or the author,

ever compile such an unimpeachable almost hour by hour record of the war.

Are the novels fact or fiction? Are they Nineteenth century romantic

fiction, or Twentieth century historical accounts? Is it a real super-

spy’s personal memoir turned into art? and if so how does the author

manage to transcend ALL literary affect, narrative mannerisms, and

every obvious artifice? These two books are perhaps the best

historical novels written on the Civil War. (I also recommend

DeForest’s Miss Ravenel’s Conversion from Secession to Loyalty,

(1867). But, reading Benson’s story with a Sneden map and a

calendar handy, can do strange things to your mind, trying to account

for the level of authenticity and historical verisimilitude. Thus, in

terms of American literature generally, they may also be the apex of the genre of psychological thriller – of a caliber that would have made

even Poe sigh with envy.

Benson has two other Civil War novels, Bayard’s Courier (1902) and Old Squire (1903) – these do not feature

Berwick Jones and his uncanny espionage abilities -- both dealing more with the Southern Black experience. But

in view of the excellence of Benson’s first two books, these also deserve very careful reading now.

SEGUE BACK to PVT. DREW’S MEMOIR

The Mine Run Campaign, so-called, was General Meade's last-ditch effort to engage Lee's Army before the full

onset of the Winter of ‘63-64. Lee's new Winter Quarters south of Mine Run were so formidably defended -- by

swamplands to the northwest, mingling with the overflown ice-cold waters of Mine Run itself, and a dozen other

small creeks and sloughs; and furthermore blocked with thickets of slash and timber – “abattis” -- that the Army of

Northern Virginia was completely impregnable to standard attack here. The landscape was incomprehensible to

military tactics, and thus thwarted every strategy: therefore, skirmishes dominated the "campaign" and isolated

limited engagements marked the end of the 1863 fighting season, with Meade throwing in the towel.

Such indeterminacy does not make for great military literature -- and so Pvt. Drew's narrative lapses here, in

correspondence with the fall-off in relevant action. Hence, he has little to say about Mine Run, and reverts back in

his mind, to the shellacking that the Sixth Maine delivered to Gen Jubal Early, at Rappahannock Station.

Photo of Calif N. Drew (reading the latest) seated on driftwood on an Oregon beach, ca. 1930.

Beside him, his son Howard & Grace (Whitehouse) Drew – with pipe.

The MS Memoir from which these issues of YANKEE SCOUT have been prepared, was written by Calif Newton

Drew at an advanced age. That in writing them, he was referring to a battlefield diary, mentioned in his memoir, but

now lost, accounts for their vividness and accuracy despite the intervening decades.

But, that at this point in his Memoir, Pvt. Drew breaks the forward flow of the narrative, and relives once again the

unique role he played in “the Taking of Rappahannock Station” and the unprecedented success of the 6th

Maine

Infantry in seizing these fortifications, should not be surprise. It was the pinnacle of accomplishment for both Drew

and the 6th

Maine Infantry. He saw the victory as key to Meade’s success in 1863, and as an additional strategic

setback for Lee’s Army, following the pivotal defeat at Gettysburg.

Hence, he recalls the hour of glory, and dips his pen again to write further details of Rappahannock Station:

“There are a few instances of the Battle of Rappahannock Station Nov.

7th

, 1863 that will do to tell.

“A small man of Co. K 4 climbing up the face of the rebel fort inline of an

embrasure as he got to the opening he saw a gunner in the act of pulling

the lanyard. He ducked his head, the canister caught his knapsack. He

said it was the first time in his life he had never turned a double back

summersult. He landed in the ditch some shaken and [a hole] mad

clear through his knapsack and everything in in torn to peaces.

“John Stewart of Co. C. was a born peddler, anything wanted

to go to John, from a chaw of gum to a $100 watch, he had

got a large supply of fine cigars just before the fight. His

knapsack would not hold all, he strapped one box [of cigars]

on the outside of his haversack. As he was charging across

the field a shot cut the strap and tore the top off the box

spilling most of the cigars. He stoped, laid down his [ P. 129

] gun, went picking up the cigars, counted them… he was out

20 cigars. He hid the cigars behind a stamp covering them

with trash, got into the fighting just as we was taking the fort.

He said he meant to have a rebel’s head for every cigar lost –

but the fight ended to soon.

“One of Co. C men and a big rebel got into close action.

Each droped his gun and went at it Queensborough style –

our man had the most science and the strongest punch. The

reb bored in and clinched as they was falling our man turned

the rebel under; the Reb caught the left hand and got the

thumb in his mouth and began to chaw; the Yank gouged out

one of his eyes and began on the other when Johnney cried

Enough and gave up our man was out the left thumb at 1st

joint.

“A reb Capt. struck at a private with his sword. The Yank

parried the blow and cocking his gun told the reb to drop his

cheeseknife and surrender or take a ounce of U.S. lead

through his digestive organs. The Capt. complied. As he

was going over the rifle pit to the rear, our man [joined] him

so gently to the toe of a No. 9 U.S. shoe, that he fell on his

face just in time for the 5th

Wis. Boys to tramp on him.5

4 This “small man of co. K.” was certainly Drew himself. See picture above.

5 This is probably another un-retouched description by Drew, of one of his own hand-to-hand encounters in the

rebel-held works at Rappahannock Station. Observe that the Confederate captain strikes an un-named private, who

is nevertheless identified by Drew as having a small shoe-size -- No. 9 in fact. In addition, Pvt. Drew is emphasizing

that the 6th

Maine was in the vanguard of the attack, and only the 5th

Wisconsin was closely behind them.

General Charles A. Russell

“Capt. R. W. Furlong of co. D. broak his sword, emptied his revolver, taking a gun and plying it vigorously. He

had eight rebels piled around him before he fell with two bullets through his head.6

“Our Adjutant Charles A. Clark emptied his revolver he was a good shot – knocked a reb down with the empty

gun, then stuck a reb Lieut. Through his insides before he fell wounded.

“Corp. Frank Johnson of Co. K. a 6-footer, 180-pounder Very powerful, when he was forced back over the rifle

pitt after our first onset [ P. 130 ] was left a prisoner the rebs wanted him to go over the river, but he told them to

wait until the fight was over, then he might have company he was better acquainted with , so he laid down inside of

the rifle pitt with a big reb on each side to hold him down. One of them wanted to blow his brains out and have it

done with - the other would not agree that he wanted to take him home and show him to is best girl [ for ]

Thanksgivings. When the 5th

Wisc boys jumped over the rifle pitt Frank came to his feet with a rebel under each

arme – he told the one who objected to the killing to get away if he could, but the one who wanted to kill him, he

threw over the rifle pitt with such force that it killed him.”

“There are many stories about that fight.

“The 6th

Maine with some 40 men from the 20th

who came in on our left

stood the blunt of the fight for 15 or 20 minutes alone – until the 5th

Wisconsin boys came in. C. A. Clark7 says Gen’l Russell and his brother

boath went in with the line – if Gen’l Russell did do so he ought to been shot

worse than he was (he got it in the foot). His place was with the Brigade, he

should have ordered the 5th

Wis in as soon as we came under fire.

“If Colonel Cobb of the 5th

[Wisc.] had been like some of the generals he

would not [have] moved a step without orders; [but] I was told by a number

of men that they started without orders from Colonel or Gen’l, that they had

to stop to load after starting.

“About the time they got in, all of the 1st

Division moved forward and I

believe every regiment in the division [now] lays claim to taking part of the

action..

[P. 131] Denbo Dugan and Drew got through without the loss of any blood. My Cartridge box was ruined –

bayonet schabord (scabbard) [ shattered ?] cut into the strap to my haversack cut and I lost my rations and four

bullets was through my cloths. In fact there was [not ] a survivor of co. K who did not [ have] bullets put through

their cloathes.”

“No more for Rappahannock Station.”

6 We first met Capt. Reuel Furlong in YANKEE SCOUT – Outbreak of War!! Fox writes: “At Rappahannock

Station, Captain Furlong of the Sixth Maine, leaped over the enemies works, and after emptying his revolver, fought

with a clubbed musket, swinging it round his head until he fell dead. After the battle his body was found among a

pile of dead, several of whom had been killed by the blows of a musket stock.” Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, p. 77. See also, Brian Schwartz’s blog, http://maineatwar.bangordailynews.com/2012/09/01/paging-

reuel-furlong-paging-captain-reuel-furlong/

7 Brevet-Lieut. Col. Charles A. Clark, Campaigning with the 6th Maine (1897) at p. 49, notes of General Russell’s

role in the action at Rappahannock Station , only this: “General Russell, who commanded the brigade, was wounded

slightly …”

“We camped on the [Rappahannock] river until all the troops was over, [to the south bank, in Culpeper County]

then we helped the engeneers take up the bridge and load them on the wagons. Then we joined the brigade and

went in Winter Quarters near Brandy Station in a fine peace of timber.

“Our picket line was along Muddy Runn ….

“Winter Quarters, On Picket (February , 1864)”

from Harper’s Pictorial History of the Civil War, Vol II, p. 524

“We built log cabins covered them with our tents and had good fire places.”

“After getting fixed up in fine shape, the ever-lasting drill came on, we had Upton three times a day.”

“Capt. Lincoln of Co. F was promoted Major and had command of the regiment. He opened up a recruiting

station for the regular army. The Government was giving 30 days furlow’s and a big bounty to be paid on the

installment plan-- $300 with the furlow, $300 at the end of the year and $300 more at the end of the war.

“About the 15 of Dec. the Reg’t received a full company of recruits and Co. K. was fortunate in getting 10 good

men, all of them had received state and town bounties ranging $500 to $1000, and one who had come in as a

substitute for a rich man that had been drafted, received $1500 we took them in and tried to make them worthy of

membership in the best company and the best regiment in the army excepting the 5th

Wis and they did stand up to

the racket in fine style in the Wilderness under Grant, the next spring.

-- Sedgwick in command

[ P. 132 ] “Gen’l Mead went home to spend the holly days and Gen’l Sedgewick had command of the Army,

and Unkle John -- we all of the 6TH

Corps called him that -- kept his scouts and reconnoitering parties on the

move all the time.

“I was called to Army headquarters, was given a roving commission8 and a statement to the commanding officer of

the regiment. Denbo and Drew were on detail for extry duty and was on the move around the enemies camps and

army most-all the time.

“We were given the Spencer seven-shots carbine it was the first gun using the metallic cartridge I had ever seen,

we tried them out – a .50 calibre, lever-action it would do in close quarters – not to be depended on over 150

yards the powder charge could not be increased we preferred the old Springfield for all purposes.”

8With General Meade on holiday, this “roving commission” was certainly given by General Sedgwick himself –

probably in recognition of Drew’s work in penetrating Rebel lines before the Battle of Rappahannock Station. This

new “roving commission” will require Drew to report back directly to Gen. Sedgwick, and may account for one of

General Sedgwick’s last words to Drew, “Well, Hello, young man, you and I are old acquaintances…” See YANKEE

SCOUT – The Killing of General Sedgwick.

“I think it was on the 18th

of Dec. while on a reconnoriter

[sic] with Comp’s. C. and K. down toards the Alexander and Richmond RR [sic]. I was captured by a band of

Johnny’s holding a observation post into which I ran

during a thick snow squall.

“They had [seen] our forces, and counted it two large for

them to attack – and was on the move to avoid us in the

squall when we meet.

“When they saw the red and green cross on my cap [the

Greek Cross of the 6th

Corps …. ] they shure did treat me

fine- gave me a horse to ride, four of them guarded – two

of them went to Richmond with me on a flat-car where

we arrived in good shape in due time and I was delivered

to provost guards head-quarters. The captain and several

others entertained me quite a while with many questions.

“Finly I was declared a prisoner of war [ P. 133 ] and

sentenced to dig sand on Belle Island till the end of the

war or exchanged – Libby Prison was full and I was to go

to the island with some twenty or more prisoners … “

Was Pvt. Drew lucky again ????

Andersonville Prison was not opened until February of

1864 – just about one month after Drew’s capture.

Belle Island Prison and Libby Prison were just two of the

most notorious Confederate camps for Union soldiers

captured and held as prisoners of war. The article at left,

reporting on conditions, including at Belle Island, in the

James River off the Richmond waterfront, ran on the

front page of the Washington D.C. Daily Morning

Chronicle News, November 9, 1863 – just two days after

the events at Rappahannock Station.

The same issue of the Morning Chronicle carried a

detailed report on that very battle – excerpted in the last

issue of YANKEE SCOUT. Since the Union troops

were regularly supplied with newspapers from D.C., it is

not unlikely that Pvt. Drew would have noticed this very account of prison conditions in the South … just in time

to be alerted …..

Wash. D.C. Daily Morning Chronicle News, Nov. 9, 1863

IN MEMORIAM, ROGER GRAYDON TILBURY, ESQ., COLLEAGUE & MENTOR;

GREAT-GRANDSON OF GEN. ROBERT E. LEE