yanow, dvora. the communications of policy meanings. implementation as insterpretations and text

7/25/2019 Yanow, Dvora. the Communications of Policy Meanings. Implementation as Insterpretations and Text

1/22

The Communication of Policy Meanings: Implementation as Interpretation and TextAuthor(s): Dvora YanowSource: Policy Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 41-61Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4532276.

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2/22


3/22

42

The

case

for

interpretive

mplementation

nalysis

Implementation

tudies to date have

focused,

in

large

part,

on

organizations

or on individuals

acting

within

organizations,

he

analytic

domainof

organi-

zational studies.

The

centrality

accorded to

organizational

heories

in

imple-

mentation

analysis

may

have

brought

their

conceptual

attributes nto a

posi-

tion to

shape

our

understanding

f

implementation.

Among

these attributes s

the

essentiallypositivist

ontology

which

characterizes

much of the

organiza-

tional literature

Burrell

and

Morgan,

1979;

Yanow,

1987a).

The

analysis

of

implementation

s

typically

presented

as a set of

factual

propositions,

where

those

facts

are treatedas

explicit

and

objective

realities hat can be discovered

bydirectobservationandperception Yanow,1987b).

There

are,

however,

other

attributes

of

implementation

hat are not under-

standable

through

observation

alone

and factual

analysis;

hey

can

only

be

known

through interpretation.Specifically,agency

staff, clients,

and other

policy

stakeholders

may

form

interpretations

of

policy

language,

egislative

intent

or

implementing

ctions;

and these

interpretations

may

differfrom one

anotherand

may

diverge

rom the intent of

the

policy's egislators

if

that can

even be established

-

a

question

raised within

the domain of

interpretive

analysis).

These

multiple

nterpretations

may

facilitate

or

impede

the

policy's

implementation.

Such

interpretations

n the

part

of

policy

stakeholdersare

not

entirely open

to

analysis

as

objective

facts: much of their

meaning

can

only

be elicited

by

an act of

interpretation

n

the

part

of

the researcher. nter-

pretation,

hen,

must

be

engaged

on

at least two levels:

hat

of the actors

n

the

policy

situation,

and

that of the

researcher

making

sense

of

those actors'

meanings.2

Moreover,

an

interpretive

approach

to

implementationanalysis

allows

attentionto

the role

that tacit

knowledge (Polanyi, 1966)

plays

in

the

policy process,

a

subject

not

given

to

positivistanalysis,

which insists that we

only knowthatwhich can be made explicit.Multiplestakeholdernterpreta-

tions

may

hamper

the

implementation

of

a

policy's explicit

mandate.On the

other

hand,

such

interpretationsmay

aid

implementation

f

its

tacitly

known,

yet

no

less

intended,

mandate.

Such

an

approach

s

useful

in

analyzing

he

case that

follows,

wherein an

agency

which,

by many

measures

accepted

as

objective

and

factual,

might

be

seen

to have failed to

implement

ts

policy

mandate,

was

instead acclaimeda

success

by

most of

its stakeholders.For

this we

need

a

different et of

analytic

tools

than those afforded

by

a

positivist analysis,

ones

that

would allow

us to

focuson the

making

and

interpretation

f

meaning.

An

introduction

o the

case

follows

immediately,

fter

which I elaborateon

an

interpretive

approach

that attends to

types

of

organizational

artifacts

which

represent policy

and

agency

meanings.

This

typology

of

symbolic

objects,

language,

and acts is then

illustrated

by

additional case material.

Analyzing

he case from the

interpretive

pproach

outlined

here

suggests

hat

acts of

implementors

cannot be

other than

interpretive

acts.

That

is,

since

organizational

ymbols

may

be

interpretedby

multiple

audiences

and accom-


4/22

43

modate

multiplemeanings,

accepting

hat

policy

meanings

are

communicated

throughsymbolic

artifactsmakes t

impossible

to

restrict

policy language

and

other

symbols

to

only

one

intended

meaning.

We cannot

eliminate

nterpreta-

tion from the

implementation

hase

of the

policy process.

Furthermore,

when

analysis

ocuses on the

meanings

of

interpretive

cts

to

actors

in

the

situation,

an additionalview of

policy-making

and

implementa-

tion

emerges.

Actors who

make

meanings

of

a

situation

include

those at

a

further distance from the

immediate

site,

including legislators

or

potential

voters

who

might

derail

continued

policy support.

These distant audiences

also become "readers" f

policy

meanings

communicated

through

agency

artifacts.

n

this

view,

the

policy process

may

be

seen

as a

"text"

hrough

which

membersof a politytell themselveswho theyare andwhattheyvalue.Part of

the work of

implementation

nalysts,

hen,

may

be to construct hese

texts,

by

turning

acit

knowledge

nto

explicit

critique.

The Israel

Corporation

f

Community

Centers,

1969-1981:

A

case

study3

The

Israel

Corporation

of

Community

Centers

(ICCC)

was established

by

the Knesset

(Parliament)

n

1969

as an

independent,government-sponsored,

public organization,

o

implement

social and educational

policies.4

These

explicitpolicies

were

two-fold,

as stated n

agency

Annual

Reports

and other

literature rom

its

inception

through

1972,

when it

opened

its

first

buildings.

First,

it would

'improve

the

quality

of

leisure

time' for residents

of

urban

housing

projects

and

geographically

solated

development

owns,

thereby

dis-

couraging

residents

of

those

towns

from

moving

to the crowded

metropolitan

areas. This

it would

do

by

providing

an

outlet for

recreationaland cultural

activities

n

each

neighborhood

or

town.5

Second,

it would

integrate

he two

majorethnic and socio-economicdivisions of the State'sJewishpopulation:

the

Middle

Eastern

groups

(sometimes

called

Orientals

or

Sfaradim),

who

immigratedprimarily

rom

North African

and

Middle Eastern countriesand

who

lived

mostly

in

the

development

owns and

urban

projects;

and the com-

paratively

more

prosperous

and

politicallyhegemonic

Western

groups

(Ash-

kenazim)

of

European

and

American

mmigrants,

who

lived

predominantly

n

the

cities

and

kibbutzim.6

uch

ntegration

was known

as

'narrowing

he

gap.'

Israeli

feeling

in

the

late

1960s was

that the

development

towns were

failures

and

would

continue

to

fail,

because

they

lacked

the

jobs,

medical and

social services,housing, and recreational acilities

necessary

to attractnew

immigrants

rom

the

West and to

retain

their

own

youth

who

had

completed

army

service

and

university

training.

The

few who

are

successful, leave,'

wrote

a

newspaper

columnist

at the

time. Most

of

the

towns,

he

wrote,

were

doomed to

'a

long

life of

poverty'

and should

be

shut down

(Tevet, 1970).

This

negative

self-appraisal

was

shared

by

many

of the

development

town

residents

themselves,

who often

encouraged

their

grown

children to

settle

elsewhere.7


5/22

44

At the same

time,

the Israeli establishment'

iscovered

hat what

they

had

assumedto

be a

homogeneous

national

culture-in-the-making

as in fact

not

cohering.

In an

interview,

Dr.

Ya'el

Pozner,

a

founding

member

and

later

Chairman f the Boardof theICCC,recalled:

It

was as

if we

awoke

suddenly

to find that two Israels had

developed

between 1950 and 1960.

We didn't

expect

it;

we

didn't

anticipate

t.

In

the

'first'

Western]

srael,

he

childrenwere

well-integrated;

ut in the

develop-

ment

towns,

in

the 'second' Israel

-

a

tremendous

gap

was revealed

betweenthe

two

populations.8

The ICCCwas created,at least in part,to narrow he gap. By bringing ome

of the culturalactivities

which

marked

urban,

middle class life into the devel-

opment

towns and

neighborhoods

of the 'second

Israel,'

t

was

hoped

to

make

them more attractive

o their

residents

and

stem the

out-migration.

The

ICCC's

founding

Executive

Director,

Haim

Zipori,

translated hese

national

policies

and the concerns

they

reflected

nto

a

program

o

provide:

1. Social

integration,by creating

a

[common]meetingplace

for all

sections

of

the

population;

2.

Social and

cultural

values;

3. Enlighteneduse of the individual's ndfamily'seisuretime;

4.

Improved

ultural,

ecreational,

nd entertainment ervices.

The

agency

would

do this

comprehensively,

ccommodating

ll

ages,

all fami-

ly

stages,

all

ethnicities,

and

all

activities

under

one

roof,

controlled and

guided

by

agency

staff

n

a cultured

and

pleasantatmosphere.

The

community

center would

replace

the cafe

as a

gatheringplace

and

fill

residents'

eisure

hours with

cultural ontent

(Zipori,

1971).

Other

goals

were

added

to

the ICCC's

mission as the

years

passed,

in

responseto new events(e.g.,the YomKippurWar of 1973; the IsraeliBlack

Panthers'

demonstrations

n

1975;

the

Report

of the

Prime Minister'sCom-

mission to

Study

Children n

Distress,

ssued

in

1978;

Project

Renewal

of

the

early

1980s)

and new

articulationsof

the

public

social

agenda

which

these

events

brought

with them

(e.g.,

'comprehensive

ocial

services,

'underprivi-

leged youth,

'the battle with

poverty').

Rather than

replacing

earlier

goals,

these later

goals

were

grafted

onto

and interwovenwith

them,

such

that 'nar-

rowing

the

gap'

and

'providing

activities

ocally'

continuedto be

the basis for

agency goals.

The

ICCC undertook

to achieve

these

goals

with some combi-

nation of three approaches:ndividualchangethrough earning;community

social

change

through group

development;

and

raising

the level of

social

service

consumptionby

providinghigher

quality

ervices

(Zipori,

1972).

By

1981,

the

ICCC had

opened

over

100

centers

(most

of

them

new con-

struction),

staffed them

with

directors and

assorted

program

heads

(among

them

librarians,

youth

counsellors,

community organizers,

adult education

supervisors,

arts and

crafts

teachers,

sports

directors),

co-sponsored

external

and

on-the-job

training

essions for

new

staff,

expanded

ts

headquarters

er-


6/22

45

sonnel

from

five to more

than

50,

produced

Annual

Reports

circulated

at

Annual

Meetings,

and

budgeted

the

above and

more.

The

agency

had

estab-

lished

the

role of

Community

Center Director as a

new,professional

career

path,

and had seen the creation of a

post-baccalaureate,

university-based

trainingprogram

to

qualify

more directors

for the

ever-increasing

umbers

of

positions.

Organizational

ize,

budget,

and amountof

activity

were

impres-

sive.

At the same

time,

the assessment

of

most

center directorswas

that their

buildings

remained

largely

under-utilizedand

most

programs,

under-sub-

scribed.

Several

centers found

that

they

were

drawing

most

of their

partici-

pants

from

nearby

Western,

middle-class towns and

neighborhoods,

rather

than from their target populations.Moreover,the social and economic gap

between

the two

populations

remained

unchanged

n

1981

and becameeven

more

vociferously

divisive

subsequently,during

the

election

campaigns

of

1982 and later.

Twelve

years

after its

founding,by

some

objective

measures

he ICCC had

not

accomplished

ts stated

goals:

the

gap

had not

been

narrowed,

he cross-

section of

townspeople

were

not

integrated

all under

one

roof,

social services

were

on

the

whole

not more

comprehensive

han

they

had been

in

1969,

and

'cafe culture'remainedas

popular

as ever.

Indeed,

Peled

(1990: p. 348)

notes

that the

gap

is considered to be

widening

even more. Within the

agency,

debate continued over

the

years

about

its

mission;

at

each Annual

Meeting,

the

question

was

asked,

'Whatare our

goals

and

objectives?'Although

one of

the

agency's objectives

was to

involve local

residents

in

programming

and

direction,

by

1981 this

had

not

been

significantly

chieved.

There was

major

internal

dissent over the

integration

of

community organizationpersonnel

and

principles.

Community organizers

found it difficult

to mobilize

the

human

and

material

resources

needed to

carry

out center

programs

mple-

mentingthe policy mandatewhichhad launched he ICCC.This was despite

the

fact

that the

agency

had

a 'fixer'

Bardach,

1977)

in the

person

of

Haim

Zipori,

its

founder

and Executive

Director,

who

(until

his

untimely

death

in

1983)

was

remarkably

successful in

corralling

the funds and

inter-agency

cooperation necessary

to

implement

the

'technology'

(buildings, budgets,

personnel,programs)

f

the

ICCC.

Despite

these

implementation

shortfalls,

neither local residents nor the

general

Israeli

public

accused the

ICCC

of

failure.On the

contrary,

esidents

of

center-less

development

towns

and

city neighborhoods

marched in the

streets

calling

on the

government

o build them

community

centers.

And,

in

1986 the

Histadrut

(the

General

Labor

Union)

declared

its intention to

develop

a chain of

multi-purpose

community

centers

in

development

towns

throughout

he

country

(Kantor,

1986),

therebydemonstrating

hat

the con-

cept

which the

ICCC had

pioneered

had

caught

a toe-hold

in

the Israelimind

as

something

worthy

of

emulation.


7/22

46

Interpretation

nd

meaning

n

policy

implementation

How

might

we

explain

public

acclaim or the

ICCC,

given

that the

gap

was no

narrowerafter12

years

of

operation?

One

reading

of thiscase is as a

story

of

success and

failure: uccess

in

establishing

a

large

new

agency, eeming

ailure

to

accomplish

he

explicit

goals

of its

policy

mandate,

as measured

by

various

numerical indicators.

And

yet

this

failure

was not

attended

to. The

most

publicly

salient

feature

of

the

organization's

dentity

12

years

after its

founding

was its

image

as a desirable

entity

from

the

perspectives

of

both rival

organizations

and

potential

clients,

as seen in

demonstrations

alling

for

the

establishment

f more

centersand

in

the

Histadrut's nnounced

plans

to

erect

similarcentersundertheirownaegis.

Over these

12

years,

then,

the

ICCC succeeded

in

creating

not

only

an

agency

and its

physical

embodiment,

but

also an

identity

which

embodied

a

certain status as a

desirable,

attractive

ntity.

It

succeeded,

in

other

words,

in

creating meaning

and

communicating

that

meaning

to distant

publics

-

other

agencies

n

its

organizational

nvironment,

esidentsof other

neighbor-

hoods and towns

-

as well as to

organizational

members and

clients. That

meaning

captured

part

of

the

tacit mandate

of

the

agency's

enablingpolicy

-

elements which were known

and shared

by legislators,

agency

members,

clients, and policy-relevantpublics, but which could not be expressedex-

plicitly

because there was

no

explicit

social

consensus to

support

them. Had

they

been made

explicit,

hey

are

likely

to have

raised

explicit

opposition.

An

interpretive nalysis

allows us to

get

at

these

issues,

in

that t focuses on

the

creation and

communication

of

context-specific

meanings,

both

explicit

and

tacit.

This

is

done

through

artifactsof the

policy

and its

implementing

agency

which are vested with

meaning.

These

meanings

are

conveyed argely

tacitly,

without

making

hem

explicit,

n

part

because

that is the

nature

of

the

communicationof meaning,and in the case of the ICCC, in part because

some

of

the

policy

rested

on

'verboten

goals'

-

goals

which

could not

be

spoken

of

publicly

because

they

were

not

girded

by explicit

public

consensus,

often

because

they

were

incommensurable.

These

goals

were

communicated

tacitly,

and

supported by

a

tacitly

known,

although

unspoken

consensus

(Yanow,

1992b).

As a new

agency,

the

ICCC

had to

create and

communicate

ts

organiza-

tional

meanings

rom

scratch.

While

many organizations

are

concerned with

the

need to recruitnew

members and

attractnew

customers

or

clients,

new

organizationsdo not have anexisting dentityto workwith(oragainst). n the

case

of

the

ICCC,

its

product

-

a

community

center

replete

with

programs

was

a new

notion

in

the

country,

and

highly

abstract

n

concept.

In

developing

the

concept,

the founders

began

to

create

organizational

rtifacts the

agen-

cy

names,

its

buildings

and

programs,

Annual

Reports

and Annual

Meetings,

and so

forth

-

and these were the

vehicles

through

which

policy

meanings

were

communicated.


8/22

47

Organizational

rtifacts:Bearersof

meaning

Dress

codes,

agency

names,

program

and

space design,

and so forth are

arti-

facts of an

organization.

Each

organization

creates these

things

in a

way

unique

to that

organization

althoughorganizations

withinthe same

industry

may

create artifacts which bear a

family

resemblance

to one

another;

see

Cook

and

Yanow,

1993 or

Weiss and

Delbecq,

1987).

The artifacts

embody

the values and beliefs of the

organization,

nd

they

are

meaningful

or

organi-

zational

members in

ways

that are

particular

o their

context.

Artifacts,

to-

gether

with their

underlying

beliefs and

values,

constitute

the culture

of

the

organization.Analytically,

hese

artifacts are

categorized by

such labels

as

symbols,rituals,ceremonies,stories,myths,and so forth.9

Cultural

artifactsof

different

ypes

work in similar

ways.

First,

they

consti-

tute

symbolic

-

i.e.,

representational

relationships:

hey

stand

n as concrete

referencesfor more

abstractvalues and

beliefs and are

short-hand

ways

of

communicating

hose

meanings.

We are

used

to

thinking

of

objects

as

sym-

bolic: the dove

is

a

symbol

of

peace,

the

flag

is a

symbol

of

nationhood.

Lan-

guage

is

symbolic.

Metaphors,

for

example,

find

similarity

between two

seemingly

unlike

things,

one

of which

represents

a

concept

or

concepts

present

in

the abstract.

Greenhorn,

for

example,

draws on

'green-ness'

as

symbolicof newness,freshness,unknowing.10 ctions mayalso be symbolic.

Rituals

and

ceremonies are

patterns

of

activities

which

typically

are

enact-

ments of the values

and

beliefs which

they represent.Organizational

tories

and

legends

narratea

set of events

which

represent

ome

meaning

or

value of

importance

to both

teller

and

listener;

both the

story

and the act of

telling

may

be

symbolic.

Organizational

myths

temporarily

reconcile two

or

more

incommensurable

ruths;

hey

end further

nquiry,

nd also

convey

a sense

of

something

of value.

These

categories

give

us

an

analytic taxonomy

of

sym-

bolicobjects,symbolic anguage,andsymbolicacts.l1

Second,

artifactsare

'read'

n

a

particular

ontext:

hey carry

the

meanings

of

a

particular

point

in

time,

or of a

particular

ocio-cultural

environment.

This

means, third,

that artifacts

accommodate

multiple

meanings.Meaning

s

not universalor

determinate;

t

depends

on context

and

on the

perception

and

interpretation

of

the

participant.

When

meaning

is

shared,

the

artifacts

create

a

feeling

of

unity among

those who

sharethe same

or similar

nterpre-

tations of

them

and

demarcate

hose

people

from

others who hold

different

interpretations.

ince

artifacts

accommodate

multiplemeanings,

t

may

not be

self-evident hattwo partiesdo not sharesimilar nterpretations. uchdiffer-

ences

may

not

become

apparent

until

some later

time.

Finally,

he

human

artifactual

andscape

s

read

tacitly.

An

agency

member

invited

to an

Annual

Meeting usually

would not

say

to

her

colleague,

'Now

I'm

going

to

attend

a

ritual,

which will

reinforce

my

ties

to the

group

and

reiterate he

collective

values

of

the

organization.'2

The

meanings

of the

gift

of

the

gold

watchto

the

retiring

mployee

are

typically

not

made

explicit.

The

presenter

would not

say,

We

spent

$250

on

this watch as a

way

of

tellingyou


9/22

48

how much we value

your

service to the

company'

-

without

riskingvoiding

the

meanings

embedded

n the ritual.Nor would

the

honoree

say,

But

you

do

this for

everyone,

t doesn'tvalue me in

particular.'

Or,

'Why

did

you get

me

a

Bulova? You

gave

Joe a Rolex ' And

yet

the

meanings

of such actions are

known,

tacitly,

and

communicated,

ven

thoughthey

are

not made

explicit.

The

ICCC

conveyed

ts

identity

and

purpose

to its stakeholders

hrough

at

least

two

types

of

symbolic objects:

physicalsymbols

(the

community

center

buildings

and their

landscaping

and

internal

decor)

and

programmatic

ym-

bols

(in

the

choice

of

center

activities).

Two

kinds

of

symbolic

anguage

were

also used: the

agency's

choice

of

name,

and

the

adoption

of a

particular

organizationalmetaphor.

n

addition,

he

agency

used two forms of

symbolic

acts - rituals and myths - in the same process.

Symbolicobjects:

Physical

and

programmatic

ymbols

Organizations

se

various

aspects

of

the

built

or

createdenvironment

o

com-

municate their

identity

and

self-image:

physical design

of

headquarters

nd

other

organizational

uildings;

onstruction

materials;

nternal

spatial

alloca-

tions

(scale,

or

distance

from

the center of

power);

decor

(art

work,

furnish-

ings,

color

schemes);

dresscodes;

design

of

products,

ogos

or

awards,

andso

forth.'3

For

the

ICCC,

building

design

and

landscaping,

as well as

construction

materialsand

furnishings,

et the

community

center

apart

rom its

surround-

ings

in

every

town

or

neighborhood

where a new

building

was constructed.

(In

a few cases the

agency

took

over

pre-existingyouth

clubs and inherited

a

site

design;

this

analysis

does not

apply

to

them.)

Siting

and

landscaping

establisheda

physical

distance:

o enter

most

centers,

one

had to cross a

plaza

or a stepped expansewhich set the buildingapartfrom the street. Such an

approach

made

entering

a

center

building

purposive

and

intentional;

one

did

not

enter

by

accidentor error.

Other

design

choices created a

feeling

of

psychological

distance,

which

reinforced he

sense of

physical

distance.

The

buildings

were

constructed

of

materials

not used in

adjacent

residential

architecture:

ostly

interior wood

panels

and

stone and

glass

exteriors.

Most

other

nearby public

offices were

built of

materials and in

a

design

similar

to

surrounding

residences. The

centers'

massive

scale

and

design

also

distinguished

hem

from both

local

residences and most other

public

buildings.

The

typical

entrancehall was

cavernous

and

imposing,

with much

'wasted'

space,

unlike

other

clubhouses

which

were

typically single

story,

utilitarian,

pare,

and

sparsely

decorated.

The

most

dramatic

example

of

the

contrast

between

centers

and

'indigenous'

architecture

was the

international

tyle

of

the

ICCC's

104th

center,

opened

in

1980. It was

designed

by

a

Mexican

sculptor

who

believed,

according

to a

local

architecture

ritic

(Ronnen,

1980),

that

buildings

should be

'emotional

sculpture.'

n

the

center's

design

he

used

the

sharpangles

which

were his

hall-


10/22

49

mark

-

which,

the critic

noted,

had influenced

I.

M. Pei's

designs

for the

John

Hancock

Life

Insurance

building

n

Boston and the

National

Gallery

addition

in

Washington,

D.C.

These elementsof the physicaldesigncarriedmeanings or agencyexecu-

tives and

managers

who

made the

design

choices,

as well as for

policy

stake-

holders

(clients,

constituents,

and

other

publics).

The most basic

message

was

'difference,

otherness':

he

community

center

building

was different rom

the

general experience

of

local

residents,

different

from

their

homes and their

local

public

buildings.

This

'otherness'was enhanced

by

the interior

design

choices of

scale, materials,

and

decor,

which indicated

greater

financial

resources and

implied higher

social status. The

meanings

carried

by

these

buildingsfor agencyexecutives and founders are strikinglyexpressedin the

words

of

the Chairman

of

the

Board

in

May,

1973

in

his

Report

to the

Second

Annual

National

Conference:

The

[community

enter]

building

.. is

often

a contradiction o the houses

surrounding

t.

Its

cultured,

spacious,

restful

atmosphere

makes

the acute

social and cultural

problems

stand

out.

Despite

this,

when it was

decided

to

build the

centers,

it

was

clear...

that the center itself and its

programs

would

belong

to the

world

of

a

higher

level of

aspirations,

which

would

serve as anexampleof whatcouldbe thelegacyof itsvisitors.

This

suggests

hat,

at least fromthe

point

of view of the

Board,

he

gap

between

the

two Israels

was to be

narrowed

by erecting

a

physicalrepresentation

f the

values

whichthe

first Israel

deemed

worthy

of

aspiration,

or

the second Israel

to emulate.The

second Israel

would learn to

aspire

to

these values

-

if

they

attended center

programs.

This

depended

on the staff's

ability

to

bring

local

residents nto the

buildings,

where

he

programs

were carriedout.

The sense of othernessembodiedin the physical symbolswas reinforced

by

the centers'

programs:

allet

classes

for

school-agedgirls;

udo,

karate,

and

tennis;

photography;

weight

reduction clubs for

adults;

performances

of

Garcia Lorca's

Blood

Wedding,

Beethoven

String

Quartets,

etc. Such

pro-

grams represented

a

middle-classWestern

ifestyle,

in

contrast

to

local resi-

dents'

ower-classMiddle

Eastern

and

Eastern

Europen

ifestyles.

As a mem-

ber of

the

Executive

Committee

of

the

Boardwrote:

How

proud

some of

the

citizens of

[this

development

own]

must now feel

that even theiryoungsterscan studyballet.... It is not ballet that is impor-

tant,

but the

fact

that

in

this

little

God-forsaken

own,

the

youngsters

of

the

poor

have

an

equal

opportunity

o be

exposed

to

today's

culturalactivities

as are the

youngsters

f

[metropolitan]

esidents

Correspondence,

/29/72).

Community

enter

programs

on

the

whole

echoed the

message

of

foreignness

and distance

which

the

buildings

and

landscaping

ommunicated,

ather

han

creating

a

common

ground.

Rather

han

narrow

he

gap,

they emphasized

t.


11/22

50

Symbolic

anguage:

Organizational

ames and

metaphors

In

its

symbolic

objects,

the

ICCC

looked

primarily

o an external

audienceof

potentialclients and stakeholders; rganizationalmemberswere a secondary

audience.

In its choice of

symbolic anguage,

he ICCC addressedboth more

distant audiences

and

internal

ones. In its choice of

international

name,

it

sought

an

identity

for

donors;

n its local

names,

it

sought

an

identity

or

cog-

nate social

service

agencies

as

well

as

for

potential

clients. Its

organizational

metaphor

was

solely

for

internal

use.

Although

the

ICCC,

duly

constituted

as a

Government

Corporation,

was

supported

by

the

government

budget,

it

depended

on

private

contributions,

primarily romoverseas,for its majorbuildingexpenses.In Englishlanguage

materialsdistributed

o

potential

donors

overseas,

the

agency

translated

ts

name as

the

Corporation

of

Community

Centers.

It was soon informed

by

overseas fundraisers hat

'Corporation'

onnoted a

meaning

unsuitable

or

a

non-profitorganization

which

hoped

to

raise

tax-deductible

donations.

Asso-

ciation' was

the more suitable

term

in

English,

the

fundraisers

said,

and

requested

that the

agency

change

its name.

The

ICCC

consulted

its

lawyers,

who determined that

changing

Corporation'

n

its

title would

endanger

its

legal

statusat

home. After some

discussion,

he

agency

and its overseasadvo-

cates reacheda compromise:he agencyuses Corporationn its own publica-

tions,

and

the fundraisers

se

Association

n

their

overseas iterature.

This

story

illustrates

potential

differences

in

interpretation

of

meaning

which can occur.

Agency

names

convey

a sense of

identity

and

purpose

which,

if

interpreted

o

its

detriment,

may

affect the

agency's mplementation

abilities.l4

A

generic

name

for

its

community

centers

presented

another

problem.

'Community

enter' s an American

concept;

he

idea to create

such

centers

n

Israelcame from people who were familiarwith centers in the U.S. In the

Israeli context

of

the late

1960s-early

1970s,

it

was

an abstract

concept.

Translated nto

Hebrew,

the words do

not have

a

native sound.

Moreover,

there is no

indigenous

notion

of a

secular

community'

n

Israeli

Hebrew,

nor

of

a 'center' o such a

community.

The

agency

needed

a

name

for

its

buildings

that would

capture

he essence of their

activitiesand

sound

correct

within

the

logical

structure

f

the

Hebrew

anguage.

For

some

time,

the centershad been

referredto

as

'culture,

youth,

and

sports

centers,'

n no

small

part perhaps

because those were the three

branches

of

the

Ministry

of Education

and

Culturewhichprovidedthe bulk of the ICCC'sprogrammatic unding.The

name stuck in

its

acronym

'matnas'

accent

on

the

second

syllable,pl.

mat-

nassim)

and the ICCC

itself came

to be called

the

Agency

of

Matnassim.

This

accomplished

much in

terms of

setting

the

agency's self-image

and

identity

both. Matnas was a new

entity.

While

there were other

buildings

which

functioned as

activity

centers

-

People's

Halls on

the

kibbutzim,

Cul-

tural

Centers in the

cities,

Scout

Halls,

etc.

-

never before

had there

been

a

'matnas.'This meant that the

ICCC could claim

that it was not

duplicating

an


12/22

51

existing

function;

that was

important

n

garnering

budgetarysupport

from

over-extended ministries.

In its own

eyes

it was a

pioneering

enterprise,

important

for

tapping personal

energies

and commitment and

attracting

entrepreneurial

personnel

to fill the

positions

of center directors.The new

name

also

meant

that its

product

was

something

new and

different,

a

selling

feature

n

its

marketing.

And it

could

attempt

o

allay

the fears

of local

agen-

cies,

such

as

the

welfare

ministry,

hat t was

encroaching

n their

turf.

The

same name

that was such an

advantage

o

external

audiences,

however,

presented

a

disadvantage nternally.

ince the

'community

enter'

was

clearly

a

foreign

transplant

both

in

sound

and

in

concept,

few

knew

what

it

was,

meant,

or should be.

While

it was

clear

what

ICCC

headquarters

workwas

(staff the centers, train new personnel, identifyfundingsources, engage in

public

relations,

etc.),

the

unknown

and abstract

quality

of the

community

center idea made it

difficult or

individual

entersto know

how to

function

on

a

daily

basis.

The

adoption

of

the

new matnasname

gave

no hint as

to

how

to

proceed.

In

an

early planning

meeting,

an

organizationalmetaphoremerged

which

helped

do

this.

Adopted

by

agency

founders,

executives,

and

manage-

ment,

it

gave shape

to the centers'

self-image,

structure,

and

tasks

(Yanow,

1992a).

The idea that

the center would

be 'a

functional

supermarket'

rew during

the

agency's

planning years

and

gave

form to the abstraction.The

super-

market

metaphor

helped

determine an

administrative

tyle,

as well

as a

proper

role

for

clients

and

personnel.

By

applying

o

the

centers

some

of the

language

that

is

common

in

describing supermarkets,

we

may

see how

the

metaphor

helped

give

form to

center activities.

Centers

would offer

a

'large

variety'

of

programs;

programs

were

'pre-packaged'

nd

'ready

to serve'

-

most centers

offered identical

programs,

since

program

funds

and advice

were

usually

made

available

by

Headquarters;

lients were to come into the

center, with 'shoppinglists' (lists of desired courses), to 'consume' center

offerings;

taff

would 'sell'

programs

o

clients

inside the

building;

and center

success would be

evaluated

by

'turnover

of

goods' (numbers

of

registrants,

inquiries

or

attendance

igures).

Although

supermarket'

as also

an

imported

dea,

supermarkets

ad been

in the

country

or

some

years

and

had become

familiar

o

many.

As

a

Western

idea,

they

carred

some

cachet that

made them

attractive;

nd

supermarkets

also

represented

a

Western,

middle-class

ifestyle,

as distinct

from

the

daily

shopping

at

open-air

stalls

common

to

poorer

people

who didn'town

refrig-

erators.

Symbolic

acts:

Myths

and

rituals

Myths

and rituals

also

contributed

o

the

establishment f the

ICCC's denti-

ty.

In

this

case,

the

audience

was

internal

alone. An

organizational

myth

is

created

to

accommodate

ncommensurable

alues,

beliefs or

points

of

view;


13/22

52

by

deflecting

attention

from the contradictions oward

itself,

it

resolves,

at

least

temporarily,

he tension

between them

(Yanow,1992b).

Rituals

are the

more visible

embodiments

of

myths;

hat

is, they

are

acts

which are

repeated

regularly

nd

give

expression

o

the

values that

myths

attempt

o reconcile.

One of the ICCC's

rituals ook

place

yearly

during

he

period

of this

study

at the

Annual

Meeting,

at

which time the Executive

Director would

initiate

and

lead

a

lively

discussion of the

question,

'What

are our

goals?'

Since the

goals

were set

when

the

agency

was

created,

were made

explicit

in

written

public

relations materials

and

in

internal

agency

documents,

and

were dis-

cussed at

monthly

meetings

of

directors

and

of

staff

community

organizers,

one

might

ask

why

it

was

necessary

to ask

the

question

in

the forum

of

the

AnnualMeeting.Whydiscussagency goalsin a groupof 100 or morepartici-

pants,

all

of whom were familiarwith the

written

presentation

of

agencygoals

and had

participated

in at

least one

prior

discussion

of those

goals?

Moreover,

having

asked it

once,

why repeat

it

regularly,

nd

why

in

this

par-

ticular orum?

Seeing

this

activity

as a ritual

suggests

that,

as with other

artifacts,

t

repre-

sents

and communicates

particular

values. As a

ritual,

the

agency's

annual

asking

of itself about its

goals

carriedseveral

meanings, ncluding

he

agency's

effort to renew

itself,

to

involve

all

organizational

members

in

goal-setting,

and to indicate the ExecutiveDirector'scommitment o the

goals

and to the

process.

In

addition

to

this,

the annualritual

divertedattention

rom

the sub-

stantive

difficulties

posed by

the

goals

themselves:

narrowing

he

gap,

for

example,

was an

immense task to

pull

off,

especially

when

laid

at the feet of

a

new

agencystruggling

o establish

tself and which

constituted

but a

small

part

of

the

polity

whose

problem

t

was;

and the

gap

was not

being

narrowed.

Moreover,

by engaging

n

the

rituals

of

goal-setting,

he

ICCC

created the

image

that

it was

a rational

agency.

n

light

of

tacitly

elt

uncertainty

bout

the

extent to whichcommunitycenteractivitiescould,in fact,address hemyriad

social

problems they

were

expected

to

solve,

engaging

n

an

activity

which

participants

recognized

as rational

reassured

hem,

as well as

more remote

audiences,

that the

organization,

and hence its

programs,

were rational.

In

engaging

in

this

ritual,

the ICCC

created a

'myth

of

rationality'

which

resolved,

at least

temporarily,

he

tension between

two

incommensurables:he

agency's nability

(through

no

fault of

commission)

to

implement

ts

explicit

mandate,

and its

ability

to make

this failure

explicit,

because that

would have

required

making

acit

goals

explicit

and

would

have

undermined

ts

continued

existence.

More

specifically,

he

agency's

explicit

mandate

required

t to narrow

the

gap

between two

ethnic

groups

and

retain

residents of one

group

in their

remote,

small,

undeveloped

towns. But

the

towns often lacked an

industrial

base which

could

provide jobs

and

incomes to allow

residents to

improve

their

economic

and

physical

status.

The

ICCC

was not

given

resources to

address

this

aspect

of the

problem,

and it is

not clear

that the

resources t was

given

(funds

for

ballet

lessons and

other

social,

educational and cultural


14/22

53

undertakings)

were of the

right

type

to

address

the

problem.

On the

other

hand,

the

enablingpolicy

entailed a

tacitly

known mandate

- to convert

the

second

Israel into the first

Israel. It was

perceived

that this could

only

be

accomplishedby educating

the second Israelto the values of the firstIsrael

and that the

way

to

do

this

was

by using

the

social, cultural,

and

educational

activitiesof the

first Israel

which embodied these values.ICCC founders

and

staff

tacitly

understood this

mandateand

accepted

it,

as did

members

of

the

general public

and

some members of

the

client

group

-

these are the

ones

who

frequented

the

centers. Yet this

tacitly

known mandate

could

not

be

made

explicit

because there

was no

public

consensus to

support

it;

had

it

been made

explicit,

that would have

generated

more

public

debate

and

oppo-

sition thantheIsraelipopulationwasprepared o acceptat the time.15

The

ICCC,

facing

verboten

policy goals,

needed

to forestall urther

discus-

sion

of

an irresolvable

ssue,

which

it did

through

the

development

of

the

rationality

myth

and

its enactment in

the ritual

of

annually asking,

in

the

forum of

the

large,organization-wide

Annual

Meeting,

n

a

session led

by

the

founderand Executive

Director,

"What re

our

goals?"

Interpretive

pproaches

o

implementation

nd

policy analysis

This article

began

with a

set

of

questions

which

are

posited

as

central

to the

development

of

interpretive

analyses

of

policies

and

policy implementation.

Taking

the role of

meaning

as the

key

characteristic

of

interpretivepolicy

analysis,

I

suggest

that

we

need to

ask how

policies

mean

in

general,

and use

our

understanding

f

these

processes

to

explore

what a

policy

means and to

whom. What

a

policy

means

can

only

be

answered

meaningfully

about

a

specific

policy,

and the

example

of the

ICCC illustrateshow such an

analysis

mightproceed.

The

Israel

Community

Center

Corporation

ailed to alter the

gap

between

the two

major

population

subdivisions,

but it

succeeded in

validating

the

'under-dog's'

laim to

government

attentionwhile

at the same time

validating

the values

associated with

the

'establishment.' he

gap

of

1981 was

no

more

narrow

than the

gap

of

1969,

but

no

one

claimed that the

ICCC failed

to

implement

ts

mandate.On

the

contrary, ommunity

centers came to be

very

much in

demand

in

center-less

development

owns and

poor

neighborhoods.

Seen from

this

point

of

view,

the

policy's

tacitly

known

elements were

imple-

mented successfully:communitycentersbecameidentifiedwith a

particular

quality

of

life,

and

that

lifestyle

and its

values became

seen as desirable.The

implementing

gency

successfully

used

symbolic

artifacts

n

their

many

forms

as

representations

of

the

values of

the

identity

and status it wanted

to com-

municate,

and

various

stakeholders,

ncluding

many

clients,

came

to

sharethe

meanings

and the

underlying

values of

those

symbols.

One

mightsay

that

the

presence

of a

community

center in

a

neighborhood

became itself a

symbol

of

a certain

status

and,

thereby,

of

individual

and

group identity,

without the


15/22

54

individual

or

group

necessarily

having

attainedthat status.The

development

town

is

still a

development

own,

not

(with

rare

exception)

a desirable

settle-

ment,

and

its residents

by

and

large

still

earn

less

than urban

residents,

are

less well educatedandhoused,and follow differentpatternsof consumption

and leisure-time activities.

Yet,

the

presence

of a

community

center made

residents

eel that

they

belonged

to

the 'desirable'

lements

of the

Israeli

poli-

ty.

The

symbol

of the

goal

became the

goal

itself:

the

public

demonstrations

called

for a

matnas,

not

for

a

higher

social

status

or

for more materialmeans

to

acquire

t.

Acts of

implementationnecessarily

entail

interpretationsby

actors

in

the

situation,

whether

by implementors

of

policy

language,by

clients of

imple-

mentors'acts, or by more distantaudiences.The ICCCpolicy togetherwith

these

interpretations

may

be 'read'

in

their

broadest sense

(that

is,

at the

second level

of

interpretation)

as a text about

conceptions

of the

desired

Israeli

identity.

The

nature

of this

identity

was, however,

never

explicitly

stated,

because

to do so would have meant

making

certainsocial

goals explicit

in

the absence of

general

consensus

to

do so.

'Narrowing

he

gap'

and

'im-

proving

the

quality

of leisure

time' were

publicly

acceptable

goals. They

and

others

like

them,

therefore,

could

be,

and

were,

explicitly

stated.

However,

he

agency

was not

provided

with

the means to

tackle

socio-economic

problems

(e.g.,to createjobs or to determine ndustrialpolicy).It was in a positionto

encourage

adoption

of the

symbols

of

a

lifestyle,

replacing

the

explicitly

stated

goal

-

narrowing

he

gap

-

with

a

tacitly

known

one,

expressedtacitly.

In

this

case,

the

tacitly

known

goal

was

shared

by

many policy

stakeholders.

This

is what accounts

for

the

fact that the

matnassim,

despite

their

nability

o

implement

he

explicitpolicy

with which

they

were

charged,

became

a

desired

entity

on

the

part

of

residentsof towns

and

neighborhoods

withouta matnas.

Symbolicmeanings

also

accommodatenuance and

difference,

and

they

do

this also tacitly,withoutnecessarilymakingdivergencesexplicit.For the first

several

years

of their

operation,

matnassim

by

and

large

attracted

he

middle-

class,

Western residents of

neighboring

owns and

villages

and some

local,

upwardly-mobile

dultsand their

children.

These

people

did

recognize

n the

community

centers'

artifacts a

set

of

meanings

which

matched their

own

values.

Other local residents

did not

identify

with

those

values and

did not

participate

n

center

activities.

Some of

them made no

meaning

of

the

sym-

bols

when

asked about them

(they

could

not

identify

the

agency,

he

building

or its

activities)

or

interpreted

he

symbols

to

mean

something

other than the

meaningsthat agency staff intended them to represent(e.g., identified the

center as a

place

for

children's

activities,

as

a

cafe,

as an

adjunct

o the

appa-

ratusof

a local

political

party,

or

as

something

not for

me').

The

fact that

symbolic

artifacts

accommodate

multiple

meaningsmay

both

hinder

mplementation

nd facilitate

t. The

Corporation

name carried

mean-

ings

which

made

fundraising

difficult.

That

difficulty

was rather

easily

re-

solved,

once

it was

identified.The

matnasname

enabled

implementationby

declaring

he

uniqueness

of

the new

agency,

ndicating

hat it

would not

dupli-


16/22

55

cate

services or

compete

for

resources,

thereby heading

off

inter-agency

sabotage;

but

it

impeded implementation

because the name carried

no

opera-

tional

meanings

or

identity.

The

supermarketmetaphor

aided the

shaping

of the

centers,

thereby

con-

tributing

o

implementation.

But

the same

metaphor

created other

problems,

which

impeded

implementation:

he

conception

of center

activities

and

per-

sonnel

roles

suggestedby

the

supermarketmetaphor

conflictedwith

the

pro-

fessional

practice

of a unit of

community

organizers

who

were

brought

nto

the ICCC

to

carry

out

an

important aspect

of its

work. The

community

organizers

ound

the

principles

of their

professionalpractice

to be

in

opposi-

tion to the dictates

of

the

metaphor.

This created

organizational

ensions

at

the local level between individualorganizersand center directors,and at

headquarters

etween the

head

of

the

CO

Division and the

ExecutiveDirec-

tor,

tensions which

diverted

energy

from

implementation

and

impeded

the

process,

as

both

organizers

and

managersthought

each

was

implementing

policy

correctly

and

the other

was

in

error.While

this clash

might

be seen as

a

problem

of

coordinatingmultiple

decision

points

(Pressman

and

Wildavsky,

1973)

or

controlling

street-levelbureaucrats

Lipsky,

1979),

an

interpretive

approach

would see

it as the

result

of an

organizationalmetaphor

which

accommodateda set of

meanings

shared

by

one

group,

but not another.

How does a policymean?In

general,

t does so

through

he artifactsof the

policy

language

and

through

the

symbolic objects, language,

and

acts

of

the

implementing

agency,

n

a

given

societal

context.

The

meanings

which accrue

to a

particularpiece

of

legislation

rom the

legislative

and

idea

history

of

that

policy

issue

are

embedded

in

its

language.They may

become the

object

of

researchers'

nterpretations

much

as

they

are

the

subjects

of

stakeholders'

interpretations.

Much of

the

implementation

iteraturehas assumedthat

poli-

cies

have a

single goal

or

express

a

single,

identifiable

egislative

ntent

(as

Love and Sederburg,1987, also note), rather than seeing that the symbolic

nature

of

their

anguage

and other

artifacts

may

accommodate

multiple

mean-

ings,

including

those

inheritedfrom

earlier

debates

on the same

policy

issue

(see

also Baier et

al.,

1986 on

this

point).

Criticism

of

the

ambiguity

of

policy

language

addresses this

multivocality

of

meaning;

but calls

to eliminatesuch

ambiguities

gnore

the

fact that

anguage

s

symbolic

and

inherently ubject

o

multiple nterpretations.

Positivist

approaches

to

implementation

are

likely

to search for

univocal

policy

language

and

other

elements

-

those which have

only

one mean-

ing that can be established clearly and that will carry legislators'intent

unambiguously

o

implementors,

deally (from

a

positivist point

of

view)

leaving

no

room for

interpretation.

From

an

interpretive point

of

view,

multiple

meanings

and

multiple

interpretations

are

anticipated

as the norm

rather

han

treated

as

the

aberrant

xception.

Such

multivocality

ecomes the

reason for

and

the

explanation

of

implementation

difficultiesas well

as suc-

cesses,

and

the

task

of

implementation

analysis

is

to uncover or

anticipate

these

multiple

nterpretations.

The

examples

above of

symbolicobjects,

sym-


17/22

56

bolic

language,

and

symbolic

acts

in

one

agency

suggest

the

range

of

agency

actions and

events which

may

carry meanings

and

require nterpretation.

n

some cases the

meanings

which

they carry

are

agency meanings;

n

some

cases,

policy

meanings;

n

some,

the

two

are

intertwined;

and

in

some,

the

meanings

are read

by

different

audiences,

aside

from

legislators'

or

imple-

mentors'

meanings.

In

suggesting

hat

a

legitimate

role for

policy

and

implementation nalysis

is

a

focus

on how

meanings

are

communicated,

uccessfully

or

not,

I

am also

suggesting

hat

the net

of

stakeholdersneeds to be more

widely

cast than

is

traditionally

uggested.

Not

only

are

we

interested

n

the actions

of

traditional

implementors

(agency

directors

and

bureaucrats, ixers,

and

so

forth),

but

also in non-participant bserversof the policy issue: membersof the greater

public

who have an

interest

n

the

issue

and who are also involved

n the

crea-

tion

and

sharing

of

policy

meaning.

While not

standing

to

gain

materially

from

the

success

of the

policy, they

are

part

of a

policy process

that is also

about

the

expression

and

validation

of

values,

and

what

they

value

s corrobo-

rated

by

the

policy's

success and

defeated

by

its failure.

A

positivist

view

would

be

powerless

to

evaluatethe

ICCC's

policy imple-

mentation

n

terms

of

its

popular

success: n

measuring

outputs

or

outcomes

against

stated

intentions,

one

would

find

only slippage

where those affected

by

the

agency

found

a

fulfilling

expression

of their

largely

unstated

goals.

When we

limit

ourselves

o

policy

'facts'

which

may

or

may

not

be

implement-

ed,

we omit

much

that

may

be of

interest

rom a

meaning-ful

perspective.

The

California

cities of

Oakland,

Berkeley,

Hayward,

and

Santa

Cruz,

along

with

Cambridge,

Massachusetts

have all

passed

local ordinances

barring

the

transshipment

of nuclear materials.

They

have

posted

street

signs

declaring

themselves

'nuclear

ree zones.' Yet

none

of

these ordinances

s

implement-

able,

because nuclearmaterialsare

primarily

arried

on

federal

highways,

nd

federal policy supersedes local policy.From an interpretivepoint of view,

these

legislative

acts

are

symbolic

forms

through

which

each

community

ells

itself and other audiences

something

about its

identity

as a

polity.

The

legisla-

tive acts are

statements

of

meaning,

o be

interpretedby

actors

in

each situa-

tion as

well

as

by

onlookers. The

acts and their

interpretations

become

expressive

exts.

In

the

context

of

implementationanalysis,

we

need

to

expand

our focus

beyond

the

capacity

of

language

o

represent

and

convey

meaning,

o

include

the

symbolic objects

and

symbolic

acts

of

the

implementingagency.

All

of

these are

ways

in which a

policy

may

acquire

and communicate

meaning.

They

suggest

a role for

policy analysis

in

discovering

and

analyzing

the

multiple

meanings

conveyed

in

policy language

and

in

agency

acts.

They

are

the

subjects

and

tools

of

interpretive

nalysis.


18/22

57

Acknowledgements

The author

thanks David

K.

Cohen,

Murray

Edelman,

Michael

Lipsky,

and

Gary

T. Marxfor their commentson an earlierversion of this

paper,

and

editor

Doug Torgerson

or his astute

nsight

nto "texts."

Notes

1.

In

asking

how

a

policy

means

I

am

borrowing

rom

the late

poet

and

English professor

John

Ciardi,

who in 1959

published

his book How Does a Poem Mean? In it he

explores

various

ways

in

which

poems

acquire

and

communicate

heir

meanings.

t has taken

me

nearly

25

years

to

parse

the

meaning

of Ciardi's itle (andI still don'tcompletelyunder-

stand

structurally

why

it is so

linguistically roubling).

Let me reassure he reader

hat it

is

grammatically

orrect,

hough

unusual,

usage

(the

adverb how'

modifying

he verb

mean').

I am

intentionally laying

off

its awkwardness

n

the

hope

of

jogging

hought.

2.

This

corresponds

with Schutz's

1962)

notion of first evel and

second level

interpretations.

3.

Data

reported

n

this

section

were

collected

through

participant

bservation

n

two ICCC

community

enters

from 1972

through

1975,

followed

n

1980-81

by

six

months

of

obser-

vation

of

several centers and of

Corporate

headquarters,

nterviews

of

government

and

agency

officialsand center directorsand

staffs,

and document

and

journal

analysis.

These

data are

presented

n

greater

detail

in

Yanow

(1992a,

1992b,

1993).

The

analysis

applies

only to those centersbuilt in the Jewish sector of the country.Centerswerealso builtin

Arab

neighborhoods

and

towns;

they

were not included

in

this

study,

or

reasons of lan-

guage

and access.

4. The

ICCC

was

establishedon

May

4,

1969

by

the PrimeMinister'sCabinet

Committee or

Economic

Affairs,

and later ratified

by

the

Government,

as

a

Government

Corporation.

The

translation f

its

legal

name

s

'Corporation

or

Cultureand

Sports

Centers

for

Youth

and

Adults),

Limited.'The

name 'Israel

Corporation

of

Community

Centers'

was devel-

oped subsequently

s an

English

rendering

f the

legal

name.

The

legal

status

of

a Govern-

ment

Corporation

refers

to

a

non-governmental gency

established

by

authority

of the

Knessetunder

the

aegis

of

a

Ministry,

ts

shares

wholly

owned

by

the

Government,

irect-

ed by a Board appointedby the supervisingMinisterand chairedby the Ministeror a

designated

ubstitute.The ICCC's

21-memberBoardwas to consist

of 10

government

ffi-

cials and

11

membersof the

public.

5. Israel's

development

towns

are

comparable

to

Britain's

New

Towns.'

They

were built

between

1950 and

1963

on

geographically

dispersed

sites

to

house

immigrants,

most of

whom came from

Spanish

and French

Morocco,Tunisia,

Libya,Iraq,

Iran, ndia,

Romania,

and

Poland

n

1948-1951 and

1955-56.

On

theirarrival hese

immigrants

were

housed

in

transit

camps

(ma'abarot,

ent cities later

converted

to

tin

or wood

shacks)

until their

resettlement

n

the

development

owns,

some

of

which were

built

adjacent

o

the

transit

camps.

The

locations

of the

towns were

chosen to

disperse

the

population

around

the

country,n orderto decreasemetropolitan rowding,optimizethe use of waterresources,

and secure

distant

borders.

Development

own' s not a

legal

determination;

t

is

used to

referto

non-agricultural lanned

communitiesbuilt

after

1948,

but

criteria

or

identifying

a

settlementas a

development

own

vary

from

one

ministry

o

the next.

Accounts

of

the

total

number

have varied from 19

(Spilerman

and

Habib,

1976)

to

34

(Shachar,1971),

depending

on

which

criteria are used. See

also

Comay

and Kirschenbaum

1973)

and

Spiegel

(1966)

for further

discussionof

the

economic

and

demographic

haracteristics f

development

owns.

The

important

point

for the

analysis

of

the

ICCC,

however,

s,

as seen

in the

case and

as

Goldberg

1984:

ch.

1)

has

noted,

that the combination f

immigrant

nd

economic

characteristics

ssociatedwith

development

owns has turned the towns into

a


19/22

58

category

of ascribed

dentification

n

Israeli

society.

Residence n a

development

own is

a

stigmatizing

abel which

implies

low social

status and economic and educational

attain-

ment.

The label attaches

o all

development

owns;

residentsof more 'successful'

meaning

economically ndependent)owns do not escapethe negativeconnotationsattached o the

term.See note 6.

6.

Although

in

common

understandingdevelopment

own resident'connotes

a

lower class

person

of Middle

Eastern

background,

he

categorization

of classes

by

country

of

origin

and

by place

of residence

(development

own

=

Middle

Eastern,

ower

class;

city

=

Euro-

pean,

middle

class)

is

not

factually

supported.

Most

development

own

populations

were

split

60/40

between

Middle Easternersand

Eastern

Europeans.

The traditional

appella-

tion for Middle Easterners

'tribes

of the East' or

Sfaradim)

ncludes

people

from

Bulgaria,

Greece,

Italy

and other countrieson the

European

continent,

whose

lifestyles

are

more

similar o their Western

compatriots

han to

people

from

rural

parts

of

Morocco

or Iran.

Also, among

the ranks

of the urbanmiddle class were

manyprominent

amiliesof

Middle

Eastern

origin.

Moreover,

dividing

the Jewish

yanow, dvora. the communications of policy meanings. implementation as insterpretations and text

Documents