ifrs for sme’s

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ISSUE March

The Finance Club of Asian Institute of Management, Manila

OIL DYNAMICS

MICROFINANCE

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

MOMENTUM INVESTING

IFRS FOR SMES

RISK MANAGEMENT Fin i ht

YEAR 2010VOLUME 2

Microfinance

Challengesahead for MFIs


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Contents

1VaR Unleashed: A continuing series on VaR and its effectson financial crisis

From VaRs success a model for risk measurement to its flaws and why we still need it!

by Lakshminarasimhan Sundararajan

2The Changing Oil Dynamics

From inventory model to OPEC spare capacity to term structure fluctuations, the oil pricingdynamics have been changing constantly as marginal returns on investment fall. But as

always, fundamentals hold the key to pricing.by Mona Khetan

4Microfinance Institutions: The Challenges Ahead

60 % of the Indias population is dependent on agriculture and it contributes up to 18% tothe national economy. The changing land patterns and the unstable cycles have reduced

micro lending to small farmers. This article presents the challenges MFIs should overcometo promote AGRI Micro Finance

by Hari Vardhan Kuna

5Upcoming Events at AIM Finance Club

6Acquisition through Stock or Cash?

Shall an offer be made with stock or cash? What are the concerns of Buyers and Sellers andwho takes away chunk of Shareholder Value Added (SVA)?

by Rajan Pahuja


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8Momentum Investing: Riding the wave

The prospect of earning abnormal profits due to this market anomaly has attracted many

asset managers to pursue momentum investing which has created a wide spreadcompetition in this arena.

by Anuj Goel

9IFRS for Small & Medium Enterprises

Preparing Financial Statements in accordance with IFRS or full US GAAP is an expensive andtime-consuming process with extensive disclosure requirements. This article describes IFRSfor SMEs that have been prepared specifically for SMEs, their benefits, drawbacks and issues

to consider for the transition to IFRS for SMEs.

by Syed Mehdi Kalbe


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1

VaR Unleashed: A continuing

series on VaR and its effects on

financial crisis

There are known

knowns. These are thingswe know that we know.There are knownunknowns. That is to say,there are things that wenow know we dont know.But there are alsounknown unknowns.These are things we donot know we dont know.Donald Rumsfeld

What made VaR successful as amodel? At the time when Risk Metricsdesigned VaR, there was no modelsthat could apply to compare risks ofvarious assets as well as the firm widerisk. VaR solved all that by coming upwith a dollar value that a portfoliocould stand to lose 99% of the time inthe given time frame. Every time anew asset was added to the portfolio,

VaR could be recalculated and newlevel of risk assessed. The reason forVaR s prevalence across the financialspectrum, is when JP Morgan decidedto give it away by making it opensource and even asking other expertsto contribute to it. Everyone, from atrader to a CEO liked the simple dollarvalue estimate for risk; even the SECwas convinced so much that itrequired financial intermediaries to

disclose their VaRs in the annualreports. When VaR was included as thepreferred method of measuring marketrisk in Basel II banking norms itbecame institutionalized.

So what are the flaws in VaR? Its theunpredictability of the amount of lossthe 1% of time that is the mostdangerous with VaR models. Its aBlack swan event that causes the risk

model to fail. VaR flaws lies in the factthat it depends on historical data topredict the losses. A black swan event

(which has a few in a million chancesin history of appearing) creates aproblem in the model. Most of theworst case risk scenarios weremodelled for example after the 1987stock market crash in the US whichresulted in the Dow Jones lost almost22% of its value in a day, i.e. mostpeople were betting on the fact that noother event would happen that wouldbe worse than this happens to be thebiggest fallacy. For example, a creditdefault swap is essentially aninsurance the company wont defaulton its borrowings. Many investmentbanks/financial firms made gains byselling CDS to investors, but thechance of paying the insurance wasthought to be very small(about one ina million), and since it was beyond the99%, VaR number did not show thetrue extent of the riskiness of thefinancial institution.

In my opinion, even though the idea ofVaR number seems to create a wholelot of problems, its importance inmeasurement of risk 99% of the time

cannot be diminished. After all weneed to be able to quantify risk inorder to see the direction of risk ourportfolio is moving to. A story goesthat Goldman Sachs lost the leastduring the crisis because they lookedat direction at which their portfolio riskwas proceeding and not just at thenumbers. The ideal role of the VaR isto provide managers with some intelabout the situation in hand just as in a

war then they have to make judgmentcalls based on all available informationrather than blindly following a dollarfigure.

Lakshminarasimhan Sundararajan, FRM

Level 1 Candidate, MBA 2010, Interests inEconomics, Risk Management and Forex.


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2

The Changing Oil Dynamics

Like mostcommodity markets,

it is the supply anddemand dynamicsthat determine theprice of oil.However, unlike

other commodities, oils nonrenewability and its high reserveconcentration in a few countries makethe supply of oil highly vulnerable. Incontrast, on the demand side, theworlds sustained dependence on oilhas kept the demand curve prettymuch upward sloping. This makes oil avery sought after commodity.

The story was not the same a fewdecades back though. At that point oftime, most thought that despite oilbeing non-renewable, its abundant. In1956, when King Hubbert proposed hisoil peak theory stressing that US1

1 US oil production is just a proxy, the bell shapedproduction curve goes for every oil field, though thepeak time would differ.

oilproduction would peak by 1970, hisprediction received a lot of criticism.

However, US oil production peaked ataround 10 million barrels per day in1970 and has been on a downward

trend since then. However, as wenotice in the chart below, the trendwasnt clear enough until 2000 andmost people came to agree with it onlyaround 2004.

This does not imply that we are notrunning out of oil, not anytime soon.The downward trend however impliesthat we need to invest more and moreto extract every extra barrel of oil nowi.e. diminishing marginal returns oninvestment. This changes thedynamics for oil pricing.

Historically, inventory model worked(the lower the inventory, the higherthe price and vice versa) fordetermining the price of oil. Therelationship however broke down in2004 when a sharp fall in sparecapacity led to unprecedented rise inprices. Spare capacity2

Around the same time, we also noticea prominent shift in the oil forward

became adominant driver for oil prices sincethen.

2OPEC countries do not produce oil to their full

potential but according a quota assigned to them. Thisgenerates spare capacity which can be brought to

production within a short period of time in case ofhigh demand.


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curve from contango3

tobackwardation as the convenienceyield for oil increased, reflecting theexpected low scarcity of the oil todayversus sometime in the future.(Ideally, backwardation is an unlikelyscenario when it comes tocommodities given the associatedstorage costs.)

Finally, OPECs influence in dictatingthe terms has substantially increased.Any signal from them can change thecourse of oil price. We also witnessed

a long list of alternate energy sourcesas substitutes to oil, but none of themso far has been a fitting reply,especially when it comes totransportation. For example, thoughethanol is a close substitute togasoline, its production poses threat tofood scarcity and its transport to retailoutlets isnt as easy as it is forgasoline.

3 Contango implies an upward sloping forward curve

while backwardation implies a downward slopingcurve.

In effect, the reasons driving oil priceshave been changing constantly. Thequestion is how do we capitalize fromthese? The bottom-line is to neverloose sight of the underlyingfundamentals. For example, the recentrecession had the power to drive downoil prices as low as $40 per barreldespite supply concerns. Moreover,one could reap benefits from asustained backwardation by buyinglong term (low price) and then cashingin near term (high price) due to thedownward sloping term structure. And

last but not the least, we could allbenefit if we are committed to usingenergy judiciously.

Mona Khetan, FRM, MBA 2010, CFA level

II candidate, interests in Risk

Management, Merger and Acquisitions andCommodities

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007

Crude Oil M1-M3 Spread

Backwardation

Contango

Source: Bloomberg

$/barrel


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4

Microfinance Institutions: The

Challenges Ahead

Agricultural contribution to Indian

economy is about 18%, involvingabout 60% of the population.According to Ravallion and Datt(1996), 84.5 percent of the substantialpoverty reduction in India during 1951to 1991 was due to agriculturalgrowth. These numbers highlights howimportant agriculture is for a countrylike India.The landholding per household hasdecreased considerably in the last 30

years. Marginal land owners (owningless than one hectare) has increasedfrom around 40% in 1971 to morethan 70% in 2003 and is increasingfurther. The changes in thelandholding patterns have affected theway these institutional creditors(traditional banks) lend over a periodof time. Institutional creditorscontributed for 7.2 percent of the totalcultivator debt in 1951 and hasincreased its share to 66.3% in theyear 1991.However, the share of theinstitutional credit agencies has comedown 57 percent in 2002.If you consider that agricultural growthwas one of the main reasons forpoverty reduction in India, one of themain supporting pillars for the povertyreduction was the Institutional creditto farmers. Institutional lenders lendmoney by having land as thecollateral. But with the changingpatterns of the landholdings in therecent times institutional lenders arelosing ground in rural India. Their lossis the gain of moneylenders (noninstitutional). This trend should not bewelcomed as many moneylendersexploit the situation of the poorfarmers due to the non availability ofthe credit from the institutionallenders.

Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are inthe forefront for poverty reduction inmany developing countries. MFIs have

confined themselves essentially torural micro enterprises as they cateredto the requirements of the non-farmsector and satisfied only immediateconsumption needs. Micro enterprisesor non - farm business activitiesgenerate regular income and permitthe beneficiaries of the credit facilitiesto repay in frequent and smallinstalments. Farm activities on theother hand have a longer and lessstable, unpredictable cycles. MFIsloans are in proportion to savings, itrequires frequent and fasterrepayments higher than marketinterest rates and insistence on regulargroup meetings. All these factorsmake MFI loans unattractive tofarmers needs. Income accruals fromagriculture are significantly influencedby risks associated with natural factorssuch as rainfall and other climaticconditions; as a result very few MFIscome forward to lend exclusivelyagricultural activities. Only 8% of thetotal INR 75 billion was lent to financeagriculture.The concerns of both the institutional

lenders and the MFIs are genuine, butby not providing access to themarginal farmers, Indian institutionsare ignoring the very sector that havecontributed the most for povertyreduction. To overcome this both MFIsand institutional lenders should comeup with new forms of lending that willrenew the farm credit once again. Inpast 2-3 years there are few initiativesthat were taken different pockets of

the country. But these initiatives arefacing challenges in replicating thembecause of the heterogeneity involvedin the nature of the agriculturethroughout the country. Now the gamefor MFIs and institutional lenders liesin customized innovation, since theneeds of different farmers of differentregions are distinct, and contributionfor poverty reduction in the country.

Hari Vardhan Kuna, MBA 2010, Interests

in Microfinance and Risk Management


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Upcoming Events at AIMFinance Club

1. A talk by Prof. Roberto GalangMSc Economics Oxford

University on 8th March, 2010

on the practical applications on

economics/econometrics as a

future career. This is especially

for those who want to apply

their microeconomics skills after

AIM, both from a government /

policy-makers viewpoint, as

well as for those interested in

private sector positions.

2. The CFA Society of thePhilippines in cooperation with

Institute of Strategy & Valuation

presents a seminar on "Why

Bruce Lee would have been

great at valuation Varying

Techniques for Superior

Investing By MR. JOEL LITMAN,

Managing Director, EquityAnalysis & Strategy, Inc.

Thursday, March 11, 2010,

2:30PM to 5:30PM

Address: Oakwood Premier Joy

Nostalg Center, 17 ADB Avenue,

Ortigas Center, Pasig, Metro

Manila, Philippines.

3. Virtual Stock Exchange:Students try out different

strategies to maximise the

equity portfolio gain on virtual

stock exchange software dealing

US stocks. The competition runs

for a month starting 8th March,

2010; standing and portfolio of

each member can be seen by

anyone. This game makesstudents understand concepts of

risk and return through

perspective of a day trader.


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6

Acquisition through Stock or

Cash?In a an acquisition with cash deal, theroles of two parties are clear but in a

stock deal, it is less clear who is thebuyer and who is the seller.

In cash transactions, acquiringshareholders take on the entire riskthat expected synergy value

embedded in the acquisition premiumwill not materialize. In stocktransactions, the risk is shared withthe selling shareholders; moreprecisely, the synergy is shared in theproportion to the percentage of thecombined company the acquiring andselling shareholders each will own.For instance, Buyer Inc. wants toacquire the competitor Seller Inc. Themarket capitalization of Buyer is $5

billion made up of 50 million sharespriced at $100 per share. Sellersmarket capitalization stands at $2.8billion-40 million shares each at $70.The managers of Buyer estimate thatmerging the two companies can createsynergy value of $1.7 billion byacquisition of Seller. They announcethat an offer to buy all the shares ofSeller at $100 per share. The valueplaced on the Seller is therefore is $4

billion, representing a premium of $1.2billion over the companyspreannouncement market value of$2.8 billion.

The expected net gain to the acquirerfrom the acquisition-called asShareholder Value Added (SVA) is thedifference between the estimatedvalue of the synergies obtainedthrough the acquisition and the

acquisition premium. So if Buyerchooses to pay cash for the deal, thenSVA for its shareholders is expected

synergy of $1.7 billion minus the $1.2billion premium, of $500 million.But if Buyer decides to finance theacquisition by issuing new shares, theSVA for the existing shareholders willdrop. Lets assume that Buyer offersone of its shares for each of theSellers shares. The new offer placesthe same value on the Seller as didthe cash offer. But upon the dealscompletion, the acquiring shareholderswill find that the ownership in Buyerhas been reduced. They will own only55.5% of the new total of 90 millionshares outstanding after theacquisition. So their share of theacquisitions expected SVA is only55.5% of $500 million, or $277.5million. The rest goes to the Sellersshareholders, who are nowshareholders in an enlarged Buyer Inc.

Fixed value or Fixed number ofsharesBoards and shareholders must dosimply more than stock or cash whilemaking or accepting an offer.Companies can either issue a fixed

number of shares or they can issue afixed value of shares.Fixed shares: The number of shares tobe issued is certain, but the value ofthe deal may fluctuate between theannouncement of the offer and theclosing date, depending on theacquirers share price. Both parties areaffected, but changes in the acquirersprice will not affect the proportionalownership of the parties in the

combined company.Fixed value: In these deals, thenumber of shares issued is not fixeduntil the closing date and will dependon the prevailing price. As a result, theproportional ownership of the ongoingcompany is left in doubt until theclosing date. Lets go back to Buyerand Seller Inc. Suppose that Buyer hasmade stock offer and its share hasfallen exactly by the premium it is

paying to the Seller- from $100 to $76per share. At this price in fixed valuedeal, Buyer has to issue 52.6 million


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shares to give Sellers shareholders $4billion worth. But that leaves Buyerwith just 48.7% of the combinedcompany as compared to 55.5% theywould have had in the fixed-sharedeal.

Questions for the acquirerThere are primarily three questions.First, are the acquiring companysshares undervalued, fairly valued, orovervalued? Second, what is the riskthat the expected synergies need topay for the acquisition premium willnot materialize? The answer to thesequestions will help in making thedecision between cash and a stockoffer. Finally, how likely is it that thevalue of the acquiring companysshares will drop before closing? Theanswer to this question should guidethe decision between a fixed-value anda fixed-share offer. Lets take eachquestion in turn:Valuation. If market is undervaluingthe acquirers shares then it should notissue the new shares to finance thetransaction because that would

penalize the current shareholders.When a company issues stock tofinance the transaction, it may give asignal to the market that managersthink the stock is overvalued and stockmay fall after the information isdisseminated. Acquirer may believethat its shares are undervalued, but inreal world, it is not easy to convince adisbelieving seller to accept fewer but more undervalued shares. In this

case it is logical course to proceed withthe cash offer.Synergy Risks. A really confidentacquirer would pay for acquisition withcash so that shareholders would nothave to give any of the anticipatedmerger gains, synergy, to the acquiredcompanys shareholders. But if themanagers think that the risks aresubstantial, they can be expected totry to hedge their bets by offering

stock. By diluting the ownershipinterests, they will also limit thepartition in the losses incurred. Hence,

stock offer sends two powerful signalsto the market: that the acquirersshares are overvalued and that itsmanagement lacks confidence in theacquisition.Pre-closing market risk: Through aresearch by Journal of Finance it hasbeen found that more sensitive thesellers compensation is to changes inthe acquirers stock price, the lessfavourable is the markets response tothe acquisition announcement. Hencethe greater the potential impact ofpre-closing market risk, the more theimportant it is for the acquirer tosignal its confidence by assumingsome of the risk.

Questions for the sellerIn case of a cash offer, the sellingcompanys board faces a fairlystraightforward task. It just has tocompare the value of the company asan independent business against theprice offered. The only risks are that itcould hold out for a higher price orthat management can create a bettervalue if company remained

independent. For example, Buyer bidfor $100, representing a 43%premium over the current price of $70of Seller. Let us suppose that they canget a 10% return by putting the cashin investments with similar level ofrisk. After five years, the $100 willcompound to $161. If the bid wererejected, Seller will have to earn 18%return on its currently valued $70share to do as well. So uncertain a

return must compete against a bird inthe hand. The questions Seller needsto answer are: How much is theacquirer worth? How likely is it thatthe expected synergies will berealised? and, How great is the pre-closing market risk?

Rajan Pahuja, MBA 2010, CFA level III

candidate, interests in Fundamental

Research (Equities and Derivatives),Merger and Acquisitions and

Macroeconomic Events


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8

Momentum Investing: Riding the

wave

Momentum is one of the mostchallenging asset pricing anomalies in

modern finance literature. Momentumimplies that stocks with high short-term past returns (3 to 12 months)will continue to outperform the stockswith low short term past returns, Itprovides the investment managerswith a trading strategy whereby theycan buy past winners and short sellpast losers and expect to earn extra-normal returns.

This strategy was first documented byN. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) forthe US market. They definemomentum in terms of averageunadjusted short-term past returns.Their study shows that stock returnsexhibit momentum behaviour atintermediate horizons. A self-financingstrategy that buys the top 10% and

sells the bottom 10% of stocks rankedby returns during the past 6 months,and holds the positions for 6 months,produces profits of 1% per month.

The empirical evidence from thepractitioner studies also show thatstocks with specific characteristics asmentioned had outperformedconsistently, over the time. The bestrecent performers had outperformed

the worst recent performers. JPMorgan conducted a study on the 12month returns obtained by 3000

stocks in the US market from 1951-2005, which showed that a consistentstrategy of buying the best performers(top 10%) over the previous yearreturned 15.2%; and selling the worstperformers (bottom 10%) returnedonly 3.4%.

The abnormal profitability cannot beexplained by the existing multifactormodels like Arbitrage Pricing Theory(APT) and macroeconomic-based riskexplanations, which compensate theinvestor with risk adjusted returns. Itis believed that the outperformance ofthe assets can be attributed to theirrational behavior of investorsexplained by the behavioral finance.Behavioral finance states thatpsychological characteristics ofinvestors such as bounded rationalityand biased expectations result in thisirrational behavior which in turncreates a market anomaly ofmomentum in stocks.

The prospect of earning abnormalprofits due to this market anomaly has

attracted many asset managers topursue momentum investing whichhas created a wide spread competitionin this arena. A wide range ofinvestment strategies built onmomentum has netted record capitalflows, raising the possibility that theseanomalies get arbitraged away. Thekey to continued success will be tospot these anomalies well before thecompetition, identify appropriate entry

and exit points of trading onmomentum, and act with utmostdiscipline.

Anuj Goel, MBA 2010,CFA level III

candidate, interests in Corporate Finance,Mergers and Acquisitions, and Capitalmarkets.


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IFRS for Small & Medium

Enterprises

The purpose of financial reporting is toprovide financial information for its

users. In any accounting text, you willfind the statement, the benefitprovided by information should begreater than the cost of provision.Compliance with Generally AcceptedAccounting Principles (GAAP) or fullInternational Financial ReportingStandards (IFRS), which wereprepared for large publicly listedcorporations, requires complexaccounting treatments and extensive

disclosure requirements, making fullcompliance quite expensive. Thus,private small and medium sizedenterprises (SMEs) generally incurredhigh costs of contracting professionalaccounting firms and external auditorsin preparing complex financialinformation that may not even be fullyunderstood by the main user, theowner.

Thus, there was a need for a differentset of simpler standards for SMEs andto fulfil this need the InternationalAccounting Standards Board (IASB)published IFRS for SMEs on the 9th ofJuly 2009. As compared to full IFRS orthe US GAAP, the IFRS for SMEs havesimpler accounting standards andfewer disclosure requirements, whichare more relevant to these small andmedium enterprises. Stressing on the

simplicity and fewer disclosurerequirements, the full US GAAPexceeds 10,000 pages1, full IFRS isabout 2,700 pages, while IFRS forSMEs is a mere 230 pages. Due to thesimplicity and reduction in time takento comply with these new standards,adopting IFRS for SMEs would lead tocost reductions as well as provideinformation that is meaningful andrelevant to key users.

An added benefit is for privatecompanies that have foreign

businesses and thus need foreignfinancing. It will be easier for suchcompanies to prepare statements inaccordance with IFRS for SMEs, whichare accepted globally, rather thanhaving to prepare another set offinancial statements in the local GAAPof the foreign lender.The IASB defines SMEs as entities thatdo not have public accountability butdo publish general purpose financialstatements for external users such asthe owners of a privately ownedcompany, lenders and tax authorities.Not having public accountabilityimplies its debt and equity instrumentsare not traded on a public financialmarket.

One of the main drawbacks is that thestandards do not offer a choicebetween the FIFO and LIFO method ofinventory costing (while full IFRS offera choice between LIFO and FIFO, aslong as the principle of consistency isapplied). The FIFO method ofaccounting leads to lower cost ofgoods sold (as compared to LIFO

method) during times of rising costs,thus increasing reported profits,resulting in higher business tax.In deciding to switch to IFRS for SMEs,in my opinion the most importantissues an SME will face will be duringthe transition stage. Some of theconsiderations for transition includeguidance on first time adoption,acceptance by key user of financialstatements, personnel training,

modifications to internal controlsystems, communication tostakeholders such as lenders andsuppliers and acceptance by externalauditors.

For first time adopters, IFRS for SMEsrequire full retrospective adjustment.As an example, an entity adoptingIFRS for SMEs for the first time in its2010 financial statements must:

Prepare an openingstatement of financial


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position (balance sheet) at

the transition date (January

1, 2010) in accordance with

IFRS for SMEs. Comparative

information for the previous

year must also comply with

IFRS for SMEs.

Make adjustments due totransition from previousGAAP or IFRS. Most can bemade directly to retainedearnings.

Consistently apply IFRS forSMEs. The standards thatneed to be applied are thosethat were in effect at thedate of the closing statementof financial position,December 31, 2010.

Prepare financial reports forthe period ending December31, 2010.

In the notes, providereconciliations between IFRSfor SMEs and previous GAAP(or IFRS)

There is a general exemption fromretrospective application if it isimpracticable for the company. Tofacilitate transition, there are certainother exemptions available which areoutside the scope of this article.SMEs represent approximately 95% ofall companies2, and this excellentinitiative by the IASB could potentiallycater to the lower cost more relevantinformation demand of this huge

potential target market.

References:1. www.allbusiness.com/education

-training/continuing-education/11416715-1.html

2. www.iasb.org/News/Press%20Releases/IASB%20publishes%20IFRS%20for%20SMEs.htm

3. www.iasplus.comSyed Mehdi Kalbe, ACCA Associate, MBA

2010, interests in Corporate finance, M&A,

and Capital Markets.

that the lowest price for a barrel of oil

was approximately 15 dollars (calculated

in 2006 terms) in the year 1930.

that the Philippines is one the best in

the world in terms of its microfinance

environment. Its ranks 3rd after Peru

and Bolivia in a study done by theEconomist Intelligence Unit.

the first time terms bull and bear

were used to describe investors was in

the book, Every Man His Own Broker,

published in 1775 by Thomas Mortimer.

that a study conducted in 2000 by

Lehman Brothers, revealed that, on an

average, large M&A deals cause the

domestic currency of the target

corporation to appreciate by 1% relative

to the acquirers.

DID YOU KNOW ...
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