estelarshodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/26960/1...the npas growth involves the necessity...
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CHAPTER-1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Meaning
1.2 Significance of the Topic
1.3 Concept and Background of Non-Performing Assets
1.4 Instructions, Guidelines and Prudential Norms of Reserve Bank of India
1.5 Appraisal of Managerial Capability of a Borrower : A Key Element inCredit Decisions
1.6 About the Present Study
1.6.1 Problem to be Investigated
1.6.2 Significance of the Study
1.6.3 Objectives of the Study
1.6.4 Hypothesis
1.6.5 Period of the Study
1.6.6 Units of the Study
1.6.7 Plan of Research Design
1.6.8 Review of Literature
1.6.9 Scope of the Study
1.6.10 Limitations of the Study
Banking in India in the modern sense originated in the last decades
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of the 18th century. Reserve Bank of India was established in 1935. In
1969, the Indian government nationalised all the major banks that it did
not already own and these have remained under government
ownership. They are run under a structure know as ‘profit-making public
sector undertaking’ (PSU) and are allowed to compete and operate as
commercial banks.
The Indian banking sector is made up of four types of banks, as
well as the PSUs and the state banks, they have been joined since
1990s by new private commercial banks and a number of foreign banks.
Banking in India was generally fairly mature in terms of supply, product
range and reach-even though reach in rural India and to the poor still
remains a challenge.
The next stage for the Indian banking has been set up with the
proposed relaxation in the norms for Foreign Direct Investment, where
all Foreign Investors in banks may be given voting rights which could
exceed the present cap of 10%, at present it has gone up to 74% with
some restrictions.
The new wave ushered in a modern outlook and tech-savvy
methods of working for traditional banks. All this led to the retail boom in
India. People not just demanded more from their banks but also
received more. Up to this, it was fair, but down grade in its recovery
create non-performing assets which is a matter of worry.
1.1 Meaning
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Non Performing Asset means an asset or account of borrower,
which has been classified by a bank or financial institution as
sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset, in accordance with the directions or
guidelines relating to asset classification issued by The Reserve Bank of
India. Banks usually classify as non-performing assets any commercial
loans which are more than 90 days overdue and any consumer loans
which are more than 180 days overdue. More generally, an asset which
is not producing income is called as non-performing asset.
Ninety days overdue : With a view to moving towards international
best practices and to ensure greater transparency, it has been decided
to adopt the ‘90 days overdue’ norm for identification of NPAs, from the
year ending March 31, 2004.1 Accordingly, with effect form March 31,
2004, a non-performing asset (NPA) shall be a loan or an advance
where:
1. interest and /or installment of principal remain overdue for a
period of more than 90 days in respect of a Term Loan.
2. the account remains ‘out of order’ for a period of more than 90
days, in respect of an overdraft/ cash credit (OD/CC).
3. the bill remains overdue for a period of more than 90 days in
the case of bills purchased or discounted.
4. interest and/ or installment of principal remains overdue for two
harvest seasons but for a period not exceeding two half years
in the case of an advance granted for agricultural purpose.
Out of order : An account treated as ‘out of order’ if the outstanding
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balance remains continuously in excess of the sanctioned limit /drawing
power. In case where the outstanding balance in the principal operating
account is less than the sanctioned limit/ drawing power, but there are
no credits continuously for six months (the ‘time limit’ is for the study
period of present study from 2007-08 to 2011-12, otherwise The
Reserve Bank of India issued a master circular DBOD.No.BP.BC.21
/21.04.048/2010-11 on dated July 1, 2010 named as Master Circular -
Prudential Norms on income Recognition, Asset Classification and
Provisioning pertaining to Advances in which this ‘time limit’ has been
reduced to 90 days) as on the date of balance sheet or credits are not
enough to cover the interest debited during the same period, these
account should be treated as ‘out of order’.2
1.2 Significance of the Topic
A strong banking sector is important for flourishing economy. The
failure of the banking sector may have an adverse impact on other
sectors. Non-performing assets are one of the major concerns for banks
in India.
NPAs reflect the performance of banks. A high level of NPAs
suggests high probability of a large number of credit defaults that affect
the profitability and net-worth of banks and also erodes the value of the
asset. The NPAs growth involves the necessity of provisions, which
reduces the overall profits and shareholders value.
The issue of Non Performing Assets has been discussed at length
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for financial systems all over the world. The problem of NPAs is not only
affecting the banks but also the whole economy. In fact, high level of
NPAs in Indian banks is nothing but a reflection of the state of health of
the industry and trade.
1.3 Concept and Background of Non-Performing Assets
NPA surfaced suddenly in the Indian banking scenario, around the
Eighties, in the midst of turbulent structural changes overtaking the
international banking institutions, and when the global financial markets
were undergoing sweeping changes. In fact after it had emerged, the
problem of NPA kept hidden and gradually swelling unnoticed and
unperceived, in the maze of defective accounting standards that still
continued with Indian Banks up to the Nineties and opaque
Balance-sheets.3
In a dynamic world, it is true that new ideas and new concepts that
emerge through such changes caused by social evolution bring
beneficial effects, but only after levying a heavy initial toll. The process
of quickly integrating new innovations in the existing set-up leads to an
immediate disorder and unsettled conditions. People are not
accustomed to the new models. These new formations take time to
configure, and work smoothly. The old is cast away and the new
formations take time to configure, and work smoothly. Marginal and
sub-marginal operators are swept away by these convulsions. Banks
being sensitive institutions entrenched deeply in traditional beliefs and
conventions were unable to adjust themselves to the changes they
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suffered easy victims to this upheaval in the initial phase.4
Consequently, banks underwent this transition-syndrome and
languished under distress and banking crises surfaced in quick
succession one following the other in many countries. Elaborating a
cross-country description of this phenomenon a study by FICCI depicts
as under :
“Since the mid-eighties, banking crises have come to the forefront
of economic analysis. Situation of banking distress have quickly
intensified and in the process, have become one of the main obstacles
to stability to the financial system. According to Lindgren et al. (1996),
73 per cent of the member countries of the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) experienced at lest one bout of significant banking sector
problem from 1980 to 1996. More importantly, such crises have resulted
in severe bank losses or public sector resolution costs. As Caprio and
Klingebiel (1996) observe, such costs amounted to 10 per cent or more
of GDP in at least a dozen developing country episodes during the past
15 years. Recent studies by Honohan (1996) provide the estimated
resolution costs or banking crises in developing and transition
economies 1980.5
But when the banking industry in the global sphere came out of this
metamorphosis to re-adjust to the new order, they emerged revitalized
and as more vibrant and robust units. Deregulation in developed
capitalist countries particularly in Europe, witnessed a remarkable
innovative growth in the banking industry, whether measured in terms of
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deposit growth, credit growth, growth intermediating instruments as well
as in network.
During all these years, the Indian Banking, whose environment was
insulated from the global context and was denominated by state controls
of directed credit delivery, regulated interest rates, and investment
structure did not participate in this vibrant banking revolution. Suffering
the dearth of innovative spirit and choking under undue regimentation,
Indian banking was lacking objective and prudential systems of
business leading from early stagnation to eventual degeneration and
reduced or negative profitability. Continued political interference, the
absence of competition and total lack of scientific decision-making, led
to consequences just the opposite of what was happening in the
western countries. Imperfect accounting standards and opaque balance
sheets served as tools for hiding the shortcomings and failing to reveal
the progressive deterioration and structural weakness of the country’s
banking institutions to public view. This enabled the nationalized banks
to continue to flourish a deceptive manifestation and false glitter, though
stray symptoms of the brewing ailment were discernible here and there.6
The government hastily introduced the first phase of reforms in the
financial and banking sectors after the economic crisis of 1991. This was
an effort to quickly resurrect the health of the banking system and bridge
the gap between Indian and global banking development. Indian
Banking, in particular, Public Sector Banks suddenly woke up to the
realities of the situation and to face the burden of the surfeit of their
woes. Simultaneously major revolutionary transitions were taking place
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in other sectors of the economy on account the ongoing economic
reforms intended towards freeing the Indian economy from government
controls and linking it to market driven forces for a quick integration with
the global economy. Import restrictions were gradually freed. Tariffs were
brought down and quantitative controls were removed. The Indian
market was opened for free competition to the global players. The new
economic policy in turn, revolutionarises the environment of the Indian
industry and business and put them to similar problems of new mixture
of opportunities and challenges. As a result, we witness today a
scenario of banking, trade and industry in India, all undergoing the
convulsions of to the reformation battling to kick off the decadence of the
past and to gain a new strength and vigor for effective links with the
global economy. Many are still languishing unable to get released from
the old set-up, while a few progressive corporate are making a niche for
themselves in the global context.7
During this decade, the reforms have covered almost every
segment of the financial sector. In particular, it is the banking sector,
which experienced major reforms. The reforms have taken the Indian
banking sector far away from the days of nationalization. Increase in the
number of banks due to the entry of new private and foreign banks;
increase in the transparency of the banks’ balance sheets through the
introduction of prudential norms and norms of disclosure; increase in the
role of the market forces due to the deregulated interest rates, together
with rapid computerization and application of the benefits of information
technology to banking operations have all significantly affected the
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operational environment of the Indian banking sector.8
As banking in the country was deregulated and international
standards came to be accepted and applied, banks had to unlearn their
traditional operational methods of directed credit, directed investment
and fixed interest rates, all of which had led to deterioration in the quality
of loan portfolios, inadequacy of capital and the erosion of profitability.
Banks have now an entirely different environment under which to
operate, to innovate and thrive in a highly competitive market and their
success depended on their ability to act and adopt to market changes.
These called for new strategies, different from those that related to
regulated banking in a captive environment.9
In the background of these complex changes when the problem of
NPA was belatedly recognized for the first time at its peak velocity during
1992-93, there was resultant chaos and confusion. As the problem in
large magnitude erupted suddenly banks were unable to analyze and
make a realistic or complete assessment of the surmounting situation. It
was not realized that the root of the problem of NPA was centered
elsewhere in multiple layers, as much outside the banking system, more
particularly in the transit end economy of the country, as within Banking
is not a compartmentalized and isolated sector declined from the rest of
the economy. As has happened elsewhere in the world, a distressed
national economy shifts a part of its negative results to the banking
industry. In short, banks are made ultimately to finance the losses
incurred by constituent industries and businesses. The unpreparedness
and structural weakness of our banking system to act to the emerging
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scenario and derrick itself to the challenges thrown by the new order,
dying to switch over to globalisation were only aggravating thrown by the
new order dying to switch over to globalisation were only aggravating
the crisis. Partial perceptions and hasty judgments led to a policy of
ad-hoe-ism, which characterized the approach of the authorities during
the last two-decades towards finding, solutions to banking ailments and
dismantling recovery impediments. Continuous concern was expressed.
Repeated correctional efforts were executed, but positive results were
evading. The problem was defying a solution.10
But why? The threat of NPA was being surveyed and summarized
by RBI and Government of India from a remote perception looking at
bird’s eye-view on the banking industry as a whole declined form the
rest of the economy. A bird’s eye view is distinct, extensive and even
sharp, but it is limited to the view appearing at the surface or top-layer. It
is not an exhaustive or in-depth view. Restricted merely as a top-layer
view it is partial and is not even a top-to-bottom view, where a
bottom-to-top- view alone can enlighten the correct contributing
factors.11
Flying at a great height the bird can of-course survey a wide area,
but it perceives only a telescopic view of the roof-top and not the
contents that exist inside the several structures. A simple look at the
whole provides summarized perception. But, it is not homogeneous
whole that is being perceived. RBI looks at the banking industry’s
average on a macro basis, consolidating and tabulating the data
submitted by different institutions. It has collected extensive statistics
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about NPAs in different financial sectors like commercial banks, financial
institutions, RRBs, urban cooperatives, NBFC etc. But still it is a distant
view of one outside the system and not the felt view of a suffering
participant. Individual banks inherit different cultures and they finance
diverse sectors of the economy that do not possess identical attributes.
There are distinct diversities as among the Public Sector Banks
themselves, between different geographical regions and between
different types of customers using bank credit. There are three weak
nationalized banks that have been identified. But there are also
correspondingly two better performing banks like Corporation Bank and
Oriental Bank of Commerce. There are also banks that have
successfully contained NPA and brought it to single digit like Syndicate
(Gross NPA 7.87%) and Andhra (Gross NPA 6.13%). The scenario is not
so simple to be generalized for the industry as a whole to prescribe a
ready-made package of a common solution for all banks and for all
times.12
Similarly, NPA concerns of individual Banks summarized as a
whole and expressed as an average for the entire bank cannot convey a
dependable picture. It is being statistically stated that bank X or Y has
12% gross NPA. But if we look down further within that Bank there are a
few pockets possessing bulk segments of NPA ranging between 50% to
70% gross, which should consequently convey that there should also be
several other segments with 3 to 5% or even NIL (0%) NPA, averaging
the bank’s whole performance to 12%.13
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1.4 Instructions, Guidelines and Prudential Norms of
Reserve Bank of India
In order to have all current instructions on the subject at one place,
the Reserve Bank of India had issued a Master Circular on the
captioned subject, which is now updated up to 30th June 2009. It may be
noted that the Master Circular consolidates and updates all the
instructions contained in the notifications vide Notification No.
DNBS.2/CGM(CSM) -2003, dated April 23, 2003 read with Company
Circular DNBS (PD) CC.1/SCRC/10.30/2002-2003 dated April 23, 2003.
The Reserve Bank of India, having considered it necessary in the
public interest, and being satisfied that, for the purpose of enabling the
Reserve Bank to regulate the financial system to the advantage of the
country and to prevent the affairs of any Securitisation Company or
Reconstruction Company from being conducted in a manner detrimental
to the interest of investors or in any manner prejudicial to the interest of
such Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company, it is
necessary to issue the guidelines and directions relating to registration,
measures of asset reconstruction, functions of the company, prudential
norms, acquisition of financial assets and matters related thereto, as set
out below hereby, in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 3, 9,
10 and 12 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, issues to every
Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company, the guidelines and
directions hereinafter specified.14
Short title and commencement
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These guidelines and directions shall be known as ‘The
Securitisation Companies and Reconstruction Companies (Reserve
Bank) Guidelines and Directions, 2003’. They shall come into force with
effect from April 23, 2003.15
Applicability of the Directions
The provisions of these guidelines and directions shall apply to
Securitisation Companies or Reconstruction Companies registered with
the Reserve Bank of India under Section 3 of the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest
Act, 2002.
Definitions
‘’Non-performing Asset‘’ (NPA) means an asset in respect of which:
(a) Interest or principal (or installment thereof) is overdue for a period of
180 days or more from the date of acquisition or the due date as per
contract between the borrower and the originator, whichever is later
(Amended as 90 days from 31st March 2004); (b) interest or principal (or
installment thereof) is overdue for a period of 180 days or more from the
date fixed for receipt thereof in the plan formulated for realisation of the
assets referred to in paragraph 7(1)(6) herein (Amended as 90 days
from 31st March 2004); (c) interest or principal (or installment thereof) is
overdue on expiry of the planning period, where no plan is formulated
for realisation of the assets referred to in paragraph 7(1)(6) herein; or (d)
any other receivable, if it is overdue for a period of 180 days or more in
the books of the Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company
(Amended as 90 days from 31st March 2004).
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Permissible Business
A Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company shall
commence/undertake only the securitisation and asset reconstruction
activities and the functions provided for in Section 10 of the Act. A
Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company shall not raise
moneys by way of deposit.16
Securitisation
Issue of Security Receipts : A Securitisation Company or
Reconstruction Company shall give effect to the provisions of Sections
7(1) and (2) of the Act through one or more trusts set up exclusively for
the purpose. The Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company
shall transfer the assets to the said trusts at the price at which those
were acquired from the originator.17
Requirement as to capital adequacy
(1) Every Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company
shall maintain, on an ongoing basis, a capital adequacy ratio, which
shall not be less than fifteen percent of its total risk weighted assets. The
risk-weighted assets shall be calculated as the weighted aggregate of
on balance sheet and off balance sheet items as detailed hereunder:
Table 1.1
Weighted Risk Assets
On-Balance Sheet items Percentage risk
weight
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(a) Cash and deposits with scheduled commercialbanks
0
(b) Investments in Government securities 0
(c) Other assets 100
Off-Balance Sheet Items
All Contingent Liabilities 50
(2) Shares held in other Securitisation Companies or
Reconstruction Companies shall not attract any risk weight.
Deployment of Funds
(i) A Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company, may as a
sponsor and for the purpose of establishing a joint venture, invest in the
equity share capital of a Securitisation Company or Reconstruction
Company formed for the purpose of asset reconstruction;
(ii) A Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company may
deploy any surplus available with it only in Government securities and
deposits with scheduled commercial banks in terms of a policy framed in
this regard by its Board of Directors;
(iii) No Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company shall
invest out of its owned fund in land and building, provided that this
restriction will not apply to funds borrowed as also to owned fund in
excess of the minimum prescribed.
Provisioning requirements : Every Securitisation Company or
Reconstruction Company shall make provision against Non Performing
Assets, as under18: -
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Table 1.2
Provision against Non Performing Assets
Asset Category Provision Required
Substandard Assets A general provision of 10% of theoutstanding;
Doubtful Assets (i) 100% provision to the extent the assetis not covered by the estimated realisable value of security;(ii) In addition to item (i) above, 50% ofthe remaining outstanding.
Loss Assets The entire asset shall be written off.(If, for any reason, the asset is retained in the books, 100% thereof shall beprovided for).
Investments
All investments should be valued at lower of cost or realisable
value. Where market rates are available, the market value would be
presumed to be the realisable value and in cases where market rates
are not available, the realisable value should be the fair value. However,
investments in other registered Securitisation Company or
Reconstruction Company shall be treated as long term investments and
valued in accordance with the Accounting Standards and guidance
notes issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.
Income recognition
(i) The income recognition shall be based on recognised
accounting principles;
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(ii) All the Accounting Standards and Guidance Notes issued by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India shall be followed in so far as
they are not inconsistent with the guidelines and directions contained
herein;
(iii) Interest and any other charges in respect of all the NPAs shall
be recognised only when they are actually realised. Any such unrealised
income recognised by a Securitisation Company or Reconstruction
Company before the asset became non-performing and remaining
unrealised shall be derecognised.19
Internal Audit
Every Securitisation Company or Reconstruction Company shall
put in place an effective Internal Control System providing for periodical
checks and review of the asset acquisition procedures and asset
reconstruction measures followed by the company and matters related
thereto.
These Guidelines and Directions of Reserve Bank of India are quite
explanatory and clear. Also, it seems that if these are followed strictly by
Public Sector Banks, other banks and financial institutions,
Non-Performing Assets will not be a huge problem which now affecting
the whole economic system. But there are several factors due to which it
is practically not possible and the amount of NPAs is getting increment.
Prudential Norms on Income Recognition, Asset Classification and
Provisioning on Advances
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Prudential norms on income recognition, asset classification and
provisioning (IRAC norms) pertaining to advances portfolios of banks
were introduced for the first time by Reserve Bank of India during
financial year 1992-93 i.e. year ended 31st March 1993 in line with the
international practices.
The prudential norms are formulated on the basis of objective
criteria rather than on any subjective consideration. This has brought in
uniform and consistent application of the norms and greater trans-
parency in published accounts of banks.
Reserve Bank of India has been issuing Master Circulars on
prudential norms for past few years. Last Master circular on prudential
norms pertaining to advances was issued by Reserve Bank of India on
1st July 2010.20
Asset Type
Standard Asset : The account is not non-performing and does not
carry more than normal risk attached to the business.
Non-Performing Asset (NPA) : An asset becomes NPA when it
ceases to generate income for the bank. This would mean that interest,
which is debited to borrower’s account, has to be realised by the bank.
An account has to be classified as NPA on the basis of record of
recovery rather than security charged in favour of the bank in respect of
such account. Thus, an account of a borrower may become NPA if
interest charged to that particular borrower is not realised despite the
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account being fully secured.
Identification of Account as NPA
RBI has laid down various criteria for classification of various types
of advances as NPA which are as under21:
Term Loan : Interest and /or installment of principal remain overdue
for a period of more than 90 days.
One will have to determine the due date of interest and installment.
If either interest or installment is overdue for more than 90 days then the
account would become NPA. Interest or installment, which is due as on
30th December, would be overdue for more than 90 days as on 31st
March 2006 and the account would become NPA. However, if the same
was due on 31st December 2005, then the account would not become
NPA as on 31st March 2006.
Overdraft/Cash Credit : If an account remains out of order, it would
become NPA. For this purpose an account would be treated as ‘out of
order’ if :
(i) The outstanding balance remains continuously in excess of the
sanctioned limit/drawing power for 90 days or more, or
(ii) Even if the outstanding in the account is less than the
sanctioned limit /drawing power, there are no credits in the
account continuously for 90 days as on the date of Balance
sheet, or
(iii) Credits in the account are not sufficient to cover interest
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debited during the same period.
Thus, as on 31st March 2006, if any of the above criteria is
satisfied, the account would be classified as NPA. There may be a
situation where say for example drawing power of an account is Rs.10
lacs, balance is Rs. 8 lacs and there are no credits in the account for 90
days. Such account would be classified as NPA.
Bills Purchased/Discounted : If the bills purchased or discounted
remains overdue for a period of more than 90 days from its due date.
Agricultural Advances : A loan granted for (i) Short duration crops
will be treated as NPA, if the installment of principal or interest thereon
remains overdue for two crop seasons. (ii) Long duration crops will be
treated as NPA, if the installment of principal or interest thereon remains
overdue for one crop season.
For the purpose of these guidelines, “long duration” crops would be
crops with crop season longer than one year and crops, which are not
“long duration” crops would be treated as “short duration” crops.
Thus an auditor will have to verify the nature/duration of crop circle
and accordingly verify whether an agricultural account is NPA as on 31st
March 2006.
Other Credit Facility : In case of any other credit facility, if the
amount to be received remains overdue for more than 90 days, then the
account will be classified as NPA.
Accounts with temporary deficiencies : Even though criteria laid
down for identification of an account as NPA are objective, an account
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should not be classified as NPA, if the deficiencies like non-submission
of stock statement and, non-renewal of facility in the account are
temporary in nature. RBI guidelines in this regard as follows :
Drawing power is required to be arrived at based on the stock
statement, which is current. However, considering the difficulties of large
borrowers, stock statements relied upon by the banks for determining
drawing power should not be older than three months. The outstanding
in the account based on drawing power calculated from stock
statements older than three months, would be deemed as irregular. A
working capital borrower account will become NPA if such irregular
drawings are permitted in the account for a continuous period of 90 days
even though the unit may be working or the borrower’s financial position
is satisfactory.
Thus, if a borrower is allowed drawing on the basis of stock
statement of September ‘05, the account will be classified as NPA as on
31st March 2006.
Regular and ad hoc credit limits need to be reviewed/regularised
not later than three months from the due date/date of ad hoc sanction. In
case of constraints such as non-availability of financial statements and
other data from the borrowers, the branch should furnish evidence to
show that renewal/review of credit limits is already on and would be
completed soon. In any case, delay beyond six months is not
considered desirable as a general discipline. Hence, an account where
the regular/ ad hoc credit limits have not been reviewed/ renewed within
180 days from the due date/date of ad hoc sanction will be treated as
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NPA.
Income Recognition
Income from NPA is not recognised on accrual basis but is booked
as income only when it is actually received. Therefore interest on any
NPA should not be recognized unless realized.
However, interest on advances against term deposits, NSCs, IVPs,
KVPs and Life policies may be taken to income account on the due
date, provided adequate margin is available in the accounts. If
Government guaranteed advances become NPA, the interest on such
advances should not be taken to income account unless the interest has
been realised.
Reversal of Income
(i) If any advance, including bills purchased and discounted,
becomes NPA as at the close of any year, interest accrued and credited
to income account in the corresponding previous year, should be
reversed or provided for if the same is not realized during the year under
audit. This will apply to Government guaranteed accounts also.
(ii) In respect of NPAs, fees, commission and similar income that
have accrued should cease to accrue in the current period and should
be reversed or provided for with respect to past periods, if not collected.
(iii) The finance charge component of finance income [as defined in
‘AS19-Leases’ issued by the Council of the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India (ICAI)] on the leased asset which has accrued and
was credited to income account before the asset became
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non-performing and remain unrealised, should be reversed or provided
for in the current accounting period.22
Appropriation of Recovery in NPAs
(i) Interest realised on NPAs may be taken to income account
provided the credits in the accounts towards interest are not out of
fresh/additional credit facilities sanctioned to the borrower concerned.
(ii) In the absence of a clear agreement between the bank and the
borrower for the purpose of appropriation of recoveries in NPAs banks
should adopt an accounting principle and exercise the right of
appropriation of recoveries in a uniform and consistent manner. Thus, as
per the consistent policy of the bank recovery may be appropriated
towards interest or principal.
(iii) As per income recognition norms, bank cannot recognise
income unless realised. However, bank can debit interest to NPA
account provided it is credited to interest suspense account.
Asset Classification
Having identified assets as NPA, banks are required to classify
them further into -
a) Sub-standard Assets
b) Doubtful Assets
c) Loss Assets
(i) Sub-standard Assets : A sub-standard asset is one, which has
remained NPA for a period of less than or equal to 12 months.
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(ii) Doubtful Assets : An asset is classified as doubtful if it has
remained in the sub-standard category for a period of 12 months and up
to 36 months.
(iii) Loss Assets : A loss asset is one where loss has been identified
by the bank or internal or external auditors or the RBI inspection but the
amount has not been written off wholly. In other words, such an asset is
considered uncollectible and of such little value that its continuance as a
bankable asset is not warranted although there may be some salvage or
recovery value.
Exceptions : In respect of accounts where there are potential
threats for recovery on account of erosion in the value of security or
non-availability of security and existence of other factors such as frauds
committed by borrowers, it will not be prudent that such accounts should
go through various stages of asset classification. In cases of such
serious credit impairment the asset should be straight away classified as
doubtful or loss asset as appropriate.
(i) Erosion in the value of security can be reckoned as significant
when the realisable value of the security is less than 50 per cent of the
value assessed by the bank or accepted by RBI at the time of last
inspection, as the case may be. Such NPAs may be straight away
classified under doubtful category and provisioning should be made as
applicable to doubtful assets.
(ii) If the realisable value of the security, as assessed by the
bank/approved valuers/RBI is less than 10 per cent of the out-standing
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in the borrower accounts, the existence of security should be ignored
and the asset should be straight away classified as loss asset. It may be
either written off or fully provided for by the bank.23
1.5 Appraisal of Managerial Capability of a Borrower : A
Key Element in Credit Decisions
Credit processing is the stage where all required information on
credit is gathered and applications are screened. Credit application
forms should be sufficiently detailed to permit gathering of all information
needed for credit assessment at the outset. In this connection, financial
institutions should have a check list to ensure that all required
information is, in fact, collected.
Financial institutions should set out pre-qualification screening
criteria, which would act as a guide for their officers to determine the
types of credit that are acceptable. For instance, the criteria may include
rejecting applications from blacklisted customers. These criteria would
help institutions avoid processing and screening applications that would
be later rejected.
Moreover, all credits should be for legitimate purposes and
adequate processes should be established to ensure that financial
institutions are not used for fraudulent activities or activities that are
prohibited by law or are of such nature that if permitted would
contravene the provisions of law. Institutions must not expose
themselves to reputational risk associated with granting credit to
customers of questionable repute and integrity.
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The next stage to credit screening is credit appraisal where the
financial institution assesses the customer’s ability to meet his
obligations. Institutions should establish well designed credit appraisal
criteria to ensure that facilities are granted only to credit worthy
customers who can make repayments from reasonably determinable
sources of cash flow on a timely basis.
Financial institutions usually require collateral or guarantees in
support of a credit in order to mitigate risk. It must be recognized that
collateral and guarantees are merely instruments of risk mitigation. They
are, by no means, substitutes for a customer’s ability to generate
sufficient cash flows to honour his contractual repayment obligations.
Collateral and guarantees cannot obviate or minimize the need for a
comprehensive assessment of the customers ability to observe
repayment schedule nor should they be allowed to compensate for
insufficient information from the customer.
Care should be taken that working capital financing is not based
entirely on the existence of collateral or guarantees. Such financing
must be supported by a proper analysis of projected levels of sales and
cost of sales, prudential working capital ratio, past experience of working
capital financing, and contributions to such capital by the borrower
itself.24
In conclusion, it can be said that appraisal of managerial capability
of a borrower is a key element in credit sanctioning decision and if the
managerial capability has been appraised accurately and credit decision
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taken according to it then the chance of this credit to become a
non-performing asset will be negligible and vice versa.
1.6 About the Present Study
Research methodology discusses the following aspects of
research:
1.6.1 Problem to be Investigated
Public sector banks are important constituent of Indian financial
system. They play a crucial role in the attainment of macro-economic
objectives. These banks act as a vehicle for socio-economic
transformation and also act as a catalyst for economic growth. On one
hand, they help in mobilising the nation’s savings and on the other, they
channelize these savings into higher investment priorities.
Public sector banks have made a significant progress after
nationalisation in three aspects: Branch expansion, deposit mobilisation
and loan maximisation. Among these, monitoring of loans took a back
seat in an era of mass banking and social banking. In the changing
scenario of the operations, Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) have been
the most vexing problem faced by public sector banks. The Reserve
Bank of India and Government of India has made various measures to
curb NPAs in the post-financial sector reforms. The research will details
the trends in NPAs, sectoral composition of NPAs, asset quality
diagnosis and the scenario of NPA at the bank level. This study reveals
that the gross and net NPAs of public sector banks have gone down
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gradually due to their strong commitment towards reduction and
management of NPAs.
1.6.2 Significance of the Study
In the post nationalization period, public sector banks in India have
made rapid strides of progress but due to competition, organisation
constraints, fluctuations in the market and inflationary trends weakening
operational efficiency has been noticed in some of the cases which is
rectified by the banks in current scenario to some extent. In this context,
an attempt has been made to examine:
· the productivity and profitability of public sector banks in India
· the management of Non Performing Assets by the banks under
study.
· the impact of effective management of Non Performing Assets
on public sector banks.
· Social objectives fulfilled by public sector banks.
The study will be immense importance to the researchers,
students, policy makers, academicians, bankers, financial analysts and
the common masses.
1.6.3 Objectives of the Study
The objectives help in focusing the study on the result that is
desired to be achieved by the research. The main objectives of the
study are as follows:
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1. To study the geometrically increasing growth of non performing
assets in selected public sector banks.
2. To study the causes of origin of NPAs.
3. To review the present position of NPAs.
4. To make comparative analysis between public sector banks
about prevalence of NPAs.
5. To suggest remedies and strategies for controlling NPAs.
6. To find out the techniques of solving problems of NPAs
according to prudential norms of RBI and other committees.
1.6.4 Hypothesis
A hypothesis state what we are looking for and it is a proposition
which can be put to test and determine its validity. The hypothesis may
not be proved absolutely, but in practice it is accepted if it has withstood
a critical testing otherwise rejected.
(a) Central Hypothesis : The selection of the topic has been made
with a view to evaluating, analyse and examine the non performing
assets of the public sector banks under study. It is true that these banks
are performing well and in profitable condition but a significant
percentage of their assets are becoming non performing assets and
amount of these non performing assets is not decreasing with time.
Hence there is a need to control them adequately. The present study is
based on the hypothesis that the management performance of
non-performing assets is very poor in public sector banks in India as
anticipated by Reserve Bank of India and other committees. It needs
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adequate improvement.
(b) Sub Hypothesis :
(i) The NPA is increasing continuously in public sector banks.
(ii) Liberalization is one of the factors to increase non performing
assets in banks.
(iii) The selected public sector banks have not successfully
managed their non performing assets.
(iv) The NPAs recovery performance of banks is not satisfactory.
1.6.5 Period of the Study
The present study has been covered a period of five years from
2007-08 to 2011-12.
1.6.6 Units of the Study
For the purpose of study, following three banks have been
selected:
1. Bank of Baroda
2. Canara Bank
3. UCO Bank
1.6.7 Plan of Research Design
Research design is the overall framework of the research project
which mentions about the types of sources of information and
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procedures to be followed in collecting it. It is simply the specifications of
methods and procedures for acquiring information needed. The
research design includes the methods of research likewise survey,
observation, experiment, the content analysis and their combinations. It
also include the type of data (quantitative and qualitative) to be
collected, structured or unstructured schedules and also about the size
and techniques of sampling.
Data Collection : The present study is based on secondary data
which have been obtained through annual reports of selected banks,
annual bulletins of Reserve Bank of India, trend and progress report of
banking in India, statistical report related to banking in India, journals,
magazines, newspapers and other published material available.
Data Analysis : For analysing the data, accounting techniques like
ratio analysis, percentage trend and graphical representation have been
used. On the basis of these parametric tests, the conclusions have been
interpreted and submitted in a report form.
1.6.8 Review of Literature
The researcher gone through the available literature about the
non-performing assets in Indian Pubic Sector Banks. Various reports
and bulletins of Reserve Bank of India, thesis work, periodicals,
research articles etc. have been studied. A brief description of this
review of literature is as follows:
By the year 2001, the view was crystallized that a bulk segment of
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NPA consists of credit availed by big corporates, who are willful
defaulters. This section of borrowers is able to prolong and continue to
default repayment taking advantages of the deficiencies in the Legal
framework. These views are conveyed in RBI Report of Banking for the
year 2001 published on 15th November 2001.
According to this R.B.I. report, non-performing assets have been
substantially reduced since regulation was tightened in 1993, but
improvement has recently showed down and the levels of NPAs remain
high compared to international standards. In 2001, the commercial
banking system’s gross NPA to gross advances ratio was 11.4 per cent;
net of provisions, it was 6.2 per cent. The public sector banks’ NPA
witnessed a decline in 2001, with the gross NPA to gross advances ratio
being 12.4 per cent, and 7.4 per cent, respectively.
Asset Reconstruction and Securitisation : The suggestion of
creation of Asset Reconstruction company to tackle problem of
hangover piled up past NPAs was first suggested by Narasimham
Committee Report II. To Quote therefrom - “An important aspect of the
continuing reform process is thus to reduce further the high level of
NPAs as a means of institutional strengthening. While there is reason to
expect that with a combination of policy and institutional development,
new NPAs could in future be lower than hitherto, the problem remains of
the huge backlog of existing. NPAs which impinges severely on banks
performance and their profitability. Several approaches are possible.
The earlier Committee had suggested the creation of an Assets
Reconstruction Fund (ARF) to take these assets off banks books at a
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discount. Recapitalization through infusion of capital is another
approach and has been used in the case of some banks. In the last six
years massive budgetary funds have been used for recapitalization of
public sector banks. This a costly and over time, not a sustainable
option. The problem however remains and consideration would need to
be given to revisiting the concept for an ARF.” The Ordinance for
creation of ARCs for recovery of NPAs of Banks was passed during
June 2002 and this was upgraded as an Act of the Parliament in
December 2002. This is an important measure, as handicaps posed by
the infirmities of the legal system were undergone.
Deergha Sharma (2009) in her Ph.D. thesis “Working of Public
Sector Banks in India with Special Reference to Non Performing Assets
in Selected Banks (2000-2008)” submitted to University of Rajasthan,
Jaipur in which she took four banks namely State Bank of India, Bank of
Baroda, Central Bank of India and Punjab National Bank. The work was
focused on working of public sector banks. It was divided into seven
chapters as: (i) Introduction, (ii) Organisation of Public Sector Banks, (iii)
Working of Public Sector Banks, (iv) Productivity and Profitability of
Public Sector Banks, (v) Human Resource Management in Public Sector
Banks, (vi) Management of Non Performing Assets by selected Public
Sector Banks and (vii) Summary of findings and Suggestions. There is
only one chapter (Chapter sixth) discusses about non performing
assets. She concluded that the selected banks have decreased their
gross and net NPA as percentage of total assets by strong recoveries to
avoid the slippage of accounts in NPA.
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Meenakshi Rajeev and H.P. Mahesh (2010) in their research paper
“Banking Sector Reforms and NPA: A Study of Indian Commercial
Banks” concluded that the issue of non-performing assets (NPA), the
root cause of the recent global financial crisis, has been drawing the
attention of the policy makers and academicians alike. The problem of
NPAs, which was ignored till recently, has been given considerable
attention after liberalisation of the financial sector in India. This
exploratory paper examines the trends of NPAs in India from various
dimensions and explains how mere recognition of the problem and
self-monitoring has been able to reduce it to a great extent. It also
shows that public sector banks in India, which function to some extent
with welfare motives, have as good a record in reducing NPAs as their
counterparts in the private sector. The paper also discusses the role of
joint liability groups (JLGs) or self help groups (SHGs) in enhancing the
loan recovery rate.
Siraj K.K. and Prof. (Dr.) P. Sudarsanan Pillai, “A Study on the
Performance of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) of Indian Banking during
Post Millennium Period”, International Journal of Business and
Management Tomorrow, Vol.2, No.3, March 2012.
According to this research paper, NPA is a virus affecting banking
sector. It affects liquidity and profitability, in addition posing threat on
quality of asset and survival of banks. This study explored movement of
various NPA indicators; Gross NPA, Net NPA, Additions to NPA,
Reductions to NPA and Provisions towards NPA and compare it with
Total Advances and Total Deposits of banks. The study utilized
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bank-group wise performance statistics for post-millennium period up to
the period ended 31st December 2011. The study utilized growth rate
calculating using AAG rate, correlation and regression study to analyze
the movement and significance of NPA indicators during the period. The
effect global financial crisis on the NPA indicators as well is explained.
The study concluded that NPA still remains a major threat and the
incremental component explained through additions to NPA poses a
great question mark on efficiency of credit risk management of banks in
India.
Prashanth K. Reddy, “A comparative study of Non Performing
Assets in India in the Global context - similarities and dissimilarities,
remedial measures”, IIM Ahmedabad, October, 2002.
In this paper, the author opined that financial sector reform in India
has progressed rapidly on aspects like interest rate deregulation,
reduction in reserve requirements, barriers to entry, prudential norms
and risk-based supervision. But progress on the structural-institutional
aspects has been much slower and is a cause for concern. The
sheltering of weak institutions while liberalizing operational rules of the
game is making implementation of operational changes difficult and
ineffective. Changes required to tackle the NPA problem would have to
span the entire gamut of judiciary, polity and the bureaucracy to be truly
effective. This paper deals with the experiences of other Asian countries
in handling of NPAs. It further looks into the effect of the reforms on the
level of NPAs and suggests mechanisms to handle the problem by
drawing on experiences from other countries.
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Pacha Malyadri and S. Sirisha, “A Comparative Study of Non
Performing Assets in Indian Banking Industry”, International Journal of
Economic Practices and Theories, Vol.1, No.2, October, 2011.
The Indian banking system has undergone significant
transformation following financial sector reforms. It is adopting
international best practices with a vision to strengthen the banking
sector. Several prudential and provisioning norms have been introduced,
and these are pressurizing banks to improve efficiency and trim down
NPAs to improve the financial health in the banking system. In the
background of these developments, this study strives to examine the
state of affair of the Non Performing Assets (NPAs) of the public sector
banks and private sector banks in India with special reference to weaker
sections. The study is based on the secondary data retrieved from
Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India. The scope of the
study is limited to the analysis of NPAs of the public sector banks and
private sector banks NPAs pertaining to only weaker sections for the
period seven years i.e. from 2004-2010. It examines trend of NPAs in
weaker sections in both public sector and private sector banks. The data
has been analyzed by statistical tools such as percentages and
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR). The study observed that the
public sector banks have achieved a greater penetration compared to
the private sector banks vis-à-vis the weaker sections.
Poongavanam. S., “Non performing assets: Issues, Causes and
remedial Solution”, Asian Journal of Management Research, Volume 2
Issue 1, 2011, pp.123-132.
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The banking industry has undergone a sea change after the first
phase of economic liberalization in 1991 and hence credit management.
While the primary function of banks is to lend funds as loans to various
sectors such as agriculture, industry, personal loans, housing loans etc.,
in recent times the banks have become very cautious in extending
loans, this is due to mounting non-performing assets (NPAs). Therefore,
an NPA account not only reduces profitability of banks by provisioning in
the profit and loss account, but their carrying cost is also increased
which results in excess and avoidable management attention. Apart
from this, a high level of NPA also puts strain on a bank’s net worth
because banks are under pressure to maintain a desired level of Capital
Adequacy and in the absence of comfortable profit level, banks
eventually look towards their internal financial strength to fulfill the
norms thereby slowly eroding the net worth. Considering all the above
facts banking industry has to give more importance to NPA and to
structure proper remedial solutions.
1.6.9 Scope of the Study
Although this study has been covered only three Indian banks but
the management of non-performing assets is a universal problem and
almost every bank and finance provider institution suffering from it.
Hence, this study has a wide scope not only useful for selected banks
but also other banks and finance providing institutions in India and
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abroad, their managements, governments, employees and
shareholders.
1.6.10 Limitations of the Study
Although maximum efforts have been made for an extensive study
of the management of non-performing assets in selected banks but it is
true that a researcher has to function under various constraints and
limitations. Since the researcher has to depend heavily upon published
reports, literature and secondary data, one of the limitations lies in the
quality of the accounting data. Further, the techniques and tools of
investigations have also inherent limitations, e.g. financial data are the
mixture of convenience and convention. The cooperation in collection of
primary data and information about the working style of key persons
affecting management of non-performing assets, by the bank official was
negligible. Lastly, the study is a subject to general human limitations.
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Reference
1. Reserve Bank of India, Report on trend and Progress of Banking in
India, 2004-2005 to 2010-2011.
2. Reserve Bank of India, “Master Circular - Prudential Norms on income
Recognition, Asset Classification and Provisioning pertaining to
Advances”, DBOD.No.BP.BC.21 /21.04.048/ 2010-11 on dated July 1,
2010.
3. GOI (1999), Report on Non-performing Assets of Public Sector Banks,
Ministry of Finance, New Delhi.
4. Rajaraman I., Bhaumik S. and Bhatia N., “NPAs Variations across
Indian Commercial Banks”, Economic and Political Weekly, Jan.16-23,
1999, pp.161-168.
5. Ibid.
6. Shajahan K.M., “Non-performing Assets of Banks- Have they Really
Declined and on Whose Accounts”, Economic and Political Weekly,
Vol.33, 1998, pp. 671-674.
7. Rajaraman I., Bhaumik S. and Bhatia N., op.cit., p.164.
8. Shajahan K.M., op.cit., p.673.
9. Ibid.
10. Rajaraman I., Bhaumik S. and Bhatia N., op.cit., p.165.
11. Ibid.
12. Rajaraman I., Garima V., “Non-performing Loans of PSU Banks- Some
Panel Results”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.27, 2002,
pp.429-435.
13. Ibid.
14. The Securitisation Companies and Reconstruction Companies
(Reserve Bank) Guidelines and Directions, 2003, RBI/2009-2010/12,
DNBS (PD) CC. No. 15/SCRC/ 26.03.001/ 2009-2010.
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15. Ibid.
16. Rajaraman I., Garima V., op.cit., p.430.
17. The Securitisation Companies and Reconstruction Companies
(Reserve Bank) Guidelines and Directions, 2003, RBI/2009-2010.
18. Ibid.
19. RBI (1991), The Committee of Financial Sector Reforms, RBI, Bombay.
20. RBI (1991), The Committee of Financial Sector Reforms, RBI, Bombay.
21. RBI (1999), “Some Aspects and Issues Relating to NPAs in Commercial
Banks”, RBI Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 7, pp. 913-936.
22. Ibid.
23. RBI (1999), “Some Aspects and Issues Relating to NPAs in Commercial
Banks”, RBI Bulletin, Vol. LIII, No. 7, pp. 913-936.
24. Das Abhiman, “Risk and Productivity Change of Public Sector Banks”,
Economic and Political Weekly, 37(5), 2002, 437-48.
*****
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