1. SHIELD

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2. MAP

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SAC LANT __ ... _. ..

' i'J'F\Ttr-t~Ulll--rvtl~ I lt\t

CoPY No clJ OF ~ PAGE l OF 18

---------~.;,.~= -­

_-.-:--· ~::;:::-;-- -

MAY l FIRST OF ALL WELCOME YOU, SIR, TO YOUR FIRST VISIT IN NORTH NORWAY AS SACLANT.

As AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR TOUR THIS TIME I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU A PICTURE OF THE DEFENCE OF NORTH NORWAY, BY COVERING THE FOLLOWING ITEMS:

- A SHORT GEOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA

- THE COMMAND STRUCTURE

- THE MILITARY THREAT TO THE AREA INCLUDING LIKELY ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

- THE INPLACE FORCES IN NORTH NORWA~ AND LOCALLY MOBILIZED FORCES

- AND FINALLY NATIONAL AND ALLIED REINFORCEMENTS.

GEOGRAPHY

CQMNQN's GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY INCLUDES OUR THREE NORTHERNMOST COUNTIES:

NoRDLAND, TROMS AND FINNMARK - WITH AN AREA OF 112.000 SQUARE KILOMETERS WHICH TOTALS ABOUT 1/3 OF NORWAY'S NATIONAL TERRITORY,

As REGARDS INHABITANTS, NORTH NORWAY HAS ONLY 466,000 -('\ D I\ 'D f'\ II T 1 / l fl f'\ ~ TUC T f'\ T I\ I n f'\ n I I I I\ T T f'\ !'._I .... I\ !=' I\ I"' T l"'I n VI"\ l'""r_ v" l"\D vu I .J../ v v r I n i:. I v I /-\ '- r v r u 1.../-\ I J. v n I M I /-\ \.,, I v f\

IMPORTANCE IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE MATTERS.

3. COMPARISON

4. COMNON AREA

5. DISTANCES

( L. SUMMER

7. WINTER

\_

8. SOLDATER

9. THE GULF STREAM

L NAIO CONFIDtNTIAL

A COMPARISON BETWEEN COMNON AREA AND DENMARK, NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM WITH THEIR 30 MILL INHABITANTS ILLUSTRATES THi:S.~; . .PITTNT- .-~-:-_

T 0 THE EAST WE SHARE. 196 KM BORDER w I TH THE S·OV I ET UN I ON THE KOLA PENINSULA. THE BORDER TO FINLAND IS 716 K ABOUT THE SAME AS TO SWEDEN. AT SEA, NORWAY CLAIMS A TERRITORIAL BORDER OF 4 NM O.FF THE COAST.

Bon0, LOCATED 50 MILES NORTH OF" THE ARTIC CIRCLE, IS ROUGHLY IN THE CENTER OF THE COUNTRY, IN OTHER WORDS MIDWAY BETWEEN OSLO AND THE RUSSIAN BORDER.

DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS WE HAVE DAYLIGHT FOR 24 HOURS A DAY. ON THE OTHER .HAND THERE rs, HOWEVER, VERY LITTLE DAYLI.GHT DURING THE WINTER· MONTHS,

THERE I_S A GREAT CHANGE IN CLIMATE BETWEEN SUMMER AND WINTE.R AND BETWEEN THE COAS.TAL. AND INLAND AREAS, SNOW COVERS MOST OF THE COUNTRY 6-7 MONTHS A ¥EAR AND

· HEAVY SNOWFALLS: AND STRONG GALES ARE FAIRLY FREQUENT, DEEP LOOSE SNOW ALso· RESTRICTS MOVEMENT OF MOTORIZED ~9UM.2(~R~-~ WHl;REAS7.FRoZEN STREAMS, LAKES AND .MARSHES WITHOUT TO MUCH SNOW COULD INCREASE THEIR MOBILITY. THE INTERIOR OF FINNMARK AS AN EXAMPLE MAY HAVE TEMPERATURES DOWN TO 50 CENTIGRADES BELOW ZERO IN THE W.INTER, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY IN THE COASTAL AREA THE TEMPERATURE. NORMALLY rs AROUND THE FREEZING POINT.

SUCH WEATHER CONDITI.ONS MAY OF CO.URSE HAMPER MILITARY OPERATIONS AND TROOPS MUST BE PHYSICALLY FIT AND SPECIALLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FOR WINTER WARFARE TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY IN THIS ENVIRONMENT,

PARTS OF THE WORLD AT THE SAME LATITUDE SUCH AS SIBIRIA, ALASKA OR GREENLAND, DUE TO THE GULF STREAM; WHICH RtiNS UP THE NORWEGIAN COAST. THE MOST IMPORTANT

FEATURE IN THE CLIMATE IS PERHAPS THAT THE PORTS AND THE FIORDS ARE FREE OF ICE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR,

1\1 /\'T'f"\ f"'f'\l\IL' TT'IC"J\IT TI\. I

10. THE INSHORE LEAD

11. RAILROADS

12. MAIN ROAD

13., V°EGER I

FINNMARK

14. CIVILIAN AIRFIELDS

r

\

15. AREA

16. VINTERBILDE KAMUFLERING

17. TROMS

18. FINNMARKS­VIDDA

) l~r\I U LUl~t' !LJ.tJ~ J lAL

SEA COMMUNICATIONS ARE GOOD, AND THE INNER LEADS OFFER CALM WATERS FOR SAFE SAILING ALONG THE COAST TO WESTERN FINNMARK.

Bur LANDCOMMUNICATIONS ARE LIMITED. A SINGLE TRACKED RA 1 LWA Y FROM SourH NORWAY ENDS - .~ . -. AT Bon0. FURTHER NORTH, .NARVIK HAS A RAIL CONNECTION TO THE· SWEDIS~ RAILWAY SYSTEM,

THERE IS ONLY ONE MAIN ROAD THROUGH THE AREA·; Ir HAS NUMEROUS BRIDGES AND IS BROKEN BY FERRIES ACROSS 2 FIORDS lN NORDLAND •.

THE ROADS ARE KEPT _ _; ._ OPEN DURING. THE WINTER, BUT

ROAD 6 IN· FINNMARK IS BLOCKED BY SNOW BETWEEN BANAK AND TANA MOST OF THE WINTER, A NEW ROAD ALONG THE TANA ~VER HAS GIVEN EASTERN FINNMARK AN ALL YEAR ROAD CONNECTION WITH THE REST OF THE COUNTRY,

AIR COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BECO~~ AN IMPORTANT PART OF .EVERYDAY LI.FE, AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS AND SHORT AIR STRIPS,. AS SHOWN ON THIS SLIDE, HAVE BEEN. BUILT. ALTHOUGH THE AIR STRIPS ARE ONLY 800 M LONG, MOST OF THEM HAVE THE NECESSARY NAVIGATIONAL All

AN:> A CIVILIAN AIRLINE OPERATES REGULARY BETWEEN THESE STRIPS.,

MosT OF NORTH NORWAY IS MONTAINOUS AND BARREN. ONLY 1,2% lS CULTIVATED LAND AND. 8% COVERED BY FORESTS.

THE POSSJB lLITI.ES FOR CON.CEALMENT OF MILITARY UN ITS ARE LIMITED AS YOU CAN SEE ON THIS SLIDE. DARKNESS AND. BAD WEATHER WILL, HOWEVER, IN AUTUMS AND WINTER­TIME OFFER GREATER OPPORTUNITIES,

NORDLAND AND TROMS ARE VERY MOUNTAINOUS, RATHER NARRO~ AND BROKEN UP BY FIORDS. AND VALLEYS,

THE INTERIOR OF FINNMARK IS DIFFERENT FROM THE REST OF NORTH NORWAY, WITH ROLLING MOUNTAIN PLATEAUS, - MAINL1 BARE, NONCULTIVATED AND WITH SCATTERED LOCAL SETTLE-

19. FINNMARKS.•

VlDDA - BV

SPOR

2.0-~ V .ER0Y

21. FISHING SETTLEMENT

22. AREA OF INTEREST

23. JAN MAYEN

24. COMNON ORG·

25. DIV 6

1'fr\ l U. L,Ul'fi l lJC.l~ i 1AL

MENTS. THE TERRAIN HERE IS. NOT AS ROUGH AS I.N TROMS AND NORDLAND, AND IN PARTICULAR DURING WINTER, TRACKED VEHICLES COULD FIND CROSS-COUNTRY A~

OF ADVANCE .•

ALONG THE COAST LINE, WHICH. IS FREQUENTLY BROKEN UP BY NARR.OW FIORDS·, WE VERY OFTEN FIN·D THE LAND RISING

DIRECTLY· AND INHOSPITABLY FROM THE SEA,. BUT WE ALSO FI.ND SMALL SETTLEMENTS DEPENDING ON THE SEA AND THE FISHERIES. _· . : :·:--.... . :--.--:~ --~ ·. - .. - -

COMNONs.AREA OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST FURTHER IN­CLUDES THE SVALBARD ARCHIPELAGO TO BE FOUND.AROUND 700 KM .. DUE NORTH. ACCORDING TO AN lNTERNATIONAL TREATY OF 1920, .. SVALBARD WAS. CEDED TO NORWAY WITH THE LIMI.TATlON THAT THE I.SLANDS SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR AN'

WARLIKE. PURPOSES, NAVAL BASES COULD NOT BE ESTAB.LISH THERE IN PEACETIME. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE FREE ACCESS FOR ANY PART OF THE TREATY TO .. ·EXPLOIT ECONOMIC

RESOURCES, OF COURSE WITHlN THE· FRAMEWORK OF NORWEGIA1=-C> •

LAID· RULES.AND REGULATlONS •

. THE -ISLAND. OF JAN: MAYEN. IS. HOWEVER NORWEGIAN TERRITOR'

FREE OF ANY LIMITATION.&~ ON THE ISLAND WE HOLD A

SMALL GARRIS.ON MANNING A METROLOGICAL STATION AND A

. NAVIGATION S.TATION FOR THE US COAST GUARD,

COMMND. STRUCTURE A FEW WORD.S ABOUT THE COMMAND S.TRUCTURE I COMNON

· EXERC !SES 1N PEACE .. AND WAR H:I.S. COMMAND THROUGH HIS THREE SERVICE COMMANDERS, COMLANDNON1 COMNAVNON- AND

COMAIRNON, WHO IN WAR WILL HAVE. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

OF ALL AVAILABLE FORCES,

ON THE ARMY SIDE WE FIND No 6 D$V AND FOUR LAND DEFENCf DISTRICTS WITH THEIR STANDING - AND MOBILIZATION FORCE! 6 DIV IS IN PEACETIME RESPONSIBLE. FOR THE TRAINING PROGRAMS AND FOR ARMY LOGISTICS. IN WAR 6 DIV IS A

MOBILE DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS, WITH THE CAPABILITY TO COMMAND 3-5 NATIONAL - OR ALLIED BRIGADES.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

26. LF-INNDELING

_/,. SJ0FORSVARS

DISTRIKTS­INNDEL.ING

28. FLYSTAS~ONER K&V

29. HV-soLDATER.

30. Kol.A

l'CM I U \,,UIH J.J.Jl...l't I .1,n1.,,

THE LAND DEFENCE DISTRICT COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FO THE DEFENCE OF THEIR DISTRICT WITH FORCES ALREADY THERE AND WITH FORCES MADE AVAIU\BLE TO THEM • ..:.---·-

UNDER COMNON WE FURTHER FIND: - FouR. NAVAL DISTRICTS, COASTAL. FORTS AND NAVAL VESSELS

(OOS BASE FOR SUB- AND MTB'·s~ ROS MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY BASE)•··

- FOUR AIR STATIONS WITH AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS AND ANTI­

AlRCRAFT BATTALI.ONS, AND THE: CONTROL AND REPORTING

. ORGANIZATION ••

- HOME GUARD UNITS OF VARIOUS STRENGTH WITHIN THE THREE SERVICES.,

<THE THREAT} · 1 W·ILL. THEN. BRIEFLY DESCRIB.E THE THREAT AS L SEE t'T~:

THE COMBINED MILITARY FORCES THAT WE FACE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF OUR COMMON~ BOP.DER wrr-.tLTHE: SovrET-· Llm'O~f. - -·~·~-::~: -ARE OF COURSE OVERWHELMING COMPARED TO. WHAT WE MIGHT RAISE ON OUR SIDE.

THE KOLA PEN-I.NSULA COMR.I.S.ES AROUND 145 OOO SQUARE KILO­

METERS, OR ABOUT THE. SAME AS EN.GLAND AND WALES TOGETHER

THE COAS,TAL, AREA SUITED FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT .OF HARBOU AND MARITIME ACTIVITIES, IS, HOWEVER, FAR SMALLER. THE POPULATION HAS GROWN RAPID.~Y, FROM 316 000 IN 1946 TO MORE THAN 1 MILLION TODAY.

31. DEPLOYMENT ON KOLA (ARMY)

32. GT-T

33. 0RBAT NORTHERN FLEET

34. ALLIGATOR

6 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

AND KANDALAKSHA, PARTLY DOUBLETRACKED. THE ROAD­NET IS NOT DENSE, BUT ALL IN ALL 2.200 KM OF ROAD HAS BEEN BUILT, BETWEEN MURMANSK AND LENINGRAD RUNS A FAIRLY GOOD HIGHWAY,

SOVIET COMBAT READY ARMY FORCES IN THE KOLA-MURMANSK AREA ARE LIMITED, COMPARED TO FORCES FOUND IN CENTRAL EUROPE. Two MOTORIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS, THAT ARE PARTLY TAILORED FOR OPERATIONS IN THE ARTI.C, TO­GETHER WITH THE NAVAL INFANTRY REGIMENT AND THE SUPPORTING ARTILLERY, ROCKET-, ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ENGINEER BRIGADES, ALL UNDER AN ARMY HQ's ARE OBVIOUSLY CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THIS VITAL BASE COMPLEX. AND THEY MAY FAIRLY QUICKLY BE AUGMENTED BY A DIVISION MOBILIZED IN THE NORTH, AND BY OTHER DIVISIONS FROM THE SOUTH.

As FAR AS THE NORTHERN FLEET .IS CONCERNED, YOU KNOW THE PICTURE BETTER THAN ME, LET ME JUST REMIND YOU THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SUFFICIENT MARITIME CAPASITY AT HAND TO LIFT, AND TO SECURE THE. PASSAGE OF ANY LIKELY ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH NORWEGIAN TERRITORY. POSSIBLE LAND FO~CES IN SUCH A SEA LIFT COULD BE A NAVAL INFANTRY REGIMENT ON LCT's AND AT LEAST 2 DIVISIONS TO BE CARRIED TACTICALLY ON MODERN MERCHANT VESSELS.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

3 5, BEAR/D (IKKE PA KOLA.)

3·5, BADGER

7 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

THE AIR FORCE PERMANENTLY STATIONED AT KOLA BELONG TO THE NORTHERN FLEET AND TO THE ARKANGELSK AIR D~FENCE DISTRICT. THE NORTHERN FLEET AIR FORCE HAS ABOUT 350 AIRCRAFT PRIMARILY OPERATING IN MARITIME SURVEILLANCE-, ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND MARITIME STRI.KE ROLES. THE NORTHERN. FLEET BADGER AIRCRAFT WIT~ THEIR "STANDOFFN MISSILES ALSO HAVE A CAPABILITY TO ATTACK LARGE AND WELL DEFENDED GROUND TARGETS,

3 7.BACKFIRE LONG RANGE BOMBER OF THE BACKFIRE TYPE, WHICH ARE. BASE

INTERSEP LOFOTEN. OUTSIDE LEMD, COULD. GREATLY ENHANCE THE SOVIET ANTI-JUNI 81 SHIPPING CAPABILITY, BUT COULD ALSO BE EMPLOYED AGAINS

TARGETS lN NORTH NORWAY.

····.38 I FLOGGER

· 3'9-. AIRFIELDS ON KOLA

THE AIR· DEFENCE REGIMENTS, HOLDING AROUND 100 AIRCRAF1 AT KOLA.,. MAY CONDUCT OPERATIONS OVER NORWEGIAN TERRITC I.N WAR, BUT WE -BELIEVE, THAT THE· ~ -~~~:-=· ---., ::-.

RUSSIANS WOULD BE RELUCTANT IN TASKING AIR DEFENCE AIR CRAFT OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF THEIR RADAR CONTROL SYSTEMS T. I. BEYOND FINNMARK. SHIP-AND AIR BORNE CONTROL SYSTEMS MAY, HOWEVER, CHANGE·THts· SITUATION~ WE THERE FORE .THINI<~:~:· THAT AIR SUPPORT WOULD NOT BE A LIMITING FACTOR IN AN ATTACK AGAINST NORTH NORWAY.

THE KOLA/MURMANSK HOLDS NO LESS THAN 19 AIRFIELDS

WITH THE NECESSARY CAPACITY TO. OPERATE HIGH PERFORMANC AIRCRAFT. ONLY 8 OF THESE AIRFIELDS ARE IN ·PERMANENT USE IN PEACETIME WHILE THE OTHERS ARE KEPT READY•-- - .

THUS ALLOWING FOR CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENTS TO BE FLOWN IN QUICKLY IF SO DESIRED.

40 .. HooK 84./78. L~ · -~~ HELICOPTERS OF THE TYPES HIP AND HOOK WITH CAPACITY OF LIFTING UP TO TWO BATTALIONS SIMULTANOUSLY ARE PRESENT

q1, RADIUS IN LEMD. FROM SOVIET TERRITORY THEY CAN OPERATE AS FA LI.-. •......... f"\ "'ZC nc.1...1 u~ u-..;u

42...ATTACK ALTERNATIVES

WEST AS ALTA, AND OPERATING FROM FINISH TERRITORY EVEN BEYOND BARDUFOSS. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT TO NOTICE THAT THE 131 MRD ON THE NORTHERN. KOLA RECENTLY HAS BEEN EQUIPPED WITH HIND ATTACK HELICOPTER.

WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND CQMNQN PEALS WITH

l.J J. UNREINFORCED ATTACK

u~f!-. ATTACK -VITAL AREAS

45~ REINFORCED . _ ATTACK

46. CANDID

8 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

THREE MAIN ALTERNATIVES OF ATTACK AGAINST NORTH NORWAY:

- UNREINFORCED ATTACK - DESTRUCTIVE/NEUTRALIZING ATTACK - t{EINFORCED ATTACK,

SOVIET COMBAT READY FORCES, TOGETHER WITH LAND AND AIR REINFORCEMENTS THAT QUICKLY COULD BE-MADE AVAILABLE POSSESS SUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO LAUNCH A LIMITED ATTACK

TACTICALLY GIVING us VERY LIMITED WARNING TIME. Bur SUCH AN ATTACK COULD HARDLY AIM FURTHER THAN TO SECURE SOME GROUND IN FINNMARK AND POSSIBLY ON OUR ARCTIC

... --· ..

IS_~NDS.

THE SOVIET UNION COULD HOWEVE~ HARDLY LAUNCH A LIM.ITED ATTACK WITHOUT PREPARING FOR ESCALATION. THIS AGAIN WOULD ALERT US, AND ALERT NATO.

A MORE REALISTIC CONTINGENCY COULD BE A PREEMTIVE ATTACK ·sy ONLY NAVAL AND AIRFORCES WITH I.NITIALLY LIMITED AIMS TO DESTROY OR NEUTRALIZE AIR- AND NAV~L

-BASES, THE CONTROL AND REPORTING SYSTEM AND OTHER KEY INSTALLATIONS. SUCH AN ATTACK COULD POSSIBLY SATI~FY THE SOVIETS IMMEDIATE NEED IN THE NORTH BY

' REDUCING THE THREAT AGAINST THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION FOR AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN THE NORTHERN AREA.

ONLY AN ATTACK AFTER A.BUILD UP OF FORCES, WITH TH~ AIM TO ASSUME CONTROL OVER THE AREAS NORTH OF VESTFJORDEN OR EVEN FURTHER WOULD- GIVE THE SOVIETS A SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE.

SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD MOST LIKELY REQUIRE 7-8 MRD's IN ADDITION TO AIR AND NAVAL UNITS. THE BRINGING IN OF SUCH REINFORCEMENTS WILL TAKE SOME TIME. HOWEVER, WE NOTE WITH CONCERN THAT THE CAPASITY OF THE SOVIET DOUBLE TRACKED RAILROAD FROM THE LEN.i NGRAD DISTRICT HA!

INCREASED CONSIDERABLY, AND THAT THE TRANSPORT AIRCRAF­AVAILABLE1GREATLY ENHANCETHE CAPABILITY TO BRING IN REINFORCEMENTS QUICKLY.

4 7 •. STANDING

FoRcEs/FLF

48 I STAND I N.G FoRces/TLF

49,, COASTAL FORT

SO .. KoBBEN 51. MTB (HAUK) 52. FRE. GATT ' 53. LGF 54. MINELEGGER _?5, KYSTVAKT

STANDING FORCES LET US THEN HAVE A LOOK AT OUR OWN FORCES.

OUR STANDING LAND FORCES IN fINNMARK INCLUDE TWO GARR SONS, ONE CONSISTING OF A REDUCED INFANTRY BATTALION SOUTH VARANGER, AND THE OTHER CONSISTING OF A REIN­FORCED BATTALION GROUP IN· PoRS.ANGER •.

BY LOCAL MOBILIZATION. WE CAN INCREAS.E THE FORCES HERE

WITH SOME BATTALIONS,. iNDEPENDENT COMPANIES .. SUPPORT UNITS. AND HOME GUARD FORCES, BRINGING THE TOTAL STRENGTH UP TO MORE THAN BRIGADE SIZE ORGANIZED IN INDEPENDENT BATTALION GROUPS.

PREPARATIONS ARE ALSO MADE FOR A RAPID REINFORCEMENT OF FINNMARK BRINGING IN, B.Y AIR A RAPID MOBILIZATION BATTALION WHICH HAS ITS HEAVY EQUIPMENT PRESTOCKED IN THE PoRSANGER AR.EA ,. THERE ARE ALSO· A FORWARD MI LIT Af

AI.RFlELD AT BANAK, THREE. EARLY WARNING STATIONS AND

FOUR COASTAL RADAR STATIONS, . !N. PEACETIME FINNMARK ' .

. ls. PROBABLY· ALSO O.UR. MOST lMPORTANT P-LA TFOR1'1 FOR

MAINTAJNI.NG CONTINOUS SURVEILLANCE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY

IN Ko-LA-MURMANSK, AND OF SOVIET TRANSIT ROUTES TO

AND FROM; THE N.OR.WEG IAN SEA AND THE ATLANTI c I

TRoMs AND OFoTEN r.s ro ·Be HELD AT ALL cosr.· THE

STANDING LAND FORCES HERE INCLUDE A BRIGADE WITH GARRISONS IN TROMS INLAND AND ON HINN0YA/AND0YA.

THE COASTAL DEFENCE COMPRISES A TOTAL. OF 14 FORTS, TORPEDO. BATTERIES AND MINESTATIONS PLACED TO BLOCK ALJ

LEADS TO THE CENTRAL PARTS OF TROMS AND 0FOTEN FROM THE LYNGEN TO VESTFJORDEN. NORMALLY 7 OF THESE ARE OPERATIONAL AT ALL TIME,

THE MOBILE ELEMENTS OF THE COASTAL. DEFENCE WITH OPERATIONAL BASE IN NORTH NORWAY INCLUDE 2-4 SUBMARINE

- 8-12 'tPB'S AND. 2 FRIGATES... THE NAVY ~

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

.56~ MIL AIRFIELDS IN NON

57. F-16

·i- n "- - - - . :>O. UK l UN

59~ UH-lB

10 NA 10 CONF lDl:N I lAL

FURTHER INCLUDES ONE SQUADRON OF LANDING CRAFT FOR SUPPORT OF LAND FORCES, 2 MINELAYERS AND A COAST GUARD SQUADRON, ONE SQUADRON OF LYNX HELIKOPTE WILL OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE COASTGUARD, THUS EX­TENDING THE COASTGUARDS OPERATIONAL AREA. THE SQUADRON IS FORMING NOW AND WILL BE FULLY OPERATIONAL IN 1983,

OUR AIR FORCE IS BASED ON 3 MILITARY AIRFIELDS, WITH HARDENED SHELTERS, T.I. BARDUFOSS, AND0YA AND Bon0. THESE ARE TODAY PROVIDED WITH LOW LEVEL GUN DEFENCES. WE LACK TOTALLY A MI SS I LE D~FENCE SYSTEM, U~N­FORTUNA.TEL Y.

foR THE PROTECTION AGAINST SURPRISE AIRBORNE LANDINGS, THE AI.RFIELDS HAVE DEPLOYED SMALL ARMY UNITS.

THE MILITARY AIRFIELDS, AND THE AIRFIELDS EVENES AND LANGNES HAVE TODAY A TOTAL OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF TEN TACTICAL SQUADRONS. HOWEVER, OF THE PRESENT EXTERNAL AIR REINFORCEMENTS ONLY HARRIER TYPE AIR­CRAFT CAN OPERATE FROM lANGNES.

To ALLEVIATE THE BASING PROBLEM, THE SMALL AIR STRIPS, 800 M LONG~ PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED, CAN BE USED BY HARRIER ~IRCRAFT AND PROBABLY F-16 IN THE AIR DEFENCE ROLE. A STUDY O~ THE LATTER IS IN PROGRESS.

COMBAT AIRCRAFT PERMANENTLY IN NORTH NORWAY ARE TWO F-16 SQUADRONS - BOTH AT Bon0. ONE oF THE SQUADRONS IS OPERATIONAL IN THE AIR DEFENCE ROLE. THE OTHER SQUADRON IS AT PRESENT CENVERTING TO THE F-16, AND EXPECTS TO BE OPERATIONAL THIS YEAR,

rURTHER WE HAVE THE MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT SQUADRON. CP-3B) AT AND0YA.

ONE SQUADRON OF HELICOPTERS (LJH-lB) FOR TACTICAL SUPPO

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

60! SEA KING

61. . Twr N OTTER

62 .. ~.VrrAt AREAS

(

6,"7

:;; I I MoBILIZAT.ION

11 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

OF. THE ARMY OPERATES FROM ~ARDUFOSS,

LASTLY WE HAVE ONE SQUADRON OF SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTERS. (SEA KING) AND; ONE SQUADRON SHORT RANGE TRANSPORT (SRT) AIRCRAFT. (TWIN OTTER'S/HELICOPTERS) AT Bon0.

MOBILIZATION .. FORCES CONSlDERING BOTH THE POSSIBLE THREAT AND THE VAST AREAS TO BE DEFENDED, WHERE JROMS IS THE DESICIVE AREA, IT IS IMPORTANT .THAT WE ARE ABLE RAPIDLY TO REINFORCE OUR STANDING UNITS W1TH LOCALLY OR REGIONALLY MOBILIZED FORCES HERE I.N. NORTH NORWAY. WE HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED A HIGHLY DECENTRALIZED. MOBILIZATLON SYSTEM. MOBILI­ZATION WILL IN CERTAIN S.ITUATIONS BE INITIATED BY THE

\

LOCAL COMMANDER~ THAT IS WHEN ENEMY FORCES APPEAR ON NORWEGIAN TERRITORY AND THE LOCAL COMMANDER CANNOT GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS HIGHER COMMANDERS, THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE SIMPLE, ..

. . "STAND I NG FO.RCES IN· NORTH NoRWA Y TOTALS APPROX 12 500 ME ALL SER.VI.CES ,,

Ar SIMPLE ALERT WE CAN MOBILIZE ABOUt 32 000 MEN WHICH INCLUDES:

- ALL FIELD UNITS IN FINNMARK

- THE MOBILIZATION INCREMENT FOR THE DEFENCE OF COASTAL FORTS AND AIR STATIONS,

- APPROXIMATELY 5 300 HOME GUARD PERSONNEL, INCLUDING THE CREW OF 96 HOME GUARD CUTTERS.

- LOGISTIC SUPPORT UNITS NEEDED FOR THE RECEPTION OF EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS,

Ar REINFORCED ALERT WE CAN MOBILIZE AN ADDITIONAL 19 500 MEN WHICH INCLUDES TWQ BRIGADES.

NATn rnN~Tn~NTT81

64. NATIONAL ~· . RE I NFORCEMENTS

l'tM I u t..,unr UJC.1~ I l.1-\L

. THE TOTAL .STRENGHT I ALL SERVICES'· . IN NORTH NORWAY

AFTER MOBILIZATI.ON. WLLL BE ABOUT 64 000 MEN, APPR.OXIMATELY 4~ BRIGADES... UNFORTUNATELY A RELATIVE

LARGE PART OF THE OFFICERS, AND ALSO SOME OF THE MEN, ARE LIVING IN SOUTH NORWAY AND HAVE TO BE BROUGHT IN· MA I NL'( BY A I R I .

NATIONAL REINFORCEMENTS . NATIONAL REINFORCEMNETS FROM SOUTH NORWAY WILL~ AFTER RECEIPT OF EXE.CUTION ORDE.R, DEPENDIN.G ON MOBILIZATION STATUS AND. MEANS- OF TRANSPORT, BE READY FOR ACTION I~ NORTH NORWAY ACCORDING TO THE TIME-FRAMES GIVEN ON THE SLIDE.

- CHOD NORWAY 1 S RAPID DEPLOYMENT BAT.TALION, WITHIN

14-32 HOURS, THE EQUIPMENT FOR THIS BATTALION IS

PRESTOCKED IN NORTH NORWAY (BANAK)-

- BRIGADE 5, WHICH ALSO HAS· I.TS. HEAVY EQUIPMENT ?.RE­

STOCKED IN. NORTH NORWAY, CAN- ARRI'rE WITHIN 2-5 DAYS .•

- BRIGADE. 13 WILL BE TRANSPORTED· WITH ITS HEAVY EQUIP­

MENT, USING RAIL, ROAD, OR SEA TRANSPORT OR A COMBINATION OF THESE1- AND W.ILL BE READY IN NORTH NoRWA v w I THIN .. 3-6 DA vs •.

As PAR-T OF THE CONCEPT FOR PRESTO.CK I NG FOR A US MAB IN

TR0NDELAG, IT IS PLANNED TO ?·RESTOCK HEAVY EQUI.PMEN

FOR AN· ADDITION.AA~ .B BRRIIGADE IN THE 0FOTEN - EVENE·S AREA, (/VDf!:VJ' ,

THE TOTAL _FIGHTI.NG SHIPS EARMARKED FOR COMNON IS SHOWN

ON THE SLI.DE. 15-20%. O"F THE FORCE IS PERMANENTLY BASE

IN NORTH NORWAY. ABOUT 65% OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF l I .. ,

THESE SHIPS WILL BE READY FOR ACTION IN NORTH NORWAY WITHIN 1-4 DAYS, - 90% WITHIN 15 DAYS· AND 95% WITHIN 30 DAYS,

ONE AIR FORCE SQUADRON WITH F-5 AND A PHOTO-RECCE DETA MENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO NORTH NORWAY ON O~DER.

l\fttTn rnl\ICT11C:l\ITT "'

\. · · SuRVE I LLANCE · o~

66 ., OR I ON·:

(oG KIEV)

67. UTSEILING

J...) ll/a\ 1 U ~Ul~r l.Ut.l~ I lfiL

ALL IN ALL, STANDING FORCES, REGIONALLY MOBILIZED FORCES AND NATIONAL REINFORCEMENTS, FROM SOUTH NORWAY EARMARKED FOR ASSIGNMENT, GIVE US A TOTAL OF'. ABOUT 80 000 MEN. ALL SERVICES, THIS INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY

6~ BRIGADES.,.

WITH THESE FORCES WE.EXPECT TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY HOLDING TIME IN THE DECISIVE AREA UNTIL EXTERNAL REINFORCEMENTS. CAN ARRIVE,

BEFORE WE GO ON TO DESCRIBE THE AVAILABILITY OF ALLIE:

.REINFORCEMENTS,. LET US SUM UP OUR MOST IMPORTANT

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON NATO DEFENCE:

- RADAR AND !N.TELLIGENCE STATIONS TOGETHER WITH AIR-­

AND NAVAL UNITS PROVIDE Goon COVERAGE AND EARLY

WARNING OF SOVIET AIR: AND OTHER ACTIVITIES., DATA

FROM THE RADAR CHAIN IS AUTOMATICALLY TRANSFERRED T(

THE CONTROL CENTERS OF NATQ.~.s INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCl

-· NORWEGIA~ MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT AND OTHERS CONDUC DAILY' SURVEILLAN.CE OF SOVIET SURFACE· SHI.PS AND

S.UBMARINES MOVING OUT OF THE LOCAL WATERS INTO

WESTERN SEA AREAS., TH.rs, SURVEILLANCE IS CLOSELY

COORD·INATED WITH CORRESPONDING ALLIED ACTIVITIES FRC

ICELAND AND. SCOTLAND~

-·AND LAsri..v, ArRFxeLDs: 1N HoRWAY .. ~-FoRM· A;_:vitAtr ,_ THIRD co·RNER OF NATO's INTEGRATED AIR. DEFENCE SYSTEJ't

6VER THE NORWEGIAN SEA .

NATn rnN~TTI~NTT~I

68~ US TRANSP FLY

(.

69. ~ALLIED

REINFORCEMENT

14 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL .REINFORCEMENTS TH.IS BRINGS ME ON TO THE QUESTION OF EXTERNAL

REINE9RCEMENTS •

. .

OUR OWN RECENT NATIONAL OPERATIONAL STUDIES AS WELL AS RE~ENT-· NATG STUDIES CONCLUDE WITH THE NEED FOR FORCES THAT GOES BEYOND WHAT WE OU~SELVES CAN RAISE

. IN THI s COUNTRY I

ALLIED- LAND REINFORCEMENTS.SHOULD ARRIVE EARLY ENOUGH TO TAKE PART I.N THE DEFENCE OF VITAL GROUND

. INSTALLATIONS, AND THEY SHOULD PREFERABLY ENHANCE OUR LIMI.TED AIR DEFENCE AND.LONG RANGE ANTI-TANK CAPACl.TY.

CURRENT PL.AN-S INCLUDE SEVERAL ALLI ED GROUND AND

AMPHIBIOUS FOBCESr

THE MAIN; PR.OBLEM CONNECTED TO . .- MANY OF THEM IS THAT . THEY MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE AT A FAIRLY LATE STAGE,

. . THAT THEY S.IMULTANEOUSLY MAY HA.VE OTHER OPTIONS, AND THAT·THE.Y ARE DEPENDANT ON SEA TRANSPO.RT.AND THUS ON·' ALLIED CONTROL OF THE NORWEGIAN SEA.

THE MULTINATIONAL ACE MOBILE FoRCE··AMF-Is PRIMARILY . .

CON;SIDERED A DETERRENCE FORCE,. THAT COULD BE EMPLOYED

ro DEMoNs:rRATE NATO's SOLIDARITY.

THE. CANADIAN AIR SEA TRANSPORTABLE BRIGADE GROUP (CAST BRIGADE GROUP) IS THE ONLY ALLIED GROUND FORCE DEDI..CATED TO NORTH. NORWAY.

PLANS ALSO EXIST AS YOU WELL KNOW, FOR EMPLOYMENT OF ELEMENTS OF THE MARITIME CONTINGENCY FORCE ATLANTIC. THE UK-NETHERLAND AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AND A us MARINES

I

AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE ARE THE MORE LIKELY OPTIONSa

- THE UK/NL LANDING FORCE CONSISTS OF THE 3RD UK ROYAL MARINE Cno BRIGADE WITH THREE Cno GROUPS AND AN AMPHIBIOUS COMBAT GROUP FROM THE ROYAL N~THERLANDS MARINE CORPS,

71A_ ·-MA.B -' \J.· . . \ . . . · . EMPL AREAS.

71. CONMAROPS

- ··-

15 . NATO CONFIDENTIAL . .

THE FORCE COULD BE EMPLOYED IN .NORTH NORWAY ON ITS OWN, OR. T.OGETHER WI TH US MAR I NE FORCES •·

THE. TOTAL STRENGHT OF THE· UK/NL FORCE IS 6 900 MENP ABOUT 1 000 BEING THE NETHERLANDS CONTRIBUTION,

THE WINTER-TRAINED. PART, ABOUT 4 800 MEN, TRAIN IN

N·oRWAY EVERY WINTER TO MEET THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

FOR TH.IS REINFORCEMENT ROLE.

ACCORDING TO. SACEURS RAPID REINFORCEMENT PLAN

THE WI.NTERTRAlNED PART OF UK/NL W·ILL ALSO HAVE NON AS PRIORITY EMPLOYMENT OPTION.

I WILL NOT COVER THE ·US PQRTION OF THE MARITIME CONTINGENCY FORCE ATLANTIC •. ·I AM PRIMARILY TH.INKING

.OF THE MAH EXCEPT BY PICKING IT UP FROM THE TR0NDELAG AREA.

THE TRANS.FER TIME FR.OM US, VI.A TR0NDELAG· TO MARRY UP

- . - WITH· THEIR EQUIPMENT AND TO BE COMBAT READY IN NORTH . -NORWAY WI.LL BE APPROX 14 DAYS .•.

TENTATIVE EMPLOYMENT AREAS. IN NON W.ILL BE:

- -· T ROMS0: AR.EA

- HINN0YA AREA - 0FOTEN.AREA.,. WITH. PRIORITY TO 0FOTEN AREA.·

THE AIR.CRAFT COMB·AT GROUP WILL BE OPERATI.NG. FROM Bon0 EXCEPT FOR T:HE AV 8's <HARRIER) AV-lO's AND THE HELI..a

COPTERS, WHICH WILL BE BASED EITHER ON EVENES· OR lANGNE

CTROMS0) DEPENDING ON. GIVEN OPTION. ·

. As FAR AS NAVAL FORCES ARE CONCERNED, LET ME JUST SAY - THAT CONMAROPS SEEMS TO BE A SOUND CONSEPT OF OPERATIONS

AND THAT WE FEEL THAT FORWARD DEFENCE OF THE NORWEGIAN SEE IS DECISIVE FOR THE DEFENCE OF NORTH NORWAY,

RE I NFORCEMENTS THE EXTERNAL AIR REINFORCEMENTS AS LISTED IN SACEUR's RAPID REINFORCEMENT PLAN ARE SHOWN ON THIS SlIDE.

MI\ Tn rnri.11:: T nl='l\IT T L\ I

BASE

AND0.YA

BARD UFO SS

BOD0

.J.U l'tM j V \JUl11 .l.J.11...'1 I J.I \iz.,

EXTERNAL A.I R REINFORCEMENTS ·

SQN/TOTAL AC TvpE AC NATION

1/18 "F-4C us· 2/20 CF-SA CA 1/9 RF-4C us 1/12 JAGUAR . UK 1118 F-4C us 114 HC-130 us

Ro LE

FBA/AW) FBA TRX TRX/FBt FBA/AW)

- -·- ····- ·-·- - ·---ARRS

A~A/X

EVEN.ES

t.ANGNES .

- - _, --

2/24 1/19 1/4 1/4 1/24 1/20

76 1/12

-· --------

.~F~4S US MAE A-4M US MAB

RF-4B US MAB EA~6 US MAB A-7D US

AV-8A US MAE HELICOPTERS us MAB HARRIER . UK (SSR <AHDB~ IN NEC)

FBA TRX EW FBA

FBA

THE AIRCRAFT OF THE US MAB DEDICATED TO NORWAY ARE

ALSO LISTED AS THE PRIORITY EMPLOYMENT OPTION OF Tr

MAB IS NORTH NORWAY.

SACEUR's RAPID REINFORCEMENT PLAN 1s EFFECTIVE IN JANUARY 1983.

THE PLAN MAKES NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE EXTERNAL AIR REINFORCEMENTS TO NORTH NORWAY BUT WILL GIVE US THE

ADVANTAGE THAT MORE ALLIED SQUADRONS WILL BE CLOSER CONNECTED TO OUR DEFENCE. THIS ALSO GIVES JUSTIFI­CATION FOR INFRASTRUCTURE MEANS.

THE PLANNING AND PREPARING FOR AIR REINFORCEMENTS HAVE HIGH PRIORITY, ADDITIONAL AIR SQUADRONS WOULD HIGHLY SUPPORT OUR LIMITED AIR DEFENCE1 AND THE ENTIRE ANTI INVASION CAPACITY. AIR FOR~ES A~E ALSO THE MOST LIKELY ONES TO REACH NORWEGIAN TERRITORY

IN TIMEs

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

73. MAP

-.

74. REINFORCEMENTS

--75 8~ -~ ALL -SOLD

17 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

ALL THE REINFORCEMENTS, MENTIONED, MAY NOT BE READIL AVAILABLE TO US, DEPENDING UPON VARIOUS FACTORS AS FORCES READINESS, TRANSPORT CAPACITY AND OF COURSE THE THREAT FACING OTHER PARTS OF NATO,

IT HAS, HOWEVER, A DETERRENT EFFECT THAT PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF THESE REINFORCEMENTS EXISTS, AND THAT THE FORCES ARE TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FOR EMPLOYMENT IN OUR AREA.

SUMMARY

MAY 1 SUMMARIZE, THAT THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NORTH NORWAY IS BASICALLY A FUNCTION OF THE PROXIMIJ'(TO THE GREATEST AND MOST IMPORTANT OF SOVIETS STRATEGIC NAVAL BASES.

THE LACK OF BALANCE OF STRENGHT IN THIS AREA UNDERLI~ THE IMPORTANCE OF RAPID NATtONAL AND ALLIED REINFORCE~

MENTS OF NORTH NORWAY.

NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE GIVEN THE DEFENCE OF NORTH NORWAY FIRST PRIORITY, AND NATO AND THE NATIONS HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL TO FACILITATE REINFORCEMENTS IN TIMES OF TENSION OR UPON HOSTILITIES.

A CLEAR DEMONSTRATION OF OUR DETERMINATION AND ABILITY TO DEFEND THIS COUNTRY, AND OF NATO's DETER­MINATION AND ABILITY TO COME TO OUR ASSISTANCE WILL HAVE - ! BELIEVE - THE PLANNED DETERRENT EFFECT, AND THEREFORE INFLUENCE ON SOVIETS CALCULATIONS AND PLANSu

THE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIED FORCES DURING EXERCISES IS LENDING CREDIBILITY TO THE CONCEPT OF REINFORCE­MENTS AND DETERRENCE AND IS CONSIDERED BY US TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE,

LASTLY, I ASSESS THE ESSENTIALS OF DEFENCE AND THE CRITICAL FACTORS REGARDING THE DEFENCE OF NORTH NoRWA

N8Tn rnN~Tn~NTT81

76. LISTE

18 NATO CONFIDENTIAL

TO BE:

- FORWARD DEFENCE IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA ARE VITAL.

- DEPLOYMENT TIME FOR EXTERNAL LAND REINFORCEMENTS IS TOO LONG,

- POLITICAL DECISIONS AND REQUISITION OF REINFORCEMENT MUST BE MADE EARLY.

- AIR DEFENCE ARE LIMITED AND THERE ARE TOO FEW AIR DEFENCE FIGHTERS IN EXTERNAL AIR REINFORCEMENTS.

- THE AIRCRAFT BASING CAPACITY ARE LIMITED.

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NATO CONFIDENTIAL