001. husserl e weber
TRANSCRIPT
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Sociological Inquiry
51 (2) 99-104
Edmund HusserFs Impact on Max Weber*
Kenneth R. M U S E
Earlham College
In correcting Rickcrt, Weber was influenced by Dillhey when he accepted th e central place
of interpretive understanding in the Geisteswissenschaften. But it was partly th e influence
of Husserl
that
led
Weber
to
correct Dilthey's psychological reductionism
in two respects,
both
of
which
are
imporuint
in
Weber's concept
of
ideal
types: (I) categorial
understanding,
such as H'f have no t only in mathematical analysis bu t also in the anaiysi.'io f rational action,
does no t depend on psychological peculiarities, and (2) perceptual understanding, such as
th e
investigator
may
have
of
irrational
an d
nonrational
action, is not
given
by
immediate
intuition alone but is partly constructed, and the validity of the construction must be tested
by causal
analysis.
The author
argues,
further, that there is a phenomenological aspect to
Weber's well-known types
of
authority,
for
example. (Editor)
In this brief inquiry, I propose to raise the
question of whether there is any discernible
impact of the work of Edmund Husserl. the
"founder" of phenomenology, upon that of Max
Weber, or to phrase the question the other way
around, whether Weber appropriated anything
from Husserl's endeavors. Num erous scholars
have claimed that there are "phenomenological"
types of notion in Weber's methodological for-
mulations,' such as his doctrine of Verstehen, or
interpretive understanding, or his notion of in-
tended meaning {gemeinter Sinn), but no one, to
my knowledge, has ever claimed that Weber
himself understood these notions to be phenom-
enological, much less that they were directly bor-
rowed from phenomenological writers in his day.
All that these scholars usually wish to claim is
that these notions are similar in basic meaning to
a number of ideas that since Weber's time have
become associated with the phenomenological
mo vem ent. N o one, as far as I know, has yet
attempted to discover whether there exist direct
links between Weber and the phenomenological
movement of his day, or to explore the nature of
those con nect ions, if they exist. I propose to
open this area of inquiry by claiming that there is
strong evidence, if somewhat intricate, of a direct
impact of Husserl on Weber. However, as we
shall see, this impact had reverberations in an area
Presented at Max Weber Colloquium, University
of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, April 21, 1977.
'See, for example, George Psathas, Phenomeno-
logical Sociology: Issues and Applications
(New
ork: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 2-3. See also
tome remarks by Helmut R. Wagner in the same
work, e.g. p. 63. James Heap and Philip Roth ("On
of Weber's methodological work where it has sel-
dom been looked for, indeed where it might
- from certain perspectives be least expecte d: in
his doctrine of ideal types.
I will endeavor to show that Weber was well
acquainted with Husserl's early work, at least,
and that Weber's major appropriation from that
work was, eventually, to conceive of ideal type
construction asat least in parta "phenom-
enolog ical" procedure. If this can be show n
with at least a degree of plausibility, then the
inquiry, tentative as it is, can be expected to
have two possible pay-offs. First, a new eleme nt
will perhaps have to be added to the ongoing
debate over ideal-type construction, namely, the
possibility that the procedure involves at least
in part a phenom enological m ethod. A nd sec-
ondly, there may be implications for the whole
arena of recent attempts to devise a phenom-
enological socio logy . I have long been suspiciou s
of attempts to make a wholesale application of
Husserlian notions directly to socio logy . Th e
question as to how a philosophical approach such
as phenomenology is to be related to a scientific
approach such as sociology is far from simple,
I believe. Perhaps we can take some clues from
Weber in this regard, and learn from his selective
appropriation from Husserl's work.
Let us now turn to the issue of Husseri's direct
impact upon Weber. A s nearly as I can deter-
mine, there are no fewer that seven references
to Husserl in Weber's Wissenschaftslehre, his col-
lected me thodo logical writings. This may appear
to some as too small a number to support a
contention that Husserl had an impact upon
Weber's me thodo logicai stance. Ho we ver, it is
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fore, at least on the face of it, the number of
references to Husserl, though relatively small,
does not argue against his having had a signifi-
cant methodological effect.
By far the majority of those references are
contained within Weber's early essay on Roscher
and Knies, published in three parts in 1903, 1905,
and 1906. Th e work of HusserKs that is men -
tioned is the Logical Investigations, published in
tw o volum es in 1900 and 1901. Weber's refer-
ences are all to Volume II of that work, particu-
larly to Investigation V, Investigation VI, and the
Appendix, since these sections are the most rele-
vant ones for the social sciences. Weber's
references to these sections range from the
very beginning right through to the Appendix,
indicating, I think it is fair to say, a thorough
reading of the work.
Weber's treating Husserl's work in this context
stems from his concerti in the essay to correct
a deficiency in the scheme of the sciences set forth
by Heinrich Ricker t. Weber has told us early in
the essay that "it is one of the purposes of this
study to test [erproben] the usefulness of his ideas
for the metho dology of our discipline."' Ho w-
ever, Rickert's framework is lacking in that it
does not have an adequate theory of interpreta-
tion [Deiitt4ng] or of interpretive understanding
[deutend Verstehen]. "Even granting the fun-
damentals of Rickert's position, the following
p o i n t . .. is indisputable: the methodological con-
trast between the sciences, with which Rickert
was concerned in his work, is not the only
contrast The following fact re m ai ns . . . :
both the course of human action and human
expressions of every sort are susceptible to a
meaningful interpretation
[sinnvollen Deutung]. '
Weber is at this point revising Rickert's frame-
work by adopting insights from the figure whom
Rickert consistently viewed as his primary antag-
onist: Wilhelm Dilthey.* This beco m es clearer
a few sentences later when Weber asserts that
"contrary to what Rickert thinks, [this sort of
interpretation] is the definitive criterion that jus-
tifies us in classifying together into a special
group of human sciences [Ceisteswissenschaften]
all those disciplines that employ such interpreta-
tions for methodological purposes.""
Weber has here adopted one of Dilthey's cen-
tral concernsthe notion of interpretationand
'Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of
Historical Economics, trans. Guy Oakes (New York:
The Free Press, 1975), p. 213, n. 9 (I will occasionally
rework Oakes's translation in minor respects).
'Ibid.,
pp. 217-218, n. 22.
has chosen to designate the social sciences
Dilthey's term [Geisteswissenschaften] and
Rickert's term [Kultttrwissenschafteti], conce
by Rickert in opposition to Dilthey's terminol
I have argued elsewhere that this pas
initiates Weber's preoccupation with the prob
of interpretive understanding, a preoccupa
that grew to such proportions as to explode
Rickertian framework altogether and led W
to adopt a revised form of Dilthey's stance
the time of Weber's late methodological work
But it would lead us astray to treat such is
in greater detail. It is sufficient to simply no
that this passage initiates Weber's life-long
cern with the problem of Verstehen, and th
is in this context that Weber finds Husserl us
Husserl's Logical Investigations became usefu
Weber by providing a view of interpretive un
standing that avoided two of Dilthey's error
his formulation of the same notion.
The first error in Dilthey's notion of in
pretive understanding is that, for Dilthey,
interpretive understanding of the expression
mental
[geistige]
life is best grounded upon
science of psychology, not a positivistic psyc
ogy but a descriptive [beschreibe nde] psychol
"Psycho logy, s
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When I interpretively understand another person's
life expressions, according to Dilthey, I "project"
myself into his inner life and relive his experi-
enc es. "On the basis of this projection [Hinein-
versetzens], this transp osition, arises the highest
form in which the totality of mental life is actu-
alized in understandingthat of reproducing or
reliving [das Nachbilden oder Nacherlehen]. '"
Weber wished to dissociate his theory of inter-
pretation from this sort of naive realism, from
this epistemological optimism. He acknow ledges
that the interpretive understanding of others does
have a kind of intuitive self-evidence. "There is
certainly a sense in which the play of human
'passions' can be 'intuited' [anschauUch] and re-
produced in inner experience [nacherlebbar], in
a qualitatively different sense from 'natural' pro-
cesses." " And in a discussion of the philosopher
Theodor Lipps, Weber acknowledges that the
empathic understanding [Einfiihlung] of other
persons has a unique kind of self-evidence [vj-
denzV But it is precisely because my inter-
pretive understanding of others often seems self-
evident that the method is epistemologically
suspect. Th e intuitive obviousness of interpretive
understanding masks its subjective character: in
the domain of empathy, says Weber, "everyone
sees what he bears in his heart." " Therefore,
he conclud es, this self-evidence [Evidenz] of the
object of interpretive understanding must be care-
fully distinguished from every relation germane
to 'validity' [Geltung]
Weber's solution to the problematic status of
interpretive understanding is well kno wn : it was
to check interpretive understanding against other
methods, in particular, causal explanatory meth-
o d s . "
But our concern here is with the way in
wh ich Husserl fits into all of this. Weber's prob-
lem is this: he wishes to m ove beyond R ickert
in the direction of Dilthey by acknowledging a
'"Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften,Vol. VIT, p. 214.
Roscher and Knies. p. 174.
Ibid.,
pp. 163-166. Any full understanding of
Weber's indebtedness to the phenomenological move-
ment of his day would have to sort out Weber's
relationship toLipps,as well as to Husserl. We must
recall that Lipps and his students had already begun
to move in similar directions as Husserl during the
early years of the century, and that the early phenom-
enological movement grew out of bothfiguresand the
students they shared (see Herbert Spiegelberg.
The
Phenom enological Movem ent: A Hiitorical Intro-
duction, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (The Hague: M artinus
Nijhoff, 1965], Vol I, pp . 21-22). What is significant
is that Weber, at least at the time of the R oscher and
Kniet essay, seems to associate the term "phenomeno-
logicat" more with Lipps than with Husserl (see
legitimate role within sociology for interpretive
understanding; yet he wish es to avoid two con -
comitants of Dilthey's view of interpretive under-
standing, namely, the overemphasis upon psy-
chology and the overemphasis upon immediate
self-eviden ce. It is Husserl. I maintain, to whom
Weber turned for a solution to both of these
problems.
Why Husserl? Weber uses Husserl, I suspect,
because Dilthey had, in 1905, immediately prior
to Weber's writing of the Roscher and Knies
essay, praised Husserl's Logical Investigations as
providing the necessary epistemological frame-
work for Dilthey's view of the human sciences.
As Herbert Spiegelberg documents, "In 1905, in
presenting his 'Studies for the Foundations of the
Geisteswissenschaften' to the Berlin Aca dem y,
[Dilthey] took occasion to refer to the 'excellent
studies of Husserl,' who 'from a related standpoint
had prepared a strictly descriptive foundation of
an epistemology as a phenomenology of knowl-
edge and thus a new philosophic discipline.'
A little later he went out of his way to acknowl-
edge 'once and for all how much, by way of the
use of description in epistemology, I owe to
Husserl's epochal Logical Investigations'. T o
be sure, Dilthey's relationship with Husserl later
became strained, but at the time of Weber's writ-
ing of the Roscher and Knies article the con-
nection was being very much affirmed by Dilthey,
and Weber was surely aware of this since he
makes reference in the article to Dilthey's 1905
Berlin Academy address."
Since Dilthey had placed his stamp of approval
upon Husserl's Logical Investigations, there is
a touch of irony in Weber's use of that work
to correct the deficiencies of Dilthey's stance.
Weber is in a sense using Htisserl against Dilthey.
The key notion that Weber found helpful in the
Logical Investigations is Husserl's distinction be-
tween categorial intuition [kategoriaie Anschau-
ung]
an d
sensuous
or
perceptual intuition [sinn-
liche Anschauung]. TTiey key passag e in this
respect goes as follows:
The intuitive self-evidence
[anschauliche
Evidenz]
of mathematical propositions is quite different from
the "intuitabllity" [Anschatilichkeit]of the m ulti-
plicities of "experience," immediately given "In" us
and "external to" us, experienced [erUbte] and
accessible to experience [erlebhare]. To use Htis-
serl's terminology, the distinction is between
"categorial" intuition and "perc^tual" intuition.
. . . When empirical science treats a given manifold
as a "thing" ... then it is
invariably
the case that
this object is only "relatively determined." I.e., it
is a conceptual construct that always includes
aspe ct that are empirically "intuited." But at the
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There
is no
need here
to
unpack this very
intricate passage. The way in which Husserl's
work is significant for Weber can be explained
in very simple language . Husserl's notion of
categorial intuition, one of the paradigms of
whichis theintuition ofmathematical statements,
provided Weber with
a
model
of
interpretive
understandingand intuitive self-evidence thatwas
not,as Husserl repeatedly emphasized, subject to
psychological reductionism, and that was not
as subject to the distorting biases that Weber
detected in much of our empathic understanding
of others. Weber's way of appropriating this
insight for the interpretation of action was to
place a great emphasis upon
rational
action,
which he felt shared thekind of categorial intui-
tion which was characteristic of mathematical
statements.
Weber goes
on to
elaborate this notion
in the
Roscher and Knies
essay, but I should like to
examine this notion in itslaterand more familiar
contex t, Weber's last methodological work, Basic
Concepts. My purpose in treating the notion
in that contextis to showthe essential similarity
of the discussion there to the earlier one,since
Husserl's name is not mentioned in the later
context. In this way, I hope to indicate that
Husserl's influence was felt throughout Weber's
work, even where Husserl's name is not cited.
Further, I wish to trace Weber's handling of
Husse rlian themes through
the
'Basic
Con-
cepts essayinsucha way as tosuggestapossible
link between Husserl and Weber's notion of
meaning-adequacy.
The continuation of these earlier themes into
Weber's later work is found in the opening
passage of Basic Con cepts. Husserl is not
mentioned here by name(heismentionedat the
beginning of the methodologically similar essay
Cber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Sozio-
logie as an important, if indirect, methodo-
logical influence'), but the thematic indebtedness
to Husserl
is
evident
in
four sections,
nos. 3, 6,
10,and 11under theheading I.Methodological
Foundations. It is interesting to notice that
the term ideal type isexplicitly mentioned only
four times in Basic Conc epts and those four
mentions occur in sections 3, 6, 10, and 11,
indicating a coincidence between Husserl-related
themesandideal types.
In section 3, Weber discussesthekindsof self-
evidence (Evidenz) there are, and he continues
touse the Husserlian distinction between mathe-
matical
and
logical self-evidence
on the one
hand,
an d empathic (einfiihlend) self-evidence on the
other, although he no longer uses the explicitly
Husserlian terms, categorial and sensible. R
er, Weber now uses solely the terms ratio
and irrational to characterize the two sor
self-evidence and the two sorts of action
responding to them. These terms have
plantedtheHusserlian ones.
It
is in
this passage that Weber makes
famous statement about rational ideal type
For the purposes of scientific analysisit isco
ient to treat all irrational, afTectually determ
meaning complexes
of
behavior
as
factors
of
d
tion from
a
conceptually pure type
of
rat
ac t ion . . .. The construction of a strictly ra
courseof action in such cases serves the socio
asa type ( ideal type ) thathas the merit of
evident understandability
(evidenten Verstand
keit)
and
u nequivocality (Eindeutigkeit).
By
parison with this
it is
possible
to
understand
ways
in
which actual action
is
influenced
by
tional factors of all sorts, such as affects
errors,in that they account for the deviation
the line of conduct that would be expected o
hypothesis that
the
action were purely rational
Therefore, at the time of Basic Conc
Weber continues to feel that a preference
ideal types of.r tion l action puts his rel
upon interpretive understanding on a fi
epistemological ground: the interpretive u
standingof
rational
action seemsto him to
the same kind
of
self-evidence
as
that
of
m
matical and logical propositions, as he tel
explicitly in section 3, comparing the evid
status of the interpretation of rational a
with that of the proposition 2 x2 = 4.
was precisely to this kind of self-evidence
Husserl gave the name categorial {katego
And it was categorial self-evidence that
Husserl escapes any redtKibility to psycholo
origins. The interpretive understanding of
rational and irrational action has a charact
self-evidence,but the interpretive understan
of
r tion l
action
has an
additional feature:
deutigkeit, which could be translated as e
unequivocality or unambiguity.
Weber reaffirms this point again
in
sectio
once again comparing rational action to m
matical reasoning.
The
meaning
of a
tra
mathematical reasoning thata person carrie
is not in the relevant sense 'psych ic.' Sim
the rational deliberationof anactoras towh
the results of a given proposed course of a
willor willnot promote certain specific inte
and the corresponding decision, do not be
on e
bit
more understandable
by
taking 'ps
logical* considerations into ac co u nt .., . H
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ociology has no closer relationship on a general
nalytical level t o . . . psychology than to any
ther science."
''
That this reliance upon rational action traces
back to the epistemological difficulties of inter-
retive understanding discussed earlier and to
eber's use of Husserl's notion of categorial
ntuition to place interpretive understanding upon
irmer epistemolog ical ground , should by now
airly clear. How ever, I should like to con-
sider a further link to Husserl present in "Basic
Co ncepts." I wish to maintain that Weber's
erm "meaning adequacy" {sinnhafte Addqitanz)
eserves to be understood as part of this set
f themes that go back to Weber's reading of
Husserl. How ever, this claim must be somew hat
ore tentative than the previous one, since the
term
sinnhafte Addquanz
is far from a central
usserlian term. There is considerable emphasis
n the
Logical Investigations
upon the "ideal
f adequation (Addquation) between meaning-
ntention and meaning fulfillment," but it is diffi-
ult to know whether Weber's terms relate to
his discussion or not. In the absence of a clear
erminological link to Husserl, I shall have to
argue that the meaning of the term and the
ontext in which it occurs suggest strongly that
t belongs to this "Husserlian" complex of themes
understanding.
The term "meaning adequacy" is first intro-
uced in section 6 of "Basic Concepts," where
it is discussed as a counterpoint to causal ade-
That discussion is well know n, and we
ave already discussed Weber's claim that inter-
retive understanding, no matter how self-evident,
lways requires corroboration by causal explana-
{Geltung). W e are here more concerned with
eaning adequacy itself and with the possibility
hat it should be understood as "phenomenologi-
character; therefore we can turn imm e-
iately to section 11, where the term is expanded
upon.
Weber informs us there that a generalizing
science such as sociology can compensate for the
rather abstract character of its concepts by offer-
a greater precision of concepts." "This pre-
ision," he tells us, "is obtained by striving for
he highest degree of meaning adequacy (5(>irt-
dUquanz). But how does this relate to the
sectio n, section 3? Th e
relation of this passage to section 3 can be seen
y examining the word that "precision" translates:
he word is Eindeutigkeit. It wa s discovered in
section 3 as the kind of self-evidence the inter-
pretive understanding of
rational
action possesses.
We can also see by Weber's very next sentence
that he is here continuing the themes of section 3.
"It has already been repeatedly stressed that this
aim can be realized in a particularly high degree
in the case of concepts and generalizations that
formulate rational processes."
But in this treatment, Weber begins to moderate
and soften the preference for rational ideal types
exhibited in section 3. "But sociologica l investi-
gation attempts to include in its scope various
irrational phenomena, such as prophetic, mystic,
and afTectual modes of action, which, to be sure,
are likewise formulated in terms of theoretical
concepts that are meaning adequate." Later in
the same paragraph, both rational and irrational
ideal types are again classified under meaning
adequacy: "But when reference is made to 'typi-
cal' cases, the term should always be understood,
unless otherwise stated, as meaning ideal types,
which may in turn be rational or irrational as
the case may be, but in any case are always
constructed with a view to adequacy on the level
of meaning. '
Here we begin to see that meaning adequacy
is but a substitute term for the earlier term self-
evidence {Evidenz). It cov ers precisely the sam e
territory, occurs in the same thematic context,
and appears to be a preferable term because it is
more specific to interpretive sociology, whereas
Evidenz applied to all the sciences. W hen we
recall that this whole discussion is indebted to
Husserl, we begin to see that what Weber means
by the criterion of meaning adequacy is that
ideal types must strike us as self-evident, as
intuitively correct, whether that self-evidence be
of a rational or an emp athic sort. They must
make intuitive sense.
If it is true that Weber's criterion for ideal type
construction has, at least in part, a phenom-
enological character, that meaning adequacy
means something like "intuitive consistency" or
"faithfulness to lived experience as it gives itself
or some such phrase, then it is perhaps not so
far-fetched to claim that Weber's meaning-ade-
quate ideal types represent a "phenomenology of
social reality."
To buttress this tentative argument, I should
like to illustrate how it is that Weber's ideal types
could be seen to have a phenomenological char-
acter by examining one set of ideal types from
Economy and Society.
As my example, I have chosen the well-known
types of legitimate authority: bureaucracy, tradi-
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history as he could, and has found three sorts
of legitimate authority to have kept recurring;
he then described them as consistently as
possible in "pure" terms. Th is sounds like an
ordinary enou gh scientific procedure. Why call it
"phenomenological"?
In the first place, the three "sorts" of authority
that kept recurring are not identified by means
of numerical averages or some such quantitative
procedure. Web er is, dare I use the hated word,
"intuiting" the basic qualitative types of authority
that emerge from the flux of historical data.
Secondly, a healthy dose of intuition is generally
acknowledged as a respectable, even necessary,
procedure in even the "hardest" of natural sci-
ences for the purposes of generating hypotheses
and theories. It is only that those sciences do not
remain satisfied with the intuitive self-evidence of
their hypotheses but go on to test them by other
m ethods before accepting them . But so does
Weber, as we have seen: mea ning adequacy needs
cattsal adequacy as a check.
Finally, when we look at the result of Weber's
intuitive work in this area, we see that it has some
"phenomenological" features, most notably an
attempt at a sort of "eidetic completion," a
description of the "pure possibles" that can be
imagined within the sphere of authority.
Try as one may, it is difficult to even conceive
of ways of exercizing political leadership that
can lay claim to legitimacy other than appeals
to formal rules and regulations (bureaucracy),
to traditional roles (patriarchalism and patri-
monialism), or to extraordinary personal qualities
(charisma). Tak e, for example, a father wh o
wishes to lead his family out of its current lack
of togetherness in the direction of greater com-
munal cohesiveness. Assum e that he wishes to
not simply force such togetherness through physi-
cal violence (naked power, M achi), but rather
wishes genuinely to lead with the "consent of the
govern ed" (legitimate authority). What option s
are available to him? He can encourage the
family to "legislate" rules or regulations (every-
one shall do one family-oriented deed per day,
there shall be a weekly family gathering, etc.) that
apply across-the-board to all family members
(legal-rational or bureaucratic authority). H e
might appeal to his traditional role as The Father
("I am your father, and I say.,,") and attempt
to gain consent for his scheme in that fashion
(traditional authority). Or finally he might en-
deavor to draw the family together through
generating a sense of infectious excitement
("Tennis, anyon e?" "Let's all take in a movie "
"Come, follow me; I have an exciting new vision
I of course do not wish to pass judgement
the ethical status or the pragmatic chances
success of any of these scheme s; I wish mer
to point out that it is difficult to imagine a
scheme by means of which a single individ
might successfully lead a group of people w
their consent, in some form, that would not f
into one or the other of these "pure possibl
or that would not be merely a combination
one or more of these.
I do not think that Weber would ever h
wanted to claim that his ideal types were tota
exhaustive: he had more respect for the vari
of empirical reality than that. But I do w
to suggest that there is at least a press in
direction of some basic structures of social l
some "pure possibilities" that "give themselve
"present themselves" to human action in cert
spheres. Ideal-type constr uction, thus conce iv
is far from any pure operationalism in which o
simply throws together a set of factors and s
"This will be my working ideal type for t
study." The method appears to be far m
rigorous than that. Ideal-type constructi
according to this line of thinking, would be
merely an ad hoc procedure, but a methodolo
cal procedure with its own sorts of requiremen
involving, it appears, an attempt to descr
phenomenologically the given structures wit
each action sphere, and aiming at a rather f
if not exhaustive, listing of some of the "p
possibles" that present themselves to social m
Before closing, I should like to notice in pass
one feature that this way of looking at id
types opens up. Viewed in this way , ideal ty
appear to relate to both the micro- and mac
levels of social life. In my exam ple, I noted h
an individual actor finds a limited set of ways
which to exercise authority. Th e example w
handled purely at the micro-level of analy
Yet, we are all aware that Weber's three p
types of authority allowed him to describe
number of macro-level institutiotial forms, e
elaborating at the level of leader and st
not to speak of educational, cultural, and ot
institutions, the 'log ic" of each action type. P
haps,
then, this view of ideal types allows us
see how Weber links the two levels of focus
I do not wish to develop at this point a
further implications of this analysis for eit
ideal-type construction or phenomenological so
ology. M y point has been simply to suggest i
tentative way that there exist connections betw
Weber and Husserl, the "founder" of phenom
nology, and that those connections may well
fairly significant for an understanding of Webe
-
8/11/2019 001. Husserl e Weber
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