8.2 001 hiroshi orihara weber

8/13/2019 8.2 001 Hiroshi Orihara Weber

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[ MWS 8.2 (2008) 141-162]ISSN 1470-8078

Max Weber Studies 2008, Global Policy Institute, London Metropolitan University, 31 Jewry Street, London, EC3N 2EY.

Max Webers Four-Stage Rationalization-Scale of SocialAction and Order in the Categories and its Signifcance

to the Old Manuscript of his Economy and Society:A Positive Critique of Wolfgang Schluchter

Hiroshi Orihara*

Abstract

The basic concepts laid out in Webers 1913 essay: Some Categories of InterpretiveSociology constitute the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order.The rst stagethe germinal similar action of plural individuals (gleichartigesMassenhandeln); the secondthe orderless social action among plural individu -als (amorphes Gemeinschaftshandeln); the thirdthe social action among pluralindividuals oriented one another to the non-enacted order (Einverstndnishandeln);

the fourththe social action among plural individuals oriented one another to therationally enacted order (Gesellschaftshandeln). This article aims to show that thisscale, unique to the Categories, is not only an outcome of Webers critic of RudorfStammler, but also is validly applied throughout the whole Old Manuscript of theEconomy and Society.

Keywords: Max Weber, Interpretive sociology, Economy and Society (Wirtschaft undGesellschaft), social action, social order, rationalization, community and association,domination, consensus and enactment.

Problem

Max Webers sociological main work known as Economy and Soci-ety (from the rst to the fth versions) was edited and publishedas One Book with Two Parts. But this composition unwarrantablycombined Webers twodivergent manuscripts written respectivelyin different periods into One Book. Weber wrote the Old Manu-script (hereafter OM) probably from 1910 until the outbreak ofWorld War I in August 1914. After the War, he set about a radical

* At the outset, I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr Sam Whimsterand Dr Yoshiro Yano, who kindly advised me on technical and linguistic matters.


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142 Max Weber Studies

Max Weber Studies 2008.

revision of the OM and partially nished the New Manuscript(hereafter NM) just before his death in June 1920. The editors, Mar-ianne Weber and Johannes Winckelmann, arranged this NM as the

First Part, the OM as the succeeding Second Part, contrary to thetime-order according to which the manuscripts had been writtenby Max Weber. This combination of NM and OM in the reversed order broughtabout serious problems. For example, the basic concepts found inthe concrete chapters of the Second Part areat variance with thoseformulated in the opening chapter, entitled Sociological BasicConcepts, of the First Part. This variance is natural, as the authorchanged his basic concepts and terms when he radically revised theOM to the NM. However, as far as the basic concepts are concerned,the changes were to some degree too delicate and subtle to be noticedand to be clearly distinguished (for the main differences formulatedsee Orihara 2003a: 152-53). The editors, probably being unaware ofthe variance derived from the revision, compelled the readers toread the concrete chapters of the OM of 19101914 with thealtered basic concepts and terms of 1920. Their versions were, so to speak,A Torso with aWrong Head.

How about the Complete Works version then? As Oriharaargued in a previous paper contributed to this journal (2003a: 133-68), the ve sub-volumes (Gesamtausgabe I/22/1-5) correspond -ing to the OM must be considered as Five Disjointed Body-Partswithout a Head. Either within the texts per se or even as editorssupplementary remarks, the sub-volumes (at least the four alreadypublished), plainly lack their uni ed conceptual introduction , withwhich Weber himself would never have dispensed. Accordingly,the sub-volumes lack asystematic integration resting on basic con-

cepts that spread beyond each sub-volume. At least we cannotperceive such a systematic integration either from the texts or aseditors expositions. As is well known, Weber declared his fundamental intention andviewpoint in the Foreword to the Outline of Social Economics in June 1914, as follows: Assuming every sphere of life to possess itsown autonomy, he would like to grasp the development of theeconomy as a partial phenomenon of the rationalization of life in gen-eral (Weber 1914: vii). The part allotted to him is entitled Economyand the Social Orders and Powers. As this title clearly indicates,his OM was destined to focus on the relationship of the economywith the society, more precisely, the structural forms of human


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Orihara Four-Stage Rationalization 143


groups (Gemeinschaften) (Weber 1980: 212; 1978: 356; 2001b: 114).1 If so, the development of these structural forms must be as wellgrasped as another partial phenomenon of the rationalization of

life in general. In his conceptual introduction to the OM itself, Weber reaf rmedthis intention, saying We shall have to trace the growing penetra-tion of the process ofrationalization and association into all spheres ofsocial action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) as a most essential dynamicfactor in development (E&S: 196, 333; emphasis mine). To carry out this fundamental intention, how could he have donethat without a master compass? In other words, what is thescale forwhich he arranged his basic concepts, in order to measure the degreeof that rationalization? Only if we are well acquainted with thisscale that works as a master compass, can we read the OM accordingto his original intention.

Webers basic concepts of Categories and his critique of Stammler

Where and how, can we nd his basic concepts being de ned andarranged for this scale of rationalization? On this matter, Wolfgang Schluchter (1991: 628) answered at rstthat the basic concepts are certainly found in the separately pub-lished essay of 1913: Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology(hereafter: Categories). He once recognized that the basic conceptsformulated in the Categories were applied throughout the wholeOM, so that the Categories must be put in front of the OM (1991:633). Moreover, he properly pointed out that Weber had elaboratedthe basic concepts of the Categoriesin close connection with his cri-tique of Stammler (1907) (Schluchter 1998: 338-39; 1999: 739; 2000: 182-

83, 187; 2005: 230, 232, 236-37). Schluchter seems, however, to have changed or moderated hisassertion since his essay in 1998: Max Webers Contribution to theOutline of the Social Economics (Schluchter 1998: 327-43). Askinghow Webers writing proceeded, he tried to distinguish somediver- gent working periods during which Weber had written the OM.From this point of view, he began to suspect that the basic conceptsof the Categories had lost their role as the guiding principle to thewhole OM in the second period, that is, from the end of 1912 or the

1. Hereafter, with respect to citations fromEconomy and Society, abbreviated asE&S, as far as the 5th edition of 1980, the English translation of 1978 are concerned,only page numbers are written, e.g., E&S: 212; 356.


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beginning of 1913 to the middle of 1914. In particular, he presumesthat the texts such as Sociology of Religion, Domination and so on,belong to the second period and he doubts if the terms consensus

and its composites ( the composite words formed with consensus)(Einverst ndnis und seine Komposita), which are unique to the Cat-egories, are applied to in those second period texts. Moreover, Schluchters suspicion seems to be reinforced (Schluchter2005: 229-38) by the interim ndings from the editing of the third sub-volume Law (which is the only remaining unpublished sub-volume). Judging from Webers handwritten manuscript itself, which is trans-mitted to the editorial staff, they say that the OM, at least the chaptersrelated to the sub-volume Law, consists of a number of text-layers or text-groups (Gephart 2003: 111-27). It is indeed natural that the text, written during the four or veyears (19101914), should have some layers. In addition, it is veryvaluable as well to investigate the manuscript itself thoroughly todistinguish the text-layers within it. Nevertheless, to discover suchlayers is one thing. To nd out any conceptual disintegration among them is another. Even if such layers are ascertained to exist by care-ful comparison, the next step is primarily to ask whether or in what

degree the original conceptual integration, so natural as a project,remains or terminates among such different layers. Only when thisquestion is duly answered, the loss of the original integration can beproved. So the previous question still remains: what was theoriginal conceptual integration? If we go forward without answering thissine qua non, we cannot but drift about in the ocean, without ahelm. Then, how can we nd out such an original conceptual integra -tion?

We can regard the Categories as a compact compendium, intowhich all the fruits of Webers intensive methodological thinkingsince Roscher and Knies, especially of his critique of Rudorf Stam-mler, have been compiled and positively reformulated for a founda-tion of his interpretive sociology to be developed from that time on.2 However, we have no space here to follow comprehensively andintensively the development of his methodological thinking (for

2. Weber wrote in the opening note, that the second part of his essay shouldserve as the methodical foundationnot only of his contribution to a collective work(E&S) shortly to be published,but also for concrete studies in general (Weber1988b: 427 n. ; 1981: 179 n. 1). Hereafter, as for citations from Categories, only pagenumbers are written, so Categories: 427 n.; 179 n. 1.


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such a following, see Orihara 2003b). So let us start from a contra-vention to Schluchters view. It should be noted once again, that itis very much to Schluchters credit that he discerned the connection

between the basic concepts of the Categories and Webers critiqueof Stammler. But it seems to me that he has not made the best of hisown insight. According to Weber (1988b: 368-83), Stammler properly askedwhat constitutes the social life, but he could not give a clear answerto his own question. Stammler regarded the social life as livingtogether, regulated externally through law. He once set this de ni -tion correctly against the simple temporal-spatial coexistence ofplural individuals (Stammler 1906: 77-111.).3 But he then confusedthe concept with the empirical reality to be conceptualized, so asto bring the strict dichotomy (that holds true of the concept alone)between the simple coexistence and the social life regulated exter-nally through law into the empirical reality as well. At the sametime, he could not consider the opposition of the non-natural (thesociocultural) to the natural as that of the meaningful (sinnhaft)to the having nothing to do with meaning (sinnfremd), as clearlyas Weber formulated for a link of the same critique (Weber 1988b:

331-37; Mukai 2000: 240-56). As a result, Stammler did not cometo recognize the liquid transition in the empirical reality from thetemporal-spatial coexistence of plural individualswithout meaning-relationship to their living togethermeaningfully regulated throughrationally enacted rule (Weber 1988b: 374-83). Against Stammler, based on this negative critique, Weber himselfconceptualized the very transition, in connection with his mean-ing (Sinn) theory, as a positive unfolding and formulation of whatStammler should have meant (Categories: 427 n.; 179). Thus, Weber

could outline in the Categories a conceptual scheme, a four-stagerationalization-scale of social action and order . And he applied it to thewhole OM including the texts that Schluchter presumed to be writtenby Weber during the second period.

Four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order

This scale basically consists of the following four stages (see Catego-ries: 439-74, 159-79):

3. But he mistook the latter at one time for the absolutely isolated individual,at another time for the purely instinctive life.


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The rst germinal stage is the (not-yet-fully-social) similar actionof plural individuals (gleichartiges od. gleichmssiges Massenhan-deln), when there is still neither meaningful order nor meaning-

relationship among themselves. This stage is the precondition forsocial action. The empirical regularity of action at this stage is calledcustom (Sitte). The second stage is theorderless social action among plural indi-viduals (amorphes Gemeinschaftshandeln). At this stage there arisessome meaning-relationship among them, but without any meaning-ful order. The third stage is thesocial action among plural individuals ori-ented one another to the non-enacted order (einverstndnismssigesGemeinschaftshandeln). Here, the social action, in this case consensual action (Einverstndnishandeln), proceedsas if there is some enactedorder existing among them, because they regard one anothers expec-tation as valid (gltig) and practically meet it. The non-enactedorder that adequately generates in this way some empirical regular-ity of the social action is called convention (Konvention). The fourth stage is thesocial action among plural individuals ori-ented one another to the rationallyenacted order (vergesellschaftetes

Gemeinschaftshandeln). The enacted order (gesatzte Ordnung), as wellas the convention, adequately causes some empirical regularity of thesocial action, in this case associational action (Gesellschaftshandeln). Law (Recht) is a special case of the enacted order, the empiri-cal validity of which is guaranteed also externally by the coerciveapparatus (Zwangsapparat). At the rst stage, the simple coexistence of plural individuals, thecollectivity of those who commonly share some speci c mark or dis -tinctive situation, is later called Gruppe, namely statistical group

in English. It is merely a germinal precondition for group-forma-tion (Vergemeinschaftung). As soon as any meaning-relationshipsprings up among those individuals, it proceeds to a real group(Gemeinschaft). The collectivities at the second, third and fourth stages are amor-phous, consensual, and associational groups (Gemeinschaften). Onlythe last one, vergesellschaftete Gemeinschaft, is called Gesellschaft. In addition, as for the groups that grow to be perennial, Weberintroduced a distinction between institution (Anstalt) and orga-nization (Verband) from the viewpoint of how their members arerecruited. The institution is de ned as an associational group withits enacted order and coercive apparatus for enforcing the order.


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But the membership or participation is ascribed on the basis ofpurely objective facts independent of declarations by those personsascribed (Categories: 466; 174), as is the case with state or church

in the technical sense. In this respect, the institution is contrasted tothe voluntary association (Zweckverein), the rational ideal type ofassociation, where the enacted order is not imposed (oktroyiert)from above by some superior authority, but agreed (paktiert, ver-einbart) in principle byall the participants or members to be. Different from them, the organization is a consensual groupthat lacks formally enacted order and coercive apparatus. But cer-tain power holders issue consensually effective rules for the actionof those consensually counted participants and exert, if necessary,physical or psychic coercion against those participants who violatethe consensus (Categories: 466; 174). The transition from the rst to the fourth stage is not only liquid,but also reversible or bilateral. For instance, although the transitionfrom consensual to associational action is naturally uid, nearlyevery association tends to give rise to a consensual action amongits associates that transcends the realm of the associations ratio-nal purposes (consensual action conditioned by association) as

well. So, every bowling club has conventional consequences forthe behavior of members to one another, i.e., it brings about socialaction oriented to consensus outside the association (Categories:461; 171). On the whole, however, the observable historical developmentindicates an ever wider ranging rational ordering of consensualaction by means of statute [enacted rule] and, especially, an increas-ing incidence of transformation of organizations (Verbnde) intorationally ordered institutions (Anstalten) (Categories: 471; 177). So

the calculability of others actions grows on average with the stages,the series of which can be quali ed accordingly as a rationalization -scale. Here, we must pay attention to this peculiar terminology of MaxWeber and that only of his Categories, where Gemeinschaft, in thiscase group in general formed by social actions, is not the oppositeof, but superior to Gesellschaft. Gesellschaft is a special case ofGemeinschaft in so far as the enacted order exists and empiricallyholds good. Gesellschaft, therefore,necessarily is Gemeinschaft atany time. If anyone should confuse this terminology unique to WebersCategories of 1913 with that of Ferdinand Tnnies or ofWebers


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own in the Basic Sociological Concepts of 1920, the expressionassociation-formation to a community (Vergesellschaftung zu einerGemeinschaft), for instance, does not make sense. In reality,

however, such remarkable expressions are often found throughoutthe OM. They designate the typical situation where some speci cconsensual group (Gemeinschaft) is generated through the mediumof association-formation (Vergesellschaftung). For example, Weberdiscusses the local community or congregation (Gemeinde) as sucha consensual group conditioned by association-formation, and thisin several separate places of some different chapters of the OM. So,in this case, it is not until we rely on the peculiar terminology abovefor a guide, that we can grasp the inner connection and integration ofthe seemingly unrelated, scattered passages, as discussed below ingreater detail. In Categories, Weber did not contrive a few basic concepts apartfrom one another, but properly arranged them solelyfor the four-stagerationalization-scale. Hence, the terms consensus and its compositesmust be treated solely as a link in the chain, designating the thirdstage of that scale. Now, we can nd the four-stage rationalization-scale being

applied throughout the OM no matter when the text was written. Aswe demonstrate in the following: (1) the terms consensus and itscomposites have been applied by Weber himself, as the distinc-tive mark of the third stage, even in the text of Domination thatis presumed by Schluchter to belong to the second period; (2)even if the terms consensus and its composites are not found, thefour-stage rationalization-scale itself with its basic concepts (forexample, Vergesellschaftung zu einer Gemeinschaft, bergreif-ende Ver-gemeinschaftung etc.) is certainly applied by Weber also

in the second period. Namely, it is utilized as valideverywhere inthe whole OM.

Webers sociological concept of domination in Categories and OM

According to Max Webers own comment on the construction of theOM (E&S: 356; 2001b: 114) and his disposition of 1914 (1914: x-xi;cited in Orihara 2003a: 165-66), the whole OM was to be divided intothree parts. The rst is a conceptual introduction which correspondsto the item 1 of the disposition of 1914. The second is a generalcharacterization of certain universal types of groups (the items 2-7).The third is the rather detailed discussion about the historically


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developed forms of those groups in connection with domination(the item 8). Of these three parts, Weber has attached great impor-tance to the phenomenon domination.

Well, it is just in the Categories that Weber frst arrived at hissociologicalconcept of domination. Since he had been armed with hismeaning theory introduced into the de nition of the social life at hiscritique of Stammler, he was freed from the ordinary path of takingdomination like a physical phenomenon where the stronger mechan-ically overwhelms the weaker. He, instead, grasped domination asindeed a non-symmetric, but meaningful social relationship betweenthe ruler with some authority of command, on the one hand, and theruled with a corresponding obligation of obedience, on the other.Moreover, in connection with his four-stage rationalization-scaleof social action and order, he could pay attention to, and focus on,the legitimacyconsensus (Legitimitts-Einverstndnis ), with whichthe former legitimates his rule as well as the latter accept it and aremotivated to obey. In the Categories already, with this basic conception in hismind, Weber appropriately observed the meaningful bases of thatlegitimacy consensus to determine in fundamentally signi cant

fashion the speci c character of domination wherever naked fearor directly threatening power does not condition the submissive-ness (Categories: 470; 177). Weber then, in the third part of the OM,designates the simple generic concept (Gattungsbegriff) of domi-nation by authority alike, and elaborates the three quasi-genericideal types (gattungsm ssige Idealtypen): rational, traditionaland charismatic, according to each ones distinctive basis of thelegitimacyconsensus. In the opening chapter of the OM on Domination, he starts byputting emphasis on the universal signi cance of domination ingeneral, as follows:

Domination in the most general sense is one of the most importantelements of social action (Gemeinschaftshandeln) Without exceptionevery sphere of social action is profoundly in uenced by structuresof dominancy. In a great number of cases the emergence of rationalassociation (rationale Vergesellschaftung) fromamorphous social action(amorphes Gemeinschaftshandeln) has been due to domination andthe way in which it has been exercised. Even where this is not the case,

the structure of dominancy and its unfolding is decisive in determin-ing the form of social action and itsorientation toward a goal ( E&S: 541,941; 2005: 126-27; partial emphasis mine).


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This last sentence can be seen as referring to the case where theruler compels the ruled to accept the goal as valid and to takeconsensual action toward it, even if the former can not impose an

enacted order on the latter. Thus, the signi cance of domination in general is elucidated, so to speak, as a lever to rationalization , basedon the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order ofthe Categories. As for its rational ideal type bureaucracy, the same can be saideven more clearly. Bureaucracy isthe means of transforming socialaction (Gemeinschaftshandeln) into rationally organized [associa-tional] action (rational geordnetes Gesellschaftshandeln) Underotherwise equal conditions, rationally organized and directed action(Gesellschaftshandeln) is superior to every kind of collective behav-ior ( Massenhandeln) and also [amorphous or consensual] socialaction (Gemeinschaftshandeln) opposing it (E&S: 569-70, 987; 2005:208; partial emphasis mine).

Without being fully informed of the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order of the Categories, we could notunderstand what these passages mean and imply precisely.

Consensus and its composites applied in Traditional DominationFurthermore, in his discussion on the second quasi-generic idealtype Traditional Domination, Weberexplicitly applies his speci cterms consensus and its composites three times. First, he calls the social relationship between the ruler and theruled in the patrimonial state (patrimonialstaatliches Gebilde),plainly consensual as follows:

As a rule, the political patrimonial ruler is linked with the ruledthrough a consensual community (Einverstndnisgemeinschaft) which alsoexists apart from his independent military force and which is rootedin the belief that the rulers powers are legitimate insofar as they aretraditional (E&S: 590, 1020; 2005: 274; emphasis mine).

The patrimonial state means the political organization, where apowerful patriarch ruled not only his own oikos, but also the otheroikoi (pl.) politically with physical coercive force and treated theruled alike as patrimonial dependents. Yet in such a political orga-nization too, except for the extreme form of Sultanism, the politi-

cally ruled were ordinarily attached to the political ruler throughthe legitimacy consensus. Namely, the formerconsented to the lattersexercise of power as valid, so long as it fell within the range oftradition in each case.


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Secondly, Weber writes as follows:The alienation of the ef, which of course required the lords willing -ness to accept the new vassal, became more and more the rule and

the purchase of his consent (Einverstndnis ) one of the most importantfeudal sources of revenue. However, the purchase was equivalent tothe full appropriation of the ef, since the transfer fee came to be xedby tradition or law (traditionell oder durch Satzung ) (E&S: 635, 1084;2005: 408-409; emphasis mine).

The ef-relationship (Lehensverhltnis) linked the lord, the ruler,to the vassals, the ruled, who, in this case, constituted administrativestaffs (Verwaltungsstbe) to assist the ruler. The lord bestowed a ef(a tract of land and the power to control it) personally on the vassal, at

rst in exchange for homage and military service from the latter. Now, the traditional domination in general gives rise to strugglesfor power, which are, openly and covertly, carried on between theruler and the administrative staffs, and bring about shifts in thepower relationship. A precarious power balance comes into exis-tence, somewhere between thedecentralizing tendency for the latterfully to appropriate the control over the efs invested to themselvesand the centralizing counteraction by the former to expropriate thecontrol once appropriated by the latter. The feudalism or ef-relationship is a form where the decentral -izing trend surpasses the centralizing one. There, the appropriationby the vassals goes practically so far that they can alienate their ef.At rst, it is necessary to obtain the lords agreement to approve thealienation concerned as valid and to accept the new holder of the

ef as his succeeding vassal, even if there were no enacted order forhim to do so. But, in course of time, that consensus itself also comesto be purchased as to be the lords main source of revenue. Moreover,the transfer fee is rst xed by tradition , later stipulated by enactedrule. To that extent, the alienation of the ef becomes a calculabletransaction. Thus, in the passage above, Webers four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order isexplicitly applied to the ef-rela -tionship and that including the terms consensus and enacted ruleor order. Thirdly, Weber explicates the condition, in which the Stndestaathas been formed, as follows:

Once the efholders constituted an autonomous legal group, theStndestaat came into being for very diverse reasons, mainly howeverbecause the stereotyped and therefore in exible efs and privileges


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had to be adapted to extraordinary or new administrative require-ments [for example, an enormous expenditure on armaments andwars] There were no provisions for raising these special revenues;hence the frequent conclusion of new agreements was unavoidable,eventually requiring a consociation (Vergesellschaftung) of the indi-vidual power-holders in the form of a corporative assembly. This veryassociation (Vergesell-schaftung) either included the prince or turnedprivileged persons into Estate, and thus changed themere agreed-uponaction (blossesEinverstndnishandeln ) of the various power-holders andthe temporary associations (Vergesellschaftungen von Fall zu Fall) intoa permanent political structure (ein perennierendes politisches Gebilde)(E&S: 637, 1086-87; 2005: 411-12; partial emphasis mine).

This passage looks just like a parade of the basic concepts constitut-

ing the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order. Itis not until we rely on this scale, that we can analyze the process andthe condition, in which the Stndestaat emerged. Simultaneously,we can position it on the boundary of the traditional domination,from which the patrimonial bureaucracy of the absolutist kingdomgradually revolves into the rational one of the modern state.

Textual connection between Charismatic Domination and Categories

As for the chapter on Charismatic Domination, the third quasi-generic ideal type of the legitimate domination, it is true that Weberdoes not explicitly apply there the terms consensus and its com-posites. But, by means of a cross-reference, that chapter is plainlyattached to the basic concepts of Categories. In that chapter, Weber contrasts charisma to rationalization in sofar as both operate as revolutionary power. The former revolution-izes its followers from the inside and shapes material and socialconditions according to its revolutionary will. Against it, the latterrevolutionizes from the outside, namely, it rst changes the mate -rial and social orders, and through them the people, by changing theconditions of adaptation (E&S: 657, 1116; 2005: 481). Here, Weberstresses the point that the difference between the two types of revo-lution does not lie in the original ideas intuitively conceived by thecharismatic or bureaucratic ruler or leader alike, but in the mannerin which the ruled and led experience and internalize the ideas. Inthis respect, he instructs the reader to refer backward, as follows:

As we have shown earlier , rationalization proceeds in such a fashion thatthe broad masses of the led merely accept or adapt themselves to theexternal, technical, resultants which are of practical signi cance fortheir interests (as we learn the multiplication table and as too many


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jurists learn the techniques of law), whereas the substance of thecreators ideas remain irrelevant to them (E&S: 658, 1116-17; 2005: 482;partial emphasis mine).

Now, this thesis on the concomitant result of the rationalizationin general is discussednowhere within the OM, but at the end of theCategories (Categories: 471-74, 177-79). Here, Weber asks, what itpractically means that the order of a group is rationalized. He thenanswers that the masses, adapted to rationally enacted orders aswell as to rationally produced daily goods, are increasingly alien-ated from the rational bases (ideas or principles) on which the ordersor the goods have been created. They merelybelieve them to functionin a rational calculable way. Thus, Webers instruction in the OM to refer backward corre-sponds in content exactly to this description in the Categoriesabbreviated here.

Concept of Gemeinde in OM

Next, how about the chapter on Sociology of Religion that Schlu-chter presumed to be written by Weber in the second period aswell. It is true that the terms consensus and its composites cannotbe found there. But, with respect to the congregation (Gemeinde),the main theme of the religious group-formation, the concept ofthe association-formation (Vergesellschaftung) is consistentlyapplied in the sense unique to the Categories, especially as a con-stituent of the remarkable expression Vergesellschaftung zu einerGemeinschaft. According to Weber, there are several cases, in which the congre-gation, the Gemeinde in the religious sense, comes into existence.In one case, it results from the routinization of prophecy. The per-sonal disciples or helpers of a prophet, the administrative staff ofthe charismatic ruler, do not want to leave the adherents, whom theprophet gathers around himself, as they remain temporary laymen(Gelegenheitslaien), namely anamorphous group (amorphe Gemein-schaft). Instead, they x the rules, through which both sides come tobe organized into a congregation withenacted rights and duties. Theassociation-formation (Vergesellschaftung) by the staff gives birthto a religious congregation (Gemeinde) as aconsensual group (Ein-

verstndnisgemeinschaft) on the basis of plural neighborhoods. Inother words, a consensual group is born, in this way conditioned byassociation-formation (E&S: 275-76, 452-53; 2001a: 194-95; emphasisand additions mine).


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In another case, Gemeinde is organized and utilized by an impe-rial conqueror as a means for the domestication of the conqueredmasses. The previous political organization of the conquered is

exterminated and the inhabitants are disarmed, but their priests areguaranteed to remain in their position and to govern their congrega-tion even with some political competence. Here Weber adds, Thiswas done because the religious congregation was regarded as a valu-able instrument for pacifying the conquered, just as the neighborhoodassociation turned into a compulsory community (die Zwangs gemeinde aus dem Nachbarschafts-verband) was found to be useful for theprotection of fnancial interests (zur Sicherung skalischer Interes -sen) (E&S: 277, 454-55; 2001a: 197-98; emphasis mine). The concept Gemeinde, therefore, is not only applied in the reli-gious sense to various cases of religious congregation. With respectto its rst case stated above, Weber adds:

A congregation in the speci cally religious sense (for this term is [inGerman] also employed to denote the neighborhood that has beenassociated for economic or for scal or other political purposes) doesnot arise solely in connection with prophecy in the particular senseused here (E&S: 275, 452; 2001a: 195).

The German original text runs here as follows:Die Gemeinde in diesem religisen Sinndie zweite Kategorie vonGemeinde, neben dem aus konomischen, skalischen oder anderenpolitischen Grnden vergesellschafteten Nachbaverschaftsverbandtaucht ebenfalls nichtnur bei Prophetie im hier festgehaltenen Sinneauf.

Then, what is the frst category of the Gemeinde? With regard tothis, Weber writes in another chapter on Neighborhood as follows:

The neighborhood is the natural (urwchsig) basis of the local commu-nity (Gemeinde)a structure which arises only, as we shall see later[cf. ch. XVI, The City], by virtue of political action comprising a multitudeof neighborhoods (E&S: 217, 363; 2001b: 125; emphasis mine).

Here, the English translator regards this authors reference for-ward as indicating the city as an autonomous local community (dieStadt als eine Gemeinde) in Webers particular sense, discussed inthe later chapter on City. But, why does it deserve the frst category?Should it rather be the third? If so, what is the rst then? Where is itdescribed? In this respect, the following two passages are worth noting. Oneis from the chapter called Sociology of Law, as follows:


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The [English] king assured himself of the contributions needed for thegovernment and the administration of justice by formingcompulsoryorganizations with collective duties (Zwangsverbnde mit Kollektivp-

ichten) similar to those of the Chinese, the Hellenistic, the late Roman,the Russian, or other legal systems. Acommunaltie (Gemeinde) existedexclusively as an organization with liturgical duties toward the royaladministration, and it had its rights only by virtue of royal grant orindulgence (E&S: 435; 723; emphasis mine).

The other is from the chapter on Patriarchal and Patrimonial Dom-ination, as follows:

The liturgical meeting of the rulers political and economic needs ismost highly developed in the patrimonial state. This mode of meetingdemands has different forms and effects. We are here interested inthose consociations of the subjects (Vergesellschaftungen der Untertanen)which derive from liturgical methods. For the ruler, liturgical methodsmean that he secures the ful llment of obligations through the creationof heteronomous and often heterocephalous associations (heteronomeund oft heterokephale Verbnde) held accountable for them. Just asthe kinship group is answerable for crimes of its members, so theseassociations are liable for the obligations of all members.

Liturgical methods of meeting public needs prevailed especially in the

Orient: in Egypt and in parts of the Hellenistic world, and again inthe late Roman and the Byzantine Empire. With less consistency thesemethods were also applied in the Occident and played a considerablerole, for example, in English administrative history (E&S: 592, 1022-23;2005: 278-81; emphasis mine).

Thus, we can consider the frst category of Gemeinde to be such aliturgical association of the political subjects with some xed collec -tive duty and liability that the patrimonial ruler creates for meetinghis public wants. He imposes his enacted order on the plural neighbor-hoods ruled by him politically , and, by means of this association-formation (Vergesellschaftung) from above, organizes thesenatural bases into aconsensual group (Einverstndnis-gemeinschaft). After de ning this simple generic concept of the Gemeinde,Weber elaborates, here as well, the two quasi-generic ideal typesof its alternative development (E&S: 593-94, 1024-25; 2005: 283-84).The one is the direction that the Gemeinde exceptionally developstoward local administration by largely independenthonoratiores asin England. The other is that toward a [universal] personal patrimo-nial dependence of all subjects as in the Orient. Now, on the other hand, if anurban ruler politically comprises theplural urban neighborhoods likewise as natural bases, and associates


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them through imposing his enacted order into an local organization,then an urban community structured as a Gemeinde will come intoexistence. With regard to this, Weber writes in the chapter on City

as follows:It is quite true that the initiator of the urban economic policy may bea prince (Frst) in whose political territory the city and its inhabitantsbelong. In this case, whenever a speci cally urban economic policyexists at all, it is determined for the city and its inhabitants and notby it. However, this does not have to be the case, and even if it is, thecity must still to some extent be a partially autonomous organization(autonomer Verband), a community (Gemeinde) with special admin-istrative and political institutions (mit besonderen politischen undVerwaltungseinrichtungen) (E&S: 732, 1220; 1999: 72).

Therefore, the originally heteronomous urban community,whose enacted order is imposed from above by the urban prince,can grow to be an autonomous, in most cases also autocephalous,organization or institution with its own political and administra-tive orders. These orders are now enacted through theagreement of its members, the urban inhabitants themselves united with oneanother to the citizenry (Brgerstand). So, this fully developedurban community also remains a special case of Gemeinde, a con-sensual group or organization generated through the medium ofcertain association-formation among plural neighborhoods as itsnatural bases. The resulting organization or institution is, on thewhole, autonomous and autocephalous, namely its enacted orderand its head or chief do not derive from the imposition by the out-side ruler, but from the agreement among the urban inhabitantsthemselves. Thus, although the descriptions of the three categories of Gemeinde

lie scattered all over the OM and seem to be irrelevant to one another,they are really connected and integrated with the basic conceptsunique to the Categories. They hold in common the general concept,the perennial local community (Gemeinschaft) formed on the naturalbasis of plural neighborhoods through the medium of (heteronomousor autonomous) association-formation (Vergesellschaftung). Based onthis general concept, concrete aspects and developments of such localgroups as religious congregation, rural and urban communitiesare analyzed and conceptualized under Webers central problem,4

4. This problem was nally formulated at the beginning of his Collected Worksof the Sociology of Religion (see Weber 1988a: 1). But it had already been conceivedand also partially stated in the OM. See, e.g., E&S: 229, 379-80; 2001b: 151-52.


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what the peculiar constellation of factors is, that differentiates thehistorical destiny of the Occident from the others .

Consensual group conditioned by association-formationNow, how about the other chapters that belong to the secondperiod? From the chapter on Economic Relationships of OrganizedGroup corresponding to the item 1 (2) of the Disposition of 1914,presumed by Schluchter to be written in the second period, we cancite the following passage.

We have already stated in general terms that voluntary organizations tendto transcend their rational primary purpose and create relationshipsamong the participants that may have quite different goals: As a rule,an overarching communal relationship (bergreifende Vergemein-schaftung) attaches itself to the association (Vergesellschaftung) (E&S:205, 346; 2001b: 91; emphasis mine).

The voluntary association (Zweckverein) that is formed on thebasis of xed and enacted agreement, such as a religious sect (inthe technical sense), a social club, or even a bowling club, exceptfor the purely economic or political type, used toexamine the appli-cants quali cations. Then, the items to be examined usually extend,beyond the realm of the speci c ability or quali cation indispensableto attaining the de nite purpose of the association-formation, up tothe applicants conduct and personal character in general. Accord-ingly, those who pass such an examination and obtain admission toit can also be legitimated as its fully- edged members of respectabil -ity too. As such, they win and enjoy the con dence of outsiders somuch that they can create and also expand trade relations on credit.In addition, they can foster various kinds of informal connections

to afford one another convenience. As far as these internal and external human relations developbeyond the realm of the rationally enacted order based on the ratio-nally agreed purpose of the voluntary association, they themselvesare not associational butconsensual. The associates there regard oneanothers expectations practically asvalid, and meet them in mostcases. Then, it comes to be widely noticed that such consensual rela-tionships bring about economic returns. So, often too many appli-cants appear one after another, who are not interested at all in thespeci c purpose of the association-formation, but want to enter itmerely for such bene ts. Consequently, the priority of the social rela -tionship in the very association really shifts from the associational to


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the consensual. With this reversal transition, the original purposeof the association-formation often comes to be slighted and evenabandoned.

In reality, this thesis is closely related to Webers experienceduring his travels in the United States of America. He observed therethe Baptist sects and their secularized equivalents, the clubs, andattained an insight into their latent social and economic functions.Now, in connection with the bilateral four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order, he recaptures these functions asthe consensual relationships derived from the association-formation(Vergesell-schaftung) and formulates them into an general empiri-cal law. Indeed, he does not apply here his terms consensus and itscomposites themselves. But it is quite obvious also from the back-ward-reference at the beginning of the citation above, that Webersconception and formulation is based on the four-stage rationaliza-tion-scale of social action and order of the Categories. The creationof an overarching communal relationship (bergreifende Verge-meinschaftung) as a concomitant result of the association-formation(Vergesellschaftung) is already, in the passage of the Categories

cited previously, literally stated in general terms, including theillustration of a bowling club.

Political association reinterpreted to ethnic relationship

Moreover, Weber also refers to this general empirical law in thechapter on Ethnicity, as follows:

In our sense ethnic membership [Gemeinsamkeit] does not constitutea group; it only facilitates group formation [Vergemeinschaftung] of

any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, itis primarily the political community [Gemeinschaft], no matter howarti cially organized, which inspires the belief in common ethnicity.This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the politicalcommunity, unless drastic differences in the custom, physical type, or,above all, language exist among its members.

This arti cial origin of the belief in common ethnicity follows the previously described pattern (cf. chapter II: 3) of rational associationturning into personal relationships. If rationally regulated action isnot widespread, almost any association, even the most rational one,creates an overarching communal consciousness; this takes the formof a brotherhood on the basis of the belief in common ethnicity (E&S:237, 389; 2001b: 175; emphasis mine).


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The twelve tribes of Israel were really the administrative subdivi-sions of a political association, which the kingdom arti cially createdthrough a rational association-formation in order to assign the litur-

gical duty to such subdivisions. But, in those days, such a rationallyobjecti ed associational action was not so widespread as to suit thehabit of the political subjects. Hence the ctitious brotherhood, thatconsented to offer monthly meals to the kings table, was created onthe basis of the belief in common ethnicity. It is not until the establish-ment of this overarching communal consciousness (bergreifendesGemeinschaftsbewusst-sein), that the rational association-formationin ltrated into peoples minds, obtained their consensus and thuscame to ful l its administrative function smoothly. Therefore, Webers instruction to refer backward, previouslydescribed patternof rational association turning into personal rela-tionships, nds its instructed description in the passage cited above.That general scheme well-known to us there is applied here to theethnical group-formation. The general scheme itself is connectedthrough the cross-reference network to the general formulation ofthe uid and reversible transition on the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order of the Categories (Categories: 460-

61, 171).Working period or object applied?

Well then, how about the remaining other chapters? Indeed, fromthe chapter on Household to that on Oikos, the terms consen-sus and its composites themselves donot appear explicitly. But itis quite evident that such groups as household, neighborhoodand kinship do not consist ofamorphous social actions that emerge

sporadically, but rather of consensual actions oriented one anotherto the non-enacted orders. In these cases, the chances of consensusare related to common household and piety, neighboring habitua-tion and mutual help in need, and exogamy, succession to propertyand joint responsibility for security and so on. Such groups are,so to speak, the representatives of relatively the most natural andso universal consensual groups (Einverstndnisgemeinschaften).So long as the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action andorder ([1] Gruppe, [2] amorphe Gemeinschaft, [3] Einverstndnis-gemeinschaft, [4] vergesellschaftete Gemeinschaft) is kept in mind,that such groups are nothing but (3) consensual groups, is too self-evident to apply each time such an exact but awkward expression


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Nachbarschafts-einverstndnisgemeinschaft and so on. When it isobvious that some power holders appear and maintain the non-enactedorders, not so awkward usual expressions as Hausverband, Nach-

barschaftsverband and Sippenverband, are frequently utilized. In contrast to these cases, matters stand different regarding suchsocial collectivities or groups as ethnicity, class, status group,party and considerably large-scale organization of domination.Here, it is never self-evident but justa sociological problem, to whatstage each collectivity above proceeds on the four-stage rationaliza-tion-scale of social action and order. For example, it may be a fundamental problem of the sociology ofsocial class-formation, whether a multitude of individuals that com-monly share a distinctive classsituation , remain astatistical groupor grow to be a real group of various stages of social action (E&S:532-33, 928-29; 2001b: 255-56). Not-yet-fully-socialsimilar actionwithout mutual awareness (i.e., scattered riots)? Or to amorphous social action with still diffuse a feeling of solidarity (i.e., naturallyengendered but mutually reinforced booing), or toconsensual action (i.e., mutually consented slow-down, sabotage), or furtherto temporary associational action (i.e., occasionally planned, indi-

vidual agreed strike) or nally to perennial association-formation (i.e.,trade-union, class-party). In those realms, the degree of growth orof dissolution as a social structure, that is, as a social class, must beaccurately measured and distinguished each time on the four-stagerationalization-scale of social action and order. So, it is inevitablethat the terms consensus and its compositesas an index of the thirdstage should be explicitly applied to each case. Therefore, whether the terms consensus and its compositesexplicitly appear in the text or not does not indicate the speci c

period when the text was written. But it is a distinctive mark, if thesocial structure as theobject treated in that context requires the plainapplication of the term for a sine qua non. The four-stage rational-ization-scale of social action and order itself is applied throughoutthe whole OM irrespective of the period when the text was written.

Conclusion

With these proofs stated above, we must conclude that the basic con-ceptual scheme of the Categories, the four-stage rationalization-scale of social action and order, has never lost its role as the guidingprinciple to the whole OM.


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Without reading the Categories intensively and recapturing thescale beforehand, we could not read the whole OM appropriatelyaccording to the authors original conception and systematization.

On the contrary, with the four-stage rationalization-scale of socialaction and order of the Categories rmly in our minds, we canread the individual sections or chapters of the OM better,closely con-nected one another beyond each sub-volume, as is illustrated above withthe theme Gemeinde.

References

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2003 Das Collagenwerk: Zur so genannten Rechtssoziologie Max Webers,Rechtsgeschichte 3: 111-27.Mukai, Mamoru 2000 Shutamur-Ronbun no Igi (The Signi icance of Max Webers Essay

on Stammler), in Makkusu Wb no Shinseiki (The New Century ofMax Weber; Tokyo: Mirai-sha): 240-56.

Orihara, Hiroshi, 2003a From A Torso with a Wrong Head to Five Disjointed Body-Parts

without a Head: A Critique of the Editorial Policy for Max WeberGesamtausgabe I/22, Max Weber Studies 3.2: 133-68.

2003b Makkus Wb ni okeru Shakaigaku no Seisei: 190307 nenki noGakumon-Ks to Hh (The Genesis of Sociology in Max Weber:Project and Methodology from 1903 to 1907), inShakaigaku Zasshi (Sociological Review of Kobe University, No. 20; Kobe: Associationof Sociology, Kobe University): 3-41.

Schluchter, Wolfgang 1991 (1988) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Das Ende eines Mythos, inReligion

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