026 Chin Ah Foo vs ConcepcionGR No. 33281, 31 March 1930TOPIC: Proceedings for the hospitalization of insane personsPONENTE: Malcom, J.

AUTHOR: twinkleNOTES: any person confined by order of the court in an asylum cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or permanently cured or may be released without danger

FACTS:1. Chan Sam (Chin Ah Foo) was charged in CFI Manila for the murder of Chin Ah Kim.2. RTC found that Chan Sam was not responsible for the crime and that he must be confined in an

asylum because of insanity.3. Subsequently, RTC ordered the release of Chan Sam without the opinion of the Director of Health.4. It was opposed by the family of Chin Ah Kim, contending that Chan Sam was still insane (and this

was proved by two doctors). But RTC sustained its order.

ISSUE: WON RTC can order the release of a person confined in an asylum (by virtue of a court order), without the opinion of the Director of Health.HELD: NO. RTC exceeded its authority by giving such order.

RATIO:1. Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported to act in issuing his order of

release, provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are:An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented article 8 of the Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the insane the following:

When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may discharge such patient, and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in case the patient is confined by order of the court.

2. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as in force and construing this article and section 1048 of the Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion that the Director of Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the converse proposition is equally tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or permanently cured or may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts and the Director of Health are complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to adopt all reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the asylum, and this can best be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in proper cases.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

027 People v. Andres MagallanoG.R. No. L-32978 October 30, 1980TOPIC: Proceedings for the Hospitalization of insane personsPONENTE: Teehankee, J.

AUTHOR: Rhona

FACTS:1. Andres Magallano was charged with parricide for having killed his lawful wife, Exequiela Costa. The accused asserted insanity as a defense. He was referred to the Chief of the Davao General Hospital for examination. The Director was ordered to file the necessary petition for hospitalization of the accused if in his opinion it served the public welfare or the welfare of the person concerned.2. After psychiatric examination a report was submitted to the effect that the accused was quiet, no bizarre behavior noted. He was in good contact with his environment, recognized his companions and was aware of the place where he was being examined. He answered questions coherently and was relevant." It was recommended however that the subject be further examined in the Regional Mental Hospital at least once a week for further evaluation.3. The court ordered that accused be again sent to the regional mental hospital for examination to determine once and for all the mental condition of the accused and to find out whether he was fit for arraignment. Result of the examination:

subject was observed to be in good contact with his environment. No odd behavior was observed. He answered questions coherently and relevantly. No hallucinations or delusions elicited. He is well oriented to the date, place and person. He can give his personal data and other circumstances in his life. He can relate the event that led to his confinement in jail.4. Andres was found fit for trial. On the basis of the two medical reports, the trial court proceeded to arraign him. He entered a plea of not guilty. The court however found him guilty of parricide.

Note:The record shows that on October 1, 1968, the accused companied by his father voluntarily informed, and surrendered to, the Davao City Police Department that he had killed his wife. The accused declared upon investigation conducted by policy officers that he strangled his wife to death in the early morning of September 29, 1968 after an exchange of heated words between them stemming over his suspicion that she had been unfaithful to him; that the following day, he went to a nearby house owned by one Peping Orais to whom he confided the killing. The accused described to the police the scene of the crime and true enough, when the police went there, they found the victim's cadaver. Post- mortem findings showed that she died of "asphyxia due to choking" and that she had been dead for more than 30 hours but less than 50 hours at the time of discover.

The defense in its attempt to prove mental disorder on the part of the accused presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of the accused's father, his son and three neighbors.

ISSUE: WON Andres Magallano is guilty of parricideHELD: Yes. The defense has failed to prove that the accused was legally insane at the commission of the crime.

RATIO:

1. Indeed, the evidence presented by the defense does not outweigh the certifications submitted by government psychiatric doctors who had closely observed the accused for a month and a half, and found that the accused was in good contact with his environment; that he did not manifest any odd behavior for in fact he could even relate the circumstances that led to his confinement.

2. Apart from these certifications, statements in court by witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense have pictured a mental condition on the part of the accused that is not inconsistent with sanity. The fact that a few days after the killing incident the accused was seen sweating with his face covered with blood, as testified to by his own father and Crispin Orais, for the reason according to accused himself that he struck his head against a tree to end his life in atonement for his guilt in killing his wife is a manifestation of remorse or self-reproach

which is but a rational feeling experienced by normal persons. As correctly observed by the prosecution, it revealed an awareness of a wrongdoing.

Coupled with this manifestation or remorse is the appellant's voluntary surrender to the police headquarters where he executed a statement confessing his misdeed. The police officer and the City Fiscal who separately conducted investigation of the accused observed that he was normal for he could answer their questions coherently and intelligently and that there was no indication of abnormality on his part. The observation of these public officials is entitled to full credence, for they have not been shown nor alleged to have any improper or ulterior motive to misrepresent or not tell the truth about the mental condition and behavior of the accused.

3. Again from accused's own evidence is the testimony of his son, that before the killing for which he stands charged, he was working for a living through fishing three times a week and that he himself prescribed the prices for his catch which his son brought to the market for sale. While there is evidence tending to show that the accused in some instances had displayed some unusual behavior, at most these could only be eccentricities which do not mean complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment. The presumption of sanity is not overcome by mere abnormality of behavior.

4. "In the eyes of the law," as held in the case of People vs. Renegado, "insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence."

5. Over and above these is the trial judge's "keen observation of [the accused's] conduct, appearance, demeanor and behavior in the courtroom every time he appeared at the trial. He did not find any symptoms of insanity in his acts or behavior for he behaved better than some of his neighbors who were around him."

6. The defense attempted to adduce expert testimony to prove the alleged insanity. The Court however properly excluded the expert when he was made to answer by hypothetical questions in relation to allegations of fact which have not been proven but were in fact disputed by the prosecution. No contribution could be made by him since he did actually examine the accused and was being made to testify only on the contents of a book or modern psychiatry without particular reference to the actual and proven facts regarding the mental condition of the accused.

As to the question raised by accused of the admissibility of the government doctors' medical reports as being hearsay since their contents were not testified to in court by the said doctors, suffice it to state that these formed part of the records, and that at the resting of the case, the defense failed to register any objection thereon when the prosecution specifically invited the court to take judicial notice of its records.

Authorities hold that whenever evidence of acts, conduct or declarations are introduced to prove the defendant insane, the prosecution may offer evidence of other acts, conduct and declarations during the same period to show that he was sane — more so, at the time of the commission of the crime charged and thereafter — and that the irrational acts testified to were mere lapses into which humans occasionally fallCASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and he must prove it by clear and positive evidence.

Whenever evidence of acts, conduct or declarations are introduced to prove the defendant insane, the

prosecution may offer evidence of other acts, conduct and declarations during the same period to show that he was sane — more so, at the time of the commission of the crime charged and thereafter — and that the irrational acts testified to were mere lapses into which humans occasionally fall.

028 People v RafananG.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991TOPIC:Convention on the Rights of Persons with DisabilityPONENTE: Del Castillo, J.

AUTHOR: NormanNOTES:

FACTS:1. On February 27, 1976, complainant EstelitaRonaya who was then only fourteen years old was

hired as a house helper by the mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same. Policarpio was then married and had two children.

2. On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said that they should have intercourse, Ronaya refused.

3. The accused held a bolo and pointed it to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. He then raped Ronaya in spite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her. In the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened that night.

4. The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. The trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.

5. On the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations.

6. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial."

7. Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant.

ISSUE(S):Whether or not the reason of insanity in this case is sufficient to relieve himself of criminal liability through exempting circumstance.

HELD:NO. In order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason;

RATIO:That there be no responsibility for his own acts; that the acts without the least discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.

 The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions In the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our case law, is critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained.

The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveals she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault.

In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of  proving his affirmative allegation of insanity.DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

029 MONCUPA v. ENRILEG.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986TOPIC: Writs of Habeas Corpus, Habeas Data, and AmparoPONENTE: , J.

AUTHOR: Rhona

Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic.

FACTS:1. Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at

the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained.

2. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.

3. After two separate investigations, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.

4. Two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms and the other for violation of P.D. 33. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Petitioner Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.

5. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. The lower court denied the petitioner’s motions for bail.

6. Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition (habeas corpus).7. The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground

that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner.8. Respondents (Juan Ponce Enrile, et al.,) filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, petitioner

Moncupa was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated, "since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.”

9. Petitioner’s argument: although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom; and his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions

imposed by the respondents.

Note: attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security."4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus filed by Moncupa has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release.HELD: NO. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one, which is free from involuntary restraints. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint, alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE.RATIO:

1. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.

2. Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.

3. In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint, which will preclude freedom of action, is sufficient.

A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one, which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

030 Glenn Caballes v CAG.R. No. 163108, 23 February 2005TOPIC: Writs of Habeas Corpus, Habeas Data and AmparoPONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J.,

AUTHOR: SarahNOTES: (if applicable)

FACTS:1. Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor in the RTC of Malabon City.2. He was charged with a non-bailable offense, hence he was detained.3. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.4. The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a “Petition for Habeas

Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition.”5. The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to

a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge Antonio had prejudged the case against him.

6. CA: dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus.7. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:1. Whether the proper remedy from the appellate court’s denial of a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus is

a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of CourtHELD:

1. No.RATIO:

1. Petitioner’s recourse to this Court via a petition for certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate.  Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.  While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15, 2001, thus:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.—The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.  However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.   No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

2. Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.   The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.  The existence and availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari.  These two remedies are mutually exclusive.  An appeal in this case would still have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and executory.

3. It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.

4. Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea.

5. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended.  InEx Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in character.  It seeks the enforcement of civil rights.  Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.  The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom.  When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.

6. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.   The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.   Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant.  In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief

by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.7. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy.  It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole

purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.

8. A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a “palladium of liberty” is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge.  It, is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held.

9. Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA reveals that it was a “petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of certiorari” The petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him, and questioned Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition.  We agree with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set of rules.  Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action.

10. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.   The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.  A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors.  It has no other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction.  A writ of certiorari reaches the record.  On the other hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record.  However, when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by anybody or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly complained of.

The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be treated as a petition for habeas corpus.  Even then, the CA rightly dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ.  The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.[41] There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner.  The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial.  The petitioner failed to establish that his incarcerationpendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate court.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

031 Samuel Barredo y Golani vs Hon. Vicente Vinarao[G.R. No. 168728; August 2, 2007]TOPIC: WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, HABEAS DATA and AMPAROPONENTE: Corona, J.

AUTHOR: Arthur Archie TiuNOTES: petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani prays for his release from the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on the ground that he has already served the sentence imposed on him in Criminal Case

FACTS:1. Criminal Case No. Q-92-38559 was for carnapping while Criminal Case No. Q-92-38560 was for

illegal possession of firearms. Both cases were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. These were tried jointly and the petitioner was found guilty for both charges

2. No appeal was made (final and executory)3. Petitioner was committed to the QC jail and was transferred and confined in the Maximum security

compound of New Bilibid.4. Petitioner: he already served a total of 18 years. He claims that, on October 9, 2001, the Board of

Pardons and Parole passed a resolution recommending the commutation of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He further points out that, based on the Bureau of Corrections’ revised computation table for determining the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct while serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE(S): Is the petitioner entitled to the writ of Habeas Corpus?HELD: No

RATIO:1. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of

liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained.

2. The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, the writ may be allowed as a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings leading to the conviction were attended by any of the following exceptional circumstances:

a. there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;b. the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence orc. the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.

3. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. (Rule 102, Sec. 4)

Other issues:1. SENTENCE IS VOID INSOFAR AS IT FAILED TO IMPOSE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE

a. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, however, the trial court erred in imposing a straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years in the carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial court deprived petitioner of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

2. REDUCTION OF PENALTY UNDER AMENDATORY LAW SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY

a. Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed upon him in the illegal possession of firearms case in view of the passage of RA 8294. The law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession of firearms to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than P15,000. Being favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied retroactively to benefit him. Further applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper imposable penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.

3. PETITIONER HAS NOT YET SERVED THE PENALTIES IMPOSED ON HIMa. Petitioner has to serve the penalties imposed on him successively in the order of their severity.

Hence, he has to first serve the more severe penalty, i.e., that imposed in the carnapping case: imprisonment for 17 years and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as maximum. Only after he has served this will he commence serving the less severe penalty imposed in the illegal possession of firearms case: imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.

b. Per the certification issued by the Bureau of Corrections, as of April 3, 2007, petitioner has served a total of 18 years, 4 months and 26 days, inclusive of his good conduct time allowance and preventive imprisonment. Thus, while he has already served the minimum penalty in the carnapping case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in the illegal possession of firearms case. Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he eligible for parole because only prisoners who have served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be released on parole on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Board of Pardons and Parole

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of liberty... it is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custodyDISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

032 In the matter of the petition for habeas corpus, Engr. Ashraf KuntingGR No. 167193, 19 April 2006TOPIC: WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, HABEAS DATA and AMPAROPONENTE: Azcuna, J;

AUTHOR: De Guzman, Bien

FACTS1. Petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act.2. The Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task

Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC.

3. Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.

4. In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNP-IG.

5. The RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.

6. However, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer

of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.

7. RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused, finding of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.

8. RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.

9. Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case, citing the same grounds.

10. Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin.

11. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan

12.ISSUE:1. Whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper

HELD:1. No, Kunting was restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment and person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines. (Sec. 4, Rule 102)

RATIO:In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.1avvphil.net

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. The trial court has been waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said motion comply with the Order of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court.CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION:

36 Father Robert Reyes v. CAGR No. 182161 , December 31 2009TOPIC: WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, HABEAS DATA and AMPAROPonente:Facts:

1. Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007.2. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued

Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others in the interest of national security and public safety.

3. RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.

4. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order and has no legal basis since Rebellion case has already been dismissed but the HDO has not been lifted.

5. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO.

6. The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel.

7. The CA dismissed the petition and denied the privilege of the writ of amparo.8. MR was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.HELD: Petition is denied.RATIO:

1. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

2. In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the court made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of “extralegal killings” and

“enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof.

3. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. In Marcos v. Sandiganbayan:

“xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.”

4. The restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.

5. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

6. The direct recourse to this Court is inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which provides, that when a criminal action has commenced no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.

7. Petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO.

8. Petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative.

9. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of Hold departure Order.

10. The court explained the concept of right to life, right to liberty and right to security:

The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.”

The right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government.

037 Razon v TagitisGR No. 182498, December 3, 2009

TOPIC: Writs of Habeas Corpus, Habeas Data and AmparoPONENTE: BRION, J. .

FACTS:

1. Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House.

2. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis’ return.

3. On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.

4. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as “petitioners”), with the Court of Appeals (CA).

5. On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.

6. On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an “enforced disappearance” under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.

7. The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.

8. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military that was involved.

9. On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition.

2. Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the court to grant the privilege of the writ.

3. Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.

HELD:

1. No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.

2. Yes.3. No.

RATIO:

1.    REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty .

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.

In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.

The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.

2.    EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner – [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence . Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings – The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on

the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness – As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.

3.    ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance

[The writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate

[T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive

laws that Congress may promulgate.

The concept of “enforced disappearances” is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction

The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that although the writ specifically covers “enforced disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.

The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power of the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances – Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.

DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:

1. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;

2. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

3. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;4. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for

the disclosure of material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;

5. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to his “assets” in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

6. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;

7. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

8. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision were given to, and were directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand.

Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the aforementioned directives – particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City.