1 civil systems planning benefit/cost analysis scott matthews 12-706/19-702 / 73-359 lecture 7
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Efficiency Definitions/Metrics
Allocative - resources are used at highest value possible
But welfare economics uses another:An allocation of goods is Pareto efficient if
no alternative allocation can make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. Inefficient if can re-allocate to make better
without making anyone else worse Assumed that decisions made with this in mind?
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A Pareto Example
Try splitting $ between 2 people Get total ($100) if agree on how to split No agreement, each gets only $25
Pareto efficiency assumptions: More is better than less Resources are scarce Initial allocation matters
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$100
$1000
Given this graph, how canWe describe the ‘set of all Possible splits between 2 peopleThat allocates the entire $100??
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$100
$1000
Line is the ‘set of all possible splits that allocates the entire $100, Also called the potential pareto frontier. Is the line pareto efficient?
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$100
$1000
No. Could at least get the ‘status quo’ result of (25,25) if they do not agree on splitting. So neither person would accept a split giving them less than $25. Is status quo pareto efficient?
$25
$25
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$100
$1000
No. They could agree on splits of (25, 30) or (30, 25) if they wanted to - all the way to (25,75) or (75,25). All would be pareto improvements. Which are pareto efficient?
$25
$25
$75
$75
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$100
$1000
The ‘pareto frontier’ is the set of allocations that are pareto efficent. Try improving on (25,75) or (50,50) or (75,25)…We said initial alloc. mattered - e.g. (100,0)?
$25
$25
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Pareto Efficiency and CBA
If a policy has NB > 0, then it is possible to transfer value to make some party better off without making another worse off.
To fully appreciate this, we need to understand willingness to pay and opportunity cost in light of CBA.
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Willingness to Pay
Example: how much would everyone pay to build a mall ‘in middle of class’ Near middle may not want traffic costs Further away might enjoy benefits
Ask questions to find indifference pts.Relative to status quo (no mall)E.g. middle WTP -$2 M, edges +$3 MEdges could ‘pay off’ middle to buildOnly works if Net Benefits positive!
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Opportunity Cost
Def: The opportunity cost of using an input to implement a policy is its value in its best alternative use. Measures value society must give up
What if mall costs $2 M? Total net WTP = $1M, costs $2M
Not enough benefits to pay opp. cost Can’t make side payments to do it
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Wrap Up
As long as benefits found by WTP and costs by OC then sign of net benefits indicated whether side payments can make pareto improvements
Kaldor-Hicks criterion A policy should be adopted if and only if
gainers could fully compensate losers and still be better offPotential Pareto Efficiency (line on Fig 2.1)
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Three Legs to Stand On
Pareto Efficiency Make some better / make none worse
Kaldor-Hicks Program adopted (NB > 0) if winners
COULD compensate losers, still be better
Fundamental Principle of CBA Amongst choices, select option with
highest ‘net’ benefit
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Welfare EconomicsConceptsPerfect Competition
Homogeneous goods. No agent affects prices. Perfect information. No transaction costs /entry issues No transportation costs. No externalities:
Private benefits = social benefits.Private costs = social costs.
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Discussion - WTP
Survey of students of WTP for beer How much for 1 beer? 2 beers? Etc.
Does similar form hold for all goods? What types of goods different?
Economists also refer to this as demand
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(Individual) Demand Curves Downward Sloping is a result of diminishing marginal
utility of each additional unit (also consider as WTP) Presumes that at some point you have enough to make
you happy and do not value additional units
Price
Quantity
P*
0 1 2 3 4 Q*
A
B
Actually an inverse demand curve (whereP = f(Q) instead).
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Market DemandPrice
P*
0 1 2 3 4 Q
A
B
If above graphs show two (groups of) consumer demands, what is social demand curve?
P*
0 1 2 3 4 5 Q
A
B
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Market Demand
Found by calculating the horizontal sum of individual demand curves
Market demand then measures ‘total consumer surplus of entire market’
P*
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Q
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Social WTP (i.e. market demand)
Price
Quantity
P*
0 1 2 3 4 Q*
A
B
‘Aggregate’ demand function: how all potential consumers in society value the good or service (i.e., someone willing to pay every price…)
This is the kind of demand curves we care about
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Total/Gross/User BenefitsPrice
Quantity
P*
0 1 2 3 4 Q*
A
B
Benefits received are related to WTP - and approximated by the shaded rectangles
Approximated by whole area under demand: triangle AP*B + rectangle 0P*BQ*
P1
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Benefits with WTPPrice
Quantity
P*
0 1 2 3 4 Q*
A
B
Total/Gross/User Benefits = area under curve or willingness to pay for all people = Social WTP = their benefit from consuming = sum of all WTP values
Receive benefits from consuming this much regardless of how much they pay to get it
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Net BenefitsPrice
Quantity
P*
0 1 2 3 4 Q*
A
BA
B
Amount ‘paid’ by society at Q* is P*, so total payment is B to receive (A+B) total benefit
Net benefits = (A+B) - B = A = consumer surplus (benefit received - price paid)
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First: Elasticities of Demand
Measurement of how “responsive” demand is to some change in price or income.
Slope of demand curve = p/q.Elasticity of demand, , is defined to
be the percent change in quantity divided by the percent change in price. = (p q) / (q p)
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Elasticities of DemandElastic demand: > 1. If P inc. by 1%, demand dec. by more than 1%.Unit elasticity: = 1. If P inc. by 1%, demand dec. by 1%.Inelastic demand: < 1 If P inc. by 1%, demand dec. by less than 1%.
Q
P
Q
P
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Elasticities of Demand
Q
P
Q
P
PerfectlyInelastic
PerfectlyElastic
A change in price causesDemand to go to zero(no easy examples)
Necessities, demand isCompletely insensitiveTo price
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Elasticity - Some Formulas
Point elasticity = dq/dp * (p/q)For linear curve, q = (p-a)/b so dq/dp
= 1/bLinear curve point elasticity =(1/b)
*p/q = (1/b)*(a+bq)/q =(a/bq) + 1
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Maglev System Example
Maglev - downtown, tech center, UPMC, CMU
20,000 riders per day forecast by developers.
Let’s assume price elasticity -0.3; linear demand; 20,000 riders at average fare of $ 1.20. Estimate Total Willingness to Pay.
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Example calculations
We have one point on demand curve: 1.2 = a + b*(20,000)
We know an elasticity value: elasticity for linear curve = 1 + a/bq -0.3 = 1 + a/b*(20,000)
Solve with two simultaneous equations: a = 5.2 b = -0.0002 or 2.0 x 10^-4
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Demand Example (cont)
Maglev Demand Function: p = 5.2 - 0.0002*q
Revenue: 1.2*20,000 = $ 24,000 per day
TWtP = Revenue + Consumer Surplus TWtP = pq + (a-p)q/2 = 1.2*20,000 +
(5.2-1.2)*20,000/2 = 24,000 + 40,000 = $ 64,000 per day.
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Change in Fare to $ 1.00 From demand curve: 1.0 = 5.2 - 0.0002q, so q
becomes 21,000. Using elasticity: 16.7% fare change (1.2-1/1.2), so q
would change by -0.3*16.7 = 5.001% to 21,002 (slightly different value)
Change to Revenue = 1*21,000 - 1.2*20,000 = 21,000 - 24,000 = -3,000.
Change CS = 0.5*(0.2)*(20,000+21,000)= 4,100 Change to TWtP = (21,000-20,000)*1 + (1.2-
1)*(21,000-20,000)/2 = 1,100.
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Estimating Linear Demand Functions
As above, sometimes we don’t know demand Focus on demand (care more about CS) but can
use similar methods to estimate costs (supply) Ordinary least squares regression used
minimize the sum of squared deviations between estimated line and p,q observations: p = a + bq + e
Standard algorithms to compute parameter estimates - spreadsheets, Minitab, S, etc.
Estimates of uncertainty of estimates are obtained (based upon assumption of identically normally distributed error terms).
Can have multiple linear terms
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Log-linear Function
q = a(p)b(hh)c….. Conditions: a positive, b negative, c positive,... If q = a(p)b : Elasticity interesting = (dq/dp)*(p/q)
= abp(b-1)*(p/q) = b*(apb/apb) = b. Constant elasticity at all points.
Easiest way to estimate: linearize and use ordinary least squares regression (see Chap 12) E.g., ln q = ln a + b ln(p) + c ln(hh) ..
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Log-linear Function
q = a*pb and taking log of each side gives: ln q = ln a + b ln p which can be re-written as q’ = a’ + b p’, linear in the parameters and amenable to OLS regression.
This violates error term assumptions of OLS regression.
Alternative is maximum likelihood - select parameters to max. chance of seeing obs.
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Maglev Log-Linear Function
q = a*pb - From above, b = -0.3, so if p = 1.2 and q = 20,000; so 20,000 = a*(1.2)-0.3 ; a = 21,124.
If p becomes 1.0 then q = 21,124*(1)-0.3 = 21,124. Linear model - 21,000
Remaining revenue, TWtP values similar but NOT EQUAL.
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BCA Part 2: CostWelfare Economics Continued
The upper segment of a firm’s marginal cost curve correspondsto the firm’s SR supply curve. Again, diminishing returns occur.
Quantity
Price
Supply=MCAt any given price, determineshow much output to produce tomaximize profit
AVC
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Supply/Marginal Cost Notes
Quantity
Price Supply=MCAt any given price, determineshow much output to produce tomaximize profit
P*
Q1 Q* Q2
Demand: WTP for each additional unitSupply: cost incurred for each additional unit
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Supply/Marginal Cost Notes
Quantity
Price Supply=MCArea under MC is TVC - why?
P*
Q1 Q* Q2
Recall: We always want to be considering opportunity costs (total asset value to society) and not accounting costs
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Monopoly - the real game
One producer of good w/o substituteNot example of perfect comp!
Deviation that results in DWL There tend to be barriers to entry Monopolist is a price setter not taker
Monopolist is only firm in market Thus it can set prices based on output
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Monopoly - the real game (2)
Could have shown that in perf. comp. Profit maximized where p=MR=MC (why?)
Same is true for a monopolist -> she can make the most money where additional revenue = added cost But unlike perf comp, p not equal to MR
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Monopoly Analysis
MR D
MC
Qc
Pc
In perfect competition,Equilibrium was at (Pc,Qc) - where S=D.
But a monopolist has aFunction of MR that Does not equal Demand
So where does he supply?
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Monopoly Analysis (cont.)
MRD
MC
Qc
Pc
Monopolist supplies where MR=MC for quantity to max.profits (at Qm)
But at Qm, consumersare willing to pay Pm!
What is social surplus, Is it maximized?
Qm
Pm
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Monopoly Analysis (cont.)
MRD
MC
Qc
Pc
What is social surplus?Orange = CS
Yellow = PS (bigger!)
Grey = DWL (from notProducing at Pc,Qc) thusSoc. Surplus is not maximized
Breaking monopolyWould transfer DWL toSocial Surplus
Qm
Pm
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Natural Monopoly
Fixed costs very large relative to variable costs Ex: public utilities (gas, power, water)
Average costs high at low outputAC usually higher than MCOne firm can provide good or service
cheaper than 2+ firms In this case, government allows monopoly but
usually regulates it
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Natural Monopoly
MRDQ*
P*
Faced with these curvesNormal monop wouldProduce at Qm and Charge Pm.
We would have sameSocial surplus.
But natural monopoliesAre regulated.
What are options?Qm
Pm
MC
AC
a
bc
d
e
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Natural Monopoly
MR
D
Q*
P*
Forcing the price P*Means that the social surplus is increased.
DWL decreases from abc to dec
Society gains adeb
Qm
Pm
MC
AC
a
bc
d
e
Q0
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Monopoly
Other options - set P = MC But then the firm loses money Subsidies needed to keep in business
Give away good for free (e.g. road) Free rider problems Also new deadweight loss from cost
exceeding WTP
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Pricing Strategies
Highway pricing If price set equal to AC (which is assumed to be TC/q
then at q, total costs covered p ~ AVC: manages usage of highway p = f(fares, fees, travel times, discomfort) Price increase=> less users (BCA) MC pricing: more users, higher price What about social/external costs? Might want to set p=MSC