1 product variety under monopoly. eco 171 2 introduction most firms sell more than one product...
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Product Variety under Monopoly
ECO 171 2
Introduction
Most firms sell more than one product Products are differentiated in different ways
horizontally goods of similar quality targeted at consumers of
different types how is variety determined? is there too much variety
ECO 171 3
Horizontal product differentiation
Suppose that consumers differ in their tastes firm has to decide how best to serve different types of consumer offer products with different characteristics but similar qualities
This is horizontal product differentiation firm designs products that appeal to different types of consumer products are of (roughly) similar quality
Questions: how many products? of what type? how do we model this problem?
ECO 171 4
A spatial approach to product variety The spatial model (Hotelling) is useful to consider
pricing design variety
Has a much richer application as a model of product differentiation “location” can be thought of in
space (geography) time (departure times of planes, buses, trains) product characteristics (design and variety)
consumers prefer products that are “close” to their preferred types in space, or time or characteristics
ECO 171 5
An example of product variety
McDonald’s Burger King Wendy’s
ECO 171 6
A Spatial approach to product variety 2 Assume N consumers living equally spaced along
Montana Street – 1 mile long. Monopolist must decide how best to supply these
consumers Consumers buy exactly one unit provided that price plus
transport costs is less than V. Consumers incur there-and-back transport costs of t per
mile The monopolist operates one shop
reasonable to expect that this is located at the center of Montana
ECO 171 7
The spatial model
z = 0 z = 1
Shop 1
t
x1
Price Price
All consumers withindistance x1 to the leftand right of the shopwill by the product
All consumers withindistance x1 to the leftand right of the shopwill by the product
1/2
V V
p1
t
x1
p1 + t.x p1 + t.x
p1 + t.x1 = V, so x1 = (V – p1)/t
What determinesx1?
What determinesx1?
Suppose that the monopolist sets a price of p1
Suppose that the monopolist sets a price of p1
ECO 171 8
The spatial model 2
z = 0 z = 1
Shop 1
x1
Price Price
1/2
V V
p1
x1
p1 + t.x p1 + t.x
Suppose the firmreduces the price
to p2?
Suppose the firmreduces the price
to p2?
p2
x2 x2
Then all consumerswithin distance x2
of the shop will buyfrom the firm
Then all consumerswithin distance x2
of the shop will buyfrom the firm
ECO 171 9
The spatial model 3
Suppose that all consumers are to be served at price p. The highest price is that charged to the consumers at the ends of
the market Their transport costs are t/2 : since they travel ½ mile to the shop So they pay p + t/2 which must be no greater than V. So p = V – t/2.
Suppose that marginal costs are c per unit. Suppose also that a shop has set-up costs of F. Then profit is (N, 1) = N(V – t/2 – c) – F.
ECO 171 10
Monopoly pricing in the spatial model What if there are two shops? The monopolist will coordinate prices at the two shops With identical costs and symmetric locations, these prices
will be equal: p1 = p2 = p Where should they be located? What is the optimal price p*?
ECO 171 11
Location with two shops
Suppose that the entire market is to be servedSuppose that the entire market is to be servedPrice Price
z = 0 z = 1
If there are two shopsthey will be located
symmetrically a distance d from theend-points of the
market
If there are two shopsthey will be located
symmetrically a distance d from theend-points of the
market
Suppose thatd < 1/4
Suppose thatd < 1/4
d
V V
1 - dShop 1 Shop 2
1/2
The maximum pricethe firm can chargeis determined by the
consumers at thecenter of the market
The maximum pricethe firm can chargeis determined by the
consumers at thecenter of the market
Delivered price toconsumers at the
market center equalstheir reservation price
Delivered price toconsumers at the
market center equalstheir reservation price
p(d) p(d)
Start with a low priceat each shop
Start with a low priceat each shop
Now raise the priceat each shop
Now raise the priceat each shop
What happens ifmove to the right?
What happens ifmove to the right?
The shops should bemoved inwards
The shops should bemoved inwards
Price can be increased without losing market
Price can be increased without losing market
ECO 171 12
Location with two shops 2
Price Price
z = 0 z = 1
Now suppose thatd > 1/4
Now suppose thatd > 1/4
d
V V
1 - dShop 1 Shop 2
1/2
p(d) p(d)
Start with a low priceat each shop
Start with a low priceat each shop
Now raise the priceat each shop
Now raise the priceat each shop
The maximum pricethe firm can charge is now determined by the consumers at the end-points
of the market
The maximum pricethe firm can charge is now determined by the consumers at the end-points
of the market
Delivered price toconsumers at theend-points equals
their reservation price
Delivered price toconsumers at theend-points equals
their reservation price
Now can gainshifting left and
raising price
Now can gainshifting left and
raising price
The shops should bemoved outwards
The shops should bemoved outwards
ECO 171 13
Location with two shops 3
Price Price
z = 0 z = 11/4
V V
3/4Shop 1 Shop 2
1/2
It follows thatshop 1 shouldbe located at
1/4 and shop 2at 3/4
It follows thatshop 1 shouldbe located at
1/4 and shop 2at 3/4
Price at eachshop is thenp* = V - t/4
Price at eachshop is thenp* = V - t/4
V - t/4 V - t/4
Profit at each shopis given by the
shaded area
Profit at each shopis given by the
shaded area
Profit is now (N, 2) = N(V - t/4 - c) – 2FProfit is now (N, 2) = N(V - t/4 - c) – 2F
c c
ECO 171 14
Gain from introducing extra shop Price Price
z = 0 z = 11/4
V V
3/4Shop 1 Shop 2
1/2
P2 = V - t/4 V - t/4
c c
P1 = V - t/2
• Total surplus increases as transportation costs are now lower
• Producer surplus increases but consumer surplus decreases
•So producer surplus increases more than total surplus
Profits with one firm
Profits with two firms
ECO 171 15
Three shops
Price Price
z = 0 z = 1
V V
1/2
What if there are three shops?
What if there are three shops?
By the same argumentthey should be located
at 1/6, 1/2 and 5/6
By the same argumentthey should be located
at 1/6, 1/2 and 5/6
1/6 5/6Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3
Price at eachshop is now
V - t/6
Price at eachshop is now
V - t/6
V - t/6 V - t/6
Profit is now (N, 3) = N(V - t/6 - c) – 3FProfit is now (N, 3) = N(V - t/6 - c) – 3F
ECO 171 16
Optimal number of shops A consistent pattern is emerging.
• Assume that there are n shops.
• We have already considered n = 2 and n = 3.
• When n = 2 we have p(N, 2) = V - t/4
• When n = 3 we have p(N, 3) = V - t/6
• They will be symmetrically located distance 1/n apart.
• It follows that p(N, n) = V - t/2n
• Aggregate profit is then (N, n) = N(V - t/2n - c) – n.F
How manyshops should
there be?
How manyshops should
there be?
ECO 171 17
Optimal number of shops 2
Profit from n shops is (N, n) = (V - t/2n - c)N - n.Fand the profit from having n + 1 shops is:
*(N, n+1) = (V - t/2(n + 1)-c)N - (n + 1)F
Adding the (n +1)th shop is profitable if (N,n+1) - (N,n) > 0
This requires tN/2n - tN/2(n + 1) > F
which requires that n(n + 1) < tN/2F.
ECO 171 18
An example
Suppose that F = $50,000 , N = 5 million and t = $1
Then t.N/2F = 50
For an additional shop to be profitable we need n(n + 1) < 50.
This is true for n < 6
There should be no more than seven shops in this case: if n = 6 then adding one more shop is profitable.
But if n = 7 then adding another shop is unprofitable.
ECO 171 19
Some intuition
What does the condition on n tell us? Simply, we should expect to find greater product variety
when: there are many consumers. set-up costs of increasing product variety are low. consumers have strong preferences over product characteristics
and differ in these consumers are unwilling to buy a product if it is not “very close” to
their most preferred product
ECO 171 20
How much of the market to supply Should the whole market be served?
Suppose not. Then each shop has a local monopoly Each shop sells to consumers within distance r How is r determined?
it must be that p + tr = V so r = (V – p)/t so total demand is 2N(V – p)/t profit to each shop is then = 2N(p – c)(V – p)/t – F differentiate with respect to p and set to zero: d/dp = 2N(V – 2p + c)/t = 0 So the optimal price at each shop is p* = (V + c)/2 If all consumers are served price is p(N,n) = V – t/2n
Only part of the market should be served if p(N,n) < p* This implies that V < c + t/n.
ECO 171 21
Partial market supply
If c + t/n > V supply only part of the market and set price p* = (V + c)/2
If c + t/n < V supply the whole market and set price p(N,n) = V – t/2n
Supply only part of the market: if the consumer reservation price is low relative to marginal
production costs and transport costs if there are very few outlets
ECO 171 22
Market density and prices
What should this model imply of market prices and density?
Higher density is equivalent in this model to reducing transportation cost: If consumers are concentrated in half the interval, can
reach the same fraction of the consumers at half the cost.
Same effect as if transportation cost were cut in two Implications for prices?
ECO 171 23
Market density and prices
From previous slides, the number of firms n is approximately determined by: n(n + 1) = tN/2F.
As t decreases n goes down From the equation above, t/n is proportional to (n
+ 1). So as n decreases, t/n must decrease. Optimal price is given by p(N,n) = V – t/2n. This decreases as t/n increases.
ECO 171 24
Social optimum Are there toomany shops or
too few?
Are there toomany shops or
too few?What number of shops maximizes total surplus?What number of shops maximizes total surplus?
Total surplus is therefore N.V - Total CostTotal surplus is therefore N.V - Total Cost
Total surplus is then total willingness to pay minus total costsTotal surplus is then total willingness to pay minus total costs
Total surplus is consumer surplus plus profit
Consumer surplus is total willingness to pay minus total revenue
Profit is total revenue minus total cost
Total willingness to pay by consumers is N.V
So what is Total Cost?So what is Total Cost?
ECO 171 25
Social optimum 2
Price Price
z = 0 z = 1
V V
Assume thatthere
are n shops
Assume thatthere
are n shops
Consider shopi
Consider shopi
1/2n 1/2n
Shop i
t/2nt/2nTotal cost istotal transport
cost plus set-upcosts
Total cost istotal transport
cost plus set-upcosts
Transport cost foreach shop is the areaof these two triangles
multiplied byconsumer density
Transport cost foreach shop is the areaof these two triangles
multiplied byconsumer density
This area is t/4n2 This area is t/4n2
ECO 171 26
Social optimum 3
Total cost with n shops is, therefore: C(N,n) = n(t/4n2)N + n.F
= tN/4n + n.F
Total cost with n + 1 shops is: C(N,n+1) = tN/4(n+1)+ (n+1).F
Adding another shop is socially efficient if C(N,n + 1) < C(N,n)
This requires that tN/4n - tN/4(n+1) > F
which implies that n(n + 1) < tN/4F
The monopolist operates too many shops and, more generally, provides too much product variety
The monopolist operates too many shops and, more generally, provides too much product variety
If t = $1, F = $50,000,N = 5 million then this
condition tells usthat n(n+1) < 25
If t = $1, F = $50,000,N = 5 million then this
condition tells usthat n(n+1) < 25
There should be five shops: with n = 4 adding another shop is efficient
There should be five shops: with n = 4 adding another shop is efficient
ECO 171 27
Optimal variety and monopoly In previous example get excess variety Social value of increase in varieties < increase in
monopoly profits What is the key ingredient? Variety makes markets more homogeneous Monopoly is able to extract higher surplus Is this always true?
ECO 171 28
Example 1: Excess variety
3 consumers: {b,g,s} 3 possible goods: bitter (B),
generic(G), sweet(S) Preferences: Mc=0 Offer generic only:
p=2, =6 Offer (B,S)
pB = pG = 3
B G S
b 3 2 1
g 3 3 3
s 1 2 3• Profits increase by 3
• Total surplus increases by 2
• CS decreases by 1 (for g)
• Suppose additional investment to offer both brands: 2<c<3
- It is socially efficient to offer g only
- But monopolist will offer B,S
- Excessive product variety
• Variety partitions consumers into more homogeneous groups.
ECO 171 29
Example 2: Too little variety
4 consumers: {b,gb,gs,s} 3 possible goods: bitter (B),
generic(G), sweet(S) Preferences: Mc=0 Offer generic only:
p=2, =8 Offer (B,S)
pB = pG = 2
B G S
b 3 2 1
gb 2 2 1
gs 1 2 2
s 1 2 3• Profits do not increase
• CS increases by 2
• Suppose additional investment to offer both brands: 0<c<2
- It is socially efficient to offer both brands
- But monopolist will offer only G
- Too little product variety
• Variety reduces homogeneity in groups
ECO 171 30
Product variety and price discrimination Suppose that the monopolist delivers the product.
then it is possible to price discriminate What pricing policy to adopt?
charge every consumer his reservation price V the firm pays the transport costs this is uniform delivered pricing it is discriminatory because price does not reflect costs
Should every consumer be supplied? suppose that there are n shops evenly spaced on Main Street cost to the most distant consumer is c + t/2n supply this consumer so long as V (revenue) > c + t/2n This is a weaker condition than without price discrimination. Price discrimination allows more consumers to be served.
ECO 171 31
Product variety and price discrimination 2 How many shops should the monopolist operate now?
Suppose that the monopolist has n shops and is supplying the entire market.
Total revenue minus production costs is N.V – N.c
Total transport costs plus set-up costs is C(N, n)=tN/4n + n.F
So profit is (N,n) = N.V – N.c – C(N,n)
But then maximizing profit means minimizing C(N, n)
The discriminating monopolist operates the socially optimal number of shops.