1 semantics and cognition helena gao helena gao lecture 6 2 nov., 2005

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1 Semantics and Cognition Semantics and Cognition Helena Gao Helena Gao

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Page 1: 1 Semantics and Cognition Helena Gao Helena Gao Lecture 6 2 Nov., 2005

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Semantics and CognitionSemantics and Cognition

Helena Helena GaoGao

Lecture 6 2 Nov., 2005Lecture 6 2 Nov., 2005

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Required readings:Required readings: Jackendoff, R. (2002). Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Foundations of

Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. Evolution. Oxford University Press.Oxford University Press.Chapter Chapter 10: Reference and Truth. pp. 53-67; Chapter 10: Reference and Truth. pp. 53-67; Chapter 11: Lexical Semantics. pp. 333-37711: Lexical Semantics. pp. 333-377

Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a ‘kind Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a ‘kind of fruit’: the semantics of human of fruit’: the semantics of human categorization. categorization. American EthnologistAmerican Ethnologist , Vol. , Vol. 11, No. 2, 313-328.11, No. 2, 313-328.

Recommended readings:Recommended readings: Talmy, L. (2000). Talmy, L. (2000). Toward a Cognitive Toward a Cognitive

SemanticsSemantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Vol. 1. Chapter 7: Force dynamics in Vol. 1. Chapter 7: Force dynamics in language and cognition. pp. 409-47language and cognition. pp. 409-47

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The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics

Semantic structure is conceptual Semantic structure is conceptual structurestructure Semantic structure (the meanings Semantic structure (the meanings

conventionally associated with words conventionally associated with words and other linguistic units) is equated and other linguistic units) is equated with concepts.with concepts.

Conceptual structure is embodiedConceptual structure is embodied The nature of conceptual organization The nature of conceptual organization

arises from bodily experiencearises from bodily experience

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The Key Tenets of Cognitive The Key Tenets of Cognitive Semantics Semantics Cont’d Cont’d Meaning-representation is encyclopedicMeaning-representation is encyclopedic

Words (and other linguistic units) are treated Words (and other linguistic units) are treated as “points of access” to vast repositories of as “points of access” to vast repositories of knowledge concerning a particular concept.knowledge concerning a particular concept.

Meaning-construction is conceptualizationMeaning-construction is conceptualization Meaning construction is equated with Meaning construction is equated with

conceptualization, a dynamic process whereby conceptualization, a dynamic process whereby linguistic units serve as prompts for an array linguistic units serve as prompts for an array of conceptual operations and the recruitment of conceptual operations and the recruitment of background knowledge.of background knowledge.

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Issues in Cognitive Issues in Cognitive SemanticsSemantics

Conceptual structure a) Conceptual structure vs. conceptual content b) profile/base organization c) mappings: projection, pragmatic-function,

schema Word-meaning Categorization Bodily basis of meaning

a. John got the highest score on the test. b. Oil prices have fallen lately. c. Be nice to people on your way up because

you meet them on your way down.

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According to Jackendoff According to Jackendoff (1992),(1992),

Within a cognitive theoryWithin a cognitive theoryConceptual

Well-Formedness Rules

linguisticstructures

conceptualstructures

perceptualand action

Inferencerules

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ConceptualWell-Formedness Rules

linguisticstructures

perceptualand action

Inferencerules

conceptualstructures

the brain’s combinatorialorganization

the resources availablein the brain for forming

concepts

Similar to logicalinference

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Contributions from perceptual Contributions from perceptual modalities for the structure of modalities for the structure of meaning (Jackendoff, 2002)meaning (Jackendoff, 2002) How perceptual structures are stored?How perceptual structures are stored?

According to Jackendoff, a major division According to Jackendoff, a major division in the structure of meaning appears to lie in the structure of meaning appears to lie between between conceptual structureconceptual structure (CS) and (CS) and spatial structure spatial structure (SpS) (SpS)

(see Jackedoff, 1978, 1996b; Landau and (see Jackedoff, 1978, 1996b; Landau and Jackendoff, 1993)Jackendoff, 1993)

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Conceptual Structure Conceptual Structure (CS)(CS)

CS is a hierarchical arrangement CS is a hierarchical arrangement built out of discrete features and built out of discrete features and functions.functions.

It enables such aspects of It enables such aspects of understanding as category understanding as category membership (taxonomy) and membership (taxonomy) and predicate-argument structure.predicate-argument structure.

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Spatial StructureSpatial Structure (SpS)(SpS) SpS is concerned with encoding the spatial SpS is concerned with encoding the spatial

understanding of the physical world – not just understanding of the physical world – not just moment by moment appearance, but the moment by moment appearance, but the integration over time of the space, motion, and integration over time of the space, motion, and layout of objects in space (and possibly the layout of objects in space (and possibly the forces among them).forces among them). The “upper end” of the visual systemThe “upper end” of the visual system Also receives and integrates inputs about shape and Also receives and integrates inputs about shape and

spatial somatosensory system (felt position of one’s spatial somatosensory system (felt position of one’s own body)own body)

This integration is what enables you to know by This integration is what enables you to know by looking at an object where to reach for it, and what looking at an object where to reach for it, and what it should feel like when you handle it.it should feel like when you handle it.

Thus SpS should be thought of as a system of Thus SpS should be thought of as a system of central cognition, to some degree modality-central cognition, to some degree modality-independent.independent.

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SpSSpS SpS must encode the shape of objects in a form that is SpS must encode the shape of objects in a form that is

suitable for recognizing an object at different distances suitable for recognizing an object at different distances and from different perspectives.and from different perspectives. E.g., it must solve the classic problem of object consistencyE.g., it must solve the classic problem of object consistency

It must be able to encode spatial knowledge of parts of It must be able to encode spatial knowledge of parts of object that cannot be seen (e.g., the hollowness of a object that cannot be seen (e.g., the hollowness of a balloon).balloon).

It must support visual object categorization as well as It must support visual object categorization as well as visual object (identification) visual object (identification) e.g., making explicit the range of shape variations possible e.g., making explicit the range of shape variations possible

among different cupsamong different cups It must be able to encode the degrees of freedom in It must be able to encode the degrees of freedom in

objects that can change their shape objects that can change their shape e.g., human and animal bodies.e.g., human and animal bodies.

It must be suitable for encoding the full spatial layout It must be suitable for encoding the full spatial layout of a scene , and for mediating among alternative of a scene , and for mediating among alternative perspectives.perspectives.

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The Difference between Image The Difference between Image and SpSand SpS

An image is restricted to a particular point of An image is restricted to a particular point of view, whereas SpS is not.view, whereas SpS is not.

An image is restricted to a particular instance An image is restricted to a particular instance of a category, whereas SpS is not.of a category, whereas SpS is not.

An image can’t include the unseen parts of an An image can’t include the unseen parts of an object – its back and inside – whereas SpS object – its back and inside – whereas SpS does. does.

An image is restricted to the visual modality, An image is restricted to the visual modality, whereas SpS can equally well encode whereas SpS can equally well encode information received haptically or through information received haptically or through proprioception.proprioception.

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Functions of CS and SpSFunctions of CS and SpS

Judgments and inferences having to do Judgments and inferences having to do with predicate-argument relations, with predicate-argument relations, category membership, the type-token category membership, the type-token distinction, quantification, and so forth distinction, quantification, and so forth can be formulated only in terms of CS.can be formulated only in terms of CS.

Judgments and inferences having to do Judgments and inferences having to do with exact shapes, locations, and with exact shapes, locations, and forces can be formulated only in terms forces can be formulated only in terms of SpS.of SpS.

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Overlap between CS and Overlap between CS and SpSSpS

The notions of physical object, part-The notions of physical object, part-whole relationships, locations, force, whole relationships, locations, force, and causation have reflexes in both and causation have reflexes in both systems.systems.

It is these shared components that It is these shared components that enable the two systems to enable the two systems to communicate with each other communicate with each other through an interface of the usual through an interface of the usual sort.sort.

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Jackendoff’s (1996) Jackendoff’s (1996) Hypothesis Hypothesis

The grammatical aspects of language The grammatical aspects of language make reference only to CS, not to SpS. make reference only to CS, not to SpS.

Nothing in grammar depends on Nothing in grammar depends on detailed shapes of objects. detailed shapes of objects.

SpS is language’s indirect connection SpS is language’s indirect connection to visual, haptic, and proprioceptive to visual, haptic, and proprioceptive perception, and to the control of action.perception, and to the control of action.

It is through the SpS connection that It is through the SpS connection that we can talk about what we see. we can talk about what we see.

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Incorporating the CS-SpS split in meaning (Jackendoff, 2002, 348)

Noises

Language CS SpS

Visual system

Haptic system

Action system

Object

WORLD

F- MIND

However, not all lexical terms have a SpS component. e.g., abstract concepts such as fairness and values and logical concepts such as and, if, not

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Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection connection (Jackendoff, 2002, 349)

a. Lexical items supplemented by a. Lexical items supplemented by SpSSpS

Phonology + Syntax + CS

+ SpS

LANGUAGE ???

SpS falls outside the standard tripartite organization of languageSpS falls outside the standard tripartite organization of language

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Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS Two ways of thinking about the CS-SpS connection connection

(Jackendoff, 2002, 349)

b. Non-linguistic concept attached to wordsb. Non-linguistic concept attached to words

An evolutionary perspective: Suppose one deletes An evolutionary perspective: Suppose one deletes the phonological and syntactic structuresthe phonological and syntactic structures What is left is a non-linguistic association of cognitive What is left is a non-linguistic association of cognitive

structures in memory, much of which could be shared structures in memory, much of which could be shared by a non-linguistic organism. by a non-linguistic organism.

Phonological and syntactic structures can then be Phonological and syntactic structures can then be viewed as further structures tacked onto this concept viewed as further structures tacked onto this concept to make it linguistically expressible.to make it linguistically expressible.

Phonology + Syntax + CS + SpS

LANGUAGE “CONCEPT”

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Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Wierzbicka, A. (1984). Apples are not a Apples are not a ‘kind of fruit’: the semantics of human ‘kind of fruit’: the semantics of human categorizationcategorization Our principle categorization of the world does Our principle categorization of the world does

seem to be taxonomic, both in the areas of seem to be taxonomic, both in the areas of biological kinds and of “manufactured” biological kinds and of “manufactured” environment.environment.

But, above this basic level of categorization, it But, above this basic level of categorization, it is only with respect to the biological is only with respect to the biological environment that we group kinds of things environment that we group kinds of things into superkindsinto superkinds

With respect to the manufactured With respect to the manufactured environment, we proceed differently – environment, we proceed differently – we group kinds of things into supercategories on a we group kinds of things into supercategories on a

different basis. different basis. We no longer ask, what kind of thing is it?; rather We no longer ask, what kind of thing is it?; rather

we ask, what is it for? How can one use it? Where we ask, what is it for? How can one use it? Where does it come from? Why is it there? (does it come from? Why is it there? (Wierzbicka, 1984: Wierzbicka, 1984: 325). 325).

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Taxonomic supercategories Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 314)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 314)

Taxonomic categorization does play Taxonomic categorization does play a role in human thinking as reflected a role in human thinking as reflected in natural language, but it does not in natural language, but it does not dominate that thinking as has been dominate that thinking as has been assumed.assumed.

Other classification principles also Other classification principles also play an important role; and in some play an important role; and in some areas of the lexicon, a more areas of the lexicon, a more important role at that.important role at that.

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Taxonomic supercategories Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 315)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 315)

Scientific classification, according to which a Scientific classification, according to which a bird, a fish, or a spider is a kind of animal, is bird, a fish, or a spider is a kind of animal, is not at issue.not at issue.

In ordinary language they are not so In ordinary language they are not so classified.classified. One would say of a parrot, a fish, or a spider: “A One would say of a parrot, a fish, or a spider: “A

beautiful creature!” or “A repulsive creature!” but beautiful creature!” or “A repulsive creature!” but not “A beautiful animal!” or “A repulsive animal!”not “A beautiful animal!” or “A repulsive animal!”

In nonscientific English the word animal does not In nonscientific English the word animal does not apply to everything that zoologists call apply to everything that zoologists call animalanimal, , and the word and the word plantplant does not apply to everything does not apply to everything that botanists call that botanists call plantplant..

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Taxonomic supercategories Taxonomic supercategories (Wierzbicka, 1984: 316)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 316)

When we define a cat as a kind of animal, a When we define a cat as a kind of animal, a parrotparrot as kind of bird, a as kind of bird, a roserose as a kind of as a kind of flower, or an flower, or an oakoak as a kind of tree, we are as a kind of tree, we are implying that conceptually a cat is above all a implying that conceptually a cat is above all a kind of animal, a kind of animal, a parrotparrot is a kind of bird, and is a kind of bird, and so on, and that all the other defining features so on, and that all the other defining features are subordinate to this one.are subordinate to this one.

A concept that identifies a kind of thing A concept that identifies a kind of thing stands for something that has certain stands for something that has certain perceptual characteristics and can therefore perceptual characteristics and can therefore be imagined or drawn.be imagined or drawn. Thus, one can draw not only a parrot but also an Thus, one can draw not only a parrot but also an

unspecified bird, not only a rose but also a flower, unspecified bird, not only a rose but also a flower, not only an oaktree but also a tree in general.not only an oaktree but also a tree in general.

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Functional concepts Functional concepts (Wierzbicka, 1984: 316)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 316)

Functional concepts stand for artifacts if any Functional concepts stand for artifacts if any kind made with a particular function in mindkind made with a particular function in mind

The crucial differences between taxonomic The crucial differences between taxonomic supercategories such as birds or flowers or supercategories such as birds or flowers or trees and nontaxonomic ones such as toys or trees and nontaxonomic ones such as toys or weapons or ornaments can be seen weapons or ornaments can be seen immediately when one tries to represent immediately when one tries to represent them pictorially.them pictorially. One cannot draw a toy, a weapon, a container, or One cannot draw a toy, a weapon, a container, or

a utensil “in general.” a utensil “in general.” purely functional and thus imply no visual or more purely functional and thus imply no visual or more

generally perceptual properties.generally perceptual properties.

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Functional concepts vs. taxonomic Functional concepts vs. taxonomic concepts concepts (Wierzbicka, 1984: 318)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 318)

For taxonomic concepts (concepts that For taxonomic concepts (concepts that stand for a kind of thing), such as tricycles stand for a kind of thing), such as tricycles or balls, visible characteristics are crucial.or balls, visible characteristics are crucial.

But a concept such as But a concept such as toy toy or or weaponweapon stands stands neither for “a kind of thing” nor strictly neither for “a kind of thing” nor strictly speaking, for “a kind of function”. It stands speaking, for “a kind of function”. It stands for anything that has a particular function.for anything that has a particular function.

““Imaginability” is a useful criterion to Imaginability” is a useful criterion to distinguish concrete concepts that stand for distinguish concrete concepts that stand for “a kind of thing” from other concrete “a kind of thing” from other concrete concepts. concepts.

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Semantic “fuzziness” Semantic “fuzziness” (Wierzbicka, 1984: 318)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 318)

The difference between taxonomic The difference between taxonomic and functional concepts is reflected and functional concepts is reflected in the greater semantic “fuzziness” in the greater semantic “fuzziness” of the latter.of the latter.

This “fuzziness” has been presented This “fuzziness” has been presented as a fundamental feature of human as a fundamental feature of human categorization reflected in natural categorization reflected in natural language (e.g., language (e.g., cup, knife, cup, knife, etc.)etc.)

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The concept of contiguity The concept of contiguity (Wierzbicka, 1984: 319)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 319)

The concept of contiguity plays crucial role The concept of contiguity plays crucial role in natural language in the area of concrete in natural language in the area of concrete lexicon.lexicon.

A concept based on anthropologists A concept based on anthropologists distinction between taxonomies (systems of distinction between taxonomies (systems of kinds) and partonomies (systems of parts). kinds) and partonomies (systems of parts). Thus a nose is not a kind of thing (that sticks Thus a nose is not a kind of thing (that sticks

out in the middle of the face, etc.) but a part of out in the middle of the face, etc.) but a part of the face (that sticks out in the middle of the the face (that sticks out in the middle of the face, etc.).face, etc.).

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singularia tantum singularia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984: 320-321)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 320-321)

Collective concepts based on contiguity and function, Collective concepts based on contiguity and function, such as such as furniturefurniture, are singularia tantum., are singularia tantum.

A misconception to assume that tables are A misconception to assume that tables are semantically a kind of furniture; shirts, a kind of semantically a kind of furniture; shirts, a kind of clothing; or apples, a kind of fruit.clothing; or apples, a kind of fruit.

There is nothing wrong to say so but semantically they There is nothing wrong to say so but semantically they are not.are not.

E.g., cockroaches can be described as vermin, but E.g., cockroaches can be described as vermin, but semantically they are not a kind of vermin – they are a kind of semantically they are not a kind of vermin – they are a kind of bug.bug.

Vermin is a collective concept and cockroach is an Vermin is a collective concept and cockroach is an individual one.individual one.

The grammatical difference between vermin (a mass The grammatical difference between vermin (a mass noun) and a cockroach (a countable) reflects a noun) and a cockroach (a countable) reflects a difference in the conception.difference in the conception.

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pluralia tantum pluralia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984: 321)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 321)

Collective concepts based on contiguity without a Collective concepts based on contiguity without a reference to function, such as reference to function, such as leftovers leftovers and and contentscontents, , are pluralia tantum.are pluralia tantum.

E.g., goods, , clothes, goodies groceries, refreshments, E.g., goods, , clothes, goodies groceries, refreshments, odds-and-ends, bits-and-pieces, remains, belongings, odds-and-ends, bits-and-pieces, remains, belongings, supplies, trappings, trimmings, spoils, valuables, nuts-supplies, trappings, trimmings, spoils, valuables, nuts-and-bolts, covers, dishes.and-bolts, covers, dishes.

All these words are designate heterogeneous All these words are designate heterogeneous collections of things: things that at some particular collections of things: things that at some particular time are, or are expected to be, in the same place.time are, or are expected to be, in the same place.

In some instances the lack of a common function is In some instances the lack of a common function is transparent.transparent.

In other instances a common function does seem to be In other instances a common function does seem to be implied.implied.

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singularia tantum vs. singularia tantum vs. pluralia tantum pluralia tantum (Wierzbicka, 1984: 321)(Wierzbicka, 1984: 321)

The two types of supercategories are both The two types of supercategories are both based on contiguity.based on contiguity.

Singularia tantum such as Singularia tantum such as furniturefurniture stand for stand for categories the members of which are categories the members of which are physically separate from one another and physically separate from one another and therefore could be counted together.therefore could be counted together.

Memebers of categories designated by Memebers of categories designated by pluralia tantum such as pluralia tantum such as groceriesgroceries are not only are not only heterogeneous but also not fully discrete.heterogeneous but also not fully discrete.

The pluralia tantum class has a nontaxonomic The pluralia tantum class has a nontaxonomic character while the singularia tantum one character while the singularia tantum one does not.does not.