Motion for Reconsideration

1.11 Bernardo v. CA 275 SCRA 413

1.12 Casuela v. Ombudsman 276 SCRA 635

1.13 Cordenillio v. Executive Secretary 276 SCRA 652

1.14 Chua v. CA 287 SCRA 33

1.15 De la Cruz v. Abelle 352 SCRA 691

1.16 Rodreguez v. CA GR 134275 August 7, 2002

1.17 Gonzales v. CSC 490 SCRA 741

1.18 Berboso v. CA 494 SCRA 583

1.19 Pontejos v. Desierto 592

Suretyship

1.20 Stronghold Insurance v. CA 205 SCRA 605

Tariff and Customs Code

2.11 Feeder v. CA 197 SCRA 842

Appeal

2.12 Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman 254 SCRA 753

2.13 Telan v. CA 202 SCRA 246

2.14 Rivera v. CSC 240 SCRA 43

2.15 Singson v. NLRC 274 SCRA 358

2.16 Building Care v. Macaraeg 687 SCRA 643

Closure Proceedings

2.17 CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536

2.18 Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288

2.19 Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995

Biddings

2.20 Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502

UDHA

3.11 Perez v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696

Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges

3.12 American Inter-Fashion v. OP, 197 SCRA 409

3.13 Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma, 254 SCRA 565

3.14 ABAKADA v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1

3.15 British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511, 585 SCRA 36

Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-Ombudsman

3.16 Roxas v. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001

3.17 Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA 17

3.18 Serapio v. Sandiganbayan GR 148468 Jan. 28, 2003

Substantive Due Process

3.19 US v. Toribio – 15 Phil. 85

3.20 Churchill v. Rafferty – 32 Phil. 580

4.11 People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172

Facts: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Ruling: No,The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment. The ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

4.12 Ermita Hotel vs City of Manila

Facts:Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose license fees for first and second class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.

Issue:Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

Ruling: No,The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process.It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police power.On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle.

4.13 Ynot vs Intermediate Court of Appeals

Facts:Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.The original E.O was for prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos, except under certain conditions, for the purpose of preserving them for the benefit of small farmers.

Issue:Is the Amendment valid?

Ruling:No, outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the purpose. Moreover, it is unduly oppressive.The owner of the property is denied the opportunity to be heard and the property is immediately confiscated and distributed.

14.4 Agustin Vs Edu

Facts:This petition assails the validity of LOI 229,issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. Incompliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No.1 directing the compliance thereof. Petitioner also stressed out that the said LOI and A.O are unlawful for it is undue delegation of Police Power.

Issue:Whether the LOI is considered as a valid delegation of Police Power

Ruling:Police power, is nothing more or less than the power of government inherent in every sovereignty. Also,the police power is state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare. It is the power to describe regulatins to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, and general welfare of the people. Government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity.The presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing the statuteThere was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision.LOI 229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement from any source.The objective is public safety.

4.15 Balacuit Vs CFI 163 SCRA 182

Facts:The City of Butuan issues an ordinance prescribing that between the ages of 7 and 12 should be charged only half the admission price in movie houses.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

Ruling:No. For the benefit of parents then the cost is passed on to cinema owners. There is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

4.16 National Development Co. and New Agrix v. Phil Veterans Bank 192 SCRA 257

Facts: The Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondent Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.Pursuant thereto, the private respondent filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development Company, petitioners herein, invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of the private respondent. For its part, the private respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting the petitioners to file a second case with the same court to stop the foreclosure.The petitioners argue that property rights, like all rights, are subject to regulation under the police power for the promotion of the common welfare.

Issue: May the petitioner invoke police power in the case at bar?

Ruling:The police power is not a panacea for all constitutional maladies. Neither does its mere invocation conjure an instant and automatic justification for every act of the government depriving a person of his life, liberty or property.A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

4.17 Maranaw Hotel v NLRC 238 SCRA 190

14.18 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties – 234 SCRA 255

Facts:ordinance no. 3353 an ordinance prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino.The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City.

Issue:May the state prohibit gambling?

Ruling:The state may do so,if it chooses, and make violation a criminal offense. But gambling is not immoral per se. 4.19 Bennis Vs Michigan March 4, 1996

Facts:Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute in the automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross indecency.The State then sued both Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have the car declared a public nuisance and abated as such.

Issue:Whether Michigan's abatement scheme has deprived petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without due process.

Ruling:A long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use. In Dobbins's Distillery v.United States, this Court upheld that the acts of [the possessors] bind the interest of the owner whether he be innocent or guilty."

4.20 Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri – No. 88-1503 June 25 1990

Facts:Missouri denied the withdrawal of treatment request because Ms. Cruzan’s parents could not establish Ms. Cruzan’s wishes regarding such withdrawal by clear and convincing evidence. Ms. Cruzan had a discussion with a friend who testified in court that she said she would not want to be on life support, but this was the only evidence of her personal wishes.

Issue:Does Missouri have a legitimate state interest in tempering the liberty interests of incompetent patients?

Ruling:Yes. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.Chief Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) notes that unwanted medical treatment is considered a battery at common law. Hence, it is clear that there must be a liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. However, the treatment must be unwanted by the patient.Missouri is free to choose whether or not they will accept a surrogate for an incompetent’s medical decisions, but they are free to establish the standard by which they do so. That is a legislative, not judicial choice.

Dissent.Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) dissents, arguing that the State interest cannot outweigh Ms. Cruzan’s liberty interest in having treatment withheld.Concurrence.Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) concurs, emphasizing that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) did not have to decide whether a State must abide by the decisions of a medical surrogate.Justice Antonin Scalia (J. Scalis) concurs, but writes separately to state his opinion that the federal courts have no place making substantive decisions in this area, that this police power has always been afforded to the States.

5.11 JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA

FACTS: SOJ issued a Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedure and requirements for screening performing artist. For deployment of female entertainers to Japan it required an Artist Record Book (ARB), which could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required tests as precondition for the processing of the POEA of any contract for overseas employment.

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), filed a class suit assailing these department orders, contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 3, as an exercise of police power, constitutes a violation to due process of law.

RULING: No. No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing artists ended up as prostitutes abroad. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.

5.12. Corona v. United Harbor – 283 SCRA 31

FACTS: In issuing administrative order no. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO. 04-92), limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilot Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO no. 04-92. On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO no. 04-92.

On March 17. 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato Corona, dismissed the appeal/ petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and damages, before branch 6 of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PPA-AO-04-92 violates respondents’ right to due process of law

RULING: Yes. The court is convinced that PPA-AO no. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against deprivation of property without due process of law. The SC said that in order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing. There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO no. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.

5.13. Kelly v. Johnson – 425 US 238

FACTS: This case began in 1971, when a Civil Rights action was instituted against the Commissioner of the Suffolk County Police Department by the president of the Suffolk County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association. An order had been put into effect requiring that male members of the police force abide by certain hair-grooming standards. Police officers were forbidden from having beards or goatees, and the length of hair and sideburns were likewise regulated. There was an exception for medical need. The action was said to violate Johnson’s First Amendment right of free expression, as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection. The District Court dismissed Johnson’s complaint, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court, where testimony was taken on the issue of whether there was a “genuine public need” for these regulations. There was but one witness, the Suffolk County Police Department’s Deputy Commissioner. He contended that the hair-grooming regulations met a need for uniformity and satisfied a concern for public safety of the patrolmen. A ruling was made in favor of Respondent based upon this testimony, with the District Court determining that there was no proof to support these claims. The Court felt as if the police department was seeking “[u]niformity for uniformity’s sake.” The District Court’s ruling was affirmed on petitioner’s appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the hair-grooming and hair-length regulations issued violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by infringing upon liberty interests.

RULING: No. The Court upheld the grooming regulations for police officers, thereby limiting the scope of privacy concerns. The Court’s holding established that there is no protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment when it comes to personal appearance, distinguishing the case from those that impact an individual’s choice with respect to basic and fundamental matters of procreation, marriage, sexual relations, and family life. Justice Rehnquist noted that there were countless demands placed upon police officers, including the need to wear a uniform, the requirement of saluting the flag while in uniform, the prohibition against smoking in public, and the restriction against participating in political affairs. Rehnquist believed that Suffolk County’s organized structure for its police force served the purpose of discipline and uniformity. The Court looked at the hair-length regulation similarly, and declined to use the standard that had been applied by the Court of Appeals, which had attempted to establish whether there was a “genuine public need” for the regulation. The Supreme Court instead indicated that the standard was “whether respondent can demonstrate that there is no rational connection between the regulation, based as it is on the county’s method of organizing its police force, and the promotion of safety of persons and property.” The Court ruled that the regulations were not so irrational as to be deemed “arbitrary,” and therefore respondent had not been deprived of liberty. To the

contrary, the Court determined that similarity in appearance of police officers was desirable and served as a rational basis for the regulations imposed by the police force.

5. 14. Chavez v. Romulo – 431 SCRA 534 (2004)

FACTS: Acting on President Arroyo’s directive in her speech on the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence. Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied.

Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public respondents. The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and contends that (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.

ISSUE: Whether the said guidelines violates the due process clause

RULING: In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.” All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare

5.15. Cruz v. Flavier, GR 135385, December 6, 2000

FACTS: Cruz is a noted constitutionalist. He assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not IPRA violates rights of landowners

RULING: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was re-deliberated upon. However, after re-deliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

5.16. Smith Kline v. CA, GR 121267, October 23, 2001

FACTS: In August 1989, Danlex Research Laboratories petitioned before Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) that it may be granted a compulsory license for the use and manufacture of the pharmaceutical product Cimetidine. Cimetidine is useful as an antihistamine and in the treatment of ulcers.Cimetidine is originally patented to Smith Kline and French Laboratories in 1978, and the said patent is

still in force at the time of application by Danlex Research. The BPTTT granted the application of Danlex Research together with a provision that Danlex Research should be paying 2.5% of the net wholesale price as royalty payment to Smith Kline. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Smith Kline assailed the grant as it argued, among others, that the same is an invalid exercise of police power because there is no overwhelming public necessity for such grant considering that Smith Kline is able to provide an adequate supply of it to satisfy the needs of the Philippine market; that a provision in the Philippine Patent Laws is violative of the Paris Convention to which the Philippines is a signatory. To explain the second contention, Smith Kline states that the Paris Convention only allows compulsory licensing if the original licensee (patent holder) has failed to work on the patent; that therefore, the provision in the Philippine Patent Laws which adds other grounds for the granting of compulsory license i.e. monopoly, is invalid and contrary to the Paris Convention.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of due process

RULING: No. The granting is a valid exercise of police power. Cimetidine is medicinal in nature, and therefore necessary for the promotion of public health and safety. On the second contention, Section A(2) of Article 5 [of the Paris Convention] unequivocally and explicitly respects the right of member countries to adopt legislative measures to provide for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent. An example provided of possible abuses is “failure to work;” however, as such, is merely supplied by way of an example, it is plain that the treaty does not preclude the inclusion of other forms of categories of abuses. The legislative intent in the grant of a compulsory license was not only to afford others an opportunity to provide the public with the quantity of the patented product, but also to prevent the growth of monopolies. Certainly, the growth of monopolies was among the abuses which Section A, Article 5 of the Convention foresaw, and which our Congress likewise wished to prevent in enacting.

5. 17. Pareno vs COA

Facts: The petitioner served for 32 years in AFP, upon retirement, he received his pension which is good for 3 years but later on he migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen so the AFP stopped the petitioner’s monthly pension pursuant to PD 1638. Petitioner filed a claim before the respondent for the continuance of such but was denied. Petitioner claim that he was deprived of his property when they stop the continuance of his pension since a pension being a property vested by the constitution, cannot be removed or taken from him just because he became a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner further alleges that the termination of his monthly pension is a penalty equivalent to deprivation of his life.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was deprived of his property which is guaranteed by the due process clause

HELD: No, the SC held that retirement rights are future rights that the constitution only vested upon any person who had retired from their service and such right is protected by the due process clause. The SC held that there was no denial of due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638. Petitioner had the opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of his pension, but was denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638.

5.18. Esponcilla vs Bagon Tanyag

Facts: Petitioners Jasmin Alipato, Primitivo Belandres, Nestor Leduna, Anita de los Reyes, and Gina Caballero (petitioners) were among the actual occupants of the subject land. They occupied the land by mere tolerance long before the said land was acquired by PCIB in 1989. To evade eviction from PCIB and in order to avail of the benefits of acquiring land under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the said occupants formally organized themselves into an association, the RHAI. With the aid and representation of the Bacolod Housing Authority (BHA), RHAI was able to obtain a loan from the NHMFC and acquired the subject land from PCIB. As a consequence, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City issued a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T- 202933, covering the 19,897 square-meter land, in the name of RHAI. By virtue of the land acquisition by RHAI, all the occupants of the land became automatic members of RHAI. To fully avail of the benefits of the CMP, the NHMFC required the RHAI members to sign the Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and to maintain their membership in good standing in accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws5 of RHAI. Petitioners, however, refused to sign the LPA as a precondition under the CMP. They likewise failed to attend the regular meetings and pay their membership dues as required by the RHAI By-Laws. As a result, RHAI through its Board of Directors, approved a resolution6 to enforce the eviction of petitioners and recover possession of the portions of land which they were occupying. The RTC decided in favor of RHAI because they found out that the occupants were unlawful occupants in the area. The occupants contend that they were denied due process when the RTC decided in favor of RHAI.

Issue: Whether the occupants were denied due process of law.

Held: No, it ruled that petitioners were not denied of their right to procedural due process as they were given opportunity to present evidence, but failed to do so. According to the CA, "where opportunity to be heard either through oral argument or pleadings is accorded, there can be no denial of procedural due process.

5.19. BF vs CITY MAYOR

Facts: BF Homes Parañaque Subdivision (BF Homes Parañaque), with a land area straddling the cities of Parañaque, Las Piñas, and Muntinlupa, is the largest subdivision in the country.The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted an Ordinance prescribing the land use plan &zoning pursuant to the LGC. Secs 11.5 & 11.6 of the Ordinance, reclassified El Grande and Aguirre Avenues from residential to commercial areas. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Secs 11.5,11.6, etc: the reclassification of certain portions is unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the developer and the lot buyers. The annotation on the lot buyers’ titles provides that "the property shall be used for residential purposes only and for no other purpose."

Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.

Held: Yes, The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.

With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee–referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee–it should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people."

5.20. ST. LUKE’S VS NLRC 517 SCRA 677

FACTS: The private respondent Maribel Santos worked as an X-Ray technician at the petitioner hospital (SLMC) but she does not possess a certificate of registration as required under the newly passed Radiologic Act or RA 7431. Due to her non-compliance and her failure to pass the exams, she was separated.

The private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other monetary benefits. The Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay respondent separation pay and this was affirmed by both NLRC and the Court of Appeals, hence this petition. The petitioner contended that respondent dismissal was valid.

Issue: Whether the dismissal was valid.

HELD: Yes, while the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people.

Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. The most concrete example of this would be in the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches has been closely regulated by the State.

6. 11 Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD

Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

6.12 PEREZ V. LPG

6.13 MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc

Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishment of a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals

Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents’ terminals.

Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an express delegation by the LGC of 1991.

6.14 SEC of DND V. MANALO

FACTS: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.

ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of Right to liberty and other basic rights of Manalo Brothers?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of Manalo’s right to security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.

6.15 Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

FACTS: Petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) RA 9165 from enforcement on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm for the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices, For the constitutional right against unreasonable searches is breached by said provisions.

ISSUE: Whether RA 9165 violates the people’s right gainst unreasonable searches?

HELD: The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court ruled that, unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy, has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

6.16. Social Justice Society v. Atienza

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila City enacted an ordinance reclassifying certain areas of the city from industrial to commercial. As a result of the zoning ordinance, the oil terminals located in those areas were no longer allowed. Though the oil companies assailed the validity of the ordinance contending they will lose billions of pesos because of the enactment of the said ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether the enactment of the ordinance is within the scope of Police Power of Sanguniang Panglungsod of Manila?

HELD: In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

The power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust.

6.17 SEC vs. INTERPORT SERVICES

FACTS: Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints for violations of rules and regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be referred to the Department of Justice

(DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers. Additionally, the SEC may still impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned law.

Respondent claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered that the respondents appear before the SEC and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them, and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the Securities Regulations Code violates the right to due process of the respondents?

HELD: SEC retains jurisdiction to investigate. The Court of Appeals determined that there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due process and equal protection. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules, the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of re-filing the same case against the respondents.

6.18 PEOPLE V. SITON

FACTS: Siton et al. were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art. 202(2) of the RPC. They filed separate motions to quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.

The MTC denied the motions and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and justified by the maxim �salus populi est suprema lex.” The MTC also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting officer it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on Siton et al. in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.

ISSUE: Whether the Law on Vagrancy is constitutional?

HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state as an aspect of police power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. As a police power measure, Art. 202(2) must be viewed in a constitutional light.

6.19 WHITE LIGHT V. CITY OF MANILA

(Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights)

FACTS: In 1992, then Mayor Lim signed an Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance is nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare

7.11 Southern Hemisphere v Anti-Terrorism Council 632 SCRA 146

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts

ISSUE: WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper.

RULING: No. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

7.12 Roxas v Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211

FACTS: Decision of the SC, after finding that the failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents’ responsibility anent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of extraordinary diligence on the part of existing police and military investigations, this Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, to be spearheaded by the CHR. The CHR was then required to submit a report of its investigations as well as recommendation to the CA. Finally, the CA was directed to monitor the investigations and submit to the Court its own report and recommendation.

ISSUE: Can the CA conduct a summary hearing to require the personal appearance of confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under oath?

RULING: The court ruled in affirmative. The Court pointed out that “while the CHR investigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence tending to implicate any of the public respondents in the abduction and torture of the petitioner have materialized. The court agreed that bringing the persons interviewed, before a summary hearing will serve as a huge step towards identifying the persons behind the abduction and torture. Thus, the Court must ensure that each and every possible theory was pursued and verified.

7.13 Meralco v Lim 632 SCRA 195

FACTS: Lim is an administrative clerk at MERALCO, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of her assigned office denouncing respondent. By Memorandum of Alexander (head of MERALCO Human Resource Staffing), he directed the transfer of respondent to another sector due to the accusations and threats against her from unknown individuals and which could possible compromise her safety and security. Lim filed a TRO for her transfer and a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data against MERALCO commanding MERALCO, to wit:

1. Full disclosure of a the data or information about respondent in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security;

2. The nature of such data and the purpose of its collection;3. The measure taken by MERALCO to ensure the confidentiality of such data or information; and4. The currency and accuracy of such data or information;

ISSUE: Whether or not habeas data is proper in this case.

RULING: No, the writ of habeas data directs the issuance only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home and MERALCO is not engage in such activities.

Habeas data is designated to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy, life, liberty or security.

7.14 Pollo v Karina Constantino, GR 181881, October 8, 2011

FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source, making her aware that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to back up all the files of the computers found therein. David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of parties who were facing charges. David inferred that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice that he pursued regularly.

Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713. After some motions filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the CA wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental duties. The CA ruled that the search was legal because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation of his constitutional right to privacy.

RULING: No. First, SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work computer. He did not have a separate office space nor did he use a password for his computer. The CSC also implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their use. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. Second, the search were conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

7.15 Sto. Tomas v Salac 685 SCRA 245

FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of RA 8042: Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of RA 8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for being violative of due process.

RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.

ISSUE: Is the validity of RA 8042 violative of due process?

RULING: No. The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.

Equal Protection Clause of the Law

7.16 People v Cayat 68 PHIL 12, 18

FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.

RULING:No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

7.17 Ichong v Hernandez 101 PHIL 1155

FACTS: Petitioner, in behalf of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” filed to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business is unconstitutional

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws

RULING: No.  The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not

demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

7.18 Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

7.19 Dumlao v COMELEC 96 SCRA 392

FACTS: Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 disqualifies retired elective officials who has received retirement benefits and is already 65 years old to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. Petitioner Patricio Dumlao said it is concocted and designed against him to prevent him from running again as Governor.

ISSUE: Is Sec. 4 BP Blg. 52 violative of equal protection?

RULING: No. There is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit of such denial.

7.20 Goesaert v Cleary 335 US 464

FACTS: A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female bartenders challenged the law, requesting an injunction against its enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the bartenders' claim.

ISSUE: Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

RULING: No. the Court concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legislators."

8.11 Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City Feb 7 1968

Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging said ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation, among other things.  Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.

Issue:WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protection of laws and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.

Ruling: Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said ordinance shoouldn’t be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for coverage of the tax.

EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesn’t bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

8.12 Sison Jr. v. PAGCOR May 14 1991

Facts: Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 – for being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward “crony economy”, waiving the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in the Constitution.

Issue: Won it violates the equal protection clause

Ruling: Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

8.13 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 230 SCRA 711

Facts: Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr., was able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks aggregating approximately one hundred twenty million US dollars ($120 M). These foreign loans were guaranteed by PHILGUARANTEE, whose Board of Directors was then composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin, and Cezar Zalamea. Congressman de Venecia's group of companies was unable to seasonably service these foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to assume its obligation as guarantor. The EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power. One of the first official acts of then President Corazon C. Aquino was the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) under E.O No. 1. It was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth of the Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and their cronies had to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth allegedly plundered by them while in power. Case No. 0020 for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution and Damages was one of these cases. It was filed by the petitioner Republic against Jose de Venecia, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Rosendo D. Bondoc, Cesar E. A. Virata, Ruben Ancheta, Jaime C. Laya, Placido Mapa, Jr., Roberto Ongpin and Cesar C. Zalamea. We quote its relevant allegations.

Issue: Won the dismissal is compelled by the equal protection of laws

Ruling: Yes. The dismissal of the Complaint against Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Venecia, Jr., and the respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated. Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint only because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors to de Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter's foreign loans. When petitioner admitted that no undue favor was granted to de Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and dismissed its complaint against him, petitioner cannot avoid its duty of dismissing its complaint against respondents Bondoc and company. To give a more favored treatment to de Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in invidious discrimination.

8.14 Himagan vs, People 237 SCRA 538

Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension averring that  Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over

90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution

Ruling:  No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

8.15 Almonte vs. Vasquez 244 SCRA 286

Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office.  They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.

Issue: WON petitioners can be ordered to produce documents without violating their equal protection of laws.

Ruling: Yes. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18 Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, 19 no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations

8.16 Telebap vs. COMELEC 289 SCRA 337

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law.  Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.  Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.

Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge.  Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year.  Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property.  According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. 

Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws

Ruling: Petitioner’s argument is without merit.  All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images.  They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them.  Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. 

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.  Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media.  To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC  is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

8.17 Tiu vs. CA GR127410 Jan 20 1999

Facts: Petitioners assail the CA decision and resolution that upheld the constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, according to which the grant and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 (“An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”) were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ).

Respondent Court held that “there is no substantial difference between the provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227. In both, the ‘Secured Area’ is precise and well-defined as ‘. . . the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America, as amended . . .'” The appellate court concluded that such being the case, petitioners could not claim that EO 97-A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of RA 7227.

The court a quo also explained that the intention of Congress was to confine the coverage of the SSEZ to the “secured area” and not to include the “entire Olongapo City and other areas mentioned in Section 12 of the law.”The Court of Appeals further justified the limited application of the tax incentives as being within the prerogative of the legislature, pursuant to its “avowed purpose [of serving] some public benefit or interest.” It ruled that “EO 97-A merely implements the legislative purpose of [RA 7227].”

Disagreeing, petitioners now seek before us a review of the aforecited Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution.

Issue: Won EO 97 A is violative of the equal protection clause

Ruling: YES. Said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. There are real and substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby justifying a valid and reasonable classification.

8.18 Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC GR 132774 June 21 1999

Facts: Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or municipal officials in Cagayan. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) in accordance with its own tenor or as modified by paragraph 3 of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436. Petitioners contend that the classification in Section 67 is not based on substantial distinctions and, thus, violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Issue:WON the Section 67of the Omnibus Election Code is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution

Ruling: Section 67 was crafted with the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional pronouncement that public service is a public trust. Hence,it is not violative of the Constitution as it does not unduly cut short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the application of Section 67 is covered by the term voluntary renunciation.

8.19 De Guzman vs. COMELEC 336 SCRA

Facts: At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".

RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996

By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-0002[1] and 97-0610[2] for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives[3] reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.

Issue: WON SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION

Ruling:  The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:

1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;

2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.[4]

After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.

8.20 People vs. Mercado GR 116239 Nov 29, 2000

Facts: The defendants were convicted by the trial court with the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing them the punishment of death. The defendants raised the constitutionality of death penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors committed in convicting the accused.

Issue:  Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment.

Ruling: No the death penalty is not unconstitutional. As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is an exercise of the state's power to "secure society against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are established.

9.11 People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue: Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

Ruling: No. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are varied. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

9.12 People v. Piedra 350 SCRA 163

Facts: Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against her, without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in Singapore to Modesto, Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the amount of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was arrested in her home after an investigation was made by Atty. Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who pretended to be an applicant, which led to an entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the LaborCode defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. The provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.(b) “Recruitment and placement” refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,

utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any

manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

Issue: Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442 (Labor Code), as amended, otherwise known as the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause

Ruling: No. Dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining “recruitment and placement” is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct ontheir part will render them liable to its penalties. In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the Supreme Court “criticized” the definition of “recruitment and placement.” The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only “whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee.” In this case, the Court merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13(b), therefore, is not a “perfectly vague act” whose obscurity is evidenton its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

9.13 International School v. Quisimbing June 1, 2000

Facts: Petitioners work under private respondent International School. The school hires both local and foreign hires. Foreign hires are granted with more benefits and higher salary. Respondent says this is because of dislocation factor and limited tenure. Petitioners contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local hires. They claim that it is discriminatory to Filipinos and it constitutes racial discrimination.

Issue: Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause

Held: There is violation of equal protection. Equal pay for equal work, persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skillsm effort, and responsibility under similar conditions should be paid similar salaries. If an employer accords the same rank and position, the presumption is that they perform equal work. Here, both groups have similar functions which they perform under similar conditions. There is no evidence that foreign hires perform 25% more efficient than local hires. The dislocation factor and tenure are properly accorded by the benefits they received.

9.14 Central Bank Employees Assn. v. BSP 446 SCRA 29

Facts: The New Central Bank Act abolished the old Central Bank and created the new BSP on 1993 through RA No 7653. Central Bank Employees Association assailed the provision of RA No 7653, Art II Sec 15(c). They contend that it makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers as exempt class of Salary Standardization Law (RA 6758) and (2) the rank-and-file non-exempt class. BSP contends that the exemption of officers (Salary Grade 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file.

Issue: Whether or not contended proviso of RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws, hence unconstitutional

Ruling: Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by the proviso.

9.15 Ycasuegi v. PAL 569 SCRA 467

Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of PAL, herein respondent. Petitioner was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was dismissed

Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th Amendment, which is the source of

our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee

9.16 SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92

Facts: Petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumboko sought to compel respondent Lito L. Atienza, then Mayor of City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified Pandacan area from industrial to commercial and redirected the owners and operators of disallowed businesses to desist from operating their business. Among the disallowed businesses was the “Pandacan Terminal” of the oil companies.

Cheveron, Petron, Shell and DOE question the validity and enforceability of Ordinance No. 8027 and contend that it was superseded by Ordinance No. 8119 also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is valid and enforceable

Ruling: Yes. Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027, we now proceed to make a definitive ruling on its constitutionality and validity.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.

9.17 Gobenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 302

Facts: Dr. Pedro Gobenciong was Administrative Officer IV in Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center. He was charged and 3 other persons with Falsification of Public Document and Misconduct. Gobenciong then sought reconsideration of this order, but without awaiting the Ombudsman’s action thereon, Gobenciong filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA denied Gobenciong’s petition for certiorari on the strength of Sec. 24 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which expressly empower the Ombudsman, under defined conditions, to preventively suspend, for a maximum period of six months, all but three categories of public officials and employees under investigation by his office and to direct the immediate implementation of the corresponding suspension order. Ombudsman eventually found Gobenciong, et al guilty of Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay. Gobenciong filed a motion for reconsideration, which Ombudsman denied, prompting Gobenciong to appeal to the CA.

Issue: Whether RA 6770, on the ground of undue delegation of legislative authority and under the equal protection clause, is unconstitutional?

Ruling: NO. The Office of the Ombudsman is a creature of the Constitution. The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the office to be strong and effective, with sufficient bite and muscle to enable it to carry out its mandate as protector of the people against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government. They, however, left it to Congress to invest the office with more broad powers to enforce its own action. Clearly then, the espoused theory of undue delegation of authority is untenable. For, in the ultimate analysis, it is the 1987 Constitution no less which granted and allowed the grant by Congress of sweeping prosecutorial, investigatory, and disciplinary powers to the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest possible opportunity; this means before the Office of the Ombudsman, or at least before the CA.

9.18 MIAA v. Olongapo 543 SCRA 269

Facts: OMSI (Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc) and TCSI (Triple Crown Services, Inc) were among the five contractors of MIAA which had janitorial and maintenance service contracts covering various areas in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Before their service contracts expired on October 31, 1998, the MIAA Board of Directors, through Antonio P. Gana, then General Manager (GM) of MIAA, wrote OMSI and TCSI informing them that their contracts would no longer be renewed after October 31, 1998. OMSI and TCSI, in a letter to Gana, expressed its concern over the award of its concession area to a new service contractor through a negotiated contract. It said that to award TCSIs contract by mere negotiation would violate its right to equal protection of the law. TCSI thus suggested that a public bidding be conducted and that the effectivity of its service contract be meanwhile extended until a winning bid is declared.

Consequently, OMSI and TCSI instituted civil cases against MIAA to forestall the termination of their contracts and prevent MIAA from negotiating with other service contractors. Issue: Whether the right of OMSI and TCSI to equal protection of the law was violated by MIAA

Ruling: According to the Supreme Court, the constitutional right of Olongapo Maintenance Services, Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services, Inc. (TCSI), the incumbent service contractors, to equal protection of the law was violated by MIAA and its general manager when no public bidding was called precisely because the latter were going to award the subject service contracts through negotiation. Worse, the Court continued, the acts of MIAA and Gana smack of arbitrariness and discrimination as they not only did not call for the required public bidding but also did not even accord OMSI and TCSI the opportunity to submit their proposals in a public bidding

9.19 Nicolas v. Romulo 578 SCRA 438

Facts: On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole, together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.

ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of its provisions.

9.20 League of Cities v. COMELEC 608 SCRA 636

Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws.

In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the Court En Banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate equal protection clause of the Constitution

HELD: Yes. The petition is meritorious. Cityhood Laws were declared unconstitutional. Substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present.

10.11 QUINTO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369. 

ISSUE: Is the said COMELEC resolution valid?

RULING: NO. The Court found that the assailed provisions are violative of the equal protection clause. According to the court, “in considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their COCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.”

Main point: Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.

10.12 CREBA VS ROMULO

FACTS: Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. (CREBA), an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines, questioned the validity of Section 27(E) of the Tax Code which imposes the minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on corporations.

CREBA argued, among others, that the use of gross income as MCIT base amounts to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not realized gain.

ISSUE: Is the imposition of MCIT constitutional? 

RULING: YES. The imposition of the MCIT is constitutional. An income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital, because it is income, and not capital, which is subject to income tax. However, MCIT is imposed on gross income which is computed by deducting from gross sales the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other direct expenses from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed.

10.13 NPC VS PINATUBO

FACT: The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional,  which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for being violative of substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce.

ISSUE(S): Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -

(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

(b) restrained free trade and competition.

RULING: The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.

10.14 BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION

FACTS: Petitioners asked the Court to declare E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued that E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

ISSUE: W/N EO NO 1 violates the equal protection clause

RULING: Yes. E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause.  The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

MAIN POINT: The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.

10.15 LEAGUE VS COMELEC

FACTS: petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners submit that the Cityhood Laws violated the Equal Protection Clause.

ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING: Yes. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. 

10.16 PAGCOR VS BIR

FACTS: PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. 9337 (a law amending certain provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed. Section 1 thereof excluded PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR was subjected to pay income taxation.) as well as the IRR. PAGCOR avers that the said provision violates the equal protection clause. PAGCOR argues that it is similarly situated with SSS, GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH, hence it should not be excluded from the exemption.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional..

HELD: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It was the express intent of Congress to exclude PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject to income taxation.

PAGCOR’s contention that the law violated the constitution is not tenable. The equal protection clause provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

The general rule is, ALL GOCC’s are subject to income taxation. However, certain classes of GOCC’s may be exempt from income taxation based on the following requisites for a valid classification under the principle of equal protection:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the deliberations of the lawmakers when R.A. 8424 was being drafted, the SC found out that PAGCOR’s exemption was not really based on substantial distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely exempted PAGCOR from income taxation upon the request of PAGCOR itself. This was changed however when R.A. 9337 was passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to income taxation.

Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT against PAGCOR, the BIR had overstepped its authority. Nowhere in R.A. 9337 does it state that PAGCOR is subject to VAT. Therefore, that portion of the IRR issued by the BIR is void. In fact, Section 109 of R.A. 9337 expressly exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further, PAGCOR’s charter exempts it from VAT.

To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation but not to VAT.

10.17 GAYNACO VS QUEZON CITY

FACTS: retired justice Gancayco filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance.

ISSUE/S:  Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a public nuisance.

Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property.

HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it was implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the damage.

10.18 MENDOZA VS PEOPLE

FACTS: Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer convicted for violating a special law known as the Social Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless, Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).

On January 7, 2010, during the pendency of the petitioner’s case before the Court, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed RA No. 9903 into law. RA No. 9903 mandates the effective withdrawal of all pending cases against employers who would remit their delinquent contributions to the SSS within a specified period, viz., within six months after the law’s effectivity. The petitioner claims that in view of RA No. 9903 and its implementing rules, the settlement of his delinquent contributions in 2007 entitles him to an acquittal. He invokes the equal protection clause in support of his plea.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is entitled to the equal protection clause

RULING: NO. The equal protection clause requires that similar subjects, [sic] should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The petitioner is no more no less in the same situation as the employer who would enjoy freedom from criminal prosecution upon payment in full of the delinquent contributions due and payable to the SSS within six months from the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9903.

The Court cannot amplify the scope of RA No. 9903 on the ground of equal protection, and acquit the petitioner and other delinquent employers like him; it would in essence be an amendment of RA No. 9903, an act of judicial legislation abjured by the trias politica principle.

10.19 BUREAU OF CUSTOMS VS TEVES

FACTS: Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 R.A. No. 9335, otherwise known as the Attrition Act of 2005 to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). are tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), directly filed the present petition before this Court against respondents.

In essence, BOCEA contends that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violates the rights of BOCEA’s members to: equal protection of laws because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of other revenue generating government agencies which are not subject to attrition, (2) that the assailed law because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets.

ISSUE: W/N R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violates the rights of BOCEA’s members to equal protection of laws.

RULING: NO.  Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.

10.20 PICHAY VS OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: Petitioner assails the constitutionality of EO no 13, abolishing the presidential anti-graft commission and transferring its investigative, adjudicatory and recommendatory functions to the office of the deputy executive secretary for legal affairs, office of the president. In pursuant to the said Order, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-odesla a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner. Petitioner argues E.O. 13 violated the guarantee of due process and the equal protection clause

ISSUE: W/N the EO 13 is constitutional

RULING: NO. Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary, wherein we further stated that –

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

11.11 Alvarez vs. People

FACTS: Petitioner, being then the mayor of Munoz, Nueva Ecija, taking advantage of his official position and while in the discharge of his official or administrative functions, and committing the offense in relation to his office, acting with evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence or manifest partiality did criminally give the Australian-Professional Incorporated (API) unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, by awarding to the latter the contract for the construction of Wag-Wag Shopping Mall in the amount of P240,000,000.00 under a Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement, notwithstanding the fact that API was and is not a duly-licensed construction company as per records of the Philippine Construction Accreditation Board (PCAB), which construction license is a pre-requisite for API to engage in construction of works for the said municipal government and that API does not have the experience and financial qualifications to undertake such costly project among others, to the damage and prejudice of the public service. Petitioner was charged with violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. He contends that the non-inclusion of all the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan denied him the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is denied of the equal protection of laws.

RULING:No. As this court explained in Santos vs. People, “the prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by the officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not denial of the equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of “clear and intentional discrimination.” Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a “clear and intentional discrimination” on the part of the prosecuting officials.

11.12 Garcia vs. Executive Secretary

FACTS: Petitioner was an officer in the active service of the AFP from March 2003 and 2004, when the alleged violations were committed; charge 1: violation of the 96th Article of War (conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman) and charge 2: violation of the 97th Article of War (conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline). The charges were filed on October 27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations were committed until the time the petitioner was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Therefore, petitioner’s retirement on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON the application of Articles of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: Yes. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly-constituted authorities. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.

The General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts Martial, can be supplementary. Under Article 10 of the RPC, offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

11.13 Arroyo vs. DOJ

FACTS: The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the DOJ which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.

The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the COMELEC. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.

After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, GMA, ET al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING: No. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Petition was dismissed.

11.14 Sto. Tomas vs. Paneda

FACTS: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress. Petitioners seek to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 for being unconstitutional.

The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 as unconstitutional for the reason that it gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses or authorities. The RTC also declared Section 7 as unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such violation. Hence, petitioners seek to reverse the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 are unconstitutional.

RULING: No. The SC sets aside the decision of the RTC of Manila and declares Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. As the Court held in People v. Ventura, the State under its police power “may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.” Police power is “that inherent and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.”

11.15 Republic vs. Daisy Yahon

FACTS: Daisy married Sgt. Charles, a soldier in 2003. Sgt. Charles retired from military service in 2006. In 2006, Daisy filed a petition for temporary protection order before the RTC against Charles, alleging physical abuse. The RTC, in its order granting the petition for temporary petition order, mandated Charles’ employer, the AFP Finance Center, to set aside to withhold the salary and retirement benefits of Charles to insure a fair share of spousal support to Daisy. Because of continued violation of the TPO by Charles, the TPO became permanent. The RTC directed the AFP Finance Center to withhold 50% of the retirement benefits of Charles and give it to Daisy.

The AFP Finance Center thereafter filed its special appearance before the RTC. It argued that it is a stranger to the TPO between Daisy and Charles, hence, execution could not issue against it as no proper service of summons was served to it. The RTC denied the motion of the AFP; according to it, the order had long become final and executory. The AFP then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals; it denied the petition for certiorari filed by the AFP and granted the prayer for writ of preliminary injunction by Daisy. Hence, they further elevated it to the SC citing Section 31 of PD 1638, Section 39 of RA 8291, and they assailed the constitutionality of RA 9262, the law calling for the penalty of violating such TRO.

ISSUE: WON RA 9262 is violative of the equal protection clause.

RULING: No. In Garcia vs. Drilon, the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice against women.

We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

“The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support.”

Section 2

2. Scope of the Protection

11.16 Moncado vs. People’s Court

FACTS: In an ejectment case filed before the justice of the peace court of Guijulngan, Negros Oriental, after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Court of First Instance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September 8, 1939 the notice of receipt of appealed case and the period for pleading. Defendants were informed of such mail by the postmaster but the same was not claimed, CFI of Negros Oriental, upon motion of plaintiff, ordered defendants to vacate the land and to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of PHP 18 as damages, plus costs. Defendant’s appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get notice from post office was due to ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiff’s motion for default. CFI denied defendant’s motion.

ISSUE: Was defendant’s failure to get notice valid and excusable?

RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendant’s are not entitled to a service of copy of the motion that they are in default except when they file a motion to set aside the order of default, in which event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings (Rule 27, Section 9, Rules of Court). Second, failure to get notice was not excusable neglect as claimed by defendants. Indeed, a notice, is deemed served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within 5 days from first notice of postmaster (Rule 27, Section 8, Rules of Court). Appealed order affirmed.

11.17 Stonehill vs. Diokno

FACTS: Respondent made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a result, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises. The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.  Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights have been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation (for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

11.18 People vs. Marti

FACTS: The proprietor of the courier company, upon opening the package, noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling: The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.

11.19 Waterous Drug Corp. vs. NLRC

FACTS: Catolico, a pharmacist in Waterous Drug Corp., sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640. YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

ISSUE: WON the check is admissible as evidence

RULING: Yes. Marti ruling: the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico.

11.20 People vs. Mendoza

FACTS: Octavio killed his wife Cecilla. Octavio called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac arrived, they all brought her to Prepetual Help Hospital where Cecila was decalred DOA (dead on arrival). The policemen investigated Gabac and found a gun in his waist. A .38 caliber revolver. He told them that Octavio handed it over to him as soon as he arrived at the crime scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio learned of his daughter’s death and that valuable were being taken away from her house. He and his sons decided to go there and remove the rest of the property, including a memorandum receipt signed by Octavio and a mission order authorizing him to carry such weapon. He said that Eusebio illegally procured the memorandum receipt and mission order in violation of his right against unreasonable search and seizure.

ISSUE: Was Octavio’s constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure violated when Eusebio took the memorandum receipt and mission order and brought it to court?

RULING: NO. The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to immunity of one’s person from interference from THE GOVERNMENT and it cannot be extended to acts committed by PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

12.11 PEOPLE V. BONGCARAWAN GR 143944

Facts: The security officer of Super Ferry 5, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher

Bongcarawan. Bongcarawan was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bagand small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items. NBI Forensic Chemist later confirmed the substance to be shabu. Accused was convicted of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. Bongcarawan appealed, arguing that the Samsonite suitcase containing the shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Issue: Whether the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against accused.

Ruling: As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, [i]n the absence of governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. In the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply. There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.

2. Requisite for a valid warrant

A. Probable Cause

I. Defenitin

12.12 HENRY V, US 261 US 98

Facts: Without a warrant for search or arrest, federal officers who were investigating a theft from an interstate shipment of whiskey twice observed cartons being placed in a motorcar in a residential district, followed and stopped the car, arrested petitioner and another man who were in it, searched the car, and found and seized cartons containing radios stolen from an interstate shipment. At petitioner's trial for unlawfully possessing radios stolen from an interstate shipment, his timely motion to suppress the evidence so seized was overruled and he was convicted. 

Issue: W/N the search or arrest made by the officers was valid.

Ruling: The officers did not have probable cause for the arrest when they stopped the car; the search was illegal; the articles seized were not admissible in evidence; and the conviction is reversed. 

For Arrest:

12.13 PEOPLE V. SYJUCO 64 PHIL 667

Facts: The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. In the process, the authorities seized, among others, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his and contained some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging to Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized.

Issue: W/N the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the provisions of the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?

Ruling: The search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books, documents or records referred to therein are being used or are intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant avers that they are actually being used for such purpose. Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the only ground upon which such assumption is based is the BIR agent's statement which is mere hearsay (coming from an informant) and when in fact part thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was not asked that the things belonging to Atty. Remo and to others also be searched and seized. For all the foregoing reasons, and finding that the errors assigned by the appellant are very well founded, the appealed judgment is reversed, and it is ordered that the art metal filing cabinet, together with the key thereof seized by the internal revenue agent by

virtue of the judicial warrant in question, which is hereby declared null and void, be immediately returned unopened to the appellant; and that a copy of this decision be sent to the Solicitor-General for him to take action, if he deems it justified, upon careful investigation of the facts, against the internal revenue agent or agents who obtained and executed the warrant in question, in accordance with the provisions of article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, without special pronouncement as to costs.

12.14 ALVAREZ V. CFI 64 PHIL 33

Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti- Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez's store and residence on 4 June 1936, and seized and took possession of his confidential files. The search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of Alvarez who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the court.

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts

12.15 WEBB V. DE LEON GR 121234 AUG. 23,1995

Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.   Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.   The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.   Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

ISSUES:  W/N respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?  

Ruling: NO. It is a valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it.   Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.”  Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission

that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them.  

For Search:

12.16 BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800

Facts: Armed with a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, law enforcement officers searched the offices of the “We forum” and “Metropolitan Mail” newspapers. During the course of the search, the law enforcement officers seized office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia and several other materials used in the distribution of newspapers. Petitioner avers, among others, that the seizure of the properties mentioned above amounts to seizure of real properties, which cannot be validly conducted under the strength of a search warrant. It must be noted that real properties are not susceptible of confiscation under a search warrant. Hence this appeal which assails the validity of the search and the seizure of the properties of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether there is merit in the petitioner’s assertion that real property were invalidly seized under the disputed warrants.

Ruling: No. The petitioner’s assertion does not hold water. Under Article 415(5) of the civil code, “machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works” are considered immovable property. In another case decided by the Court, in which the abovementioned legal provision was invoked, it was ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remains movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

12.17 PRUDENTE V. DAYRIT 180 SCRA 69

FACTS: The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives and ammunitions. Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.

Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:

1. Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts

2. The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and answers

3. Search warrant was a general warrant

4. Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?

Ruling: No. Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which the offense are in the place sought to be searched. This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

12.18 UNITED STATES V. JONES JANUARY 23, 2012

Facts: Antoine Jones was arrested on Oct. 24, 2005, for drug possession after police attached a tracker to Jones's Jeep -- without judicial approval -- and used it to follow him for a month. A jury found Jones not guilty on all charges save for conspiracy, on which point jurors hung. District prosecutors, upset at the loss, re-filed a single count of conspiracy against Jones and his business partner, Lawrence Maynard. Jones owned the "Levels" nightclub in the District of Columbia. Jones and Maynard were then convicted, but a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court specifically stated in a 1983 case regarding the use of a beeper to track a suspect that the decision could not be used to justify 24-hour surveillance without a warrant.

Issue: W/N the warrantless use of a tracking device on Jones's vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violate Jones' Fourth Amendment rights?

Ruling: Yes. The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the installation of a GPS tracking device on Jones' vehicle, without a warrant, constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the government's argument that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's movement on public thoroughfares and emphasized that the Fourth Amendment provided some protection for trespass onto personal property.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, agreeing that the government had obtained information by usurping Jones' property and by invading his privacy. However, she further reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was not only concerned with trespasses onto property. She stated that a Fourth Amendment search occurs whenever the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, which is particularly important in an era where physical intrusion is unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.

II Who determines Probable Cause

12.19 PEOPLE V. CA GR 126005 JAN. 21, 1999

Facts: Jonathan Cerbo was charged in an information for murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Rosalinda Dy inside the office of his father, Billy Cerbo. The information was amended to include Billy Cerbo as one of the accused and a warrant for his arrest was correspondingly issued. Respondent judge, in a motion to quash warrant of arrest, dismissed the case against Billy for insufficiency of evidence, recalled the warrant issued, and ordered the prosecution to withdraw its amended information and to file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only. The private prosecutor's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, his resort to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, in affirming the trial court held that the trial court RTC has authority to reverse the prosecutor's finding of probable cause and dismiss the information on the ground that the evidence presented did not substantiate the charge.

Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo.

Ruling: Yes. The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function, the correctness of the exercise of which is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judge should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of a warrant of arrest was insufficient. As a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of evidence because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the trial.

III. Kinds of Evidence Needed to Establish Probable Cause

12.20 MICROSOFT CORP. V. MAXICORP, GR 140946

FACTS : This case involves the issuance of search warrant to the respondent MAXICORP Inc for alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair competition). Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants." Where the RTC denied the motion and at the same time denied their motion for reconsideration. According to RTC they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp. Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC’s order. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order denying Maxicorp’s motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion on 29 November 1999. The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."

ISSUE : Whether or not there’s a probable cause on the part of CA to quash the search warrants issued by RTC

RULING: Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. The testimonies of these two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of petitioners. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there. The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation.26 Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name. For purposes of determining probable cause, the sales receipt is not the only proof that the sale of petitioners’ software occurred. During the search warrant application proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented to the judge the computer unit that he purchased from Maxicorp, in which computer unit Maxicorp had pre-installed petitioners’ software.

IV. In General

13.11 Nala v. Barroso, GR 153087 Aug. 7, 2003

FACTS: On June 2001, PO3 Alcoser together with his witness applied for the issuance of a warrant to search the person and residence of petitioner Bernard R. Nala, who was referred to in the application as “Rumolo Nala alias Long” of “Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon.” The application was filed in connection with petitioner’s alleged illegal possession of one caliber .22 magnum and one 9 mm. pistol in violation of Illegal Possession of Firearms. On the same day, respondent Presiding Judge of RTC of Malaybalay City, issued Search and Seizure Warrant. The fact that the items seized were not exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the items seized bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.

(Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his first name was erroneously stated therein as “Romulo” and not “Bernard”, considering that the warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence of petitioner and no other.)

ISSUE: Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant?

RULING: YES. the failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner, which is “Bernard” and not “Romulo” or “Rumolo”, does not invalidate the warrant because the additional description “alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao, Bukidnon” sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner. . What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case, contains a description personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. Search and Seizure Warrant is declared VOID and the articles seized by virtue thereof are declared inadmissible in evidence.

13.12 Betoy v. Judge MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES,  A.M. No. MTJ-05-1608, February 28, 2006

Facts: In a Letter-Complaint dated July 2000, signed by Bernardo Betoy, Sr. (complainant) charges Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores (respondent) with Grave Abuse of Discretion and Authority, Conduct Unbecoming as a Judge and Gross Negligence Resulting to Procedural Lapses (Dereliction of Duty).Complainant attached to the Letter-Complaint an Affidavit executed by his wife Lucia Betoy.

Issue: Whether respondent retired Judge was found guily of gross ignorance of the law.

Ruling: Yes. Respondent retired Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is fined P20,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section 11(A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more thanP40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may

determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

13.13 20th Century Fox v. CA, 162 SCRA 655; G.R. Nos. 76649-51, August 19, 1988

Facts: Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBI’s anti-film piracy campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.

Issue: Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?

Ruling: YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.

The Court DISMISSED the petition and AFFIRMED the questioned decision and resolution of the CA.

13.14 Columbia Pictures v. CA, 262 SCRA 219

Facts:In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge granted the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be issued in copyright cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be attached in the application for warrant.

ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case.

HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the VRB and Columbia Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted, required with respect to the finding of probable cause.

B. Personally Determined by the Judge

13.15 Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463

Facts: Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have been found. Upon receipt of said information, respondent judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the information to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscal’s certification in the information of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest.

Issue: Whether respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the conclusion as to existence of probable cause. Petition dismissed.

13.16 Lim v. Judge Fenix, 194 SCRA 292

FACTS: On March 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Mr. Siblante

another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused.

ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

13.17 People v. Inting, 187 SCRA 788

Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor.

Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

13.18 People v. Delgado, 189 SCRA 715, 189 SCRA 715, 1990

Facts: On January 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from the Election Registrar of Toledo City against private respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an information against each of the private respondents for violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against the private respondents as recommended.

Private respondents filed motions for reconsiderations and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC.

Issue: Whether the (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.

Held: Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the court or unless so ordered by the court.

13.19 Allado v. Diokno – 232 SCRA 192

Facts: On September 1993, a Security Guard and a discharged Philippine Constabulary named Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Van Twest, a German national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios of the RTC of Manila.

Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant issued separately raided the dwellings of police officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and ammunitions were found in the raid including Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and their other co-defendants were charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority.

Issue: Whether a warrant of arrest without bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in the custody of the court.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding in the case on the ground of lack of probable cause. As with other earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement that the accused be in the custody of the law. Various reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court to accused even if they are not in the custody of the law.

13.20 Gozos v. Tac-an – GR 123191, Dec. 17, 1998

Facts: On February 1995, the officials, teachers, and students of the Concepcion Aguila Memorial College in San Jose, Batangas organized a school party. While the party was going on, the principal, Felizardo Aguila, was informed that several men, who appeared to be drunk, were trying to force their way through the main gate. One of the men seemed armed with a handgun. After calling the police, Aguila went to the main gate, where he asked the men what their business was.

At this point, private respondents Blanco and Atienza arrived at the school. They were shortly joined by private respondents Pedro Castillo, Sulit, and Ildefonso Castillo, who were all members of the Philippine National Police of San Jose, Batangas. They demanded from the man armed with a handgun, who later turned out to be the victim Gilbert Dyogi, that he surrender his gun and go with them to the station. Gilbert Dyogi gave the handgun to the respondents, who then asked to see his license. He produced a sheet of paper from his wallet which he handed to private respondents. After allowing them to inspect the weapon and the alleged license, Gilbert Dyogi asked the private respondents to give them back to him. However, private respondent Blanco, who had the gun, refused to do so.

What exactly followed is unclear. Before long the two were grappling for possession of the gun. Apparently, Blanco pulled out his sidearm and fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice. Order dated January 1996 Respondent judge Tac-an denied the second motion for reconsideration filed by complainant Edna Dyogi, questioning the authority of respondent to require the Provincial Prosecutor to amend the information. (long facts to be substantial)

Issue:  Whether or not there is probable cause against all the accused before the issuance of a warrant of arrest

Ruling: The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Hence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the judge regarding the designation of the offense committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for the offense charged, he should issue a warrant of arrest against the accused for the crime charged in the information.Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted and the orders, dated October 1995 , November 1995, and January 1996, of respondent Judge Paterno tac-an are annulled and set aside.

14.11 FLORES vs. SUMALJAG (290 SCRA 568)

Facts: This is an administrative case against Judge Antonio C. Sumaljag, Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 5, Municipal Trial Court of Baybay, Leyte, for gross ignorance of the law in connection with the preliminary investigation of three criminal cases and the arrest of complainants.

Complainants Domingo Veloso, et al, were charged for conspiring together in preparing a spurious and falsified excerpt from the alleged minutes of the regular session dated August 24, 1996 to unduly protest the application of another person in the name of Gualberto Parmis to own a certain lot in Sitio Hayahay in Baybay, Leyte. The charge arises from the fact that no regular session was held on the above-mentioned date.

Basically, the complainants instituted this administrative case because of the four main points:

1. The testimonies during the preliminary examinations failed to establish probable cause;

2. In Criminal Case Nos. R-3227-A and R-3228-A, the complainant was not personally examined by respondent, the ones who testified being only complainants witnesses;

3. In Criminal Case No. R 3231-A, there was absence of searching questions and answers during the preliminary examination, the questions propounded being answerable by Yes, Judge;

4. There was no cause under the law to arrest them as the possibility of fleeing to escape the hands of justice is remote as they are barangay officials.

In response to the charge, the respondent judge said that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation had likewise been observed. He contended that, by posting bail, complainants waived objection to any irregularities which might have been committed in the course of the preliminary investigation. 

ISSUE:When may an investigating judge issue a warrant of arrest of the accused?

HELD:What differentiates the present rule from the previous one before the 1985 revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is that while before, it was mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused if he found probable cause, the rule now is that the investigating judges power to order the arrest of the accused is limited to instances in which there is a necessity for placing him in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The arrest of the accused can be ordered only in the event the prosecutor files the case and the judge of the Regional Trial Court finds probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It is entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion.

14.12 BACHE & CO. vs RUIZ (37 SCRA 823)

Facts: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J  Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant “Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by

which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

14.13 SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR (GR 8287, Nov. 14, 1981)

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

HELD: What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

14.14 LUNA vs. PLAZA (26 SCRA 310)

Facts: Luna was charged with the crime of murder before the court of respondent-judge Lorenzo Plaza. Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the form of questions and answers taken by investigator T-Sgt. Patosa, and subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the complaint. The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions were propounded by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them. Considering the answers of the affiants to the questions contained in their sworn statements, together with the post-mortem and autopsy report on the dead body of the victim, the respondent Judge opined that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof. Respondent Judge issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be accepted for the provisional release of the accused.Petitioner contends that Republic Act No. 3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a warrant of arrest, two specific duties, to wit: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The record of the instant case, according to petitioner, does not show that said examination was performed by respondent Judge.

ISSUE: Did the respondent judge violate the above-mentioned requisites for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?

HELD: The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respondent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution; that respondent judge adopted as his own personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa appearing in the written statements, which he read over again the witnesses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. The second condition for the issuance of a warrant of arrest was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by statements of the witnesses under oath." The third condition requiredwas likewise fulfilled. The examination of the witnesses was written down, in the form of searching questions and answers.

Additional notes: The term "searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial.” What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the

subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At any rate, the court a quo found that respondent Judge was "satisfied that the questions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law," so the respondent Judge adopted them.

14.15 KHO vs. JUDGE MAKALINTAL (GR 94902-06)

Facts: May 15, 1990, NBI agents Max Salvador and Eduardo Arugay applied for the issuance of search warrants by the respondent Judge against petitioner Kho, in his residences in BF homes and Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search warrants were applied after teams of NBI agents had conducted personal surveillances and investigation in the 2 houses on the basis of confidential information they received that said places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop” vehicles. On the same day, respondent Judge conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after which he issued search warrants. On May 16, 1990, NBI searched the premises and recovered unlicensed high-powered firearms, ammunitions, radio transceivers and unregistered motor vehicles. On May 28, 1990, petitioners file a Motion to Quash contending that said warrants were issued without probable cause and were in the nature of general warrants. On July 26, 1990, respondent Judge denied said motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants?

HELD: Yes. It is within the discretion of the examining judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the questions asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry – the existence or absence of probable cause. The respondent judge examined the applicants and witnesses under oath, and asked them questions on the facts and circumstances personally known to them enough to create a probable cause.

On the issue of general warrants, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstance will ordinarily allow.

14.16 ALVAREZ vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (64 PHIL 33)

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.  Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal.  On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the search warrant issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.

HELD: Yes. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s

knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

14.17 BACHE & CO. vs. RUIZ (37 SCRA 823)

Facts: Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code. Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon and Arturo Logronio went to CFI with proper documents. Judge Vivencio Ruiz asked his secretary to take the deposition and when done stenographer read it to the judge. Logronio took the oath and was warned by judge that he may be charged with perjury if found lying. Search warrant was issued and served. Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents. BIR based on the documents seized. Petitioner contend that judged failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not search warrant is null and void on the ground of no personal examination of the judge?

RULING: Yes. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.

14.18 BORLONGAN vs. PENA (GR 143591, Nov. 23, 2007)

Facts: Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss, including several documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued for the petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners’ refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of “Not Guilty” for them. The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court ruled that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly issued;

2. WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and

3. WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.

HELD: First issue: For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid. On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest. The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. The respondent’s claims of the falsity of the documents were mere assertions. It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion

Second issue: Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge could determine probable cause.

Third issue: Yes. The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.

Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x.

14.19 PEOPLE vs. MAMARIL (GR 147607)

Facts: SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and prepared a receipt of property seized and certified that the house was properly searched, which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials who witnessed the search. The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same. Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was at his parent’s house when the search was conducted only because he visited his mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly searched was his.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant.

RULING: Yes. In determining probable cause, it is required that (1) the judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally; (2) that the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into writing his examination of the applicant, and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available records kept in their office, neither transcript of the proceedings of a searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in writing was presented. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable cause.

14.20 ORTIZ vs. PALAYPAYON (234 SCRA 391)

Facts: Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur is administratively charged with gross ignorance of the law tainted with vindictiveness and oppression relative to a criminal case pending before respondent judge. The charge stemmed from a complaint for damage to property thru reckless imprudence filed before the respondent's sala on May 19, 1993 involving a collision between a Toyota Corolla owned by one Rosalinda Tanay and then driven by her husband, Roberto Tanay, and a mini-truck owned by one Juliana Lu which was entrusted to herein complainant, and then driven by one Rodrigo Vasquez. It appears that on May 19, 1993, respondent judge issued an order for the arrest of accused Juliana Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant, David Ortiz, on the basis of mere affidavits by the offended party and without conducting the preliminary investigation required by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court

Respondent judge, instead of filing his comment on the complaint, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of factual or legal basis. claims that pursuant to the said rule, he personally examined in writing and under oath the private complainant and his witnesses by asking the same questions propounded to them in their sworn statements and the same answers were given. At the same time, respondent judge maintains that it is customary for him to adopt the sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied of the existence of probable cause. This practice, he claims, will expedite the proceedings and save the party litigants' time and money.

ISSUE: Whether or not Palaypon erred in ordering the arrest of the accused Juliana Lu, et al.?

HELD: The respondent judge's action clearly violates constitutional provisions and established rules of procedure. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “…no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce...” In relation thereto, Rule 112, Section 6 (b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that “If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.”

From the foregoing factual and legal milieu, it is evident that there was no preliminary investigation conducted. Respondent judge did not personally examine the complainant and her witnesses by asking searching questions and answers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause as mandated by law. He simply ignored the constitutional requirement of procedural due process. This Court cannot countenance such blatant practice of disregarding fairly elementary legal principles and substituting it with an unorthodox and highly irregular practice which appears convenient only to respondent judge.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State.

D. Particularity of Description

15.11 People versus Veloso

F:In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the Penal CodeThe errors assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.

I:Whether there was a valid SW?

R:YES. John Doe warrants are valid if the best description possible is given in the arrest warrant. It must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, personal appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he may be identified.

The Court agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty, accordingly, falls within that provided by the Penal Code.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.12 Alvarez versus CFI

F: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’ house. On June, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the Search Warrant (SW). Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further

investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.

Ruling: The Constitution requires that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

Particularity of Decision

15.13 Corro versus Lising

F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.

I: Whether the SW was valid?

R: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. Conclusions of law of military officers will not satisfy probable cause requirement for issuance of search warrants.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.14 Pangandaman versus Casar

F: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

I: Whether said warrant is valid?

R: NO. Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would identify. Clearly such was violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

Wherefore, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint of his court for further appropriate action.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.15 Stonehill versus Diokno

F: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts,

financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June with respect to some documents and papers.

I: Whether the SW were vaid?

R: NO. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.

Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.16 People versus Martinez

F: September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported that a pot session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez. Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methyl amphetamine HCL. On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit. The CA supported the findings of the lower court.(IN SHORT THE ACCUSED HEREIN ARE CAUGHT IN A POT SESSION INFLAGRANTE DELICTO)

I: Whether the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest.

R: YES. Section 2 as a constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances.

This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.17 Microsoft Corp versus Maxicorp

F: In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares were being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz”.

Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.

The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.

I: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling in favor of Maxicorp.?

R: NO. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there.

The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.18 Burgos versus Chief of Staff, AFP

F: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real properties.

Issue: Whether the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

R: NO. What makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.

The Search Warrants issued by respondent judge are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.19 Frank Uy versus BIR

F: In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.

I: Whether there was a valid search warrant issued?

R: NO. The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies were cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

15.20 Yousex Al Ghoul versus CA

F: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the RTC, Caloocan City, issued 2 search warrants for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Caloocan City.

On April, the police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Caloocan City accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.6 Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during the search, and said witness was not presented at the trial.

I: Whether the items described in the warrant were sufficiently described with particularity.

R: NO. The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.

Now, in contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seized during the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specifity in the warrants in question.

The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or species would suffice.

EMPHASIS ON MAIN POINT SUPPLIED

16.12 People v CA

FACTS; A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant.

An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.

ISSUE: Whether the search warrant is valid

RULING: No. What was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant and the premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized

16.12 Paper Industries v Asuncion

FACTS: Petitioners pray, inter alia for the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799. Petitioners submit that Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash such warrant as probable cause has not been sufficiently established and it was of the nature of a general search warrant and on the additional ground that the warrant was unlawfully served or implemented.

ISSUE: Whether the warrant is valid

RULING: NO. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity. Search Warrant No. 799 is declared null and void.

16.13 Malalaon v CA

FACTS: Filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at Quezon City. Respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90, the same was implemented and resulted to the indictment of herein petitioners. Petitioners raise the issue of WHETHER A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.

ISSUE: Whether a branch of a RTC has the authority to issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction

RULING: YES. A search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglamentary, expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. The Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in the country. Contrary to what petitioners aver, there was no violation of their constitutional right which is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. 

16.14 People v Estrada

FACTS: Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the RTC of Quezon City, an application for the issuance of a search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza of Cebu City," for violation of The Consumer Act of the Philippines (selling medicines without appropriate license from DOH). Judge Estrada issued Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a motion to quash the warrant which the respondent Judge granted.

ISSUE: Whether the quashal of the warrant was valid

RULING: YES. The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant. The search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be

searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.

4. Only a Judge May Issue Warrant

16.15 Salazar v Achcoso

FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Marquez directed petitioner to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. After knowing that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, respondent Administrator Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, having verified that petitioner has— (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group went to petitioner’s residence. They served the order to a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. 

ISSUE: Whether the search order was valid?

RULING: No. Under the new Constitution, “. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized”. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, “We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.

16.16 Republic (PCGG) v Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

**** as of the moment, NOT FOUND ****

16.17 Morano v Vivo

FACTS: Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two (2) months. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest.

ISSUE: Whether the Commissioner of Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest

RULING: YES. The constitutional guarantee set forth in Section 1(3), Article III of the Constitution , requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge (prior issuance of a warrant), does not extend to deportation proceedings. The view we here express finds support in the discussions during the constitutional convention. The convention recognized, as sanctioned by due process, possibilities and cases of deprivation of liberty, other than by order of a competent court.

RATIO: The stay as a temporary visitor is subject to certain contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by him, among them, that in case of breach the Commissioner may require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has been filed. The Commissioner did nothing but to enforce such condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the Commissioner to prepare the ground for his deportation under section 37(a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A contrary interpretation would render such power nugatory to the detriment of the State.

16.18 Sy v Domingo

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

**** as of the moment, NOT FOUND ****

16.19 Tron Van Nyhia v Liway

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

**** as of the moment, NOT FOUND ****

16. 20 Board of Commissioners v Judge De La Rosa

FACTS: On January, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 which directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where entry (to the Philippines) was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William Gatchalian and others. The new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings in the Board of Special Inquiry ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian. Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of Manila as presided by respondent Judge De La Rosa. The petition is anchored on inter alia, the proposition that: respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals

ISSUE: Whether the warrant is valid

RULING: NO. From a perusal of the Immigration Act, it is clear that in matters insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional since the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian included.

17.11 Harvey v. Santiago 162 SCRA 840

Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American Nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna. Respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to comprehend petitioners at their residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Poster and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found. Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended February 17, 1988, after close surveillance for 3 months of the CID in Pagsanjan., Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, no other charge but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On March 4, 1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Section 69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of arrest were issued on March 7, 1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec. 37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and Sec. 69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for Bail was filed on March 11, 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. April 4, 1988, Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on April 20, 1988.

Issue: Whether the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause.

Ruling: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based in the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the article are admissible evidences (Rule 126 Section 12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

17.12 Ho v. People 280 SCRA 365

Facts: On August 8, 1991, the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso, Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and Leonardo Odoño. The complaint was for alleged

violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act 3019 prohibiting a public office from entering into any contract or transaction on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will not profit thereby.

According to the information, Rolando Narciso, being then the Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or controlled corporation organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and Doris Ho, the President of National Marine Corporation (NMC), a private corporation organized and operating under our Corporation law, was said to have entered without legal justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to Manila. Such contract was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon as much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shippng Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 per Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation.

Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsmand without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled jurisprudence. They contend that a judge, in personally determining the existence of probable cause, must have before him sufficient evidence submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest warrant. Such evidence should not be “merely described in a prosecutor’s resolution.”

Issue: Whether a judge may determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainant’s affidavit, respondent’s counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been submitted at the preliminary investigation.

Ruling: Article III Section 2, 1987 Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The word “personally” does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitution’s intent to a place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous charters.

The Court, in this case, reiterated and elaborated on the doctrine laid down in People vs. Inting and ruled that:

“First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence of probable cause to issue an arrest order. Their responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable his honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.

Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine te complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor’s recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case enjoys the legal presumption or

regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court consistently held that judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.”

IN THE INSTANT CASE, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor’s findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.

17.13 Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La Rosa 197 SCRA 853

Facts: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, William, the 12 years old, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The Board of Commissioners directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the grounds that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting Commissioner issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of William and was released upon posting P200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29th of the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue: Whether William Gatchalian is to be declare as a Filipino citizen.

Ruling: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child. Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.

5. “Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose”

17.14 Material Distribution v. Judge 84 Phil 127 (1989)

Facts: On March 24, 1947, Lope Sarreal filed a complaint (amended on April 10, 1947, to include Harry Lyons) seeking a money judgment against petitioners on three causes of action in the total of P1,256,229.30. On May 27, 1947, Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of documents. On June 4, 1947, Sarreal filed a supplemental motion for the production and inspection of the originals of Annexes A and B of the complaint. On June 12, 1947, petitioner filed a memorandum and opposition to Sarreal’s original and supplemental motion on the ground that he failed to show good cause and that the motion were evidently filed for the purpose of fishing evidence. On July 16, 1947, respondent judge, granting both motions, required petitioners to produce the documents and annexes in question on July 24, 1947. On account of the absence in the Philippines of Harry Lyons, petitioner moved, reserving whatever rights they have under the Rules of Court, to postpone the inspection of the documents and annexes in question and accordingly respondent judge postponed it to August 15, 1947. Petitioners impugn the validity of the orders of July 16 and September 27, 1947, as were issued by the respondent judge in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of his discretion, and prayed for the annulment or modification Of the order of July 16, 1947.

Issue: Whether the order of the trial judge violated petitioner’s constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Ruling: This Court have considered carefully persons advanced by petitioners and memoranda in support of this allegation and found nothing in them to show how, without the inspection of Annexes A and B of the complaint petitioners may incriminate themselves. The Court have, therefore, to dismiss such contention.

The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection of books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by respondent judge place them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable searches.

The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be violated, because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue an order for the production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of the constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor

of the disclosure of communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice. After a careful consideration of the legal question raised by petitioners, this Court has arrived at the conclusion that the trial judge, in issuing the order of July 16, 1947, has not exceed his jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion.

17.15 Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 US 186

Facts: The provisions of Section 11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, authorizing the Administrator to investigate conditions and practices of employment in any industry subject to the Act, and of Section 9, incorporating the provisions of Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizing the issuance and judicial enforcement of subpoenas, were challenge by the petitioners, contending that they violate the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures or any other provision of the Constitution. Said law applies to business of publishing and distributing newspapers like the herein petitioners. Respondent conducted an investigation pursuant to the above-mentioned law against the petitioners.

Issue: Whether the Fair Labor Standard Act violates the fourth amendment.

Ruling: No. The Fourth Amendment, if applicable, guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be “particularly described,” if the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant, the gist of the protection being the requirement that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable. There was no violation of petitioner’s rights in these cases, since both petitioners were corporations; the only records or documents sought were corporate ones; no element of self-incrimination was presented or claimed; all the records sought were relevant to an inquiry for the purpose of determining whether petitioners were subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it; and such an inquiry was authorized by Section 11 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

17.16 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US 523 (1967)

Facts: On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.” The inspector was informed that the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he did not have a warrant. The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a second time two days later, and again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons ordering him to appear at the district attorney’s office. The Appellant did not appear and a few weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were again refused because they did not have a search warrant. A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section “does not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it is part of a regulatory scheme which is essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under reasonable conditions.”

Issue: Whether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted, violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through Fourteenth Amendment.

Ruling: Yes. (Frank v. Maryland) to the exten that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must be overruled.” In Frank v. Maryland, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance.” The Frank opinion has been generally been interpreted as carving out an additional exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” The majority here observed, the practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no subtle for individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty.

Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness of a search other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But the majority thought that a number if persuasive inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results. Many such conditions – faulty wiring is an obvious example – are not observable from outside the building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy. Further, after concluded that the area inspection is a reasonable search of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the majority observed it is obvious that “probable cause” to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.

6. Warrantless Searches and Seizures

A. General Rule: Get a Search Warrant

17.17 People v. Aminuddin, 163 SCRA 402

Facts: Idel Aminuddin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one of their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a thorough investigation. The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. In his defense, Aminuddin disclaimed marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However, the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.

Issue: Whether the search of defendant’s bad is legal.

Ruling: the search is illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was no committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime charged.

17.18 People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 85

Facts: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y De La Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant’s hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverder, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. At approximately 5:00 o’clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They then proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant’s hut. The appellant admitted that the said marijuana was owned by him. The police took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by trial court of cultivating marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The accused-appellant contended there was unlawful search and that the court erred in declaring the marijuana plants, as evidence despite that was the product of an illegal search.

Issue: Whether the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in this case lawful.

Ruling: No. in the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause. The Supreme Court Reversed the decision of the RTC and the appellant was acquitted.

17.19 People v. Oliver Edano, GR No.188133, 729 SCRA 255, July 7, 2014

Facts: The prosecution charged appellant Edaño and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A No. 9165 under two separate Informations. The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits followed. The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay P500,000.00 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision. Appellant move to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion.

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid, and if so, whether the seized items were admissible.

Ruling: No. the shabu purportedly seized from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known as arrest in flagrante delicto.

“For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED MUST EXECUTED AN OVERT ACT INDICATING THAT HE HAS JUST COMMITTED, IS ACTUALLY COMMITTING, OR WAS ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT A CRIME. In fact, SPO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them. There was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car.

17.20 Dale Grady v. North Carolina, March 30, 2015

Facts: Between 1997 and 2006, Dale Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released for the second time, a trial court civilly committed Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring program for the duration of his life. The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that authorities can make sure that participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking amounted to unreasonable search that was prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. Both the trial court and North Carolina Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search.

Issue: Whether wearing of a GPS monitor constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Ruling: Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the trial court and appellate court both failed to apply correct law based on the Court’s decision in United States v. Jones, which held that placing a GPS tracker on the bottom of a vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that participation in the North Carolina program amounted to a search because requiring someone to wear a bracelet that tracks the person’s whereabouts constitutes what the Jones decision termed a “physical occupation of private property for the purpose of obtaining information.” The Court remanded the case back to the trial court for a determination of whether or not this “search” was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

B. When is search a “search”

18.11 Valmonte v. General de Villa – 178 SCRA 211 (Main) and 185 SCRA 655 (MR)

FACTS: The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.

ISSUE: Whether the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures

RULING: No. Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invoked only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those, which are reasonable, are not forbidden.

Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.

18.12 Guazon v. De Villa – 181 SCRA 623

The military and police officers conducted “Areal Target Zonings” or “saturation drives” in Metro Manila, specifically on places where the subversives, as pinpointed by said authorities, were hiding. During these saturation drives, police and military units cordon an area o! more than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay or areas of barangays, without any search warrant or warrant o! arrest. Petitioners claimed that said saturation drives followed a common pattern of human rights abuses, as such, sought for its stoppage.

FACTS: The petitioners, who are of legal age, bonafide residents of Metro Manila, and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities, sought to prohibit the military and police officers from conducting “real Target Zonings" or “saturation drives" in Metro Manila.

ISSUE: Whether a search may be conducted legally without search warrant.

RULING: No. Nothing in the Constitution denies the authority of the Chief Executive to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming communist activities. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their distinguishing features. Moreover, the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house guaranteed under Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which the Government may not touch.

18.13 People v. Tudtud, GR 144037, Sept 26, 2003

Facts: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was proper.

RULING: No. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. The search of Tudtud's box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.

18.14 Sony Music v. Judge Espanol, GR 156804, March 14, 2005

The presumption juris tantum of regularity cannot, by itself, prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual because zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself detests.

FACTS: In a criminal complaint filed with the DOJ, the VRB charged Respondents with violation of PD 1987. As alleged in the complaint, the four were engaged in the replication, reproduction and distribution of videograms without license and authority from Videograms Regulatory Board. The NBI through Agent Lavin applied on with the RTC presided by respondent judge for the issuance of search warrants against private respondents which was then issued.

Individual private respondents, through counsel filed a motion to quash search warrant and to release seized properties grounded on lack of probable cause, that the warrant did not sufficiently describe the items to be seized and that the warrant was improperly enforced.

ISSUE: Whether the warrant was issued without probable cause.

RULING: In the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exist to justify the issuance or quashal of the warrant. Moreover, a core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning “the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched.”

In the exercise of this mandate which we can allow as being akin to conducting a preliminary investigation abuse of discretion cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the issuing court on account of its prima facie holding that no offense has been committed, even if consequent to such holding a warrant is recalled and the private complainant is incidentally deprived of vital evidence to prove his case.

D. Instances of Warrantless Searches and Seizures

18.15 People v. Sevilla– 339 SCRA 625

FACTS: Automatic review after the trial court find both the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec 8 , Art II, Republic Act 6425, as amended by R.A 7659, An Act To Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose The Revised Penal Laws, As Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, And For Other Purposes both of them are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death with all the accessory penalties provided by law. Accused are now contending that the court erred in convicting the accused despite the absence of search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

RULING: YES. There are certain cases where the law itself allows a search even in the absence of a warrant. Jurisprudence mentions the following instances under which a warrantless search and seizure may be effected, to wit: 1. Search which is incidental to the arrest. 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view 3. Search of moving vehicle 4 Consented warrantless search 5. Customs search 6. Stop and frisk 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

i. Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

Sec. 12 Rule 16, Rules of Court

Two Requisites:

1. Item to be searched was within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control.

2. Search was contemporaneous with an arrest.

18.16 Padilla v. CA, GR 121917 March 12, 1997

FACTS: A vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident. SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile 3 were able to intercept the vehicle by cutting into the latter's path forcing it to stop. SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla. SPO2 Miranda told Padilla to alight to which Padilla complied. Padilla was wearing a short leather jacket such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed, its butt protruding. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but Padilla held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja disarmed Padilla and told the latter about the hit and run incident. Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing to SPO2 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko." Because Padilla's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in his back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when Padilla turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from Padilla. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Padilla by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights. The police officers brought Padilla to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales Boulevard where Padilla voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol with a single round in its chamber and a magazine loaded with 7 other live bullets.

ISSUE: Whether the firearms and ammunition confiscated during a warrantless search and seizure, especially the baby armalite, are admissible as evidence against Robin Padilla.

RULING: Yes. When in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti. Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant." With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, Padilla voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of Padilla indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of Padilla, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within Padilla's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense.

18.17 Espano v. CA 288 SCRA 558 (1998)

FACTS: On 14 July 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., Pat. Romeo Pagilagan and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw Rodolfo Espano selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they approached Espano, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Espano was brought to the police headquarters where he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On 24 July 1991, Espano posted bail and the trial court issued his order of release on 29 July 1991. On 14 August 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting Espano of the crime charged. Espano appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, on 15 January 1995 affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Espano filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the search of Espano’s home after his arrest does not violate against his right against unreasonable search and seizure.

RULING: Espano's arrest falls squarely under Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw Espano handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime. As for the 10 cellophane bags of marijuana found at Espano's residence, however, the same inadmissible in evidence. The articles seized from Espano during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of Espano. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Herein, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.

18.18 People v. De Lara – 236 SCRA 291

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the sale of prohibited drugs. The National Criminal Investigation Service were ordered to conduct a surveillance operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana, Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-pushing in that area. No arrest was made because the team was instructed by their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only. Weeks after, Capt. Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation. The confidential informant proceeded to the house of appellant and bought two foils of marijuana. It was after the accused handed the two foils that he sensed the presence of the police operatives. Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD headquarters for investigation. The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI for chemical analysis. In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found inside his house.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest without warrant was lawful

RULING: As to the legality of appellant's arrest, we find that the police operatives acted within the bounds of law. In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest"

18.19 People v. Leangsiri – 252 SCRA 213

FACTS: Leangsiri, a Thai national, was arrested at the arrival area of the (NAIA). He was in the act of bringing into the country heroin hidden under a black suitcase. He was brought to the headquarters of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) at the Old MIA for further investigation. The head of the command formed a team to conduct follow-up operations in the case. Leangsiri received a telephone call from his contact and was told that the black suitcase would be picked up at about ten oclock that night. He relayed the information to the NARCOM agents. At about ten p.m., Amidus co-appellants, Omogbolahan and Bhola, arrived at the Las Palmas hotel. They knocked on the door of Room 504. Leangsiri took the black suitcase and brought it to the dining area of the room where appellants stood in full view of NARCOM agents Gapiangao and Balneg and handed it over to appellants. They started to leave the hotel room with the contraband when Agents barged out of the washroom and made the arrest. Appellants identified themselves by presenting their respective passports. Amidu, on the other hand, merely said she was staying in Room 413 in the same hotel. Accompanied by the hotels owner and security officer, appellant Amidus room was searched. Tucked within the pages of her telephone and address book was a piece of paper with the name Suchinda Leangsiri written on it. The paper and Amidu’s other possessions were confiscated. The trial court convicted appellants, finding them guilty of conspiring to transport heroin.  The argument of appellants is that the piece of paper found in Amidus hotel room should not be admitted to the court because such warrantless search is illegal being made in a place other than the place of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search made by the agents at Amidu’s room is illegal

RULING: The Revised Rules of Court provide that (a) person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The better and established rule is a strict application of the exception provided that is to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri’s name was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant Amidus telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing Leangsiris name cannot be admitted as evidence against appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution’s case against appellants.

18.20 People v. Cuenco – GR 128277, Nov. 16, 1998

FACTS: Ferdinand Cueno y Mata was accused for the sale of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. A surveillance operations was ordered to be conducted on the alleged drug pushing activities of herein accused. During the operation, a sale of marijuana has been consummated. They reported the result of their surveillance to their commanding officer who instructed them to apply for a search warrant. They were issued a search warrant which ordered the search of the premises of Ferdie and the seizure of dried marijuana leaves allegedly in the possession of aforesaid person. However, they were instructed that a buy-bust operation be conducted on the accused first before the implementation of the search warrant. After the operation, they arrested Ferdie. The policemen announced that they had with them a search warrant for the search and seizure of marijuana. Before the raiders proceeded to search the house of the accused, they called for barangay officials in the area to witness the conduct of the search.  Appellant questioned his conviction because of the illegality of the search made in his house. He contends that the policemen showed the barangay officials the search warrant which was not shown to the them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search made in the house of the accused was illegal

RULING: The arrest of appellant has been made in the course of a buy-bust operation, thus, in flagrante delicto. A buy-bust operation - a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law - is far variant from an ordinary arrest.  In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of escaping.