1d responding 2

Upload: sweedy-iwamoto-5584

Post on 06-Apr-2018

215 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    1/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Strategies for Responding to

    Buyer Power

    Strategies for Responding to

    Buyer Power

    MANEC 387

    Economics of Strategy

    MANEC 387

    Economics of Strategy

    David J. BryceDavid J. Bryce

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    2/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Summary of LastFew SessionsSummary of LastFew Sessions Buyers have powerrelative to sellers when demand

    curvesare flat

    Firm demand curvesare flatwhen manyalternativeproductoptionsare available to buyerwhich limitspricing flexibilityand drives down profit

    A change in price could eitherincrease or decreasetotal revenue

    A decrease in price will enhance the availablesatisfaction a consumer can get froma good, whilean increase in price will decrease the availablesatisfaction

    Buyers have powerrelative to sellers when demandcurvesare flat

    Firm demand curvesare flatwhen manyalternativeproductoptionsare available to buyerwhich limitspricing flexibilityand drives down profit

    A change in price could eitherincrease or decreasetotal revenue

    A decrease in price will enhance the availablesatisfaction a consumer can get froma good, whilean increase in price will decrease the availablesatisfaction

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    3/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    The Structure of IndustriesThe Structure of Industries

    Competitive

    Rivalry

    Threat ofnew

    Entrants

    Bargaining

    Powerof

    Customers

    Threat of

    Substitutes

    Bargaining

    Powerof

    Suppliers

    From M. Porter, 1979, How Competitive ForcesShape Strategy

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    4/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Whatcan be done to neutralize the

    bargaining power ofbuyers?

    Whatcan be done to neutralize the

    bargaining power ofbuyers?1. Differentiate product orservice so thatituniquelyrespondsto

    only certain buyer needs

    2. Create demand for complementary goods thatrequire yourproductorservice asan exclusive input

    3. Discriminate on price among buyerscharge differentbuyersadifferentprice foryour product

    4. Narrow the options ofthe buyer through marketconsolidation orexclusive alliances

    5. Find new types ofbuyersand/oralternative uses foryour product

    6. Create switching costs foryourbuyers7. Price atorbelow marginal cost and produce large quantitiesso

    thatyour product floodsthe marketand attracts loyalty,dependence, and dominantmarketshare; then restrictsupplyandraise price (risky)

    1. Differentiate product orservice so thatituniquelyrespondstoonly certain buyer needs

    2. Create demand for complementary goods thatrequire yourproductorservice asan exclusive input

    3. Discriminate on price among buyerscharge differentbuyersadifferentprice foryour product

    4. Narrow the options ofthe buyer through marketconsolidation orexclusive alliances

    5. Find new types ofbuyersand/oralternative uses foryour product

    6. Create switching costs foryourbuyers7. Price atorbelow marginal cost and produce large quantitiesso

    thatyour product floodsthe marketand attracts loyalty,dependence, and dominantmarketshare; then restrictsupplyandraise price (risky)

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    5/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    1. Differentiate Product1. Differentiate Product Recall from lastsession thatconsumer

    preferencesvary

    Ifa firm can uniquelysatisfythe preferencesofsome particular group, itcreatesasteeperdemand curve and more flexibilityin itspricing

    By differentiating, the firmmay, in effect,create a monopoly within some particularconsumersegment

    Recall from lastsession thatconsumerpreferencesvary

    Ifa firm can uniquelysatisfythe preferencesofsome particular group, itcreatesasteeperdemand curve and more flexibilityin itspricing

    By differentiating, the firmmay, in effect,create a monopoly within some particularconsumersegment

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    6/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: Differentiate ProductExample: Differentiate ProductBig Bertha

    Golf clubs

    Wide hittingface and superbbalance appeal

    to less proficientgolfers

    Big BerthaGolf clubs

    Wide hittingface and superbbalance appeal

    to less proficientgolfers q

    p

    Demand forall golf clubs

    Demand forBig Bertha-

    style clubs

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    7/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    2. Create Demand for Complementary

    Goods

    2. Create Demand for Complementary

    Goods Complementary goodsare those thatwork

    together with other products orservicesto createjointvalue

    Example: Sign exclusive jointagreements withcomplementary productcompanies or create newgoods outrightand then help to stimulatedemand forthatgood; or

    Make your good orservice an exclusive inputintothe production ofanother good orservice andcreate demand forthatgood

    Complementary goodsare those thatworktogether with other products orservicesto create

    jointvalue

    Example: Sign exclusive jointagreements withcomplementary productcompanies or create newgoods outrightand then help to stimulatedemand forthatgood; or

    Make your good orservice an exclusive inputintothe production ofanother good orservice andcreate demand forthatgood

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    8/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: Complementary Goods

    Strategy

    Example: Complementary Goods

    Strategy Nutrasweetbrand on dietcolas helped to sell

    more colaand create demand for Nutrasweet

    Intel inside campaign in which Intelsbrand isstamped on complementary goods, thus creatingdemand forthose goodsand selling more chips

    NextelDirect Motorola cell phone walkie-talkiefeaturesare valuable onlyin the presence of

    complementary directconnectservices; sell morephonesby creating demand forthe walkie-talkieservice; Sell the service by creating network-exclusive phones with Motorola

    Nutrasweetbrand on dietcolas helped to sellmore colaand create demand for Nutrasweet

    Intel inside campaign in which Intelsbrand isstamped on complementary goods, thus creatingdemand forthose goodsand selling more chips

    NextelDirect Motorola cell phone walkie-talkiefeaturesare valuable onlyin the presence of

    complementary directconnectservices; sell morephonesby creating demand forthe walkie-talkieservice; Sell the service by creating network-exclusive phones with Motorola

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    9/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    3. Price Discrimination3. Price Discrimination

    Price discrimination is charging a higher price toconsumers with higher willingnessto pay

    Firstdegree: price equals willingnessto pay for everyconsumer firm extractsall consumersurplus

    Second degree: differentprices for differentquantities

    Third degree: differentprices for differentconsumer groups

    In practice, segmentconsumersby elasticity of demand raise price forinelastic customers; lower price forelastic customers

    Auctions, purchasing a car

    Airlines, hotels

    Firstadoptersvs. later ones

    Price discrimination is charging a higher price toconsumers with higher willingnessto pay

    Firstdegree: price equals willingnessto pay for everyconsumer firm extractsall consumersurplus

    Second degree: differentprices for differentquantities

    Third degree: differentprices for differentconsumer groups

    In practice, segmentconsumersby elasticity of demand raise price forinelastic customers; lower price forelastic customers

    Auctions, purchasing a car

    Airlines, hotels

    Firstadoptersvs. later ones

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    10/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Segmenting Customersby

    Differencesin Price Elasticity

    Segmenting Customersby

    Differencesin Price Elasticity

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    11/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    The Opportunity of ConsumerSurplus

    The Opportunity of ConsumerSurplus Considerthe demand curve

    asan ordering of consumersfrom highestto lowest

    willingnessto pay

    Buyersto the leftofmarketclearing demand (Q*) paidlessthan they were willing

    can we charge themmore? Areabetween the demand

    curve and the marketclearing price (P*)is

    consumersurplus.

    Considerthe demand curveasan ordering of consumersfrom highestto lowest

    willingnessto pay

    Buyersto the leftofmarketclearing demand (Q*) paidlessthan they were willing

    can we charge themmore? Areabetween the demand

    curve and the marketclearing price (P*)is

    consumersurplus.

    Q*Q*

    P*P*

    DemandDemandSupply

    ConsumerSurplus

    ConsumerSurplus

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    12/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Value of Price Discrimination:Some Calculations

    Value of Price Discrimination:Some Calculations

    With demand curveQ(P)=100-P and no pricediscrimination, the firmsells70 unitsat$30 for $2100

    revenue.

    With price discrimination, thefirmsells 30 unitsat$70 and40 unitsat$30 for $3300

    revenue. As long asthe costof

    implementing pricediscrimination is lessthan$1200, profitsare increased.

    With demand curveQ(P)=100-P and no pricediscrimination, the firmsells70 unitsat$30 for $2100

    revenue.

    With price discrimination, thefirmsells 30 unitsat$70 and40 unitsat$30 for $3300

    revenue. As long asthe costof

    implementing pricediscrimination is lessthan$1200, profitsare increased.

    3030

    7070

    7070

    3030

    QuantityQuantity

    PricePrice

    Q(P)=100-PQ(P)=100-P

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    13/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: FirstDegree Price

    Discrimination

    Example: FirstDegree Price

    Discrimination

    Auctionstend to collectall availableconsumersurplus when there are many

    bidders

    Carbuying marketgenerally prices highand then bargains down to the

    amountthe consumeris willing to pay

    Auctionstend to collectall availableconsumersurplus when there are many

    bidders

    Carbuying marketgenerally prices highand then bargains down to the

    amountthe consumeris willing to pay

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    14/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: Second Degree Price

    Discrimination

    Example: Second Degree Price

    Discrimination

    Volume discountsdifferentunitpricesdepending on how much is purchased

    Costco large size packaging

    Buy 10 get1 free punch cards

    Supersizein FastFood Wood pegsvolume discounts (see next)

    Volume discountsdifferentunitpricesdepending on how much is purchased

    Costco large size packaging

    Buy 10 get1 free punch cards

    Supersizein FastFood Wood pegsvolume discounts (see next)

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    15/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    16/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: Third Degree Price

    Discrimination

    Example: Third Degree Price

    Discrimination

    Airlines have a differentticketpricedepending on how long before a flighta

    person books; price rises dramaticallyas flightdate approaches

    Three weeks or greateradvancepurchaserstend to be private travelers

    more likelyto shop on price Lastminute purchaserstend to be business

    travelers with deeper pockets

    Airlines have a differentticketpricedepending on how long before a flighta

    person books; price rises dramaticallyas flightdate approaches

    Three weeks or greateradvancepurchaserstend to be private travelers

    more likelyto shop on price Lastminute purchaserstend to be business

    travelers with deeper pockets

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    17/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Requirements forSuccessful Price

    Discrimination

    Requirements forSuccessful Price

    Discrimination1. Identifyand segmentcustomer groupsby

    elasticity inelastic customers are not eager toreveal their elasticity

    2. Preventinelastic customers from purchasingatthe lower price

    3. Preventarbitrage by elastic customers purchasing atthe lower price and reselling to inelastic

    customers4. Provide premium features orservicesthat

    cost lessthan the price premium(legally, youmust show cost differences to justify the pricedifferences)

    1. Identifyand segmentcustomer groupsbyelasticity inelastic customers are not eager toreveal their elasticity

    2. Preventinelastic customers from purchasingatthe lower price

    3. Preventarbitrage by elastic customers purchasing atthe lower price and reselling to inelastic

    customers4. Provide premium features orservicesthat

    cost lessthan the price premium(legally, youmust show cost differences to justify the pricedifferences)

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    18/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    4. Narrow the Options ofthe Buyer4. Narrow the Options ofthe Buyer Since many optionsavailable to buyers

    diminishesasellers flexibility, one strategyisto limitbuyers options

    How?

    Buy, merge, oralign with your competitor(s),supplier(s), or customer(s)

    Lobbythe governmentto impose preferentialtreatments foryour products over foreigncompetitors orto impose importrestrictions oncompetitors products

    Since many optionsavailable to buyersdiminishesasellers flexibility, one strategyisto limitbuyers options

    How?

    Buy, merge, oralign with your competitor(s),supplier(s), or customer(s)

    Lobbythe governmentto impose preferentialtreatments foryour products over foreigncompetitors orto impose importrestrictions oncompetitors products

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    19/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: Narrow Buyer OptionsExample: Narrow Buyer Options OPEC isthe classic case: Numeroussellers of oil who

    create multilateral agreementsamong themselvestoweaken the power ofbuyers

    AOL-Time Warnermerger eliminatesbuyersentertainmentalternatives for each ofTime WarnerandAOL and instead poolsall alternativesunder one roof

    Fruitcooperatives consolidate the produce supply ofmany farmersto limitthe power ofbuyersto extract priceconcessions fromindividual farmers (government

    sanctioned) Merck-Medco Merging with abuyer: Merckbuys Medco

    to mitigate the impactof pharmacybenefitmanagement(PBM) practices on itsbusiness, effectively placing itselfincontrol ofthese practicesand neutralizing some PBMpower

    OPEC isthe classic case: Numeroussellers of oil whocreate multilateral agreementsamong themselvestoweaken the power ofbuyers

    AOL-Time Warnermerger eliminatesbuyersentertainmentalternatives for each ofTime WarnerandAOL and instead poolsall alternativesunder one roof

    Fruitcooperatives consolidate the produce supply ofmany farmersto limitthe power ofbuyersto extract priceconcessions fromindividual farmers (government

    sanctioned) Merck-Medco Merging with abuyer: Merckbuys Medco

    to mitigate the impactof pharmacybenefitmanagement(PBM) practices on itsbusiness, effectively placing itselfincontrol ofthese practicesand neutralizing some PBMpower

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    20/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Example: Narrow Buyer OptionsExample: Narrow Buyer Options Korean Beefindustryin 1980s: Farmers lobbied the

    governmentto reject foreign beefimports; themarketprice ofKorean beefrose to $14 per pound

    USShrimping Industry: Encourage the governmentto place tarriffs on imported shrimp from China

    Korean Beefindustryin 1980s: Farmers lobbied thegovernmentto reject foreign beefimports; themarketprice ofKorean beefrose to $14 per pound

    USShrimping Industry: Encourage the governmentto place tarriffs on imported shrimp from China

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    21/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    5. Find NewT

    ypes ofBuyers5. Find NewT

    ypes ofBuyers Find alternative uses foryour product

    thatare fundamentally new or different;

    i.e. theyappeal to an entirely newcustomer group

    Thisreducesthe total influence thatany

    one group of customers hasin thebusinessand thusreducestheir power

    Find alternative uses foryour productthatare fundamentally new or different;

    i.e. theyappeal to an entirely newcustomer group

    Thisreducesthe total influence thatany

    one group of customers hasin thebusinessand thusreducestheir power

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    22/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    ExamplesExamples Synthetic diamondsused in drill bitsare

    now applied in artificial joints

    New entryinto drill bits was giving powerto buyers

    New medical device customers (forartificial

    joints)reduce the effects of drill bitcustomer power

    Synthetic diamondsused in drill bitsarenow applied in artificial joints

    New entryinto drill bits was giving powerto buyers

    New medical device customers (forartificial

    joints)reduce the effects of drill bitcustomer power

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    23/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    6. Switching costs6. Switching costs By creating coststo switch fromyour

    productto another, you lock-in buyers

    to repeated purchasesand lowertheirpower

    The price ofa potential alternative

    productmustthen be lowerthan theprice ofyour product plusthe switchingcost

    By creating coststo switch fromyourproductto another, you lock-in buyers

    to repeated purchasesand lowertheirpower

    The price ofa potential alternative

    productmustthen be lowerthan theprice ofyour product plusthe switchingcost

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    24/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    ExamplesExamples Ink for Inkjetprinterscustomersare locked into ink

    cartridge typesbased on their printer purchase;therefore, manufacturers price cartridges high sincethey have amonopolyin theirtype ofink cartridge

    Games for NintendoSame effectas forink; oncethe game console is purchased, customersare lockedinto Nintendo games; the high prices for gamesdemonstrate this fact

    Cell phone companiesimpose a contractperiod ofayear (minimum)and impose a high cost for earlywithdrawal

    We will studymore aboutthe theory of lock-in andswitching costsin a latersession

    Ink for Inkjetprinterscustomersare locked into inkcartridge typesbased on their printer purchase;therefore, manufacturers price cartridges high sincethey have amonopolyin theirtype ofink cartridge

    Games for NintendoSame effectas forink; oncethe game console is purchased, customersare lockedinto Nintendo games; the high prices for gamesdemonstrate this fact

    Cell phone companiesimpose a contractperiod ofayear (minimum)and impose a high cost for earlywithdrawal

    We will studymore aboutthe theory of lock-in andswitching costsin a latersession

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    25/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    7. Playthe Demand Game7. Playthe Demand Game1. Price atorbelow marginal cost (your costmustbe

    lowerthan competitors)and produce largequantities, essentially foregoing profitin earlyperiods

    2. Your productattracts loyalty, dependence, anddominantmarketshare; competitors leave themarket

    3. Then restrictsupplyand raise price

    Riskyif loyaltyand dependence does notdevelop orifthisloyaltyisbased only on price

    Worksbestin the presence of consumerswitching costsand/orin standardsraces

    1. Price atorbelow marginal cost (your costmustbelowerthan competitors)and produce largequantities, essentially foregoing profitin earlyperiods

    2. Your productattracts loyalty, dependence, anddominantmarketshare; competitors leave themarket

    3. Then restrictsupplyand raise price

    Riskyif loyaltyand dependence does notdevelop orifthisloyaltyisbased only on price

    Worksbestin the presence of consumerswitching costsand/orin standardsraces

  • 8/3/2019 1d Responding 2

    26/26

    David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002

    Examples: Playthe Demand GameExamples: Playthe Demand Game

    Microsoftoperating systems pricing strategy;MSDOS, Windows (succeeded)

    Similar pricing strategy for Netscape (failed),Adobe Acrobat(succeeded), others

    HondasUS entrystrategyin motorcycles

    (succeeded) HyundaisUS entrystrategyin automobiles

    (failed)

    Microsoftoperating systems pricing strategy;MSDOS, Windows (succeeded)

    Similar pricing strategy for Netscape (failed),Adobe Acrobat(succeeded), others

    HondasUS entrystrategyin motorcycles

    (succeeded) HyundaisUS entrystrategyin automobiles

    (failed)

    Note: Success or Failure in terms ofafter-the-factmarketshare