1d responding 2
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
1/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Strategies for Responding to
Buyer Power
Strategies for Responding to
Buyer Power
MANEC 387
Economics of Strategy
MANEC 387
Economics of Strategy
David J. BryceDavid J. Bryce
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
2/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Summary of LastFew SessionsSummary of LastFew Sessions Buyers have powerrelative to sellers when demand
curvesare flat
Firm demand curvesare flatwhen manyalternativeproductoptionsare available to buyerwhich limitspricing flexibilityand drives down profit
A change in price could eitherincrease or decreasetotal revenue
A decrease in price will enhance the availablesatisfaction a consumer can get froma good, whilean increase in price will decrease the availablesatisfaction
Buyers have powerrelative to sellers when demandcurvesare flat
Firm demand curvesare flatwhen manyalternativeproductoptionsare available to buyerwhich limitspricing flexibilityand drives down profit
A change in price could eitherincrease or decreasetotal revenue
A decrease in price will enhance the availablesatisfaction a consumer can get froma good, whilean increase in price will decrease the availablesatisfaction
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
3/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
The Structure of IndustriesThe Structure of Industries
Competitive
Rivalry
Threat ofnew
Entrants
Bargaining
Powerof
Customers
Threat of
Substitutes
Bargaining
Powerof
Suppliers
From M. Porter, 1979, How Competitive ForcesShape Strategy
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
4/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Whatcan be done to neutralize the
bargaining power ofbuyers?
Whatcan be done to neutralize the
bargaining power ofbuyers?1. Differentiate product orservice so thatituniquelyrespondsto
only certain buyer needs
2. Create demand for complementary goods thatrequire yourproductorservice asan exclusive input
3. Discriminate on price among buyerscharge differentbuyersadifferentprice foryour product
4. Narrow the options ofthe buyer through marketconsolidation orexclusive alliances
5. Find new types ofbuyersand/oralternative uses foryour product
6. Create switching costs foryourbuyers7. Price atorbelow marginal cost and produce large quantitiesso
thatyour product floodsthe marketand attracts loyalty,dependence, and dominantmarketshare; then restrictsupplyandraise price (risky)
1. Differentiate product orservice so thatituniquelyrespondstoonly certain buyer needs
2. Create demand for complementary goods thatrequire yourproductorservice asan exclusive input
3. Discriminate on price among buyerscharge differentbuyersadifferentprice foryour product
4. Narrow the options ofthe buyer through marketconsolidation orexclusive alliances
5. Find new types ofbuyersand/oralternative uses foryour product
6. Create switching costs foryourbuyers7. Price atorbelow marginal cost and produce large quantitiesso
thatyour product floodsthe marketand attracts loyalty,dependence, and dominantmarketshare; then restrictsupplyandraise price (risky)
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
5/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
1. Differentiate Product1. Differentiate Product Recall from lastsession thatconsumer
preferencesvary
Ifa firm can uniquelysatisfythe preferencesofsome particular group, itcreatesasteeperdemand curve and more flexibilityin itspricing
By differentiating, the firmmay, in effect,create a monopoly within some particularconsumersegment
Recall from lastsession thatconsumerpreferencesvary
Ifa firm can uniquelysatisfythe preferencesofsome particular group, itcreatesasteeperdemand curve and more flexibilityin itspricing
By differentiating, the firmmay, in effect,create a monopoly within some particularconsumersegment
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
6/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: Differentiate ProductExample: Differentiate ProductBig Bertha
Golf clubs
Wide hittingface and superbbalance appeal
to less proficientgolfers
Big BerthaGolf clubs
Wide hittingface and superbbalance appeal
to less proficientgolfers q
p
Demand forall golf clubs
Demand forBig Bertha-
style clubs
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
7/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
2. Create Demand for Complementary
Goods
2. Create Demand for Complementary
Goods Complementary goodsare those thatwork
together with other products orservicesto createjointvalue
Example: Sign exclusive jointagreements withcomplementary productcompanies or create newgoods outrightand then help to stimulatedemand forthatgood; or
Make your good orservice an exclusive inputintothe production ofanother good orservice andcreate demand forthatgood
Complementary goodsare those thatworktogether with other products orservicesto create
jointvalue
Example: Sign exclusive jointagreements withcomplementary productcompanies or create newgoods outrightand then help to stimulatedemand forthatgood; or
Make your good orservice an exclusive inputintothe production ofanother good orservice andcreate demand forthatgood
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
8/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: Complementary Goods
Strategy
Example: Complementary Goods
Strategy Nutrasweetbrand on dietcolas helped to sell
more colaand create demand for Nutrasweet
Intel inside campaign in which Intelsbrand isstamped on complementary goods, thus creatingdemand forthose goodsand selling more chips
NextelDirect Motorola cell phone walkie-talkiefeaturesare valuable onlyin the presence of
complementary directconnectservices; sell morephonesby creating demand forthe walkie-talkieservice; Sell the service by creating network-exclusive phones with Motorola
Nutrasweetbrand on dietcolas helped to sellmore colaand create demand for Nutrasweet
Intel inside campaign in which Intelsbrand isstamped on complementary goods, thus creatingdemand forthose goodsand selling more chips
NextelDirect Motorola cell phone walkie-talkiefeaturesare valuable onlyin the presence of
complementary directconnectservices; sell morephonesby creating demand forthe walkie-talkieservice; Sell the service by creating network-exclusive phones with Motorola
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
9/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
3. Price Discrimination3. Price Discrimination
Price discrimination is charging a higher price toconsumers with higher willingnessto pay
Firstdegree: price equals willingnessto pay for everyconsumer firm extractsall consumersurplus
Second degree: differentprices for differentquantities
Third degree: differentprices for differentconsumer groups
In practice, segmentconsumersby elasticity of demand raise price forinelastic customers; lower price forelastic customers
Auctions, purchasing a car
Airlines, hotels
Firstadoptersvs. later ones
Price discrimination is charging a higher price toconsumers with higher willingnessto pay
Firstdegree: price equals willingnessto pay for everyconsumer firm extractsall consumersurplus
Second degree: differentprices for differentquantities
Third degree: differentprices for differentconsumer groups
In practice, segmentconsumersby elasticity of demand raise price forinelastic customers; lower price forelastic customers
Auctions, purchasing a car
Airlines, hotels
Firstadoptersvs. later ones
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
10/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Segmenting Customersby
Differencesin Price Elasticity
Segmenting Customersby
Differencesin Price Elasticity
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
11/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
The Opportunity of ConsumerSurplus
The Opportunity of ConsumerSurplus Considerthe demand curve
asan ordering of consumersfrom highestto lowest
willingnessto pay
Buyersto the leftofmarketclearing demand (Q*) paidlessthan they were willing
can we charge themmore? Areabetween the demand
curve and the marketclearing price (P*)is
consumersurplus.
Considerthe demand curveasan ordering of consumersfrom highestto lowest
willingnessto pay
Buyersto the leftofmarketclearing demand (Q*) paidlessthan they were willing
can we charge themmore? Areabetween the demand
curve and the marketclearing price (P*)is
consumersurplus.
Q*Q*
P*P*
DemandDemandSupply
ConsumerSurplus
ConsumerSurplus
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
12/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Value of Price Discrimination:Some Calculations
Value of Price Discrimination:Some Calculations
With demand curveQ(P)=100-P and no pricediscrimination, the firmsells70 unitsat$30 for $2100
revenue.
With price discrimination, thefirmsells 30 unitsat$70 and40 unitsat$30 for $3300
revenue. As long asthe costof
implementing pricediscrimination is lessthan$1200, profitsare increased.
With demand curveQ(P)=100-P and no pricediscrimination, the firmsells70 unitsat$30 for $2100
revenue.
With price discrimination, thefirmsells 30 unitsat$70 and40 unitsat$30 for $3300
revenue. As long asthe costof
implementing pricediscrimination is lessthan$1200, profitsare increased.
3030
7070
7070
3030
QuantityQuantity
PricePrice
Q(P)=100-PQ(P)=100-P
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
13/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: FirstDegree Price
Discrimination
Example: FirstDegree Price
Discrimination
Auctionstend to collectall availableconsumersurplus when there are many
bidders
Carbuying marketgenerally prices highand then bargains down to the
amountthe consumeris willing to pay
Auctionstend to collectall availableconsumersurplus when there are many
bidders
Carbuying marketgenerally prices highand then bargains down to the
amountthe consumeris willing to pay
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
14/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: Second Degree Price
Discrimination
Example: Second Degree Price
Discrimination
Volume discountsdifferentunitpricesdepending on how much is purchased
Costco large size packaging
Buy 10 get1 free punch cards
Supersizein FastFood Wood pegsvolume discounts (see next)
Volume discountsdifferentunitpricesdepending on how much is purchased
Costco large size packaging
Buy 10 get1 free punch cards
Supersizein FastFood Wood pegsvolume discounts (see next)
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
15/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
16/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: Third Degree Price
Discrimination
Example: Third Degree Price
Discrimination
Airlines have a differentticketpricedepending on how long before a flighta
person books; price rises dramaticallyas flightdate approaches
Three weeks or greateradvancepurchaserstend to be private travelers
more likelyto shop on price Lastminute purchaserstend to be business
travelers with deeper pockets
Airlines have a differentticketpricedepending on how long before a flighta
person books; price rises dramaticallyas flightdate approaches
Three weeks or greateradvancepurchaserstend to be private travelers
more likelyto shop on price Lastminute purchaserstend to be business
travelers with deeper pockets
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
17/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Requirements forSuccessful Price
Discrimination
Requirements forSuccessful Price
Discrimination1. Identifyand segmentcustomer groupsby
elasticity inelastic customers are not eager toreveal their elasticity
2. Preventinelastic customers from purchasingatthe lower price
3. Preventarbitrage by elastic customers purchasing atthe lower price and reselling to inelastic
customers4. Provide premium features orservicesthat
cost lessthan the price premium(legally, youmust show cost differences to justify the pricedifferences)
1. Identifyand segmentcustomer groupsbyelasticity inelastic customers are not eager toreveal their elasticity
2. Preventinelastic customers from purchasingatthe lower price
3. Preventarbitrage by elastic customers purchasing atthe lower price and reselling to inelastic
customers4. Provide premium features orservicesthat
cost lessthan the price premium(legally, youmust show cost differences to justify the pricedifferences)
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
18/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
4. Narrow the Options ofthe Buyer4. Narrow the Options ofthe Buyer Since many optionsavailable to buyers
diminishesasellers flexibility, one strategyisto limitbuyers options
How?
Buy, merge, oralign with your competitor(s),supplier(s), or customer(s)
Lobbythe governmentto impose preferentialtreatments foryour products over foreigncompetitors orto impose importrestrictions oncompetitors products
Since many optionsavailable to buyersdiminishesasellers flexibility, one strategyisto limitbuyers options
How?
Buy, merge, oralign with your competitor(s),supplier(s), or customer(s)
Lobbythe governmentto impose preferentialtreatments foryour products over foreigncompetitors orto impose importrestrictions oncompetitors products
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
19/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: Narrow Buyer OptionsExample: Narrow Buyer Options OPEC isthe classic case: Numeroussellers of oil who
create multilateral agreementsamong themselvestoweaken the power ofbuyers
AOL-Time Warnermerger eliminatesbuyersentertainmentalternatives for each ofTime WarnerandAOL and instead poolsall alternativesunder one roof
Fruitcooperatives consolidate the produce supply ofmany farmersto limitthe power ofbuyersto extract priceconcessions fromindividual farmers (government
sanctioned) Merck-Medco Merging with abuyer: Merckbuys Medco
to mitigate the impactof pharmacybenefitmanagement(PBM) practices on itsbusiness, effectively placing itselfincontrol ofthese practicesand neutralizing some PBMpower
OPEC isthe classic case: Numeroussellers of oil whocreate multilateral agreementsamong themselvestoweaken the power ofbuyers
AOL-Time Warnermerger eliminatesbuyersentertainmentalternatives for each ofTime WarnerandAOL and instead poolsall alternativesunder one roof
Fruitcooperatives consolidate the produce supply ofmany farmersto limitthe power ofbuyersto extract priceconcessions fromindividual farmers (government
sanctioned) Merck-Medco Merging with abuyer: Merckbuys Medco
to mitigate the impactof pharmacybenefitmanagement(PBM) practices on itsbusiness, effectively placing itselfincontrol ofthese practicesand neutralizing some PBMpower
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
20/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Example: Narrow Buyer OptionsExample: Narrow Buyer Options Korean Beefindustryin 1980s: Farmers lobbied the
governmentto reject foreign beefimports; themarketprice ofKorean beefrose to $14 per pound
USShrimping Industry: Encourage the governmentto place tarriffs on imported shrimp from China
Korean Beefindustryin 1980s: Farmers lobbied thegovernmentto reject foreign beefimports; themarketprice ofKorean beefrose to $14 per pound
USShrimping Industry: Encourage the governmentto place tarriffs on imported shrimp from China
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
21/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
5. Find NewT
ypes ofBuyers5. Find NewT
ypes ofBuyers Find alternative uses foryour product
thatare fundamentally new or different;
i.e. theyappeal to an entirely newcustomer group
Thisreducesthe total influence thatany
one group of customers hasin thebusinessand thusreducestheir power
Find alternative uses foryour productthatare fundamentally new or different;
i.e. theyappeal to an entirely newcustomer group
Thisreducesthe total influence thatany
one group of customers hasin thebusinessand thusreducestheir power
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
22/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
ExamplesExamples Synthetic diamondsused in drill bitsare
now applied in artificial joints
New entryinto drill bits was giving powerto buyers
New medical device customers (forartificial
joints)reduce the effects of drill bitcustomer power
Synthetic diamondsused in drill bitsarenow applied in artificial joints
New entryinto drill bits was giving powerto buyers
New medical device customers (forartificial
joints)reduce the effects of drill bitcustomer power
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
23/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
6. Switching costs6. Switching costs By creating coststo switch fromyour
productto another, you lock-in buyers
to repeated purchasesand lowertheirpower
The price ofa potential alternative
productmustthen be lowerthan theprice ofyour product plusthe switchingcost
By creating coststo switch fromyourproductto another, you lock-in buyers
to repeated purchasesand lowertheirpower
The price ofa potential alternative
productmustthen be lowerthan theprice ofyour product plusthe switchingcost
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
24/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
ExamplesExamples Ink for Inkjetprinterscustomersare locked into ink
cartridge typesbased on their printer purchase;therefore, manufacturers price cartridges high sincethey have amonopolyin theirtype ofink cartridge
Games for NintendoSame effectas forink; oncethe game console is purchased, customersare lockedinto Nintendo games; the high prices for gamesdemonstrate this fact
Cell phone companiesimpose a contractperiod ofayear (minimum)and impose a high cost for earlywithdrawal
We will studymore aboutthe theory of lock-in andswitching costsin a latersession
Ink for Inkjetprinterscustomersare locked into inkcartridge typesbased on their printer purchase;therefore, manufacturers price cartridges high sincethey have amonopolyin theirtype ofink cartridge
Games for NintendoSame effectas forink; oncethe game console is purchased, customersare lockedinto Nintendo games; the high prices for gamesdemonstrate this fact
Cell phone companiesimpose a contractperiod ofayear (minimum)and impose a high cost for earlywithdrawal
We will studymore aboutthe theory of lock-in andswitching costsin a latersession
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
25/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
7. Playthe Demand Game7. Playthe Demand Game1. Price atorbelow marginal cost (your costmustbe
lowerthan competitors)and produce largequantities, essentially foregoing profitin earlyperiods
2. Your productattracts loyalty, dependence, anddominantmarketshare; competitors leave themarket
3. Then restrictsupplyand raise price
Riskyif loyaltyand dependence does notdevelop orifthisloyaltyisbased only on price
Worksbestin the presence of consumerswitching costsand/orin standardsraces
1. Price atorbelow marginal cost (your costmustbelowerthan competitors)and produce largequantities, essentially foregoing profitin earlyperiods
2. Your productattracts loyalty, dependence, anddominantmarketshare; competitors leave themarket
3. Then restrictsupplyand raise price
Riskyif loyaltyand dependence does notdevelop orifthisloyaltyisbased only on price
Worksbestin the presence of consumerswitching costsand/orin standardsraces
-
8/3/2019 1d Responding 2
26/26
David J. Bryce 2002David J. Bryce 2002
Examples: Playthe Demand GameExamples: Playthe Demand Game
Microsoftoperating systems pricing strategy;MSDOS, Windows (succeeded)
Similar pricing strategy for Netscape (failed),Adobe Acrobat(succeeded), others
HondasUS entrystrategyin motorcycles
(succeeded) HyundaisUS entrystrategyin automobiles
(failed)
Microsoftoperating systems pricing strategy;MSDOS, Windows (succeeded)
Similar pricing strategy for Netscape (failed),Adobe Acrobat(succeeded), others
HondasUS entrystrategyin motorcycles
(succeeded) HyundaisUS entrystrategyin automobiles
(failed)
Note: Success or Failure in terms ofafter-the-factmarketshare