1.in re joaquin borromeo

VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995 405In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo

A.M. No. 9376960. February 21, 1995.*

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. Ex Rel. Cebu CityChapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Administrative Law; Contempt; There can scarcely be anydoubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of andinterference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect tocourts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding,obstructing and degrading the administration of justice.—Uponthe indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt ofBorromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference withjudicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judgesand improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing anddegrading the administration of justice. He has stubbornlylitigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinatelyclosing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him inmany suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final andexecutory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on theapplication of his own individual version of the rules, founded onnothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading ofthe Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and courtofficers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries,needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried thepatience of the judges and court employees who have had to act onhis repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings andmotions.

Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the power or duty of thecourt to institute a charge for contempt against itself, without theintervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to thepreservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants,lawyers and the public. —It is axiomatic that the "power or dutyof the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself,without the intervention of the fiscal or pros

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* EN BANC.

406

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo

ecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and ofthe respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were theintervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges obligedto file complaints for contempts against them before theprosecuting officer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courtswould be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to performtheir functions with dispatch and absolute independence. Theinstitution of charges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary tohold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trialand punishment by the court. All that the law requires is thatthere be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunityto the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. Thecharge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by aprivate person.

Same; Same; The constitutional rights invoked by him affordno justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes andissues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees and otherpersons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wastingtheir time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.—Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contentionthat in making the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he"was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression, andto petition the government for redress of grievances asguaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordancewith the accountability of public officials." The constitutionalrights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitiouslitigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers,judges, court employees and other persons, for abusing theprocesses and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringingthem into disrepute and disrespect.

Same; Same; Public policy demands that at some definitetime, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositionsthereon accorded absolute finality.—To be sure, there may be, onthe part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with theverdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of nomoment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but theCourt's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demandsthat at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and thecourt's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.

Same; Same; Judgments of the highest tribunal of the landmay not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department orofficial of Government.—The sound, salutary and selfevidentprinciple prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is thatjudgments of the highest

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VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995 407


tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency,branch, department, or official of Government. Once the SupremeCourt has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision shouldnot and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity,much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted byerror in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed in its logicor language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. This,on the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy,and constitutional and traditional principle.

Same; Same; Should judgments of lower courts become finaland executory before or without exhaustion of all recourse ofappeal they too become inviolable, impervious to modifications.—ln respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinaryremedies available under law to a party who is adversely affectedby their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (orreconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Courtof Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whetherquestions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, inaccordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably withthe hierarchy of courts. Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act

of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or in excessof its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be hadthrough the special civil action of certiorari or prohibitionpursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, shouldjudgments of lower courts—which may normally be subject toreview by higher tribunals—become final and executory before, orwithout, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too, becomeinviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longerbe reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by ahigher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by anyother official, branch or department of Government.

Same; Judges; Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled thata judge may not be held administratively accountable for everyerroneous order or decision he renders.—Judges must be free tojudge, without pressure or influence from external forces orfactors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear ofcivil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may doand dispositions they may make in the performance of theirduties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must berecognized independently of statute, that judges are not generallyliable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and ingood faith. This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that ajudge may not be held administratively accountable for everyerroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise wouldbe nothing short of harassment and would make his positiondoubly unbearable, for no

408



one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the processof administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. Theerror must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, orincurred with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases thatadministrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty ofthe Supreme Court.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.Contempt.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; andthat he who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client.There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in theseaphorisms; and they appear to find validation in theproceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is nota lawyer but has apparently read some law books, andostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of afew substantive legal principles and procedural rules.Incredibly, with nothing more than this smattering oflearning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) yearsnow, from 1978 to the present, been instituting andprosecuting legal proceedings in various courts,dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committedby the courts, including the Supreme Court. In thepicturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique M.Fernando, he has, "with all the valor of ignorance,"

1 been

verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverselitigations; or in the words of a wellknown song, rushinginto arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusionthat his trivial acquaintance with the law had given himcompetence to undertake litigation, he has ventured torepresent himself in numerous original and reviewproceedings. Expectedly, the results have been disastrous.In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable andquite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he hasseen fit to compose

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1 Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98,106; Peo. v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389,407.

409


and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts,


judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, forwhich he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's illadvised incursions intolawyering were generated by fairly prosaic transactionswith three (3) banks which came to have calamitousconsequences for him chiefly because of his failure tocomply with his contractual commitments and his stubborninsistence on imposing his own terms and conditions fortheir fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank(TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), SecurityBank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans orcredit accommodation from them, to secure which heconstituted mortgages over immovables belonging to him ormembers of his family, or third persons. He failed to paythese obligations, and when demands were made for him todo so, laid down his own terms for their satisfaction whichwere quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with hisobligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, thebanks refused to let him have his way, he brought suitsright and left, successively if not contemporaneously,against said banks, its officers, and even the lawyers whorepresented the banks in the actions brought by or againsthim. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges ofthe Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of Appealsand the Supreme Court who at one time or another,rendered a judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, aswell as the Clerks of Court and other Court employeessigning the notices thereof, In the aggregate, he hasinitiated or spawned in different fora the astoundingnumber of no less than fifty (50) original or reviewproceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For somesixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuouslycluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baselessif not outlandish, complaints and contentions.

I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS ROYAL BANK(TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to havedealt with was the Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2,1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. Thishe secured by a real estate mortgage created over twoparcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro

1.

410

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATEDIn Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo

BorromeoThakuria (his sister) and Teresita WinniefredLavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a secondloan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this timegiving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land ownedby the Heirs of Vicente B. Borromeo, covered by TCT No.RT7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was vestedin him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by theirrespective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained aLetter of Credit from TRB in the sum of P80,000.00, inconsideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No.595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980.

2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despitedemands therefor. Consequently, TRB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them.At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September 7,1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRBas the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known tothe Bank his intention to redeem the properties at theirauction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however madeclear that Borromeo would also have to settle Hisoutstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80(P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and thisdisagreement gave rise to a series of lawsuits commencedby him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, asaforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

RTC Case No. R22506; CA G.R. CV No. 07015;G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in theCebu City Regional Trial Court for specific performanceand damages against TRB and its local manager, BlasAbril, docketed as Civil Case No. R22506. The complaintsought to compel defendants to allow redemption of theforeclosed properties only at their auction price, with


2.

stipulated interests and charges, without need of

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2 SEE SubHead I, A, 7, infra.

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paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt abovementioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor onDecember 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; buton defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals—docketed asCAG.R. CV No. 07015—the judgment was reversed, bydecision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals heldthat the "plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right ofredemption and can no longer compel defendant to allowredemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this Court where hisappeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By Resolutiondated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division deniedhis petition for review "for failure ** to sufficiently showthat the respondent Court of Appeals had committed anyreversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing onthe contrary that the said decision is supported bysubstantial evidence and is in accord with the facts andapplicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolutiondated November 23, 1988. A second motion forreconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution datedApril 19,1989. The last resolution also directed entry ofjudgment and the remand of the case to the court of originfor prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment wasmade on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7,1989, the Court denied another motion of Borromeo to setaside judgment; and by Resolution dated December20,1989, the Court merely noted without action hismanifestation and motion praying that the decision of theCourt of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "nofurther motion or pleading ** shall be entertained **."

RTC Case No. CEB 8750; CAG.R. SP No. 22356

3.

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentionedbefore Borromeo initiated another civil action in the sameCebu City Regional Trial Court by which he attempted tolitigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRBBranch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as CivilCase No. CEB8750. As might have been anticipated, theaction was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Orderdated May 18, 1990,

3 on the ground

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3 Per Judge Benigno G. Gaviola, Branch 9, RTC, Cebu.

412


of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action—i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB—having been ventilated in Civil Case No. R22506(Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders RoyalBank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by theCourt of Appeals and the Supreme Court in favor ofdefendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court ofAppeals in CAG.R. SP No. 22356.

RTC Case No. CEB9485; CAG.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil CaseNo. R22506, TRB consolidated its ownership over theforeclosed immovables. Contending that that act ofconsolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeofiled complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebuagainst the bank officers and lawyers. These complaintswere however, and quite correctly, given short shrift bythat Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC,this time not only against the TRB, TRB officers JacintoJamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against CityProsecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, EnriquetaBelarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers, MarioOrtiz and the law firm, HERSINLAW. The action wasdocketed as Civil Case No. CEB9485. The complaintcharged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with


4.

manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminalcases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager,Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titlesto the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite thependency of Case No. R22506. This action also failed. Ondefendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19,1992by the RTC (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata(being identical with Civil Case Nos. R22506 and CEB8750, already decided with finality in favor of TRB), andlack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarminoand Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals(CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by that Court's 16thDivision

4 on

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4 Ramirez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Francisco (Cezar) and

Vailoces, JJ.

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October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy wasappeal.

RTC Case No. CEB10368; CAG.R. SP No. 27100

Before Case No. CEB9845 was finally decided, Borromeofiled, on May 30, 1991, still another civil action for thesame cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, andits lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW lawoffice. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums ofMoney, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case metthe same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion,dismissed on September 9,1991 by the RTC (Branch 14

5) on

the ground of litis pendentia.The RTC ruled that—

"Civil Case No. CEB9485 will readily show that the defendantstherein, namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, EnriquetaBelarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante,



5.

Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the sameperson's or nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants inthe present Civil Case No. CEB10368, namely, the Traders RoyalBank, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The onlydifference is that more defendants were impleaded in Civil CaseNo. CEB9485, namely, City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and hisassistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The inclusion of theCity Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they hadnothing to do with the questioned transaction in said case. **."

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for werethe same as those sought in Civil Case No. CEB9485, andthe factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same—the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation ofthe three properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeoto TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9,1991 was setaside by an Order rendered by another Judge on November11, 1991

6—the Judge who previously heard the case having

inhibited

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5 Judge Renato C. Dacudao, presiding.6 Judge Celso M. Gimenez, Branch 5.

414


himself; but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn,nullified by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decisionpromulgated on March 31, 1992 in CAG.R. SP No. 27100(Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. andJoaquin T. Borromeo),7 which decision also directeddismissal of Borromeo's complaint.

RTC Case No. CEB6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointedfor TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo forthwith made that eventthe occasion for another new action, against TRB, RonaldSy, and the banks' attorneys—Mario Ortiz, Honorato



6.

Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAWfirm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB6452,and described as one for "Annulment of Title withDamages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, againinvolved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovables abovementioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious,deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB'sfavor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. Ondefendants' motion, the trial court

8 dismissed the case on

the ground of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point **,plaintiffs right to seek annulment of defendant TradersRoyal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff willultimately and finally win Civil Case No. R22506."


Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrateto the courts the "merit" of his cause against TRB and itsofficers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack byalso suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the members ofthe appellate courts who had ruled adversely to him. Hefiled in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB8236,impleading as defendants not only the same parties he hadtheretofore been suing—TRB and its

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7 Guingona, J., ponente, with whom concurred Javellana and Imperial,JJ.

8 Branch 24, Hon. Priscilla S. Agana, presiding.

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officers and lawyers (HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz)—but alsothe Chairman and Members of the First Division of theSupreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R.No. 83306 (SEE subhead I, A, 1, supra), as well as theMembers of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court ofAppeals who had likewise made dispositions unfavorable tohim. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed torecover damages from the defendant Justices for—


7.

"** maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods anddisregarding evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestlyunjust and biased resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures,facts or laws in support thereof, depriving plaintiff of his cardinalrights to due process and against deprivation of property withoutsaid process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patentlyillegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendant TRB,(which) constitute a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY ANDABUSE OF POWER emanating from the people, b) FLAGRANTVIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARYRIGHTS, DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208,REV. PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants mustbe held liable under said laws."

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "faketitles obtained fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," andrecovery of "P 100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses."This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious demise.On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trialcourt, by Order dated November 7, 1989,

9 dismissed the

case.


It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigatethe same cause subject of two (2) prior actions instituted byhim. This was RTC Case No. CEB13069, against TRB andthe latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. Theaction was dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993,

10

on the ground of res judicata—the subject matter being thesame as that in Civil

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9 Per Judge Jose P. Burgos, Branch 17.10 Per Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Godardo Jacinto.

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Case No. R22506, decision in which was affirmed by theCourt of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by

this Court in G.R. No. 8330611—and litis pendentia—the




8.

this Court in G.R. No. 8330611—and litis pendentia—the

subject matter being also the same as that in Civil CaseNo. CEB8750, decision in which was affirmed by the Courtof Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 22356.

12

RTC Criminal Case No. CBU19344; CAG.R. SPNo. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed aninformation with the RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) againstBorromeo charging him with a violation of the TrustReceipt Law.

13 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.

CBU19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to dismiss thecase on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial.His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A.Abarintos dated April 10,1992. In the same order, HisHonor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment andplaced the case "under a continuous trial system on thedates as may be agreed by the defense and prosecution."Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion wasagain found without merit, by Order dated May 21,1992, hebe took himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civilaction of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders, hisaction being docketed as CAG.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appealsdeclared that the facts did not show that there had beenunreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, anddenied his petition for being without merit.

14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court(G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution dated January 31,1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo tocomply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 188 and1991. His motion for reconsideration was subsequentlydenied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

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11 SEE SubHead I, A, 1, supra.12 SEE SubHead I, A, 2, supra.13 SEE SubHead I, supra.14 Decision dated May 21, 1993; AustriaMartinez, J., ponente, with

whom concurred Puno and Ramirez, JJ.

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a.


Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re"Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 callingthe Resolution of March 23, 1994 "UnConstitutional,Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'"because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and ** (failed)to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was notresolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mereclerk."

15

The Court responded with another Resolution,promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some patiencedrew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his ownprevious case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appealsand Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA1)

16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution

of June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent bythe Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of theDivisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actuallyadopted by the Court after deliberation on a particularmatter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well,that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk ofCourt start with the opening clause—

'Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of theFirst Division of this Court dated ,'

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk ofCourt who prepared or signed the resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matterhad been explained to Borromeo. The record shows that onJuly 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of CourtJulieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealingwith the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243.

17 The same

matter was also dealt with

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15 As every lawyer knows, the Clerk of Court of a Division or of theCourt En Banc is, of course, not a "mere clerk" but the highestadministrative officer in the Division or Court, next only to the Justices.

16 SubHead II, A, 1 infra.




1.

17 SubHead II, A, 4, infra; SubHeads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra.

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in the letter received by him from Clerk of CourtLuzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letterto him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J.Garma, dated May 19,1989.

18 And the same subject was

treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice ofwhich was in due course served on him, to wit: that datedJuly 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897.

19

B. CRIMINAL CASESMention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt—with "all the valor of ignorance"—to fasten not only civil,but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers.

20

Several other attempts on his part to cause criminalprosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will notbe dealt with here.

I.S. Nos. 901187 and 901188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints withthe Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor against JacintoJamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe andOfficers of Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketedas I.S. Nos. 90118788) accused the respondents of "Estafaand Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, amongothers that the bank and its officers, thru its manager,Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that byfraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiatedand effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) propertiesfrom his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lackof legal knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for onlyP671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing marketprices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.

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18 SubHeads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively.19 SubHead II, A, 3, infra.20 See subhead I, A, 3, supra—Because TRB consolidated its ownership




a.

over the foreclosed immovables during the pendency of Civil Case No. R22506, Borromeo filed criminal complaints in the Office of the CityProsecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and lawyers, which werehowever, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office.

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In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990,21 the Cebu City

Fiscal's office dismissed the complaints observing thatactually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank andBorromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs.Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of theforeclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a strangerto the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudicethereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of theforeclosed properties was beyond question as the matterhad been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation;and moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedlyfalsified nor of the manner of its falsification.

I.S. Nos. 873795 and 894234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for recklessfiling of unfounded complaints, the Fiscal also adverted totwo other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo—involving the same foreclosed properties and directedagainst respondent bank officers' predecessors (includingthe former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers—both ofwhich were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:

a. I.S. No, 873795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIOORTIZ and RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification ofPublic Documents, Deceit and False Pretenses."—This case wasdismissed by Resolution dated January 19, 1988 of the CityProsecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letterdated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to thelessee of a portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising thelatter to remit all rentals to the bank as new owner thereof, asshown by the consolidated title; and there was no showing thatrespondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing thedeed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period ofredemption, or that Ortiz had benefited pecuniarily from the


2.

transaction to the prejudice of complainant; andb. I.S. No. 894234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD

SY, ET AL.) for "Estafa Through False Pretenses andFalsification of Public Documents."—This case was dismissed byResolution dated January 31, 1990.

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21 Per 3rd Assistant Fiscal Enriqueta RoquillanoBelarmino.

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I.S. Nos. 88205 to 88207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was stillpending before the Supreme Court,

22 an affidavit was

executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, inconnection with the former's fire insurance claim overproperty registered in its name—one of two immovablesformerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (JoaquinBorromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said bank.

23 In that

affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante statedthat "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired realproperty together with the improvements thereon whichproperty is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered byTCT No. 87398 in the name of TRB." The affidavit wasnotarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified andperjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over theforeclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatantfalsehood in that, among others: ** the consolidation waspremature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminalcomplaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office against theaffiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso)for "falsification of public document, false pretenses,perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's Officedismissed the complaint.

24 It found no untruthful

statements in the affidavit or any malice in its execution,considering that Bustamante's statement was based on theTransfer Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus thedocument that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in order.




3. OMBVIS8900136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No.83306 dated August 15, 1988—sustaining the judgment ofthe Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 inCAG.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of acriminal complaint by

____________

22 See subhead I, A, 1, supra.23 See subhead I, supra.24 By resolution of Fiscal Rodulfo T. Ugsal, approved by City Fiscal

Jufelinito R. Pareja.

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Borromeo in the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas,docketed as OMBVIS8900136. His complaint—against"Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of AppealsJustice (10th Div.)"—was dismissed for lack of merit in aResolution issued on February 14, 1990

25 which, among

other things, ruled as follows:

"It should be noted and emphasized that complainant hasremedies available under the Rules of Court, particularly on civilprocedure and existing laws. It is not the prerogative of this Officeto make a review of Decisions and Resolutions of judicial courts,rendered within their competence. The records do not warrantthis Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20 of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman act statesthat 'the Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessaryinvestigation of any administrative act or omission complained ofif it believes that (1) the complainant had adequate remedy inanother judicial or quasijudicial body;' and Sec. 21 of the samelaw provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not havedisciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary."

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUTPLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated,26 Borromeo (together with a certain



As earlier stated,26 Borromeo (together with a certain

Mercader) also borrowed money from the United CoconutPlanters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgageto secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constitutedover a 122squaremeter commercial lot covered by TCT No.75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwardssold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Laofor P 170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase(pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The salewas made without the knowledge and consent of UCPB.

____________

25 Per Investigator Mario E. Camomot, recommended for approval byDirector IV V. V. Varela, and approved by Juan M. Hagad, DeputyOmbudsman, Visayas.

26 In the third paragraph of this opinion.

422


A. CIVIL CASESNow, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loansand credit accommodations he had obtained from theTraders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment ofhis obligations to the UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, andobviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects of the latter'sdelinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for aloan, offering the property he had purchased fromBorromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealingwith Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one ofwhich was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property.Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title,docketed as Civil Case No. R21009. However, as willshortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidationprayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's applicationfor a loan and itself commenced proceedings to foreclose themortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged byBorromeo not only against Lao, but also against UCPB andthe latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought


1.

contemporaneously with his court war with Traders RoyalBank.

RTC Case No. R21009; ACG.R. No. CV07396;G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as juststated, the action initiated by Samson Lao in the RegionalTrial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122squaremeter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, inaccordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suitLao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was latersubstituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contestedLao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC(Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante, presiding) denyingconsolidation because the transaction between the partiescould not be construed as a sale with pocto de retro being inlaw an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo wasordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00, representingthe price stipulated in the sale a retro,

423


plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and othertaxes in connection with the transaction (P 10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court ofAppeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for failure of hislawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal—ACG.R. No. CV07396—resulted in a Decision by the Court ofAppeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC'sjudgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed bythis Court (Third Division) in a fourpage Resolution datedSeptember 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273—anappeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion forreconsideration on several grounds, one of which was thatthe resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutionalbecause contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of theConstitution," it was not signed by any Justice of theDivision, and there was "no way of knowing which justices

a.

had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrenceof at least three of the members." Since the motion was notfiled until after there had been an entry of judgment,Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration withinthe reglementary period, the same was simply notedwithout action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordancewith established rule and practice, sent to Borromeo overthe signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk ofCourt (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and AlfredoMARASIGAN, respectively).


Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicialcampaign against Traders Royal Bank, Borromeoattempted to vent his resentment even against theSupreme Court officers who, as just stated, had given himnotices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's ThirdDivision. He filed Civil Case No. CEB8679 in the CebuCity RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against "Attys.Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerkof Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division,and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office."He charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, forallegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake,baseless and unconsti

424


tutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No.82273." Summonses were issued to defendants by RTCBranch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybañez, presiding). Theseprocesses were brought to the attention of this Court'sThird Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter asan incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the CourtEn Banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in saidG.R. No. 82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court EnBanc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash the summonses, todismiss Civil Case No. CEB8679, and "not to issuesummons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar naturewhich may in the future be filed in his court." Accordingly,

Judge Ibañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashingthe summonses and dismissing the complaint in said CivilCase No. CEB8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 199027 explained to Borromeo

in no little detail the nature and purpose of notices sent bythe Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the CourtEn Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:

'This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several lettercomplaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman, Borromeohad repeatedly alleged that he 'suffered injustices/ because of thedisposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to thisCourt which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly inviolation of Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutionswhich disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of theJustices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions anddo not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained thatthe resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and thatthey did not state the facts and the law on which they were basedand were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore'unconstitutional, null and void.'

*** *** ***The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that

it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions anddecrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patentlywithout merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature,where the decision appealed from is in accord with the facts of thecase and the applicable laws,

____________

27 Like the letter written to Borromeo, dated July 10, 1987, Subhead A, 1, 5,supra.

425


where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merelyto forestall the early execution of judgment and for noncompliance with the rules. The resolution denying due coursealways gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao


Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], '[T]he Court is not 'dutybound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has amplediscretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions,provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of acase' ** **. This is the only way whereby it can act on all casesfiled before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutionalfunctions. **

** (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and anysubsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motionsdecides to deny due course to the petition and states that thequestions raised are factual, or no reversible error in therespondent court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basisstated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with theconstitutional requirement ** (of Section 14, Article VIII of theConstitution 'that no petition for review or motion forreconsideration shall be refused due course or denied withoutstating the legal basis thereof).

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minuteresolutions are promulgated by the Court through the Clerk ofCourt, who takes charge of sending copies thereof to the partiesconcerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued on aparticular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform theparties of the action taken on their cases by quoting the resolutionadopted by the Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in thedeliberations of a case. All decisions and resolutions are actions ofthe Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the Court'saction. This was explained in the case—G.R. No. 56280, 'RhineMarketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.,' where, in a resolutiondated July 6, 1981, the Court said—'[M]inute resolutions of thisCourt denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like thepetition in the case at bar, are the result of a thoroughdeliberation among the members of this Court, which does notand cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to itsClerk of Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known tocounsel. When a petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, thisCourt sustains the challenged decision or order together with itsfindings of facts and legal conclusions.'

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of theCourt who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do theyrequire the certification of the Chief Justice. For to requiremembers of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would not onlyunduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount oftheir time would be spent on functions more properly performedby the Clerk of Court and which time could be more profitablyused in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and

b.

orders of important nature and char

426


acter. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is stillstruggling to wipe out the backlogs accumulated over the yearsand meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it. ***."

RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB(6501) 6740; G.R. No.84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actionswhich, while having no relation to the UCPB, TRB orSBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates forother suits filed by Joaquin Borromeo againstadministrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judgewho decided one of the cases adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987,Borromeo filed a civil action for damages against a certainTomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as CivilCase No. CEB6501. On January 12,1988, the trial courtdismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure to state acause of action and prematurity (for noncompliance withP.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to refile the samecomplaint with the same Court, on March 18, 1988. Thistime it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB6740, andassigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon.Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, thetrial court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28,1988. His first and second motions for reconsiderationhaving been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for reviewbefore this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T.Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Hon. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Courtrequired petitioner to comply with the rules by submittinga verified statement of material dates and paying thedocket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him tothe Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case.His petition was eventually dismissed by Resolution of theSecond Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure onhis part to show any reversible error in the trial court's

c.

judgment. His motion for reconsideration was denied withfinality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk ofCourt of the Second Division) on April 27, 1989 once moreremonstrating that the resolutions received by him had notbeen signed by any

427


tion of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him onMay 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions ofthis Court denying or dismissing petitions, like the petitionin the case at bar, which was denied for failure of thecounsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that theRegional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committedany reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolutiondated November 21,1988], are the result of a thoroughdeliberation among the members of this Court, which doesnot and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functionto its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns. When thepetition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains thechallenged decision or order together with its findings offacts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from theextended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273,supra (or the earlier communications to him on the samesubject) which had so clearly pointed out that minuteresolutions of the Court are as much the product of theMembers' deliberations as fullblown decisions orresolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk consistsmerely in the ministerial and routinary function ofcommunicating the Court's action to the parties concerned.


What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from thislatest judicial rebuff, yet another in an already long series,was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (SecondDivision) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and AssistantClerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers whohad sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R.No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on June 1,1990, was

2.

docketed as Case No. CEB9042 (Branch 8, Hon. BernardoSalas presiding). Therein he complained essentially of thesame thing he had been harping on all along: that inrelation to G.R. No. 91030—in which the Supreme Courtdismissed his petition for "technical reasons" and failure todemonstrate any reversible error in the challengedjudgment—the notice sent to him—of the "unsigned andunspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying hismotion for reconsideration—had been signed only by thedefendant clerks of court and not by the

428


Justices. According to him, he had thereupon writtenletters to defendants demanding an explanation for said"patently unjust and unConstitutional resolutions," whichthey ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions byissuing resolutions signed only by them and not by anyJustice, and without stating the factual and legal basisthereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patentlyabusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish,severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights andworry"; and consequently, he was entitled to moraldamages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplarydamages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses ofP5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered therecords of the case transmitted to the Supreme Courtconformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R.No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court ofAppeals and Samson Lao," supra—directing that allcomplaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to itfor appropriate action.

28 Borromeo filed a

"Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking theCourt to "rectify the injustices" committed against him inG.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This theCourt ordered expunged from the record (Resolution, July19, 1990).

RTC Case No. R21880; CAG.R. CV No. 10951;G.R. No. 87897


Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing themortgage on his property. In the Cebu City RTC, he filed acomplaint for "Damages with Injunction," which wasdocketed as Civil Case No. R21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeovs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Nameddefendants in the complaint were UCPB, EnriqueFarrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager), and Samson K.Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. DaniloDeen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (bothbeing then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Laowas represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again,Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, JudgeValeriano R. Tomol, Jr.,

_____________

28 Rollo of G.R. 82273.

429


presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right toforeclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damagesin the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's fees amounting toP10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appealswhere it was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 10951. ThatCourt, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente,with de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed hisappeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

Borromeo filed a petition for review with the SupremeCourt which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed it forinsufficiency in form and substance and for being "largelyunintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration wasdenied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motionfor reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July31, 1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effectedon August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (FirstDivision) said:

'The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July4, 1989 filed by petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY thesame for lack of merit, the motion having been filed without

'express leave of court' (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of Court) apartfrom being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petitionfor Review dated April 14,1989 and the Motion forReconsideration dated May 25, 1989. It should be noted thatpetitioner's claims have already been twice rejected as withoutmerit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by theCourt of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have athird ruling on the merits of his claims, this time by this Court.Petitioner is advised that a review of a decision of the Court ofAppeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretionand will be granted only when there is a special and importantreason therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review maybe dismissed summarily on the ground that 'the appeal is withoutmerit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay or the question raisedis too unsubstantial to require consideration' (Section 3, Rule 45),or that only questions of fact are raised in the petition, or thepetition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisitesprescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 188).Petitioner is further advised that the first sentence of Section 14,Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution refers to a decision, and hasno application to a resolution as to which said section pertinentlyprovides that a resolution denying a motion for reconsiderationneed state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution ofJune 26, 1989

430


denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May25, 1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor, The plainand patent signification of the grounds for denial set out in theResolution of June 26, 1989 is that the petitioner's arguments—aimed at the setting aside of the resolution denying the petitionfor review, and consequently bringing about a review of thedecision of the Court of Appeals—had failed to persuade the Courtthat the errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed beencommitted and therefore, there was no cause to modify theconclusions set forth in that judgment; and in such a case, there isobviously no point in reproducing and restating the conclusionsand reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECTENTRY OF JUDGMENT."

3.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C.Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the Court's FirstDivision, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "aLITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELFSERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded anddrunk with power which it has forgotten emanates fromthe people," aside from being "patentlyUNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and factsand law: **" and characterizing the conclusions therein as"the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESSassuming a KINGLIKE AND EVEN GODLIKE POWERtotally at variance and contradicted by **CONSTITUTIONAL provisions **." To the letter Borromeoattached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman"dated August 10,1989 protesting the Court's "issuingUNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTERESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" datedAugust 12, 1989; and (3) a communication of Domingo M.Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, datedAugust 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from therecord because containing "false, impertinent andscandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules ofCourt)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7,1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolutionpromulgated on December 13, 1989.

RTC Case No. CEB4852; CA G.R. SP No. 14519;G.R. No. 84999

In arrant disregard of established rule and practice,Borromeo filed another action to invalidate the foreclosureeffected at the

431


in Case No. CEB21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB4852of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, etal.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPBwas represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, inconsultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII,Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding) dismissed the

a.

complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and orderedBorromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigationexpenses (P 1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court ofAppeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519);but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court onJune 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with thatCourt's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission ofcertified true copies of the Trial Court's decision ofDecember 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, andfor statement of "the dates he received ** (said) decisionand ** order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appealbeing docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a Resolution datedOctober 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment onBorromeo's petition for review by the respondents thereinnamed, and required Borromeo to secure the services ofcounsel. On November 9,1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerillesentered his appearance for Borromeo. After dueproceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, byResolution dated March 6,1989 of the Second Division forfailure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals hadcommitted any reversible error in the questioned judgment.His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989, againcomplaining that the resolution contained no findings offact and law, was denied.


Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB8178, wascommenced by Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this timeagainst the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgmentadverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded asdefendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (thenChairman, First Division\ Estrella G. Pagtanac andMarissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court andAssistant Clerk of Court of

432


the First Division,) and others. Judge German G. Lee ofBranch 15 of said Court—to which the case was raffled—

4.

caused issuance of summonses which were in due courseserved on September 22, 1989, among others, on saiddefendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En BancResolution dated October 2, 1989—in G.R. No. 84999—thisCourt, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court andAssistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show causewhy no disciplinary action should be taken against themfor issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles—who, asalready stated, had for a time represented Borromeo inG.R. No. 84999—filed with this Court his withdrawal ofappearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility"between him and his client, Borromeo—because "Borromeohad been filing pleadings, papers, etc. without ** (his)knowledge and advice"—and declaring that he had "notadvised and ** (had had) no hand in the filing of (said)Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court inCebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance"dated October 23, 1989, apologized to the Court andinformed it that he had already promulgated an orderdismissing Civil Case No. CEB8178 on motion of theprincipal defendants therein, namely, Judge GenerosoJuaban and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty.Cerilles' withdrawal of appearance, and Judge Lee'scompliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution datedNovember 29, 1989.

RTC Case No. CEB374; CAG.R. CV No. 04097;G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction betweenBorromeo and Samson K. Lao which gave rise to anotheraction that ultimately landed in this Court.

29 The

transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's knownas the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeosued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in theCebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contractwith the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable

____________

29 This concerned a fourth bank, the Philippine Bank ofCommunications.

433



mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB374.Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court(Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of theproperty by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale thereofby Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court ofAppeals, but that Court, in CAG.R. CV No. 04097,affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decisionpromulgated on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court on appeal, his reviewpetition being docketed as G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution ofthe Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, hispetition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition aswell as the docket and legal research fund fees were filedand paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and thefindings thereon of the Court of Appeals are final." Hemoved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolutiondated June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still soughtreconsideration of said adverse resolutions through variousmotions and letters, all of which were denied. One of hisletters—inter alia complaining that the notice sent to himby the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of anyJustice—elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y.Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July10, 1987, reading as follows:

"Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copyof the 'actual resolution with the signatures of all the Justices ofthe Second Division' in Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motionfor reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition was denied forlack of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance,Resolution dated July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine MarketingCorp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al., wherein the Supreme Courtdeclared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court denying ordismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case atbar, are the result of a thorough deliberation among the membersof this Court, which does not and cannot delegate the exercise ofits judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its subalterns,which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or

1.

dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challengeddecision or order together with its findings of facts and legalconclusions.' It is the Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties ofthe action taken on their case by quoting the

434


resolution adopted by the Court.Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y. CARREON * * * * * "

B. CRIMINAL CASESJust as he had done with regard to the cases involving theTraders Royal Bank, and similarly without foundation,Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the casesconcerning the UCPB criminally liable.

Case No. OMBVIS8900181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appealsand other attempts to overturn the judgment of the RTC inCivil Case No. 21880,

30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18,1989, a complaintagainst the Chairman and Members of the SupremeCourt's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Divisionof the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice SedfreyOrdoñez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, andCebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them withviolations of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act andthe Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990,31 the Office of the

Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's complaint, opining thatthe matters therein dealt with had already been tried andtheir merits determined by different courts including theSupreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987.That resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find itunreasonable for complainant to dispute and defiantlyrefuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree renderedby the highest tribunal of the land in this case. **."



2.

1.

____________

30 Subhead II, A, 3, supra.31 Written by Felicito C. Latoja, Asso. Graft Investigation Officer II,

and approved by Juan M. Hagad, DOMB.

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Case No. OMBVIS9000418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Officeof the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated January 12, 1990,against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the ThirdDivision, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with aviolation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules ofCourt, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions inthat they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually,notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273which did not bear the justices' signatures.

32 In a

Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of theOmbudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit"declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned actuations ofthe respondents alleged to constitute usurpation ** itcannot be reasonably and fairly inferred that respondentsreally were the ones rendering them," and "it is not theprerogative of this office to review the correctness ofjudicial resolutions."

33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY BANK & TRUSTCO., (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES

RTC Case No. R21615; CAG.R. No. 20617; G.R.No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeoengaged in running court battles, was the Security Bank &Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtainedfive (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19,consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979.



To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit ofP200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in thecase of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations.Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTCagainst

___________

32 SEE SubHead II, A, 1, supra.33 SEE also subhead II, A, 2, supra.

436


Borromeo and Summa for collection.The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R21615, and

was assigned to Branch 10, Judge Leonardo Cañares,presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. EdgarGica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the lawfirm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suitthrough Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.

Judgment by default was rendered in the case onJanuary 5, 1989; both defendants were sentenced to pay toSBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereofas attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); andP5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ ofexecution issued in due course pursuant to which animmovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually soldat public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of thehighest bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to setaside the judgment by default, but the same was denied onMarch 6,1990. His Motion for Reconsideration havinglikewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court ofAppeals for relief (CAG.R. No. 20617), but the latterdismissed his petition. Failing in his bid forreconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court oncertiorari—his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769.On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition,and subsequently denied with finality his motion forreconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on

2.

2.

December 26, 1990.However, as will now be narrated, and as might now

have been anticipated in light of his history of recalcitranceand bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end oflitigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractualcommitments to SBTC, but only marked the start ofanother congeries of actions and proceedings, civil andcriminal concerning the same matter, instituted byBorromeo.


While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the SupremeCourt, Borromeo commenced a suit of his own in the CebuRTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in CivilCase No. R21625HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro,Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried anddisposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Cañares. Hedenominated his action, docketed as Civil

437


Case No. CEB9267, as one for "Damages from Denial ofDue Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment,with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaintaccused defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitfulacts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process anddefraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which actscaused him grave mental and moral shock, sleeplessnights, worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety forwhich he sought payment of moral and exemplary damagesas well as litigation expenses.

By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City,Branch 16 (Hon. Grodardo Jacinto, presiding) granted thedemurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed thecomplaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduceevidence to support ** (his) causes of action asserted **, itwould be superfluous to still require defendants to presenttheir own evidence as there is nothing for them tocontrovert."

RTC Case No. CEB10458; CAG.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filedon July 2, 1991 still another suit against the same parties—SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares—but nowincluding Judge Godardo Jacinto, who had rendered thelatest judgment against him. This suit, docketed as CivilCase No. CEB10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "forDamages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial ofEqual Protection of the Laws, Violation of the Constitution,Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted JudgesCañares and Jacinto "for the way they decided the twocases (CVR21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended thatdefendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts"by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him equalprotection of the laws and due process," on account ofwhich he had been "caused untold mental anguish, moralshock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment forwhich the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order datedAugust 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge

____________

34 Judge Jacinto has, to repeat, since been promoted to the Court ofAppeals.

438


German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint ongrounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from liability inthe performance of their official functions, and lack ofjurisdiction. Borromeo took an appeal to the Court ofAppeals, which docketed it as CAG.R. CV No. 39047.

In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty.Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for contempt of court.The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court ofAppeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993.

35 Said

the Court:

"Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, thesubject motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference inopinion as to what can, or cannot, be considered res judicata


under the circumstances.""* * * * * *"By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and

his apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on thecontrary the appellant who precariously treads the acceptablelimits of argumentation and personal advocacy. The Court,moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets headmits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible andneedlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of theCourts. That he is not a licensed law practitioner is, in fact, theonly reason that his otherwise contumacious behavior is presentlyaccorded the patience and leniency it probably does not deserve.Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited, theappellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays inthe future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurateseverity."

IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB2074; CAG.R. CV No. 14770; G.R.No. 98929One other case arising from another transaction ofBorromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent. This is CaseNo. CEB2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. Itappears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted aloan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank ofCommunications (PBCom) on the security of a lot

____________

35 Rollo, Vol. VII, p. 115.

439


belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered byTCT No. 34785.

36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of

credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic PlantersBank, with Samson Lao as comaker. Borromeo failed topay his obligations. Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's


obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), inconsideration of which a deed of sale was executed in hisfavor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one of whichwas that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao thenmortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loanin the amount of P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of itspersonnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu Regional TrialCourt alleging that the defendants had conspired todeprive him of his property. Judgment was renderedagainst him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the caseto the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed asCAG.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Courtrendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision,and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denyingBorromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to thisCourt, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift.On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated aResolution denying his petition for review "for being factualand for failure ** to sufficiently show that respondent courthad committed any reversible error in its questionedjudgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, heinsisted the notices of the resolutions sent to him wereunconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures ofthe Justices who had taken part in approving theresolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB11528What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositionsrendered against Borromeo, at least as of date of thisResolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeooutlandishly founded on the theory that a judgmentpromulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third

_____________

36 SEE SubHead II, A, 5, supra.

440


Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendantin the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan,as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question.On August 31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O.Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissingBorromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdictionand res judicata" His Honor made the following pertinentobservations:

"** (T)his Court is of the wellconsidered view and so holds thatthis Court has indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret orreverse the judgment or order of the Honorable Supreme Court.The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff against theherein defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court ofthe land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff s complaintare certainly beyond the sphere of this humble court to considerand pass upon to determine their propriety and legality. To try toreview, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of theHonorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuousbut also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for thedefendant, a careful perusal of the allegations in the complaintclearly shows that all material allegations thereof are directedagainst a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedlyissued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. Noallegation is made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernanin his personal capacity. That being the case, how could this Courtquestion the wisdom of the final order or judgment of theSupreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiffhimself had issued a resolution denying plaintiff s petition andaffirming the Lower Court's decision as reflected in the 'Entry ofJudgment.' Perhaps, if there was such violation of the Rules ofCourt, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution by thedefendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have beenobtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse,interpret or review the acts of a superior court might be construedto a certain degree as a show of an uncommon common sense.Lower courts are without supervising jurisdiction to interpret orto reverse the judgment of the higher courts."

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20,1994 was denied "for lack of sufficient factual and legalbasis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

441


V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers of his Court AdversariesBorromeo also initiated administrative disciplinaryproceedings against the lawyers who had appeared for hisadversaries—UCPB and Samson K. Lao—in the actionsabove mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, theselawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen,Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez.His complaint against them, docketed as AdministrativeCase No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeoaverred that the respondent lawyers connived with theirclients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of salewith pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it wasactually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently deprivingcomplainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed ofSale; and (3) defying two lawful Court orders, all inviolation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood norconsent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged thatrespondents Perez and Regis falsely attempted toconsolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent LawyersThe respondent lawyers denounced the disbarmentcomplaint as "absolutely baseless and nothing but pureharrassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled"Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeoin Contempt of Court" July 10, 1990, filed by the IntegratedBar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed byDomero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (VicePresident), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B.Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director),Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director),Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director),and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). Thelawyers made the following observations.:

"It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members ofthe Judiciary with deferential awe and respect sometimes to the

extent of cowering before the might of the courts, here is a nonlawyer who, with gleeful abandon and unmitigated insolence, hascast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the authority andname of the courts.

442


And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate thathere is a nonlawyer who uses the instruments of justice to harasslawyers and courts who crosses his path more especially if theiractuations do not conform with his whims and caprices."

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, interalia charging then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan withsupposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc.,the lawyers went on to say the following:

"The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this HonorableCourt, and other members of the Judiciary are clearly and grosslydisrespectful, insolent and contemptuous. They tend to bringdishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the public confidence on thecourts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will undermine thedignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in thecountry's judicial system and administration of justice."

"** (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of thecourts and the legal profession. So many baseless badmouthinghave been made by Borromeo against this Honorable Court andother courts that for him to go scotfree would certainly bedemoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the courtwith all the respect and esteem due them."

Subsequently, in the same proceeding, Borromeo filedanother pleading protesting the alleged "refusal" of theCebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippinesto act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."

C. Decision of the IBPOn March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP(Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon) transmitted to this Court thenotice and copy of the decision in the case, reached afterdue investigation, as well as the corresponding records inseven (7) volumes. Said decision approved and adopted theReport and Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of

Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu CityChapter, representing the IBP Commission on BarDiscipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint asagainst all the respondents and the issuance of a "warningto Borromeo to be more cautious and not be precipitatelyindiscriminate in the filing of administrative complaints

443


against lawyers."37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Courtare copies of letters ("open" or otherwise), "circulars," flyersor leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory ofthe many court judgments or directives against him anddefamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers andemployees, as well as the judges and court employeesinvolved in the said adverse dispositions—some of whichscurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondentlawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing andcirculation of these defamatory writing were apparentlyundertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his"judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had occasion torefer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum adhominen" and of the "irresponsible leaflets he admits tohave authored ** (which were found to be) highlyreprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity,honor and reputation of the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges andlawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of theConstitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to theeditor of the "Daily Star" as regards the reportedconferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an"Award from the University of Texas for his contributionsin upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing thatFernan "and the Supreme Court persist in renderingrulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due Processand Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of socalled


Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW orSIGNATURES **." He sent a copy of his letter in theSupreme Court.

_____________

37 During the entire period that the administrative case was pending(1990 to 1994), Borromeo wrote an unceasing stream of letters, leaflets,flyers to IBP, harshly critical of the courts and the lawyers who had in oneway or another taken measures adverse to him. One of the last was an"OPEN LETTER to IBP Prexy Manuel Legaspi" dated April 19, 1994.

444


He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan,"declaring that he had "suffered INJUSTICE afterINJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUEJUSTICE but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OFRECTIFYING THEM, labelled my cases as 'frivolous,nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute theirrefutable evidences therein **"; in the same letter, hespecified what he considered to be some of "the terribleinjustices inflicted on me by this Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observedthat "3 years after EDSA, your pledges have not beenfulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts areagents of oppression, instead of being saviours anddefenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referringagain to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, thecourt of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and thetrampling of the rule of law and due process, and does notcomply with the Constitution when it should be the first touphold and defend it **." Another circulated letter of his,dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter toSupreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and AndresNarvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim ofmany ** 'Minute Resolutions' ** ** which in effect sanctionthe theft and landgrabbing and arson of my properties byTRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUTPLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TANall withoutstating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of **(my) cases, despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan)

that you would cite me such facts or laws (during our talkin your house last March 12, 1989)"; and that "you in facthave no such facts or laws but simply want to ram down amost unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. **."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't.That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he mentionswhat he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions ofthe Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing byTraders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyerhas at the center the caricature of a person, seated on athrone marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by suchstatements as, "Sa TRB, para kami ay royalty. Nakaw atnakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc. Stillanother "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know:Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law, orsignatures violate the Constitution" and ends with theadmonition: "Supreme Court,

445


Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER."38

One other "circular" reads:

"SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS!!! — CODDLERS OF CROOKS! — VIOLATOR OF LAWS

by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has itshielded CROOKS in the judiciary. Adding, The SCRA (SCReports) will attest to this continuing vigilance of theSupreme Court.' These are lame, cowardly and selfservingdenials and another 'selfexoneration' belied by evidencewhich speak for themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic)—theSCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa andassociates issued UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING'Minute Resolutions' devoid of CLEAR FACTS and LAWSin patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of theConstitution. It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL,and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that Narvasa &


Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB,UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions thatNarvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE of the LAW inruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHTOF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despoticresolutions, NARVASA & CO. have sanctionedUCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and naked landgrabbing—What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999)

Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry ofJudgment without first resolving the motion forreconsideration (G.R. No. 82273). Was it not tyranny andabuse of power for the SC to order a case dismissed againstSC clerks (CEBV8679) and declare justices and said clerks'immune from suit'—despite their failure to file anypleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on therule of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in sodoing? (GR No. 82273)

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. Buttheir acts speak for themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC:ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS CHARGESOR RESIGN!!"

____________

____________

38 There are at least ten (10) other such "circulars," flyers, or letters inthe record, all mouthing more or less the same errors and defamatoryimputations.

446


"IMPEACH NARVASA

* ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR,UNCONSTITUTIONAL 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS'VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution

* VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS INORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB8679)DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILEPLEADINGS, HENCE IN DEFAULT

* CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY INRIGHT OF REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW ANDSC'S OWN RULINGSTO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TOSTEAL 3 LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION

* CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWOLAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OFPROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION

* BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME ANDPREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOWCORRUPT JUSTICES

* DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKSTO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UNACCOUNTABLE TOTHE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTECHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO Mabolo, Cebu City

Tel. 75649."

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGSAT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter, IBP, dated June 21, 1992Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into thehands, among others, of some members of the Cebu CityChapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. ItsPresident thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, datedJune 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one of them—that last quoted, above—"** sent to the IBP Cebu CityChapter and probably other officers ** in Cebu," describedas containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarksagainst the Supreme Court and the whole justice system"—and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "officers and mem

447


bers," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctionsagainst Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

1)

(a)

(b)

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution onJuly 22, 1993, requiring comment by Borromeo on theletter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of theClerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows:

"*** *** ***The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as

April 4, 1989, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D.Puno, wrote a fourpage letter to Mr. Borromeo concerning G.R.No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Traders Royal Bank [referredto by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator herein,the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed withthe Court by Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (JoaquinT. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan), all resolvedadversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letterAtty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principlesapplicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned inhis 'circular.'

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by theCourt in other cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e.,G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.)and G.R. No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Court of Appeals andSamson Lao), as well as the existence of other communicationsmade public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments alreadypassed upon by the Court in his cases and condemning the Court'srejection of those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu CityChapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its abovenamed President, and taking account of the related facts onrecord, the Court Resolved:

to REQUIRE:

the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at baras a proceeding for contempt against Joaquin T.Borromeo instituted at the relation of said CebuCity Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff, Cebu City,notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter'sletter dated June 21, 1993 together with itsannexes; andsaid City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSEPERSONAL SER

448

2)

1.


VICE of said notice of resolution and a copy of theChapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together withits annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his addressat Mabolo, Cebu City; andto ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten(10) days from receipt of such notice and the IBPChapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, tofile a comment on the letter and its annexes as wellas on the other matters set forth in this resolution,serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu CityChapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.SO ORDERED."

Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989,referred to in the first paragraph of the resolution justmentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the secondtime, precisely the principles and established practicerelative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treatedof in several other communications and resolutions sent tohim by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received byhim on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y.Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R.No. 77243

39), the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second

Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989,40 and

three Resolutions of this Court, notices of which were indue course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989,in G.R. No. 87897;

41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No.

82274 (186 SCRA 1),42 and that dated June 11, 1994 in G.R.

No. 112928.43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeofiled a Comment dated August 27, 1993 in which he allegedthe following:

_____________






1)

2)

3)

4)

5)

39 SubHead II, A, 4, infra; SubHeads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra.40 SubHeads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively.41 SubHead II, A, 3, infra.42 SubHead II, A, 1, a, infra.43 SubHead I, A, 7, supra.

449


the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment)violates the Constitution which requires"signatures and concurrence of majority of membersof the High Court;" hence, "a certified copy dulysigned by the Justices is respectfully requested;"the Chief Justice and other Members of the Courtshould inhibit themselves "since they cannot be theAccused and Judge at the same time, ** (and) thiscase should be heard by an impartial andindependent body;"the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signedby members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; ** isvague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing topoint out "what particular statements in thecircular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;"and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi hasauthority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf ofthose accused in the 'libelous' circular;"in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "wasexercising his rights of freedom of speech, ofexpression, and to petition the government forredress of grievances as guaranteed by theConstitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordancewith the accountability of public officials;" thecircular merely states the truth and asks for justicebased on the facts and the law; ** it is not libelousnor disrespectful but rather to be commended andencouraged; ** Atty. Legaspi ** should specifyunder oath which statements are false and lies;"he "stands by the charges in his circular and isprepared to support them with pertinent facts,evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon.Chief Justice and members of the High Court to

1)

either refute said charges or dispense the justicethat they are dutybound to dispense."

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accordBorromeo the fullest opportunity to explain his side, and berepresented by an attorney, the Court promulgated thefollowing Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice ofwhich was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk ofCourt.

450


"** The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A Belarmino,Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,dated August 26, 1993, and the Comment of Joaquin Borromeo,dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President Manuel P.Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED.After deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the CourtResolved to GRANT Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period offifteen (15) days from notice hereof within which to engage theservices or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer and submitsuch further arguments in addition to or in amplification of thoseset out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.

SO ORDERED."

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment of October 15, 1992Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October15, 1992, reiterating the arguments and allegations in hisComment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additionalarguments and amplification to ** (said) Comment," viz.:

the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specifyand state under oath the alleged 'libelous' remarkscontained in the circular **; (they should) beordered to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT **(failing in which, they should) be cited in contemptof court for making false charges and wasting theprecious time of this Highest Court by filing abaseless complaint;"

2)

a)

b)

c)

the allegations in the circular are not libelous nordisrespectful but "are based on the TRUTH and theLAW, namely:

" 'minute resolutions' bereft of signatures and clearfacts and laws are patent violations of Secs. 4(32),13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution;""there is no basis nor truth to this Hon. Court'saffirmation to the Appellate Court's ruling that theundersigned 'lost' his right of redemption allegedlydue to his failure to consignate the redemptionprice, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruledin many rulings that CONSIGNATION ISUNNECESSARY in right of redemption;"this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony

451


banks TRB and UCPB's frauds and defiance of courtordersin G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999."

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of November 26, 1993Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date ofNovember 26, 1993, adverting to "the failure of the IBP andAtty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath andthe failure of the concerned Justices to refute the chargesin the alleged 'libelous circular'" and, construing these as"an admission of the truth in said circular," theorized thatit is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their graveinjustices as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless andfalse charges."

VII. THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability for Contempt of CourtUpon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely beany doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of andinterference with judicial rules and processes, grossdisrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct

1.

directly impeding, obstructing and degrading theadministration of justice.

44 He has stubbornly litigated

issues already declared to be without merit, obstinatelyclosing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely tohim in many suits and proceedings, rulings which hadbecome final and executory, obdurately and unreasonablyinsisting on the application of his own individual version ofthe rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (andquite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law;he has insulted the judges and court officers, including theattorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlesslyoverloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patienceof the judges and court employees who have had to act onhis repetitious and largely unfounded complaints,pleadings and motions. He has wasted the time of thecourts, of his adversaries, of the judges and courtemployees who have had the bad luck of having to act inone way or another on

___________

44 Rule 71, Sec. 3, (c) and (d), Rules of Court.

452


his unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite hisattention having been called many times to the egregiouserror of his theory that the socalled "minute resolutions" ofthis Court should contain findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, and should be signed or certified by the Justicespromulgating the same,

45 he has mulishly persisted in

ventilating that selfsame theory in various proceedings,causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to thecourts, the court employees and parties involved.

Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justiceand other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the sametime, ** (and) this case should be heard by an impartialand independent body," is still another illustration of an



entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensibleassumption of a competence in the field of the law: he againuses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking anargument long since declared and adjudged to beuntenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of thecourt to institute a charge for contempt against itself,without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer,is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of therespect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Werethe intervention of the prosecuting officer required andjudges obliged to file complaints for contempts againstthem before the prosecuting officer, in order to bring theguilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecutingofficers and impotent to perform their functions withdispatch and absolute independence. The institution ofcharges by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to holdpersons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable totrial and punishment by the court. All that the lawrequires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed incourt and an opportunity to the person charged to be heardby himself or counsel. The charge may be made by thefiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. **."

46

___________

45 SEE Subhead II, A, 1, a, supra.46Peo. v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211, cited in Gavieres v. Falcis, 193

SCRA 649,660 (1991); see also Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140.

453


His claim—that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verifiednor signed by members of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board;** is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing topoint out "what particular statements in the circular areallegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not appearthat Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file acomplaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous'circular"—is in the premises, plainly nothing butsuperficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his othercontention that in making the allegations claimed to be


1.

contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom ofspeech, of expression, and to petition the government forredress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution(Sec. 4, Art III) and in accordance with the accountability ofpublic officials." The constitutional rights invoked by himafford no justification for repetitious litigation of the samecauses and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, courtemployees and other persons, for abusing the processes andrules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing theminto disrepute and disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing the Judicial FunctionThe facts and issues involved in the proceeding at benchmake necessary a restatement of the principles governingfinality of judgments and of the paramount need to put anend to litigation at some point, and to lay down definitepostulates concerning what is perceived to be a growingpredilection on the part of lawyers and litigants—likeBorromeo—to resort to administrative prosecution (orinstitution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for orsupplement to the specific modes of appeal or reviewprovided by law from court judgments or orders.

Reason for Courts; Judicial Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement ofcontroversies. In every country there is a more or lessestablished hierarchical organization of courts, and a moreor less comprehensive system of review of judgments andfinal orders of lower courts.

454


The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for severallevels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by theparties—a trial or hearing in the first instance—as well asa review of the judgments of lower courts by highertribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilationof the factual and legal issues through briefs ormemoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by law, andis in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.

2.

3.

Paramount Need to End Litigation at Some Point

It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that atsome point, litigation must end. Hence, after theprocedures and processes for lawsuits have beenundergone, and the modes of review set by law have beenexhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of thesame subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be,on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreementwith the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied.This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it isnot their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, torepeat, public policy demands that at some definite time,the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositionsthereon accorded absolute finality.

47 As observed by this

Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967decision,

48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual

endowment. That is his privilege. And he may sufferfrustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is hismisfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should notbe allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack acourt's

_____________

47 Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 100474,September 10, 1993; GSIS v. Gines, 219 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 85273, March9, 1993; Gesulgon v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 90349, March 5,1993; Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japson, 211 SCRA 879, G.R.No. 68037, July 29, 1992; Cachola v. CA, 208 SCRA 496, G.R. No. 97822,May 7, 1992; Enriquez v. C.A., 202 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 83720, October 4,1991; Alvendia v. IAC, 181 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990;Turqueza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, G.R. No. L51626, April 30, 1980;Lee Bun Ting v. Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, G.R. No. L30523, April 22, 1977.

48 20 SCRA 441, 444.

455


decision in words calculated to jettison the timehonoredaphorism that courts are the temples of right."

Judgments of Supreme Court Not Reviewable



The sound, salutary and selfevident principle prevailing inthis as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of thehighest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by anyother agency, branch, department, or official ofGovernment. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, therethe matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot beappealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much lessreversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted byerror in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, flawed inits logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some otherrespect.

49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable

foundation of public policy, and constitutional andtraditional principle. In an extended Resolutionpromulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: WenceslaoLaureta—involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecutebefore the Tanodbayan "members of the First Division ofthis Court collectively with having knowingly anddeliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minuteResolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article204 of the Revised Penal Code ** and for deliberatelycausing 'undue injury' to respondent ** and

_____________

49 Against judgments of the Supreme Court, since obviously no appealto a higher court or authority is possible, the only remedies are those setforth in the Rules of Court, particularly Rule 56 in relation to Rules 52and 53, with regard to civil cases and proceedings, and Rule 125 inrelation to Rule 124, in respect of criminal cases. SEE Calalang v.Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 215, G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992; Tan v.Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212, G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991; ChurchAssistance Program v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 76552, March21,1989; Ver v. Quetulio, 163 SCRA 80, G.R. No. L77526, June 29, 1988;Ang Ping v. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77, G.R. No. 75860, September 17,1987; VirJen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA577, G.R. Nos. L580112, November 18, 1983; Tugade v. CA, 83 SCRA226; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, G.R. No. L31589, July 31, 1970;Albert v. CFI, 23 SCRA 948, G.R. No. L26364, May 29, 1968; Shioji v.Harvey, 43 Phil. 333 (1922); SEE also Concurring Opinion of Gutierrez, J.in Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217, G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5,1990.

456




her coheirs because of the 'unjust Resolution' promulgated,in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act**"—the following pronouncements were made inreaffirmation of established doctrine:50

"** As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement ofDecember 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, '(I)t iselementary that the Supreme Court is supreme—the third greatdepartment of government entrusted exclusively with the judicialpower to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, publicand private. No other department or agency may pass upon itsjudgments or declare them 'unjust.'" It is elementary that "(A)shas ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente(18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) 'controlling and irresistible reasons ofpublic policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that atthe risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determiningcontroversies submitted to them should become final at somedefinite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized bylaw, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the courtwhich rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact orof law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen.The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to put anend to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to thelitigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties.'"(Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg, Co., Inc., 86 SCRA305, 316317)

*** *** ***Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court,

whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitledto full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiryunder the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of thelegislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner, et al. vs.Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1)The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that '(I)t iswell settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courtsas regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress andapproved by the President. If there has been any mistake in theprinting of the bill before it was certified by the officers ofCongress and approved by the Executive [as claimed bypetitionerimporter who unsuccessfully sought refund of marginfees]—on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing theprinciple of separation of powers and undermining one of thecornerstones of our democratic system—the remedy is by

4.

amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree' is fullyand reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court

457


orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil.Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. CitingPrimicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)

The Court has consistently stressed that the 'doctrine ofseparation of powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicialdepartments being left alone to discharge their duties as they seefit' (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained inthe same way that the judiciary has a right to expect that neitherthe President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring ofits orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as toalleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled eithercoordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept ofseparation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and betweenthe three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas, 34SCRA 275, 286287)"

Final and Executory Judgments of Lower CourtsNot Reviewable Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinaryremedies available under law to a party who is adverselyaffected by their decisions or orders are a motion for newtrial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal toeither the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or oflaw only, are raised, in accordance with fixed and familiarrules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts.

51

Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on theground that it was rendered without or in excess of itsjurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be hadthrough the special civil action of certiorari or prohibitionpursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts—which maynormally be subject to review by higher tribunals—becomefinal and executory before, or without, exhaustion of allrecourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious


1.

to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, orin any way modified directly or indirectly, by a highercourt, not even by the Supreme Court,

______________

51 Against a final and executory judgment, the extraordinary, equitableremedy of relief from judgment under Rule 38 may be availed of, or inextreme situations, an action to annul the judgment on the ground ofextrinsic fraud.

458


much less by any other official, branch or department ofGovernment.

52

C. Administrative, Civil or Criminal Action Against Judge,Not Substitute for Appeal; Proscribed by Law and LogicNow, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that therehas been of late a regrettable increase in the resort toadministrative prosecution—or the institution of a civil orcriminal action—as a substitute for or supplement toappeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to theseremedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation tocoerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives,or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency,administrative complaints are being presented to the Officeof the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are beingfiled with the Office of the Ombudsman or the publicprosecutor's office; civil actions for recovery of damagescommenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trialjudges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of theSupreme Court.

Common Basis of Complaints Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment:that the respondent Judges or Justices rendered manifestlyunjust judgments or interlocutory orders

53—i.e., judgments

or orders

_____________



2.

52 Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 302, G.R. No. L59730, February 11, 1986,citing Malia v. IAC, 138 SCRA 116, G.R. No. L66395, August 7, 1985;Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210, G.R. No. L70230, June 24, 1985;Bethel Temple, Inc. v. General Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 136SCRA 203, G.R. No. L35563, April 30, 1985; Insular Bank of Asia andAmerica Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, G.R. No.L52415, October 23, 1984 and the cases cited therein pertaining to"immutability of judgments;" Heirs of Pedro Guminpin v. CA, 120 SCRA687, G.R. No. L34220, February 21, 1983; Commissioner of InternalRevenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, G.R. No. L24921, March31, 1967; Daquis v. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913; Sawit v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310.

53 Articles 204206 of the Revised Penal Code define and penalizeoffenses which have "unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" foran essential element.

459


which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or withlaw or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse ofdiscretionthereby causing injustice, and actionable andcompensable injury to the complainants (invariably losinglitigants). Resolution of complaints of this sort quiteobviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, theOmbudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision ororder of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine itscorrectness or erroneousness, as basic premise for apronouncement of liability.

Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for Correction ofJudgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints areproper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recoursesfor appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, aparty may file an administrative or criminal complaintagainst the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or,having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneouslyseek also such administrative or criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the powervested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and thelower courts established by law, the question submits toonly one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies

are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial reviewwhere such review is available, and must wait on the resultthereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear,and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can haveonly intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party whofeels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet finaland executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminalprosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judgewould, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step,confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruousfunction pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: thedetermination of whether the questioned disposition iserroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, orboth. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whateverdetermination he makes could well set off a proliferation ofadministrative or criminal litigation, a possibility hereaftermore fully explored.

460


Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It isnot, as already pointed out, within the power of publicprosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly orvicariously, to review judgments or final orders orresolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of reviewby appeal or special civil action—is not only lodgedexclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercisedin accordance with a welldefined and long establishedhierarchy, and longstanding processes and procedures. Noother review is allowed; otherwise litigation would beinterminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: WenceslaoLaureta, supra.5

4

"Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 ofthe Revised Penal Code as to 'rendering knowingly unjustjudgment,' refer to an individual judge who does so 'in any casesubmitted to him for decision' and even then, it is not theprosecutor who would pass judgment on the 'unjustness' of thedecision rendered by him but the proper appellate court withjurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or


the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that saidpenal article has no application to the members of a collegiatecourt such as this Court or its Divisions who reach theirconclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collectivejudgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently,that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt PracticesAct on the ground that such a collective decision is 'unjust' cannotprosper.

• • • •To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and

prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court forofficial acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exerciseof official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and underminethat very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate thejudiciary to the executive. 'For it is a general principle of thehighest importance to the proper administration of justice that ajudicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall befree to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension ofpersonal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to everyonewho might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge wouldbe inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and woulddestroy that independence without which no judiciary can beeither respectable or useful' (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335)

____________

54148 SCRA 283, 418, 419, 420421.

461


To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claimthat the members acted 'with deliberate bad faith' and renderedan 'unjust resolution' in disregard or violation of the duty of theirhigh office to act upon their own independent consideration andjudgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy theauthenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate actsand resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption ofregular performance of official duty. To allow such collateralattack would destroy the separation of powers and undermine therole of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciabledisputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without

3.

4.

violating the separation of powers mandated by the Constitutionrelitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court onlegal issues submitted by them and their adversaries for finaldetermination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall withinthe judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vestedby the Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferiorcourts as may be established by law."

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwiseappealable, which have become final and executory. Suchjudgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals,are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority.

Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed Rules, toDeclare Judgments or Orders Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or nota judgment or order is unjust—or was (or was not)rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority,or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powersor maliciously delayed the disposition of a case—is anessentially judicial function, lodged by existing law andimmemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts andultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, noother entity or official of the Government, not theprosecution or investigation service or any other branch,nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review ajudicial order or decision—whether final and executory ornot—and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for acriminal or administrative complaint for rendering anunjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to thecourts alone.

462


Cotrary Rule Results in Circuitousness anl Leads toAbsurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution forsupposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutoryorders of the type above described, which, at bottom,consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or

interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in theirconclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuseof discretion—as distinguished from accusations ofcorruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allowinstitution of such proceedings would not only be legallyimproper, it would also result in a futile and circuitousexercise, and lead to absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut ofreview in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment isrendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed andaffirmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter'sjudgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by theCourt of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decisionis brought up to and affirmed by the Supreme Court. Theprosecution of the municipal trial court judge who renderedthe original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestlyunjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; itwould mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of thepublic prosecutor would have to find, at the preliminaryinvestigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrongand unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisionsor orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as theJustices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Courtwho affirmed the original judgment were also all wrongand unjust—most certainly an act of supreme arroganceand very evident supererogation. Pursuing the propositionfurther, assuming that the public prosecutor orOmbudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a reviewof the decision in question—despite its having beenaffirmed at all three (3) appellate levels—and thereafter,disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file aninformation in the Regional Trial Court against theMunicipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such anindictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or theRegional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

463


convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court,the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court ofAppeals would have an inevitable result: given the

5.

antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set asideand the correctness of the judgment in question, alreadypassed upon and finally resolved by the same appellatecourts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent theMunicipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from filing a criminalaction against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the RegionalTrial Court Judge who should convict him of the offense,for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against theJustices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court whoshould affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances ofthe case may be modified, and regardless of whether it is acivil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availedof as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedlyrendering an unjust decision or order.

Primordial Requisites for Administrative, CriminalProsecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecutejudges for this impropriety, of rendering an unjustjudgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of allthe foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisitesare that there be a final declaration by a competent court insome appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjustcharacter of the challenged judgment or order, and there bealso evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance orinexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in renderingsaid judgment or order. That final declaration is ordinarilycontained in the judgment rendered in the appellateproceedings in which the decision of the trial court in thecivil or criminal action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is adecision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as towhich—the same being unappealable—it would beunreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime(or even publicspirited citizens) the opportunity to put tothe test of proof such 463

464


charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustlyrendered, with malice or by deliberate design, throughinexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case,the essential requisite is that there be an authoritativejudicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust characterof the judgment or order in question. Such apronouncement may result from either (a) an action ofcertiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning thevalidity of the judgment, as having been rendered withoutor in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse ofdiscretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process tothe prosecution; or (b) if this be not proper, anadministrative proceeding in the Supreme Court againstthe judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment ororder. Until and unless there is such a final, authoritativejudicial declaration that the decision or order in question is"unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judgeconcerned is legally possible or should be entertained, forwant of an indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from Influence or PressureJudges must be free to judge, without pressure or influencefrom external forces or factors. They should not be subjectto intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrativesanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they maymake in the performance of their duties and functions.Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognizedindependently of statute, that judges are not generallyliable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdictionand in good faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that ajudge may not be held administratively accountable forevery erroneous order or decision he renders.

55 To hold

otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and wouldmake his position doubly unbearable, for no one calledupon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process ofadministering justice can be infallible in his judgment.

56

The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and

___________

55 Rodrigo v. Quijano, etc., 79 SCRA 10 (Sept. 9, 1977).56 Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 (Aug. 31, 1977); Pilipinas Bank v.

TironaLiwag, 190 SCRA 834 (Oct. 18, 1990).

465




malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith;57 it is only in

these cases that administrative sanctions are called for asan imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existingdoctrine is that "judges of superior and general jurisdictionare not liable to respond in civil action for damages forwhat they may do in the exercise of their judicial functionswhen acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction."

58

Based on Section 9, Act No. 190,59 the doctrine is still good

law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislativeissuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace orassessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery ofdamages by reason of any judicial action or judgmentrendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of hislegal powers and jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 ofthe Civil Code, providing that any public officer oremployee, or any private individual, who directly orindirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any mannerimpedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights andliberties of another person—which rights are the same asthose guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of theConstitution)—shall be liable to the latter for damages.However, such liability is not demandable from a judgeunless his act or omission constitutes a violation of thePenal Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extentthat the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment"or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, itneed only be reiterated that prosecution of a judge for anyof them is subject to the caveat already mentioned: thatsuch prosecution cannot be initiated, much lessmaintained, unless there be a final judicial pronouncementof the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. AfterwordConsidering the foregoing antecedents and long standingdoctrines, it may well be asked why it took no less thansixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfoundedcases lodged by




___________

57 Quizon v. Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293 (July 25, 1975).58 Alzua, et al. v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326.59 The old Code of Civil Procedure.

466


respondent Borromeo in the different rungs of theJudiciary before this Court decided to take the presentadministrative measure. The imposition on the time of thecourts and the unnecessary work occasioned byrespondent's crass adventurism are selfevident andrequire no further elaboration. If the Court, however, borewith him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that therepeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures onthe error of his ways, would somehow seep into hisunderstanding and deter him from further forays along hismisguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared,the power of contempt is exercised on the preservative andnot the vindictive principle. Unfortunately, the Court'sforbearance had no effect on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extendedto him were read as signs of weakness and impotence.Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to haveinfluenced and emboldened others to just as flamboyantlyembark on their own groundless and insulting proceedingsagainst the courts, born of affected bravado or sheeregocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislativeand executive departments, the Ombudsman included, intheir assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personalagendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end,and it is time for the court to now draw the line, with morepromptitude, between reasoned dissent and selfseekingpretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those withthe same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth dealwith them, decisively and fairly, with a firm and evenhand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions asmay be appropriate to maintain the integrity andindependence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found anddeclared GUILTY of constructive contempt repeatedly

committed over time, despite warnings and instructionsgiven to him, and to the end that he may ponder his seriouserrors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for theCourts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to servea term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jailof Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS(P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of theoffenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similaror other offense against courts, judges or court employ

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VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995 467Gil vs. Son

ees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.IT IS SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., No part due to some relationships.

Respondent guilty ilty of constructive contempt andwarned against repetition of similar infraction.

Note.—All courts have the inherent power to punish forcontempt, this being essential to their right of selfpreservation. (Patricio vs. Suplico, 196 SCRA 140 [1991])

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