1NC Security K

Food security rhetoric exacerbates hunger and causes resource grabs

Shepherd 12 -- PhD candidate within the Food Security in Asia research programme funded by the MacArthur Foundation at the Centre for International Security Studies, University of Sydney, participating in the Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East research programme at the Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (Benjamin, 6/8/2012, "Thinking critically about food security," Security Dialogue 43(3), Sage)A consequence of casting food security as an availability problem is that actors use food-security language to legitimize competition over increasingly scarce food-production resources. The underlying implication is that controlling or hoarding of resources must be good; however, control and hoarding by some invariably implies exclusion and deprivation for others. Food-security language has become widely employed as a way of pursuing particular agendas and legitimizing particular actions, especially those of powerful actors, but at the expense of others. Food-security language is used to legitimize the securing of rights over agricultural lands (Alshareef, 2009; Peoples Republic of China, 2008), which one African scholars described as a dubious way to solve the food security conundrum in Ethiopia, noting that it seems paradoxical that one of the most vulnerable countries in the world is handing over vast land and water resources to foreign investors to help food security efforts of their home countries.2 It is used by transnational agribusiness corporations in the legitimization of their profit-generating activities (ArcherDanielsMidland, 2010; Cargill, 2010; Monsanto, 2010), which range from the corporatization and amalgamation of farmlands sometimes pushing small- and medium-sized landholders off their farms to the pursuit of revenues from patented inputs that have been argued to be detrimental to poor farmers in developing countries (Holt-Giminez, 2011; Patel, 2007; Shiva, 2002, 2005, 2007). It is used to justify the pursuit of speculative profit by wealthy investors (Emerging Asset Management, 2010). It is also used in the pursuit of political agendas for example, in concert with the subsidizing of electorally sensitive rural constituencies (USDA, 2010; Philpott, 2006) or, contrarily, providing an argument for the reduction of trade barriers in the quest for greater access to foreign markets. For example, the official Australian food-security policy position is that developing countries must reduce trade barriers in preference to supporting local food producers.3 This privileges Australias major agricultural exporters over the agrarian poor in the developing countries. In such ways, the current paradigm of food security is used to privilege the interests of certain actors, often at the expense of others, including those at risk from the inability to access adequate food. The commandeering of food-security language helps explain the contradiction that, while it is ostensibly about hunger (achieving sufficient food for all people at all times), food security has instead become a game for powerful actors competing for advantage (profit or scarce resources such as agricultural land) in an increasingly resource-constrained world. One response to this has been the idea of food sovereignty, promulgated by grassroots organizations such as La Via Campesina, which argues that people should have the right to take control of their own choices over food and its provenance. Food sovereignty has been put forward as a central element of attempts to frame food as a new human and livelihood security challenge (Spring, 2009: 471). A core strength of the concept is its emphasis on the democratization and localization of food-producing resources and distribution of production, however a substantial weakness is that the concept is equally open to usurpation by powerful players in the global food regime. Governments are now starting to use food-sovereignty language to legitimize their efforts to secure control over food supplies and food-producing resources. In recent meetings with the author, for example, policymakers from several Gulf Cooperation Council member-states referred to food sovereignty as the rationale behind their respective governments efforts to pursue certain food-security strategies.4 Strategies to address the problem of hunger should discourage this kind of co-opting and instead attempt to challenge such actors to engage in the process of tackling the fundamental issues. Moreover, given the rise of neo-Malthusian fears, the inability of existing food-security strategies to address hunger should prompt a search for alternatives. Indeed, even if the insecurity of hunger had been adequately addressed in the past, that would not mean that the same strategies would continue to be adequate for a high-population future.5 Commentators are already flagging stress and potential conflict as a result of increasingly tight global food supplies (IISS, 2011). It is a reasonable premise that if the world cannot overcome the problem of widespread hunger when there is surplus production capacity, then finding solutions will become increasingly fraught as constraints become tighter, the desire to resort to competitive securing of food resources increases and risks of violent conflict over food resources intensify.

Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3 Frederickcultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books, From Apocalypse To Way of Life, pages 185-186

Looked at critically, then, crisis discourse thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a political liability almost as much as an asset. It calls up a fierce and effective opposition with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too vulnerable to refutation by events. It also exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a total solution to the problems involved a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reichs infamous final solution.55 A total crisis of societyenvironmental crisis at its gravestthreatens to translate despair into inhumanist authoritarianism; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same time it depoliticizes people, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn ones back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning ones back on natureon traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, people need to delink from nature and live in postnaturea conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply nature has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to further indifference to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisiswith 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate total solution. Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal nature.

Water scarcity scenario planning creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and reactionary militarizationensures violent reactions that turn the case and cause global warsonly the alt solves the root cause

Guslits 11 Bayly Guslits Political Science Department University of Western Ontario The War on Water: International Water Security February 28, 2011http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/gradsymp11/Guslits.pdfThe world is facing a water crisis, but there is still much that can be done to address the problems causing the emergency. First, "securitization" of the water crisis can become a self-fulfilling prophecy if it is not approached from a holistic viewpoint that takes into consideration ecological, human and state water security needs. If academics and policymakers continue to debate over whether the "water wars" scenario will ever come true, states may take this as a cue to securitize and militarize their water resources, and this will certainly lead to political and even violent conflict. However, if instead policymakers and government leadership use a holistic and diplomatic approach to address ecological and human water needs sustainably, international water security can be achieved. Whether this approach is branded a "post-security" or "environmental security" paradigm, the ultimate goal lies in changing policy and practice to address the root causes of water scarcity, and thus ensure water availability for environmental and anthropogenic purposes.Framing climate change in terms of security legitimizes preemptive military doctrines to contain anticipated threats while foreclosing attention to the institutional drivers of environmental degradation rejecting the militarization of warming is a prerequisite to forging effective political responses to ecological destruction.

Gilbert 12 [Emily, Director of the Canadian Studies Program in the Graduate Program in Geography at the University of Toronto, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 11(1), The Militarization of Climate Change, p. 1-10]

Climate change has been identified as a top military concern. We should be worried. In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2009, US President Barack Obama stressed the importance of climate change to national security, and the militarys growing interest in the issue.2 Then, on February 1, 2010 the US Pentagon released its Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) that includes, for the first time ever, climate change as a military concern.3. The QDR is a powerful document that shapes the militarys operating principles and budgets for the next four years. The 2010 QDR argues that military roles and missions on the battlefield will need to be reformulated to address changing environmental conditions. Climate change is presented as a threat multiplier that will propel food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, poverty, the spread of disease, and mass migration. Each of these could contribute to failed state scenarios which will demand military intervention. In an earlier report of high-ranking admirals and generals at the Center for Naval Analyses, upon which the QDR builds, this threat multiplier effect and failed state scenario is also directly linked to future acts of extremism and terrorism (CNA, 2007; see also CNA, 2009; Korb et al, 2009; Warner and Singer, 2009; Parthemore and Rogers, 2010). While the US militarys interest in climate change has escalated, it is not alone. In 2007, the Australian Defence Force produced a 12 page study, Climate Change, the Environment, Resources and Conflict that proposed a new role for the military in resource protection, eg tackling illegal fishing as fish stocks relocate due to the changing climate. Two years later, a Department of Defence white paper identified climate change as a threat multiplier, especially in the fragile states of its neighbouring South Pacific islands (Australian Government, 2009). In the UK, the DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036 reportissued from within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and considered to be a source document for national defence policyhas asserted a future role for military engagement in climate change-related scenarios around humanitarian and disaster relief, and for protecting oil and gas resources in insecure areas (see also MoD, 2010). The DCDC report even indicated that intervention in outer space might be required so as to mitigate the effects of climate change, or to harness climatological features in the support of military or strategic advantage (MoD 2006: 65). Other governments discussing militarization include Germany, France, and perhaps also, secretly, India and China (Mabey 2007: 9). Military experts from across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the US have issued a joint statement warning of the impending security impact of climate change.4 There was even a special session on Climate change and the military organized by the Brookings Institution, Chatham House, and the Institute for Environmental Security at the COP15 meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009.5 What to make of this growing military interest in climate change? There is a longstanding literature that addresses the linking of environment and security discourses (eg Kakonen, 1994; Deudney, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Barnett, 2001, 2006; Dalby, 2002, 2009; Davis, 2007). Although cautionary in their approach, many of these authors suggest that linking the two concepts makes it possible to open up questions around both security and the environment. Ragnhild Nordas and Nils Petter Gleditsch, for example, broaden the security debate to address human security, which takes account of matters relating to issues such as migration, disease, food security (Nordas and Gleditsch, 2007). Others argue that hiving climate change to national security discourses may galvanize more public interest (Dalby, 2009)something that has been attempted with the Kerry-Graham-Lieberman climate bill in the US. But while the literature on security and environment raises some important questions, I want to problematize both the way that security is being constituted through the military, and the concept of the environment that is being mobilized, by paying particular attention to how militarization is unfolding in the US. First, the militarys interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security. Although the 2010 QDR recognizes impending concerns associated with human security (eg migration, disease and food security), it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo-Malthusian conflict over resources (Dalby, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia (Broder, 2009; CNA, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-08; Werz and Manlove, 2009), where, it is argued, they will act as threat multipliers that will escalate into failed state scenarios. This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory, not as a result of domestic policies (Eckersley 2009: 87). In this vein, the CIA has established a Center on Climate Change and National Security to collect foreign intelligence on the national security impact of environmental change in other parts of the world.6 The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions (Dalby 2009: 50; Deudney 1999: 189).7 Moreover, the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource-acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives.8 In this vein, Thomas Freidman has proposed a militant green nationalism, something along the lines of a triumphalist Green New Deal that will recapture US global hegemony (Friedman, 2009).9 Achieving this result requires, however, more political agreement across US Democrats and Republicans, and it is precisely here that reframing climate change as a military issue seems to be an effective strategy for cross-partisan agreement.10 But what are the costs when militarization becomes necessary to legitimize climate change action? The upshot is that the military is also legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics. In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate (UNEP 2007: 403). Militaries are about the maintenance of elite power (Barnett 2001: 25). Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated (Barnett, 2006). This is particularly apparent vis-a-vis environmental refugees, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates will swell to 150 million by 2050 (Reuveny, 2007). Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change, even though they are usually the least responsible for climate change. As Paul Smith notes, Operation Seal Signal, which the US deployed in 1994 to deal with 50,000 refugees from Haiti and Cuba, offers an instructive example of how the military addresses refugees, most of whom were held at Guantanamo Bay while their cases were processed (Smith, 2007). The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance (Giroux, 2006; Hallward, 2010). This is part of a worrisome trend of the rise of an aid-military complex and military encroachment on civilian-sponsored development (Hartmann 2010: 240). Finally, the militarys approach to climate change does not lend itself to addressing fundamental social structures that perpetuate environmental degradation: oil dependency, oil colonialism, and the deepening international fragmentation of rich and poor. The conditions that entrench insecurity are thus left unchallenged. Rather, attention is directed to long term defensive planning and risk scenarios around potential disaster outcomes with the military presented as the only, or simply the best and most capable, institution for dealing with the scope of the adversity (QDR 2010: 86). Since Robert Kaplans polemic The Coming Anarchy, much of the literature invokes similar disaster scenarios (Kaplan, 1994, see also 2008; Schwartz and Randall, 2003; Campbell et al, 2007; Dwyer, 2008). Security exercises are used to model these disasters; eg a 2008 exercise at the National Defense University in Washington that anticipated that refugees escaping flooding in Bangladesh would lead to religious and political conflict at the Indian border (Werz and Manlove, 2009). Worst possible outcomes are thus anticipated, and they these become the basis for actions in the present (de Goede 2008: 159). As Melinda Cooper writes vis-a-vis the worst-case security scenarios of the Schwartz and Randall report, It recommends that we intervene in the conditions of emergence of the future before it gets a chance to befall us; that we make an attempt to unleash transformative events on a biospheric scale before we get dragged away by natures own acts of emergence (Cooper 2006: 126). Coopers argument introduces my second concern regarding the militarization of climate change: the ways that the environment is being mobilized. As noted above, the focus on resource wars casts the environment as a hostile power (Eckersley 2009: 87). Or, scarcity and degradation are naturalised, while institutional causes are obscured (Hartmann 2010: 235). Either way, nature is an externality to be managed as the resurrection of the concept of the commons in these debates affirms (see Posen, 2003). Advocacy groups and government representatives alike are using the commons to inform their perspectives on climate change security. Abraham Denmark and James Mulvenon explicitly delineate the concepts legacy to Garrett Hardins controversial piece, The tragedy of the commons, and his argument that Freedom in a commons brings ruins to all (Denmark and Mulvenon 2010: 7-8). Rather than privatization, the contemporary version of the polemic posits that military force is necessary to prevent the misuse and abuse of navigable passageways. In a web article entitled The Contested Commons that is linked to the QDR2010, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy of the United States Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley suggest that since WWII, US grand strategy has centered on creating and sustaining an international system that facilitates commerce, travel, and thus the spread of Western values including individual freedom, democracy, and liberty.11 This uncontested access to and stability within the global commons of air, sea, space and cyberspace has only been possible because of US military power. As the emergent multipolar world challenges its hegemony, they argue, it is in the USs interest to shore up its military and defend the global commons, in partnership with its allies (see also Denmark and Mulvenon, 2010).12 The military build-up in the Arctic, where states are jockeying over access to previously unnavigable passageways and resources, is held out as an example of how emergent resource conflicts are taking shape, but also the need for a coordinated US approach to protect its interests (Carmen et al, 2010; Paskal, 2007). The discourse around the commons reinforces the idea that the environment is to be controlled and managed. This is equally the case with respect to how the militarization of climate change is also reshaping domestic politics and society. Catherine Lutz reflects that As or more important than the efficacy of a mode of warfare... has been the form of life it has encouraged inside the nation waging it (Lutz 2002: 727). Her own critical work on militarism examines the social formations that are organized around the military, eg the racialized and gender labour economies of suburban US formed around the production of nuclear weapons. Environmental relations need also be taken into consideration: they are constituted through the military which is charged with bringing nature under control: to model it, to manage it and to make it predictable in the name of security, albeit an anthropocentric security that is only understood in human terms (Barnett 2001: 65; emphasis in the original). That the US military is increasingly becoming a site and source for new green technologies is just one such manifestation of the orchestration of life for military purposes, and is suggestive of the problematic deepening and extension of the military-industrial-academic-scientific complex. The QDR sets out the complex web of collaborations that will tackle climate change: the DoD will partner with academia, other U.S. agencies, and international partners to research, develop, test, and evaluate new sustainable energy technologies (QDR 2010: 87). Military innovations such as GPS, radar and the Internet are offered as comparable examples of transformative technological innovation that have had immense social benefit (Warner and Singer 2009: 6). This provides a rationalization for the millions of dollars that are being siphoned into the military so that it can be at the frontlines of developing alternative energy projects. For example, the largest existing solar panel project in the US is at the Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, where 70,000 solar panels are spread out across 140 acres to generate 14 megawatts (about 45 million KWh) a year.13 A $2 billion agreement signed in 2009 between DoD and Irwin Energy Security Partners will make Fort Irwinthe armys largest training camp located in Californias Mojave Desert energy independent by 2022, with a 500MW solar project on 21 square miles.14 Zero-energy homes are being built on US military bases.15 A project is underway to introduce 4,000 electric cars into the armed forces to create one of the largest such fleets in the world (Pew 2010: 13). The first hybrid Navy vessel, a Wasp class amphibious assault ship, is already on the water (Rosenthal, 2010). In Iraq, the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery (or tiger) is converting garbage to biofuel to power generators.16 In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, solar panels are being used on tents, for recharging computers and other equipment (Rosenthal, 2010). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)the research and development office of the military in change of technological advancementis developing alternative fuel sources, from products such as algae and rapeseed that are less carbon-intensive.17 The objective of biofuels development is to make military transport more sustainable, like the Great Green Fleet of aircraft carriers and support ships that is in development for 2016 (Shachtman, 2010). It is not that this greening of the military is unwarranted, or that these technological developments are not desirable. If there is to be a military at all, it might as well be more sustainable. As it is, the US military is the worlds single largest energy consumerit consumes more than any other private or public institution, and more than 100 nations (Warner and Singer 2009: 1; see also Deloitte, 2009; Sanders, 2009). This comprises 0.8% of total US energy, and about 78% of government energy useroughly 395,000 barrels of oil a day, equivalent to all of Greece (Warner and Singer 2009: 2). Its operations abroad are equally rapacious. In the first-ever energy audit in a war zone it was revealed that US marines in Afghanistan used 800,000 gallons of fuel each day.18 Figures from Iraq show that between 2003 and 2007 the war generated 141 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalentmore than 139 countries (Reisch and Kretzmann 2008: 4). There is thus a clear case for reducing the militarys damaging impact on the landscape. The question that the greening of the military sidesteps, however, is whether there should indeed be a military at all. Moreover, even if the military persists, should it be where climate change innovations are located? Should public funds be directed into the military to fight climate change? In a speech on energy security in March, 2010, President Obama lauded the $2.7 billion already spent that year by the DoD on energy efficiency measures.19 This investment is being used to support select military partnerships, with a strong emphasis on privatization. The solar panel project at Nellis Air Force Base Nevada, mentioned above, is a privately financed and owned initiative by MMA Renewables, with equity investments from Citi and Allstate.20 The panels will be owned by the financiers; Nellis will lease the land, and purchase the power. The Fort Irwin project agreed to in October 2009 operates along similar lines, and is a partnership with the Clark Energy Group and Acciona Solar Power.21 The zero-energy homes being installed in Kentucky are a public-private partnership between the US Army and Actus Lend Lease.22 Universities are also complicit: the Tactical Garbage to Energy Refinery at the Victory Base Camp in Baghdad, for example, has been developed in conjunction with Purdue University.23 When environmental issues are filtered through the military, however, less money is available for innovation in other sectors, unless they are working in partnership with the military. Military investment in green initiatives, for example, is not likely to develop innovations around public transport, but rather focus on the kind of transportation required for military needs, which will then become available to consumersmuch as Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) are an offshoot of four-wheel drive military vehicles. Moreover, a military-driven agenda contributes to a more protectionist approach around technological innovation that is exacerbated alongside an uneven landscape of investment (UNEP 2007: 404).24 The priorities around climate change are thus skewed by the military. As President Obama affirmed in his March 2010 speech, the primary national interest is really with energy independence, not energy reduction.25 At the same time that he was applauding the greening of the military, the President announced the expansion of offshore oil and gas exploration, including in the Bay of Mexico. (This expansion was later suspended in wake of the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, before being resumed.) The military has also presented a case for mitigating the reliance on (foreign) oil and developing renewable energy, which has more to do with the impact on military personnel in the field than with ecological principles. In the last five years, fuel consumption at US forward operating bases in conflict zones has increased from 50 million gallons to 500 million gallons a year (Deloitte 2009: 15). This creates a dangerous situation for the long tail of convoys that are needed to supply these bases (Pew 2010: 7). Some reports indicate that more than three quarters of US casualties in war zones are the result of supply vehicles that have been targeted by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and convoys have been identified by Commandant General James Conway as one of his most pressing problems related to risk of casualties (Deloitte 2009: 15; see also CNA, 2009). Shachtman (2010) reports that in Iraq, In one month, 44 trucks and 220,000 gallons of fuel were lost. This is a problem that the QDR takes explicitly on board. Whereas climate change is presented as a threat multiplier, energy efficiency is described as a force multiplier, because it increases the range and endurance of forces in the field and can reduce the number of combat forces diverted to protect energy supply lines, which are vulnerable to both asymmetric and conventional attacks and disruptions (QDR 2010: 87). The reduction of casualties is thus propelling much of the impetus for renewable energy, even though it is couched in climate change rhetoric (see also Warner and Singer 2009: 2; Deloitte 2009: 27). Notably, there is no mention, across any of the policy documents that have appeared, about the devastating environmental impact of war upon the landscapes where it takes place, and the need to prevent or even mitigate this destruction. Back at home, military personnel returning from war are being enrolled as climate warriors. During the 2009 election campaign Obama announced a Green Vets Initiative that would provide green training and jobs in the private sector for the 837,000 vets of Iraq and Afghanistan. While this exact initiative has not been introduced, the government has promoted Green Energy Jobs through its Veterans Workforce Investment Program and through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.26 This is a reconfiguration, and privatization, of the civilian-military pact of cradle-to-grave provision of social welfare (see Lutz 2002: 730). To this end, programs have begun popping up across the US. The Green Collar Vets is a non-profit organization in Texas that helps retrain and reskill vets for the green economy.27 The organization Veterans Green Jobs, in partnership with several educational institutions and organizations such as Walmart, Whole Foods, and the Sierra Club, provides vets of four states with training opportunities for the green economy. What differentiates their program, they argue, is that their keystone course Green 101, makes explicit the links between green programs and national security. 28 Veterans are also taking on a more activist role to promote the shift to renewable energy. A group of US Vets, sponsored by Operation Free (whose mission is to secure America with clean energy), travelled to Copenhagen to discuss the national security dimensions of climate change (and groups have also travelled across the US to visit Senate Offices, and to the White House).29 Domestic programs for vets, and resource and research investments for greening the military point to some fundamental ways that domestic social formations are being reorganized in support of the militarization of climate change. This is part of militarisms typical double move: on the one hand, war is projected as being over there while the second move saturates our daily lives with war-ness (Ferguson 2009: 478). Domestic measures to address energy security are put forward as calculable, rational and even compassionate measures, while the foreign threat is presented as non-state, elusive, and undeterminedand hence coherent with much of the discourse around diffuse new wars and terrorist threats (Kaldor, 2006). At the same time, there is also greater convergence between the inside and the outside, and between the environment and the military in the ways that the discourses are mobilized and mapped out (Cooper, 2006). Indeed, as Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen notes, there is a coherence between pre-emptive military doctrines and precautionary environmental strategies: both are based upon a rationale for urgent action based on anticipated future disaster scenarios (Rasmussen 2006: 124). Notably, however, it is only when environmental issues are harnessed to security claims that the precautionary approach gains traction. Hiving climate change to national security ensures that environmental issues will garner more attention, as is argued by many of the experts on the environment and security noted above. But as I have sought to illustrate in this paper, instead of opening up questions regarding security or the environment, these are foreclosed by a military approach. It reduces the concept of security to a nationalist, defensive strategy modelled on future disaster scenarios of resource conflict. Moreover, it perpetuates an externalized concept of nature that is to be commanded and controlled, with no real sense of ecological prioritization. Rather, energy security emerges as the primary focus for innovation and investment to combat geopolitical concerns around the reliance on foreign oil and the threat to military personnel in the field. At the same time, increased spending on the military is legitimized as it becomes a source of green initiatives. Where does this leave politics, and more precisely, as Melinda Cooper asks, What becomes of an anti-war politics when the sphere of military action infiltrates the grey areas of everyday life, contaminating our quality of life at the most elemental level? (Cooper 2006: 129). If we support climate change initiatives, are we then pro-military? If we are anti-military, do we jeopardize climate change action? As the militarization of climate change unfolds, it is this interpenetration that needs to be disrupted, both with respect to martial approaches to the environment, and with respect to the troubling attempts to use the mobilization of climate change to re-moralize war and the military.

This technological enframing makes warming strategically even more dangerous and crowds out more pressing environmental movements

Crist 7 Ass. Prof. Sci & Tech in Society @ VT (Eileen, Telos 141, Winter, Beyond the Climate Crisis)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planets ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve the problem. Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the suns rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by changing our whole style of living.16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, the one lifeline we can use immediately.17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. The Montreal protocol, he submits, marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planets predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be nave not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisisamong numerous other catastrophesclimate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisisa crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem lossesindeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end towill barely addressthe ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

The 1ACs Orthodox IRs atomistic approach to global problems makes extinction inevitable

Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity

This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents, the report concludes that The implications for future conflict are ominous.97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable youth bulge by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to endemic unemployment will be channelled through political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: The worlds middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries* that 'operate to exclude and include*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105

Vote neg to reject the 1ACs enframingonly this accesses a healthy middle ground that reevaluates problematisation

Cheeseman & Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its knowledge form as reality in debates on defense and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australias identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is itself a considerable part of the problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their context in the world, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom to remain outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the rightness of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at the least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because they were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. One must be able to say why to power and proclaim no to power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australias security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defense and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that informs conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defense and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realization that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the worlds ills in general, or Australias security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defense practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities that might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought process of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not as much at contending policies as they are made for us but challenging the discursive process which gives [favored interpretations of reality] their meaning and which direct [Australias] policy/analytical/ military responses. This process is not restricted to the small, official defense and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defense and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community. They also question the discourse of regional security, security cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to Australias official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defense and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on defense and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Saids critical intellectuals. The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy makers frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australias policy-makers and their academic advisers are unaware of broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? To summarize: a central concern of this book is to democratize the defense and security theory/practice process in Australia so that restrictions on debate can be understood and resisted. This is a crucial enterprise in an analytical/ policy environment dominated by particularly rigid variants of realism which have become so powerful and unreflective that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of constituting the world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-as-practice may be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial) War Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young Australians in towns and cities around the country. These are the flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which, tragically, remains integral to Australian realism, despite claims of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what unfortunately, continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly debates over defense and security revealed in this book. For this reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its criticisms.Beginning discussions at the intellectual level is more productivecauses better social change which their engagement cant accessthis is empirically proven

Bilgin 05Assistant Prof of International Relations at Bilkent University, REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, p54-The point is that a broader security agenda requires students of security to look at agents other than the state, such as social movements, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals, instead of restricting their analysis to the states agency. This is essential not only because states are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their citizens security, as noted above, but also because there already are agents other than states be it social movements or intellectuals who are striving to provide for the differing needs of peoples (themselves and others). This is not meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the contrary, they remain significant actors with crucial roles to play.25 Rather, the argument is that the states dominant position as an actor well endowed to provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its agency. Furthermore, broadening the security agenda without attempting a reconceptualisation of agency would result in falling back upon the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. In other words, the state being the most qualified actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. This is why students of critical approaches aim to re-conceptualise agency and practice. Critical approaches view non-state actors, in particular, social movements and intellectuals, as potential agents for change (Cox 1981, 1999; Walker 1990b; Hoffman 1993; Wyn Jones 1995a, 1999). This echoes feminist approaches that have emphasised the role of womens agency and maintained that women must act in the provision of their own security if they are to make a change in a world where their security needs and concerns are marginalised (Tickner 1997; also see Sylvester 1994). This is not necessarily wishful thinking on the part of a few academics; on the contrary, practice indicates that peoples (as individuals and social groups) have taken certain aspects of their own and others security into their own hands (Marsh 1995: 1305; Turner 1998). Three successful examples from the Cold War era the Nestl boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in Europe are often viewed as having inspired the social movements of the post-Cold War era (Lopez et al. 1997: 2301; Marsh 1995). Christine Sylvester (1994) has also pointed to the examples of the Greenham Common Peace Camp in Britain (198089) and womens producer cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe (198890) to show how women have intervened to enhance their own and others security. These are excellent examples of how a broader conception of security needs to be coupled with a broader conception of agency. It should be noted here that the call of critical approaches for looking at the agency of non-state actors should not be viewed as allocating tasks to preconceived agents. Rather, critical approaches aim to empower nonstate actors (who may or may not be aware of their own potential to make a change) to constitute themselves as agents of security to meet this broadened agenda. Nor should it be taken to suggest that all non-state actors practices are emancipatory. Then, paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors will enable students of security to see how, in the absence of interest at the governmental level (as is the case with the Middle East), non-state actors could imagine, create and nurture community-building projects and could help in getting state-level actors interested in the formation of a security community. It should, however, be noted that not all non-state actors are community-minded just as not all governments are sceptical of the virtues of community building. Indeed, looking at the agency of nonstate actors is also useful because it enables one to see how non-state actors could stall community-building projects. In the Middle East, womens movements and networks have been cooperating across borders from the beginning of the Intifada onwards. Womens agency, however, is often left unnoticed, because, as Simona Sharoni (1996) has argued, the eyes of security analysts are often focused on the state as the primary security agent. However, the Intifada was marked by Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish womens adoption of non-zerosum, non-military practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities (Mikhail-Ashrawi 1995; Sharoni 1995). Such activities included organising a conference entitled Give Peace a Chance Women Speak Out in Brussels in May 1989. The first of its kind, the conference brought together about 50 Israeli and Palestinian women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip together with PLO representatives to discuss the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The follow-up event took place in Jerusalem in December 1989 where representatives of the Palestinian Womens Working Committees and the Israeli Women and Peace Coalition organised a womens day for peace which, Sharoni noted, culminated in a march of 6,000 women from West to East Jerusalem under the banner Women Go For Peace (Sharoni 1996: 107). Aside from such events that were designed to alert public opinion of the unacceptability of the Israel/Palestine impasse as well as finding alternative ways of peacemaking, women also undertook direct action to alleviate the condition of Palestinians whose predicament had been worsening since the beginning of the Intifada (Mikhail-Ashrawi 1995). In this process, they were aided by their Western European counterparts who provided financial, institutional as well as moral support. In sum, womens agency helped make the Intifada possible on the part of the Palestinian women, whilst their Israeli- Jewish counterparts helped enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli state. The Intifada is also exemplary of how non-state actors could initiate processes of resistance that might later be taken up by policy-makers. The Intifada began in 1987 as a spontaneous grassroots reaction to the Israeli occupation and took the PLO leadership (along with others) by surprise. It was only some weeks into the Intifada that the PLO leadership embraced it and put its material resources into furthering the cause, which was making occupation as difficult as possible for the Israeli government. Although not much came out of the Intifada in terms of an agree- ment with Israel on issues of concern for the people living in the occupied territories, the process generated a momentum that culminated in 1988 with the PLOs denouncement of terrorism. The change in the PLOs policies, in turn, enabled the 1993 Oslo Accords, which was also initiated by non-state actors, in this case intellectuals (Sharoni 1996). The point here is that it has been a combination of top-down and bottom-up politics that has been at the heart of political change, be it the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, or Intifada in Israel/Palestine.Emphasising the roles some non-state actors, notably womens networks, have played as agents of security is not to suggest that all non-state agents practices are non-zero-sum and/or non-violent. For instance, there are the cases of Islamist movements such as FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and Hamas in the Occupied Territories that have resorted, over the years, to violent practices as a part of their strategies that were designed to capture the state mechanism. However, although they may constitute threats to security in the Middle East in view of their violent practices, what needs to be remembered is that both FIS and Hamas function as providers for security for some peoples in the Middle East those who are often neglected by their own states (Esposito 1995: 16283). In other words, some Islamist movements do not only offer a sense of identity, but also propose alternative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members. However, the treatment women receive under the mastery of such Islamist movements serves to remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on non-governmental actors as agents for peace and security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas. Middle Eastern history is replete with examples of non-state actors resorting to violence and/or adopting zero-sum practices in the attempt to capture state power. In fact, it is often such violent practices of nonstate actors (that is, terrorism or assassination of political leaders) that are mentioned in security analyses. Nevertheless, the fact that not all non-state actors are fit to take up the role of serving as agents of emancipatory change should not lead one to downplay the significant work some have done in the past, and could do in the future. After all, not all states serve as providers of security; yet Security Studies continues to rely on their agency.Then, in order to be able to fulfil the role allocated to them by critical approaches, non-state actors should be encouraged to move away from traditional forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state power or that adopt zero-sum thinking and practices. Arguably, this is a task for intellectuals to fulfil. This is not to suggest that intellectuals should direct or instruct non-state actors. As Wyn Jones (1999: 162) has noted, the relationship between intellectuals and social movements is based on reciprocity. The 1980s peace movements, for instance, are good examples of intellectuals getting involved with social movements in bringing about change in this case, the end of the Cold War (Galtung 1995; Kaldor 1997). The relationship between intellectuals and peace movements in Europe was a mutually interactive one in that the intellectuals encouraged and led whilst drawing strength from these movements. Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that to make a change, intellectuals should get directly involved in political action. They could also intervene to provide a critique of the existing situation, what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in world politics. Students of security could help create the political space that would enable the emergence of a Gorbachev, by presenting such critique. It should, however, be emphasised that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. In other words, intellectuals should be informed by the practices of social movements themselves (as was the case in Europe in the 1980s). The hope is that non-state actors such as social movements and intellectuals (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Lastly, intellectuals could make a change even if they limit their practices to thinking, writing and self-reflection. During the Cold War very few security analysts were conscious and open about the impact their thinking and writing could make. Richard Wyn Jones cites the example of Edward N. Luttwak as one such exception who admitted that strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen ones own side in the contention of nations (cited in Wyn Jones 1999: 150). Still, such explicit acknowledgement of the political dimension of strategic thinking was rare during the Cold War. On the contrary, students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have been characterised by limited or no self-reflection as to the potential impact their research could make on the subject of research (Wyn Jones 1999: 14850). To go back to the argument made above about the role of the intellectual as an agent of security and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, students of critical approaches to security could function as agents of security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications of their own thinking and writing. Self-reflection becomes crucial when the relationship between theory and practice is conceptualised as one of mutual constitution. State-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a reality out there but help reinforce statism. Although it may be true that the consequences of these scholarly activities are sometimes unintended, there nevertheless should be a sense of selfreflection on the part of scholars upon the potential consequences of their research and teaching. The point here is that critical approaches that show an awareness of the socially constructed character of reality need not stop short of reflecting upon the constitutive relationship between theory and practice when they themselves are theorising about security. Otherwise, they run the risk of constituting threats to the future (Kublkov 1998: 193201).1NC Inherency

Status quo solvesLopez 1/1/14 (Oscar, Latin Times, "New Year 2014: 4 Reasons Immigration Reform Will Pass In 2014," http://www.latintimes.com/new-year-2014-4-reasons-immigration-reform-will-pass-2014-141778)Immigration reform is set to be the key issue of 2014. Following Mitt Romney's dismal performance among Latino voters in the 2012 election, both sides of the Government woke up to the necessity for comprehensive reform on immigration. Indeed, in his State of the Union address in February, President Obama declared that the time has come to pass comprehensive immigration reform. Yet with the House divided over Obamacare and the budget crisis, the Government Shutdown let immigration reform die. 2014 will change that: and here are 4 Reasons Why. 1. Republican Support: A fundamental lack of support from the GOP has always been one of the major obstacles for passing comprehensive reform legislation, and indeed this seemed to be the case this year after the Bill passed by the Senate was struck down by Congress. However, more and more GOP members are realizing the significance of the Latino vote and understanding that passing comprehensive immigration reform is the most significant way of securing support from Latino voters. A July poll from Latino Decisions found that immigration reform was the most important issue facing the Latino community for 60 percent of those surveyed. The poll also found that 70 percent of those questioned were dissatisfied with the job Republicans were doing on the issue. The survey also found the 39 percent would be more likely to support a Republican congressional candidate if immigration reform was passed with Republican leadership. Republican candidates have become aware of the significance of immigration reform for the party. Even in traditionally conservative Republican strongholds like Texas, candidates are turning towards immigration reform. According to Republican strategist and CNN en Espaol commentator Juan Hernandez, "it also wouldnt surprise me if after the primary, the candidates move to the center and support reform. For Republicans to stay in leadership in Texas, we must properly address immigration. The March 2014 primaries will be a key moment in determining how reform progresses: Republican Strategist John Feehery suggests, The timing on this is very important. What was stupid to do becomes smart to do a little bit later in the year. Once the primaries are over, GOP members will have the chance to implement reform legislation without fear of challenges from the right. 2. Legalization Over Citizenship: While the Senates 2013 immigration reform bill was struck down by Congress, GOP party members have indicated that they will support legislation which favors legalization of undocumented immigrants over a path to citizenship. Meanwhile, a recent survey from Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project demonstrated that 55 percent of Hispanic adults believe that legalizing immigrants and removing the fear of deportation is more important than a pathway to citizenship (although citizenship is still important to 89 percent of Latinos surveyed.) As CBS suggests, Numbers like these could give leverage to lawmakers who are interested in making some reforms to the legal immigration system, but not necessarily offering any kind of citizenship. If House Republicans offered legalization legislation for the undocumented community, this could put pressure on the President to compromise. And while this kind of reform would not be as comprehensive as the Senates bill, a bipartisan agreement would be a significant achievement towards accomplishing reform. 3. Activism Steps Up: 2013 saw one of the biggest surges in grassroots activism from immigration supporters, and political leaders started to listen. The hunger strike outside the White House was a particularly significant demonstration and drew visits of solidarity from a number of leaders from both sides of Congress, including the President and First Lady. Immigration reform activists have promised "we will be back in 2014." Indeed, 2014 promises to be a year of even greater activism. Activist Eliseo Medina has pledged that immigrant advocacy groups would visit as many congressional districts as possible in 2014 to ensure further support. Protests, rallies and marchers are likely to increase in 2014, putting greater pressure on Congress to pass legislation. Such visual, vocal protests will be key in ensuring comprehensive reform. 4. Leadership: As immigration reform comes to the fore, party leaders will step up in 2014 to ensure change is achieved. While President Obama has made clear his support for comprehensive reform, House Speaker John Boehner previously stated that he had no intention of negotiating with the Senate on their comprehensive immigration bill. However, towards the end of 2013, it seemed that Representative Boehner was changing his tune. In November, President Obama revealed that the good news is, just this past week Speaker Boehner said that he is hopeful we can make progress on immigration reform. As if to prove the point, Boehner has recently hired top aide Rebecca Tallent to work on immigration reform. With bipartisan leadership firmly focused on immigration reform and party members on both sides realizing the political importance of the issue, comprehensive legislation is one thing we can be sure of in 2014.1NC Agriculture

No farm labor shortage wages are decreasing while profits are increasing

CNBC 12 (What the Invisible Farm Labor Shortage Is Really About 11/29, pg online at http://www.cnbc.com/id/50016592)Despite the absolute lack of evidence of anything approaching a farm-labor shortage, complaints about this invisible menace continue to make headlines. Here's how a recent piece from the Washington bureau of Gannett begins: Farmers from Arizona to New York are struggling to find enough people to harvest their crops this season, a shortage they blame on state and federal laws designed to crack down on the migrant labor that makes up the bulk of the nation's seasonal farmworkers. "We see shortages in all parts of the country," said Kristi Boswell, director of congressional relations for the American Farm Bureau. "Farmers are struggling with fewer bodies out there to harvest the crop. They're definitely stressed." Farmers with labor-intensive crops or livestock, including fruit, vegetables, nuts, Christmas trees and dairy cows say they are being hit especially hard. "We've got neighbors literally competing against each other just to have enough of a workforce to harvest their crops," Boswell said. Heaven forefend! Neighbors "literally competing against each other." It's practically a civil war. The fact is that there is no data whatsoever to support the alleged farm labor crisis. The latest data, issued from the Department of Agriculture on November 27, shows that labor expenses on farms have increased just 0.7 percent over the past year. Costs for hired labor, those who work on the farm long-term, are up just 0.5 percent. Costs for contract labor, the harvest-time pickers, are up just 1.5 percent. In other words, labor costs are well-below the level of general price inflation. In fact, farm labor costs are still below where they were in 2008 on a nominal basis. In real terms, labor costs are falling for farmers. This doesn't mean all is well for the farmer. There are genuine challenges and for