1NCCritiqueThe 1ACs security discourse forwards an atomistic approach to global problems within orthodox IR that makes extinction inevitableAhmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 ComplicityThis analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of 'resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies', particularly due to a projected 'youth bulge' in the South, which 'will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy'. This will prompt a 'return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets'. Finally, climate change will 'compound' these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents, the report concludes that The implications for future conflict are ominous.97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable youth bulge by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to endemic unemployment will be channelled through political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: The worlds middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.99 Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how secur-itisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarization against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous 'outsiders*. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new "outsider* identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of 'Otherisation'. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying 'discursive complex", where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on 'the construction of stark boundaries* that 'operate to exclude and include*. Yet these exclusionary discourses are 'intimately bound up with political and economic processes', such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of 'maintaining American hegemony* by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military-political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different. As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of 'othering* in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously 'included* groups become 'ideologically recast' and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and 'Otherised' in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of 'inclusion*, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.1 3 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project - or colonial project designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable. Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new 'outsider' group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105

Their expertism masks politically constructed scenarios as objective this privileges insulated decision-making authority causes deference to the executive turns case and results in endless militarismAziz Rana 12, Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; A.B., Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School; PhD., Harvard University, July 2012, NATIONAL SECURITY: LEAD ARTICLE: Who Decides on Security?, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1417Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create a world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310 [*1486] Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. military permanently mobilized to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs. Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well. Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

Vote neg to reject the 1ACs enframingonly this accesses a healthy middle ground that reevaluates problematisationCheeseman & Bruce 96 (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9) This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its knowledge form as reality in debates on defense and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australias identity are both required and essential if Australias thinking on defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is itself a considerable part of the problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their context in the world, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom to remain outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the rightness of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at the least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because they were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between open societies and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. One must be able to say why to power and proclaim no to power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australias security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defense and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that informs conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defense and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realization that terms and concepts state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the worlds ills in general, or Australias security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defense practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities that might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought process of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not as much at contending policies as they are made for us but challenging the discursive process which gives [favored interpretations of reality] their meaning and which direct [Australias] policy/analytical/ military responses. This process is not restricted to the small, official defense and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australias academic defense and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australias security community. They also question the discourse of regional security, security cooperation, peacekeeping and alliance politics that are central to Australias official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defense and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australias public policies on defense and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Saids critical intellectuals. The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy makers frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australias policy-makers and their academic advisers are unaware of broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? To summarize: a central concern of this book is to democratize the defense and security theory/practice process in Australia so that restrictions on debate can be understood and resisted. This is a crucial enterprise in an analytical/ policy environment dominated by particularly rigid variants of realism which have become so powerful and unreflective that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of constituting the world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-as-practice may be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial) War Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young Australians in towns and cities around the country. These are the flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which, tragically, remains integral to Australian realism, despite claims of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what unfortunately, continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly debates over defense and security revealed in this book. For this reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its criticisms.

This comes first teaching fear is the infusion point of militarism justifies perpetual war, colonialism, and academic racism rejection destabilizes the foundations of interventionismNguyen 14 [Nicole, Department of Cultural Foundations of Education at Syracuse University, January 21, Education as Warfare?: Mapping Securitised Education Interventions as War on Terror Strategy, Vol. 1 No. 1, pg. 20-6]Since September 11, the US has renewed its focus on domestic education as a critical component of protecting national and economic security. This focus includes shifting instruction and curricula toward preparing students for the military and security industry, infusing ideas of security and safety into school culture, militarising school space through the implementation of techniques like zero tolerance policies and surveillance cameras, and teaching students these dominant representations of the brown Other. In this articulation of the role of schools, ghting the war on terror begins at home in our public schools, which conscript students into the war effort by educating them for war and perpetuating fear and anxiety. Such measures are not new in the post-9 / 11 US security state. Jackson reminds us that educational policies in the United States have been integrally related to social and economic policies, with domestic and foreign interests linked inextricably. 112 Following Sputnik , there was a massive infusion of money to enhance the curriculum of high schools, with a greater emphasis on math and the sciences as well as foreign language instruction in order to globally compete economically and militarily. 113 Means offers that connections between public education, crisis, and national security are nothing new in the United States. Cold War anxieties and concerns over national security provided inspiration for Dwight Eisenhowers National Education Defense Act (NDEA) in 1958 . . . 114 Three years later the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961 promised to bolster language and area studies expertise of American students and faculty and to increase understanding and mutual cooperation between the people of the United States and the people of other countries and to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations in order to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world. 115 In other words, by sending US educators abroad, Fulbright-Hays operated as both a diplomacy project and an effort in spreading American ideals, values, market economy and epistemologies. David Austell, while supporting this assertion, argues that these education initiatives work more insidiously in relation to the US war agenda: International education in the United States has its roots rmly planted in views of homeland security stemming from the Cold War, and its role and effectiveness as a foil to a purely militaristic foreign policy has changed very little in the intervening sixty years. 116 Further, Webber, in tracing the genealogy of the use of US domestic public education as a means to warehouse and re-socialise immigrants, argues that the democratic school [in the US] has always been as instrument of the security state. This is by no means a new idea, pace 9 / 11 . . . . Schools have always been a hegemonic tool of the security state as schooling by which Ivan Illich understood it to be a process of training people to believe in the legitimacy of the states orders. 117 The late nineteenth-century warehousing of Native Americans in white boarding schools in the United States also served to assimilate populations wholesale to defuse the threat they putatively posed. In present day, such historical efforts an esthetise contemporary educational projects abroad as purely apolitical aid, and provide the humanitarian veneer necessary to continue such efforts. Following this history, recent domestic school reforms rely on fear and insecurity to justify and legitimise reforms that situate schools squarely in line with the war agenda. Former Chancellor of New York Citys Department of Education Joel Klein and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explain in their 2012 U.S. Education Reform and National Security com-missioned report that far too many U.S. schools are failing to teach students the academic skills . . . they need to succeed and, as such, . . . Americas failure to educate is affecting national security . 118 The Report specically calls for a focus on job training in math and science human capital development in order to continue to protect and defend the US homeland and economy. This follows The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century report (Phase III: Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change, Journeys through the Teacher Pipeline addendum, 2001). 119 This report names education as a national security imperative where [US] education in science, mathematics, and engineering has special relevance for the future of U.S. national security, for Americas ability to lead . . . 120 Such discourses around national and economic in/security, risk, and education do much work to continue to authorise and justify particular school reform efforts intended to train and recruit students for war and work in the multi-billion dollar security industry. Following this logic, schools are transformed from a public good to a security risk. 121 Such preparation contributes to the warmachine. 122 Since the Cold War, the US has increasingly militarised schools, reective of the larger push of militarisation the privileging of the military and military logics in everyday day life in the US. Militarising and securitising education means that schools adopt harsh disciplinary policies, regulate student movement and mobility, and teach students to value and privilege military doctrine. While fear of nuclear warfare dotted US school curriculum and pedagogy during the Cold War, the global war on terrorism has continued to reshape US public education. Indeed, since the Cold War, US cities increasingly militarise, police, and fortify schools and children. 123 In 2008, several greater-DC area counties and their school districts formed the Mid-Atlantic Homeland Security Network of Educators (MHSNE) in order to respond to the regions critical shortage of skilled homeland security workers by working to create a kindergarten to career pipeline aimed at training young people to work in the homeland security industry in public high schools re-designed to meet security industry needs. The Network does so by partnering homeland security and emergency preparedness professionals with educators to develop curriculum together. Such school-industry partnerships engender a neoliberal militarised and securitised form of education aimed at training future workers to defend and protect the homeland from the brown Other. Based on preliminary eldwork I conducted atone such high school, students built rockets with representatives from NASA, learned to protect nuclear reactors from a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission engineer, and discussed important military weaponry from AR 15s to Desert Eagles to Remotely Operated Weapons Systems (ROWS). A local base commander congratulated students for their participation in the homeland security programme, citing this passage from Heinleins military-science novel Starship Troopers delineating the differences between mere civilian and citizen: The difference lies in the eld of civic virtue. A citizen accepts personal responsibility for the safety of the body politic, of which he is a member, defending it, if need be, with his life. The civilian does not. The commander applauded students: You are taking a very large step from walking down the road as a civilian in the greatest country in the world to a citizen making a difference. 124 In this way public schools and staff communicate to students certain versions of militarised citizenship, security, and terrorism that both perpetuate fear and representations of the brown Other and call them to action as citizen[s] making a difference by learning to defend the greatest country in the world with their lives. Perhaps less noticeably, students learned to valorise the military with the JROTC Color Guard opening meetings, military and security industry banners hanging in the hallway, the encouragement of teachers to discuss guns and weaponry, the presence of military gures in their school, the valuing of hyper-masculinities noted by a knowledge of weapons and military war history, the continual reference to America as the greatest and freest nation in the country, the perpetual suggestion of bad guys out there threatening the US, and the framing of military action as the only means to security. US students in these types of schools are not only drafted as foot soldiers in the war on terror, they are also taught to view the world according to these hegemonic imaginative geographies. For example, while watching a lm on teen violence, students remarked, Well, that explains it! when a young brown boy opened a Quran to pray. Students articulated what they had learned in class and in everyday life in the US: Islam and brown skin communicated danger and violence. Nationally, the greater DC areas public schools are not alone in their current efforts to supply the security industry with skilled workers and, historically, such school reforms merely serve as another node on the longer genealogy of US educations role in supporting military agendas. While these programmes intend to (and do) engage students with hands-on lessons, eld trips, and guest lecturers as well as make them marketable for the booming US security industry, the inuence of neoliberal and securitised logic is readily apparent. Students, for example, learned about parabolas by pretending to be snipers needing to nd and hit their target, North Korea. They shadowed workers at the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and secured internships at the National Security Agency (NSA). This type of education excited students through these hands-on opportunities and lessons seemingly readily applicable to everyday life and future job opportunities. The heightened attention toward security that has shaped US school reform projects means that children develop securitized subjectivities as they are prepared for the long war. In other words, young people enrolled in these programmes develop a sense of self dened by heightened fear, anxiety, and uncertainty of an unknown threat. This normalised apprehension and subsequent practices of militarism are justied in the name of US and personal safety and security. 125 Building US public schools around a militarised interpretation of homeland security relies on the aforementioned scenes of legibility that map terror and threat onto brown bodies. Given this putative threat, students must arm and prepare to enter the homeland security workforce. These priorities shift the purpose of education away from fostering critical thinking for democratic participation to training young people for the war on terror. Corporations partner with public high schools, donating dollars and expertise in order to ensure a pipeline of diverse talent needed for our future workforce. 126 Northrop Grumman allocated $20.9 of its $28.2 mil-lion philanthropic donations toward the development of STEM education across the nation, its core philanthropic focus according to its 2011 Corporate Responsibility Report. Northrop Grumman argues that supporting STEM initiatives is critical for our business and for U.S. competitiveness, so weve embraced programs that we think will help build a diverse employee pipeline. 127 For Northrop Grumman, the development of and investment in STEM K-16 education programmes ensure the health and life of the business and the security of the homeland. Such school reform projects follow calls from the US state to improve STEM education. The U.S. Commission on National Security / 21st Century outlines, for instance that to ensure the vitality of all its core institutions, the United States must make it a priority of national policy to improve the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly in mathematics and the sciences. Moreover, in an era when private research and development efforts far outstrip those of government, the United States must create more advanced and effective forms of public / private partnerships to promote public benet from scientic-technological innovation. 128 In this way, homeland security programmes and schools typify how securitised neoliberal logic, fuelled by corporate dollars, is infused into school reform, curriculum, and everyday (normalised) neoliberal and securitised school subjectivities. While the Obama administration ended the war in Iraq, promised troop reduction in Afghanistan, and increased its use of drones, much of my time in the homeland security high school revolved around talk of the growing pipeline initiative to continue to grow the programme throughout the state and to extend it through all grade levels in order to meet the nations growing security needs. In a meeting with school administrators and representatives of the defence corporations, students from local elementary, middle, and high schools as well as current college students presented how the homeland security programme was useful to them, how the corporations might get more young people interested in working in the industry, and what they found exciting in the programme. The school also holds several recruiting events at the elementary schools, simulated cyber-security battle labs, and homeland security fairs to spur local interest. The mushrooming number of regional and national initiatives aimed at further institutionalising homeland security education in US public schools indicates that this form of securitised education has drastically shifted public schooling in the United States even as the war on terror strategy continues to morph under the Obama administration. The continued portrayed need to secure US borders, cyber space, and the homeland authorised this emphasis on homeland security in US public schools. The fears of the dangerous brown Other and of ungoverned school space dramatically altered the architecture of school discipline at Wellington. These changes highlight how this fear and anxiety can be used to mobilise school reforms intending to fortify US public schools and control brown bodies, and borrow from the scripts used to make sense of US interventions in Iraq. Further, the US state portrays a lack of skilled workers as a national security risk, demanding US public schools reform their schools in order to meet the needs of the security industry. As the reverberations of September 11 and the long war continue to structure US public schools, children educated in these schools learn to interpret the world and their place in it through a lens of homeland security and war. In this way, US public schools become yet another site of war on terror strategy. Taken together, these militarised and securitised US public school reforms instituting homeland security studies programmes, tactical US engagements with madrassas, and the emphasis on girls education as empowerment highlight the critical role education plays in supporting and furthering war on terror strategy both materially and discursively. Though disparately located, these sites of education are connected by larger social processes invested in the reproduction of difference and inequality, the advancement of capitalist imperialism, and the furthering of US warfare through the circulation of specic geographic imaginaries of here and there and us and them. DISRUPTIONS Through this analysis, we can see how the US constructs and mobilises convenient scripts and imaginative geographies in order to perpetuate hegemony, justify war, and humanise US military intervention while refuelling a sense of imminent danger and fear across the US homeland. We see this in looking specically at three distinct sites of education: Framed by Orientalist understandings of brown women as oppressed by brown men, girls education initiatives mobilised by the United States work to humanise and justify war under the guise of advancing human rights and feminism. The representation of madrassas as incubators of terrorism authorises the implementation of US-style education programmes and military intervention. Lastly, US public schools organise their schools to abate the threat posed by brown bodies and the spaces they occupy, and to prepare young people to defend the homeland either militarily or through their work in the security industry. Gregory proposes that for us to cease turning on the treadmill of the colonial present it will be necessary to explore other spatializations and other topologies, and to turn our imaginative geographies into geographical imaginations that can enlarge and enhance our sense of the world and enable us to situate ourselves within it with care, concern, and humility. 129 As the US continues to invent and invest in new forms of education to service the war industry, the challenge posed by critical geopolitics is to work to disrupt the geographies that enable these education and military practices. Throughout this work, we have seen how the architecture of enmity animated through various Orientalist and patriarchal discourses shapes and justies US engagements with education to buttress war on terror efforts and to revivify the USs standing as the worlds moral compass. Informed by a longer colonial genealogy long before September 11 noted by various inection points during the Cold War, this analysis recognises that these operative hegemonic discourses and ideologies appear and reappear across time and space their traces always and everywhere superimposed and enable seemingly unconnected practices to work together to maintain and extend patriarchal and colonial dominance. 130 Plotting the ideological and discursive routes that link various sites that make up the topography of imperial, securitised education can help us map and, in turn, challenge the contours of US interventions with education. A re-scripting of the Middle East as well as of the United States role in putatively promoting global security while risking the human security of millions of brown bodies across the globe acts as one step toward dismantling the prevailing geopolitical imagination(s) that operates on and through brown bodies in dangerous and violent ways. By exposing the patriarchal and imperial investments of dominant geopolitical scripts, this analysis has worked to provide some entry points for reframing the conversation around in/security and education in ways that might de-centre and destabilise US hegemonic imaginings and, in turn, privilege Other ways of knowing.

1NCInherencyStatus quo solves cloud computingRelander 3/27 [Brett, Investment Advisor, 2015, Cloud-Computing: An industry In Exponential Growth, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/032715/cloudcomputing-industry-exponential-growth.asp]Driving the growth in the cloud industry is the cost savings associated with the ability to outsource the software and hardware necessary for tech services. According to Nasdaq, investments in key strategic areas such as big data analytics, enterprise mobile, security and cloud technology, is expected to increase to more than $40 million by 2018. With cloud-based services expected to increase exponentially in the future, there has never been a better time to invest, but it is important to make sure you do so cautiously. (See article: A Primer On Investing In The Tech Industry.)

Lack of EU investment makes solvency impossible every single speech or action Obamas taken and then failed to fully implement prove the aff would be seen as another failed attempt AND people dont trust the NSA because they lied in congress trust is the key internalLomas 13 (Natasha, NSA Spying Risks Undermining Trust In U.S. Cloud Computing Businesses, Warns Kroes, Tech Crunch, July 4, 2013, Accessed April 8, 2015, http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/04/spying-bad-for-business/)//ADThe NSA spying scandal risks undermining trust in U.S. cloud computing businesses, the European Commissions vice-president, Neelie Kroes, has warned in a speech today. Kroes also reiterated calls for clarity and transparency from the U.S. regarding the scope and nature of its surveillance and access to data on individuals and businesses living and conducting business in Europe in order to avoid a knock-on effect on cloud businesses. Loss of Europeans trust could result in multi-billion euro consequences for U.S. cloud providers, she added. Kroes was speaking during a press conference held in Estonia, following a meeting of the ECs European Cloud Partnership Steering Board, which was held to agree on EU-wide specifications for cloud procurement. In her speech, part of which follows below, she argued that cloud computing businesses are at particular risk of fallout from a wide-reaching U.S. government surveillance program because they rely on their customers trust to function trust that the data entrusted to them is stored securely. Kroes said: If businesses or governments think they might be spied on, they will have less reason to trust the cloud, and it will be cloud providers who ultimately miss out. Why would you pay someone else to hold your commercial or other secrets, if you suspect or know they are being shared against your wishes? Front or back door it doesnt matter any smart person doesnt want the information shared at all. Customers will act rationally, and providers will miss out on a great opportunity.

1NCWarmingNo internal link other countries wont model US adaptation or invest especially true since the other NSA spying programs still exist

Alt cause lack of accurate models faster data processing means nothing if were using the same approach

Depictions of climate conflict cause pre-emptive military build-up starting great power conflict before the migration even occursMichael Brzoska 8, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg [The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security, Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention 2008, 3/26-29]It will affect the living conditions of many people. In many cases the change in living conditions will be for the worse. This may, in turn, lead to violent conflict. The deterioration of the human environment and the resulting violent conflict may induce large numbers of people to migrate, thus also creating conflicts in areas less negatively affected by climate change. Beyond local and regional effects, climate change increases the global risk of violent conflict by adding another element of contention to the competition among major powers. These dangers associated with climate change are by now quite well rehearsed. But how high is the probability that they will occur? How likely is it that climate change will lead to more interstate wars, intrastate wars or terrorism? How much do we know about the links between climate change and violence? Are these dangers real in the sense of having a high likelihood of occurring or are they largely fictitious, edge-of-range possibilities that are used to draw attention to climate change, a level of attention that would not be attainable by stressing the more likely, but less spectacular economic and social consequences of the problem? The latter would be understandable but potentially counterproductive. In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round exceptionalism in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards security experts (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations such as more use of arms, force and violence will gain in importance in the discourse on what to do. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

Social change is key to solve adaptation even if the aff gives us the capabilities they cant overcome the implementation barrier their cardRomero 08 [Purple, reporter for ABS-CBN news, 05/17/2008, Climate change and human extinction--are you ready to be fossilized? http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/05/16/08/climate-change-and-human-extinction-are-you-ready-be-fossilized]Climate change killed the dinosaurs. Will it kill us as well? Will we let it destroy the human race? This was the grim, depressing message that hung in the background of the Climate Change Forum hosted on Friday by the Philippine National Red Cross at the Manila Hotel. "Not one dinosaur is alive today. Maybe someday it will be our fossils that another race will dig up in the future, " said Roger Bracke of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, underscoring his point that no less than extinction is faced by the human race, unless we are able to address global warming and climate change in this generation. Bracke, however, countered the pessimistic mood of the day by saying that the human race still has an opportunity to save itself. This more hopeful view was also presented by the four other speakers in the forum. Bracke pointed out that all peoples of the world must be involved in two types of response to the threat of climate change: mitigation and adaptation. "Prevention" is no longer possible, according to Bracke and the other experts at the forum, since climate change is already happening. Last chance The forum's speakers all noted the increasing number and intensity of devastating typhoons--most recently cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, which killed more than 100,000 people--as evidence that the world's climatic and weather conditions are turning deadly because of climate change. They also reminded the audience that deadly typhoons have also hit the Philippines recently, particularly Milenyo and Reming, which left hundreds of thousands of Filipino families homeless. World Wildlife Fund Climate and Energy Program head Naderev Sao said that "this generation is the last chance for the human race" to do something and ensure that humanity stays alive in this planet. According to Sao, while most members of our generation will be dead by the time the worst effects of climate change are felt, our children will be the ones to suffer. How will Filipinos survive climate change? Well, first of all, they have to be made aware that climate change is a problem that threatens their lives. The easiest way to do this as former Consultant for the Secretariats of the UN Convention on Climate Change Dr. Pak Sum Low told abs-cbnews.com/Newsbreak is to particularize the disasters that it could cause. Talking in the language of destruction, Pak and other experts paint this portrait of a Philippines hit by climate change: increased typhoons in Visayas, drought in Mindanao, destroyed agricultural areas in Pampanga, and higher incidence rates of dengue and malaria. Saom said that as polar ice caps melt due to global warming, sea levels will rise, endangering coastal and low-lying areas like Manila. He said Manila Bay would experience a sea level increase of 72 meters over 20 years. This means that from Pampanga to Nueva Ecija, farms and fishponds would be in danger of being would be inundated in saltwater. Saom added that Albay, which has been marked as a vulnerable area to typhoons, would be the top province at risk. Saom also pointed out that extreme weather conditions arising from climate change, including typhoons and severe droughts, would have social, economic and political consequences: Ruined farmlands and fishponds would hamper crop growth and reduce food sources, typhoons would displace people, cause diseases, and limit actions in education and employment. Thus, Sao said, while environmental protection should remain at the top of the agenda in fighting climate change, solutions to the phenomenon "must also be economic, social, moral and political." Mitigation Joyceline Goco, Climate Change Coordinator of the Environment Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, focused her lecture on the programs Philippine government is implementing in order to mitigate the effects of climate change. Goco said that the Philippines is already a signatory to global agreements calling for a reduction in the "greenhouse gasses"--mostly carbon dioxide, chloroflourocarbons and methane--that are responsible for trapping heat inside the planet and raising global temperatures. Goco said the DENR, which is tasked to oversee and activate the Clean Development Mechanism, has registered projects which would reduce methane and carbon dioxide. These projects include landfill and electricity generation initiatives. She also said that the government is also looking at alternative fuel sources in order do reduce the country's dependence on the burning of fossil fuels--oil--which are known culprits behind global warming. Bracke however said that mitigation is not enough. "The ongoing debate about mitigation of climate change effects is highly technical. It involves making fundamental changes in the policies of governments, making costly changes in how industry operates. All of this takes time and, frankly, we're not even sure if such mitigation efforts will be successful. In the meantime, while the debate goes on, the effects of climate change are already happening to us." Adaptation A few nations and communities have already begun adapting their lifestyles to cope with the effects of climate change. In Bangladesh, farmers have switched to raising ducks instead of chickens because the latter easily succumb to weather disturbances and immediate effects, such as floods. In Norway, houses with elevated foundations have been constructed to decrease displacement due to typhoons. In the Philippines main body for fighting climate change, the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change, (PTFCC) headed by Department on Energy Sec. Angelo Reyes, has identified emission reduction measures and has looked into what fuel mix could be both environment and economic friendly. The Department of Health has started work with the World Health Organization in strengthening its surveillance mechanisms for health services. However, bringing information hatched from PTFCCs studies down to and crafting an action plan for adaptation with the communities in the barangay level remains a challenge. Bracke said that the Red Cross is already at the forefront of efforts to prepare for disasters related to climate change. He pointed out that since the Red Cross was founded in 1919, it has already been helping people beset by natural disasters. "The problems resulting from climate change are not new to the Red Cross. The Red Cross has been facing those challenges for a long time. However, the frequency and magnitude of those problems are unprecedented. This is why the Red Cross can no longer face these problems alone," he said. Using a medieval analogy, Bracke said that the Red Cross can no longer be a "knight in shining armor rescuing a damsel in distress" whenever disaster strikes. He said that disaster preparedness in the face of climate change has to involve people at the grassroots level. "The role of the Red Cross in the era of climate change will be less as a direct actor and increase as a trainor and guide to other partners who will help us adapt to climate change and respond to disasters," said Bracke. PNRC chairman and Senator Richard Gordon gave a picture of how the PNRC plans to take climate change response to the grassroots level, through its project, dubbed "Red Cross 143". Gordon explained how Red Cross 143 will train forty-four volunteers from each community at a barangay level. These volunteers will have training in leading communities in disaster response. Red Cross 143 volunteers will rely on information technology like cellular phones to alert the PNRC about disasters in their localities, mobilize people for evacuation, and lead efforts to get health care, emergency supplies, rescue efforts, etc.

1NCDiseaseInternal link disconnect the uq card is about human genomes but the internals are about bacterial genomes which are 0.1% of the size of the human code means the status quo solves because more computing power isnt necessary

Kosers about TB they have no ev that says genome sequencing is key to every other disease

Cant solve cross-resistance too many mutations and species variation make genome specificity impossible also means resistance is inevitable

Diseases wont cause extinction burnout or variationYork 14 Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species? 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-speciesBut mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

Their disease descriptions are shaped by political interests and in turn shape reality turns the aff MacPhail 09 (Theresa, medical anthropologist at the University of California, Berkeley The Politics of Bird Flu: The Battle over Viral Samples and Chinas Role in Global Public Health, Journal of language and politics, 8:3, 2009)In fact, the health development strategies of international organizations are judged as significant in reinforcing the role of the state in relation to the production of primary products for the world market, thereby perpetuating international relations of dominance and dependency. Soheir Morsy, Political Economy in Medical Anthropology In July of 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona appeared before a congressional committee and testified that during his term in office he had been pressured by the Bush administration to suppress or downplay any public health information that contradicted the administrations beliefs and/or policies. Gardiner Harris of the New York Times noted that Dr. Carmona was only one of a growing list of present and former administration officials to charge that politics often trumped science within what had previously been largely nonpartisan government health and scientific agencies (Harris 2007). Dr. Carmona testified that he had repeatedly faced political interference on such varied topics as stem cell research and sex education. Two days later, an editorial in the Times bemoaned the resultant diminution of public health both its reputation as non-biased and the general understanding of important public health issues in the eyes of the same public it was meant to serve (2007). In the wake of Dr. Carmonas testimony, it would appear that these are grave times for public health. And yet, public health concerns and international measures to thwart disease pandemics have never been more at the forefront of governmental policy, media focus and the public imagination. Dr. Carmonas testimony on the fuzzy boundaries between science and state, health and policy, is in line with a recent spate of sensational stories on the dangers of drug-resistant tuberculosis and the recurrent threat of a bird flu outbreak all of which belie any distinct separation of politics and medical science and highlight the ever-increasing commingling of the realms of public health and political diplomacy. Until recently, the worlds of public health and politics have generally been popularly conceptualized as separate fields. Public health, undergirded by medicine, is primarily defined as the science and practice of protecting and improving the health of a community (public health 2007), regardless of political borders on geographical maps. Disease prevention and care is typically regarded as neutral ground, a conceptual space where governments can work together for the direct (or indirect) benefit of all. Politics, on the other hand, is usually referred to in the largely Aristotelian sense of the word, or politika, as the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation, and the administration and control of its internal and external affairs (politics 2007). If we take to be relevant Clausewitzs formulation that war is merely the continuation of policy (or such politics) by other means, might we then argue that the recent wars on disease specifically the one being waged on the ever-present global threat of bird flu are merely a continuation of politics by different means? In an article written for the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC), two health professionals suggest that the flow of influence works optimally when an unbiased science first informs public health, with public health then influencing governmental policy decisions. The other potential direction of influence, wherein politics directly informs public health, eventually constraining or directing scientific research, has the potential to create a situation in which ideology clouds scientific and public health judgment, decisions go awry and politics become dangerous (Koplan and McPheeters 2004: 2041). The authors go on to argue that: Scientists and public health professionals often offer opinions on policy and political issues, and politicians offer theirs on public health policies, sometimes with the support of evidence. This interaction is appropriate and healthy, and valuable insights can be acquired by these cross-discussions. Nevertheless the interaction provides an opportunity for inappropriate and self-serving commentary, for public grandstanding, and for promoting public anxiety for partisan political purposes. (ibid.) The authors, however, never suggest that pure science, devoid of any political consideration, is a viable alternative to an ideologically-driven disease prevention policy. What becomes important in the constant interplay of science, politics and ideology, is both an awareness of potential ideological pitfalls and a balance between official public health policy and the science that underlies it. The science/ public health/politics interaction is largely taken for granted as the foundation of any appropriate, real-world policy decisions (Tesh 1988: 132). Yet the political nature of most health policies has, until recently, been overshadowed in popular discourse by the ostensibly altruistic nature of health medicine. Yet as Michael Taussig reminds us of the doctor/patient relationship: The issue of control and manipulation is concealed by the aura of benevolence (Taussig 1980: 4). Might the overt goodwill of organizations such as the WHO, the CDC, and the Chinese CDC belie such an emphasis on politics? Certainly there is argumentation to support a claim that public health and medicine are inherently tied to politics. Examining the hidden arguments underlying public health policies, Sylvia Noble Tesh argues: disease prevention began to acquire political meaning. No longer merely ways to control diseases, prevention policies became standard-bearers for the contending political arguments about the form the new society would take (1988: 11). Science is a reason of state in Ashis Nandys Science, Hegemony and Violence (1988: 1). Echoing current battles over viral samples, Nandy suggests that in the last century science was used as a political plank within the United States in the ideological battle against ungodly communism (1988: 3). Scientific performance is linked to political dividends (1988: 9), with science becoming a substitute for politics in many societies (1988: 10). What remains novel and of interest in all of this conflation of state and medicine is the new politics of scale of the war on global disease, specifically its focus on reemerging disease like avian influenza. As doctor and medical anthropologist Paul Farmer notes: the WHO manifestly attempts to use fear of contagion to goad wealthy nations into investing in disease surveillance and control out of self-interest an age-old public health ploy acknowledged as such in the Institute of Medicine report on emerging infections (Farmer 2001: 5657). What Farmers observation underlines is that public health has transformed itself into a savvy, political entity. Institutions like the WHO are increasingly needed to negotiate between nations they function as the new diplomats of health. Modern politics, then, have arguably turned into health politics. In 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution on infectious diseases. The resolution came in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic and was the first of its kind issued (Fidler 2001: 80). What started as a reaction to a specific disease, AIDS, has since developed into an overall concern with any disease or illness which is seen as having the potential to lay waste to global health, national security, or economic and political stability. In other words, disease and public health have gone global. But, as law and international disease scholar David Fidler points out, the meeting of realpolitik and pathogens that he terms microbialpolitik is anything but new (Fidler 2001: 81). Microbialpolitiks is as old as international commerce, wars, and diplomacy. Indeed, it was only the brief half-century respite provided by antibiotics, modern medicine and the hope of a disease-free future that made the coupling of politics and public health seem out-of-date. But now we have (re)entered a world in which modern public health structures have weakened, thus making a return to microbialpolitiks inevitable. As Fidler argues: The reglobalization of public health is well underway, and the international politics of infectious disease control have returned (Fidler 2001: 81). Only three years later, Fidler would write that the predicted return of public health was triumphant, having emerged prominently on the agendas of many policy areas in international relations, including national security, international trade, economic development, globalization, human rights, and global governance (Fidler 2004: 2). As Nicholas King suggests, the resurgence of such microbialpolitiking owes much to the discourse of risk so prevalent in todays world. The current focus on risk, as it specifically pertains to disease and its relationship to national security concerns, has been constructed by the interaction of a variety of different social actors: scientists, the media, and health and security experts (King 2004:62). King argues: The emerging diseases campaign employed a strategic and historically resonant scale politics, making it attractive to journalists, biomedical researchers, activists, politicians, and public health and national security experts. Campaigners identification of causes and consequences at particular scales were a means of marketing risk to specific audiences and thereby securing alliances; their recommendations for intervention at particular scales were a means of ensuring that those alliances ultimately benefited specific interests. (2004: 64) King traces this development to the early 1990s, specifically to Stephen Morses 1989 conference on Emerging Viruses. Like the UN Security Council resolution on emerging infections, the conference was in the wake of HIV/AIDS. In Kings retelling, it was Morses descriptions of the causal links between isolated, local events and global effects that changed the politics of public health (2004: 66). The epidemiological community followed in Morses footsteps, with such luminaries as Morse and Joshua Lederberg calling for a global surveillance network to deal with emerging or reemerging diseases such as bird flu or SARS. However, although both the problem and the effort were global by default, any interventions would involve passing through American laboratories, biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the information science experts (King 2004: 69). Following the conference, disease became a hot topic for the media. Such high-profile authors as Laurie Garrett (The Coming Plague) and Richard Preston (The Hot Zone) stoked the emerging virus fires, creating what amounted to a viral panic or viral paranoia (King 2004: 73). Stories of viruses gone haywire, such as Prestons account of Ebola, helped reify the notion that localized events were of international importance. Such causal chains having been formed in the popular imagination, the timing was ripe for the emergence of bioterrorism concerns. In the aftermath of 9/11, the former cold war had been transformed, using scalar politics, into a hot war with international viruses (King 2004: 76). Of course, all of this can be tied into the Foucaultian concept that knowledge is by its very nature political. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault outlines the ways in which medicine is connected to the power of the state. For Foucault, medicine itself becomes a task for the nation (Foucault 1994: 19). He argues that the practice of medicine is itself political and that the struggle against disease must begin with a war against bad government (Foucault 1994: 33). In an article on the politics of emerging diseases, Elisabeth Prescott has echoed Foucaults equation of disease with bad government. She suggests that a nations capacity to combat both old and newly emergent diseases is a marker not of just biological, but of political, health. She argues that the ability to respond [is] a reflection of the capacity of a governing system (2007: 1). Whats more, ruptures in health can lead to break-downs in effective government or in the ability of governments to inspire confidence. Prescott suggests: Failures in governance in the face of infectious disease outbreaks can result in challenges to social cohesion, economic performance and political legitimacy (ibid.). In other words, an outbreak of bird flu in China would equate to an example of Foucaults bad government. In the end, there can be no doubt that the realms of medicine and (political) power are perpetually intertwined. Foucault writes: There is, therefore, a spontaneous and deeply rooted convergence between the requirement of political ideology and those of medical technology (Foucault 1994: 38). In other words, we should not be overly surprised by Richard Carmonas testimony or by debates over bird flu samples. Politics and health have always arguably gone hand-in-hand

1NCEconomyDeterrence, trade, and lack of convincing ideology prevent the impacts to China risePosen 14 [Barry, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT's Security Studies Program, June 24, Restraint : A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy, Cornell University Press, pg. 94-5/AKG]Some aspects of the situation will likely make China a less potent competitor than the Soviet Union, especially on a global scale. First, China faces a geopolitically more problematic environment than did the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union after World War II faced immediate neighbors exhausted by war, and hence vulnerable. The opposite is the case today; global prosperity has been growing since the end of the Cold War. China has two nuclear neighborsIndia and Russia. One of them is potentially as dynamic economically as China. Two other neighbors, the Republic of Korea and Japan could easily become nuclear weapons states. Chinas own population near its land borders often consists of ethnic minorities, restless under governance from Beijing. China cannot afford war on those borders. 50 Many neighboring countries are separated from China by bodies of water, which would make it difficult for China to apply military pressure, if it ever came to that. Finally, at least for the immediate future, Chinas economic prosperity is inextricably bound up with global trade, which leaves it vulnerable in extremis to blockade. United States naval, air, and space power allow it to dominate the open oceans. So long as this remains the case, in the event of hot war, the independent nations on the edge of the East and South China Seas would all have access to the outside world, while China would not. Second, and related, Chinas geography makes it at most an Asian land power. The Soviet Union spanned Eurasia and thus it had inherent potential to be a global power: it had ports and airfields that allowed it to project at least some power in almost any direction, and it could move resources from one theater to another overland or through its own controlled airspace. Chinas naval geography, even in Asia, helps hem it in. Independent countries with their own nationalist sensibilities sit astride Chinas route to open waters. Third, China does not have ideology working for it. The colonial empires were collapsing as the Cold War opened. In part due to resentment of the capitalist system of their former colonial masters, and in part due simply to the moment in history, communism was an attractive ideology and social system in the early Cold War. It served as a legitimating force for Soviet activities worldwide. Local nationalisms in the developing world were more suspicious of the West than they were the Soviet Union, creating opportunities for Soviet political penetration in the emergent countries. Nationalist sentiment today seems to be omnidirectionally suspicious, which would make Chinese penetration difficult, and leave Chinese influence vulnerable to constant local attack. China does not have an ideology or social system that travels, in any case. Authoritarian capitalism with Chinese nationalist overtones and communist trappings is not much of a brand.

Cant solve China long-term Hsu says China's defense budget could outstrip that of the U.S. within the next 20 years

Framing economic leadership as the driver of US-China peace strains relations and causes US aggressionNilsson 12 (Fredrik, Lund University Graduate School in Poly Sci, Securitizing Chinas Peaceful Rise An Empirical Study of the U.S. Approach to Chinese Trade Practices, Military Modernization and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea, http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=2740544&fileOId=2743569)The main objective of this study was to investigate how the United States has approached elements of Chinas economic growth and military modernization. By employing securitization theory and neorealist notions of security, I sought to reveal the transformation of the U.S. approach from being of a political nature to becoming issues of security. I employed a slightly modified model of securitization theory, emphasizing the importance of facilitating conditions and the institutional power of securitizing actors. I have argued that the United States has chosen to securitize a range of issues pert