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Foreign Policy and Human Rights Advocacy: An Exercise in Measurement and Explanation

Federico Merke fmerke@udesa.edu.ar

Gino Pauselli gpauselli@udesa.edu.ar

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Introduction Although the promotion of human rights in international relations is a growing institutionalized practice, we still lack a metric for assessing and explaining both the activism and ideological bias in promoting human rights. In other words, we know that states words and deeds on human rights at the global level are more abundant, but we do not know precisely what drive states to be active internationally in human rights and why different states promote some human rights and leave other aside. This article aims to answer three interrelated questions:

1. How can we define and measure what constitutes a foreign policy in human rights?

2. How is it possible to explain both the activism of a state and its ideological orientation in the international promotion of human rights?

3. What is the empirical evidence found when we try to answer these questions in intermediate states?

The text is divided into four sections, followed by a conclusion. The first section explains what it means to speak of a human rights foreign policy (hereinafter HRFP) and reviews the relation between foreign policy and human rights in the International Relations (IR) literature. The second section proposes an elaboration of our dependent variable, HRFP style, which will be defined along two dimensions: (a) activism and (b) orientation. We explain what we mean by 'activism' and 'orientation' and then put forward a metric to estimate them. The third section presents three hypotheses to explain the HRFP intensity and three hypotheses to explain its orientation. The six hypotheses will be tested empirically upon the definition and measurement of the independent variables that compose them. To test our hypotheses, we focus on four intermediate states (more below) with variations both in activism and orientation in HRFP between 2003 and 2010. These countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa. The fourth section shows the data collected to measure the variables and the qualitative and quantitative analysis. In the conclusion, we introduce some final observations that might serve to deepen the study of HRFP. Foreign policy and human rights Simply put, a human rights foreign policy (HRFP) has to do with the defense and promotion of human rights implemented by a state beyond its borders. As such, it is just another issue area of a state foreign policy, such as trade, security or migration. A HRFP can be done unilaterally, as when the United States requires improved levels of compliance with human rights to recipient states, or multilateral, such as a UN Human Rights Council exhortation to a particular state to comply with certain rights. The means available to pursue a HRFP may also vary. At one extreme, a HRFP can be developed under the framework of diplomacy and international law. At the other end, and under certain circumstances, human rights can be enforced through the use of force.

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That a HRFP may conflict with other national interests is out of discussion. States deal with national responsibilities (with citizens), international responsibilities (to other states) and humanitarian responsibilities (with humanity) in different, complex and sometimes contradictory ways and thus conflict of interests is quite common (Donnelly 2003, 155-172). It is always a challenge for states to reconcile norms with material interests, political alliances and policy preferences. Any state can claim that human rights norms constitute the starting point of its foreign policy, but this preference alone cannot be a guide on how it will behave, for example, when its largest trading partner is also a target of international complaints because its low human rights standards. The study of human rights in the IR discipline became a growing industry in the last ten years and it has followed mainly two lines of reasoning. On the one hand it is possible to locate research whose main interest has been put on the fulfillment of human rights standards within states. These works concentrated on explaining why and how states are coerced or convinced to have acceptable standards of human rights at home. This approach actually omitted foreign policy analysis and rather focused on how internal and external factors lead to a greater respect for human rights within the target state. On the other hand, there has been other literature much more concentrated on the presence of human rights in foreign policy. These studies seek to explain why states decide to have a foreign policy on human rights, entering into international agreements or promoting them in various fields (bilateral or multilateral) and with different instruments (economic, diplomatic or military). The following section briefly reviews these two broad perspectives and highlights the gaps which will be in part taken up in this article. Human rights and domestic policy A recurrent theme in the IR study of human rights has been placed on studying domestic and international variables which may account for human rights compliance within states. Both liberalism and constructivism have led the research agenda following predictable lines. Liberalism analyzes how non-state actors and international organizations excercise pressure on states to comply with human rights standards. Berkovitch and Gordon (2008) considered the potential of civil society organizations (CSOs) to alter human rights policies within states. The authors concluded that this potential is mainly based on the type of economic context in which CSOs operate and their funding sources (pp. 881-885). Whitten-Woodring (2009) studied how press freedom affects the governments respect of physical integrity on its citizens. Lutz and Sikkink (2000) analyzed the impact of international human rights treaties on its signatories. Also, Pevehouse (2002a, 2002b) studied how membership to international organizations promotes democratization (as a facilitator process for obtaining political rights) of its authoritarian members. This change takes place mainly through diplomatic and political pressures exerted by liberal countries in these organizations. Taking a broad systemic level, Brysk (2002) noted how globalization presents new challenges and solutions for the protection of human rights domestically.

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Constructivists have also explored sources of state commitment to its citizens human rights. This tradition has emphasized the importance of existing international norms and values and how states are socialized in these norms through globalization, transnational networks and international organizations. In this line of thought, Sikkink (1998) suggested that to understand the new role of human rights in international relations, the IR literature should further develop its understanding of the influence of norms and ideas in international politics (518). Further, Keck and Sikkink (1998) analyzed the role of transnational networks as transmission belts of ideas and international standards in human rights issues. For the authors, the presence and activities of these networks have been crucial in furthering changes in domestic human rights public policies. One of the most salient IR texts in the constructivist discussion about human rights was Risse, Ropp and Sikkinks The Power of Human Rights. The authors (1999) argued that networks of human rights promotion (usually based in countries outside the violators states) are decisive factors in the change of policy on human rights because: a) they put the violator states on the international agenda in terms of moral consciousness, b) help give voice and argumentative power to domestic opposition against violators governments and c) challenge these governments to create transnational structures of lobby from above and bottom up of these regimes (p. 5). Also within this perspective, Greenhill (2010) analyzed the role of international organizations as socializing bodies of norms and ideas. Through membership in these organizations and the interaction between violator and liberal states the former are exposed to the arguments, ideas and pressures from the latter in order to alter state practices regarding human rights violations. Put otherwise, shared membership in international organizations with liberal states may entails changes in domestic policies in states disrespectful of human rights. Human rights and foreign policy As we said before, the other line of research has been more concentrated on explaining what leads some states to have a HRFP. Curiously, power-based Realist explanations have not been foreign to this debate. Leading the discussion, Jan Egeland (1984) analyzed the commitment of states to international human rights according to their relative power. His work sought to explain in particular the selective US involvement in promoting human rights. His central argument was that powerful states have very diversified interests, both geographically and functionally, and that these multiple and conflictive interests restrict the possibilities of acting on a logic of appropriateness rather than on a logic of consequences. Forsythe (2000) also presented a number of variables to explain foreign policy on human rights among which is the position states occupy in the international system. In a similar direction, Apodaca (2005) suggested that US foreign policy in human rights is determined by its position in the international system, and so that whatever direction it may take it will always serve as a mechanism to promote its national interest.

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In an attempt to open the state into investigation, David Forsythe studied how domestic factors can also lead to a HRFP. Fist, he included the lobby exerted by CSOs to the states (1989). Second, he considered the role of public opinion in supporting a HRFP but also highlighted the public's aversion to engagement when this involves costs in terms of material and human resources (2000). Finally, he introduced the role that history and national identity can play and how these are combined with national interests in determining the level of activity that will acquire a HRFP (2006). One of the most interesting collective works on human rights and foreign policy is Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy edited by David Forsythe (2000).The book studied in particular how national culture, public opinion, regime type, ideologies and the internal structure of the state can work in favor or against a HRFP. Also working with domestic variables, Wheeler and Dunne (1998) studied Britains change in its foreign policy on human rights that occurred when the Labor Party took power in 1997. The authors observed that this change was tied to a new international identity that Tony Blair was trying to build up. Wheeler and Dunne (2001) went on to study what led Australia to intervene in East Timor and the pressure put on Western states to follow suit. The authors concluded that Australias decision was not based on sole Australian national interests but had to do with its national identity as a performer and a carrier of Western beliefs and interests in Southeast Asia. Baehr and Castermans-Holleman (2004) compared the cases of Netherlands and United States in their HRFPs and how the former had a moralistic foreign policy while the later showed a mix of idealism and realism. The authors highlighted the role of domestic political traditions and the country's position in the international arena as two critical variables to explain alternative patterns of foreign policy. Also working on a comparative basis, Jack Donnelly (2007) conducted a study including the United States, the Netherlands and Norway. For the author, an important factor explaining the variation in these three countries is the national political culture, which in turn shapes the definition of national interests and geo-strategic competition. In an attempt to synthesize the existing literature Sikkink (2005) examined both U.S. and Latin American countries. The author emphasized the role of prevailing ideas in the international order at the time of foreign policy-making while recognizing, at the same time, national interests and institutions. Although her theoretical model appears somewhat indeterminate, an important contribution made by Sikkink was the classification of foreign policies on human rights between multilateral and bilateral strategies.1 More recently, Brysk (2009) analyzed the HRFP of nearly fifty countries and classified them by different levels of activity. Her explanation focused mainly on the relative power of each country in the international system. She also considered other domestic variables, such as political regime, development and internal security. Brysk concluded

1 For Sikkink (2005, 10) states have a policy in bilateral human rights when their foreign policies take systematically into account the human rights in other states. [Also,] the state has a multilateral human rights policy when they show they are willing to submit their own internal human rights practices to some international review .

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that intermediate or regional powers are most likely to carry out an active HRFP. Simply put, big powers are too compromised and small states are too weak. As this short review tells us, the study of human rights in IR has contributed to learn more about the relationship between international politics, foreign policy and human rights. While progress has been remarkable, there is still an interesting discussion about what determines a state to conduct a more active foreign policy in human rights. One of the more elaborate dependent variable has been the level of compliance with human rights within states. Another dependent variable has been the internalization of human rights in foreign policy making. The independent variables more cited to explain HRFP have been power and interests, political regime, membership to international organizations, the weight of the CSOs, membership to international treaties and national identity and culture. In short, as Casla Salazar (2011) pointed out, the literature on HRFP has highlighted as explanatory factors the country's size, history, institutions and civil society. Beyond the utility of these contributions some shortcomings need to be pointed out. First, a selection bias still exists in the sample states considered for investigation. Most of the studies just reviewed focus their attention on the foreign policies of industrialized liberal democracies. This orientation leaves Southern states beside2, which are considered, in the worst case, as object of intervention or, at best, as passive, irrelevant countries. Second, beyond the work of Forsythe (2000) and Brysk (2009) there has been no other attempt to compare foreign policies on human rights. In particular, few comparative studies have combined qualitative and quantitative methods that help to observe and measure what states actually do in their HRFP. Finally, although the literature has made significant progress when specifying independent variables, we believe that a way to deepen the study of HRFP is to specify better the dependent variable. Thus, this paper seeks to reduce these shortcomings, first by studying four Southern intermediate states; second by gathering data to measure and compare the cases and, third, by better specifying the dependent variable. The dependent variable: HRFP styles Our dependent variable seeks to combine two aspects relatively unexplored in the HRFP literature. On the one hand HRFP style is defined by its level of activism, or intensity, in terms of defending and promoting human rights. On the other hand, the HRFP style is defined by its substantive orientation in defining what kind of human rights will it defend and promote. While activism is a dimension that can take different values along a continuum (from least to most active), orientation is a dimension that may take at least three positions. On the one hand, it is possible to have a HRFP based on the defense and promotion of human rights as defined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CP). The content of this covenant is mentioned as hosting rights of "first generation" and have essentially to do with respect for life, civil and political liberties such as freedom of thought, expression, political association, and so on. On the other hand, it is possible to have 2 Exceptions are the works of Anaya Muoz (2009) and Brysk (2009)

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a HRFP based on the defense and promotion of human rights as defined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESC), as well as collective rights. Thus, in theory, we can have a group of countries promoting mainly civil and political rights; another set of countries promoting ESC and solidarity rights and another set of countries at an intermediate position, promoting both types of rights in a rather balanced manner. Measuring HRFP activism What is an active foreign policy and how can it be measured? The level of activity of a HRFP can be understood as the number of a states actions signaling willingness to develop, promote, or advance certain principles and policies related to human rights. As we observed before, these actions can be done through a gamut of venues and fora that goes from bilateral to multilateral means. Further, activism involves normative commitments and diplomatic gestures. Last, to be credible, activism needs to assign financial resources that may match words with deeds. Thus, a comprehensive measurement of activism as a variable should take into account all these normative, material, bilateral and multilateral dimensions. As these dimensions can not be grasped using a single indicator, we propose four interrelated indicators which combined can produce a comprehensive index of activism in HRFP. The first indicator is the state of signing and ratification of international human rights treaties.3 Some authors (Sikkink 2005) have seen in the signing and ratification of international instruments a clear signal of an active foreign policy on human rights. Signing and ratifying treaties, however, is not the same as complying with them. There is compelling evidence that repressive states adhere to international human rights treaties at least at the same level as non-repressive states (Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui, and Meyer 2008). The second indicator is the level of participation in the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and, since 2006 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). As the Commission and the Council are the most important international organizations on human rights issues within the UN system, the behavior of states in these agencies becomes an important site of the HRFP at the multilateral level.4 In order to appreciate the level of activity each country had in the Commission or the Council we analyzed the number of participations (as recorded in the reports) in the various discussions that took place in 3 The level of adherence to international human rights treaties has been calculated taking into account

the signing and ratification of treaties included in the database of the Human Rights Library of the University of Minnesota that Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa conducted between 2003 and 2010. In each year under study each country was assigned a value of 1 (one) to each treaty signed and other value of 1 (one) to each treaty ratified. This sum was then divided by the number of international treaties open for signature for each state during that year multiplied by 2.The formula used was:

where is the ratio of ratification and signing of international human rights treaties, F is the number of international human rights treaties that the country i has signed up to the year t, R the number of treaties ratified, and T the number of international human rights treaties open for signature. 4 There are already studies that have analyzed the HRFP from the actors participation in discussions and

projects in the Human Rights Commission (Smith 2006).

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the eighteen sessions between 2003 and 2010, with one session per year in the Human Rights Commission and three sessions per year in the successor body.5 Since every UN member (not necessarily must be a member of the Commission or Council) may submit draft resolutions or action proposals within each of the topics covered in sessions, we considered also the presentation of projects.6 The third indicator is bilateral in nature and has to do with the importance states assign to human rights in their foreign aid programs. Because of the low amounts of money that Argentina or South Africa can offer, the element of "carrots" or "sticks" that can exist in traditional foreign aid does not apply to these cases of cooperating countries in the South. Thus, the cooperation that Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa can offer in human rights issues can be considered a part of their foreign policy on human rights.7 The fourth indicator is concerned with the number of refugees a country receives each year as a ratio of the number of decisions on acceptance or rejection made along the same year. In 2003 there were nearly 17,000,000 people of interest to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This population has doubled in seven years to more than 33,900,000.8 According to Brysk (2009) hosting refugees is the most direct and immediate action states can take to assist victims of human rights abuses.9 Indeed, the ability of states to grant refugee status to a person would prevent

5 We took into account the discussions on all topics covered. The number of participations of each country in the sessions was divided by the number of instances in which countries could make comments, observations or questions. In this way, we got the participation ratio, where higher ratios represent increased activity of the country within the Council's activities. 6 To calculate the level of activity of Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa in the presentation or sponsorship of projects, we proceeded to give a score of 2 (two) for each project presented and a score of 1 (one) per each project sponsored, being the submission of a project more activism than sponsor an already presented project. The total score received by each country in each Commission or Council meeting was divided by the total number of projects submitted in the same session to reach the ratio of participation in projects within the Commission and the Council. 7 Obtaining data on the weight of human rights in international cooperation between 2003 and 2010 of the cases under study was based on information provided by the reports of the Argentine Fund for Horizontal Cooperation (FO.AR) in the case of Argentina, and the AidData database for the cases of Australia, Brazil and South Africa. It should be noted that obtaining this data presents major obstacles to perform large N comparative studies, especially when it is about analyzing intermediate countries that do not always provide this information in a consistent manner. Of all the projects offered by each country and each year, we classified those human rights projects. We consider a project as a human rights project when its title or description referred to human rights, discrimination, memory, truth and justice, minority or vulnerable groups, conflict prevention, peace building or support to refugees abroad. Once clasiffied, we proceeded to calculate the ratio of human rights projects per year (number of human rights projects divided by the total of projects offered each year). 8 UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a013eb06.html

[Accessed November 20, 2011]. 9 Data on number of resolutions in favor in relation of total decisions made by one country in each year

were extracted from the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook of each year within the period 2003-2010. Formally, the refugee acceptance rate was calculated as follows:

where A refers to the number of people with refugee status accepted for country i in year t, and D the number of decisions taken by the country i at t, both favorable or negative.

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the violation of human rights on him or her (Goodwin-Gill 1989). Thus, a concrete example of how a country is sensitive to foreigners suffering is how likely it is to accept refugees given the large number of people in situations of having to leave their country. Index of Human Rights Foreign Policy Activism With these four indicators we are able to design an index of human rights activism. The next step is to consider the weight assigned to each indicator. First, although the signing and ratification of treaties may reveal the commitment of a country towards human rights, it is also necessary to note that this indicator remains relatively stable over the time.10 Since it is cumulative, by definition it is difficult to lower the stock of treaties (unless a country denounces them).Further, the literature indicates that there is not an overwhelming difference in ratifications between states that respect human rights and states that violate them. For this reason, the relative weight of this ratio will be intermediate, giving it a weight of 25 points out of 100. Second, UN discussions on human rights remain relatively unknown to the attentive public. Besides, UN projects and decisions taken still have a rather low impact on the international society. Thus, the relative weight of these activities within the overall HRFP index must also be medium-low, with 20 points in the index, granting 10 for the participation in the discussions and 10 points for the participation in projects. Third, foreign aid and cooperation seem to be instruments on which intermediate states have more room to maneuver. States still have an ample margin to decide terms, times and the amount of money or technical cooperation they will offer. For this reason, their relative weight within the index will be medium-high, giving a weight of 30 points. Finally, a tangible policy to defend the human rights of people forced to leave their home countries for religious, racial, or political reasons or even due to natural disasters, denotes a significant commitment by a country that accepts refugees in high proportions. For this reason, the ratio of acceptance of humanitarian asylum claims will be weighted medium in the index, with 25 points. Thus, we arrive at a rate ranging from 0 to 100. From these weights we get the following formula: where the index I is composed of D, which is the ratio of participation in discussions of the CHR and HRC; P, which is the ratio of presentation, and sponsorship of projects within the same agencies; T, which is the ratio of signature and ratification of international human rights treaties; C, which is the ratio of development cooperation projects in the field of human rights; and R, which is the ratio of acceptance of refugees in the country i and year t.

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The Human Rights Librarys database at the University of Minnesota provides data of the date of signature and ratification of 68 international and 13 regional (9 of America and 4 from Africa) treaties of human rights.

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Measuring HRFP orientation State activism tells us much about how seriously a state takes human rights, but tells us nothing about which way it does. A state may be very active, for example, in the United Nations, but that activism could be oriented to the blocking of resolutions in favor of human rights. A state can also be very active in promoting civil and political rights but also very active in promoting the obstruction of economic, social or cultural rights. This observation suggests that different states interpret human rights differently and that the tension between liberty and equality or between order and justice is still not resolved. This is why the analysis should go beyond activism and examine its orientation. As noted above, at least in theory it is likely to find states with a major orientation towards the defense of civil and political rights; states focused on the defense of economic, social and cultural rights, and states somewhere in between. We believe that the most direct way to evaluate the orientation of a state is to measure the level of support towards different human rights resolutions emanating from the United Nations General Assembly. The level of support can be measured through the ratio of voting in favor vis--vis the abstentions or negative votes a country has made over a year. The calculation of the level of support for a generation of rights (either first or second and third generation) or a set of condemnatory resolutions (to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or human rights violations in other countries) was performed using the following equation:

where N is the number of negative votes of G-type resolutions of country i in year t; A the number of abstentions and Y the amount of positive votes. To classify the resolutions we analyzed them from an open coding. It was found that the resolutions voted typically fell into four categories: (a) rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (b) rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (c) resolutions condemning violations of Palestinian human rights or promote greater respect for them and, finally, (d) resolutions condemning human rights violations in various countries (except for the region of Israel-Palestine). Upon this coding, we processed 18 resolutions on human rights of first generation, 60 on second generation, 33 on Israel and Palestine and 28 on other countries in the period 2003-2010. Explaining activism and orientation in HRFP Hypotheses on the level of activism Realism and material capacities Realist thinking has a long tradition of speculation about how power constraints normative considerations. This restriction appears to be stronger as state power

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increases. The overall idea is that a powerful state possesses global interests and commitments in the international system and this lowers its actions on human rights issues normally relegated to secondary importance or used unilaterally. According to Egeland (1984), one would expect larger states in the international system to have a more extensive network of interests that those smaller states, and thus its HRFP to maintain a low profile so as not to conflict with other interests, usually linked to economic prosperity and national security. While we agree with this observation, our interest is on the intermediate states. Realists may be correct when it comes to major powers, but its explanatory power wanes when we move down towards intermediate states. Brysk (2009) provided compelling evidence to show that those states located in the middle of the curve of power are actually the most active states in human rights in the international society. Our work aims precisely to put the focus on these intermediate states and to assess variation within this group observing, for instance, how the relative power of these states affects their activity level. Thus, contrary to what happens with the global powers, we suggest that power in the intermediate states works precisely in favor of greater human rights activism. Our hypothesis is as follows:

H1: the greater the relative power of an intermediate state, the greater their level of activism in its HRFP.

For data on the relative power of a state in the international system we used the national material capabilities index of the Correlates of War database. The composed index contains the annual values of six indicators that reflect the power of a state.11 Liberalism and domestic demands of civil society From the perspective of a domestic model of preferences formation, liberalism understands activism as something related to social identities, material interests and the ways in which both are linked in a play of political representation (Moravcsik 1997).Regarding the particular issue of human rights, the liberal informed literature has given prominence to the role of civil society advocates in demanding a more human rights based foreign policy (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008). This perspective emphasizes the liberal character of foreign policy whereas the preferences of civil society actors can come to be represented and added to the preferences of the government especially if the country has a democratic aggregation of preferences. Thus, observing civil society allows us to consider and measure the number of actors involved in the advocacy of human rights. Inquiring about the specific interests of each human rights organization and how it interacts with the state is a task beyond the scope of this work. As a fairly direct way to overcome this obstacle, we considered only the human rights organizations in each

11 This database has information until 2007, so data will be used only for the period 2003-2007. The data for the three remaining years will not be a major problem for the present analysis, as the first 5 years of the period analyzed show some stability in the relative power because power shifts in the international system occurs in longer periods of time. For this reason, the last three years will be taken as a replica of the last year for which data are available.

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country that are internationalized, i.e. with formal ties with international organizations.12

H2: the greater the internationalization of human rights organizations, the higher the level of HRFP activism.

Since 1956, the United Nations Economic and Social Council opened its doors to the participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) by granting them consultative status. Currently, more than 3,400 CSOs have some kind of consultative status within the UN. This condition offers the possibility of having a say at the Council before it reaches its decisions. They can also designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies. Constructivism and the internalization of norms Constructivism claims that states are undergoing a growing process of socialization into international standards, including those related to human rights. Constructivists analyze in particular how states internalize norms and how these very norms shape foreign policy. The hypothesis here is as follows:

H3: the more human rights norms are internalized, the greater the level of activism in its HRFP.

Examining the process by which norms and principles become internalized within domestic structures is not an easy task. We can assume, however, that these norms, once internalized, should produce concrete policies coming out from the state. Upon this reasoning it is safe to concentrate our view on the financial efforts state commit to further human rights at home. Thus, greater relative spending on human rights programs would represent greater importance of these within the state agenda. If a foreign policy, as constructivists remind us, is somehow the external projection of internal norms and policies, constructivism suggests that international human rights activism would be the manifestation of a corresponding internal activism. This approach allows us to consider Donnellys (2007) concept of political culture. A political culture is difficult to conceptualize and even more to operationalize. But restricting our analysis to state material efforts can be a useful shortcut to evaluate

12 This variable describes the ratio of human rights organizations from a specific country that have some sort of status at the UN in relation to the total of CSOs with some sort of status from that same country in each of the years between 2003 and 2010. In formal terms, if a country has a number N of CSOs registered in the UN, and n of them are CSOs of human rights, then the ratio of CSOs on human rights would be n/N, where n N. To calculate this variable, all CSOs with some sort of consultative status in the UN system and based in Argentina, Australia, Brazil and South Africa12 were categorized according to their main action area. If the mission of the organization refers to human rights as a core activity, it was classified as a CSO on human rights. Human rights as a main activity was understood as if the mission, vision or main activities mentioned the promotion, protection and/or dissemination of human rights, minority, indigenous peoples, gender or children rights, combating racism, xenophobia, and/or the promotion of cultural rights.

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states priorities, including human rights. We considered the relative weight of human rights programs in each country yearly budget.13 Hypothesis on HRFP orientation Liberalism and political regime type Briefly put, liberalism claims that regime type matters. It is not the same, for instance, a state active in promoting political and civil rights than a country active in promoting religious, cultural or collective rights that may prevail over individual liberties. For liberalism, then, one would expect that a high degree of democracy is correlated with the promotion of human rights associated with civil and political rights, while low, or no degree of democracy should be correlated with the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights. Since our work focuses on four democracies, we excluded the study of the relationship between authoritarian regimes and HRFP. These four democracies, however, have a different level of development of their political institutions and therefore also different variations should be expected in their HRFP orientation.

H4: the greater the degree of democracy, the greater the orientation towards the promotion of civil and political rights.

H5: the lesser the degree of democracy, the greater the orientation towards the promotion of economic, social, cultural and collective rights.

To measure the degree of democracy in the four countries under study we relied on the Polity IV Democracy Index, which has greater sensitivity in estimating the degree of democracy than other alternatives indexes. Liberalism and economic development Closely related to the hypotheses about regime type are the hypotheses on the degree of economic development. The basic idea is that a state with high levels of economic development will seek to defend human rights more related to individual liberties than to economic conditions. By contrast, a developing state will support more second and third-generation rights (which include the very right to development) than first-generation rights.

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The relative amount of resources allocated to human rights programs was calculated by dividing the total resources devoted to human rights programs in a given year and country by the total state expenditure in that year and country. Human rights programs have been classified based on whatever the program specifies its orientation to: a) disseminate, protect or promote human rights; b) disseminate, protect, promote the rights of a disadvantaged group; c) disseminate, protect or promote the quality of life, culture or rights of indigenous peoples; d) disseminate, protect or promote gender rights or gender equality; e) combating racism, xenophobia and related actions of discrimination. The search for human rights programs was made from the reports of the National Budget Office in the case of Argentina, the Brazilian Federal Senate website devoted to the Union Budget, the 2011-12 Commonwealth Budget website on the case of Australia, and the website of the Department of National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa, in all cases for each of the years in the 2003-2010 period.

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H6: the greater the degree of development, the more the orientation towards the promotion of civil and political rights.

H7: the lesser the degree of development, the more the orientation towards the promotion of economic, social, cultural and collective rights.

To estimate the level of development for the four countries, we used the UNDPs Human Development Index. We used the World Banks database to access the country-year data. Realism and strategic interactions Realisms main critique of a preference based liberal approach is that the study of domestic preferences tends to omit international strategic interactions. Simply put, a strong realist argument is that foreign policy, including human rights, is closely related to the type of strategic interaction in play with relevant others. A global power, for instance, that has a strategic alliance with a leading state in a region, will be reluctant to condemn it because other things considered more important (security being among the first) will trump normative considerations. Yet this global power can be very assertive in condemning practices of human rights abuses of other states confronted with its partner in the region. Put otherwise, realism cant explain why a state can have a bias per se towards civil and political rights or social, economic, or cultural rights but it can predict that whatever the orientation a state possesses it will be always already restricted by the changing patterns of strategic interaction. As noted above, of a total of 139 resolutions, 33 relate to the conflict between Israel and Palestine and 28 on other countries, typically Iran, Myanmar and North Korea.14 To analyze the bias in the voting of the four states we contrasted votes on these resolutions with overall voting coincidence with the United States. A realist conjecture is that a close relationship with the United States (of which a high voting coincidence would be the evidence) will result in not accepting charges against Israels abuses but condemning abuses in Iran, North Korea, Myanmar or any other state rival to the United States.

H8: the closer the relationship with the United States, the more likely to avoid condemning Israel.

H9: the closer the relationship with the United States, the more likely to condemn the rest of the states.

To measure voting coincidence with the US we relied on data provided by the reports of UN Voting Practices elaborated by the US State Department. The evidence

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Other states to which there was a resolution on the situation of human rights in the country were Belarus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

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The level of activism Table 1 and figure 1 below show the index of activism for each country from 2003 to 2010. The data suggests several observations. First, what emerges is that until 2005, Argentina was the most active of the four. Since 2006, Brazil then moved to the top until the last measurement, 2010, and Argentina took second place until 2009 when it was pushed into the third place. The second thing to note is the downward trend of South Africa in its activism. Since we have no data for the last two years, it is not possible to affirm whether this trend continues. The point to observe, however, is that having a score of 35.73 in 2005, South Africa went down to have a score of 19.70 in 2008. As expected, this data shows is that activism is not a constant trend but a variable subject to changes.

Argentina Brazil Australia

South Africa

2003 ND ND 23,22 ND

2004 37,33 34,48 27,70 ND

2005 39,68 34,55 28,08 35,73

2006 34,20 35,98 25,84 23,78

2007 32,60 35,33 30,73 29,03

2008 33,63 37,83 29,92 19,70

2009 32,83 46,58 34,74 ND

2010 31,53 39,83 ND ND

How this index is disaggregated into their indicators? The tables below show the scores for the four countries in each of the indicators.

0

10

20

30

40

50

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Argentina

Brazil

Australia

South Africa

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In terms of international treaties there are two distinctly different groups. On the one hand, Brazil and Argentina share similar ratios of ratification, being Brazil slightly above Argentina. On the other hand, Australia and South Africa also share similar ratios, almost twenty points below Brazil or Argentina. States also vary regarding discussions at the UN. Brazil appears as the most participative state. Observing its entire pattern, its increase has been significant. Argentina and Australia follow Brazil in a fairly similar way, although there are variations from year to year. Finally, South Africa ranks fourth, with a level of participation that is less than a half of Brazils. As for the presentation of projects, Australia leads the group, seconded very closely by Brazil and with Argentina in the third place. South Africa is again back in the fourth place. The point to note about South Africa is the fall of its activism in this area, with a ratio of 0.48 in 2003 but ending up in 2010 at 0.08. As for cooperation in human rights, Argentina is the best placed of the four. Although these ratios are rather low (0.07 for the best year in Argentina), they are no less important when compared to the ratios of 0 of Brazil or South Africa for the years which we have information. Thus, Argentina is the best positioned, followed by Australia, Brazil and South Africa. As for the acceptance of refugees, Brazil is the country that has received more asylum seekers in relation to total decisions made. It should be noted that in two years, South Africa surpassed Brazil and indeed shows the highest ratios in the entire period (0.79 and 0.63 in 2004 and 2005 respectively) but then drops to 0.09 in 2009.

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What these data suggest is that our proposal for measuring the level of activism in HRFP is sensitive to the fluctuations that occur every year. Of all the indicators, the more static is the ratio of signing and ratification of international human rights treaties. But the rest of the indicators are altered in function, precisely, of an increased activity. Thus, a state participating at the UN with interventions and proposals, providing assistance to other countries on issues related to human rights, and accepting refugees will be more active than any other state with more treaties signed and ratified but with less diplomatic action oriented towards human rights. How to explain this activism from our independent variables? The table below puts together the data collected for the independent variables beside the index of activism.

As shown in the table, when it comes to power, Brazil is the most powerful of the four and also the most active of the four. Then, in terms of power it follows Australia, South Africa and Argentina. Had Argentina been excluded in the measurement, there would be a higher correlation between power and activism, and the order would have been Brazil, Australia and then South Africa, which is exactly the same order of power. Although Argentina is a country with less relative power in relation to Australia and South Africa, it surpasses their levels of activism. Indeed, some recent studies (Sikkink 2008; Chillier 2009) have pointed out the Argentinas leadership position on issues of international human rights and its growing symbolic power on this matter. This observation seems more apparent when we notice that in matters of state efforts Argentina is the best placed of the four. In other words, Argentina is the least powerful of the four but the one who makes more financial efforts in human rights programs. This effort is followed by Brazil, Australia and then South Africa. South Africa is the least active and the least endowed with financial efforts, suggesting at first sight a significant relationship between state effort and activism. Although this observation may seem tautological, it is not. State effort is a domestic variable that has to do with the inward spending that makes a state in human rights programs and is a shortcut to account for how internalized is a human rights culture within the country. Activism is an external variable that has to do with the level of protection and promotion of human rights in international society. Observing the civil society sector, there seems not to be a correlation between internationalization and HRFP activism. In fact, the most active of the four countries

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(Brazil) has the least robust internationalized civil society in human rights. It is thus safe to say that Brazils growing international activism in human rights seems not to be accompanied by an internationalization of Brazilian civil society. This growing activism seems to be the action of a raising state and a government more committed to human rights globally. The reverse case is South Africa, which has an internationalized civil society similar to Australias and yet this level of internationalization is not reflected in its level of activism. These preliminary observations allow us to suggest that a correlation exists, on one hand, between power and activism and, on the other, between state effort and activism. A strong civil society does not seem to have much impact on international activism. For a more accurate measurement of how these variables relate to each other we made a linear correlation which yielded a positive coefficient between activism and relative power (r = 0.51, p = 0.007) and another, also positive coefficient between activism and state effort (r = 0.55, p = 0.003). Both coefficients not only rule out the null hypothesis of no relationship between these variables but also they help to support the hypotheses that relative power and state effort are closely linked with the activism of intermediate states. Although this is an exploratory study with a small N (25), both qualitative and statistic analysis suggests that the international activism of a state may well be explained by a combination of relative power and internalization of human rights norms domestically. The orientation The following table shows how the four countries voted (measured in percentage of support for resolutions) in four groups of resolutions: (a) first generation rights, (b) second and third generation rights, (c) resolutions condemning Israel for human rights violations in the conflict with Palestine, and (d) other states.

Ao First Generation Second and Third Generation Israel and Palestine Other states

AR BR AU SA AR BR AU SA AR BR AU SA AR BR AU SA

2003 67 67 67 100 90 90 20 100 100 100 75 75 67 67 100 0

2004 75 100 50 100 86 57 14 100 100 100 25 100 33 33 67 33

2005 100 100 50 100 86 86 29 100 100 100 0 100 100 80 100 20

2006 100 100 0 100 88 75 25 100 100 100 0 100 100 50 100 0

2007 100 100 33 100 90 90 20 100 67 100 0 100 100 50 100 25

2008 100 100 33 100 100 83 33 100 75 100 0 100 100 33 100 0

2009 0 0 100 0 86 86 0 100 100 100 17 100 100 0 100 33

2010 S/D S/D S/D S/D 100 100 0 100 67 100 33 100 100 33 100 33

Several observations can be made from these voting patterns. First, Argentina seems to be the most likely to vote in favor when it comes to human rights. It does not matter much if it is voting first or second generation rights or in the case of resolutions against Israel or other countries, Argentina votes in general in a positive way. Put otherwise, Argentina is the most unbiased state of the sample. Different is the case of Australia. Counter-intuitively, Australia has the lowest percentage of support for resolutions of first generation. More expected, Australia has

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the lowest percentage of support for second and third generation resolutions. Also as expected, Australia shows the weakest support to resolutions condemning Israel. This trend is reversed when Australia must vote against human rights violations in other countries, with 100% support in recent years. Brazil and South Africa show the opposite trend, both with higher support for resolutions against Israel but rather reticent to condemn other countries. Argentina is closer to Brazil and South Africa at the time of voting against Israel, but closer to Australia when voting against other countries. This shows that Argentina has a vote consistently in favor of human rights, regardless of whether it is about votes of first, second or third generation, or against Israel or other states. How to explain these trends from our independent variables? Recall that our dependent variables used were the level of democracy, level of development and the percentage of agreement with the United States. To estimate the impact on the votes, we made four different logistic regressions. The table below puts them together.

(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 1

st Generation 2

nd Generation Against Israel Against Others

Democracy -0.232 -0.484 (0.652) (0.131) HDI -8.732* -13.39*** (0.045) (0.000) US Coincidence -0.101*** 0.0756*** (0.000) (0.000) N 72 240 132 112

p-values in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Hypotheses 4 and 6 linked higher levels of democracy and development with greater promotion of civil and political rights (Model 1). The regression did not show a significant impact on the vote on resolutions of first generation rights. Further, the coefficients are negative, so if a relationship exists, this would be a negative one, meaning that greater democracy and greater development generate less support for resolutions of first generation. We believe that this observation is questionable and has to do with the particular behavior of Australia. It is the most developed country (according the UNDP) and the most democratic (according to Polity IV) of the four countries and yet it has been a poor supporter of first generation resolutions. Obviously, this trend biases the sample in a way that it is not possible to reach relevant conclusions, al least with the N used here. Hypotheses 5 and 7 linked higher levels of democracy and development with lower support to resolutions of second and third generation rights (Model 2). The results of this regression show more interesting data than the first model. Democracy has no statistical significance, but the level of development does appear as important, with a negative coefficient of thirteen points and a p value of 0.000. This suggests that an

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increase in the level of development decreases the chances of supporting second and third generation resolutions. Our third set of hypotheses had to do with the vote directed to particular states (models 3 and 4). As shown above, the decision to distinguish resolutions against Israel from resolutions against other countries proved successful. To analyze the relationship with the US, we considered voting coincidence with Washington in the UN General Assembly.

The graph shows the percentage of agreement with the US vote in the UN General Assembly. Australia is the closest country to US, followed by Argentina and then Brazil and South Africa these two countries converging in 2010 with similar rates. The table of logistic regression (Model 3) shows a statistically significant and negative relation (p = 0.000) between US coincidence and the negative vote on Israel condemnation. In other words, voting coincidence with the US can be a good predictor of how a country will vote against resolutions condemning Israel, which is the same to say that whenever the coincidence with US increases, the vote condemning Israel decreases. What happens when we do the same to explore the condemning vote to other states? To assess this, we made another logistic regression (Model 4) where we linked the level of agreement with the US with the support for resolutions condemning other states. Unlike the previous regression, this regressions shows a statistically significant and positive relations (p = 0.000), which is to say that whenever the coincidence with the US increases, the vote condemning other states increases as well. Conclusions This article proposed, first, to identify factors leading to intermediate states to have an active foreign policy on human rights (HRFP) and, second, to identify factors that drives them to adopt a particular direction in HRFP. In the first part we explained what it means to talk about a human rights foreign policy. In the second part we presented the indicators of the two dimensions of the dependent variable, activism and orientation. The third part presented the hypotheses for variations in levels of activism and orientation. In the fourth section we presented the data collected to measure our variables together with the statistical analyses obtained.

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

AR

BR

AU

SA

21

The contribution of this article has been twofold. On the one hand, we presented a model to identify a better way of specifying HRFP as a dependent variable, and put forward indicators for measuring both activism and orientation. On the other hand, we presented a set of variables to explain both activism and orientation. Regarding activism, our study suggests that the constructivist hypothesis appears to prove a positive relation between the level of state effort and its HRFP intensity. In addition, the realist hypothesis also confirmed that the greater the power of a state, the greater the activism of its HRFP. These results suggest the possibility of articulating a realist approach based on power with a constructivist approach based on norms. The general argument, which could be tested in larger N studies, is that an intermediate state with higher relative power will be more active on its HRFP, but also that this relative power should be complemented with the existence of norms internalized within the state. In terms of orientation, it was confirmed the hypothesis that a higher level of development leads to less support to second and third generation rights. It was also confirmed that a higher level of coincidence with the US leads to lower the approval rate of condemnations against Israel and to greater approval of condemnations against third countries. These data, which is still tentative and subject to further large N studies, suggests that liberalism could account for HRFP orientation, but that realist approaches highlight its limitations. In other words, while liberalism starts from preferences and from them draws results, realism considers strategic interactions and thus accounts for the constraints that may exist at the time of enforcing human rights vis--vis partners or rivals. The results presented here suggest that the study of human rights foreign policy can be approached from different theories and that the dialogue between them is something to be welcomed. Realism seems to account for both the activism of a state and its constraints at the time of voting for or against certain countries. For realism, both relative power and strategic interactions matter. Liberalism does not seem to provide an explanation of international human rights activism, but it could explain in particular why more developed states are more reluctant to vote for economic and social rights. Finally, constructivism seems to explain why a state increases its international human rights activism. The international projection would not be anything but the outward manifestation of an internalized norm within the state. Beyond these findings, however, the systematic study of HRFP is just taking its first steps in international relations. This article proposed a robust way of measuring both activism and orientation and sought to find explanations for both, presenting results that stimulate a greater dialogue among theories. References Apodaca (2005) U.S. Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance: A Short History en

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