AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT September 16, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of ISIS and its leader, dismissing the Caliphate as illegitimate and calling for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West.

2. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to correct President Hassan Rouhani publicly as he defended the Guardian Council’s role in elections as its “rational right” in response to Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Council’s growing involvement in Iran’s upcoming elections.

3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte and the surrounding areas in Libya using methods similar to those seen in Syria and Iraq.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri released two episodes of a new “Islamic Spring” audio series. Zawahiri stated that the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) caliphate is illegitimate and strongly criticized ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for claiming the title of Caliph. Zawahiri explained that Muslims are not obligated to declare their allegiance to Baghdadi and his Islamic State. He noted that ISIS has been focused on conquering other Muslims instead of uniting against external threats, such as the West, and called for fighters to set aside differences to focus on the common goal of attacking the West, secularists, and Shia Muslims in Iraq and Syria.

A report indicated that Iran released three senior al Qaeda leaders and two senior al Qaeda operatives from detention in exchange for AQAP’s release of an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Yemen. The al Qaeda leaders released, including Abu al Khayr al Masri, Saif al Adel, and Abu Muhammed al Masri, could relocate to Syria or the militant havens along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. It is not clear if the released al Qaeda members have been able to communicate with the rest of the al Qaeda network while they were under arrest in Iran.

Outlook: Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri will continue his series, drawing attention to al Qaeda’s opposition to ISIS, but encouraging cooperation between the fighters.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase. Last week, Pakistan announced that the Pakistani army would remain in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until 2019.

Outlook: Pakistani military will continue to strengthen its offensive against militancy in the country as Operation Zarb-e-Azb is in its final phase.

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalAnnounced UN-led peace talks collapsed before they began because of continued preconditions for negotiations. Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government pulled out of the talks scheduled for this week in Oman, again calling for the al Houthis to abide by the terms of UNSCR 2216, which calls for the al Houthis to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The al Houthis continue to express openness toward negotiations, but refuse to make concessions in advance. UN and humanitarian organizations continue to warn of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen.

Outlook: A negotiated political settlement remains unlikely as long as there are demands for the al Houthis to implement UNSCR 2216 without any guarantees that their interests will be protected in the future.

SecurityThe Saudi-led Arab coalition is preparing for a future offensive against Sana’a. Coalition forces supported Yemeni army and popular resistance forces in Ma’rib against the al Houthis and continued to support popular resistance forces in southern and central Yemen, especially in Taiz. They also mobilized police forces in Aden to secure the city. The al Houthis have fixed the coalition forces along a frontline that runs from Taiz into southern al Bayda and continue to control northern Yemen.

Outlook: The anti-al Houthi forces are unlikely to advance closer to Sana’a as positions once again become entrenched. Civilian deaths due to coalition airstrikes are driving support toward al Houthi-aligned forces.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP is continuing its offensive against the al Houthis, particularly in al Bayda governorate, and a senior operative described AQAP’s mission in Aden as one to restore governance. Several ISIS media offices in Yemen released materials designed to support recruitment and displayed pictures of training exercises. ISIS Wilayat Shabwah released a video in support of the new ISIS dinar, released in territory under ISIS control.

Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) SEP 10: Saudi-led airstrikes targeted al Daylami airbase and other military sites in Sana’a.2) SEP 09-12: Two U.S. airstrikes killed AQAP militants in Hadramawt.3) SEP 13: Al Houthi gunfire killed Saudi soldiers near the Saudi-Yemeni border.4) SEP 13: Saudi-led coalition forces launched a ground offensive in al Jufaynah, Ma’rib.5) SEP 09-15: Al Houthis and popular resistance forces clashed in Taiz.

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ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe U.S. re-opened a diplomatic mission to Somalia in Kenya. The signal is one of support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG). A Charge d’Affaires will lead the mission until Congress approves a new ambassador. The SFG faces challenges to its authority in central Somalia, however. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a, a group that had previously cooperated with the government against al Shabaab, controls territory in Galgudud region and refuses to recognize the SFG-backed regional authority.

Outlook: It is unlikely the U.S. will move its mission to Somalia to Mogadishu in the near future because of ongoing security concerns.

Security Kenyan security forces are conducting a large-scale operation against an al Shabaab-run cell, Jaysh Ayman, in the Boni Forest near the Somali-Kenyan border along the coast. Al Shabaab has used the area to move between Kenya and Somalia and reportedly ran cells out of it. AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) forces remain overstretched in Somalia and are vulnerable to al Shabaab attacks. Efforts remain underway to train additional Somali security and police forces.

Outlook: AMISOM and SNA forces may consolidate in southern and central Somalia, ceding some territory to al Shabaab, to protect against al Shabaab attacks.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab remains in control of territory in southern and central Somalia. It beheaded three young men it accused of being SNA soldiers near the border of Hiraan and Lower Shabelle regions. Al Shabaab continues to conduct complex attacks against underdefended AMISOM positions. An attempted bombing of a Kenyan mall may have been linked to al Shabaab.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to exploit the weak force posture in southern and central Somalia to attack AMISOM and SNA positions and contest territory.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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1) 08 SEP: Kenyan security forces disrupted an IED attack against Garden City Mall in Nairobi, Kenya.2) 10 SEP: Galmudug regional forces clashed with Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a militia in Abudwak and Guriel, Galgudud region.3) 12 SEP: Kenyan Defense Forces conducted anti-al Shabaab operations in Boni Forest region.4) 14 SEP: Al Shabaab beheaded youth in central Somalia.

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalLibyan House of Representatives (HoR) delegates and others voiced discontent with the United Nations’ Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) for its perceived bias toward the internationally recognized General National Congress (GNC) in the final round of Government of National Accord (GNA) negotiations in Sakhirat, Morocco. Several independent delegates have already left the negotiations over pressure to accept the GNC-proposed amendments to the draft agreement.

Outlook: The UN-led talks for a national unity government are unlikely to advance as long as key factions, including the HoR, perceive a bias toward the GNC and could collapse if those factions withdraw completely.

SecurityA sharp uptick in vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks and kidnappings indicates militant groups may now be focused on a military campaign in Tripoli or possibly that the GNC has lost further territorial control. The attacks have not caused significant collateral damage and are occurring as ISIS consolidates its positions along the Libyan coastline in Sirte. Outlook: Security in Tripoli will continue to deteriorate as Libya Dawn forces remain overextended and unable to disrupt operations.

Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in LibyaISIS Sirte forces are consolidating in Sirte and the surrounding areas, establishing governance and control. ISIS’s declared Abdul Mughira al Qahtani to be the emir of Wilayat Libya and is implementing reforms in the local banking system. Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture Derna and may be negotiating for ISIS’s voluntary evacuation from its strongholds in Sahel Sharqi and Fatahia.

Outlook: ISIS Sirte will continue to follow methods of control seen in Iraq and Syria to consolidate strength in Libya. MSCD militants will probably launch a new offensive against ISIS in Derna.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 09 SEP: Warshifana tribesman, operating as Libyan National Army units, attacked Libya Dawn troops IVO Janzour, Libya.2) 09 SEP: A VBIED detonated outside of Hadaba Prison IVO Tripoli, Libya. 3) 12 SEP: ISIS militants began construction on underground compounds and prisons in Sirte, Libya.4) 14 SEP: A VBIED detonated in Tajoura, Tripoli, Libya.

ASSESSMENT:

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AQIM The National People’s Army and National Gendarmerie have reported a heightened level of smuggling this week with multiple recoveries of arms caches, indicating a rise in Islamist militant activity. These arms caches are arming both AQIM and ISIS cells. Moroccan security forces found a militant group allegedly pledged to ISIS with weapons that came from Algeria. The group only consisted of five men, but presents a direct challenge to AQIM as they struggle to recruit new forces.

Outlook: AQIM continues to lose support to ISIS, but may be arming themselves for an attack in order to regain favor among the militants.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisia continues to fight against terrorists and faces a growing threat to its prison system. Terrorists plotted to bomb Mornaguia prison in Manouba and planned to hold Algerian tourists hostage to negotiate for prisoners’ release. Prime Minister Habib Essid may lift the state of emergency in light of the successful security operations, but if the government perceives any type of instability, before 02 OCT it may look to lengthen the state of emergency until the winter.

Outlook: Ansar al Sharia has not claimed any recent attacks, but the cells within Tunisia may continue to target the prisons until they successfully release their comrades. If Tunisia lifts the state of emergency, Ansar al Sharia or other aligned groups may take advantage of the lessened security measures.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Mali continues to witness militant violence, further extending into the south. Special forces arrested terrorists with connections to the Front for the Liberation of Massena, an AQIM linked group operating in central Mali. Those arrested admitted to receiving orders and money from Ansar al Din in the north, indicating the latter’s intentions of gaining control of the south. This move could strengthen AQIM’s position in Mali, prevent their supporters from defecting to ISIS. Outlook: Ansar al Din will continue using the Front for the Liberation of Massena and other cells to expand to the south and attack targets closer to the capital.

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST

AFRICA1

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1) 13 SEP: National Gendarmerie arrested seven smugglers in el Tarf, Algeria.2) 14 SEP: Moroccan forces arrested five militants pledged to ISIS in Essaouira, Morocco. 3) 14 SEP: Algerian National People’s Army arrested arms smugglers and seized an arms cache in Djelfa, Algeria.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA

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1) 08 - 14 SEP: Algerian National People’s Army arrested multiple smugglers and confiscated an arms cache in Bordj Baji Moktar and Tamanrasset, Algeria. 2) 12 SEP: Gunmen killed two police officers in Ouerkoro, Mali.3) 13 SEP: Gunmen injured two MINUSMA peacekeepers near Gao, Mali. 4

ASSESSMENT:

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Military and SecuritySupreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed new members of the High Council for the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) on September 5. He also enumerated a 10-point mission for the SCC. Along with consolidating authority under the SCC by dissolving “parallel” space councils, Khamenei wrote that the SCC’s mission includes transforming Iran into a global “cyber power.” Other points are for the SCC to accelerate the launch of a “national information network,” to combat foreign “infiltration into and infringement of” Iranian cyberspace, and to formulate “services in compliance with Islamic-Iranian values.” On September 11 and 14 respectively, Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Kazem Sedighi and Judiciary Head Sadegh Amoli Larijani called for vigilance against foreign influence in Iran.

Outlook: Authorities’ anxieties about foreign infiltration after the nuclear agreement will accelerate efforts to enhance cyberspace capabilities, particularly online censorship.

Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear Deal Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right.” He added that “some objections [to the role of the Guardian Council] are gratuitous.” The Supreme Leader was likely pushing back against President Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council’s expanding oversight of elections. Regime officials also continued to censure the Supreme Leader’s Representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili’s September 7 criticism that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, violates the Supreme Leader’s nuclear redlines and requires Iran to renounce many of its nuclear rights. Nuclear negotiator Hamid Baeidinejad and Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA member Abbas Ali Mansouri Arani singled out Jalili’s record as a senior nuclear negotiator under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, while Arani’s fellow commission member Parliamentarian Massoud Pezeshkian stated that Iran was “seeking just two rights, [both of] which we obtained.” 

Outlook: The Supreme Leader will continue to publically correct Rouhani in order to ensure the latter’s influence and politico-economic reforms do not become unmanageable.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

05 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed new members of the High Council for the Supreme Council of Cyberspace (SCC) for a four-year term.

07 SEP: Supreme Leader’s Representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili argued that Iran is forced to renounce some of its “inalienable rights” under the JCPOA.

08 SEP: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stressed that Jalili’s criticism was Jalili’s “own interpretation.”

08 SEP: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that access to military sites would be granted 24 days after UN inspectors first formally request access.

09 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani announced the formation of a “Resistance Economy headquarters.”09 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal”

and “rational right,” and argued that “objections [to the role of the Guardian Council] are gratuitous.” 09 SEP: Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri called for preparations to implement the Resistance Economy. 10 SEP: Saeed Jalili said that the supervision required under the JCPOA is “beyond [the] accepted protocol.” 10 SEP: Nuclear negotiator Hamid Baeidinejad responded to Saeed Jalili’s disapproval of the JCPOA by criticizing Jalili’s

record as a nuclear negotiator under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 10 SEP: Iran’s Permanent Representative to the IAEA Board of Governors Reza Najafi stated that it is “possible” that Iran will

export its nuclear stockpile to Russia. 11 SEP: Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA members Massoud Pezeshkian and Abbas Ali Mansouri

Arani pushed back on Saeed Jalili’s criticisms of the JCPOA. 11 SEP: Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Hojjat ol Eslam Kazem Sedighi warned that Iran must remain alert to the threat

of foreign influence.12 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani called for transferring parts of the government’s share of the economy to the private

sector. 14 SEP: Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Hassan Firouzabadi stated that the Iranian military should “exploit

their capabilities” to implement the Resistance Economy. 14 SEP: Members of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA inspected the Arak heavy water reactor.14 SEP: Officials from Iran, the U.S., and China held a trilateral meeting regarding the JCPOA on the sidelines of the IAEA

General Conference.

05 SEP – 14 SEP

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)North Waziristan (NWA)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)South Waziristan (SWA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirectorfkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569