AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

September 6, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. A pro-ISIS group may be growing stronger in Somalia, though al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab remains the dominant Salafi-jihadi group.

2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down as the political environment becomes increasingly polarized.

3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance displayed a new missile, the “Borkan-1,” a modified Scud missile. The Iranian network may have provided support to modify missiles.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

al Qaeda NetworkThe Long War Journal reported that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s al Masra magazine claimed that two of al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri’s daughters and a third woman were released in exchange for the son of Pakistan’s former Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. The claim has not been independently verified.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesJamatul Ahrar, a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) splinter group, may have conducted coordinated complex attacks in two different Pakistani cities, signaling a possible increase in the group’s sophistication and capabilities. The attacks occurred in a Christian neighborhood in the Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) region of western Pakistan and in Mardan city in northwest Pakistan on September 2.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) announced that an airstrike killed its North Waziristan military commander, Ruwayd Ali Sheikh, and ten other militants on September 4. The airstrike hit the militants’ vehicle as they traveled to Ghiyan Rawaz. Ruwayd Ali Sheikh had participated in TTP operations against the Pakistani military in Kurram Agency, FATA region.

Outlook: Jamatul Ahrar will continue to conduct explosive attacks targeting Christian communities and the judiciary in Pakistan.

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalYemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s peace proposal. An al Houthi-Saleh delegation canceled a visit to Tehran to meet with the UN Special Envoy to Yemen in Oman about peace talks. The al Houthi-Saleh Supreme Political Council (SPC) chairman announced the SPC’s willingness to participate while reiterating its right to resist attacks. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister expressed support for negotiations, but emphasized the Kingdom would not allow the al Houthi-Saleh alliance to control Yemen.

Outlook: The extent of al Houthi-Saleh representation in a transitional government will remain a stumbling block to talks.

SecurityAl Houthi-Saleh forces maintain their ability to launch cross-border attacks despite attempts by the Saudi military to dislodge al Houthi-Saleh fighters from the border. Al Houthi-Saleh forces launched multiple attacks in Saudi Arabia’s Jazan and Najran provinces. Al Houthi-Saleh media announced the creation of a new ballistic missile, the “Borkan-1,” on September 2. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have announced the new missile to increase their leverage as the peace process resumes.

Outlook: Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate in the border region but will continue to support the Hadi government’s efforts to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Sana’a.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP militants continue to target Hadi government and allied forces despite recent territorial losses. AQAP claimed responsibility for multiple attacks on Hadi-allied Hizam security forces in Abyan governorate between August 20-29 and likely detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an al Hizam commander in Aden on September 2. Hadi government security forces arrested an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) leader and a top AQAP financier on September 2-3 in Aden city.

Outlook: Hadi government counterterrorism operations will fail to prevent AQAP attacks on government officials.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe UN special envoy to Somalia, Michael Keating, called on the National Leadership Forum to end President Hassan Sheikh Mohammed's mandate by November 6. There is concern that President Mohammed and the current parliament will attempt to extend their mandates beyond the September and October parliamentary and presidential elections.

Outlook: President Hassan Sheikh Mohammed will likely be re-elected as president of Somalia, forgoing controversy over succession.

Security An ISIS-linked insurgent group in the northern Puntland state may be expanding its influence in the Horn of Africa region. The U.S. State Department designated the group’s commander, Abdul Qadir Mumin, as a Specifically Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) on August 31. Mumin’s forces repulsed an attack by al Shabaab forces in Qansax Dhere in Bay region on September 4, indicating that al Shabaab may consider Mumin’s group to be a threat. Somali security forces arrested four alleged members of Mumin’s group in Baidoa on September 2. Kenyan security forces apprehended two medical students who planned to join Mumin’s forces and assist the group in launching biological attacks on August 30.

Outlook: Mumin’s force is unlikely to displace al Shabaab as the premier Salafi-jihadi group in the region, but will still conduct successful small-scale attacks on Somali and Kenyan government targets.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab continued a wave of attacks in Mogadishu and is positioning itself for large-scale attacks during the upcoming Somali parliamentary and presidential elections. A senior SNA official claimed intelligence reports suggest hundreds of al Shabaab militants have snuck into Mogadishu prior to the upcoming elections in order to conduct attacks. Al Shabaab forces established positions in nearby Afgoi town, likely to use as a launching pad for attacks on Mogadishu.

Outlook: Al Shabaab militants will increase attacks on Mogadishu during the parliamentary and presidential elections.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe UN-brokered political process may be breaking down as tensions rise between eastern and western factions. The prime minister-designate of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) met with representatives from the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), but both sides were unwilling to compromise. HoR-allied General Khalifa Haftar reaffirmed ties with Russia, Egypt, and Chad and emphasized the importance of his forces’ counterterrorism fight in Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, over GNA-allied forces’ counter-ISIS fight in Sirte. The UN called an emergency meeting of Libyan national dialogue representatives to address rising tensions.

Outlook: The GNA’s Presidency Council may submit a new cabinet to the HoR, but it will not meet the HoR’s demands.

SecurityThe Libyan National Army (LNA), aligned with the HoR, continued intensified counterterrorism operations in western

Benghazi, sparking backlash from supporters of the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD) attempted to conduct a suicide attack on Labraq Airport in Beida, used by the LNA. The attack signals an effort to expand the MSCD’s attack zone and indicates that al Qaeda-linked hardline elements in the MSCD remain active despite rumors of internal conflict.

Outlook: The MSCD may pursue another attack on an LNA target while the LNA remains focused on Benghazi.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaThe U.S. extended its airstrike mission in support of the GNA for an additional thirty days. ISIS continues to inflict high casualties on GNA-allied forces from its few remaining strongholds in Sirte. ISIS militants that left Sirte are reportedly operating in the Bani Walid region, southeast of Tripoli, and in Ghat, on the Libyan-Algerian border.

Outlook: ISIS may reconstitute military capabilities in Libya’s interior in order to relaunch a coastal attack campaign.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Tunisian and Algerian authorities are mobilizing to prevent ISIS militants fleeing their former stronghold in Sirte, Libya from

crossing the Libyan border. Algeria is planning to build a barrier along its eastern border to defend against Salafi-jihadi militants. Algeria reiterated opposition to foreign intervention in Libya, citing negative effects on regional stability. The Tunisian Defense Minister decried the lack of regional counterterrorism coordination in the Maghreb.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi militants will retain access to Libya’s neighbors via historic trafficking networks and smuggling routes.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)Salafi-jihadi militants continue to challenge the Tunisian state. Two militants suspected of planning a suicide attack clashed with Tunisian security forces in Ain al Karma, Kasserine governorate on August 31. Two land mines, likely planted by Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants to defend the group’s safe havens, struck Tunisian military patrols near Jebel Samama on September 6. Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will continue to focus its attacks on military patrols in western Tunisia. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)A self-proclaimed pro-ISIS group claimed responsibility for a September 2 attack on a gendarmerie post in Burkina Faso. Adnan Abu Walid al Sahrawi, a former member of al Qaeda-affiliate groups in West Africa, claimed the attack as the first conducted by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara’s Burkina Faso branch. Neither ISIS nor pro-ISIS media organizations have acknowledged al Sahrawi’s group.

AQIM-linked militants continued efforts to destabilize the Malian state. Suspected Ansar al Din militants briefly seized Boni village in Mopti region, central Mali on September 2. The attack prompted Malian President Boubacar Keita to fire the country’s Defense Minister, Tieman Hubert Coulibaly.

Outlook: Al Sahrawi will continue to recruit and conduct attacks in pursuit of recognition by ISIS.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569