AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT

May 3, 2016

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. ISIS may be planning attacks in Tunisia to coincide with the coming Ramadan season, an Islamic holy month that ISIS has historically factored into its campaign plans, and the centennial anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

2. Clashes between armed forces on opposing sides of Libya’s civil war may delay an offensive to regain control of Sirte, Libya, which is ISIS’s stronghold in the country.

3. AQAP may be preparing to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan in advance of a coalition-backed Yemeni operation, but it will retain its military capabilities and popular support.

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ASSESSMENT:

Political

The peace talks in Kuwait remain fragile. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s delegation suspended talks over the seizure of

a military base near Sana’a by al Houthi-Saleh forces. The al Houthi and General People’s Congress (GPC) party delegation

previously canceled a round of direct talks over disagreements on the agenda, which continues to privilege the Hadi

government’s position. Direct al Houthi-Saudi negotiations led to the release of 40 al Houthi prisoners, and al Houthi officials

praised mutual understandings with their “Saudi brothers.”

Outlook: The Kuwait talks will likely resume in the coming week, but are unlikely to produce a negotiated settlement at this

time. Al Houthi-Saudi talks may yield tactical concessions from both sides.

Security

Clashes continue between al Houthi-Saleh forces and government forces in Taiz governorate, alongside isolated clashes in

central Yemen.The Saudi-led coalition conducted airstrikes targeting al Houthi-Saleh positions in Taiz.

Outlook: Al Houthi-Saleh forces will continue to clash with government forces, especially in Taiz, as both sides continue to

report ceasefire violations.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen

AQAP is laying the groundwork for long-term support in southeastern Yemen as coalition-backed government forces attempt to

regain control. AQAP reportedly plans to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan following negotiations with local mediators and will likely

message its intent to avert civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure, as it did following its withdrawal from al Mukalla,

Hadramawt. Coalition-backed forces are attempting to secure Aden and Lahij but face continued resistance from Salafi-jihadi

and southern secessionist groups, including multiple explosive attacks targeting Aden’s security chief.

Outlook: AQAP will likely withdraw from western Abyan and regroup in Shabwah. Islamist militants, either ISIS or AQAP, will

continue carrying out SVBIED attacks on Aden’s security chief and other personnel until the assassination is successful.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 01 MAY: Militants targeted officials with a SVBIED in Aden.2) 04 MAY: Militants detonated a SVBIED targeting Aden’s security chief.3) 26 APR: Reported U.S. airstrike killed four AQAP militants in Abyan.

4) 29 APR: Suspected ISIS militants assassinated a policeman in Aden.

5) 30 APR: Government forces seized an AQAP camp in al Qatan, Hadramawt.

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ASSESSMENT:

Political

Al Shabaab may be conducting a campaign to destabilize the government of Beled Hawo, Gedo region, which is a key border

crossing between Somalia and Kenya. Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) and local politicians are locked in power disputes

following a string of unclaimed grenade attacks and shootings in the past month, coming close to clashes.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will use the continuing tension to facilitate cross-border movement of fighters and supplies for future

operations in northeastern Kenya.

Security

Al Shabaab is disrupting Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) efforts to secure

settlements in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions. The group carried out a complex attack using a suicide vehicle-born

improvised explosive device (SVBIED) on an SNA base at Runirgood, Hiraan region.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to disrupt SNA and AMISOM operations in north central Somalia to retain control of its

territory there and possibly to disrupt the state formation conference occurring at Jowhar, Hiraan region.

Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab may be shifting its targeting of major military bases in response to recent U.S. counterterrorism support operations.

The group launched several assaults on SNA forward operating bases (FOBs) across Bay, Bakool, and Hiraan regions. Al

Shabaab has notably decreased its attacks on AMISOM bases, which can draw on U.S. support, since the March 6 U.S.

airstrike that killed a reported 150 militants in Raso, Lower Shabelle. The militants at Raso were likely mobilizing for a large-

scale attack on an AMISOM base.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will conduct complex attacks on SNA bases in areas where U.S. action is unlikely.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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1) 01 MAY: Al Shabaab launched a complex attack on an SNA base at Runirgood, Hiraan region.

2) 26 APR: Al Shabaab attacked a SNA outpost at Wajid town, Bakool region.

3) 29 APR: Al Shabaab detonated an IED and ambushed an AMISOM convoy near Nur Fahan, Hiraan region.

4) 29 APR: Al Shabaab attacked SNA barracks in Heliwa district, Mogadishu.

ASSESSMENT:

Political

The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) does not have complete authority over Libya’s armed forces. The

Misratan Military Council officially named the GNA’s leadership as its commander in chief, though the command and control on

the ground likely remains unchanged. The Libyan National Army (LNA) has not submitted to GNA control, and the LNA’s allies

in the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) continue to prevent that body from legitimizing the GNA.

Outlook: Spoilers within the HoR will continue to obstruct the implementation of the GNA.

Security

LNA forces are massing in the vicinity of Ajdabiya in preparation for an offensive against ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte, while

Misratan militia forces are mobilizing in Abugrein and al Jufra. Clashes between the Misratan Omar Mukhtar Brigade and LNA

forces near Zillah, south of Sirte, threaten to delay the offensive against ISIS, or in a worst case, reignite Libya’s civil war.

Outlook: LNA and Misratan forces will likely attack ISIS positions imminently, but may also clash with each other south of Sirte.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya

ISIS is preparing to defend its stronghold in Sirte against the anticipated LNA and Misratan offensive, while laying the

groundwork to withdraw in the event that holding Sirte becomes untenable. ISIS militants have placed improvised explosive

devices (IEDs) along the routes leading into the city, established sniper positions, and built sand barriers. Members of ISIS’s

leadership may have fled Sirte, however, the group will likely fight an initial battle before withdrawing from the city. ISIS has

established ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that it will likely use to withdraw into southwestern Libya.

Outlook: ISIS will likely fight an initial battle in Sirte to impose costs on its attackers, but will then withdraw to southwestern

Libya, where it will remain a destabilizing threat to the region.

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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

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1) 26 APR - 02 MAY: ISIS hardened Sirte’s defenses for an anticipated offensive.2) 26 - 27 APR: LNA forces arrived in Ajdabiya.3) 26 APR - 02 MAY:LNA forces continued clearing operations in western Benghazi.4) 30 APR - 02 MAY: ISIS militants fled Sirte and traveled south towards Fezzan. 5) 26 APR: Misratanaircraft bombed an ISIS checkpoint 50km west of Sirte.

ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM is increasing cohesion between cells in the Maghreb and Sahel in order to increase its capabilities across a large attack

zone. AQIM affiliate al Murabitoun reaffirmed its ties to the al Qaeda network and threatened to conduct attacks in Mali and

Algeria. An attack in Algeria would mark a return to al Murabitoun’s earlier attack zone, after the group’s recent participation in

AQIM’s hotel attack campaign in the Sahel.

Outlook: AQIM cells in the Maghreb and Sahel will cooperate to attack Western-backed infrastructure in Algeria.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)

ISIS may be preparing to attack Tunisian targets in conjunction with the coming Ramadan season and centennial anniversary

of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Tunisian security forces interdicted a suspected pro-ISIS assassination attempt and an attack

on a synagogue in La Marsa, northern Tunisia, the site where Tunisian officials established a French protectorate in 1882. ISIS

traditionally surges before or during Ramadan, and the holiday’s juxtaposition with the Sykes-Picot anniversary increases the

incentive to attack. The AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a brigade continued efforts to build its support zone in the Tunisian-

Algerian border region, where Tunisian security forces recently dismantled several logistical cells.

Outlook: ISIS will likely attack symbols of Western colonialism in northern Tunisia in the near term. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will

continue to build its support base and defend its safe haven in western Tunisia.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)

The AQIM affiliate Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) is preserving its ability to operate along the

Malian-Nigerien border by conducting occasional attacks on Nigerien military and security forces. AQIM-linked groups in Mali

continued efforts to exploit public discontent toward security forces. The Macina Liberation Front, an Ansar al Din affiliate,

released images of civilians who suffered abuses at the hands of the Malian army.

Outlook: AQIM affiliates will conduct attacks on security forces in central and northeastern Mali to bolster public support.

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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

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41) 27 APR: Tunisian security forces arrested three suspected pro-ISIS militants in Mahdia.2) 29 APR: Moroccan forces dismantled a pro-ISIS cell reportedly planning attacks in Nador.3) 29 - 30 APR:Algerian forces killed four suspected terrorists in Kerkera, Skikda governorate.4) 01 MAY: Tunisian security forces interdicted a suspected pro-ISIS attacks in La Marsa, Tunis.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 26 APR: Ansar al Din militants shelled a UN base in Kidal.

2) 26 APR: French and Nigerien forces conducted clearing operations near Madama, northern Niger.

3) 28 APR: Suspected MUJAO militants ambushed a Nigerien army vehicle in Egarek, northwestern Niger.

4) 29 APR: Suspected Islamist militants attacked a NGO field team in Doro, Timbuktu region.

ACRONYMS

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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)

Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)

Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)

Libyan National Army (LNA)

Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Possible military dimensions (PMD)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org(202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org(202) 888-6569

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