AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

November 1, 2016

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campiagn to seize strategic positions vacated by Ethiopian AMISOM forces in central and southern Somalia.

2. ISIS may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa.

3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives as a way to advance their position in political negotiations.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesLashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), a Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadi group, is cooperating with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) on a tactical level. LeJ admitted to cooperating with ISIS Wilayat Khorasan to conduct an attack on a police college in Quetta, Pakistan on October 24. The attack killed 59 security personnel and wounded more than 100 others. LeJ may be cooperating with ISIS in pursuit of additional resources and capabilities, or it may be following a pattern of working with other Salafi-jihadi groups to achieve objectives. ISIS is attempting to secure a foothold in Pakistan and the Indian subcontinent.

Pakistani authorities continued to target Salafi-jihadi groups. Pakistani security forces conducted raids in Quetta and Karachi, Sindh Province, Pakistan. A Pakistani senator announced the creation of a national counter-extremism policy but did not provide a timeline for its implementation.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will continue efforts to undermine the Pakistani state by attacking security, judicial, and sectarian targets.

SecurityPolitical and military tensions remain high between the Indian and Pakistani governments. Cross-border firing continued along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, causing military casualties on both sides. A shelling incident on November 1 killed at least 13 civilians on both sides of the border and wounded at least 15 others, marking the most fatal ceasefire violation in over two decades. India and Pakistan accused each other of initiating the exchange of fire.

Outlook: The governments of India and Pakistan will attempt to de-escalate tensions along the Line of Control.

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PoliticalRecent UN-led efforts to broker a peace deal in Yemen are not effective because they are largely divorced from the military situation on the ground. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government rejected a peace proposal that would have retained President Hadi as a figurehead and shifted presidential powers to a consensus vice president. Both sides alleged that the deal favored their opponents. The proposal also called for al Houthi-Saleh forces to transfer heavy and medium weaponry to a third party and withdraw from Sana’a, Taiz, and al Hudaydah governorates.

Outlook: Subsequent peace proposals based on the current UN framework will fail unless the facts on the ground change.

SecurityThe al Houthi-Saleh alliance is using attacks on the Saudi homeland to impose costs on Saudi Arabia for its air campaign in Yemen. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile targeting an international airport in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28. Saudi air defenses intercepted the missile approximately 65 kilometers from Mecca, inciting accusations that the “Iranian-backed” al Houthi-Saleh alliance had targeted the holy city. Unrest in Yemen continues to threaten freedom of movement in the Bab al Mandab Strait, a critical shipping lane where Yemen-based attackers fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a commercial vessel on October 25.

Outlook: Yemeni actors will intensify hostilities in the face of a failing political process, further threatening regional stability.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP reinforced its position as Yemen’s dominant Salafi-jihadi organization while admitting to tactical-level cooperation with ISIS in central Yemen. AQAP released several propaganda videos highlighting its role in the fight against al Houthi-Saleh forces in al Bayda governorate. AQAP also criticized a recent effort by ISIS to cast itself as the defender of al Bayda’s Sunni population, a role that AQAP has cultivated for itself.

Outlook: Tactical-level cooperation between AQAP and ISIS will continue despite the groups’ competing propaganda campaigns.

GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 25 OCT: Militants or pirates attacked a vessel in the Red Sea.2) 25 OCT: Hadi government and al Houthi-Saleh forces clashed in Taiz. 3) 28 OCT: Saudi air defenses intercepted an al Houthi-Saleh missile.4) 29 OCT: Militants detonated an SVBIED targeting the Central Bank in Aden city.5) 29 OCT: Saudi-led coalition airstrikes hit an al Houthi-Saleh prison in al Hudaydah.6) 30 OCT: AQAP militants clashed with al Houthi-Saleh forces in al Bayda.

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PoliticalKenyan officials are under increasing pressure to take action against al Shabaab. Several al Shabaab attacks on civilians and the gubernatorial residence in Mandera County on the Kenyan-Somali border in October prompted the Kenyan government to fast-track construction of Mandera County’s border wall. Suspected Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) aircraft conducted two airstrikes on al Shabaab militants this week. These measures seek to disrupt al Shabaab operations without sending additional resources into Somalia.

Outlook: Kenya’s limited efforts to combat al Shabaab will not prevent attacks along Kenya and Somalia’s shared border.

Security ISIS-affiliated fighters are conducting the group’s most serious effort to date to establish a foothold in the Horn of Africa region. The main ISIS-affiliated contingent, led by a former al Shabaab shari’a official, Sheikh Abdiqadir Mumin, captured its first town in Puntland State in northern Somalia on October 26. Pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed two ISIS-linked grenade attacks the same day against police stations in Boosaaso and Mogadishu. Amaq claimed a third attack, an improvised explosive device targeting an AMISOM vehicle, in Mogadishu on October 28, though no other sources reported the attack.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will prevent ISIS-linked forces from expanding beyond northern Somalia.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab continues to capture or recapture towns in south central Somalia as Ethiopian AMISOM forces withdraw from the region. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are redeploying to Ethiopia to curb protests by the Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups, who are marginalized by the ruling Tigray minority. Al Shabaab occupied a strategically important town that connects southern and central Somalia in Bakool region following the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces on October 26. Al Shabaab also temporarily seized a town in northern Bay region that is located on a road connecting regional capitals.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will expand its areas of control in south central Somalia.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 26 OCT: Al Shabaab occupied Tiyeglow, Bakool region following Ethiopian AMISOM withdrawal. 2) 26 OCT: ISIS-linked militants seized Qandala, Bari region.3) 28 OCT: Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) conducted airstrikes targeting al Shabaab militants in Ali Hared, Gedo region.4) 30 OCT: Al Shabaab temporarily seized Goof Gaduud, Bay region. 5) 30 OCT: Al Shabaab launched mortars into Hudur, Bakool region.

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PoliticalThe international community is attempting to save Libya’s economy as a liquidity crisis threatens the already fragile UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). U.S.-led talks between international actors and the GNA on October 31 emphasized the need for cooperation between Libya’s quarreling financial players, including the National Oil Company and Central Bank of Libya. Tripoli residents protested the GNA’s failure to ameliorate their economic woes on October 27.

Outlook: Armed actors in Tripoli will escalate their ongoing opposition to the GNA and its allies if the GNA fails to deliver economic relief to the population.

SecurityThe UAE is providing significant support to the Libyan National Army’s (LNA) years-long attempt to take full control of Benghazi. The UAE operates warplanes and drones out of a forward operating base in northeastern Libya in support of the LNA. The Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, retains networks capable of producing vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) despite the LNA’s attempts to besiege the BRSC’s remaining stronghold.

Outlook: The BRSC and ISIS Wilayat Barqah will defend their safe havens in Benghazi against the LNA’s offensive.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS in Libya continues to recruit foreign fighters. The governor (wali) of ISIS in Libya stated that the route to Libya remains open in an interview with ISIS’s al Naba newspaper. ISIS militants are staging operations from the deserts to the west and southeast of Sirte city in order to prolong the fight for Sirte. ISIS views Sirte as an ongoing fight and will continue to attack GNA-allied forces from the desert. The defeat of ISIS in Sirte will fail to eliminate ISIS’s presence in Libya.

Outlook: ISIS will continue to target U.S.-backed forces’ supply lines into Sirte city.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 27 OCT: ISIS killed two GNA-allied militiamen and wounded 15 others in Sirte.2) 27 OCT: Tripoli residents protested the ongoing liquidity crisis at Martyrs’ Square in Tripoli.3) 29 OCT: Militants detonated a VBIED in al Keesh Square, Benghazi. 4) 28-30 OCT: Rival tribal militias clashed in al Zawia, Tripoli. 5) 31 OCT: The U.S. conducted 14 airstrikes on ISIS in al Jiza, Sirte.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebISIS’s capabilities in Algeria remain limited to small-scale attacks. The group claimed responsibility for the shooting of a police officer in Constantine, northeastern Algeria on October 30.

Anti-government protests pose a risk to U.S. partners in North Africa. The Moroccan government is working to contain rare protests against political and economic injustice that broke out across the country on October 28. The Tunisian government denied reports of a U.S. drone base in the country in an attempt to prevent dissent.

Outlook: The Moroccan government’s concessions to protesters will de-escalate protests.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)ISIS and AQIM threaten the interests of the U.S. and its allies in the Sahel region. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge from a group responsible for several recent attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger. AQIM released a video seeking ransom for a Romanian hostage kidnapped in Burkina Faso in 2015. The U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania warned on October 28 that a terrorist group is planning “near-term” attacks on locations frequented by Westerners.

AQIM’s Ansar al Din will continue efforts to impose costs for UN and French involvement in northern Mali. Ansar al Din’s leader allegedly agreed to a ceasefire brokered by the High Islamic Council of Mali on September 27, but the group later claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a MINUSMA base and denied the ceasefire agreement.

All factions of Boko Haram are increasing their operational tempo. The Nigerian government is focused on countering an insurgency in the country’s oil-rich south, which is exacerbating the worst economic recession in Nigeria’s history. Boko Haram suicide bombers attacked an internally displaced persons’ camp three times in two days. Boko Haram’s pro-ISIS faction overran a Nigerian army outpost in southern Borno State, its first attack away from the Niger-Nigeria border.

Outlook: An ISIS-linked group in the Sahel may attempt a spectacular attack to cement its affiliation and drive recruitment. Boko Haram will continue to take advantage of the Nigerian Government’s turn away from the Lake Chad region.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 30 OCT: An ISIS militant killed an Algerian police officer in Constantine, Algeria.2) 29-31 OCT: The accidental death of a fish vendor in al Hoceima, Morocco during a police confiscation sparked protests in major cities across the country.3) 27 OCT: The Tunisian National Guard arrested an all-female ISIS cell in Kasserine, Tunisia.4) 26 OCT: The Algerian Army arrested two armed militants near Boumerdes, Algeria.

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1) 31 OCT: Ansar al Din attacked a MINUSMA camp in Kidal, Mali.2) 31 OCT: ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, the Boko Haram faction with close ties to ISIS, overran a Nigerian military outpost near Damboa, Borno State, Nigeria.3) 29 OCT: Boko Haram militants detonated two SVESTs near the Bakassi IDP camp outside of Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria. 2

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569