· 2019. 3. 13. · this report, the state of the forest: indonesia, is a product of forest watch...

The State of the Forest

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This report, The State of the Forest: Indonesia, is aproduct of Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) andGlobal Forest Watch (GFW). FWI was initiated inlate 1997 by some 20 nongovernmental organiza-tions to play its role as a civil society component,which encourages acceleration of the democratiza-tion process in terms of forest resources allocationand management in Indonesia. GFW was launchedin 1998 by the World Resources Institute (WRI) towork in alliance with nongovernmental organiza-tions and local leaders from forested countriesaround the world.

Forest Watch Indonesia seeks to develop indepen-dent citizen capacity to gather, process and dis-seminate forest data, maps and policy-relevantinformation about what is happening toIndonesia’s forests and forest-dependent peoples.FWI is an independent forest monitoring networkmade up of individuals and organizations that arecommitted to realizing sustainable forest manage-

ment in Indonesia. The objective of FWI’s pro-grams is to build and develop data on forests andforest issues, and to promote information transpar-ency in Indonesia by strengthening alternative dataand information provision.

Global Forest Watch seeks to make informationavailable rapidly to an ever wider audience byproviding forest information and maps on-line anddeveloping a Website (www.globalforestwatch.org)to post results from its multiple field and coopera-tive activities in Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Gabon,Indonesia, Russia, and Venezuela. Reports, mapsand information from credible sources will beavailable for downloading. Anyone with access tothe Internet can consult GFW data and contributeby providing information or views directly on-line.We hope that the array of products and activitieswill lead to a more constructive dialogue betweenforest managers and users at the local, national,and international levels.

The State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: Indonesia

The State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: IndonesiaThe State of the Forest: Indonesia

Forest Watch Indonesia

LLLLLead Authorsead Authorsead Authorsead Authorsead AuthorsRestu Achmaliadi, I.G. Maha Adi, Y. Martin Hardiono, Hariadi Kartodihardjo, Fachrurraji CH. Malley,Dominggus A. Mampioper, E.G. Togu Manurung, Abdon Nababan, Lyndon B. Pangkali, A. Ruwindrijarto,Lisken L.M. Situmorang, Wardiyono

Contributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsYasir Al Fatah, Haryanto R. Putro, Bambang Hero Saharjo, Silverius Oscar Unggul

Data Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map ProductionroductionroductionroductionroductionRina Agustine, C.M. Dessy Anggraini, Endarmiyati (GIS analyst), Ganip Gunawan; Y. Martin Hardiono (GISanalyst), Albert T. Mulyono, Rainny Natalia, Christian Purba, Dwi Prabowo YS (GIS analyst), Rudy A. Ranaq,Mardi Minang Sari, Lisken L.M. Situmorang (data coordination and supervision, reference collection), WishnuTirta, Arbi Valentinus, Wardiyono (database programming and system development), Denny Yomaki

RRRRReport Management and Administrationeport Management and Administrationeport Management and Administrationeport Management and Administrationeport Management and AdministrationCoordinators: Lisken L.M. Situmorang, Muhammad Ridwan, Arbi ValentinusFundraising and administration, finance management: Rina Agustine, E.G. Togu Manurung, Abdon Nababan,Rainny Natalia

Global Forest Watch

LLLLLead Authorsead Authorsead Authorsead Authorsead AuthorsCharles Victor BarberEmily Matthews

Contributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsContributing AuthorsDavid BrownTimothy H. BrownLisa CurranCatherine PlumeElizabeth Selig

Data Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map PData Collection, Analysis, and Map ProductionroductionroductionroductionroductionSusan Minnemeyer (GIS analyst), Esther Owubah (GISanalyst), Elizabeth Selig (GIS analyst)

RRRRReport Peport Peport Peport Peport ProductionroductionroductionroductionroductionPublications Manager: Hyacinth BillingsEditor: Sheila MulvihillLayout and Production: Maggie PowellDesign: Papyrus Design & Marketing, Washington, DC

Editor: Emily Matthews

This report should be cited as: FWI/GFW. 2002. The State of the Forest: Indonesia. Bogor, Indonesia: Forest Watch Indonesia, and Washington DC: Global Forest Watch.

iv THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

Cover photographs (top to bottom to background)1. © E.G. Togu Manurung2. © FWI Papua3. © FWI Sulawesi4. © E.G. Togu Manurung

Each World Resources Institute reportrepresents a timely, scholarly treatment of a subject of public concern.

WRI takes responsibility for choosing the study topicsand guaranteeing its authors and researchers freedom of inquiry.

It also solicits and responds to the guidance of advisory panels and expert reviewers.Unless otherwise stated, however,

all the interpretation and findings set forth in WRI publicationsare those of the authors.

Copyright © 2002 World Resources Institute. All rights reserved.ISBN 1-56973-492-5 ENGLISH

Available in Indonesian as Keadaan Hutan IndonesiaISBN 979.96730.0.3 INDONESIAN

Library of Congress Control Number: 2001099749

Printed in the United States of America on chlorine-free paper with recycled content of 50%, 20% of which is post-consumer.

vTHE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................... vii

Foreword ........................................................................................................... ix

Key Findings .................................................................................................... xi

1. Indonesia’s Forests: What is at Stake? .............................................. 11.1. 100 Million Hectares of Tropical Forest .......................................................... 11.2 A Rich Natural World Is Disappearing ............................................................ 11.3 People Also Depend on the Forests ................................................................. 31.4 Timber Products Are a Major Source of National Revenue ............................ 41.5 Assessing the State of the Forest ..................................................................... 41.6 Structure of the Report .................................................................................... 6

2. Forest Cover, Change, and Condition ................................................ 72.1 Forest Cover and Change ................................................................................. 72.2 Forest Condition Today ................................................................................. 15

3. Deforestation and Forest Degradation ............................................. 233.1 The Dynamics of Deforestation: An Overview ............................................. 233.2 Timber Extraction: Logging Concessions (HPHs) ........................................ 243.3 Timber Extraction: Illegal Logging ............................................................... 303.4 Industrial Timber Plantations (HTIs) ............................................................. 363.5 Oil Palm and Other Large-scale Industrial Estate Crops ............................... 423.6 Small-scale Farming ...................................................................................... 47

4. Forest and Land Fires ........................................................................ 534.1 From Normal to Abnormal Fires ................................................................... 534.2 The Fires of 1982-1983 and 1994 ................................................................. 534.3 The Fires of 1997-1998 ................................................................................. 544.4 Government Response to Forest and Land Fires ........................................... 57

5. The Prospects for Forest Policy Reform ........................................... 595.1 The Forest Policy Context: A Country in Crisis ............................................ 595.2 Political Paralysis at the Center ..................................................................... 605.3 Separatism and Demands for Decentralization in the Provinces ................... 605.4 Spreading Civil Violence and the Breakdown of Law and Order ................. 615.5 Conflicts over Forest Lands and Resources ................................................... 615.6 The Agenda and Prospects for Policy Reform ............................................... 66

Notes ................................................................................................................. 68

Glossary ........................................................................................................... 72

References ........................................................................................................ 74

Annex 1: Guest Commentaries on Data Difficulties ................................ 77

Annex 2: Tables .............................................................................................. 81

Annex 3: Data Sources and Technical Notes ............................................. 85

vi THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

Figures

1.1 Biotic Richness: Percent of World’s SpeciesFound in Indonesia .................................................................... 1

2.1 Deforestation from the Preagricultural Era to 1997 ................. 92.2 Changes in Forest Cover in Sumatra, 1900–2010 .................. 142.3 Changes in Forest Cover in Kalimantan, 1900–2010 ............ 142.4 Changes in Forest Cover in Sulawesi, 1900–2100 ................. 142.5 Allocated Forest Function and Actual Forest Cover, 1997 .... 163.1 Processes of Forest Degradation and

Deforestation in Indonesia ...................................................... 253.2 Production and Export of Logs, 1961–1999 .......................... 263.3 Production and Export of Plywood, 1961–1999 .................... 263.4 Concession Area in Major Provinces, 1985–1998 ................. 273.5 Industrial Roundwood Production, 1980–2000 ..................... 323.6 Installed Capacity in the Wood Processing

Industries, 1999 ....................................................................... 333.7 Installed Capacity and Production in the

Pulp Industry, 1990–2001 ....................................................... 403.8 Installed Capacity and Production in the

Paper & Paperboard Industry, 1990–2001 ............................. 403.9 Growth in Area of Oil Palm Plantations, 1967–2000 ............ 43

Boxes

1.1 The Wallace Line ...................................................................... 22.1 Data Sources and Difficulties ................................................. 102.2 Impacts of Logging on Dipterocarp Forests ........................... 172.3 Oil Palm Development in Gunung Leuser National Park ...... 213.1 Common Illegal Practices of Timber Companies .................. 293.2 What Do We Mean by Illegal Logging? ................................. 313.3 Illegal Logging: A Tale of Two National Parks ...................... 343.4 Some Cases in Which Companies Have Developed Industrial

Timber Plantations in Productive Natural Forest ................... 373.5 Illegal Use of Logging Concession Land for

Oil Palm in Northern Sumatra ................................................ 443.6 Clearing Natural Forests for Estate Crops on Small Islands:

The Case of Wawonii Island in Southeast Sulawesi Province . 463.7 Transmigration and Forest Clearance ..................................... 484.1 The Oil Palm-Forest Fire Connection:

Why Do People Set Fires? ...................................................... 565.1 Regional Autonomy and Forest Management ........................ 625.2 National Parks and Indigenous People:

Cooperation or Conflict? Two Cases From Sulawesi ............. 655.3 Indonesia’s 12 Commitments to the Consultative Group on

Indonesia Concerning Forests and Forest Policy ................... 67

Tables

1.1 Indonesia’s Leading Exports, 1997 .......................................... 52.1 Forest Cover in 1950 ................................................................. 82.2 Forest Area and Deforestation, 1985–1997 ............................ 12

(GOI/World Bank Estimate)2.3 Forest Area and Deforestation, 1985–1997

(GFW Estimate) ...................................................................... 132.4 Loss of Lowland Forest in Sumatra, Kalimantan,

and Sulawesi, 1900–1997 ....................................................... 142.5 Revisions to Permanent Forest Status

Between 1986 and 2000 ......................................................... 162.6 Natural Forest, Potentially Degraded Forest,

and Deforested Area, Mid-1990s ............................................ 183.1 Ranking of Top 10 Timber Groups by HPH Holdings,

1994–95 and 1997–98 ............................................................ 283.2 Logging Concession Status and Area, Reported in 2000 ...... 283.3 Forest Condition in 432 Current and

Expired Logging Concessions ................................................ 293.4 Timber Supply from All Legal Sources .................................. 323.5 Estimated Timber Supply-Demand Imbalance, 1997–98 ...... 333.6 Allocation and Planting of Industrial Timber

Plantations (HTIs), to December 2000 ................................... 383.7 Forested Versus Nonforested Area in 6 Industrial

Timber Plantation Concessions .............................................. 413.8 HPH Logging Concessions Converted to HTI Concessions,

to 1998, by Province ............................................................... 413.9 Land Holdings of Top 10 Oil Palm Conglomerates, 1997 ..... 433.10 The Balance Between Designated Conversion Forest Area and

Applications for Conversion of Forest to Plantation Crops ... 453.11 Forest Area Released for Transmigration Site Development,

to 1998 ..................................................................................... 504.1 Estimated Area Damaged by Fire, 1997–1998 ...................... 544.2 Summary of the Economic Cost of

the 1997–1998 Fires and Haze ............................................... 554.3 Health Effects of Fire-Related Haze Exposure in

8 Indonesian Provinces, September-November 1997 ............ 57

Maps

Map 1 Natural Forest Cover Change in Indonesia,1985–1997 ..............................................................................

Map 2 Natural Forest Cover Change in Kalimantan,1985–1997 ..............................................................................

Map 3 Loss of Lowland, Submontane, and Montane Forest,1985–1997 ..............................................................................

Map 4 Extent and Distribution of Low Access andAccessed Forest, 1997 ...........................................................

Map 5 Fragmentation of Low Access and PotentiallyLow Access Forest .................................................................

Map 6 Protection Status of Low Access and PotentiallyLow Access Forest .................................................................

Map 7 Extent and Distribution of Protected Areas, Kalimantan ......Map 8 Extent and Distribution of Logging Concessions .................Map 9 Limited Survey of Reported Cases of Illegal Logging,

1997–1998 ..............................................................................Map 10 Extent and Distribution of Estate Crops in Sumatra .............Map 11 Plantations in Former Logging Concessions,

Sumatra and Kalimantan ........................................................Map 12 Forest Uses and Areas Burned in 1997–1998:

East Kalimantan .....................................................................Map 13 Limited Survey of Reported Conflicts Over

Forest Resources, 1997–1999 ................................................

viiTHE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) and Global ForestWatch (GFW) wish to thank the following indi-viduals for their support, contributions, and reviewcomments on this report:

Internal Review Meeting, Held at theWisma Bogor Permai, 27-28 April, 2001

Rina Agustine, National Secretariat FWI, Bogor;Wardiyono, CIFOR, Bogor; Restu Achmaliadi,Jaringan Kerja Pemetaan Partisipatif, Bogor;Albertus T. Mulyono, FWI Simpul Bogor;Chehafudin, Aliansi Relawan untuk PenyelamatanAlam, Yogyakarta; Dwi Prabowo YS, FWI SimpulBogor; Hariadi Kartodiharjo, Faculty of Forestry,IPB/Bappedal, Bogor/Jakarta; Rajidt Ch Malley,FWI Simpul Sumatra/Yayasan Leuser Lestari,Medan; Togu Manurung, National Secretariat FWI,Bogor; Lyndon B. Pangkali, FWI Simpul Papua,Jayapura; Christian Purba, FWI Simpul Bogor;Muhammad Ridwan, National Secretariat FWI,Bogor; A. Ruwindrijarto, Telapak Indonesia,Bogor; Lisken Situmorang, ICRAF, Bogor; WishnuTirta, FWI Simpul Bogor; Yasir Al Fatah, FWISimpul Kalimantan, Banjarmasin; Muchlis L.Usman, Yayasan Cinta Alam/ FWI SimpulSulawesi, Kendari.

Expert Review Meeting, Held at the WismaBogor Permai, 29-30 June, 2001

Dian Agista, Birdlife-Indonesia Programme,Bogor; Rina Agustine, National Secretariat FWI,Bogor; Restu Achmaliadi, Jaringan Kerja PemetaanPartisipatif, Bogor; Albertus T. Mulyono, FWISimpul Bogor; M. Ali Arsyad, Pusat PembentukanWilayah Pengelolaan dan Perubahan KawasanHutan, Badan Planologi Kehutanan, DepartemenKehutanan, Jakarta; Charles Victor (Chip) Barber,World Resources Institute, Manila; Chehafudin,Aliansi Relawan untuk Penyelamatan Alam,Yogyakarta; Chrystanto, Pusat Perpetaan BadanPlanologi Kehutanan, Departemen Kehutanan,Jakarta; Wilistra Danny, DirektoratPenanggulangan Kebakaran, DepartemenKehutanan, Jakarta; Sadikin Djajapertjunda; DwiPrabowo YS, FWI Simpul Bogor; Elfian Effendi,Natural Resource Management Program/EPIQ,Jakarta; Yasir Al Fatah, FWI Simpul Kalimantan,Banjarmasin; Hargyono, Direktorat BinaPengembangan Hutan Tanaman, Ditjen BPK,Departemen Kehutanan, Jakarta; Bambang HeroSaharjo, Forest Fire Laboratory, IPB, Bogor;Imam, Planning Directorate, Ministry of Forestry,Jakarta; Rajidt Ch. Malley, FWI Simpul Sumatera/Yayasan Leuser Lestari-Medan; Togu Manurung,National Secretariat FWI, Bogor;MuhammadYusram Massijaya, Faculty of Forestry

IPB, Bogor; Emily Matthews, Global ForestWatch/World Resources Institute, Washington, DC;Muayat Ali Muhsi, Konsorsium Pendukung SistemHutan Kerakyatan, Bogor; Abdon Nababan, AliansiMasyarakat Adat Nusantara, Jakarta; RainnyNatalia, FWI Simpul Bogor; Nuswanto, DirektoratJenderal Perlindungan Hutan dan Konservasi Alam,Departemen Kehutanan, Jakarta; Lyndon B.Pangkali, FWI Simpul Papua, Jayapura; ChristianPurba, FWI Simpul Bogor; Boen M. Purnama,Pusat Rencana Kehutanan, Badan PlanologiKehutanan, Departemen Kehutanan, Jakarta;Haryanto R. Putro, Faculty of Forestry IPB, Bogor;Widodo S. Ramono, Direktorat KonservasiKawasan, Direktorat Jenderal Perlindungan Hutandan Konservasi Alam, Jakarta; MuhammadRidwan, National Secretariat FWI, Bogor; WilliamM. Rombang, Birdlife-Indonesia Programme,Bogor; A. Ruwindrijarto, Telapak Indonesia,Bogor; Harry Santoso, Pusat Pengukuhan danPenatagunaan Kawasan Hutan Badan PlanologiKehutanan, Departemen Kehutanan, Bogor; ImanSantoso, Forest Inventory and Monitoring Project,Ministry of Forestry, Jakarta; William Sunderlin,CIFOR, Bogor; Jatna Supriatna, ConservationInternational-Indonesia Programme, Jakarta;Wishnu Tirta, FWI Simpul Bogor; Silverius OscarUnggul, Yayasan Cinta Alam/ FWI SimpulSulawesi, Kendari; Arbi Valentinus, FWI SimpulBogor/Telapak, Bogor; Joko Waluyo, Sawit Watch/Walhi, Jakarta.

viii THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

Global Forest Watch and Forest Watch Indonesiawould also like to thank the many other individualswho provided data, valuable comments on data,and much wise advice during the preparation ofthis report. These individuals are too numerous tolist, but we are particularly grateful to DerekHolmes, consultant to the World Bank, and NeilScotland, UK Department for International Devel-opment (DFID).

Peer Review of Final Draft

Timothy H. Brown, Natural Resource ManagementProgram, United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment, Jakarta; Dirk Bryant, Tony Janetos,Ralph Ridder, Frances Seymour, and Dan Tunstall,World Resources Institute, Washington, DC; NigelSizer, The Nature Conservancy, Jakarta; WilliamSunderlin, CIFOR, Bogor; Thomas E. Walton,World Bank, Jakarta.

Funders

Global Forest Watch would like to thank thefollowing donors for their overall support of GlobalForest Watch Activities: AVINA, the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAID),the Department for International Development(DFID) UK, IKEA, the Netherlands Ministry ofForeign Affairs, the Turner Foundation, theBiodiversity Support Program (BSP), and theWorld Resources Institute.

Forest Watch Indonesia would like to thank theNatural Resources Management-EPIQ Program ofthe United States Agency for International Devel-opment (USAID), the Netherlands Committee forthe World Conservation Union (NC-IUCN), andthe Department for International Development(DFID) UK, for their specific support of ForestWatch Indonesia activities in Indonesia. FWIwould also like to thank IKEA for providing fundsto GFW in support of low access mapping inIndonesia.

ixTHE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

FOREWORD

Indonesia is endowed with some of the mostextensive and biologically diverse tropical forestsin the world. Tens of millions of Indonesiansdepend directly on these forests for their liveli-hoods, whether gathering forest products for theirdaily needs or working in the wood-processingsectors of the economy. The forests are home to anabundance of flora and fauna unmatched in anycountry of comparable size. Even today, almostevery ecological expedition that sets out to exploreIndonesia’s tropical forests returns with discoveriesof new species.

But a tragedy is unfolding in Indonesia. Thecountry now finds itself the unwelcome center ofworld attention, as domestic and internationaloutrage mounts over the rampant destruction of agreat natural resource. Indonesia’s “economicmiracle” of the 1980s and 1990s turns out to havebeen based, in part, on ecological devastation andabuse of local people’s rights and customs. Forexample, one of the country’s fastest growingsectors, the pulp and paper industry, has notestablished the plantations necessary to provide asecure supply of pulpwood. Instead, pulpmills relylargely on wholesale clearing of natural forest. Theeconomy is plagued by lawlessness and corruption.Illegal logging has been rampant for years and isbelieved to have destroyed some 10 million ha offorest. Indonesia’s wood-processing industriesoperate in a strange legal twilight, in which majorcompanies that – until the economic crisis of 1997– attracted billions of dollars in Western invest-ment, obtain more than half their wood supplies

from illegal sources. Wood is routinely smuggledacross the border to neighboring countries, costingthe Indonesian government millions of dollars inlost revenues each year.

Although the evidence of destruction is mounting,the picture has been muddied by conflicting data,disinformation, claim and counterclaim. The needfor an objective appraisal of the situation is urgent– one that will provide a sound information basefor every individual and organization seeking tobring about positive change.

The data difficulties are formidable, but this reportsets out to meet that need. It provides a compre-hensive summary of the scale and pace of changeaffecting Indonesia’s forests and identifies theforces and actors that are driving deforestation.Forest Watch Indonesia and Global Forest Watchhave compiled the best available official data andreports from environmentalists in the field toaddress the following questions: How much ofIndonesia’s forest cover is left, and how much hasbeen lost over the past 50 years? What is thecondition of remaining forest cover today? Whatare the major driving forces behind deforestation,and who are the principal actors? Given currentpolitical and economic conditions in Indonesia,what are the prospects for forest policy reform?

Our findings do not provide grounds for muchoptimism, despite clear signs of change in Indone-sia. The major bilateral and multilateral donors arenow working actively with the Indonesian govern-

x THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

ment to develop a strategy and action plan forreform. The Indonesian Ministry of Forestry iscommitted to implementing specific actions at thenational level and has recently endorsed a wide-ranging regional plan to combat illegal logging.

Yet even if current policy reforms are successful, itis clear that Indonesia is in transition from being aforest-rich country to a forest-poor country, follow-ing the path of the Philippines and Thailand.Millions of hectares of former forest are nowcovered in degraded forest remnants, scrub, and theubiquitous alang-alang grass. With this loss offorest, Indonesia is losing biodiversity, woodsupply, income, and ecosystem services.

Degraded forest lands can be replanted and man-aged to provide wood, tree crops, fruits, and othernontimber products. Ecosystem services such asfreshwater regulation and soil retention can berestored. Part of the tragedy of Indonesia’s forestsis that the current industrial timber plantationprogram, and the system of forest conversion to

plantation crops, have not contributed to sustain-able forest management but rather have accelerateddeforestation. Officially, decisions in the forestsector are no longer oriented toward clearance andconversion but, in reality, clearance and conversioncontinue. The system should be restructured torequire the establishment of new plantations on thevast areas of degraded land that are already avail-able for planting. The requirement should beenforced.

Indonesia is at a crossroads where much of itsnatural resource base has been destroyed or de-graded, but much still remains. Land developmentfor plantations to supply timber and valuableexport crops is a vital part of the country’s eco-nomic strategy. In coming years, the easier routewill be to allow logging operations and plantations– and the wasted land that accompanies theirdevelopment – to spread over the remaining naturalforests, rewarding developers with huge unearnedwindfall profits from forest clearance. The harderbut ultimately more sustainable route will be to

reclaim the land that currently lies idle and con-serve the primary forest that remains. Sixty fourmillion hectares of forest have been cut down overthe past 50 years. There is no economic or ethicaljustification for another 64 million hectares to belost over the next 50 years.

Togu ManurungDirector, Forest Watch Indonesia

Jonathan LashPresident, World Resources Institute

xiTHE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

KEY FINDINGS

relatives and political allies. Cronyism in theforestry sector left timber companies free tooperate with little regard for long-termsustainability of production.

• As part of the effort to boost Indonesia’s exportrevenues, and to reward favored companies, atleast 16 million ha of natural forest have beenapproved for conversion to industrial timberplantations or agricultural plantations. In manycases, conversion contradicted legal require-ments that such plantations be established onlyon degraded land or on forest land alreadyallocated for conversion.

• Aggressive expansion of Indonesia’s pulp andpaper industries over the past decade hascreated a level of demand for wood fiber thatcannot currently be met by any sustainabledomestic forest management regime.

• Forest clearance by small-scale farmers is asignificant but not dominant cause of deforesta-tion.

Illegal logging has reached epidemicproportions as a result of Indonesia’s chronicstructural imbalance between legal woodsupply and demand.

• Illegal logging, by definition, is not accuratelydocumented. But a former senior official of theMinistry of Forestry recently claimed that theftand illegal logging have destroyed an estimated10 million ha of Indonesian forests.

• Massive expansion in the plywood, pulp, andpaper production sectors over the past twodecades means that demand for wood fiber nowexceeds legal supplies by 35-40 million cubicmeters per year.

• This gap between legal supplies of wood anddemand is filled by illegal logging. Many woodprocessing industries openly acknowledge theirdependence on illegally cut wood, whichaccounted for approximately 65 percent of totalsupply in 2000.

• Legal logging is also conducted at an unsustain-able level. Legal timber supplies from naturalproduction forests declined from 17 millioncubic meters in 1995 to under 8 million cubicmeters in 2000, according to recent statisticsfrom the Ministry of Forestry. The decline hasbeen offset in part by timber obtained fromforests cleared to make way for plantations. Butthis source appears to have peaked in 1997.

• Industrial timber plantations have been widelypromoted and subsidized as a means of supply-ing Indonesia’s booming demand for pulp andtaking pressure off natural forests. In practice,millions of hectares of natural forest have beencleared to make way for plantations that, in 75percent of cases, are never actually planted.

Indonesia is experiencing one of the highestrates of tropical forest loss in the world.

• Indonesia was still densely forested as recentlyas 1950. Forty percent of the forests existing in1950 were cleared in the following 50 years. Inround numbers, forest cover fell from 162million ha to 98 million ha.

• The rate of forest loss is accelerating. Onaverage, about 1 million ha per year werecleared in the 1980s, rising to about 1.7 millionha per year in the first part of the 1990s. Since1996, deforestation appears to have increased toan average of 2 million ha per year.

• Indonesia’s lowland tropical forests, the richestin timber resources and biodiversity, are most atrisk. They have been almost entirely cleared inSulawesi and are predicted to disappear inSumatra by 2005 and Kalimantan by 2010 ifcurrent trends continue.

• Nearly one half of Indonesia’s forests arefragmented by roads, other access routes, andsuch developments as plantations.

Deforestation in Indonesia is largely the resultof a corrupt political and economic system thatregarded natural resources, especially forests,as a source of revenue to be exploited forpolitical ends and personal gain.

• Logging concessions covering more than halfthe country’s total forest area were awarded byformer President Suharto, many of them to his

xii THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

More than 20 million hectares of forest havebeen cleared since 1985, but the majority ofthis land has not been put to productivealternative uses.

• Nearly 9 million ha of land, much of it naturalforest, has been allocated for development asindustrial timber plantations. This land hasalready been cleared or will be cleared soon.Yet only about 2 million ha have actually beenplanted with fast-growing species, mostlyAcacia mangium, to produce pulpwood. Theimplication: 7 million ha of former forest landare lying idle.

• Nearly 7 million ha of forest had been approvedfor conversion to estate crop plantations by theend of 1997, and this land has almost certainlybeen cleared. But the area actually converted tooil palm plantations since 1985 is about 2.6million hectares, while new plantations of otherestate crops probably account for another 1-1.5million ha. The implication: 3 million ha offormer forest land are lying idle.

• No accurate estimates are available for the areaof forest cleared by small-scale farmers since1985, but a plausible estimate in 1990 sug-gested that shifting cultivators might be respon-sible for about 20 percent of forest loss. Thiswould translate to clearance of about 4 millionha between 1985 and 1997.

• The transmigration program that relocatedpeople from densely populated Java to the outerislands was responsible for about 2 million haof forest clearance between the 1960s and theprogram’s end in 1999. In addition, illegalmigration and settlement by pioneer farmers at

the margins of logging concessions, alongroads, and even in national parks has greatlyaccelerated since 1997, but reliable national-scale estimates of forest clearance by forestpioneers have not been made.

• Large-scale plantation owners have turned tothe use of fire as a cheap and easy means ofclearing forest for further planting. Deliberatefire-setting, in combination with unusually dryconditions caused by El Niño events, has led touncontrolled wildfires of unprecedented extentand intensity. More than 5 million ha of forestburned in 1994 and another 4.6 million haburned in 1997-98. Some of this land is regen-erating as scrubby forest, some has beencolonized by small-scale farmers, but there hasbeen little systematic effort to restore forestcover or establish productive agriculture.

The Indonesian government is facingmounting pressure domestically andinternationally to take action, but progress isslow and not all policy reforms in process arenecessarily good news for forests.

• In the freer political atmosphere that followedthe fall of President Suharto in 1998, environ-mental activists have demanded greater ac-countability from both the government and theprivate sector. Access to official information hasimproved, but efforts to prevent the worstabuses of corporate power have met withlimited success.

• Numerous forest-dependent communities,sensing the weakening of central power, haveerupted violently against logging and plantationoperations that they consider to be plundering

their local resources. Longstanding problems ofunclear land tenure rights are the root cause ofmany such conflicts. The government is nolonger willing to protect corporate interests as itonce did, but neither does it appear to have anycoordinated plan for dealing with the problem.

• Since 1999, Indonesia’s principal aid donorshave coordinated their assistance through aconsortium called the Consultative Group onIndonesia (CGI), chaired by the World Bank.Improved forest management has been declareda priority, and the Government of Indonesia hascommitted to a 12-point plan of policy reform.But continuing political turmoil seems likely toundermine these efforts. In April 2001, thethen-Forestry Minister acknowledged manyfailures, saying that Indonesia should not haveagreed to “such unrealistic targets.” As oneexample, the government imposed a morato-rium on further conversion of natural forest inMay 2000, but the ban is widely disregarded inthe provinces.

• Indonesia is moving rapidly toward a newsystem of “regional autonomy,” but the provin-cial and district governments that will benefitfrom decentralization are largely without thecapacities or funds needed to govern effectively.Raising short-term revenue will be a toppriority and, as a result, intensified exploitationof forest resources is already occurring in manyregions.

1THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

CHAPTER 1INDONESIA’S FORESTS: WHAT IS AT STAKE?

1.1 100 Million Hectares ofTropical ForestIndonesia is home to some of the most magnificenttropical forests in the world. In extent, they rankthird behind Brazil and the Democratic Republic ofCongo (formerly Zaire), and their biologicalrichness is unique. The major forest types ofIndonesia range from evergreen lowland dipterocarpforests in Sumatra and Kalimantan to seasonalmonsoon forests and savanna grasslands in NusaTenggara and nondipterocarp lowland forests andalpine areas in Irian Jaya (sometimes referred to asPapua). Indonesia also contains the most extensivemangrove forests in the world, estimated at 4.25million hectares in the early 1990s.

Most of these habitats are under serious threat.Indonesia today is losing nearly 2 million ha offorest every year. Deforestation on this scale, at thisspeed, is unprecedented. Environmental organiza-

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Source: World Resources 2000–2001. Washington DC:World Resources Institute: 246–248.

tions are sometimes accused of hyberbole in theirclaims of imminent destruction. In the case ofIndonesia, predictions of catastrophic habitat lossand species decline are not exaggerated. The mostrecent and authoritative survey of the country’sforest cover predicts that lowland dipterocarp forests– the richest tropical habitat of all – will havevanished from Sumatra and Kalimantan by 2010 ifcurrent trends continue unchecked (Holmes, 2000).

1.2 A Rich Natural World IsDisappearingAlthough Indonesia comprises only 1.3 percent ofthe earth’s land surface, it harbors a disproportion-ately high share of its biodiversity, including 11percent of the world’s plant species, 10 percent ofits mammal species, and 16 percent of its birdspecies. (See Figure 1.1.) The majority of thesespecies are found in the country’s forests.

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2 THE STATE OF THE FOREST: INDONESIA

Indonesia’s 17,000 islands span the Indomalayanand Australasian realms; the archipelago containsseven major biogeographic realms and an extraordi-nary diversity of habitat types. (See Box 1.1.) Manyislands have been isolated for millennia, so levels ofendemism are high. Of 429 locally endemic birdspecies, for example, 251 are unique to singleislands. Most of Indonesia’s insects are also foundnowhere else, with many genera confined to indi-vidual mountaintops. The country’s three maincenters of species richness are Irian Jaya (highspecies richness and endemism), Kalimantan (highspecies richness, moderate endemism), andSulawesi (moderate species richness, high ende-mism).

Indonesia provides the habitat for some of theworld’s most beloved mammals, including theorangutan, tiger, rhinoceros, and elephant. Asrecently as 1930, three subspecies of tiger, Balinese,Javan, and Sumatran, ranged across the country. Ofthese three, the Balinese tiger (Panthera tigrisbalica) became extinct in the late 1930s and theJavan tiger (Panthera tigris sondaica) in the 1970s.Today, only the Sumatran subspecies remains.Because of their solitary lifestyle and nocturnalhabits, an accurate census of Sumatran tigers isnearly impossible. They are believed to numberaround 400-500, living mostly in five national parkson Sumatra. An informal census in 1978 estimatedthe number of tigers on the island at approximately1,000. Despite tigers’ ability to live in a wide rangeof habitats, forest fragmentation and agriculturaldevelopment as well as the demand for tigerproducts have contributed to the decline of thepopulation (Tiger Information Center, 2001).

Other mammal species are not faring much better.The Sumatran and Javan rhinoceros are both onthe World Conservation Union’s (IUCN) Red Listof critically endangered species. The Javan rhinoc-eros (Rhinoceros sondaicus) is the rarest largemammal species in the world, with an estimated54-60 individuals in 1995, most of them in a singleprotected area, Ujung Kulon National Park. TheSumatran rhinoceros (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis) isknown to exist on the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra,and Borneo. In all populations, rhino numbershave declined more than 50 percent over the past

decade. Only about 400 rhinos are known to existin Indonesia.

Habitat fragmentation and conversion have also hitprimate species particularly hard. The PrimateSpecialist Group of IUCN has recently designated 2species, the Sumatran orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus)and the Javan gibbon (Hylobates moloch), among itstop 25 most endangered primates. The Javan gibbonnumbers between 300 and 400 in the scant remainingforest of Java. On Sumatra, orangutans are foundonly in the provinces of Aceh, North Sumatra, and

Box 1.1 The Wallace Line

species were Asian in origin, whereas east of Balithey seemed to have come from Australia. Thisstunning separation of species is one of the primarysources of Indonesia’s incredible biodiversity. Infact, the isolation of Indonesia’s wide archipelago,which spans over 4,800 km, is what has createdsuch a diverse range of species. Indonesia ranksamong the top five countries in the world in itsdiversity of plants, mammals, birds, and reptiles(CI, 2001).

References

Conservation International. 2001. Online at:http://www.conservation.org (January 9, 2001).

Wallace, Alfred Russel. 1859. “On the ZoologicalGeography of the Malay Archipelago” (S53, 1859).Paper presented to the Linnean Society on 3 Novemberand published in their Zoological Proceedings in 1860.

The Indonesian archipelago is split almost in half byan invisible line. The English biologist Alfred RusselWallace first described this line in the 1850s(Wallace, 1859). Wallace observed that birds presenton one island were not present on another island only40 km away. He later found that this startling patternwas true when applied to countless other animal andplant species. For example, the famous dipterocarptrees that make up the bulk of lowland forests inIndonesia show a remarkable divide across theWallace line. Over 287 species are found on Borneo,whereas only 7 are found 80 km eastward onSulawesi, at the same latitude. The line, which nowbears Alfred Wallace’s name, is created by a deep-seashelf that cuts between Bali and Lombok, and northbetween the islands of Borneo and Sulawesi. Fewspecies found on one side of Wallace’s line are foundon the other. Wallace speculated that west of Bali,


West Sumatra. As with most endangered mammals,habitat loss and fragmentation are the key causes ofpopulation decline. However, hunting for food andsport, the illegal pet trade, and management ineffec-tiveness in the national parks have also contributed topopulation declines (IUCN, 2001).

1.3 People Also Depend on theForestsA large though undetermined number of communi-ties live in or depend on Indonesia’s forests. Esti-mates made over the past several decades havevaried wildly on the precise number of people –from 1.5 million to 65 million – depending ondefinitions used and the policy agenda pursued(Zerner, 1992:4).

Nontimber Forest Products

In mid-2000, the Ministry of Forestry1 reported that30 million people “depend directly on the forestrysector for their livelihoods,” but did not define thedegree of dependency (MOF, 2000). Many of thesepeople live by traditional “portfolio” economicstrategies that combine shifting cultivation of riceand other food crops with fishing, hunting, harvest-ing and selling of timber, and gathering nontimberforest products (NTFPs) such as rattan, honey, andresins for use and sale. The cultivation of coffee,rubber, and other tree crops is also an importantsource of income (De Beer and McDermott,1996:74). One particularly valuable nontimberforest product is rattan cane. Indonesia dominatesworld rattan trade; its abundant supply of wild and

cultivated rattan accounts for 80-90 percent ofglobal supply (FAO, 2001:4).

Millions of people use forest plants and herbsknown for their medicinal properties. Medicinalplants and other nontimber forest products arepoorly appreciated and difficult to documentbecause many of them are not reflected in formalmarket transactions recorded in economic statistics.The total value of exports of “wildlife and plants”for the 1999-2000 fiscal year was more than $1.5billion, according to the Ministry of Forestry, butthe components of this aggregated total are notspecified (MOF, 2000). Nonmarket use values arealso likely to be high: if each of the estimated 30million forest-dependent people used forest prod-ucts worth only $100 each year, their total valuewould be $3 billion.

Environmental Services

The range of benefits provided by Indonesia’sforests extends far beyond forest products. Morethan 16 million people live in the country’s 15largest watersheds. Their forests help protectfreshwater supplies by stabilizing soil on hillslopesand regulating the speed and timing of river flow.Yet these watersheds lost more than 20 percent oftheir forest cover between 1985 and 1997.

Indonesia’s forests also store great quantities ofcarbon. According to the FAO, forest vegetation inIndonesia totals over 14 billion tons of biomass –more than any other country in Asia and equal toabout 20 percent of the biomass in all of Africa’stropical forests. This quantity of biomass stores,

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roughly, about 3.5 billion tons of carbon.2 Given theextensive forest clearance in Indonesia and therelatively small area that has been replanted (seeChapter 3), it appears likely that land cover changeshave created a net source of carbon in recentdecades, thus contributing to global warming.

Environmental services are hard to quantify. Muchanecdotal evidence exists and many local studiesconfirm that ecological functions have declined withdeforestation, but consistent information at thenational scale is lacking. The importance of envi-ronmental services being lost is still harder toevaluate in dollar terms. Scholars have attempted toassign economic value to environmental goods andservices that are not exchanged in recognizedmarkets. Using a variety of assumptions andmethodological approaches, researchers haveascribed values to tropical forests ranging fromhundreds to thousands of dollars per ha. One suchstudy by the Forestry Department of Bogor Agricul-tural Institute (IPB) in Java concluded that the

theoretical economic value of biodiversity andcarbon storage dwarfs the revenues currentlyobtained from roundwood production (BogorAgricultural Institute, 1999).

While such studies are not robust enough to be takentoo literally,3 they provide a useful reminder thatconventional appraisals of forest value, based ontimber prices, are too narrow and they neglect theinterests of local forest dependent people. They alsoneglect the interest and concern of people worldwidewho care about the fate of Indonesia’s forests. Manypeople respond to tropical forests with a sense ofawe, excitement, and reverence. It may be arguedthat monetary valuation techniques are not alwaysrelevant and that the spiritual and aesthetic qualitiesof Indonesia’s forests lie beyond the reach of bothmainstream and ecological economics.

1.4 Timber Products Are a MajorSource of National RevenueIndonesia is a significant producer of tropicalhardwood logs and sawnwood, plywood and otherboards, and pulp for papermaking. More than halfthe country’s forests, some 54 million hectares, areallocated for timber production (although not all arebeing actively logged), and a further 2 million ha ofindustrial wood plantations have been established,supplying mostly pulpwood. The volume and valueof Indonesian wood production are hard to deter-mine with precision: data provided by FAO, theInternational Tropical Timber Organization, and theIndonesian government are compiled differently anddo not tally. The majority of Indonesian woodproduction is used domestically and domestic prices

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are generally much lower than international marketprices. Nevertheless, the importance of the forestrysector to the Indonesian economy is clear. In 1997,the forestry and wood processing sectors accountedfor 3.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),and exports of plywood, pulp, and paper werevalued at $5.5 billion. This amount was nearly halfthe value of oil and gas exports, and equal to nearly10 percent of total export earnings. (See Table 1.1.)

The forestry sector shared in the tremendous growthand export drive of the economy in the 1980s and1990s, but this expansion was achieved at the costof wholly unsustainable forestry practices. Thewood processing industries in Indonesia nowrequire about 80 million m3 of wood annually tofeed sawmills, plywood manufacturing plants, pulpmills, and papermaking plants. This quantity ofwood is far more than can be produced legally fromthe country’s forests and timber plantations. As aresult, more than half the country’s wood supply isobtained from illegal logging.

1.5 Assessing the State of theForestOnly a century ago, Indonesia was still denselyforested, with trees covering an estimated 80-95percent of the total land area, depending on theisland being considered. Total forest cover at thattime has been estimated at about 170 million ha.Today it is approximately 98 million hectares, atleast half of which is believed to be degraded byhuman activity. The rate of deforestation is acceler-ating: Indonesia lost about 17 percent of its forestsbetween 1985 and 1997 alone. On average, the


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country lost approximately 1 million ha of foresteach year in the 1980s and about 1.7 million ha peryear in the 1990s. Since 1996, deforestation appearsto have accelerated again to approximately 2 millionha per year. At this rate, virtually all of Indonesia’slowland forests – the most valuable for bothbiodiversity and timber resources – will be gonewithin the next decade (Holmes, 2000).

The threats to Indonesia’s forest are numerous,ranging from large-scale logging operations tosmall-scale clearance by family farmers, from clear-cutting to make way for industrial agriculture todevastation by repeated fires. Illegal logging isundertaken at every level of society, by supposedlylegitimate timber groups, the military, corruptofficials, and wildcat operators. Yet despite theimportance of Indonesia’s forests, and the speed atwhich they are disappearing, accurate, up-to-dateinformation on forest extent and condition is eithernonexistent or hard to obtain. No integrated recordof forest area has been kept over the years, soinformation has to be pieced together from differentsources. On top of the practical difficulties, accessto Indonesian forestry data was hampered under theSuharto regime by government secrecy, industryintimidation, and bureaucratic obstruction. (See Box2.1 and Annex 1.)

The reformasi era that followed the fall of Suhartoin 1998 has encouraged a resurgence of interest andcritical investigation into the management of thecountry’s affairs. Nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) and other civil society groups have beenprominent in pressing for the release of officialinformation and publicizing the results. As informa-tion emerges, the extent to which Indonesia’s

natural resources – forests above all – have beenabused and wasted has become clear. The story isnow beginning to be told.

This report was prepared by Forest Watch Indonesia(based in Bogor, Indonesia) and Global ForestWatch (based in Washington DC, United States). Itspurpose is to provide a comprehensive informationsource on the state of Indonesia’s forests that willserve as a baseline for future reporting. The reportsuffers from all the imperfections of the informationsources: data are missing, often outdated, some-times conflicting. The exact extent and distributionof Indonesia’s forests still cannot be mapped,precise regional deforestation trends are not known,the biological condition of many forests is not wellstudied, and the operations of the country’s forestindustries remain secretive and are often illegal.Nonetheless, this report attempts to compile andharmonize the best of the official information that isavailable. It also includes information gathered inthe field by FWI staff and their colleagues in otherNGOs. We acknowledge the help and cooperationof some officials of the Ministry of Forestry whoprovided valuable new information on forestmanagement issues. When data sources conflict, weattempt to provide an explanation. Where data aremissing, we say so, and when we have conductedour own analyses of forestry data, especiallyrelating to forest condition, we make this clear. It isour hope that as better information becomes avail-able, future State of the Forest reports will providean increasingly accurate and reliable resource forpolicymakers, environmental organizations, forestindustries, and all those who believe that betterinformation will lead to better decisionmaking.


1.6 Structure of the ReportChapter 2 provides a summary of what is knownabout the current extent and distribution of forestcover, trends in deforestation, and the condition ofremaining forests. Chapter 3 examines the causes ofdeforestation through an analysis of the economicactivities affecting forests: logging under theconcession system, illegal logging, conversion offorests to industrial timber plantations or agricul-tural estates, and small-scale farming. Chapter 4documents the causes, scale, and impacts of forestfires over the past 25 years. Chapter 5 provides abrief summary of the current policy and institutionalenvironment, reviews the current national agendafor forest policy reform, and assesses the prospectsfor its implementation.

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CHAPTER 2FOREST COVER, CHANGE, AND CONDITION

As late as 1900, Indonesia was still a densely for-ested country. According to modeled estimates by theWorld Bank, forest cover in the three major islands ofSumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi at that time stilltotaled 103 million ha (Holmes, 2000). This repre-sents a reduction of only about 13 percent from theiroriginal forest cover, as estimated by MacKinnon.

Indonesia’s Forests in 1950

In 1950, what was then called the Indonesian ForestService produced a vegetation map of the country; itconcluded that nearly 84 percent of Indonesia’s landarea was covered in primary and secondary forestand plantations of such estate crops as tea, coffee,and rubber. (See Table 2.1.) The survey aggregatedplantations in the “forest” category and thus did notprovide an estimate of their extent, but it is clear

that plantations and smallholder plantings of treecrops covered only a small area in 1950. Dutchcolonial records from 1939 estimated that large-scale plantations included approximately 2.5 millionha “in exploitation,” of which only 1.2 million hawere actually planted. The sector stagnated duringthe 1940s and 1950s and would reach the 1939 levelof area planted again only in the 1970s. Smallholdertree crop area was only 4.6 million ha in 1969, anda large part of this area was planted in the 1950sand 1960s (Booth, 1988). In 1950, teak plantationson Java covered an additional 824,000 ha (Peluso,1992:Annex C). The major cause of forest clearancethat had occurred up to 1950 was agriculture,notably rice cultivation.

It seems reasonable to conclude that all timber andestate crop plantations covered no more than 4

2.1 Forest Cover and Change

Original Forest Cover: From thePreagricultural Era to 1900

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Figure 2.1 Deforestation from the Preagricultural Era to 1997

Sources: Land Area from WCMC, 1996.Original Forest Cover from MacKinnon,1997. Forest Cover 1950 from Hannibal,1950. Forest Cover 1985 from RePPProT,1990. Forest Cover 1997 (Kalimantan,Sumatra, Sulawesi, Maluku and IrianJaya) from Holmes, 2000. Forest Cover1997 (Java, Bali/Nusa Tenggara) fromGFW calculations based on GOI/WorldBank, 2000).

million ha in 1950, leaving approximately 145million ha of primary forest and another 14 millionha of secondary and tidal forest.

Deforestation Since 1950

Figure 2.1 summarizes the extent of forest lossfrom preagricultural times to 1997. Deforestationbecame a real concern in Indonesia only in theearly 1970s, when large-scale commercial loggingconcessions were established for the first time.Despite the fact that logging concessions wereintended to establish a system of long-term timberproduction, they sometimes led to serious forestdegradation followed by clearance and conversionto other forms of land use. (See Chapter 3.2.) Apicture of the situation in the mid-1980s can beobtained from a nationwide mapping exerciseundertaken as part of the government’s transmigra-tion program (RePPProT, 1990). According to thissurvey, forest cover in 1985 was about 119 millionha, representing a decline of about 27 percent fromthe forested area in 1950. Between the 1970s and

the 1990s, the annual deforestation rate wasestimated at 0.6-1.2 million ha (Sunderlin andResosudarmo, 1996).

A more recent forest cover mapping effort carried outin 1999 by the Indonesian government with supportfrom the World Bank (GOI/World Bank, 2000)concluded that the average annual deforestation ratefor 1985-1997 was actually about 1.7 million ha.Hardest hit during this period were Sulawesi, Sumatra,and Kalimantan, all of which lost more than 20percent of their forest cover. If these deforestationtrends continue (as they have since 1997), nonswamplowland forest will disappear in Sumatra by 2005 andin Kalimantan soon after 2010 (Holmes, 2000). Amore detailed description of these data sources isprovided in Box 2.1.

In total, Indonesia appears to have lost more than 20million ha of forest cover between 1985 and 1997 –about 17 percent of the forest area existing in 1985.Table 2.2 presents the deforestation estimatesdeveloped by Holmes, based on a comparison of

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RePPProT data with his analysis of satellite imag-ery from around 1997.

These estimates should be regarded as approximations.The forest cover data for 1997, in particular, sufferfrom a number of uncertainties. First, they are basedentirely on satellite imagery that was not verified byfield checks. Analysis by Global Forest Watch indi-cates that about 6.6 million ha classified in the WorldBank study as natural forest might be under timber orestate crop plantations.4 Second, the images wereobscured in many areas by cloud cover or are other-wise unclassified. In the three major islands ofSumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, “no data” areascover a total of 5.3 million ha, or 18 percent of the“measured” forest area (Holmes, 2000:Table 1). TheWorld Bank study makes the assumption that, onaverage, just over half these areas are forested, basedon their location and what is known of the terrain andlevel of development there.

Table 2.3 presents deforestation estimates developedby Global Forest Watch, based on modified versions


Box 2.1 Data Sources and Difficulties

No integrated record of forest area has been kept inIndonesia, so any analysis of current forest cover andrecent deforestation must be based on a variety ofnational and subnational scale sources. The analysisof Indonesian forest cover presented in this report isbased primarily on four sources of information.

• The Regional Physical Planning Programme forTransmigration (RePPProT, 1990) included amapping exercise carried out by the Ministry ofTransmigration with funds and technical assis-tance provided by the British Government. Theentire country was surveyed, using existingreports, aerial photographs, and satellite or radarimagery with selective field checking. The areascovered, dates and scales of the hand-colored draftmaps, aerial photographs and satellite imagesvaried considerably. Although the main purpose ofthe exercise was to identify land suitable fortransmigration, it provided maps and data on landcover, including different forest types. The dataare from various years but are generally taken todescribe the situation in 1985.

• The RePPProT dataset was subsequently modifiedby the World Conservation Monitoring Centre(WCMC, 1996). Land cover classes were reducedin number and harmonized, and various areas ofmissing or conflicting data were clarified.Complete map coverage for the country wasprovided at a scale of 1:250,000.

• The National Forest Inventory (NFI) (GOI/FAO,1996) was undertaken by the Ministry of Forestrywith financial support from the World Bank andtechnical assistance from the Food and Agricul-

ture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).The final report provided a set of forest cover andland use maps at a scale of 1:250,000. They werebased on MSS satellite data dating from 1986 to1991 and supplemented by a field inventory. Theinventory was conducted by sampling all forestlands below 1,000 m using a systematic sampledesign with plot-clusters in a 20 km x 20 km grid.In addition, the study created a GeographicInformation Systems (GIS) database utilizingmaps from the RePPProT and other surveys aswell as NFI data. The data, as with RePPProT, arefrom various years but are generally taken todescribe the situation in the early 1990s.

• A new set of forest cover maps has recently beendeveloped by the Government of Indonesia,working with technical assistance from the WorldBank. The mapping was conducted atreconaissance level from Landsat satellite imageryby the Planning Department of the Ministry ofForestry. The resulting dataset (GOI/World Bank,2000) categorized only forest and nonforest landcover and was not corroborated with field check-ing. The result may be some misclassifications,notably some identification of plantations asforest. The scale of mapping is 1:500,000. Most ofthe new imagery dates from 1996 to 1998 but insome areas data from 1994 or 1995 had to beused. An average date of 1997 is assumed for themaps, but some predate the forest fires of 1997 aswell as the extensive logging that followed thepolitical crisis of 1998. Thus although the mapsprovide the most recent national-level informationon forest cover available at the time of writing,they are already somewhat outdated. The GOI/

of the RePPProT and GOI/World Bank datasets. Wechose the World Conservation Monitoring Centre’smodification of RePPProT because it represents aconsistent digitized spatial dataset that could beused with the GOI/World Bank dataset for thepurposes of GIS analysis. We chose to exclude “nodata” areas in both datasets in order to compareonly areas positively identified as forested in 1985with areas positively identified as forested in 1997.This estimate is not necessarily more accurate thanthat developed by Holmes; its purpose is to com-plete estimates for the missing islands (see note toTable 2.2) and provide a form of cross-check.

Map 1 presents the same information visually. Itshows the extent and distribution of net changes innatural forest cover between 1985 and 1997. Themap highlights the fact that when the two forestcover layers are overlaid, more than 17 million hamust be recorded as “no data,” an area equal tonearly 18 percent of that reported as forest in 1997.It also highlights areas of data conflict – thoseidentified in the World Bank study as natural forestbut reported to be under plantations by the NationalForest Inventory of 1996. The significant extent of“no data” and data conflict areas (nearly 24 millionha) reminds us that current deforestation estimatesare uncertain.

A more detailed illustration of forest cover change inKalimantan is presented in Map 2. Natural forestcover in Kalimantan declined from 40 million to 32million ha between 1985 and 1997. Clearance for oilpalm and timber plantations has been a leading causeof deforestation in the province of West Kalimantan.Central Kalimantan has been hard hit by fires andclearance for the ill-conceived “million hectare rice


World Bank dataset was analyzed by DerekHolmes, a consultant working for the WorldBank; his unpublished study (Holmes, 2000) andexpert advice proved invaluable in the prepara-tion of this report.

A major problem in dealing with these nationaldatasets is their lack of direct comparability. TheRePPProT and NFI surveys provide maps at the samescale, but they use different classification schemes forforest, with the NFI being the less detailed. Inaddition, the NFI appears to include the category“bush and scrub” among its forest types, which leadsto the strange result that Indonesian forest area in the1990s appears larger than it was in the mid-1980s(Scotland et al., 1999). The GOI/World Bank datasetis mapped at a coarser scale, and the absence ofground truthing means that conclusions must beregarded as provisional. The data provide informationon forest/nonforest cover only, but the accompanyingWorld Bank study includes supplementary analysis toestimate loss of forest cover in different forest types.As far as possible, the World Bank study tried toproduce results comparable with the RePPProT studyso that 12-year trends would become clear.

Such technical difficulties are only the beginningwhen it comes to understanding Indonesian forestcover and forestry practices. Until recently, re-searchers had to deal with government secrecy,bureaucratic obfuscation, and industry intimidation.The secrecy is beginning to lift, and official coop-eration is more often forthcoming, but access togood information is still hampered by overlappingadministrative responsibilities, rapid personnelchanges, and a lack of capacity. Often the informa-

tion simply does not exist. The forestry industry maybe less all-powerful than it was, but private citizenswho attempt to monitor illegal corporate activity stillface considerable risks. (See Box 3.3.) Some sense ofthe challenges and frustrations involved in uncoveringstatistics is provided by two researchers, unconnectedwith this report, who have long experience in thefield. Their stories can be read in Annex 1.

SourcesGOI/FAO. 1996. National Forest Inventory of Indonesia:Final Forest Resources Statistics Report. Field DocumentNo. 55. Jakarta: Directorate General of Forest Inventoryand Land Use Planning, Ministry of Forestry, Governmentof Indonesia (GOI); and Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO). June.

GOI/World Bank, 2000. Digital files on CD-ROM.

Holmes, Derek. 2000. Deforestation in Indonesia: A Reviewof the Situation in 1999. Consultant report to the WorldBank. Jakarta: Draft of 3 July.

RePPProT. Final report dated 1990. The Land Resources ofIndonesia: A National Overview. Regional PhysicalPlanning Programme for Transmigration (RePPProT).Jakarta: Land Resources Department of the OverseasDevelopment Administration, London (Government ofUK), and Ministry of Transmigration (Government ofIndonesia).

Scotland, N., A. Fraser, and N. Jewell. 1999. IndonesianForest Inventory Data. Report No. PFM/EC/99/07. Jakarta:Indonesia-UK Tropical Forest Management Programme.

World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC).1996. Tropical Moist Forests and Protected Areas: TheDigital Files. Version 1. Cambridge: World ConservationMonitoring Centre, Centre for International ForestryResearch, and Overseas Development Administration ofthe United Kingdom.

Box 2.1 continuedproject,” a failed attempt to establish rice cultivationin former peat swamp forest. In East Kalimantan,forests have been both extensively converted toplantation crops and damaged by fire. SouthKalimantan, the most densely populated province,has been developed for oil palm, coconuts, andtransmigration settlements. All four provinces arealso affected by legal and illegal logging.

Our analyis produces a lower overall estimate ofnatural forest cover in 1997 than that of Holmes anda slightly higher rate of deforestation, but the differ-ences are minor. However, if we assume that theNational Forest Inventory data are reliable and that6.6 million ha of natural forest identified by Holmesare, in fact, plantations, then total natural forest covermight have fallen as low as 92-93 million ha by1997. The average annual rate of deforestationbetween 1985 and 1997 would then amount to 2.2million ha. In the absence of ground truthing, thishigher estimate cannot be substantiated.

Despite these difficulties, the overall trend is clear.If deforestation since 1997 has continued at thesame constant rate identified by Holmes, another 7-8 million ha of tropical forest will have been clearedas this report goes to press. In fact, it is likely thatdeforestation rates have actually increased since1997, driven by the enormous forest fires of 1997-1998, the economic crisis, and the subsequentbreakdown of political authority and law enforce-ment. According to the World Bank’s analysis,deforestation accelerated throughout the 1985-1997period, with a steep increase to about 2 million ha/year occurring after 1996.


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Lowland peneplain forestLowland peneplain forest

WWetland forestetland forest

Montane forestMontane forest

00

55

1010

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2525

3030

3535

4040

4545

Million

Hecta

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Mi ll ion

Hecta

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11990000 2200110011991100 11992200 11993300 11994400 11995500 11996600 1199770011998800 11999900 22000000

Million

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Heath forestHeath forest


00

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2020

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4040

5050

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Source: Holmes, 2000

Figures 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 Changes in Forest Cover

Sumatra

Kalimantan

Sulawesi

Loss of Lowland and Mangrove Forests

Throughout Indonesia, forest clearance began in thelowland areas, where topography and soil fertilitywere most favorable to human settlement andagriculture. Clearance for plantation crops in theColonial era and for transmigration programs in the1970s and 1980s also occurred largely in lowlands orgently sloping foothills. Commercial logging concen-trated first on lowland forests, which are accessible,commercially valuable, and have the greatest poten-tial for large-scale development. Unfortunately,lowland forests are also the most biologically diverse,harboring many of the most prized tree and animalspecies in Indonesia.

It is difficult to provide good estimates of how muchlowland forest has been lost. Vegetation classificationtypes used in the 1985 RePPProT survey and theNational Forest Inventory of 1996 are not directlycomparable, and the remote sensing survey sup-

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ported by the World Bank in 1997 did not distinguishamong different forest types. However, preliminaryestimates by Holmes indicate that, although lowlanddeforestation was significant even before 1985,losses of this forest type have accelerated sharplysince then. (See Table 2.4.) Approximately 60percent of Indonesia’s lowland forest in the threemajor islands was cleared between 1985 and 1997.

Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 illustrate the estimated lossof lowland and other dominant forest types in thethree islands between 1900 and 1997; they alsoproject the forest loss expected by 2010, assumingcontinuation of current deforestation trends. Theyindicate that lowland forest area in Sulawesi hasalready been reduced to statistical insignificance. InSumatra, it will disappear altogether by about 2005and in Kalimantan, soon after 2010.

Map 3 illustrates the spatial distribution of losses inlowland, submontane (upland) and montane forests

Million

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between 1985 and 1997. For purposes of thisanalysis, Global Forest Watch adopted simpleelevation thresholds to define the three forest types:lowland forest below 300 m, submontane or uplandforest at 300-1,000 m, and montane forest at above1,000 m. These thresholds are lower than thoseadopted in the RePPProT, and are comparable withthose used by Holmes in his analysis of lowlandforest loss (Holmes, 2000).

Estimates of Indonesia’s mangrove forest area arenotoriously unreliable and outdated. According tothe World Mangrove Atlas, the most reliableestimate dates from 1993, when the country’smangroves are believed to have covered approxi-mately 4.25 million ha (Spalding et al., 1997:54-58). This estimate was based on the 1985RePPProT survey, updated with maps provided tothe World Conservation Monitoring Centre by theAsian Wetlands Bureau. However, other estimatesfor the mid-1980s are as low as 3.8 million ha oreven 2.2 million ha. The Indonesian governmentreports that some 1 million ha of mangroves werelost between 1969 and 1980 alone, owing prima-rily to conversion to rice fields, aquaculture, andother agricultural uses (BAPPENAS, 1993).Continuing losses can be attributed to the develop-ment of shrimp ponds, logging activities, and localexploitation for fuelwood and building materials.Conversion to shrimp ponds is especially prevalentin East Java, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. Production ofwoodchips and pulp from mangroves is alsoincreasing; chip mills have been built in Sumatraand Kalimantan, and a major mill has been built inBintuni Bay, Irian Jaya, formerly one of the largestand most pristine mangrove areas in the world.The National Forest Inventory of 1996 estimates

mangrove forest area at 3.5 million ha, implying aloss of 750,000 ha in just 3 years. However,accurate assessment of recent mangrove losses isalmost impossible; it can only be stated that theirdestruction continues.

2.2 Forest Condition Today

Official Forest Function and Use

Virtually all forests in Indonesia are state-owned,and administratively defined forest lands are quiteaccurately mapped by the government in terms oftheir intended function and use. The Ministry ofForestry is responsible for land under PermanentForest Status, that is, land that has been allocatedfor use as conservation forest, protection forest,limited production forest or production forest. (SeeGlossary for explanation of these terms.) However,these administrative definitions of forest land use donot correspond with actual tree cover. Thus theextent and condition of Indonesia’s remaining forestsare difficult to establish from official statistics.

The Ministry of Forestry is in the process ofpreparing updated maps of land under PermanentForest Status as well as maps of vegetative coverwithin conservation and protection forests. Offi-cials from the Ministry indicated that this newinformation would be made available for publica-tion by Forest Watch Indonesia but, unfortunately,the data were not provided. In their absence, themost recent information remains that availablefrom the Ministry of Forestry Strategic Plan 2001-2005 and the data compiled by the World Bank(Holmes, 2000).

“Official” and “Actual” Forest Cover

Annex 2, Table 1 presents the World Bank’s esti-mate of the area of land officially defined as Perma-nent Forest Status (114 million ha) and contrasts itwith an estimate of land that was actually forestedin 1997 (98 million ha). It appears that actual forestscover only 86 percent of the land defined as “forest”in Indonesia.

Another study provides more detail on actual forestcover within the various categories of permanentforest status (Fox, Wasson, and Applegate, 2000). Itprovides somewhat different estimates of the totalarea under Permanent Forest Status (109 million ha)and forest cover (89 million ha) but arrives at acomparable estimate of 82 percent for the amountof Permanent Forest Status land actually covered byforest. In every category, actual forest cover issmaller than the area officially allocated to thatcategory, with the greatest shortfall found in protec-tion forest (forest maintained for soil and waterprotection). (See Figure 2.5.)

In 1997, the Ministry of Forestry revised the landarea under Permanent Forest Status, with the resultthat it decreased, possibly by as much as 20 millionha. (See Table 2.5 and note.) All categories of forestfunction were also revised: the areas allocated forprotection forest and conservation forest increased,as did the area slated for timber production. Theareas allocated for limited production and forconversion to nonforest uses decreased. Thesechanges are not purely administrative; the area ofconversion forest decreased in large part because ithas already been converted. (Note, however, that thelatest unpublished revision of Permanent ForestStatus land increases the area of forest land allo-


cated for conversion. See p. 45.) According toHolmes’s analysis, it is likely that the additionalprotection forest area has been redesignated fromlimited production forest on steep slopes, a changethat should aid in soil conservation. However, itseems likely that a great deal more land has beenmoved from limited production forest to productionforest status, which may mean that other steeplysloping land will be opened for logging. Theincrease in conservation forest is probably explainedby the establishment of new national parks andother protected areas, although such status is noguarantee of protection from logging and otherforms of degradation. In the absence of spatial data,it is not possible to say where these changes inforest land classification occurred.

Figure 2.5 Allocated Forest Function andActual Forest Cover, 1997

Source: J. Fox, M. Wasson and G. Applegate. “Forest UsePolicies and Strategies in Indonesia: A Need for Change.”Jakarta. Paper prepared for the World Bank. May, 2000.

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The reality gap between official forest area andactual forest cover can be dramatic. In SouthSumatra and Lampung provinces, for example,only one third of “permanent forest” land iscovered with trees. In South Kalimantan, theproportion is less than two thirds. Despite suchproblems, official forest land use statistics formthe basis for resource management decisions andspatial planning.

Forest Degradation

Forest Watch Indonesia analyzed spatial datafrom the National Forest Inventory in an attemptto determine the level of degradation in majorforest types. The analysis concludes that in themid-1990s, Indonesia had 59 million ha ofnatural forest unallocated for use as a concessionof any kind, 41 million ha of degraded andpotentially degraded forest, and 9 million ha

0

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Box 2.2 Impacts of Logging on Dipterocarp Forests

survival of dipterocarp regeneration by 30 percent. Inunmanaged areas, dipterocarps occupied only 25 percentof the area that they would normally cover (Kuusipalo etal., 1997).

However, the impacts of logging on these forests extendwell beyond the boundaries of a logging concession.One of the most remarkable characteristics of diptero-carps is their reproductive pattern. After several years oflittle to no reproductive activity, nearly all dipterocarpsand up to 88 percent of all canopy species may enterinto a period of rapid flowering and fruiting. Thisphenomenon, first described by Dan Janzen, is known asmast fruiting. Janzen theorized that by fruiting synchro-nously, dipterocarps are able to overwhelm their seedpredators with fruit and allow a greater percentage oftheir seeds to survive (Janzen, 1970; Janzen, 1974). Thisstrategy works only when predators are naturallydispersed over a large geographical area. If predators areconcentrated in smaller areas because of forest fragmen-tation and selective logging, their numbers may besufficient to consume even a glut of seed production.The impact of a logging road can thus affect foresthealth several kilometers away.

A recent study has shown that mast fruiting episodesoccur almost exclusively during El Niño SouthernOscillations (ENSOs). These events also appear to becritical to regional seed production and recruitment(Curran and Leighton, 2000). Despite the pronouncedENSO episode in 1997-1998, Curran and Leighton havefound that since 1991, their study site, Gunung PalungNational Park, has had nearly total seedling recruitmentfailure (Curran et al., 1999). Although Gunung Palungitself contains large areas of nondegraded, intact

The towering trees that make up the lowland forestsof Indonesia are often referred to as “cathedral-like.” Canopies in the Indonesian rainforest canreach nearly 50 m into the sky. The stalwarts ofthese forests are species of the familyDipterocarpaceae. They account for up to 80 percentof the tallest canopy trees, up to 10 percent of alltree species (Ashton et al., 1998:44-66), andconstitute as much as 70 percent of the canopy treebiomass in the Indonesian forest (Curran andLeighton, 2000:101-128). Dipterocarps are late-successional trees, invading only forests that alreadyhave a closed canopy. They are extremely wide-spread, growing across lowland and mid-elevationforests in Southeast Asia and the Indian subconti-nent. Dipterocarps are also some of the mostvaluable hardwoods in the world; a single tree maybe worth many thousands of dollars. As a result ofIndonesia’s current economic crisis and decades ofcorruption, dipterocarp forests are being commer-cially logged at unprecedented and unsustainablerates.

The direct impact of logging on forests is obviouslya net loss of trees. However, the indirect impactsplay an important role in the future health oflowland forests. Logging poses real obstacles toseedling survival (Appenah and Mohd. Rasol,1995). Young plants must not only contend with thetrampling, skidding, and disruption caused bylogging but also compete with faster growingpioneer species that can outgrow them to reach theprecious light in the canopy. One study has shownthat cutting back pioneer species and creating gapsin the canopy to generate more light increased

dipterocarp forest, it is almost completely surroundedby degraded land and logging concessions. Theresearchers believe that dipterocarp reproductivestrategy is particularly vulnerable to disruptionbecause success depends on the ability of predators torange over a large geographic area of forest. Thesestudies underscore the need for effective forestmanagement areas and a reassessment of the area andlocations currently designated for logging.

Sources

Appanah, S. and A.M. Mohd. Rasol. 1995. “Dipterocarpfruit dispersal and seedling distribution.” Journal ofTropical Forest Science 8(2): 258-263.

Ashton, P.S., T.J. Givnish, and S. Appanah. 1998. “Stag-gered flowering in the Dipterocarpaceae: new insights intofloral induction and the evolution of mast fruiting in theaseasonal tropics.” American Naturalist 132(1): 44-66.

Curran, L.M. and M. Leighton. 2000. “Vertebrate responsesto spatiotemporal variation in seed production of mast-fruiting dipterocarpaceae.” Ecological Monographs 70(1):101-128.

Curran, L.M., I. Caniago, G.D. Paoli, D. Astianti, M.Kusneti, M. Leighton, C.E. Nirarita, and H. Haeruman.1999. “Impact of El Niño and logging on canopy treerecruitment in Borneo.” Science: 286: 2184-2188.

Janzen, D.H. 1970. “Herbivores and the number of tree speciesin tropical forests.” American Naturalist 104: 501-528.

Janzen, D.H. 1974. “Tropical blackwater rivers, animals andmast fruiting by the Dipterocarpaceae.” Biotropica 4: 69-103.

Kuusipalo, J., S. Hadengganan, G. Ådjers and A. Porkas S.Sagala. 1997. “Effect of gap liberation on the performanceand growth of dipterocarp trees in a logged-overrain0forest.” Forest Ecology and Management 92: 209-219.


s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN6.2elbaT s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN6.2elbaT s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN6.2elbaT s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN6.2elbaT s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN6.2elbaT

ecnivorPaerAtseroFlarutaN

)detacollanU( )aH(tseroFdedargeD

)aH(aerAdetserofeD

)aH(

hecA 547,063,2 858,520,1 538,263

ulukgneB 869,438 224,171 177,43

ibmaJ 012,791,1 976,170,1 858,225

uaiR 760,784,1 714,176,2 104,507,1

artamuStseW 275,487,1 701,894 087,931

artamuShtroN 924,381,2 600,683 656,563

gnupmaL 278,155 519,6 324,78

artamuSlatoT 368,993,01 404,138,5 427,812,3

natnamilaKtseW 285,829,3 566,446,2 586,545

natnamilaKhtuoS 159,766 666,995 961,662

natnamilaKlartneC 054,635 119,744,8 259,980,2

natnamilaKtsaE 239,169,5 556,548,8 514,863,1

natnamilaKlatoT 519,490,11 798,735,02 122,072,4

deforested by conversion to industrial timber orestate crop plantations or to transmigration sites.(See Table 2.6.) For purposes of this analysis,degraded forest is defined as forest area withinlogging concessions. Concessions that are beingactively logged or have been logged in the past(sometimes 2 or 3 times) are invariably degraded.(See Box 2.2.) Some inactive or expired conces-sions may more correctly be described as poten-tially degraded. In the absence of attribute dataregarding the status of concessions, it is notpossible to provide separate estimates of de-graded and potentially degraded forest. The areadefined here as natural forest is characterizedonly by the fact that it is not under immediatethreat of logging or conversion. It should benoted that officials from the Ministry of Forestrywho were invited to review this report claimedthat these data were no longer valid but theyoffered no alternative information.

Low Access and Accessed Forest

In an alternative approach to estimating the condi-tion of Indonesia’s forests, Global Forest Watchtried to determine how much of Indonesia’s remain-ing forest is still relatively intact (called here “lowaccess” forest) and how much is accessed, that is,disturbed by human activities. Low access forest isdefined as forest land not in close proximity toroads, navigable rivers, human settlements, or otherforms of development. (See Glossary and Annex 3for more detailed definitions of low access andaccessed forests.) Low access forests are the mostimportant for providing habitat to Indonesia’s richbiodiversity; their extent, contiguousness, anddegree of protection are important indicators ofconservation status.


6.2elbaT 6.2elbaT 6.2elbaT 6.2elbaT 6.2elbaT )tnoc( s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN s0991-diM,aerAdetserofeDdna,tseroFdedargeD,tseroFlarutaN

ecnivorPaerAtseroFlarutaN

)detacollanU( )aH(tseroFdedargeD

)aH(aerAdetserofeD

)aH(

isewaluShtuoS 944,090,2 877,855 481,97

isewaluSlartneC 486,689,2 001,739 499,57

isewaluStsaehtuoS 723,204,2 0 743,43

isewaluShtroN 032,899 483,015 541,41

isewaluSlatoT 096,774,8 262,600,2 076,302

ilaB 714,67 0 0

araggneTasuNtsaE 257,478 0 0

araggneTasuNtseW 221,926 881,47 586

ayaJnairI 312,608,32 708,782,01 664,501,1

ukulaM 093,241,3 684,707,2 012,101

LATOT 263,105,85 440,544,14 679,998,8

:ecruoS .6991,yrotnevnItseroFlanoitaNnodesabsetamitseaisenodnIhctaWtseroF:etoN .setoNlacinhceTdnasecruoSataD:3xennAees,elbatsihtgniylrednuygolodohtemehtnosliatederomroF

We did not wish to underestimate the area of lowaccess forest, so for this analysis, we overlaid theGOI/World Bank forest cover dataset with the NFIvegetation cover dataset in order to fill, whereverpossible, the “no data” areas in the GOI/WorldBank data. (See p. 9.) By doing so, we clearlyinflated total forest area because the NFI datasetdates from the early 1990s and forest loss since thenhas been substantial. However, because this analysisis concerned with the area of low access forest –forest that is by definition relatively remote fromaccess routes and development – this methodologywas felt to be acceptable.

The analysis indicates that a total of just over 52million ha may be defined as low access forest. Afurther 33 million ha meet most of the criteria for lowaccess forests but are within logging concessions. Itmay be assumed that much of this forest area is farfrom intact. Map 4 shows the extent and distributionof low access forests, both outside and withinconcessions. Half of all low access forest outsidelogging concessions (25.6 million ha) is located inIrian Jaya, 9.2 million ha are in Kalimantan, 7.7million ha in Sumatra and 6.5 million ha in Sulawesi.Only 2.4 million ha remain in Maluku and in rem-nant areas in Java, Bali, and Nusa Tenggara.

Fragmentation of Low Access Forests

For many species, the total area of low access forestis less important than the contiguous area of indi-vidual forest blocks. When habitat is broken intofragments by roads or other developments, somespecies populations are reduced to the point at whichthey are no longer viable. Low access forests,whether formally protected or not, take on the


character of islands, where wide-ranging species arefated for extinction at the local level. Map 5 depictsthe distribution of remaining unfragmented forest inthree size categories: 20,000-50,000 ha, 50,001-1million ha, and over 1 million ha. The size categoriesreflect the generalized experience that populationstend to decrease in smaller fragments of habitat andthat species requiring large home ranges will beabsent (Thiollay, 1989; Bierregaard et al., 1992).

Protected Areas

Indonesia was one of the first countries to sign theConvention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and toprepare a National Biodiversity Strategy and ActionPlan. During the 1990s, many of the Action Planpriorities were implemented, including expansion ofthe Protected Area (PA) system and creation ofseveral new conservation areas such as BukitTigapuluh National Park in Riau Province, exten-sions to Gunung Leuser, and two new parks in NusaTenggara. Despite this activity, the conservationsituation in Indonesia is, in the words of the WorldBank, “dire” (World Bank, 2001:32).

The significant loss of natural habitats, especiallylowland forests but also coastal, marine, andfreshwater ecosystems, means that the country is“almost certainly undergoing a species extinctionspasm of planetary proportions” (World Bank,2001:32). Although habitat loss is probably themain reason for continued biodiversity loss inIndonesia, habitat fragmentation and degradation,hunting, and poaching are also important factors.

To determine how much of Indonesia’s low accessforest is under some degree of protection, weoverlaid the low access forest grid with the mostrecent spatial data available from the World Conser-vation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-WCMC). A totalof 9.2 million ha of low access forest are protectedunder World Conservation Union (IUCN) categories

I-IV, and a further 2.5 million ha are included in theweaker protection categories V and VI.5 Thedistribution of low access forests in all six protec-tion categories is shown in Map 6. Almost half thelow access forest protected under categories I-IV isin Irian Jaya; another 2 million ha are in Sumatra,and 1.5 million ha in Kalimantan. To provide amore detailed picture of the protection status of lowaccess forest, Map 7 shows the distribution ofprotected areas in Kalimantan.

Protected area boundaries are proving a poor defenseagainst the illegal logging, agricultural encroach-ment, and poaching that afflicts so much ofIndonesia’s forests. According to our analysis,approximately 1.3 million ha of low access forest aresimultaneously protected and within logging conces-sions. Illegal settlement and logging are rampanteven in some of the most well-known protectedareas which are sites of important donor programs.According to the World Bank, some 30,000 ha offorests in the northern area of Sumatra’s BukitBarisan Selatan National Park have been lost in thepast few years, and major problems with illegalloggers continue in the national parks of GunungLeuser and Bukit Tigapuluh (Sumatra), and TanjungPuting and Gunung Palung (Kalimantan) (WorldBank, 2001:34). (See Box 3.3.) Development ofestate crop plantations can also be a problem insidenational parks. Box 2.3 illustrates the complexity ofthe economic, social, cultural, political, and environ-mental interests that must be reconciled.

FWI S

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Box 2.3 Oil Palm Development in Gunung Leuser National Park

work, the access road was essential. The principalfunction of the military foundation in the partnership wasto organize all “administrative details” related to obtain-ing permission to build the road, while the Sapo PadangKUD took charge of forest clearance and planting.

The military foundation efficiently discharged its part ofthe deal, and the then-Forestry Minister granted permis-sion in January 1998 for the 11 km road to be built. InJune 1998, the local office of the Forestry Service issueda decree (No. 6201/1/783) stating that the Sapo Padangenclave was no longer legally a part of the national park.

This controversial decision disturbed many stakeholdersbecause building the road would clearly lead to forestdestruction in the park. Some local residents areconvinced that the decision will invite newcomers andplanters who will slash and burn their way ever deeperinto park territory. Many people believe, based on priorexperience, that oil palm development will not berestricted to the enclave area. But as is often the case insuch situations, local opinions vary, with some peopleeager to profit from the development of hithertoinaccessible national park forest land.

The facts were uncovered and publicized through fieldinvestigations carried out by the Leuser ConservationFoundation (YLL), a local NGO, during 1997 and 1998.YLL’s reports were taken up by another NGO, the TitianFoundation, which publicized the case to numerousparties and the press. As a result, a consortium of NGOsbrought several lawsuits against those involved in theSapo Padang oil palm scheme.

In 1999, two local university-based NGOs—GenerasiPecinta Kelestarian Alam (Generation of Nature Lovers)and Himpunan Mahasiswa Pecinta Lingkungan

Gunung Leuser National Park is one of Indonesia’soldest and largest national parks, covering nearly900,000 ha in Aceh and North Sumatra provinces atthe northern end of Sumatra. During the Dutchcolonial era, much of the area was already gazetted asnature reserve; some areas where people lived withinthe boundaries were declared as settlement “enclaves”in 1935. One of these areas, covering 4,200 ha, wasSapo Padang, an enclave in the part of the park lyingin North Sumatra. By 1953, however, residentsabandoned Sapo Padang and the area had reverted tosecondary forest by the 1990s.

In November 1995, the regent of Langkat regencyproposed to build a road through the national park tothe former enclave, and 34 families rapidly relocatedto the old Sapo Padang village site, apparentlysensing economic opportunity. Some of the familiesformed a local cooperative (KUD) in March 1996,and in August 1997 made a proposal to develop an oilpalm plantation in the enclave. The regent grantedtheir request that October, and the head of thenational park agreed to construction of the road.

To implement the oil palm scheme, the Sapo PadangKUD formed a partnership with an oil palm factorycalled PT Amal Tani, owned by the immediate familyof Jamin Ginting, the commander of the nearbyKodam I Bukit Barisan military unit. The director ofAmal Tani became an executive of the KUD. Themilitary unit’s charitable foundation, Yayasan KodamI Bukit Barisan, also entered the picture, agreeing tocooperate with the KUD as implementers of thegovernment’s Poverty Alleviation Program.

The scheme called for clearance of 4,250 ha of forestand development of oil palm in the area. For the plan to

Penyayang Alam (Association of Student NatureLovers)—brought a lawsuit in the Medan StateCourt, while another group—Forum KomunikasiPengacara 61 (the Lawyers’ Communication Forum61, or FKP) brought a parallel case in the NationalAdministrative Court. Both suits charged a varietyof civilian officials from national, provincial, andlocal government, the military foundation, the SapoPadang KUD, and PT Amal Tani (as well as PTKencana, another partner firm in the scheme),accusing them of violating a number of environmen-tal, forestry, and administrative laws and regulations.

In July 1999, the Administrative Court threw outFKP 61’s suit on the grounds that the organizationdid not have standing to bring suit because it was alawyers’ association rather than an environmentalorganization. In September 1999, however, the localNGOs won their case in the Medan State Court,which ordered the defendants to pay 300 millionrupiah (approximately US$30-35,000 at mid-2001exchange rates) in compensation for damage to thepark caused by the project, and further ordered themto restore the area to its former condition. Thedefendants appealed to the North Sumatra HighCourt, which had not ruled on the case by thebeginning of 2001. The legal process did not stopthe project, however, and the local press continues toreport extensive logging and clearing, road-building,and oil palm planting in the project area within thepark. By the time the courts ultimately rule on thecase, it may be too late to remedy the damage.

Source: Field investigations by the Leuser ConservationFoundation (YLL), and YLL review and monitoring ofadministrative and court decrees and decisions and localpress reports, 1997-2000.


CHAPTER 3DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION

3.1 The Dynamics of Deforestation:An OverviewDeforestation in Indonesia is largely the result of acorrupt political and economic system that regardednatural resources, especially forests, as a source ofrevenue to be exploited for political ends andpersonal gain. The country’s growing wood-processing and plantation crop industries provedlucrative over the years, and their profitability wasused by the Suharto regime as a means to rewardand control friends, family, and potential allies.Over the past 30 years, the country vastly increasedits output of forest products and plantation cropsgrown on former forest land. Indonesia today is amajor producer of logs, sawnwood, plywood,woodpulp, and paper as well as such plantationcrops as palm oil, rubber, and cocoa. This economicdevelopment was achieved with virtually no regardfor the sustainable management of forests or therights of local people.

• More than half of Indonesia’s forests are allo-cated for timber production on a selective fellingbasis. Many logging concessions overridetraditional patterns of land ownership or userights. Lack of corporate oversight and account-ability means that forestry management is poorlysupervised and, over time, many productionforests have been overexploited. The govern-ment now classifies nearly 30 percent of sur-veyed logging concessions as being in a “de-graded condition.” Below a productivity thresh-old, degraded concessions are vulnerable toreclassification to a category that allows planta-tion operators to apply for a conversion license.If granted, the forest may then be clearedcompletely and converted to a timber or estatecrop plantation.

• Industrial timber plantations have been widelypromoted and subsidized as a means of bothsupplying Indonesia’s booming demand for pulpand taking pressure off natural forests. Nearly 9

million ha of land have been allocated fordevelopment as industrial timber plantations, butmuch of this land was natural forest. The landhas either been cleared already or is likely to becleared soon. Only about 2 million ha haveactually been planted, leaving up to 7 million haof cleared and unproductive land.

• The boom in estate crop plantations, especiallyoil palm, is another cause of deforestation.Nearly 7 million ha of forest had been approvedfor conversion to estate crop plantations by theend of 1997, and this land has almost certainlybeen cleared. But the area actually converted tooil palm plantations since 1985 is about 2.6million hectares, while new plantations of otherestate crops probably account for another 1-1.5million ha. This leaves close to another 3 millionha of cleared forest land lying idle. Many of thesame companies that operate logging conces-sions also own estate crop plantations, andcorrupt relationships have developed in which

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operators apply for a license to establish aplantation, clear the forest, use the timber forpulp, then move on and abandon the cleared land.

• Logging concessions, timber plantations, andforest clearance combined provide less than halfthe wood needed by Indonesia’s wood process-ing industries. Imports are relatively small, andillegal logging makes up the shortfall. Indonesiatoday is plagued by organized wood theft on amassive scale: 50-70 percent of wood suppliedto the forest products industry each year is cutillegally. The total area of forest lost to illegallogging is not known, but a former seniorofficial of the Ministry of Forestry, TitusSarijanto, recently claimed that theft and illegallogging have destroyed an estimated 10 millionha of Indonesian forests.6

• The role of small-scale traditional agriculture,relative to other causes of deforestation, hasbeen the subject of great controversy. Noaccurate data are available for the area of forestcleared by small-scale farmers since 1985, but aplausible estimate in 1990 suggested thatshifting cultivators might be responsible forabout 20 percent of forest loss. This calculationwould translate to clearance of about 4 millionha between 1985 and 1997.

• The transmigration program, lasting from the1960s to 1999, relocated people from denselypopulated Java to the outer islands. According to

estimates by the Ministry of Forestry, theprogram was responsible for nearly 2 million haof forest clearance over that period. In addition,small farmers and opportunistic small-scaleinvestors have contributed to deforestation byestablishing cash crops, especially oil palm andcocoa, in forests opened up by larger-scalelogging or plantation operations. Recently,“spontaneous” transmigration has increased withthe movement of people looking for greatereconomic opportunity or seeking to avoid socialunrest and ethnic violence. Reliable national-scale estimates of forest clearance by thesemigrants have not been made.

• Deliberate fire-setting by large-scale plantationowners to clear land and by local communitiesto protest plantation or logging operations hasled to uncontrolled wildfires of unprecedentedextent and intensity. More than 5 million ha offorest burned in 1994 and another 4.6 million haburned in 1997-1998. Some of this land isregenerating as scrubby forest, some has beencolonized by small-scale farmers, but littlesystematic effort has been made to restore forestcover or establish productive agriculture.

As this brief summary makes clear, deforestationmust be seen as a complex phenomenon in whichall these factors interact. An overview of some ofthese interactions is provided in Figure 3.1.

3.2 Timber Extraction: LoggingConcessions (HPHs)Even though logging concessions are intended tomaintain forest lands in permanent production, theconcession system has, in fact, been a major causeof deforestation and forest degradation.

When Suharto’s “New Order” regime came topower in the late 1960s, economic planners tookimmediate steps to develop Indonesia’s weakeconomy and create the legal framework to permitprivate firms to harvest and export timber. Sumatraand Kalimantan were the first targets of forestexploitation because they had the largest stocks ofcommercially valuable tree species and were closestto Asian markets.

The 1967 Forestry Act provided the legal basis toaward timber harvesting rights, and many large 20-year logging concessions (Hak Pengusahaan Hutanor HPHs) were granted soon after. Exports ofunprocessed logs rose sharply in the 1970s, provid-ing foreign exchange, capital to build Indonesia’semerging business empires, and employment. From1969 to 1974, for example, nearly 11 million ha oflogging concessions were granted in EastKalimantan alone (GOI and IIED, 1985). Only 4million m3 of logs were cut from Indonesian forestsin 1967, mostly for domestic use, but by 1977 thetotal had risen to approximately 28 million m3, atleast 75 percent of which was exported (Romm,1980). Gross foreign exchange earnings from theforestry sector rose from $6 million in 1966 to morethan $564 million in 1974. By 1979, Indonesia wasthe world’s leading producer of tropical logs, with a41 percent share ($2.1 billion) of the global market.


CorruptionCorruption

Minimal Legal andMinimal Legal andPolitical Accountabilityolitical Accountabilityof Pof Political, Military andolitical, Military andEconomic ElitesEconomic Elites

Conflicts Over ForestConflicts Over ForestLands and RLands and Resourcesesources

Concession HoldersConcession HoldersEmploying PEmploying PooroorLogging PracticesLogging Practices

Forest Degradationand

Deforestation

UnderlyingUnderlyingCausesCauses

ImmediateCauses

Agents

Poor Quality Data onoor Quality Data onForest TForest Type, Condition,ype, Condition,and Locationand Location

Policies Favoringolicies FavoringLarge-Scale CommercialScale CommercialForestry OverForestry OverCommunityCommunity-based Forestry-based Forestry

Perverse Incentives anderverse Incentives andPricing PPricing Policies for Timberolicies for Timber

Official Indifference toOfficial Indifference toTraditional Forest Landraditional Forest Landand Rand Resource Rightsesource Rights

Inappropriate ForestInappropriate ForestLand Use and AllocationLand Use and AllocationDecisions

Transmigrantsransmigrants(ended in 1999)(ended in 1999)

Unclear Legal StatusUnclear Legal Statusof Forest Landsof Forest Lands

Excess Timbercess TimberProcessing CapacityProcessing Capacity

Weak and Inconsistenteak and InconsistentEnforcement ofEnforcement ofForestry LawsForestry Laws

Provincial/LocalGovernmentRevenue Needsevenue Needs

Rural PRural Poverty andoverty andLandlessness

Illegal LoggersIllegal Loggers

Oil POil Palm, Pulp, andalm, Pulp, andTimber PlantationTimber PlantationDevelopers

Forest Fire SettersForest Fire Setters

Smale-ScaleScaleFarmers

Developers ofDevelopers ofMines, RMines, Roads,and Infrastructureand Infrastructure

Poachers ofoachers ofFlora and FaunaFlora and Fauna

Figure 3.1 Processes of Forest Degradation and Deforestation in Indonesia


This figure represented a greater export volume oftropical hardwoods than the exports of Africa andLatin America combined (Gillis, 1988:43-104).

Roads, towns, and other infrastructure were built inSumatra and Kalimantan in the wake of the timberbonanza, and the island populations grew substan-tially. East Kalimantan, which was undergoing asimultaneous oil boom, doubled its populationbetween 1970 and 1980, transforming the landscapeas agricultural settlers followed the loggers into theforests (Mackie, 1984:63-74).

Consolidation in the Timber Industry

The timber industry went through a period ofconsolidation when a ban on log exports wasimposed in the early 1980s, creating a few mam-moth timber firms that concentrated on plywoodproduction. Industry concentration was furtherencouraged by an HPH regulation requiring compa-nies that sought a concession license to own aprocessing facility or have a corporate relationshipwith one. This requirement tended to limit conces-sion ownership to big groups that owned plymills.The number of plywood mills in the country rosefrom 21 in 1979 to 101 in 1985, and production rosefrom 624,000 m3 in 1979 to nearly 4.9 million m3 in1985, then doubled again to over 10 million m3 in1993. Nearly 90 percent of production in that yearwas exported. (See Figures 3.2 and 3.3.)

From the 1980s onward, the timber industry becameincreasingly concentrated in the hands of a smallnumber of firms connected to the government. By1994, the top 10 timber groups controlled 28million ha (45 percent) of the logging concessionsin the country, a figure that rose to 64 percent in

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

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Production Export

Cubic

Mete

rsC

ubic

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rs

1961

1983

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1977

1975

1979

1981

1999

1985

1987

1989

1993

1991

1995

1997

Figure 3.2 Production and Export of Logs,1961–1999

Source: FAOSTAT. FAO online database.

Note: Exports of logs have not been zero since 1986. ITTOreports log exports of nearly 300,000 m3 in 2000 and thisexcludes illegal trade.

timber-rich East Kalimantan (Brown, 1999:12-13).These big firms formed a cartel (Apkindo) that notonly made Indonesia the world’s largest plywoodproducer but also succeeded in raising internationalplywood prices (Gellert, 1998). Suharto’s familyand inner circle were important players in theindustry. According to the watchdog group Indone-sian Corruption Watch, Suharto’s family alonecontrolled more than 4.1 million ha of loggingconcessions.7 (See Annex 2, Table 2.)

By 1995, some 585 concessions covered 63 millionha, approximately one third of the nation’s totalland area (Brown, 1999:13). In the mid-1990s,however, many concessions were withdrawn, in partbecause of violations by concession holders and in

Production Export

Cubic

Mete

rsC

ubic

Mete

rs

1961

1983

1963

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1977

1975

1979

1981

1999

1985

1987

1989

1993

1991

1995

1997

0

2,000,000

4,000,000

6,000,000

8,000,000

10,000,000

12,000,000

Figure 3.3 Production and Export of Plywood,1961–99

Source: FAOSTAT. FAO online database.

Note: It seems implausible that production levels fell belowexport levels after 1998. ITTO and the Indonesian Ministry ofForestry record smaller decreases in production after 1997.(See Note 18.)

part because the value of timber stands in manyconcessions was declining, a situation that reducedtheir attractiveness as long-term commercialoperations. Brown estimates that the total numberof concessions fell to 464, while the area of forestunder concessions fell to 52 million ha. (See Figure3.4.) The majority of withdrawn concession licenseswere in Sumatra and Kalimantan; concession areacontinued to expand in Irian Jaya, which is still richin unlogged forest resources. In practice, the“withdrawal” of over 100 concessions did not meanthat they ceased operations. Numerous concessionswhose 20-year contract period had ended wereeither transferred to five state-owned forestrycorporations (Inhutani I-V) or reconstituted as jointventures between private firms and one of these


state firms. By mid-1998, only 39 million haremained wholly in the hands of private concessionholders; 14 million ha were being managed by thefive Inhutani firms, 8 million ha were under state-private joint ventures, and an additional 8 million hahad been slated for conversion to nonforestry uses(Fox et al., 2000). The armed forces also benefitedfrom the redistribution of concessions. Theirconcession area nearly doubled, to 1.8 million ha.(Brown, 1999:12, 40).

Despite this major shake-up in the industry, the top10 timber companies were virtually unscathed; theirranking and control over concession area changedlittle. (See Table 3.1.)

Area and Status of Logging Concessions

In preparing this report, we were not able to obtainspatial data that would have identified the distribu-tion of active and inactive concessions today. In

Figure 3.4 Concession Area in Major Provinces, 1985–1998

Sources: Forestry Statistics Indonesia, 1998;Concession names and locations from AgricultureCensus, 1993, BPS; CIC, Study and Directory ofForest Management Rights (HPH) in Indonesia,1999.

Notes: The data underlying this chart arepresented in Annex 2, Table 3. Data from 1996onward are for HPHs believed to be currentlyactive.

Mill

ion

Hect

are

sM

illio

nH

ect

are

s

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Sumatra Kalimantan Sulawesi MalukuMaluku Irian JayaIrian Jaya

1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

fact, the true status of many concessions – whetherthey are in active operation, officially inactive butactually in operation, or no longer operating –remains hard to establish. In early 2000, the Minis-try reported that 387 concessions were still activelyoperating, out of a total of 500 licensed to operateover a total forest area of 55 million ha.8 However,a subsequent Ministry analysis released in July 2000stated that 652 recognized concessions existed,covering an area of 69 million ha. Of these, 293were apparently still operating under valid licenses(nearly 34 million ha), 288 had expired licenses buthad not returned the land to government control(nearly 30 million ha), and 71 (about 5.5 million ha)had been formally returned to government control.(See Table 3.2.)

In January 2001, the Ministry of Forestry awarded11 new concessions with forest areas totaling599,000 ha. All but two were in Central or EastKalimantan and most ranged between 40,000 and

50,000 ha. The exceptions were one concession of45,000 ha in Riau province, Sumatra, and one muchlarger concession, of 175,000 ha, in Irian Jaya.9 Theextent and distribution of logging concessions in theearly 1990s, the most recent years for which spatialdata are available, are shown in Map 8.

Concession Mismanagement and ForestCondition

The close connections between the Suharto regimeand most of the major timber groups resulted in alack of oversight and transparency, which was onereason for poor forestry management. Concessionholders took little responsibility for forestry practicesin the field, and there is no good evidence that thesituation has improved. In early 2000, the Ministry ofForestry reported that “most” of the forest underlogging concessions was in “damaged condition.”10 Itappears that timber firms regularly violate variousprovisions of the Indonesian Selective Cutting


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System (TPTI), which they are obliged to followunder the terms of their 20-year concession contracts(World Bank, 2001:19). (See Box 3.1.)

A report by the Ministry of Forestry in July 2000indicated that in a survey of nearly 47 million ha offorest land under active or expired concessions,about 30 percent was degraded, reduced to scrub, orconverted to agriculture, and only 40 percent wasstill classified as primary forest in good condition.(See Table 3.3.)

Growing environmental activism and increasinglyfrequent public protests have begun to put pressureon the government to take some action againstoffenders. On May 5, 1999, the Minister of Forestrywithdrew a 39,300-ha logging concession granted in1992 to the Medan Remaja Timber (MRT) com-pany in Aceh Province, Sumatra. The process torevoke MRT’s license began after environmentalNGOs delivered information concerning thecompany’s poor performance to the Minister.Around the same time, local people vented theiranger and opposition by setting fire to the MRT

Box 3.1 Common IllegalPractices of Timber Companies

When opening a new area for cutting, companiesoften build substandard logging roads withoutdrainage systems (gutters, culverts, etc.), leading toerosion and landslips. Bridges are constructed bypiling up timber logs, causing forest water channelsto become clogged. Water then seeps into thesurrounding areas, creating waterlogging whichrots tree roots. Felling activities are frequentlycontracted out to other parties, who operatewithout supervision. Subcontractors tend to cut forshort-term profit – as much as they can as fast asthey can – which results in cutting of trees withdiameters smaller than the felling limit (50 cm atbreast height), removing trees from river andstream banks, or felling on steep slopes. Protectedtrees may also be cut indiscriminately. Cuttingoften occurs outside designated cutting blocks(which are specified each year in an annual plan)and even outside concession boundaries. Cut logsare often not collected or stored at the designatedsites. In many concessions, it is not difficult to findnumerous former unofficial log storage sites wherethe forest has been cut and the land so degradedthat scrub is the only regrowth. Concessionaires arerequired to replant 2 years after they have loggedan area, but some have been observed to plant onlya small area where forestry officials are most likelyto visit. Seedbeds may be established but owing tothe difficulties of producing seedlings fromdipterocarps, saplings often do not survive.

Source: Reports from the field by environmentalactivists.

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base camp, blockading the company’s logging road,and seizing the heavy equipment, making it impos-sible for the loggers to operate.11

Indonesia has been developing a system for certify-ing well-managed logging concessions since themid-1990s but, until early 1999, not one loggingcompany was ready to be certified. In April 1999,the Diamond Raya Timber Company was awarded a“bronze medal,” the lowest level of certification, byLEI, the Indonesian Ecolabelling Institute. Thecompany failed to pass a subsequent Joint Certifica-tion Protocol agreed by LEI and the Forest Steward-ship Council (FSC) but was again awarded a bronzemedal by LEI in April 2001. However, in July 2001,

the company was heavily criticized by theRainforest Foundation and WALHI, Indonesia’slargest national environmental organization. Thecompany’s concession in Riau province, Sumatra, isinhabited by the highly endangered Sumatran tiger,and Diamond Raya is accused of failing to take anyprotective measures or to conduct environmentalimpact studies of its operations. Illegal logging isalso allegedly rampant inside the concession.12

The number and total area of concessions havedeclined since the mid-1990s, and concessions areproviding a smaller share of the country’s timbersupply than formerly. However, nearly half ofIndonesia’s remaining tropical forests are still underlogging licenses and are either degraded or at risk ofdegradation unless current practices are changed.An additional threat is posed by the new regionalautonomy policy, which gives local authoritiesmuch greater power to grant logging concessions.(See Chapter 5.) After many years of seeing loggingrevenues captured by the central government, localauthorities are eager to exploit forest resources forlocal benefit. Without strong institutional frame-works and responsible planning, forests are beinglogged even more intensively for the sake of short-term gain.

3.3 Timber Extraction: IllegalLogging

Dependence on Illegal Supply

Illegal logging is widespread and systematic inmany parts of Indonesia and, in 2000, appeared tobe the source of 50–70 percent of the country’swood supply. An analysis that year by the Ministryof Forestry officially stated what has been commonknowledge for some time:

Illegal logging has come to constitute a well-organized criminal enterprise with strongbacking and a network that is so extensive, wellestablished and strong that it is bold enough toresist, threaten, and in fact physically tyrannizeforestry law enforcement authorities. …Illegalcutting occurs in concession areas, unallocatedforest areas, expired concessions, state forestryconcessions, areas of forest slated for conver-sion, and in conservation areas and protectedforests.

Indeed, illegal logging is increasing in conser-vation areas, since these areas have bettertimber potential than production areas. Theactors in illegal logging are: (a) laborers fromcommunities in the forest areas and also manywho are brought there from other areas; (b)investors, including traders, concession holders,or holders of legal timber cutting permits (IPK),and buyers of illegal timber from processingindustries; and (c) government officials (bothcivilian and military), law enforcement person-nel, and certain legislators.13

FWI S

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Illegal timber brokers flourish throughout thecountry, supplying wood processors who cannotobtain adequate supplies legally.14 Corruptionamong civilian and military officials, many ofwhom are closely involved in illegal cutting andmarketing, is pervasive.15 Official involvement inillegal logging has become so blatant and wide-spread that provincial legislators in Sumatra’s Jambiprovince felt obliged to make a public appeal tomilitary, police, and justice officials to stop support-ing illegal loggers’ operations.16 The IndonesianPlywood Association (Apkindo) complained in June2000 that illegal loggers in Sumatra and Kalimantanwere exporting at least 1 million m3 of timber toChina and undercutting the legal export market.17

Illegal logging is not always a clearly defined term.Box 3.2 explains how it is used in this report. Map 9illustrates the distribution of reported cases of illegallogging in Indonesia between 1997 and 1998.

The Gap Between Supply and Demand

How has such a situation arisen? The short answeris that Indonesia has pursued a policy of aggressiveexpansion in the forest products sector with insuffi-cient regard for the long-term sustainability ofsupply. (See Figure 3.5.) Indonesia’s annual logproduction rose from about 11 million m3 in the1970s to a peak of about 36 million m3 in the early1990s. More rapid expansion occurred in theprocessed wood products sector as the governmentencouraged a shift away from the production oflower-value unprocessed logs toward value-addedproducts. The first boom was in plywood produc-tion, which took off during the 1980s and 1990s aspart of the country’s drive to increase exports. (SeeFigure 3.3.) Production has declined somewhat

Box 3.2 What Do We Mean by Illegal Logging?

• Harvesting outside concession boundaries

• Falsifying log transport documents

HTI/Industrial THTI/Industrial THTI/Industrial THTI/Industrial THTI/Industrial Timber Plantations Linked to Pimber Plantations Linked to Pimber Plantations Linked to Pimber Plantations Linked to Pimber Plantations Linked to PulpulpulpulpulpMillsMillsMillsMillsMills• Clear-cutting natural forest, then failing to replant

• Not planting at rates required to maintain long-term production

• Replanting with low-quality species

• Replanting at low density

• Persistently supplementing plantation supply with“bridging” supply from conversion forest

• Accepting falsified log transport documents

Big wood processing operations are responsible –directly or indirectly – for the majority of illegallogging because they consume the most wood andbecause small companies lack the capacity to overhar-vest at significant levels. Illegal logging is alsoundertaken by small-scale operators who mightharvest a few logs from the forest each week and sellthem to larger legitimate operators. These small teamsof illegal loggers are frequently funded and directedby the major companies. Illegal logs from suchsources are then mingled undetectably with the legalharvest.

Source: “Indonesian Forestry Sector: Discusson of DataAnalysis and Current Policy Issues.” Presentation by theEPIQ/Natural Resources Management Program, UnitedStates Agency for International Development (USAID) atWinrock International. Arlington, VA. August 1, 2000.

Illegal logging is an emotive term that requires somedefinition. This report uses the term to describe allforestry practices or activities connected with woodharvesting, processing, and trade that do not conformto Indonesian law. There are essentially two kinds ofillegal logging. The first is carried out by legitimateoperators who violate the terms of their licenses. Thesecond involves outright timber theft, whereby treesare felled by people who have no legal right to cuttrees at all.

Data collection and analysis by the Natural Re-sources Management (NRM) Program of USAIDfocused on the wood intake and production ofIndonesia’s sawmills and plywood plants. Oneconclusion was that any discussion of industryovercapacity and the link to illegal logging mustrecognize that “illegal logging” can take many formsbeyond the illegal removal of trees from the forest.Examples can be found in the forest concession(HPH) system and the industrial timber plantation(HTI) system.

HPH/FHPH/FHPH/FHPH/FHPH/Forest Concessions Linked to Worest Concessions Linked to Worest Concessions Linked to Worest Concessions Linked to Worest Concessions Linked to WoodoodoodoodoodPPPPProcessing Frocessing Frocessing Frocessing Frocessing Facilitiesacilitiesacilitiesacilitiesacilities• Harvesting more than the annual allowable cut

(AAC)

• Harvesting in Protection Forest areas (steepslopes and river banks)

• Underreporting harvest volumes and tax payable

• Ignoring selective cutting guidelines


0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

Logsogs PlywoodPlywood Pulp

1980 1990 2000

Thousa

nd

Cubic

Mete

rsThousa

nd

Cubic

Mete

rs

Sawnwood

Figure 3.5 Industrial Roundwood Production,1980–2000

Source: ITTO (Logs, Sawnwood and Plywood). IndonesianPulp and Paper Association (Pulp)

Notes: Pulp production data are in roundwood equivalent,using a conversion rate of 4.9 cubic meters consumed toproduce 1 metric ton of pulp. ITTO production data forIndonesia are consistently higher than those from FAO. ITTOlog production data for 2000 are provisional and may berevised downward. They are dramatically higher than the2000 log production data provided by the Indonesian Ministryof Forestry.

investment in plywood, pulp, and paper processingcapacity has far outpaced efforts to develop ad-equate feedstocks from plantations, and theindustry’s expansion has come largely at the ex-pense of the country’s natural forests. (Plantationsare discussed in greater detail in the followingsection.) Total wood demand in Indonesia today isconservatively estimated at 76-80 million m3. (SeeFigure 3.6.)

Against this picture of rapidly increasing demandfor wood is a story of static or declining supply.(See Table 3.4.) According to the latest estimatesfrom the Ministry of Forestry, output fromIndonesia’s production forests has declined precipi-tously, probably because most of the economicallydesirable concessions have been thoroughly logged.

Wood from conversion forests – forests cleared tomake way for agricultural or industrial woodplantations – appears to have peaked in 1997,possibly because the economic and political crisishas discouraged expansion in the plantation sector.Output from industrial timber plantations remainedbelow targets for some years but, according torecent MOF data, production rose sharply in 1999.The increase seems too large to be entirely plau-sible, but it may be explained by large-scale plant-ing undertaken around 1990 and 1991. Even at thislevel of production, however, plantations still supplyonly about 5 percent of total (legal and illegal)wood consumption.

Indonesia suffers from a chronic structural imbal-ance between supply and demand, and the shortfall

following the economic crisis of 1997, althoughstartling data discrepancies exist among differentsources.18

The pulp and paper industries have grown evenmore dramatically. Since the late 1980s, productioncapacity has increased nearly 700 percent. (SeeFigures 3.7 and 3.8 in next section.) Indonesia hasbecome the world’s ninth largest pulp producer andeleventh largest paper producer. This prodigious

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is made up largely from wood obtained illegally.Reliable data on illegal logging, by definition, arenot available for undocumented and undergroundactivities. However, the Government of Indonesiaand several independent researchers have madeestimates that give a good sense of the magnitude ofthe problem. Most estimates of illegal logging arebased on comparisons of known legal supplies ofwood with documented output from the woodprocessing industries.

A study that compared the production capacity ofplymills and sawmills in 1998 with the legal supplyof wood from concessions and plantations linked tothose mills and from associated forest clearance

concluded that the gap that year between knownlegal supply and mill output was nearly 21 millionm3 (Brown, 1999:49). The study used conservativeassumptions about mill production efficiency, and itdid not include the pulp sector, which by 1998 wasa significant consumer of wood. The estimate isbased on probably the most careful study yet of theplywood and sawnwood sectors but as an estimateof total illegal logging in the country, 21 m3 isundoubtedly much too low.

Another study of the situation in 1997 and 1998compared national wood supply (legal productionplus imports) with national wood consumption(domestic use plus exports) (Scotland, 2000). Thestudy found that consumption exceeded supply by32.6 million m3. (See Table 3.5.) The extent ofdomestic demand, as well as the volume of timbersmuggled out of the country, is uncertain. The sizeof imports is also difficult to ascertain, becausemost imports are of pulp, waste paper, and woodchips, all of which must be converted to roundwood

Figure 3.6 Installed Capacity in the WoodProcessing Industries, 1999

Source: Ministry of Forestry, Directorate of Forest Protection.Note: Total installed capacity = 76 million metric tons.

Other MillsOther Mills2.8 m (4%)2.8 m (4%)

3

Chip MillsChip Mills5.7 m (8%)5.7 m (8%)

3

Pulp Millsulp Mills22.5 m (30%)22.5 m (30%)

3

Plymills22.2 m (30%)22.2 m (30%)

3

Sawmills20.6 m (28%)20.6 m (28%)

3

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Box 3.3 Illegal Logging: A Tale of Two National Parks

logging concession had operated in the production forestarea prior to establishment of the park.

Bukit Tigapuluh’s rich biodiversity and watershedfunctions are gravely threatened by illegal logging tofeed local illegal sawmills, which multiplied from 4 in1997 to at least 23 in 1999. This expansion was drivenlargely by the depreciation of the Indonesian rupiahagainst the dollar following the 1997 Asian economiccrisis, which greatly increased the local rupiah sellingprice of timber for export. The most sought aftercommercial species are meranti (Shorea spp), balam(Palaquium walsurifolium), keruing (Dipterocarpusspecies), bayur (Pterospermum species), and sapat(Ludekia borneensis).

Logging, milling, and trading of illegal timber from thepark and adjacent areas are carried out systematicallyand in the open, with little or no interference fromForestry Department officials or the police, who areindeed alleged to be actively involved in the business.Illegal logging originally concentrated on the abandonedconcession of PT Patriadi, outside the park, but it hasmoved along three rivers into the park itself. The illegaltimber boom in the area has increasingly drawn outsidecapital and labor into the area, law enforcement iseffectively nonexistent, and the outlook for BukitTigapuluh’s remaining forests is discouraging.

An even more egregious and well-documented case isthat of Tanjung Puting National Park in the province ofCentral Kalimantan, which covers 400,000 ha on analluvial peninsula jutting south into the Java Sea. Thepark includes a variety of ecosystems, includingtropical heath forest, peat swamp forest, and mangroveforest, and is the habitat of over 200 bird species, 17reptile species, and 29 mammal species. Nine ofBorneo’s primate species are found in Tanjung Puting,including approximately 2,000 orangutans. The area, awildlife reserve since the 1930s, was officiallydeclared a national park in 1984 and is also officiallylisted by the UN as a Biosphere Reserve.

The park’s rich flora includes considerable standsof commercial tree species, notably meranti(Shorea species) and ramin (Gonystylus species).Ramin has been a particular target for illegalloggers since the early 1990s, and illegal cutting ofthis valuable timber has soared in recent years withthe erosion of civil order and law enforcement thataccompanied the economic and political crises thatbegan in 1997-1998 and continue today. Ramin is arare wood that grows only in lowland tropicalforest areas, and it has been essentially logged outin many other parts of Indonesia. The attraction forillegal loggers is clear – sawn ramin sells forapproximately $600 per m3 on international

The ubiquity of illegal logging in Indonesia and thepervasive corruption and lawlessness that allow it toflourish are starkly illustrated by the assault onIndonesia’s national parks. Bukit Tigapuluh NationalPark in Sumatra and Tanjung Puting National Park inKalimantan are only two of the more egregious casesin which Indonesia’s last reserves of intact forest arebeing systematically pillaged by illegal loggersoperating with the connivance of civilian and militaryofficials.

Bukit Tigapuluh National Park covers 127,698 ha ofhilly and mountainous rainforest as well as somemangrove forest in the Sumatran provinces of Jambiand Riau. In addition to serving as an importantwatershed for the region, the park is rich in biologicaldiversity. The park has 700 recorded plant species,some 246 of which are commonly used by local peoplefor medicinal and other purposes. It is home to 192recorded bird species (one third of Sumatra’s total) and59 recorded mammal species, including threatenedspecies such as the Sumatran tiger (Panthera tigris),Asian elephant (Elephas maximus), Malay tapir(Tapirus indicus), clouded leopard (Neofelix nebulosa),and the Asian small-clawed otter (Aonyx cinerea). Thearea was declared a national park in 1995, encompass-ing sites previously classified by the government asprotection forest and limited production forest. A


markets, and moulded ramin for as much as $1,200per m3. Major buyers include Malaysia, Singapore,Taiwan, China, the United States, and variousEuropean nations.

Illegal logging for ramin and other species occursthroughout most of Tanjung Puting, particularlyalong the Sekonyer, Buluh Besar, and Seruiyanrivers, which either border or bisect the park. Fieldinvestigations by the Environmental InvestigationAgency (a UK-based NGO) and Telapak Indonesia(an Indonesian NGO) during 1999 and 2000revealed that only one third of the park’s forests arestill intact.

In Tanjung Putting, illegal logging is a large-scale,well-organized commercial operation carried out withthe tacit or active support of local military, police,and forestry officials. Abdul Rasyid, a local timberbaron who also represents Central Kalimantan inIndonesia’s National Assembly (the MPR), has beenreported by numerous sources, including officials ofthe central government, as the mastermind of theoperation. Illegal loggers can be ruthless in protectingtheir interests. Two observers from EIA and Telapakwere badly beaten and held hostage for 3 days inJanuary 2000 by employees of Tanjung Lingga,Rasyid’s timber company.

Actual logging is carried out by teams of local loggerswho are supplied with chainsaws and other equipmentand are paid less than $1 per m3 for the ramin they cut.The wood is then processed in Rasyid’s nearby factoryby workers paid less than $1 per day. In some cases,police and forestry officials are bribed to “confiscate”loads of illegally cut ramin. Indonesian law providesthat confiscated timber is to be auctioned, and thecompany then buys the timber cheaply through acrooked auction process, receiving all necessary papersdeclaring the wood to have been legally obtained. Illegalramin is thus “laundered” and becomes legal in the eyesof Indonesian law.

Despite extensive video and other documentation of thewidespread illegal logging at Tanjung Puting and thecentral role of Abdul Rasyid in the operation, littleaction has been taken by the government to end thepillage of the park. Evidence to support a case againstRasyid was forwarded by the Forestry Department to theNational Police in October 2000, but to date no actionhas been taken. Under pressure from national andinternational NGOs, the government did place ramin onAppendix III of the Convention on International Tradein Endangered Species (CITES) in April 2001, with azero export quota for 2 years.

As Newsweek magazine noted in September 2001,“Tanjung Puting has come to symbolize the corruptionand lawlessness of Indonesia’s forestry sector.” Indeed,the inability or unwillingness of the government tobring Abdul Rasyid to justice in such a high profileillegal logging case – in a park often cited as a “crownjewel” of the Indonesian protected areas system –bodes ill for the remaining scraps of officially pro-tected intact forest lying within Indonesia’s poorlymanaged system of protected areas.

Sources:

Department for International Development (DFID) andWorldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). 1998. LaporanPerkembangan Sawmill Wilayah Selatan Taman NasionalBukit Tigapuluh dan di Sekitar Areal KPHP Pasir Mayang.[Report on Development of Sawmills in the Southern Regionof Bukit Tigapuluh National Park and in the area aroundKPHP Report on sawmill development in the district SouthTN Tigapuluh Hill and surrounding area KPHP PasirMayang.] DFID and WWF. Report PFM/KPHP/98/7.

Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak Indonesia.1999. The Final Cut: Illegal Logging in Indonesia’sOrangutan Parks. London, UK and Bogor, Indonesia.

Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak Indonesia.2000. Illegal Logging in Tanjung Puting National Park: AnUpdate on the Final Cut Report. London, UK and Bogor,Indonesia.

“Raping Borneo.” Newsweek, September 10, 2001.

Box 3.3 (continued)


3.4 Industrial Timber Plantations(HTIs)In the mid-1980s, the government launched anambitious plan to establish vast areas of fast-growing timber plantations (Hutan TanamanIndustri – HTIs), especially in Sumatra andKalimantan. The program accelerated with theissuance of a Government Regulation in 1990.21 Atthe outset, the government justified the HTI programin terms of supplementing supplies of timber fromthe natural forests, rehabilitating degraded lands, andpromoting nature conservation.22 To this ostensibleend, timber plantation entrepreneurs receive variousgovernment subsidies, including loans on generousterms from the “Reforestation Fund,” which iscollected from logging concession holders.23

HTI concessions are granted for production of bothpulpwood and nonpulpwood (usually sawnwood forconstruction). They can be established indepen-

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equivalent volume. In addition, large quantities ofpulp and paper are traded in both directions (im-ports and exports), imported pulp is processed intoexported paper, and so on. The shortfall of 33million cubic meters should be regarded as a roughapproximation, but it is good enough to indicate thescale of the problem. Illegal logging in 1997–1998appears to have accounted for more than half oftotal domestic production.

The imbalance between supply and demand inIndonesia appears to be worsening. The latest dataavailable from the Ministry of Forestry indicate thatlegal domestic wood production in 2000 fell to a newlow of just 17 million m3. Domestic production issupplemented by imports. Although imports ofroundwood are negligible in Indonesia, imports ofpulp and paper are an important source of supply.Data for pulp, waste paper, and paperboard are notyet available for 2000, but imports amounted to 3million m3 (roundwood equivalent) in 1999 (APKI,2001). If imports were similar in 2000, then totalwood supply in that year was a little over 20 millionm3. Consumption data for the wood products industryin 2000 are not available either, but industry capacityis conservatively estimated at about 74-80 million m3.If it is assumed that industry output is approximately75 percent of capacity, then total roundwood demandwas 55-60 million m3. (This is a reasonable assump-tion given that pulp mills, which account for about 30percent of total demand, produced at 84 percent oftheir capacity in 2000.) Demand for wood in 2000thus exceeded supply by 35-40 million m3 which, itmust be assumed, was supplied from illegal sources.If these calculations are even approximately correct,

illegal logging accounted for about 65 percent ofIndonesia’s total wood supply in 2000.

In early 2000, a senior official of the Ministry ofForestry admitted that “the wood-processingindustry has been allowed to expand withoutreference to the available supply of timber, result-ing in vast overcapacity. The shortfall in theofficial timber supply is being met largely byillegal logging, which has reached epidemicproportions.”19 Box 3.3 illustrates how illegallogging proceeds unhindered even in Indonesia’snational parks.

The international aid agencies and lending institu-tions in the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)have often warned that continued aid to the forestrysector is contingent on more effective action toeradicate illegal logging.20 (See Chapter 5.) It isclearly recognized that while the supply/demandimbalance continues, illegal logging will not bebrought under control. Most analysts agree that thesolution lies not in combatting illegal loggers in theforest but in measures directed at the demand side.Promising actions include a moratorium on furthergrowth in the capacity of the wood processingindustries, probably followed by downsizing;elimination of direct and hidden governmentsubsidies to the pulp industry; credible monitoringof plantation development and penalties for compa-nies that fail to meet their planting obligations; andenforcement of agreed due diligence practices onthe part of financial institutions that invest in pulpand paper facilities in order to avoid fundingprojects that use illegally obtained wood.


dently or in conjunction with existing HPH loggingconcessions. A special category was created for HTIconcessions linked to transmigration sites (HTI-Trans), where the transmigrants work on theplantations. HTI-Trans concessions usually producewood for nonpulp uses. According to officialfigures, some 7.9 million ha had been allocated forall three types of HTI concession development bythe end of 2000, but only 23.5 percent of that areahad actually been planted. (See Table 3.6.)

According to unpublished data provided by theMinistry of Forestry, the area of land allocated forHTI concessions by May 2001 had risen to 8.8million ha, but data on the area planted were notavailable.

Forest Conversion to HTIs

The fact that less than one quarter of lands allocatedfor HTI concessions by 2000 had actually beenplanted is a symptom of several interrelated struc-tural problems with the HTI program. The 1990Regulation clearly states that HTIs are to be grantedonly on nonproductive areas of permanent forestestate and may not be granted in areas already undera logging concession (HPH). In practice, however,HTI concessions have frequently been establishedon still-productive forest land. According to calcula-tions based on plantation company feasibilitystudies, as of June 1998, 22 percent of land man-aged as HTIs had been productive natural forestprior to plantation establishment (Kartodihardjo andSupriono, 2000:4). Many HTI concessions involvethe conversion of a much higher proportion ofnatural forest area. Table 3.7 illustrates six suchcases, where an average of 72 percent of the total

HTI area was formerly natural forest. Box 3.4provides further illustrative examples.

The economic rationale for establishing HTIs instill-forested areas is clear. First, establishingplantations on truly degraded lands is more expen-sive because it often requires considerable invest-ment in land preparation to rehabilitate soil fertility.Second, HTI concessions include the right to obtainWood Utilization Permits (IPKs), essentiallylicenses to clear-cut and use remaining standingtimber. When HTIs are established in areas withconsiderable standing timber, the IPK provisionfurnishes the company with a large supply ofessentially free timber. This dynamic, combinedwith the large supply of timber available fromillegal sources, considerably diminishes incentivesfor wood-processing companies to follow throughwith the planting and harvest of HTIs.

Less than one fifth of the approximately 2 millionha allocated for sawnwood HTI development hasactually been planted. HTIs established for produc-tion of pulp have done slightly better, with justunder one quarter of the nearly 5 million ha allo-cated for pulp production planted. (See Table 3.6.)But it is clear from the overall low percentage ofHTI area planted – only 23.5 percent of the totalarea allocated for all types of HTI – that plantingand harvesting plantation trees is not the majorreason for HTI development. Rather, growth in HTIarea is being encouraged by generous financialsubsidies and rights to clear-cut standing timber.(See Note 23.)

In addition, many HPH concession holders find iteconomically advantageous to convert degraded

Box 3.4 Some Cases in WhichCompanies Have DevelopedIndustrial Timber Plantationsin Productive Natural Forest

• The entire HTI area of PT Rimba EquatorPermai, covering 21,010 ha, was formerly anHPH of PT Barito Pacific Timber, with anarea of 1,586 ha in virgin forest.

• Of the total forest concession area of 73,153ha owned by PT Sinar Kalbar Raya, an area of28,065 ha was formerly an HPH productionforest owned by PT Pesada Kawi ITC, and3,250 ha was formerly an HPH area of PTPonti Jaya.

• The entire area of PT Adindo ForestaIndonesia’s HTI, covering 111,355 ha, wasformerly production forest for five HPHcompanies, namely PT Inhutani I, PT PulauLaut, PT Segara Timber, PT Dana MuliaBhakti, and PT Karya Jaya Parakawan.

• The entire area of PT Tanjung Redeb Lestari’sHTI, covering 180,900 ha, was formerly anHPH production forest area. The timberharvest potential of trees with a diameterexceeding 30 cm dbh was greater than 25 m³per ha.

• The entire HTI area of PT Riau Andalan Pulpand Paper, covering 121,000 ha, was formerlyproduction forest for 9 HPH companies withthe potential for producing commercial timberof up to 24 m³ per ha.

Source: Feasibility studies prepared by each companypursuant to the granting of their licenses.


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areas of their concessions to HTIs. As a World Bankstudy noted in 1998, “logging operations candegrade a site with little risk of serious penalty, andin the process set themselves up to receive a licenseto convert the site so damaged into an HTI or treecrop estate.”24 Forestry Ministry data published in1998 reveal that more than 2.7 million ha of HPHconcessions had been converted to HTI concessions.(See Table 3.8.)

Development of the Pulp and PaperIndustries

A key factor underlying the development of HTIconcessions has been the rapid development of thepulp and paper industries over the past decade.Installed annual pulp production capacity grew from1 million tons in 1990 to nearly 5 million tons in2000 and is expected to exceed 6 million tons in2001. Annual paper processing capacity increasedfrom 1.2 million tons to 8.3 million tons over thesame period (Barr, 2000:3). (See Figures 3.7 and3.8.) As a result, both allocation and actual plantingof HTI-pulp plantations have greatly exceeded theHTI area established for sawnwood production.

Capacity expansion in the pulp and paper industrieshas involved investments in large-scale mills withhigh fixed costs. Most facilities have entailed initialcapital investments of between US$600 million andUS$1.3 billion. Because of these high fixed costs,pulp and paper producers tend to run their millscontinuously at or near full capacity and are reluc-tant to countenance any slowdown in production.

Four large Indonesian conglomerates togetheraccounted for nearly all the paper industry’s growthin the 1990s: the Sinar Mas Group, the Raja Garuda


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Mas Group, the Bob Hasan Group, and the BaritoPacific Group. (All four are also major loggingconcession holders and two, Sinar Mas and RajaGaruda Mas, are among the top ten oil palmconglomerates.) Sinar Mas and Raja Garuda Masoperate large pulp processing mills that are directlylinked to affiliated paper production mills. Bothgroups established holding companies, Asia Pulpand Paper (APP) and Asia Pacific ResourcesInternational, Ltd (APRIL). Incorporated inSingapore, they attracted enthusiastic and substan-tial investment from foreign investors. However, thegroups’ glittering prospectuses did not survive themore open atmosphere following the politicalchanges of 1998, including revelations about theinsecurity of future sources of cheap fiber supply.Both APP and APRIL are now in severe financialtrouble, facing massive debt and legal action fromcreditors.25

Although pulpwood plantations can be economi-cally attractive to investors because of strongdemand and a growing period shorter than that forsawnwood plantations, they still supply only a smallfraction of the raw material needed for the boomingpulp industry. Production of 1 ton of pulp requires4.9-5.4 m3 of roundwood. Thus pulp production in2000 consumed 23-25 million m3 of wood – morethan the entire legal wood supply that year. (SeeTable 3.4.) At the same time, production of pulp-wood from HTIs was only 3.8 million m3. Produc-tion data for industrial plantations must be treatedwith caution, however. At present, therefore, asmuch as 85 percent of the industry’s pulpwoodneeds is coming from clearing natural forests, manyof them lying within HTI concessions. One recentstudy estimates that pulp production led directly to


deforestation of about 835,000 ha between 1988 and1999 (Barr, 2000:10). Nearly all this area wascleared to supply just four large pulp mills, and asingle mill, Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper, owned bySinar Mas/APP, was responsible for over one thirdof the total area deforested (Barr, 2000:10). TheIndah Kiat mill accounts for nearly 80 percent ofAPP’s pulp production capacity and over 40 percentof Indonesia’s total pulp production.

The country’s second largest mill, Riau AndalanPulp and Paper (RAPP), part of the APRILholding company, further illustrates the disturbingtrend toward use of natural forest to supply wood.RAPP began operating in 1995 and, as of Decem-ber 2000, had installed capacity of 1.3 million tonsper year. Assuming an average conversion rate of 5m3 of roundwood to 1 ton of pulp, RAPP con-sumed up to 6.5 million m3 of wood in 2000.About 80 percent of the mill’s pulpwood has beensourced from natural forest clearance on thecompany’s nearby HTI concession site, and mostof the balance has come from a plantation develop-ment project. RAPP has announced plans toexpand capacity further to 2 million tons per yearby 2004. The company has embarked on a vigor-ous planting program and claims that by 2004, itscurrent roundwood needs will be met from planta-tions, and its expanded roundwood needs (10million m3 per year) will be met by 2008. Industryanalysts familiar with RAPP’s plantation program,however, are highly skeptical that the required areawill in fact be planted or the necessary yieldsobtained (Barr, 2000:14-20). The holding group’scurrent financial crisis also casts doubt on theirexpansion plans.26

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1990 19911992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20012005 2010

Installed Capacity Production

Mill

ion

Metric

TM

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Figure 3.7 Installed Capacity and Production inthe Pulp Industry, 1990–2001 (with projections to2005 and 2010)

Sources: Indonesian Pulp and Paper Association, 29 August2000. 2005 and 2010 projections from Jaakko Poyry, 1998.Cited in C. Barr. 2000. Profits on Paper: The Political-Economy of Fiber, Finance, and Debt in Indonesia’s Pulp andPaper Industries. CIFOR: Jakarta. November 30.

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Installed Capacity Production

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Figure 3.8 Installed Capacity and Production inthe Paper and Paperboard Industry, 1990–2001

Source: Indonesian Pulp and Paper Association.

Note: Paper and paperboard includes: Newsprint Paper;Writing and Printing Paper; Sack Kraft Paper; Liner andFluting; Boards; Cigarette Paper; Wrapping Paper; TissuePaper; and Other Paper (not including recycled paper).

The two giant mills, Indah Kiat and Riau AndalanPulp and Paper, are located within 100 km of eachother in Riau province, Sumatra. With such a concen-tration of demand, it is not surprising that the pulpindustry is unable to meets its raw material needsfrom plantations or other legal supplies and thusmakes extensive use of illegally obtained wood.

The government is aggressively pushing for thedevelopment of similar facilities over the nextdecade. With the continuing vast imbalance betweenthe supply of plantation pulpwood and the pulpindustry’s demand for raw materials, it seemsinevitable that the pulp industry will be a powerful


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engine of deforestation over the coming decade.And although the amount of pulp harvested on HTIplantations is likely to grow, it is also likely that thedevelopment of HTI concessions will continue toserve primarily as a cover for clear-cutting naturalforest. The results will be intensified deforestation,with associated negative impacts on biodiversity andhydrological functions and an increase in the area ofdegraded lands. In addition, HTI development hasalready given rise to significant local social conflictsin the many cases where allocated HTI areasoverlap with agricultural and forest areas claimedby local communities. Such conflicts are likely tospread as HTI areas expand.


3.5 Oil Palm and Other Large-Scale Industrial Estate Crops

Estate crops – the generic term for agriculturalcrops grown in a plantation system – include tea,coffee, cocoa, rubber, sugarcane, coconut, and oilpalm. The oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) originated inWest Africa. It was brought to Indonesia in 1848 bythe Dutch and planted in the Botanical Gardens inBogor, Java. Oil palms now cover more than 3million ha, rivaling rubber plantations in extent andexport value. Palm oil is extracted from the fruit ofthe tree and is widely used as cooking oil and as aningredient in soap, margarine, and a variety of otherproducts.

The majority of existing oil palm plantations arelocated in Sumatra, but expansion is proceedingrapidly in Kalimantan, especially West Kalimantan.Further rapid development of this crop is expectedto occur in East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and IrianJaya. Although rubber, tea, and coconut plantationsare each more extensive than oil palm plantations,they are older, more established crops that haveexperienced much lower growth rates. They are notgenerally considered a major factor in recentdeforestation; even so, their cumulative impacts areprobably underemphasized. (See Chapter 3.6.)

The distribution of estate crops on Sumatra isshown in Map 10. The map is based on informationfrom the National Forest Inventory and is out-of-date, but it remains the most recent spatial informa-tion available. In particular, the information appearsto underreport more than 600,000 ha of oil palmplantations in North Sumatra province (Casson,2000:48).

facilities. Between 1967 and 2000, the total areaunder oil palm plantations grew from less than200,000 ha to over 3 million ha. (See Figure 3.9.)

Private Sector Concentration in the Palm OilIndustry

Indonesia’s palm oil industry is dominated by someof the same conglomerates that control the logging,wood processing, and pulp and paper industries,thus tightening the connections among forestclearance, wood supply, and plantation establish-ment. In 1997, the private estate sector was domi-nated by 10 groups that, together, owned about 64percent of the total planted area owned by privatefirms. In addition, these 10 groups owned “landbanks” (land that has been approved for develop-ment as plantations) totaling nearly 3 million ha(Casson, 2000:5). Of these 10, 4 also held majorlogging concessions in 1997. (See Table 3.9.)

Foreign investment is also considerable: at the endof 1998, 50 foreign firms were involved in the oil

The Rise of Palm Oil

Palm oil production is booming in developingcountries because the oil palm is relatively cheap togrow and produces yields up to five times those ofother oil crops. Indonesia is second only to Malay-sia in its production of palm oil. According to OilWorld Annual 2001, global production in 2000 was21.8 million tons, of which Indonesia accounted for7 million tons (32 percent).27 Palm oil is an impor-tant source of Indonesian export revenue, generatingmore than US$1 billion in 1999 (at 1993 constantprices) (Scotland, 2000). However, more than 40percent of the annual harvest is consumed domesti-cally. According to provisional data for the 2000-2001 reporting period, Indonesia consumed about 3million tons of its palm oil production and exportedabout 4.3 million tons. By far the largest importerwas India, followed by China and the Netherlands.

The growth of the palm oil industry in Indonesia hasbeen phenomenal, with production growing 36-foldsince the mid-1960s. The industry is dominated bythree classes of producer: state-owned, smallholder,and large-scale private. The Suharto government,with World Bank assistance, invested in state-runcompanies from the late 1960s, and the area of oilpalm on state-owned plantations rose steadily overthe next decade. Smallholder estates expanded after1979, again owing to government intervention andWorld Bank support. (See Chapter 3.6.) Plots of landwere prepared by private developers, then transferredto small farmers; the private developers supervisedsmallholder operations and also purchased theircrops. The large-scale private plantation sector grewmost rapidly after 1986, again with governmentencouragement. Companies were given a range ofincentives, including access to credit at concessionaryrates for estate development, planting, and processing

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palm sector, with total investments valued at US$3billion (Kartodihardjo and Supriono, 2000:4).Indonesia’s state-owned forestry companies are alsoincreasingly involved in the plantation business. In1998, the Ministry of Forestry officially permittedthe Inhutani Groups I-V to convert 30 percent oftheir concession areas to estate crops, including oilpalm (Casson, 2000:18). A prime reason is that treecrops, unlike timber, are a short-term investmentand can be expected to improve cash flow quickly.

Forest Clearance for Estate Crop Production

The development of estate crop plantations over thepast 30 years has clearly been a major factor indeforestation, but it is difficult to present definitivedata on the amount of forest that has been convertedto estate crops. Official data sources vary widelyand are inconsistent from year to year. According toone recent analysis, the total area of forest landconverted to all forms of plantation between 1982

and 1999 was 4.1 million ha (Casson, 2000:48). Ofthis total, according to another study, 1.8 million haof forest were converted to oil palm plantationsbetween 1990 and 2000 (Wakker, 2000:6).

By law, plantations are required to be establishedonly on forest land that has been officially desig-nated for conversion to other uses. (See “Conver-sion Forest” in Glossary.) In practice, two powerful

factors undermine the law. First, most conversionforest in Indonesia is available in the relativelyundeveloped eastern part of the country, but mostcompanies prefer to be in the west, closer to a laborforce, processing infrastructure, and markets.Second, establishing plantations in forest land isdoubly attractive because, having acquired a land-clearing licence (IPK), a company can clear-cut thearea and sell the timber to wood-processing indus-

0

500,000

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1,500,000

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2,500,000

3,000,000

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Figure 3.9 Growth in Area of Oil Palm Plantations,1967–2000

Source: Ministry of Forestry, Directorate-General ofPlantations.

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tries. This arrangement may represent a windfallprofit, over and above the profits expected fromfuture palm oil harvests. In many instances, planta-tion owners are also concession operators, so the“sale” of such cleared wood represents a simpletransfer from one company to another within thesame group, at rock bottom prices. As described inSection 3.2, timber from forest clearance provided

approximately 30 percent of (legal) wood in thesecond half of the 1990s, and it has become anindispensable source of supply, especially to the pulpindustry. Companies therefore are vigorously pursu-ing applications for the release of forest land forconversion, even where the forest has previouslybeen designated as production, protection, or evenconservation forest. (See Box 3.5.)

It appears that some companies have no intention ofestablishing plantations but instead pursue conver-sion licenses solely for the timber profits that can berealized through forest clearance. In WestKalimantan, for example, the head of the PlantationService threatened to revoke the licenses of 21companies and warned 29 others because of theirfailure to establish plantations as agreed (Sunderlin,1999:564). Map 11 shows the extent of plantationsestablished in former logging concessions; the dataare from the early to mid-1990s and do not reflectthe nearly 50 percent increase in oil palm area thatoccurred between 1995 and 2000, some of it informer concessions.

Competition for Forest Land

The area actually planted and in production isreasonably well known for the major commercialcrops, but much confusion surrounds the status ofestate concessions – areas that are under applicationby companies for development, areas that have beenallocated (agreed in principle) by governmentofficials for development, and areas that have beenreleased to companies for development. Vast tractsof forest land are under application for conversion toestate crops but have not yet been developed. Somehave been cleared but not planted. Applications, andindeed allocations, for estate crop developmentfrequently overlap with competing claims fordevelopment as industrial timber plantations or withforest that is not designated for conversion at all. Ifall applications currently outstanding were granted,they would greatly exceed the area of conversionforest that is legally available for development.

Two recent studies have produced conflicting butillustrative evidence of the situation. Table 3.10,

Box 3.5 Illegal Use of Logging Concession Land for Oil Palm inNorthern Sumatra

The Leuser Conservation Foundation (YayasanLeuser Lestari), an NGO based in Medan, NorthSumatra, carried out field investigations of thepractices in 13 logging concessions (HPHs) locatedin northern Sumatra. The investigations found thatlogging concessions were actively being converted tothe cultivation of oil palm in 8 of the HPHs. Suchclearing is illegal under both Indonesia’s forestrylaws and the terms of the contracts under whichHPHs are granted.

The NGO investigators documented the location of theillegal oil palm plantings using GPS technology. Theyalso documented the process of illegal conversion andplanting through tape-recorded interviews with HPHworkers, local day laborers, and villagers livingnearby. Observations were also made directly in thefield and documented with still and video cameras.

Forest clearance was carried out by both local peopleand concession workers at the request of the compa-nies and under their supervision. The companies then

provided the necessary equipment and seedlings toestablish oil palm plantations. In some cases, an oilpalm unit of the concession company would thenrequest an official permit for oil palm cultivation inthe area; in other cases, the request was put forwardby a local village cooperative unit. Sometimes alocal bureaucrat with the power to grant an oil palmconcession was in fact found to be an owner of theinvolved oil palm company.

Companies tend to justify the apparently widespreadpractice of converting permanent production forestto oil palm by pointing to the poor condition of theforest in the area being converted and to the osten-sible greater benefits to the local community thatwould follow conversion to oil palm. Thus forestdegradation and illegal conversion to oil palm, ratherthan being punished, provide the justification forgranting the company or its partner company afurther concession on public land.

Source: Leuser Conservation Foundation, 2000.


based on Kartodihardjo and Supriono, indicates thatby the end of 1997, nearly 7 million ha of forest hadbeen approved in principle for conversion to estatecrop plantations. All data should be regarded asapproximate.

In addition to the 6.8 million ha approved forplantation development, a further 9 million ha arethe subject of applications for development, accord-ing to Kartodihardjo and Supriono. Even withouttaking into account these 9 million ha, if the 6.8million ha already approved for conversion are infact all converted to plantations, Sumatra andKalimantan face serious shortfalls in available forestland. A study by Casson came to somewhat differ-ent conclusions, finding that applications for therelease of some 4.5 million ha of forest for conver-sion were outstanding as of February 1999. About840,000 ha were already approved, 70 percent ofthem for oil palm. Nearly all the applicationsapplied to forest land in Sumatra and Kalimantan.

Whether the higher or lower numbers are moreaccurate, approval of the existing applications forconversion would lead to deficits in the availability ofconversion forest in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Thissituation results in part from the declining availabilityof conversion forest area. In 1981, more than 33million ha of forest were allocated for conversion; by1990, the number had fallen to 19 million ha and by1997, to between 8 and 9 million ha. The squeeze onconversion forest in the west stems also from theindustry’s reluctance to establish plantations in theeast. However, the situation is beginning to change.Some oil palm companies are waking up to thepossibilities of the timber that can be harvested fromthe rich forests of East Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.The majority of companies that have begun opera-

tions in these regions have strong ties to loggingcompanies (Casson, 2000:23). Meanwhile, theshortage of conversion forest in Sumatra andKalimantan has encouraged the government torelease production forest in these islands for conver-sion to estate crops and to allocate broad swaths offorest in more remote locations. (See Box 3.6.)

The obvious solution would appear to be policyreforms that require companies to establish newplantations not in conversion forest, as at present,

but on the millions of hectares of land alreadycleared (for estate crops or industrial timber planta-tions) but never planted, and on land alreadydegraded by severe fires. This change does notappear likely in the short term. According to recentunpublished Ministry of Forestry data, the latestrevisions of Permanent Forest Status have increasedallocated conversion forest area to nearly 14 millionha. All the new conversion forest is located inMaluku and Irian Jaya, where Indonesia’s mostextensive remaining intact forests are found.

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isewaluS 212,297,11 000,000,9 914,816 098,663 925,152

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More Expansion May Be on the Way

Oil palm planting rates and production, whichslowed abruptly following the 1997 economic crisisand the political confusion that followed, appearedset for renewed growth by 2000. The industry wasencouraged by lower interest rates, a reduction inthe export tax on crude palm oil, new government

regulations that facilitate oil palm plantationestablishment, and a surge in the availability of landfor planting because of the great fires of 1997-1998.More recently, continued political uncertainty andeconomic crisis seem to have dampened recoveryprospects. However, the global outlook for theindustry is robust. World demand for palm oil isforecast to rise 40.5 million tons by 2020, nearly

twice the output in 2000 (Oil World, 2001). Oneindustry analyst has estimated that if world produc-tion is to increase by 20 million tons by 2020, anadditional 300,000 ha of new plantations will haveto be established every year for the next 20 years.The study predicts that most of this expansionwould occur in Indonesia, “where labor and landremain plentiful” (Sargeant, 2001:vi).

Box 3.6 Clearing Natural Forests for Plantation Development on Small Islands:The Case of Wawonii Island in Southeast Sulawesi Province

into a cocoa plantation. Political connections played aprominent role in this deal because one of the owners ofHPP is the son of the then-governor of the province.

Although the cocoa project was steadfastly opposed byseveral parties, including the affected local Wawoniicommunities, it went ahead as planned. Indeed, the twocompanies did not even wait for the government’sofficial issuance of their concession to begin cutting andclearing the forest with heavy equipment; they cleared a7 km access road 6 meters wide during their first 3months of operation. Timber from this 42,000 ha swathwas removed from the island by the firms, so it was noteven available for local use. Local people are alreadyreporting major changes in river flows, with previouslyclear waters becoming muddy and silt-choked.

A consortium of local NGOs and community groupshave vocally opposed the project, pointing out that thecompanies began operation before receiving an officiallicense to do so from the government, and that theynever carried out the required environmental impact

assessment procedure. The latest informationreceived by Forest Watch Indonesia from Wawoniiindicates that the two companies, having cut andremoved a great deal of timber, are no longeroperating on the island. This situation has heightenedsuspicions that the “cocoa plantation” scheme wasmerely a ruse to gain access to the timber availablefrom land clearing for the project. As has been trueon many similar small islands in Indonesia, grievousharm has been done to the local ecosystem and locallivelihoods for the financial benefit of a few unscru-pulous and politically connected businessmen.

Sources

Kendari Central Bureau of Statistics, 1995. Kendari dalamAngka [Kendari in Numbers], 1995.

Interview with M. Yakub Azis, Head of The Group ofTwelve (a local NGO coalition), 2000.

Kendari Express, February 21, 2000.

Field Investigations by Yayasan Suluh Indonesia andYayasan Cinta Alam (local NGOs), 2000.

Land clearing for plantation purposes does not occuronly in former logging concession areas. In someplaces, plantations are replacing relatively intactnatural forests. This trend is particularly damaging forsmall islands, where levels of species endemism arehigh and local people depend heavily on naturalforests for watershed protection and livelihood needs.Wawonii Island (40,480 ha) in Kendari regency,Southeast Sulawesi province, is one example. As of1995 (the most recent data available), 45 percent ofthe island was forested, with some 9,275 ha zoned asstate forests and an additional 8,758 ha held ascommunity forests. Twelve rivers originate in theisland’s forests and, while the forest was maintained,Wawonii did not face the water supply problems ofButon and other islands in the area.

The situation changed when the provincial govern-ment granted a license to two companies, HogaPrima Perkasa (HPP) and Hasil Human Utama(HHU), to convert some 5,500 ha of the island’snatural forest area – about 30 percent of the total –


Although oil palm development has so far oc-curred primarily in Sumatra, and South and WestKalimantan, the next phase of expansion seemslikely to be in East Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.Large tracts of forest in these regions are alreadyallocated as logging concessions or conversionforest. Recent government policy changes havepaved the way for oil palm expansion into thesesame forests. In addition to increasing the area ofallocated conversion forest in Irian Jaya andMaluku, the government has increased the incen-tive for companies to establish new plantations inproduction forest. Regulation No. 614/Kpts-II/1999 about Directives on the Development ofMixed Forest Plantings allows companies toestablish timber plantations or estate crops in“nonproductive production forests.” These aredefined as logging concession forests containingless than 20 m3 of timber per hectare. Sixtypercent of the nonproductive area must be con-verted to timber plantations, and the rest may beused for estate crop plantations. The new Regula-tion clearly risks encouraging companies tooverharvest their logging concessions, reduce thembelow the productivity threshold, and apply forconversion licenses that will allow them to clearcutthe entire area (Wakker, 2000:27). The area offorest that will be cleared in these regions is likelyto exceed what is actually planted, unless industryperformance improves markedly.

3.6 Small-scale FarmingIndonesia’s population now exceeds 212 million.The country is urbanizing rapidly, but 64 percent ofthe people (136 million) still live in rural areas,where the majority of the workforce is engaged in

the agriculture and forestry sectors. Without doubt,the increasing population density in rural Indonesiahas had a role in forest clearance, but the impor-tance of small-scale farming relative to other causesof deforestation has been the subject of greatcontroversy. Small farmers clear land to grow foodfor their families, plant tree crops to supplementtheir income, or establish small-scale plantations ofcash crops like oil palm and rubber. The clearancerate fluctuates with government development policy,the cost of living, commodity prices, availabletechnologies, weather patterns, the availability ofalternative work, and other factors.

Shifting Cultivation

During the 1980s and 1990s, shifting cultivationwas widely blamed as a significant, perhaps eventhe dominant, cause of deforestation in Indonesia.Prominent reports by the FAO and the World Bankclaimed that the “slash and burn” practices oftraditional farmers, combined with high rates ofrural population growth, were placing unsustainablepressure on forest resources. Subsequent analysishas shown that the assumptions behind this claimwere oversimplistic, stemming from a failure todistinguish among different types of small-scalefarming (Sunderlin, 1997). Traditional shiftingcultivation involves mainly subsistence crops grownin a rotational system that includes a long fallowperiod. Land is used for only 1-3 years, thenfallowed for up to 20 years, allowing regrowth ofvegetation and restoration of soil fertility. At theopposite end of what has been dubbed the “forestfarming continuum” are pioneer farmers, who clearforest land for the long-term production of cashcrops, typically coffee, cocoa, rubber, and other treecrops.

Traditional farmers have responded to land pressureby shortening their fallow periods and turning tocash crop cultivation to supplement their incomes.While it would be naive to ignore this source ofpressure on Indonesia’s natural forests, recentcommentators have downplayed the role of shiftingcultivators in deforestation. One influential studyestimated that traditional farmers may be respon-sible for no more than 21 percent of total forest loss(Dick, 1991). Given the scale of forest clearance fortimber and estate crop plantations since that study,and the acceleration of logging operations since1997, even this estimate may exaggerate the role ofshifting cultivation in deforestation today.

Forest Pioneers

Forest pioneers, as the name implies, are farmerswho open up new land for agricultural production.They may grow subsistence food crops, but theirprimary business is cultivating cash crops for saleboth domestically and in international markets.Many forest pioneers are “spontaneoustransmigrants” who voluntarily relocate to takeadvantage of abundant land in more sparselypopulated parts of the country or to escape fromcivil unrest and conflict at home. Logging roads,plantation development, and the infrastructureassociated with government-sponsored transmigra-tion sites all provide opportunities for small farmersto follow with land clearance of their own. In theabsence of comprehensive surveys, it is impossibleto estimate the amount of forest land cleared bypioneer farmers. Not all newly cleared land wasformerly forest, and anecdotal evidence suggeststhat the impact of newcomers is sometimes exag-gerated by local farmers who see their lands andtraditional practices threatened.28 Nevertheless,


pioneer farmers are known to be encroaching onnatural forests, including those in national parks andother protected areas. Such encroachment hasincreased with the breakdown of political authorityand law enforcement since 1998.

Small-scale Tree Crop Cultivation andSmallholder Plantations

Indonesia is a world giant when it comes to treecrop production. The country is the second largestproducer of palm oil and natural rubber, the thirdlargest producer of cocoa, and the fourth largestproducer of coffee.29 With the exception of oilpalms, the great majority of these crops are grownby small-scale farmers. Large-scale oil palmplantations have attracted the ire of environmentalorganizations because they have so visibly affectedforest cover, but the extent of smallholder tree cropsand their role in forest clearance have probably beenunderstated.

Box 3.7 Transmigration and Forest Clearance

Almost 39 percent of timber estate areas that haveactually been planted lie in transmigration sites(Potter and Lee, 1998), and nearly 1 million ha of oilpalm plantations with a formal link to transmigrationsites had been established by the end of 1995.

The actual impacts of transmigration projects onforests have probably been greater than these numbersimply, given the often poor site choices and the land-clearing practices employed. Transmigrant familieswho were (and are still) unable to support themselvesfrom their allotted site typically strayed into neighbor-ing unallocated forest. In addition, their presence oftenincreased the land pressure felt by indigenous inhabit-ants, leading to further forest clearance.

Transmigration projects have sometimes encroachedon national parks, as in the case of Wasur NationalPark in Irian Jaya. Wasur covers 413,810 ha ofseasonally inundated grasslands, mangrove forests,monsoon forests, and savanna in Irian Jaya’s farsoutheast corner, bordering New Guinea and theArafura Sea. Although gazetted as a national park, thegovernment nevertheless gazetted a transmigration areacovering 3,000 ha around the traditional village of Sotawithin the park in 1994, legally backed up by theissuance of various government decrees (Decree, 1994;

Transmigration, the government’s long-runningprogram to resettle people from densely populatedJava and Bali to Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the other“outer islands,”opened up 1.7 million hectares ofagricultural land and transported some 8 millionpeople between 1969 and 1993 (GOI, 1993).

Transmigration sites were commonly established inone of three patterns. Between the 1960s and 1980s,transmigration focused on developing subsistenceagriculture. The Food Crop Pattern allotted eachtransmigrant household 2 ha of farmland, of whichhalf was cleared and ready for use and half was stillforested and awaiting clearance. During the 1990s,until the formal end of the Transmigration Program in1999, the emphasis shifted away from subsistenceagriculture and toward providing wage labor onindustrial timber estates and oil palm plantations. ThePeople’s Nucleus Plantation Pattern involved associa-tions between private oil palm companies (the nucleusor Inti) and transmigrant families (the Plasma). Eachhousehold received 3 ha of land, of which 2 ha wereto be developed for oil palm. The Industrial TimberEstate Pattern involved transmigrant families receiv-ing land in exchange for their labor on privatelyowned timber plantations. In addition, familiesreceived land on which to establish their own crops.

KpS

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Site Allocation Letter, 1994; Decree, 1995). The mainrationale for creation of this enclave was to bolster“security” in an area where the government wasfighting separatist rebels, supplemented by the localgovernment’s desire to develop the area economically.A second transmigration area of 3,000 ha (Sota II) wasdesignated for development soon thereafter, but it waspostponed because of criticism from NGOs and donoragencies after the clearing of some 200 ha. Wasur isonly one of the numerous transmigration sites devel-oped in protected forest areas across Indonesia.

A 1994 World Bank evaluation of the US$560 millionin loans it made to Indonesia for the program duringthe 1970s and 1980s concluded that land clearing wasnot carried out according to agreed legal and contrac-tual guidelines. Slopes over 8 percent had beencleared, trees were bulldozed into waterways, erosionmeasures along contours were not taken, and noattempt was made to harvest the commercial timberleft partly burned in the field after clearance. Impactson local communities, particularly traditional indig-enous groups, have been extremely negative. In thecase of the forest-dwelling Kubu of Sumatra, forexample, the report concluded that “there has been amajor negative and probably irreversible impact”(World Bank, 1994).

Official data on the number of families moved underthe Transmigration Program and the total area ofland cleared are often widely divergent. Table 3.11presents two Ministry estimates of forestland clearedunder the program.

Sources

Decree of the Regional Forestry Office No. 848/KWL-6.C/1994 Regarding Relinquishment of Wasur WildlifeManagement Forest Area for a Settlement for RetiredArmy Officers in Sota Village; Site Allocation Letter ofthe Merauke Regent No. 95/1994, June 12, 1994; andDecree of the Minister of Forestry No. 1639/Menhut-VI/1995, November 14, 1995.

Government of Indonesia, 1993. Sixth Five Year Develop-ment Plan. Jakarta: National Development PlanningAgency.

Potter, L. and J. Lee. 1998. Tree Planting in Indonesia:Trends, Impacts, and Directions. Occasional Paper No.18. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR),Bogor, Indonesia.

World Bank. 1994. Indonesia Transmigration Program:A Review of Five Bank-Supported Projects. Report No.12988, Washington, DC.

Box 3.7 (continued)In recent years, small-scale tree crop production hasexpanded rapidly from an already large base asfarmers sought to increase their income and estab-lish a hedge against volatile crop prices. Tree cropsare often established in forest clearings near agricul-tural fields, so they are implicated in deforestation.Although many families plant trees independent ofgovernment help, many others participate in small-holder development schemes that provide farmerswith money and access to land (in the form of forestconversion rights). Farmers typically manage treecrop plantations of 1-5 hectares. A study of 8villages in Riau province, Sumatra, found that 80percent of households had traditional (low-yield)rubber gardens of 2.5-3.5 ha, and just over 10percent had high-yielding rubber plantationsestablished through the Smallholder Rubber Devel-opment Program (Angelsen, 1995:1721-22). Thetotal area of rubber managed by the villagers(excluding transmigrant families) was about 12,000ha, the equivalent of one quarter of the secondaryforest in the study area.

Given the fuzzy boundary between small-scale treecrop cultivation and smallholder plantations, thenumbers that follow do not attempt to distinguishbetween them. Small farmers today manage aboutone third of the total area under oil palm plantationsin Indonesia, just over 1 million ha, according to thelatest Ministry of Forestry data. Small farmers arefar more dominant in the rubber subsector, manag-ing about 3 million ha in 1997, more than 80percent of the total rubber plantation area in thatyear (Kartodihardjo and Supriono, 2000:3). Thenumber of hectares is surely higher today.30 Maturecoconut plantations producing copra covered about2.7 million ha in 2000, but this figure does not


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artamuStseW 21 52.299,62 08.274,31

uaiR 71 87.844,57 91.575,46

ibmaJ 21 35.984,67 33.756,652

ulukgneB 9 54.908,62 59.230,21

artamuShtuoS 03 82.591,321 28.122,401

gnupmaL 71 02.104,831 32.819,01

artamuS 121 85.342,535 48.220,425

natnamilaKtseW 71 61.991,94 53.434,34

natnamilaKlartneC 72 77.531,66 97.005,331

natnamilaKhtuoS 01 05.117,74 36.829,04

natnamilaKtsaE 9 90.198,93 83.117,47

include immature coconut trees or trees not used forcopra production (Oil World, 2001). Coffee planta-tions covered an estimated 1.1 million ha in 2000.31

From the mid-1980s, the government activelyencouraged smallholders to establish plantations,especially of oil palm. Some farmers already livedaround the boundaries of existing large oil palmestates; others arrived as part of transmigrationsettlement schemes. (See Box 3.7.) Smallholder oilpalm plantations grew by nearly 1 million habetween 1986 and 1996. Small-scale rubber, coffee,and coconut plantations cover significantly moreland in total, but they experienced much lowergrowth rates than oil palm during the decade. Theirimpact on deforestation over this period wastherefore relatively minor. However, small-scalerubber planting appears to have grown significantlysince 1997, despite low prices for rubber (Sunderlinet al., 2000:23-24).

Smallholders who establish plantations generally donot clear primary forest because they lack thenecessary equipment. Rather, they tend to usesecondary forest, degraded land, or plantationsabandoned by conglomerates. Smallholders,however, do contribute to forest clearance associ-ated with larger-scale private development becausethey continue to benefit from government-sponsoredclearance programs. Of the nearly 7 million ha ofconversion forest officially approved for estate cropdevelopment by 1997, nearly 1 million ha weredesignated for development under the smallholderplantation program (Kartodihardjo and Supriono,2000:7).

Small Farmers and the Economic Crisis

Palm oil, rubber, coffee, cocoa, copra, black andwhite pepper, cinnamon, and other smallholderproducts are primarily export crops. Small farmersare therefore exposed to fluctuations in internationalcommodity prices and to shifts in the value of the

Indonesian rupiah against the U.S. dollar. The centralimpact of the economic crisis that began in 1997 hasbeen the precipitous depreciation of the rupiah.Beginning in July of that year, the rupiah prices ofblack pepper, white pepper, coffee, and cocoa rose byas much as 450 percent, only to fall again in mid-1998. The prices of palm oil, rubber, and cinnamon,


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isewaluShtuoS 8 56.226,11 69.696,7

isewaluSlartneC 81 32.464,93 65.858,23

isewaluShtroN 6 65.752,12 64.605,5

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isewaluS 85 56.505,821 16.881,201

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LATOT 125 65.442,088,1 30.464,100,2

however, rose only modestly before dipping belowtheir 1997 levels, reflecting weak world prices.Small-scale producers experienced marked effects ontheir incomes, both positive and negative.

Evidence suggests that the uncertainty and volatilityexperienced by small farmers since 1997 led to an

increase in rates of forest clearance. A recent studyof more than 1,000 small farmer households inSumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi examined theeffects of the crisis in terms of farmers’ perceptionsof their standard of living and their adaptive re-sponses (Sunderlin et al., 2000). Despite markedregional differences, the study revealed that farmers

did not benefit from windfall export profits as muchas might be expected because the costs of living andagricultural production rose faster than grossincome. As a result, farmers turned to the forests tocompensate for lost earnings. Nearly 70 percent ofthe farmers said they had cleared new land between1996 and 1999, with the amount of land clearedeach year rising sharply after the economic crisis(1998-1999). Forest clearance yielded income fromtimber, and the land could then be planted to foodcrops or, increasingly, export-oriented tree crops.The study concluded that forest clearance wasstrongly linked to price changes and also to thedecreased policing of forest boundaries that fol-lowed Suharto’s fall in 1998.


CHAPTER 4FOREST AND LAND FIRES

4.2 The Fires of 1982–1983and 1994The first great fire to result from the convergence ofSuharto-era forest management and an El Niñoevent engulfed 210,000 km2 of East Kalimantanprovince during 1982-1983. East Kalimantan wasthe first focus of Indonesia’s timber boom and hadbeen almost wholly divided into logging conces-sions during the 1970s. Logging practices weregenerally poor, leaving a vast accumulation oflogging waste in the forest. Pioneer and secondaryspecies grew rapidly in logged-over areas, forminga dense and fire-prone ground vegetation layer inplace of the sparse ground cover characteristic ofprimary rainforests.

A severe El Niño-induced drought struck the areabetween June 1982 and May 1983, and fires startedalmost simultaneously across wide areas of theprovince at the end of 1982. They burned out of

4.1 From Normal to AbnormalFiresOne of the most visible results of the 30-year spiralof forest mismanagement discussed in Chapter 3has been the increasing frequency and intensity offorest and land fires, particularly on Kalimantan andSumatra. Undisturbed tropical moist forests, whichare normally quite fire-resistant, will burn only afterperiods of extended drought. Logged-over forests,degraded forests, and scrub on deforested lands aremuch more fire-prone (Schindler et al., 1989).

Scientific evidence based on radiocarbon dating ofcharcoal deposits in East Kalimantan indicates thatlowland forest areas have repeatedly burned since atleast 17,500 years ago, during periods of extendeddrought that appear to have characterized Quater-nary glacial periods (Goldammer, 1990). Theearliest fires are thought to have had natural causes,but humans probably had a role in starting fires in

recent millennia, first to improve hunting opportuni-ties and later to clear agricultural plots. But al-though fire has been a feature of Indonesia’s forestsfor thousands of years, earlier fires were undoubt-edly smaller and more spread out over time thanthose of the past 2 decades. As a result, these earlierfires did not cause significant deforestation, illus-trated, for example, by the fact that most ofKalimantan was forested until relatively recently(Barber and Schweithelm, 2000).

The processes of forest degradation and deforestationdiscussed in Chapter 3 have transformed vast areas ofIndonesia’s forest estate from a fire-resistant to a fire-prone ecosystem. This fundamental change, com-bined with the periodic occurrence of the El Niñoclimatic phenomenon,32 has set the stage for themassive outbreaks of fire over the past 20 years.

FWI S

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control until the rains finally returned the followingMay. By that time, some 3.2 million ha had burned;of this area, 2.7 million ha were tropical rainforest.Damage varied from creeping ground fires inprimary forests to complete destruction of newlylogged areas and peat-swamp forests. Some 73,000ha of commercially valuable lowland dipterocarpforests were badly damaged and another 2.1 millionha lightly or moderately damaged. The degree offire damage was directly correlated with the level offorest degradation: only 11 percent of undisturbedprimary forests in the areas affected by the droughtand fires actually burned, damage was limited toground vegetation and the forest had completelyrecovered by 1988. By contrast, in an area of nearly1 million ha of “moderately disturbed” forest (80percent of which had been logged prior to the fires),84 percent of the forest burned and the damage wasmuch more severe (Schindler et al., 1989).33 Oneestimate put the costs of the 1982-1983 fire at some

US$9 billion, of which nearly US$8.3 billion wasaccounted for by the loss of standing timber (Hess,1994).

Widespread fires reoccurred several times in thedecade following the East Kalimantan fire, burningan estimated 500,000 ha in 1991 and nearly 5million ha in 1994 (BAPPENAS, 1999). Haze fromthese fires affected Singapore and Malaysia as wellas Indonesia, disrupting air and sea transportationand sharply elevating air pollution levels. In theaftermath of the fires, the government begandeveloping new policies, international aid agenciesincreased their support for fire-related programs,and for the first time the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) began to discussIndonesia’s fires as a regional problem (StateMinistry for Environment and UNDP, 1998). Yetforest degradation and deforestation in Indonesiacontinued to intensify during the 1990s, with

increasing pressure on forest lands from developersof oil palm and timber plantations.

4.3 The Fires of 1997–1998When the next severe El Niño-induced droughtstruck Indonesia in 1997-1998, the results werecatastrophic. By early 1998, nearly 10 million hahad been affected by fire (see Table 4.1) withdamages estimated at nearly US$10 billion. (SeeTable 4.2.) Smoke from these fires shrouded muchof Southeast Asia in haze for months.34

It was clear by early1997 that it would be an ElNiño year in Indonesia but, despite warnings fromthe Environment Ministry, burning continued acrossvast areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan, primarily toclear degraded forest land and scrub for plantations.The use of fire for land clearance is not restricted to

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Kalimantan and Sumatra: fires were reported from23 of Indonesia’s 27 provinces in 1997-1998. Butplantation firms and government projects set anunusually large number of fires on the islands,clearing tens of thousands of hectares at a time. (SeeBox 4.1.) By July, the fires had created a blanket ofhaze that spread hundreds of kilometers in alldirections. Deliberately set fires in grasslands andscrub lands escaped into adjacent logged forests thatburned with greater intensity. The fires eventuallyreached drained peat swamps and burned beneaththe surface long after above-ground fires exhaustedtheir fuel supplies. Map 12 shows burned areas offorest under different kinds of land use in EastKalimantan.

Large-scale burning has produced persistent hazeover large areas of Sumatra and Kalimantan duringevery dry season but the haze normally dissipates inSeptember, when heavy rains extinguish the fires.This was not the case in 1997, however, when therains failed, the fires intensified, and the hazethickened and spread to neighboring countries. Hazereached Malaysia and Singapore in July, and airquality deteriorated steeply in September, triggeringan outburst of complaints that drew global mediaattention. By late September, approximately 1million km2 were haze-covered, affecting about 70million people. Land, air, and sea transport acci-dents were linked to the poor visibility caused bythe haze, including a ship collision in the Straits ofMalacca that killed 29 people. Hospitals and clinicswere filled with people seeking treatment forrespiratory, eye, and skin ailments. Schools, busi-nesses, and airports closed, and tourists stayedaway, inflicting economic hardship on the region.

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After comparing satellite images of fire “hotspots”with land use maps, the government determined thatmost fires were occurring in timber and oil palmplantation areas, although small farmers were alsoimplicated. It then announced a total ban on burn-ing, accompanied by threats to punish offendingfirms. Yet even as fires burned out of control intosurrounding forests, peat swamps, and agriculturallands, plantation owners and farmers started newfires to take advantage of the extremely dry condi-tions. These fires intensified the haze, which spreadfarther, resulting in health alerts and transportationdisruptions across the region.

Efforts to put out the fires were largely ineffective,even with assistance from Malaysian volunteers andfire suppression aircraft from Australia and theUnited States. Poor coordination (especially be-tween air and ground operations), insufficienttraining, lack of equipment, funds, and water, andthe remote location of many of the fires, were oftencited as the reasons for failure. Aerial suppressionby water bombers was also hindered by the lack ofaccurate land cover maps and infrastructure support,and land-based efforts were impeded by the reluc-tance of many rural people to fight fires on land thatwas not theirs. The number of fires began to declineduring October and November, partly because ofmounting pressure exerted by the government onplantation owners but also because by then they hadburned as much land as they needed. Peat swampswere still burning in late November but werepartially extinguished when rain finally began to fallin December.

Box 4.1 The Oil Palm-Forest Fire Connection: Why Do PeopleSet Fires?

oil palm firms hire outsiders to set fire to thelands of local people whose lands they want totake over. The fires reduce the value of the landby degrading it, then the companies can moreeasily take over, paying only token compensa-tion to the original inhabitants.

• In some cases, local inhabitants also set fires toprotest the takeover of their lands by oil palmfirms.

Sources

Barber, C.V. and J. Schweithelm, 2000. Trial By Fire:Forest Fires and Forestry Policy in Indonesia’s Era ofCrisis and Reform. Washington DC: World ResourcesInstitute.

Potter, L. and J. Lee. 1998. Oil Palm in Indonesia: itsRole in Forest Conversion and the Fires of 1997/98. Areport for WWF, Indonesia Programme. Jakarta,Indonesia.

Wakker, E. 2000. Funding Forest Destruction: TheInvolvement of Dutch Banks in the Financing of Oil PalmPlantations in Indonesia. Amsterdam, The Netherlandsand Bogor, Indonesia: AIDEnvironment, in co-operationwith Jan Willem van Gelder Contrast Advies and theTelapak Sawit Research Team. Commissioned byGreenpeace Netherlands.

The uncontrolled and destructive use of fire is closelyassociated with the development of oil palm inIndonesia for four principal reasons:

• Fire degrades the quality of forest lands and thussupports efforts to have areas of permanent forestestate (such as production forest) legally reclassi-fied as forest areas available for conversion toplantation agriculture. With the availability oflands not classified as forest and suitable for oilpalm plantation development declining, firebecomes a useful tool for increasing the stock ofavailable land.

• In areas already allocated for oil palm develop-ment, fire is a cost-effective way of clearing theland. According to one firm operating in CentralKalimantan (Agro Indomas), land clearing bymechanical means is more than twice as expen-sive as setting fires.

• Oil palm fruits must be processed within 24hours of harvest, so firms prefer to locate theirprocessing facilities and transportation routes asnear as possible to their plantations. But theseaccessible areas are usually already populatedand farmed by local residents. To drive them out,


The rainy season, which usually lasts at least 6months in western Indonesia, began to taper off inless than 2 months. By the end of January 1998,hundreds of hot spots again appeared on NOAAsatellite images as the drought carried over into asecond calendar year. The pattern of 1997 wasrepeated in the swamps on Sumatra’s east coastfrom January through April; in Kalimantan, the fireswere concentrated in East Kalimantan, a provincethat had escaped extensive burning in 1997. Thedrought also began to cause food shortages becauseof below-normal harvests and a total failure of therice crop in some areas. The plight of rural commu-nities already reeling from the effects of the fires,haze, and drought was worsened by the growingeconomic crisis. The value of the Indonesian rupiahplunged throughout the second half of 1997.35

Many farmers began to burn still more land in thehope that they could increase the next harvest tocompensate for 1997 drought losses. Fears alsoarose that forest exploitation and related burningwould increase as plantation owners tried to offsetthe effects of the economic crisis.

Fires continued to spread during the month ofMarch. Efforts to fight them were hampered by theincreasing scarcity of water because surface waterdried up during the drought and the ground waterlevel sank beyond the reach of wells. Haze onceagain blanketed Singapore and parts of Malaysia,and the fires did not end until heavy rains finallyarrived in mid-May.

Analysts have encountered considerable technicaldifficulties in determining precisely the total areaburned during the 1997-1998 fires and in estimatingwhat kinds of vegetation types burned in which

areas. Based on the most recent analyses, however,it seems certain that at least 9.8 million ha burned.(See Table 4.1.)

The extent of the area affected by air pollution fromthe fires has been easier to determine. Indeed, theinternational news media were initially attracted tothe 1997 fires by the spectacle of a “thousand mileshroud” spreading over an area of 1 million km2

where hundreds of millions of people live. Theimpacts on human health could be considerable.The high levels of particulates inhaled and ingestedby millions of people are likely to cause chronic,long-term respiratory diseases (Heil, 1998). Com-prehensive monitoring of health impacts is difficultbecause rural Indonesians are unlikely to visit ahospital unless they are suffering from acutesymptoms of illness. In many areas, they depend ontraditional healers and herbal medicines for much oftheir health care. The results of one study thatattempted to quantify health impacts of fire-relatedpollution exposure in eight provinces are presentedin Table 4.3.

4.4 Government Response to Forestand Land FiresSeveral government agencies have fire preventionand control policies, but they are not well coordi-nated and are generally not enforced. A 1998 reviewby the State Ministry for Environment and theUnited Nations Development Programme (StateMinistry for Environment and UNDP, 1998)concluded that the existing regulations “are appar-ently not effective to control fires.” Prior to 1997,numerous Ministry decrees dealt with fire preven-

tion in forest areas, but intentional burning was notstrictly prohibited. In fact, an April 1997 decreelegalized the practice of “controlled burning” andset out technical guidelines. This decree wasrevoked in October 1997 as a result of that year’sdisastrous fires, and a new decree prohibited all useof fire for land clearance on state forest lands. TheMinistry of Agriculture had established a “zeroburning” policy for land clearance by decree in1995, and the Ministry of Transmigration and

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Settlement of Forest Dwellers established a similarpolicy for the preparation of transmigration areas inApril 1997.

More generally, Indonesia has a variety of environ-mental and other laws that criminalize intentionalburning, both nationally and at the provincial level.But these laws are rarely enforced. Even in theaftermath of the 1997-1998 fires, almost no legalaction has been taken against companies implicatedin setting fires and, at the time of writing, nosubstantial legal penalties have been handed down.

Institutionally, the Environment Ministry/UNDPreport concluded that “Indonesia does not have aprofessional fire management organization. Firesuppression efforts are conducted on the basis ofcoordination amongst several related agencies. . . .Agencies involved in fire management do not haveadequate mandates, level of competence andequipment to carry out their tasks.” The Ministry ofForestry was the only government agency with aspecialized body for fire prevention and control, theDirectorate for forest fires under the Directorate

General for the Conservation and Protection ofNature (KPA), (subsequently renamed the Director-ate General for Forest Protection and NatureConservation).

Some of the key weaknesses in Indonesia’s firesuppression and control apparatus identified by theEnvironment Ministry/UNDP review are duplica-tion of functions across agencies, unclear institu-tional authority and responsibility, inadequatemandates, and weak local institutional capacities.

The failure to implement existing laws, according tothe review, is the result of many factors: a lack ofpolitical will on the part of law enforcement agen-cies; lack of access by enforcement authorities todata on fires; lack of facilities and equipment tosupport field investigations; differing perceptions byvarious agencies on what constitutes adequate legalproof of intentional burning; lack of an understand-ing of legal provisions on corporate crime thatwould allow for companies, rather than individualemployees, to be prosecuted; a “lack of integrity”on the part of law enforcement authorities; and“conflicts of interest” among agencies, some ofwhich are charged with conservation and firesuppression, others with promotion of plantationand other agricultural products.

In April 2000, Indonesia’s Minister of Environmentpromised his counterparts from neighboring coun-tries a “haze-free year.”36 By July 2000, however,fires were burning again in Sumatra, the haze hadcrept over the Malacca Strait to Singapore andMalaysia,37 and thick smog temporarily closed theairport at Medan (Sumatra’s largest city).38 TheIndonesian government reportedly had “no plan” to

fight the fires,39 and indeed no fire suppressionactivities were being undertaken or suspects ar-rested.40 With a “haze-free year” apparently not onthe horizon, the State Minister of Environment toldthe press that he was “really ashamed every timemy counterparts from Malaysia and Singapore callme to complain about the haze coming fromSumatra.” Further, he blamed the burning onplantation companies engaged in “organized crimewhich often involves government officials andmilitary officers. . . . Many companies feel free toburn because government officials or militaryofficers back their activities.”41

In February 2001, the government issued a newregulation on forest fires (Government RegulationNo. 4 of 2001), which covers pollution and damageto the environment caused by forest and land fires.The new regulation sets out the respective responsi-bilities of central, provincial, and district govern-ments in handling fires in an effort to stop the buck-passing among various branches of government thathobbled fire prevention and firefighting efforts inpast years.42 But by mid-2001, the situation had notimproved. Extensive fires were already burning inparts of Sumatra and Kalimantan in July, spreadinghaze as far as Malaysia and southern Thailand.43

The Minister of Forestry’s response to this newestround of fires was to tell the press: “So far, we don’thave a clear blueprint of how to cope with theproblem. We will start to prepare it.”44 Prospects foran effective policy to counter the perennial fireproblem thus appear dim.

Tela

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CHAPTER 5THE PROSPECTS FOR FOREST POLICY REFORM

nostication on what the near future may hold, onethat goes beyond “if present trends continue. . . .”This chapter, therefore, briefly summarizes thecurrent policy and institutional environment inwhich decisions must be made and action takenwithin the next few years if Indonesia is to preserveany significant part of its natural forest ecosystems.It also reviews the current national agenda for forestpolicy reform and assesses the prospects for itsimplementation.

5.1 The Forest Policy Context: ACountry in CrisisForest policy reform and the strengthening of forestmanagement institutions in Indonesia largelydepend on factors unrelated to forests. Although thisreport does not aim to analyze Indonesia’s multiple

economic, political, and social crises fully, it isimportant to review the contextual challenges facingefforts to slow deforestation, reform forest policy,and strengthen forestry institutions.

Continuing Economic Malaise

Indonesia’s economy is in tatters, partly as alingering result of the East Asian financial crisis thatbegan in late 1997, but more fully explained by thetangled web of Suharto-era economic mismanage-ment, cronyism, and corruption that was revealed bythe economic crash. Most of the country’s banksand many other key economic players are bankrupt,the value of the Indonesian rupiah remains low, andunemployment and inflation are high. At present,the national economy is being kept afloat largely onthe basis of an IMF-led international bailout pack-age and oil revenues.45

Indonesia’s forests have experienced a precipitousdecline over the past several decades. If the pres-sures on forests are not checked, Indonesia willenjoy the dubious distinction of having presidedover the disappearance of Southeast Asia’s lastremaining expanses of rainforest. Sulawesi hasalready lost all its lowland rainforest, Sumatra’s willbe gone by 2005, and Kalimantan’s will havedisappeared by 2010. (See Chapter 2.) Patches ofmontane and swamp forests on these islands maylast a little longer, but not much. By 2010, IrianJaya is likely to be the only part of Indonesia withany significant areas of undisturbed natural forest.

This study is primarily a report on the state of theforest, and it does not offer detailed prescriptionsfor policy reform and institutional change. Never-theless, a complete accounting of the state ofIndonesia’s forests should offer an informed prog-

E.G

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The major impacts of the economic crisis onIndonesia’s forests are a result of the depreciation ofthe rupiah and the more competitive position ofIndonesian commodities on the internationalmarket, the lure of boosting agricultural and naturalresources exports to ameliorate the economicdownturn, and increased income insecurity in therural population. The relatively low price of Indone-sian plywood, combined with rising demand(especially from China, which reduced domesticlogging 60 percent in 1998), and the restrictedsupply of timber owing to the 1997-1998 forest fires“means that producers will search for stems in evermore remote and inappropriate places.” (Sunderlin,1999: 562).

Producer prices for some agricultural export com-modities increased steeply from 1997 to 1998 andtherefore tended to increase pressures for clearingforest. (See Section 3.6.) A similar dynamic hasboosted expansion of mining, often in forest areas.Meanwhile, some unemployed people in the urbansector have evidently migrated to the countryside insearch of employment while labor market entrantswho might have sought work in the city remain inrural areas. This trend, combined with high rupiahprices for agricultural export commodities and theincentive to produce food domestically (because ofhigh import prices), appears to be increasingpressure for forest clearance.

A 1999 study of areas in parts of Sumatra,Kalimantan, and Sulawesi concluded that in gen-eral, better-off farmers, immigrants, and urbandwellers with capital are more likely to take advan-tage of the opportunities created by the monetarycrisis by converting forest areas for high-value

export crops. In some cases, these new investors areputting upward pressure on land prices, temptinglocal subsistence farmers to sell their holdings andopen new lands in the forest (Angelsen andResosudarmo, 1999).

5.2 Political Paralysis at the CenterFollowing more than three decades (1966-1998) ofrelatively stable rule and rapid economic growthunder the “New Order” regime of PresidentSuharto, 46 Indonesia entered a period of chaoticpolitical transition that degenerated into almostcomplete political paralysis by mid-2001. Suhartowas hounded from office in mid-1998 following thecrash of the economy in late 1997 and an accompa-nying crescendo of popular protest against thewidespread corruption and pervasive human rightsviolations of the New Order regime.47 Following aninterregnum under Suharto Vice-President B.J.Habibie,48 Abdurrahman Wahid, a Muslim cleric,came to power in October 1999 after the country’sfirst democratic election in more than 4 decades.49

Initially praised as a sincere democrat and masterfulpolitician, Wahid led a fractious coalition govern-ment that was unable to address the country’seconomic and social crises effectively. This failure,combined with his mercurial and frequently bafflingpersonal style, his alienation of the newly vocalparliament and the armed forces, and severalcorruption scandals, led to widespread calls for hisremoval from office by the beginning of 2001.50 Hewas ousted by the Parliament in July 2001, handingover the government to Megawati Sukarnoputri, theVice-President and daughter of Sukarno,Indonesia’s first President.

This drawn-out political drama has had a debilitat-ing effect on efforts to reform and implement forestpolicies. Engrossed in round-the-clock politicalmachinations, senior government officials paid littleattention to forest policy matters. Frequent cabinetshake-ups and widespread expectations of theimminent fall of the Wahid government created theperception that senior forestry officials, and theirpolicies, were transient phenomena that would notbe on the scene for long. Megawati’s new govern-ment has just been installed at the time of writing;its forestry policies, and the priority that it willaccord to forest policy issues, are largely unknown.

5.3 Separatism and Demands forDecentralization in the ProvincesThe centrifugal tendencies inherent in a largemultiethnic, archipelagic nation like Indonesia havebeen unleashed since the demise of the New Order.East Timor, invaded and occupied by Indonesia in1975, was finally given its independence after abloody UN-supervised referendum process in mid-1999.51 Long-simmering separatist movements inthe forest-rich provinces of Aceh and Irian Jayahave been reinvigorated,52 and other provinces (oil-rich Riau, in Sumatra, for example) have begun totalk about independence as well.53 Separatism ismotivated in large part by the long-standing practiceof channeling natural resource rents to Jakarta, withonly a small fraction remaining in the provinces.

Partly in reaction to these separatist movements butalso in response to a more widespread antipathyoutside Java to the centralized governance of theSuharto era, Indonesia is moving rapidly toward a


new system of “regional autonomy.” But, for themost part, the provincial and district governmentswho will benefit from this sweeping decentraliza-tion completely lack the capacities needed to governeffectively. Indeed, many are still run by entrenchedand corrupt holdovers from the Suharto era.54

This quite rapid devolution of governmentalpowers calls into question the very notion of auniform national “forest policy.” The more likelyscenario for the next few years is one in whichdifferent local government units each make andimplement their own forest policies within vaguenational guidelines under nominal oversight by agreatly weakened central Forestry Ministry.Raising revenue is foremost on the minds ofprovincial and district officials, who are beinghanded vast responsibilities without the necessaryfunds to carry them out. Intensified exploitation offorest resources through logging and conversion offorest lands for plantations is therefore likely inmany regions. (See Box 5.1.)

5.4 Spreading Civil Violence andthe Breakdown of Law and OrderEthnic and religious killing, looting, violent streetcrime, and savage vigilantism have exploded inmany parts of Indonesia since 1998. Moslem-Christian violence in the eastern province of

Maluku has taken thousands of lives,55 and similarsavagery has appeared in parts of Kalimantan andSulawesi.56 As of mid-2001, the Indonesian RedCross estimated that more than 1.25 million “inter-nal refugees” were displaced by these variousconflicts, half of them school children.57 Crimerates have soared in the cities, along with brutal“street justice” in which hundreds of suspectedstreet criminals have been beaten and burned todeath in the streets.58

The Indonesian military, reeling from revelationsabout its past human rights atrocities in East Timor,Aceh, and elsewhere, and what it sees as its humili-ation in “losing” East Timor, appears unable tocontain the growing violence.59 Indeed, in Maluku,Christian and Moslem troops sent to quell thefighting ended up fighting with the respectivefactions.60 Similarly, the police, long reviled bymost Indonesians as corrupt, brutal, and ineffective,are unable or unwilling to stem either the growingcrime rate or the vigilantism that has mushroomedin response.61

This growing lawlessness has been a major factor inincreased logging and forest clearing. Enforcementof forestry law, never strong, is almost nonexistentin national parks and many other areas, allowingnew encroachment by small farmers and large-scaleoperators alike.

5.5 Conflicts Over Forest Lands andResourcesExploitation of forest resources has been a signifi-cant factor in fueling Indonesia’s rapid economic

development since the early 1970s, as discussed inChapter 3. Benefits from logging and other forestindustries, however, flowed largely to a smallcoterie of elite Suharto family cronies and theirpatrons in the government while local and indig-enous communities bore the costs. Centuries-oldsystems of customary rights over forests andtraditional resource management systems wereswept aside in the name of development and underthe authority of national laws declaring that thecentral government “owned” the 75 percent of thenation’s land area legally designated as forest land.Local communities were barred from forest re-sources on which they had long depended, and theforests themselves were recklessly logged, burned,and cleared for plantations, often causing erosion,flooding, and drought and wiping out many speciesof plants and animals that local people had beenutilizing. The transmigration program also com-mandeered millions of hectares of land in forestareas and brought millions of new migrants intopreviously forested and sparsely populated areas.

It is not surprising, then, that conflicts betweenforest-dependent communities on the one hand andgovernment and private sector forest resourceexploitation projects on the other have been aperennial and growing problem in Indonesia since atleast the 1970s. Abused local communities had littlerecourse during the authoritarian Suharto era exceptto nurse their grievances and develop a strongmistrust of the government. Since Suharto’s fall,conflicts have multiplied in both number andintensity. (See Map 13.)

As is the case for many social tensions in Indonesiaover the past few years, conflicts over forest lands

Growing lawlessness has been amajor factor in increased logging

and forest clearing.


Box 5.1 Regional Autonomy and Forest Management

regional autonomy seem to shift significant power overnatural resources to the regions, specifying, for example,that 80 percent of state income from resources (includ-ing forests) shall go to the regions. Both laws still lackimplementing regulations, however, and many lawyersand government officials regard these laws as essentiallyinoperable (Basic Law on Regional Government, 1999,and Basic Law on Financial Balance, 1999).

The 1999 revised forestry law gave district heads the rightto hand out 100 ha logging licenses, and they have givenout hundreds in some areas, according to an investigativereport by the newsmagazine Tempo, despite an October2000 order from the Minister of Forestry to stop thepractice. These concessions are profitable for the districts(sometimes called regencies) because “It’s commonknowledge that every time such a license is issued,between Rp 50 million and Rp 100 million (approxi-mately US$5,000–10,000) finds its way into regencycoffers. And one regent alone can issue hundreds of theselicenses.” (Tempo, July 24–30, 2001.) The Tempo report

Indonesia is currently in the early stages of imple-menting a wide-ranging “regional autonomy” policythat decentralizes many functions of government,including numerous aspects of forest regulation andmanagement, to the provincial and district govern-ments. At present, however, the basic division ofauthority and responsibility over forests amongcentral, provincial, and district governments isunclear and is being contested.

With regard to the authority to decide what is forestland and how it may be used, a 1992 spatial planninglaw (Spatial Use Management Law, 1992) gaveprovinces the right to make these fundamental landuse planning decisions although it contradicted the1967 Basic Forestry Law. The revised Basic ForestryLaw of 1999, however, specifies that the centralgovernment retains the right to “determine the forestestate” and “plan the use of the forest” and need only“pay attention” to the local land use plans made underthe 1992 law. On the other hand, two 1999 laws on

goes on to note, however, that the local governments’take from this practice is small compared to theprofits being taken by the businessmen who are issuedthe licenses, sometimes as many as 10 licenses each.According to one observer in West Kalimantan, thepeople receiving the new small-scale licenses are infact old players whose HPH concessions have run outor who cannot get their old concessions renewed. Tokeep their sawmills running, they manipulate smallgroups of people to set up cooperatives, which thenapply for the new small-scale licenses. The system isalso often used to legalize illegal logging: “Thetimber brokers, who up to now have been receivers oftimber from illegally felled trees…no longer need tohide what they are doing because they officially ‘own’cooperatives that supply them with the timber theyrequire.”

The regional autonomy policy has also fanneddisputes about which level of government has theauthority to change the status of forest lands. In

and resources have become increasingly violent.Logging concessions have long been a source oftension and occasional conflict between loggingfirms and the state on the one hand and localcommunities on the other. In March 2000, theAssociation of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires(APHI) reported that 50 timber companies, control-ling about 10 million ha of logging concessions inIrian Jaya, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, had stoppedlogging because of growing trouble with local

residents, who not only claimed ownership of theconcessions but also often threatened the workers.62

In the Suharto era, such local impertinence wasusually dealt with rapidly and violently by police ormilitary personnel “rented” to logging firms.Currently, however, the companies find themselvesincreasingly on their own: the thinly-stretchedmilitary, dealing with large-scale violent conflict innumerous parts of the country, lacks the resources

to respond to concession-related disputes. TheMinistry of Forestry has softened its tone on suchlocal protests, even admitting that logging firmsmay be to blame. The fact that most of the conces-sions where clashes are occurring have been linkedto members of the Suharto family and inner circle,and hence are said to have been obtained throughcorruption, means that few officials are eager tospring to their defense.63 But despite this change inattitude, the government seems to have no plan for


South Kalimantan, for example, a dispute has brokenout between the Governor and the heads of twodistricts in the Meratus Mountains over the issuing oflogging licenses to two logging firms covering a totalof 83,000 ha. The proposed concessions are in an arealong designated as protected forest, but in 1999 thethen-Minister of Forestry changed the status of46,000 ha from protection to production forest toaccommodate one of the two companies. LocalDayak communities opposed the logging andorganized a campaign against the concession. Thedistrict heads are also reported to be opposed to theconcessions, but the provincial government hasargued that it is the Governor’s prerogative to issueconcessions without the district heads’ approval, aslong as they lie in more than one district. In short,three levels of government are arguing over who hasthe right to change the status of forest areas, and theinterpretation of regional autonomy with respect toforest land use and exploitation is unclear and isbeing disputed (Down to Earth, August 2001).

Box 5.1 (continued)

Despite widespread confusion and apparent abuses, thethen-Forestry Minister told the press in May 2001 that aPresidential decree would soon be issued allowingdistrict heads to award full-scale HPH logging conces-sions and handing them significant power to manage andsupervise national parks and protected forests (JakartaPost, May 28, 2001). The new administration ofMegawati Sukarnoputri is likely to slow down theimplementation of regional autonomy policies, however,and has signaled an intention to revise the relevant lawsto decrease district heads’ powers over both naturalresources and financial matters (Jakarta Post, August11, 2001). Megawati herself expressed dissatisfactionwith the law in May 2001 and said “I expect there to bea conceptual revision of the law as soon as possible.”(Jakarta Post, May 16, 2001). But with local officialsalready having tasted the power – and the profits – oflocal control over forest and other natural resources, itmay be difficult to take that power away from them.

Sources

The Spatial Use Management Law (No. 24/1992).

The Basic Law on Regional Government (No. 22/1999)and The Basic Law on Financial Balance BetweenCentral and Regional Government (No. 25/1999). (For adetailed analysis of the provisions in these two laws, seeH. Haeruman, “Law No. 22/1999: Regional AutonomyOver Natural Resources,” and H. Haeruman, “Law No.25/1999: Natural Resource Revenue Sharing,”both inNRM News,Vol. 1 No. 1, February 2000. Jakarta,Indonesia: Natural Resources Management Program.

“Forests and regional autonomy: all in the hands of theregents.” Tempo, July 24-30, 2001.

“The fight against illegal logging.” Down to Earth No.50, August 2001. Online at http://www.gn.apc.prg.dte.

“Regents to issue forestry licenses.” Jakarta Post, May28, 2001.

“Government revising law on regional autonomy.”Jakarta Post, August 11, 2001.

resolving conflicts over forest resources. TheMinistry of Forestry’s 2001–2005 Strategic Plandoes not specifically mention them, for example,although it does acknowledge the general problemof local grievances.

In addition to conflicts related to logging conces-sions, illegal logging is both a cause and a result oftension over resources. It generates anger in localcommunities when timber is stolen from their land.

But it also gives rise to conflicts within communi-ties, where some are employed by illegal loggingoperations, and thus benefit, while others suffer theeffects. These include diminution of local watersupplies, increased erosion, and more frequentforest fires that are either set deliberately to hideevidence of illegal cutting or are caused by in-creased fuel loads of harvest waste material. Illegallogging is also a result of forest-related disputes.When the status of a particular area is contested or

unclear (for example, a logging concession wherelocal protests have stopped operations), it becomesan easy target for illegal cutting. And where localcommunities feel unjustly deprived of access toforest resources, they may often retaliate by “steal-ing” timber that they feel is theirs.

The rapid development of oil palm and industrialtimber plantations on forest lands has sometimes ledto hostile relations with local communities, particu-


larly in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Reports follow asimilar pattern. First, land on which local communi-ties have longstanding claims and are often growingtree crops or harvesting nontimber forest productsare allocated to a company without consultationwith the community. People then protest to thecompany and local officials, and the company oftenpromises compensation, participation in the planta-tion scheme, or other enticements. But when thecompany does not honor its promises, the commu-nity protests to local government and companyofficials again. Still nothing is done to meet theirdemands, and local people destroy or confiscateequipment and vehicles, occupy base camps, andprevent plantation staff from working. Then thecompany hires local police or military (sometimesdressed in the “black ninja” outfits that are popularwith hired thugs and assassins on Java) to retaliate,and more violence ensues.

Other frequent arenas for conflict are the nationalparks and protected areas. Small farmers, poachers,and illegal loggers have long encroached upon

FWI S

ulaw

esi

protected areas, some of which have been illegallyconverted to plantation agriculture.64 Since 1998,however, encroachment has increased dramatically,as in Central Sulawesi’s Lore Lindu National Park,where locals have taken over thousands of hectaresto plant cash crops and cut timber.65 Similar take-overs have been reported at Kutai National Park inEast Kalimantan.66 Organized illegal logging hasbeen well documented in Aceh’s Leuser NationalPark and Central Kalimantan’s Tanjung PutingNational Park (Newman et al., 1999), and is gener-ally thought to be widespread in many other parks.It is sadly ironic that conservation efforts have attimes been responsible for the abuse of local people.Gazetting of national parks and other protectedareas has sometimes occurred without reference toindigenous peoples’ views or rights. Two examples,provided in Box 5.2, contrast aggressive govern-ment action with more enlightened approaches thatwere simultaneously pursued over the past decade.

Encroachment, illegal logging, and poaching inprotected areas have not given rise to much violentconflict, however, for the simple reason that suchactivities are mostly unopposed by park manage-ment officials or other government agencies. Onestriking exception is the Leuser DevelopmentProgramme, a large European Union-funded projectto conserve Leuser National Park and its surround-ing ecosystem in Aceh province. The program hasactively opposed (and in some cases, triumphedover) illegal park conversions to oil palm planta-tions and encroachments by logging concessions,illegal loggers, local government plans to buildroads through the park, and planned transmigrationsites on its boundary. Its efforts have created heatedlocal opposition and protest from some quarters.

Should Indonesia decide to take protection of itsnational parks more seriously, and should theinternational community decide to provide majorfunding for such an effort, these kinds of tensionswould probably explode into violent confrontationsin many protected areas.

Rhetoric about the need to manage forests in theinterests of traditional law (adat) and local commu-nities has been pervasive for several years, but froma legal and policy perspective, little has changedsince the Suharto era. Numerous analyses havesearched for signs of a more local community-oriented forest policy in the spate of new laws andregulations, and there are some encouragingchanges around the edges. But the basic structure ofpower over forest lands remains as it has alwaysbeen: the state controls the forest and all who woulduse it may do so legally only by leave of the state.

The 1999 Forestry Law does establish a category ofcustomary forest (hutan adat) but defines it as stateforest that happens to lie within the territory of a“customary law community,” whose definition thegovernment will elaborate in future regulations.Under the Law, the government is obliged to respectthe rights of communities that have received itsblessing as truly “customary” but “only as long asthose rights do not conflict with national interests.”In short, the government unilaterally determineswhich communities qualify as “customary” and

Illegal logging is both a cause and

a result of tension over resources.


Box 5.2 National Parks and Indigenous People: Cooperation or Conflict?Two Cases From Sulawesi

grassy plains and swampy upland valleys. Katu is asmall village occupied by 227 people whose custom-ary lands were included in the park when it wasformally established in the mid-1990s.

The Katu have repeatedly been moved around byoutsiders over the past century. In 1918, the Dutchcolonial authorities forced them to move to the townof Bangkeluho to facilitate tax collection, but thepeople moved back to Katu in 1925. In 1949, theywere again forced to relocate to Bangkeluho, this timeby the newly independent Indonesian government.When disease epidemics ravaged Bangkeluho in thelate 1950s, they once again returned to their ancestrallands in Katu. They were not disturbed again until the1970s, when the government declared their lands to bethe “Lore Kalamanta Wildlife Management Conserva-tion Area” and once again began pressuring them toleave. Pressure was stepped up in 1985 when planswere announced to incorporate their area into theplanned Lore Lindu National Park. It intensifiedfurther when the Central Sulawesi Integrated Conser-vation and Development Project was launched by thegovernment in the mid-1990s, supported by a loanfrom the Asian Development Bank.

The Katu resisted these mounting pressures to move,and, with the help of environmental NGOs in 1998,they conducted a natural resource inventory survey oftheir area and documented their natural resourcemanagement practices. The survey revealed a complexsystem of traditional agriculture using dozens of localcrop varieties and sustainable forest product harvest

As Indonesia’s system of protected areas has expandedover the past several decades, the designation of forestareas has frequently conflicted with the prior claimsand present livelihood needs of numerous indigenousforest-dwelling communities. Two cases fromSulawesi contrast the widely differing approaches thatthe government has taken to such conflicts.

Rawa Aopa Watumohai National Park comprises anarea of 105,000 ha in Southeast Sulawesi province. Itwas officially gazetted in 1990. The Moronene peoplehave occupied lands lying within the park forgenerations, but the decision to create the park wasmade without consultation with the Moronene orreference to their long-standing customary occupa-tion of their areas. From 1997 to late 2000, theMoronene have been the victims of forcible evictionsordered by the provincial governor in the name ofnature conservation. In 1997, security forces burneddown 175 homes and destroyed crops. In 1998, afurther 88 houses were burned and 12 villagers weregiven year-long jail sentences. Most recently, inNovember 2000, another 100 homes were destroyedin three Moronene villages on the instruction of theGovernor, Laode Kaimuddin, despite widespreadprotests from not only NGOs but also centralgovernment forestry and environment officials.

A more enlightened solution has been worked outbetween the Lore Lindu National Park and the Katupeople in Central Sulawesi. Lore Lindu National Parkcovers some 568,000 ha of varied ecosystems rangingfrom lowland rainforest and dense montane forest to

systems that had been in place for centuries withoutdamaging the forest.

In April 1999, the Katu finally won their long battlewhen the park authorities issued a formal letterawarding the Katu the right to remain on their ances-tral lands (1,178 ha) and to continue to use theirtraditional systems of tenure and resource manage-ment. The two factors that ultimately drove thisdecision were the considerable body of empiricalscientific evidence showing that Katu resourcemanagement practices were environmentally sustain-able, and the Katu’s ability to produce detailed mapsdocumenting their customary land claims and detaileddocumentation of their land use systems. Armed withlegal recognition of their rights, the Katu have becomemore vocal and aggressive in opposing and reportingillegal logging and other encroachments by outsidersinto the park, a growing problem at Lore Lindu.

Sources

Down to Earth. No. 48, February 2001. “Moronene peopleforced out of national park.” http://www.gn.apc.org/dte/48Ind.htm

Biodiversity Support Program-Kemala, Jakarta, Indonesia.“The End of a Dream, The Beginning of Hope: After morethan 70 years of resistance, finally the Katu people gainlegal recognition of their rights to live and manage theirAdat lands.” http://www.bsp-kemala.or.id/stories/stories8.htm

Jakarta Post, June 29, 2001. “NGOs protest forest lootingin Lore Lindu National Park.”


then unilaterally decides which community rights torespect. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 1999Forestry Law has been denounced by indigenouspeoples’ organizations and NGOs as a sham withrespect to protecting the rights of traditional forest-dwelling peoples.67

5.6 The Agenda and Prospects ForForest Policy ReformIn the reformasi euphoria following Suharto’sresignation in 1998, many believed that at last a realopportunity existed to make fundamental changes inthe way Indonesia’s forests were managed, therebyslowing deforestation and recognizing the long-slighted claims and interests of forest-dependentrural communities.68 Various government commit-tees, NGOs, donor agencies, and academics putforward reform agendas, and a flurry of new lawsand regulations was issued. But, as noted above,forest policy reform has not been the highestpriority for politicians and policymakers, or forordinary citizens, in the crisis-ridden years sinceSuharto’s fall. What commitment to reform exists inthe government is driven largely by the fact thatIndonesia’s aid donors have made future financialassistance conditional on specific reforms in theforestry sector, among other actions.

Indonesia’s aid donors coordinate their assistancethrough a consortium called the Consultative Groupon Indonesia (CGI), chaired by the World Bank.Through CGI, the donors meet periodically withsenior Indonesian government officials to discuss

and decide on levels of assistance, set targets forpolicy reform, and assess progress toward thosetargets. The state of Indonesia’s forests was firstraised in the CGI process at a meeting in July 1999.At the subsequent February 2000 CGI meeting,Indonesia committed to a set of 8 urgent forestpolicy reform actions and, in parallel, to begin theprocess of formulating a new National ForestProgram (NFP) and establishing an Interdepartmen-tal Committee on Forestry (IDCF). At the October2000 CGI meeting, the government reported littleprogress, but it renewed its commitments andpromised to prepare an Action Plan to implementthem. The Action Plan was made public in Decem-ber 2000. It covered the original 8 commitments,plus 4 new ones. These 12 now constitute the coreof Indonesia’s forest policy reform agenda. (See Box5.3.)

In early 2001, however, Indonesia’s CoordinatingMinister for Economic Affairs argued to the donorsthat the government would not succeed if it at-tempted to devote equal effort to all 12 commit-ments at the same time. Rather, he resolved to workon 4 of the most urgent issues: illegal logging,forest fires, restructuring indebted wood-basedindustries, and forest inventory and mapping. But inearly April 2001, the newly installed ForestryMinister Marzuki Usman (since replaced) admittedthat Indonesia had failed to meet its forestry com-mitments, saying “It’s our own fault. How could wehave set such unrealistic targets?”69 At the CGImeeting later that month, the donor position paperon forests confirmed the Minister’s assessment,saying:

In terms of results in the forests, which is theultimate measure of achievements, there havebeen no tangible improvements. The rate offorest loss has not abated. The situation in theforests remains grave by any measure, and thedonors remain seriously concerned…. There aremajor problems of overall governance thataffect the forestry sector particularly severely,including official corruption, weak law enforce-ment, and a judiciary system needing reform…Decentralization brings in the short term ageneral weakening of authority for forestmanagement, with the risk that the [regionaland district governments] will emphasize short-term revenue enhancement at the expense ofsustainability. Unequal resource access rightsand issues of land tenure in the forest arefundamental problems, difficult to solve. Thelegacy of alienation of forest communities andresulting mistrust of government caused by theresource allocation policies and procedures ofthe past must be cleared away, but [this] willnot be [achieved] without extraordinary creativ-ity, sensitivity and hard work.70

In measuring success, the donors’ position papercould point to little more than the issuance of apresidential instruction ordering an intensive effortto halt illegal logging in national parks, the stepstaken to cut off trade in ramin wood, Indonesia’sagreement to host a September 2001 ministerialconference on forest law enforcement, and theissuance of a regulation on combatting forest fires(discussed in Chapter 4). The donors concludedtheir analysis with the statement that “very few


BoBoBoBoBox 5.3 Indonesiax 5.3 Indonesiax 5.3 Indonesiax 5.3 Indonesiax 5.3 Indonesia’s 12 Commitments to the Consultative Group on’s 12 Commitments to the Consultative Group on’s 12 Commitments to the Consultative Group on’s 12 Commitments to the Consultative Group on’s 12 Commitments to the Consultative Group on

IndonesiaIndonesiaIndonesiaIndonesiaIndonesia (CGI) Concerning Forests and Forest P(CGI) Concerning Forests and Forest P(CGI) Concerning Forests and Forest P(CGI) Concerning Forests and Forest P(CGI) Concerning Forests and Forest Policyolicyolicyolicyolicy

• Close heavily indebted wood industries undercontrol of the Indonesia Bank RestructuringAgency (IBRA) and link proposed debt write-offs to capacity reduction.

• Connect the reforestation program with theexisting forest industries and those underconstruction.

• Recalculate the real value of timber.

• Use decentralization processes as a tool toenhance sustainable forest management.

• Prevent and control forest fires.

• Formulate the National Forest Program.

• Resolve tenurial issues on forest lands.

• Improve the forest management system.

Sources

Commitments 1-8: “Indonesia: Environment and NaturalResource Management in a Time of Transition.” (Wash-ington D.C. World Bank, 2001). Commitments 9-12:“Rencana Aksi Komitmen Pemerintah Bidang Kehutanan”[Action Plans for Government Commitments in theForestry Sector]. Jakarta, Indonesia: Ministry of Forestry,November 2000.

In the course of 2000, the Ministry of Forestry madethree groups of commitments: to establish anInterdepartmental Committee on Forestry, to proceedwith formulation of the National Forest Program, andto take immediate action to address pressing issuesraised by the CGI process. The action commitmentsare listed below.

• Invite cooperation and coordination of otherMinistries to impose strong measures againstillegal loggers, especially those operating withinnational parks, and to close illegal sawmills.

• Speed up forest resource assessment as a basis forNational Forest Program (NFP) formulation.

• Evaluate the policy in conversion forest and placea moratorium on all natural forest conversionuntil the NFP is agreed upon.

• Downsize and restructure the wood-basedindustry to balance supply and demand of rawmaterial and increase its competitiveness.

tangible results have been achieved” and warningthat the forestry situation is “rapidly deteriorating.”They singled out the illegal logging issue, notingthat “persons that manage illegal logging operationscontinue to do so with impunity.”71

The CGI 12-point plan for reform is not the onlyreform agenda that has been put forward. One ofIndonesia’s largest environmental NGOs, theIndonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI), forexample, has called for a complete moratorium onall industrial logging in natural forest areas, to bephased in over 2-3 years.72 We focus here on theCGI-mandated actions because they are the onlyones that have captured the serious attention of thegovernment – because they are ostensibly linked tocontinued donor aid. To the extent that meaningfulaction will be taken to reform forest policies andremedy the deteriorating forest situation in Indone-sia, it appears at present writing that such actionwill closely follow the steps laid out in the CGI-mandated Action Plan. However, recent experiencesuggests that the ability of donors to influenceimplementation of forest policy reforms is limited(Seymour and Dubash, 2000:83-105). Given theoverwhelming political, social, and economicproblems that Indonesia faces and the near-com-plete absence of action on any forest policy reformagenda item over the past few years, the prognosisfor Indonesia’s forests remains grim.


NOTES

Monument: Protected Area managed for conserva-tion of specific natural features; IV Habitat/SpeciesManagement Area: Protected Area managed mainlyfor conservation through management intervention;V Protected Landscape/Seascape: Protected Areamanaged mainly for landscape/seascape conserva-tion and recreation; VI Managed Resource Pro-tected Areas: Protected Area managed mainly forthe sustainable use of natural ecosystems.

6. “Illegal loggers steal Indonesia’s market share inChina.” Asia Pulse/Antara. June 22, 2001.

7. “Watchdog eyes forestry scams.” IndonesianObserver, January 5, 2000.

8. “Indonesia stops issuing fresh forestry concessionlicenses.” Asia Pulse/Antara, April 18, 2000.

9. Information made available to Forest WatchIndonesia by the Ministry of Forestry.

10. “Indonesia stops issuing fresh forestry concessionlicenses.” Asia Pulse/Antara, April 18, 2000.

11. Investigation Report. Leuser Lestari Foundation.1998-1999.

12. “Environmentalists challenge “eco-timber” go-ahead for logging in endangered tiger habitat.Important test case for Forest Stewardship Council;consumers could be misled by ‘green’ scheme.”Rain Forest Foundation and Walhi. Press Release,July 11, 2001.

13. “Analysis and Discussion Paper by the DirectorGeneral for Protection and Conservation of Nature,”National Working Meeting of the Ministry ofForestry and Estate Crops, June 26-29, 2000, 13-14.(Translation from original by C.V. Barber.)

14. “Timber fencing and smuggling still rampant.”Jakarta Post, July 3, 1996; “Legislators urgegovernment to stop timber brokers.” Jakarta Post,July 3, 1996.

15. “Security personnel aid timber thieves.” JakartaPost, May 15, 2000.

16. “Military, judiciary urged not to support illegallogging.” Indonesian Observer, June 20, 2000.

17. “Illegal loggers steal Indonesia’s market share inChina.” Asia Pulse/Antara, June 22, 2000.

18. Plywood production data from the FAO, ITTO, andGOI are broadly comparable until 1996 (reporting1996 production of 9.5, 9.1, and 9.1 million tons,respectively). From that year, the FAO shows aslight increase in 1997, then a precipitous declinefrom 9.6 million to 4.4 million tons in 1999. ITTOhas a small overall decline to 8.5 million tons in1999. The Indonesian Ministry of Forestry reports asharp increase to 10.9 million tons in 1997, fol-lowed by a fall to 7.2 million tons in 1999. Thesedata are all the more mysterious given that bothFAO and ITTO base their reports on officialIndonesian statistics.

19. “Indonesia faces forest dilemma: donors seek curbson logging but powerful interests are involved.”International Herald Tribune, February 1, 2000.

20. “Indonesia – wood cuts: illegal logging could stemthe flow of aid to Indonesia.” Far Eastern EconomicReview, January 27, 2000.

21. Government Regulation No. 7 of 1990 RegardingIndustrial Timber Plantations.

22. The 1991 Indonesian Forestry Action Programmestated that “the role of plantation forests in supple-

1. Until 1998, the Ministry was called the Ministry ofForestry. From 1998 to 2000, it was known as theMinistry of Forestry and Estate Crops (MOFEC). InAugust 2000, a new Cabinet was formed andMOFEC was merged with the Ministry of Agricul-ture and renamed the Ministry of Agriculture andForestry. This lasted just 3 months, when the namereverted to the Ministry of Forestry. For the sake ofsimplicity, this report uses “Ministry of Forestry”throughout.

2. Biomass quantities reported by the FAO refer toabove-ground live and dead vegetation. They do notinclude below-ground biomass, such as rootstructures, or organic carbon present in soils. Thecarbon storage estimate presented here is based onthe assumption that approximately half the weightof wet biomass is water and approximately half theweight of (dry) biomass is carbon.

3. Some of the common flaws and potential pitfalls ofecological valuation studies are usefully summa-rized in Doug Sheil and Sven Wunder. “The valueof tropical forest to local communities: complica-tions, caveats and cautions.” Forthcoming inEcological Economics.

4. The figure of 6.6 million ha corresponds to theareas identified in the GOI/World Bank dataset asforest but classified by the National Forest Inven-tory, 1996 as industrial timber plantations or estatecrop plantations.

5. The six IUCN protected area categories are: IaStrict Nature Reserve: Protected Area managedmainly for science; Ib Wilderness Area: ProtectedArea managed mainly for wilderness protection; IINational Park: Protected Area managed mainly forecosystem conservation and recreation; III Natural


menting natural forest resources will also be veryimportant to conservation objectives in the country.”(Government of Indonesia, 1991. IndonesiaForestry Action Programme. Vol. 2, p. 60. Jakarta,Indonesia.)

23. Private firms developing HTIs are eligible forcapital participation by the government in theamount of 14 percent and zero-interest loans of upto 32.5 percent, both drawn from the ReforestationFund. State corporations are eligible for 35 percentgovernment capital participation and can accessinterest-free loans of up to 32.5 percent.

24. “World Bank Involvement in Sector Adjustment forForests in Indonesia: The Issues.” Jakarta, Indone-sia, 1998. Memorandum.

25. Both APP and APRIL were listed on the New YorkStock Exchange in 1995, but the exchange an-nounced plans to delist them in July (APP) andSeptember (APRIL) 2001 because the groups hadtraded at below $1 per share for more than 30 days,breaking an exchange rule. “New York StockExchange intends to delist Asia Pacific resources.”The Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2001.

26. “Indonesia APRIL units $1.3B debt deal drawscreditor ire.” Dow Jones Newswires, November 8,2000; “Indonesia’s APRIL cannot meet all interestpayments.” Asian Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2001.

27. Note that Oil World’s estimate of 7 million tons ishigher than the figure of 6.2 million tons providedby the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry.

28. Local farmers in Lore Lindu National Park, CentralSulawesi, told one of this report’s authors thatextensive forest clearance around their village wascaused entirely by transmigrants from Southeastern

Sulawesi. It transpired that the newcomers num-bered less than one dozen families and that many ofthe locals had recently cleared land for new cocoatrees.

29. Production data on cocoa: online at http://www.oardc.ohio-state.edu/cocoa/regions.htm;coffee: online at http://www.ico.org/statist/po2.htm;rubber: online at http://www.sbindo.co.id/products/Agriculture/Natural_Rubber.htm; palm oil: OilWorld Annual, 2001.

30. A somewhat more recent estimate (Casson, 2000)puts the total area under rubber (including large-scale plantations) at 6.1 million ha in 1998. This ishard to reconcile with the Ministry of Forestryestimate of 3.5 million ha in 1997.

31. “Indonesian farmers have abandoned coffeeplantations in Sumatra because of low internationalprices.” Commodity News. July 23, 2001.

32. El Niño is a periodic climatic phenomenon causedby interaction between the atmosphere and abnor-mally warm surface water in the eastern PacificOcean off the coast of South America. Occurringabout every 2-7 years, El Niño events usually lastabout one year and often bring extended periods ofdrought to Indonesia and other parts of the westernPacific.

33. See Barber and Schweithelm, 2000 for a detailedaccount of the 1982-1983 East Kalimantan fire andcitations to the numerous field studies that werecarried out in the aftermath of the fire.

34. This account of the 1997–1998 fires is adapted fromBarber and Schweithelm 2000, with permission ofthe authors.

35. Rural impacts of the 1997 currency devaluationhave varied a great deal among areas, however.Where export commodities constituted a significantproportion of the local economy, farmers received awindfall from the devaluation. But, where they didnot, the rising prices had severe negative economicimpacts. See: J. Poppele, S. Sumarto, and L.Pritchett, 1999. “Social Impacts of the Crisis: NewData and Policy Implications.” Jakarta, Indonesia:Paper prepared for the World Bank. Draft.

36. “Jakarta promises a haze-free year.” Straits Times,April 5, 2000.

37. “Indonesia fires spread, smog reaches Thailand.”Reuters, July 19, 2000.

38. “Thick smog shuts Indonesia’s Medan Airport.”Reuters, July 20, 2000.

39. “Jakarta has no plan to combat forest fires.” StraitsTimes, July 18, 2000.

40. “Where in the world are the firefighters? Hundredsof fires are burning across Riau province, but noone is fighting them nor are police arrestingsuspects.” Straits Times, July 28, 2000.

41. “Sony ‘powerless’ to cope with forest fires.” JakartaPost, July 31, 2000. In the same interview, theMinister (Sony Keraf) recounted how he hadconfronted the Governor of West Kalimantan withclear satellite data implicating two companies in theongoing fires in that province. Despite the evidence,the Governor bluntly denied the charge.

42. “Who’s playing with fire again?” Tempo, July 17–23, 2001.

43. “Peat fires blamed as smoke haze thickens inIndonesia.” Agence France-Presse, July 12, 2001.


44. “Still no plan by Jakarta to fight fires feeding haze.”Straits Times, July 12, 2001.

45. For analysis of the economic crisis of 1997-1998and its lingering aftereffects, see World Bank.Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update.Washington DC: World Bank, 1998; H.W. Arndtand H. Hill. Southeast Asia’s Economic Crisis:Origins, Lessons, and the Way Forward. Singapore:Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1999; A.L.Smith. Gus Dur and the Indonesian Economy.Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,2001; E. Salim, “Indonesia’s Future EconomicChallenges.” Jakarta Post, April 9-10, 2001 (in twoparts).

46. For accounts of the politics and economics of theSuharto era, see A. Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting:Indonesia in the 1990s. St. Leonards, Australia:Allen and Unwin, 1994; H. Hill, ed., Indonesia’sNew Order: The Dynamics of Socio-EconomicTransformation. St. Leonard’s, Australia: Allen andUnwin, 1994.

47. For accounts and analysis of the fall of Suharto seeG. Forrester & R.J. May, eds., The Fall of Soeharto.Singapore: Select Books, Ltd., 1999. Many analysesof the East Asian economic crisis and its impacts onIndonesia have been published since 1998. See, forexample H.W. Arndt and H. Hill, eds., SoutheastAsia’s Economic Crisis: Origins, Lessons, and theWay Forward. Singapore: Institute of SoutheastAsian Studies, 1999.

48. On Habibie’s presidency, see D.F. Anwar, “TheHabibie Presidency” and other articles in G.Forrester, ed., Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal orChaos? Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies.

49. On the complex process and politics by whichWahid became president in October 1999, see“Dark before dawn: how elite made a deal beforeIndonesia woke up.” The Wall Street Journal,November 2, 1999.

50. For an analysis of Wahid’s first years in office andhis tenuous hold on power as of early 2001, seeInternational Crisis Group, “Indonesia’s Presiden-tial Crisis.” Briefing Paper, February 21, 2001.Online at www.intl_crisis_group.org.

51. On East Timor’s violent independence referendum,see United Nations Office of the High Commis-sioner for Human Rights, Report of the Interna-tional Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to theSecretary-General. Geneva. January, 2000.

52. On Aceh’s separatist struggle, see G. van Klinken,“Whither Aceh? An update on events in 1999.”Inside Indonesia No. 62, April-June, 2000. Onlineat http://www.insideindonesia.org and “Indonesia’sAceh conflict smoulders on.” Asian Wall StreetJournal, April 26, 2000. On separatism in IrianJaya, see “Irian Jaya wants to shake off Indonesianrule.” Agence France-Presse, December 1, 1999; J.Rumbiak, “Statement of Irian Jaya at the 56th

Commission on Human Rights.” United NationsCommission on Human Rights, 56th Session,Agenda Item 11: Civil and Political Rights. Geneva,April 6, 2000.

53. “Rich regions reject Jakarta hand.” Jakarta Post,November 22, 1999.

54. “Workshop questions Indonesia’s autonomy laws…and expert urges ‘some form of federalism.’”Jakarta Post, July 18, 2000; “Logical flaws inregional autonomy.” Jakarta Post, May 2, 2000.

55. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: OvercomingMurder and Chaos in Maluku, December 19, 2000.Online at www.intl_crisis_group.org; “Bloodbathgrips Indonesia.” Far Eastern Economic Review,July 6, 2000 (cover story).

56. “Savage attacks terrorize migrants on Borneo.”Washington Post, February 24, 2001; “211 con-firmed dead in Poso [Central Sulawesi] clashes.”Jakarta Post, July 7, 2000; “Communal violencehits Kumai in Central Kalimantan.” Jakarta Post,July 7, 2000; “West Kalimantan: Tension betweenethnic groups obscures future.” Jakarta Post,February 15, 2000; “Communal violence leavesover 765,000 refugees across Indonesia.” AgenceFrance-Presse, June 20, 2000.

57. “1.25 million people displaced by violence, armedconflicts.” Jakarta Post, July 12, 2001. For anearlier report on internal refugees, see “Communalviolence leaves over 765,000 refugees acrossIndonesia.” Agence France-Presse, June 20, 2000.

58. “The new face of Indonesian justice: the legacy ofpolice violence in the Suharto era lives on in anupsurge of brutal vigilante attacks.” Far EasternEconomic Review, July 13, 2000 (cover story).

59. On the Indonesian military since the fall of Suharto,see: “Skeletons, vigilantes and the Armed Forces’fall from grace.” In Reformasi: Crisis and Changein Indonesia. A. Budiman, B. Hatley, and D.Kingsbury, eds. Clayton, Australia: Monash AsiaInstitute, 1999.

60. J. Saunders, “Indonesian forces are part of theproblem in the Moluccas.” International HeraldTribune, July 4, 2000.


61. In July 2000, the Minister of Defense admitted thatthe government’s police and military were unable tomaintain security in the country and that it wouldtake “between 10 and 15 years” to build a well-functioning police force. “Indonesian governmentcannot guarantee internal security: minister.”Agence France-Presse, July 12, 2000.

62. “Plywood investors back off,” Jakarta Post, March18, 2000. Results of the APHI survey of conces-sion-related conflicts, including names of compa-nies and the specific demands of local communities,were published in “Darurat: Konflik Sosial”[“Emergency: Social Conflict”], Hutan Indonesia[Indonesian Forests, APHI’s newsletter] No. 7,March 2000.

63. “Conflicts between locals and timber companies togrow.” Jakarta Post, March 9, 2000. The articlequoted the Director General of Forest Production assaying that “social jealousy” was probably behindthe conflicts and that concession areas wereprobably disregarding local concerns and takingtheir lands without compensation.

64. For a detailed assessment of the situation in 20 ofIndonesia’s protected areas, see M. Wells et al.,Investing in Biodiversity: A Review of Indonesia’sIntegrated Conservation and Development Projects.Washington DC: World Bank, 1999.

65. “Locals take over most of Lore Lindu NationalPark,” Indonesian Observer, January 12, 2000.

66. “Foreign NGO blasts destruction of national park.”Indonesian Observer, January 20, 2000.

67. See, for example, “Indonesia’s indigenous peoples’demands for change.” Down to Earth (43), Novem-ber 1999. Newsletter.

68. For analysis of forest policy reform efforts in theyear following Suharto’s downfall, see: Haryanto,ed., 1998. Kehutanan Indonesia Pasca Soeharto:Reformasi Tanpa Perubahan. [Indonesian ForestryAfter Soeharto: Reform Without Change.] Bogor:Pustaka Latin; F.J. Seymour and N.K. Dubash, TheRight Conditions: The World Bank, StructuralAdjustment, and Forest Policy Reform. Washington,DC: World Resources Institute, 2000.

69. “Forestry commitments to CGI donors won’t bemet: minister.” Agence France-Presse, April 3,2001.

70. “Policy Dialogue for Creation of a ConduciveEnvironment for Sustainable Management of AllTypes of Forests in Indonesia.” Position paperpresented on behalf of the Donors by the EuropeanCommission, 11th Consultative Group Meeting onIndonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia. April 23-24, 2001.

71. “Policy Dialogue for Creation of a ConduciveEnvironment for Sustainable Management of AllTypes of Forests in Indonesia.” Position paperpresented on behalf of the Donors by the EuropeanCommission, 11th Consultative Group Meeting onIndonesia, Jakarta, Indonesia. April 23-24, 2001.

72. “Call for a Moratorium on Industrial Logging:Supporting Implementation of the Government ofIndonesia’s Commitments to Forestry SectorReform.” Prepared for the 11th CGI Meeting,Jakarta, April 23-24, 2001. WALHI-The IndonesianForum for Environment. Online at http://www.walhi.or.id/KAMPANYE/Moratorium.htm


GLOSSARY

Deforestation: The permanent removal of forest coverand conversion of the land to other uses. Accordingto the land use definition used by FAO and acceptedby most governments, forest land that has beenharvested, even clear-cut, is not regarded asdeforested because, in principle, trees may regrowor be replanted. Deforestation is recorded onlywhen the land is permanently converted tononforest use. However, the remote sensing imageryused in this report to determine land cover (thepresence or absence of forest) over time does notmake such a distinction and clear-cut land has beenrecorded as nonforest or deforested land.

DFID: Department for International Development,United Kingdom

EPIQ/NRM: Environmental Policy and InstitutionalStrengthening Indefinite Quantity Contract/NaturalResources Management Program. A program of theUnited States Agency for International Develop-ment (USAID).

Estate Crops: Agricultural crops grown on plantations.The most widely grown estate crops include rubber,oil palm, coconut, cocoa, and tea.

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations

Forest Degradation: May be generally defined as areduction in tree density and/or increased distur-bance to the forest that results in the loss of forestproducts and forest-derived ecological services. TheFAO defines degradation as changes within theforest class (for example, from closed to openforest) that negatively affect the stand or site and, inparticular, lower production capacity. Common

causes of forest degradation include selectivefelling, fuelwood collection, road building, andshifting cultivation.

Forest/Forest Cover: Land on which trees form thedominant vegetation type. The FAO defines forestas land with tree crown cover of more than 10percent of the ground and land area of more than0.5 ha. In addition, the trees should characteristi-cally reach a minimum height of 5 m at maturity. Itshould be noted that a canopy cover threshold of 10percent represents quite sparse tree cover; mostnatural forest in Indonesia is closed canopy forest.The Indonesian government uses a land usedefinition of forest in the various land use classesthat comprise “Permanent Forest Status” (seebelow). However, up to 20 percent of PermanentForest Status land has been deforested.

HPH (Hak Pengusahaan Hutan): A license that isgranted for the selective harvest of natural forestsover a given period, typically 20 years, and isrenewable for a further period, typically another 20years. The licenses are intended to maintain theforest as permanent production forest.

HTI (Hutan Tanaman Industri): A license to grow anindustrial forest to supply industrial fiber, usuallypulpwood, for 35 years plus 1 rotation period(typically 8 years for pulpwood.) The license maybe renewed for a further 35 years. Licensees areallowed to clear 100 percent of the land area but arerequired to plant only 25 percent. This limitedplanting requirement is not always met. Industrialforests are supposed to be established on degradedland, but in practice they are sometimes establishedafter clear-cutting natural forest.

Accessed Forest: A term used in this report to describeforest that has been disturbed by human activity.Accessed forests are defined not according to ameasure of biological disturbance but by theproximity of the forest to roads, navigable rivers (inthe case of Kalimantan), human settlements,agriculture, mines, and other developments. Forestsare considered accessed if they are within 0.5 km ofrivers or 1 km of roads and other features. (See alsoLow Access Forest.)

Afforestation: The establishment by human action offorest cover on land that was not previously forestedor was not forested within living memory.

BAPPENAS (Badan Perencanaan PembangunanNasional): National Development Planning Agency

BPS (Baden Pusat Statistik): Central Statistics Board

CIFOR: Center for International Forestry Research

Clear-cutting: The complete removal of all tree coverfor wood harvesting and/or land clearance.

Concession: An area of natural forest designated forselective harvest under an HPH license. (See alsoProduction Forest.)

Conservation Forest: Forest that is designated forwildlife or habitat protection, usually found withinnational parks and other protected areas.

Conversion Forest: Forest that is designated (under anIPK license) for clearance and permanent conver-sion to another form of land use, typically a timberor estate crop plantation.


ICRAF: International Centre for Research inAgroforestry

IPK (Ijin Pemanfaatan Kayu): A license to clear landfor the purposes of establishing industrial timberplantations, agricultural plantations (for example,oil palm), transmigration sites, or other develop-ment schemes. Although the ostensible purpose ofIPKs is to establish plantations, they are sometimesmore highly valued for the roundwood yielded byland clearance. Wood harvested from IPKs providesa major share of total roundwood supplies inIndonesia.

IUCN: World Conservation Union

Limited Production Forest: Forest that is allocated forlow-intensity timber production. Typically, limitedproduction forest is found in mountainous areaswhere steep slopes make logging difficult.

Low Access Forest: A term used in this report todescribe primary or mature secondary-growthforests that are relatively undisturbed by humanactivity. Low access forests are defined according totheir area and distance from roads, navigable rivers(in the case of Kalimantan), human settlements,agriculture, mines, and other development. Theminimum distance from these features is 0.5-1 km.Low Access Forests allocated for use under anHPH, HTI, or IPK license are defined as potentiallylow access forests. (See also Accessed Forest.)

MOF: Ministry of Forestry. See also Note 1 of this report.

Natural Forest: Forests composed primarily of indig-enous trees that have not been planted by humans.Natural forests exclude plantations.

NFI (National Forest Inventory): The NFI, publishedin 1996, was undertaken by the Indonesian govern-ment (Ministry of Forestry) with financial supportfrom the World Bank and technical assistance fromthe Food and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations (FAO).

Nonforest: Any land use or land cover category otherthan forest.

Permanent Forest Status: Land that is legally allocatedas part of the national forest estate and falls underthe control of the Ministry of Forestry. The termrefers to land use (land intended for the purposes offorestry) not to land cover (land covered with trees).Land under permanent forest status is not necessar-ily forested and is not therefore the equivalent offorest cover (see above).

Plantations: Forest stands established by planting and/or seeding in the process of afforestation or refores-tation. They comprise either introduced species (allplanted stands) or intensively managed stands ofindigenous species. Plantations may be establishedto provide wood products (timber, pulp) or suchagricultural crops as oil palm and coconut.

Production Forest: Forest that falls within the bound-aries of a timber concession (under an HPH license)and is managed for timber production. Under goodmanagement, harvesting levels are balanced byplanting and regrowth so that the forest willcontinue to produce wood indefinitely. In practice,forests within timber concessions are often heavilylogged and sometimes clear-cut.

Protection Forest: Forest that is intended to serveenvironmental functions, typically to maintain

vegetation cover and soil stability on steep slopesand to protect watersheds.

Reforestation: The establishment by humans of forestcover on land that was formerly forested.

Regrowth: The reappearance of forest on cleared orselectively logged land through natural regenera-tion.

RePPProT (The Regional Physical PlanningProgramme for Transmigration): A nationalsurvey, published in 1990, that included a mappingexercise, carried out by the Indonesian government(Ministry of Transmigration) with funds andtechnical assistance provided by the British govern-ment.

Roundwood: All wood in its natural state obtained fromfelling or other forms of harvesting. Commoditiesproduced from roundwood include sawlogs andveneer logs, pulpwood, wood-based panels, otherprocessed wood products, other industrial round-wood (including mining pitprops), and fuelwood.

Selective Logging/Selective Harvesting: The selectiveremoval of specific tree species or trees of a specificsize or other quality. Selective logging, dependingon its intensity, may or may not result in partialopening of the canopy cover. Even very low-intensity selective logging may lead to forestdegradation if trees are felled carelessly or areremoved roughly from the surrounding forest.

UNEP-WCMC: United Nations EnvironmentProgramme-World Conservation MonitoringCentre.


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Annex 1 Guest Commentaries on Data Difficulties

The following contributions were solicited byGlobal Forest Watch from two experienced re-searchers in the field of Indonesian forestry. Bothare based on personal experiences and offer somefrank insights into the obstacles that can block thepath of those who wish to compile and analyzecredible forestry statistics for Indonesia. The storiesare backward-looking in that they generally describeconditions prevailing under the Suharto regime.They do not reflect the genuine efforts among atleast some members of more recent administrationsto improve both the quality of and access to forestrydata. Nevertheless, Tim Brown’s observation that“official data from the Ministry of Forestry some-times seem surreal” is as valid today as it was in the1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

ing sector so that wood use, efficiency, productivity,and trends can be examined. The dataset offers greatadvantages: it is collected independently using aconsistent approach every year. The large sampleallows a reasonable projection to the entire popula-tion. Best of all, compared to Ministry of Forestrysources, it provides disaggregated firm level data – nonames, though – that can be analyzed by region orsubsector.

Excitement turned to exhaustion after the fourth orfifth month of waiting – after we had paid – to get theelectronic data from our BPS contact. Exhaustionnearly reached exasperation as we found that all thisdetail had to be cleaned and organized before the datacould be sorted or analyzed. Because BPS workswith all sectors, firms must specify their own line ofproducts (with no codes or guidelines), which can begeneral or specific (e.g., plywood or teak plywood)and can use Indonesian (e.g., kayu lapis) or English.Self-reporting also means potential for bias, gaps,mismatched units, or such incredible results as outputvolumes that exceed input volumes. Also note thatthe general questionnaire may not offer specifics thatsome analysts would want (e.g., timber from “con-cession,” “conversion,” or “purchased”). Foremostamong the disadvantages, though, is the delay of upto 2 years for BPS to get the data into a processedform: data from 1998 are not yet available (in 2001).

Whose “Official” Data ShouldWe Believe?

By Tim Brown

Central Statistics Board (BPS) Data onIndonesia’s Forestry Sector1

One current focus of policy debate in Indonesia ison the sources and trends in forest use and timberharvesting as well as on the industry restructuringneeded to face the future. Estimates of wood useand industrial capacity vary all over the map (25-90million m3 of wood per year), depending on theassumptions – and you have to use assumptionsbecause the official data from the Ministry ofForestry are notoriously “weak.”

The Natural Resources Management (NRM) Pro-gram of USAID was excited by the prospect ofanalyzing data on the wood processing industry fromthe annual Survey of Large & Medium Manufacturersconducted by the Central Statistics Board (BadanPusat Statistik, BPS), which sets the standard forquality official data in Indonesia. This survey at-tempts complete enumeration of all industrial sectorsbased on a standard questionnaire with a responserate of over 85 percent. It provides detailed informa-tion about the structure of Indonesia’s wood process-

1. Based on: “Overview Of Commercial Forestry Sector: Analysis of BPS Survey of Manufacturing,”Presentation by Natural Resources Management (NRM) Program Policy, and Planning Group andProtected Areas and Forest Management Group. Jakarta, Indonesia, June 2000.


manufacturing” (including wood processing andpaper) in a quarterly time series that can be tracedbackwards relatively easily. Starting in January 1999,though, BPS stopped including all the detailedsubsector data in the booklet. These data can beobtained, but not conveniently, through monthlyperiodicals available through the BPS bookstore.

The Ministry of Forestry’s Statistical Yearbook isconsiderably more difficult to work with. Thepublication is structured differently in differentyears. Although many of the tables are the same,content or definitions change with little warning ordocumentation. And because these documents havenever been widely disseminated, it can becomealmost a word-of-mouth process to find a copy for aparticular year. Most of mine are copies of copies.

Most years, the log and processed wood productiondata are published by month and by province. . .butnot every year. For 1994 and 1995 (importantprecrisis years for the time series), log production isavailable by month, but volume of processed woodproducts is not. Even the log production, or harvestdata, are not consistent. Some years “wood chips” arereported monthly by province but are not includedunder “total harvest.” Is that because “wood chips”aren’t “roundwood” or because they are lumped withsomething else? For the early 1990s, these consis-tency and continuity problems were even greater.

Even when monthly data on processed wood prod-ucts are reported, great detail is sometimes provided

Still, through much effort by a team of analysts, wewere able to calculate that Indonesia’s solid wood-processing industry was using at least 33.1 millioncubic meters of wood per year in the mid-1990s(sawmills: 9.4 million m3; plymills: 23.7 million m3).These figures are for a period (1994-1997) when theMinistry of Forestry was reporting official logproduction of about 25 million m3 per year. Theestimate is a lower bound because it does not includeall small sawmills (potentially another 5-6 million m3

per year) or the pulp and paper sector, which wasthen using as much as 15 million m3 per year.

Though this is just one in a sea of estimates, itcarries the credibility of BPS and establishes arealistic lower bound backed by firm level data.This “minimum estimate” represents a prodigiousvolume of wood and a major pressure onIndonesia’s forests. Further, it is about 40 percenthigher than the Ministry of Forestry reports. Theenormous potential of this database remains un-tapped, mainly owing to constraints of time, money,and demand from counterparts.

A Series of Troubles with Time Series 2

Indonesia’s financial (and political) crisis is not over.In addition to profound human effects, most peoplebelieve that the crisis has important impacts onnatural resources. Discussions of this topic usuallyrely on anecdotal evidence, however, rather than onrigorous analysis. Consistent time series data are thekey to tracing the effects of the crisis on forests.

Two sources come to mind for an economist who isreaching for the closest, easiest secondary data. TheMinistry of Forestry, Directorate General for ForestUtilization publishes a Forest Utilization StatisticalYearbook annually. It reports monthly production ofroundwood (harvests from concessions, conversion,woodlots, plantations, etc.) and processed wood (inthe form of plywood, sawnwood, and other types ofwood products). These statistics are based on thereal world (volumes harvested, hectares converted),although, admittedly, official data from the Ministryof Forestry sometimes seem surreal.

Indonesia’s Central Statistics Board, which sets thestandard for official data, publishes such keyeconomic indicators as Gross Domestic Product andvalue of exports every quarter. It tracks economicsubsectors including forestry (as part of the agricul-ture and natural resources sector) and forest prod-ucts (as part of the manufacturing sector). Much ofthis information is financial, however, at least in theeasily obtained Monthly Indicators document.

Data quality aside, it seems that these two sourcesshould be combined and compared to analyze crisisimpacts from both a financial (earnings) and real(volumes) perspective. Even without the crisis,comparing the volume data from one source withthe earnings data from another source would beinteresting. Easy, except for the devilish details.

Until the end of 1998, BPS’s Monthly Indicatorsbooklet included all the subsectors of “general

2. “Natural Resource Impacts Of Indonesia’s Financial Crisis.” NRM Program, Policy and Planning Group.Presentation for BAPPENAS. Jakarta, Indonesia. August 2000. Updated semi-annually.


for all minor products, such as block board, veneer,particle board, chips, pulp, moulding, dowels, andpaper. Other years these details are not provided. Isthat because there was no production that year? Orbecause the aggregation scheme was different? Watchout for the units, too: older issues report pulp in cubicmeters, instead of tons, as is more usual. Seemswrong, but how can you be sure?

More recently, it has become easier to track downthe people responsible for these reports and get thedata on a disk. The quality and consistency of thereports are improving, as is the Ministry of Forestrywebsite (www.mofrinet.cbn.net.id).

Timothy H. BrownNatural Resource Economics Policy AdvisorRatu Plaza building, 17th FloorJalan Jend. Sudirman No. 9Jakarta 10270Phone: +62 21 720 9596Fax. : +62 21 720 4546E-Mail: [email protected];[email protected]

Secrecy in the Indonesian ForestProducts Sector:A Researcher’s Experience

By David W. Brown

How difficult is it to obtain information on theIndonesian forest products industry? It is possible toget this type of information, but researchers must betenacious and willing to live with setbacks of yearsat a time.

In 1993, I was awarded a grant from the U.S. SocialScience Research Council and the Ford Foundationto study the Indonesian forest products industry. Iwas to have initiated my work that very summer,but I had to wait 2 years for approval from Indone-sian authorities to begin my research. I managed touse the first year in the United States productively,but the second year was almost totally wasted. Inexperiencing such delays, I was not alone. In thefirst half of the 1990s, many researchers weredenied permission to study even innocuous topics inIndonesia. However, because I was never actuallydenied permission to enter the country, I do nothave evidence that anyone in the governmentobjected to my topic.

I never did get formal approval from the Indonesiangovernment to conduct research. Instead, I con-tacted a tropical forestry expert with the WorldBank in Indonesia and asked him to sponsor mywork. He agreed and arranged for a 1-year appoint-ment in the Bank as an unpaid natural resourcespecialist. The visa that accompanied that appoint-ment was indispensable to my being able to startmy research.

But problems quickly emerged at my sponsoringinstitution, the World Bank. The forestry expert whoarranged for me to enter Indonesia was reassignedto Washington. Some of those who remained inJakarta were hostile to my research. For example,one staffer withheld a document she had beeninstructed to pass along to me and told me, in herown words, that she did not “trust” me. The realsetback came when the Bank’s Chief of Missionbarred me from coming into the Bank’s offices. Idid not insist on the Bank’s honoring its commit-ment to me because this could have resulted in myvisa being revoked. I made a decision to lay low anddid not return to the Bank until years later.

Fortunately, a forestry aid project sponsored by theUnited Kingdom’s Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID) saw value in my work. At theend of my formal scholarly research, the DFIDhired me for a consultancy, which helped me obtaina wealth of data. Later I went to work there fulltime. The DFID had built up a great deal of trustand goodwill in the Indonesian Department ofForestry over the course of a decade and, as anemployee of their project, I benefited from thattrust. When I asked the department for sensitivedocuments, I would usually receive them, but onlybecause I was affiliated with the project.

Even though I came to enjoy a solid institutionalentrée to the Indonesian Department of Forestry, Ioccasionally ran into resistance. This first happenedwhen I was given obviously fake data on thedomestic price of Indonesian roundwood. Thedepartment told me that Indonesian mills werebuying logs from Indonesian timber concessionairesfor US$100 per m3, when in fact our project knew


that mills were buying legal wood for half that priceand illegal wood for one fifth that price. Why wouldthe department deliberately overstate the domesticprice of logs? The government wished to obscurethe fact that Indonesian plywood factories weremaking enormous windfall profits from buyingIndonesian logs at low prices on the glutted domes-tic market and then processing those cheap logs intoplywood and selling them at full prices on the worldmarket. Meanwhile, Indonesia was taxing timberconcessionaires and wood processors at suboptimalrates. Therefore, instead of the majority of potentialrevenue being officially collected by the govern-ment to pursue national economic developmentobjectives, the timber industry and their patrons inthe government unofficially appropriated themajority of revenue. To some extent, the Depart-ment of Forestry was able to hide this practice bygiving out inflated domestic log price information.

A second instance of obstruction came when anofficial in the Indonesian Department of Forestryexpressed reservations about my borrowing annualwork plans for timber concessions in easternIndonesia. When I left his office with harvestingplans for a dozen concessions, he warned me,“Don’t leak these.” When I analyzed the workplans, I began to see why he had issued this warn-ing. Maps of one concessionaire, Brata Jaya Utama,owned by the National Police, showed that thecompany was logging inside a biodiversity hotspot,Manusela National Park, on Seram Island. (I neverleaked this information but did report it to theformer head of the department’s planning body inan official letter.) I also discovered that anothertimber concession, located in a biologically sensi-tive buffer zone between two proposed parks on

David W. Brown worked as a political economist forthe UK-Indonesia Tropical Forest ManagementProgramme, and as a forest products investmentanalyst with the global investment bank of DresdnerKleinwort Benson. In recent years he has alsoundertaken consultancies for the World Bank, theIndonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, and TheNature Conservancy. Brown was recently awardeda Ph.D. by the Political Science Department of theUniversity of Washington. His dissertation explainshow the secret appropriation of timber windfallprofits by political leaders undermines timberrevenue policy in developing nations.

Halmahera island, which had been turned over toone of the state forestry corporations for the purposeof rehabilitation, was not being rehabilitated at all,but instead its virgin forests were being harvested.

Although I did encounter resistance from variousinstitutions, I do not wish to characterize them asnontransparent just because some of their employ-ees went out of their way to withhold information.Rather, it is important to take a broader view of thestructural constraints on these institutions. Tropicaltimber as a commodity embodies high levels ofwindfall profit, whose very existence creates astrong disincentive for the proper management ofthe resource. Years of rent-seeking at all levels ofthe Indonesian government, especially at the top,have crippled the ability of institutions, includingthe Department of Forestry, to regulate industryproperly. Meanwhile, multilateral and bilateraldonors have their own sets of constraints. On theone hand, donors are compelled to give out loans orgrants to economically distressed governments but,on the other hand, are institutionally incapable ofensuring that these funds are not simply appropri-ated by government leaders.

In summary, agencies that work in and around thetropical timber sector face structural barriers thatprevent their employees from doing the right thing.Nevertheless, all these agencies have at least somegood employees working in them. These staff aregenuinely committed to the survival of the forestand to the people whose lives most directly dependupon it. Researchers must strive to identify theseemployees, befriend them, not place them in danger,and above all, report the truth.


Annex 2 Tables7991,revoCtseroFlautcAdnasutatStseroFtnenamreP1elbaTxennA 7991,revoCtseroFlautcAdnasutatStseroFtnenamreP1elbaTxennA 7991,revoCtseroFlautcAdnasutatStseroFtnenamreP1elbaTxennA 7991,revoCtseroFlautcAdnasutatStseroFtnenamreP1elbaTxennA 7991,revoCtseroFlautcAdnasutatStseroFtnenamreP1elbaTxennA

ecnivorP dnaLlatoTaerA )aH(

noitavresnoCtseroF )aH(

noitcetorPtseroF )aH(

noitcudorPdetimiLtseroF )aH(

noitcudorPtseroF )aH(

tseroFtnenamrePsutatS )aH(

tseroFlautcArevoC )aH(

noisrevnoCtseroF )aH(

hecA 008,476,5 124,258 005,448,1 003,73 293,106 316,533,3 359,116,3 0

artamuSnrehtroN 001,052,7 588,352 535,429,1 859,067 381,178 165,018,3 918,198,1 797,73

artamuSnretseW 000,961,4 571,648 335,019 383,642 948,704 049,014,2 510,449,1 643,981

uaiR 007,958,9 732,065 108,323,1 0 806,946,2 646,335,4 198,170,5 125,433

ibmaJ 009,378,4 021,676 031,191 007,043 094,179 044,971,2 970,306,1 0

artamuSnrehtuoS 003,622,01 003,228 093,978 006,892 004,962,2 096,962,4 902,842,1 001,477

ulukgneB 004,090,2 288,444 240,252 012,281 038,14 469,029 858,998 063,07

gnupmaL 007,683,3 005,224 135,133 021,44 209,291 350,199 913,163 954,351

artamuS 009,035,74 025,878,4 264,756,7 172,019,1 456,500,8 709,154,22 341,236,61 385,955,1

natnamilaKtseW 000,357,41 084,534,1 540,553,2 059,124,2 007,532,2 571,844,8 620,317,6 023,285

natnamilaKlartneC 004,063,51 085,086 031,410,1 300,395,4 222,844,4 539,537,01 000,009,9 0

natnamilaKhtuoS 000,947,3 516,671 931,455 862,551 438,786 658,375,1 281,999 836,562

natnamilaKtsaE 000,127,91 212,661,2 874,539,2 494,557,4 884,727,4 276,485,41 000,009,31 0

natnamilaK 004,385,35 788,854,4 297,858,6 517,529,11 442,990,21 836,243,53 802,215,13 859,748

isewaluShtroN 005,556,2 560,924 744,143 375,255 801,861 391,194,1 000,003,1 218,43

isewaluSlartneC 009,230,6 842,676 329,984,1 613,674,1 430,384 125,521,4 000,004,3 114,962

isewaluShtuoS 001,542,6 669,348 795,829,1 552,828 666,681 484,787,3 000,003,2 370,201

isewaluStsaehtuoS 000,186,3 960,472 072,160,1 442,914 134,336 410,883,2 000,000,2 321,212

isewaluS 005,416,81 843,322,2 732,128,4 883,672,3 932,174,1 212,297,11 000,000,9 914,816

sdnalsI3:latotbuS 008,827,911 557,065,11 194,733,91 473,211,71 731,675,12 757,685,96 153,441,75 069,520,3

ilaBdnaavaJ 004,028,31 332,864 156,827 613,493 383,336,1 385,422,3 573,649,1 0

araggneTasuN 000,470,8 417,765 814,175,1 752,156 623,676 517,664,3 003,064 766,253

ukulaM 009,108,7 543,344 436,908,1 526,356,1 171,350,1 577,959,4 605,345,5 239,430,2

ayaJnairI 000,084,14 003,935,7 099,254,11 574,563,3 486,973,01 944,737,23 132,061,33 572,176,2

AISENODNILATOT 001,509,091 743,975,02 481,009,43 740,771,32 107,813,53 972,579,311 367,452,89 438,480,8

:ecruoS .0002,semloH:etoN .0002,knaBdlroW/IOGnodesabsetamitseWFGeraaraggneTasuNdnailaB/avaJrof7991,revoCtseroFlautcA


seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP2elbaTxennA seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP2elbaTxennA seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP2elbaTxennA seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP2elbaTxennA seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP2elbaTxennA

ynapmoC renwOylimaFotrahuS rotceSaerA)aH( noitacoL

iratseLinatuHodnidA idayiraHitaideHitiS noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 182,102 natnamilaKtseW

lanoisanretnIartuPahrA tigiSirA tnempoleveDtseroFtaeP 004,4 uaiR

)I(etatsEanauB ojdetusoborP mlaPliO,tunocoC,aocoC,rebbuR:noitatnalP 887,1 artamuShtroN

)II(etatsEanauB ojdetusoborP aocoC,mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 357 artamuShtroN

)II(etatsEanauB ojdetusoborP aocoC,rebbuR:noitatnalP 659 artamuShtroN

gnalabmaHetatsEanauB ojdetusoborP rebbuR,tunocoC,evolC:noitatnalP 507 avaJtseW

ayaJahasUamatarPimuB artuPaladnaMomotuH noissecnoCgniggoL 000,65 artamuShtuoS

adasrePgnugorotmaLartiC anamkuRitnayidraHitiS aocoC:noitatnalP 585,1 natnamilaKtseW

turaGgnodnoC artuPaladnaMomotuH mlaP,liOtunocoC,rebbuR:noitatnalP 120,5 avaJtseW

IImuidircaD idayiraHitaideHitiS noissecnoCgniggoL 000,08 natnamilaKlartneC

arethajeSayluMardneRatuD ojdomtahirTgnabmaB noissecnoCgniggoL 000,512 natnamilaKtsaE

iratseLnamanaTsutpylacuE idayiraHitaideHitiS noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 009,892 ayaJnairI

amrahDitluMrajaF tigiSirA mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 579,51 isewaluShtuoS

ayaJgnurunaMawoG omotraHunbI.rD mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 000,01 artamuShtuoS

marataMhituPaluG ojdomtahirTgnabmaB enaCraguS:noitatnalP 000,81 gnupmaL

tnalPudaMgnunuG otnadujojraHtigiS enaCraguS:noitatnalP 902,71 gnupmaL

ijaniSgnunuG artuPaladnaMomotuH mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP .d.n isewaluShtuoS

atarunaH noitadnuoFylimaF noissecnoCgniggoL 006,151 natnamilaKtsaE

atarunaH noitadnuoFylimaF noissecnoCgniggoL 005,881 ayaJnairI

atarunaH noitadnuoFylimaF noissecnoCgniggoL 075,174 ayaJnairI

amatUatiKnaparaH ojdomtahirTgnabmaB noissecnoCgniggoL 005,831 natnamilaKtseW

irabaNaharGssupmuH artuPaladnaMomotuH mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP .d.n artamuStseW

AFI anamkuRitnayidraHitiS noissecnoCgniggoL 001,842 ibmaJ

asakrePgnupmaLodnI ojdomtahirTgnabmaB enaCraguS:noitatnalP 104,12 gnupmaL

ICTI ojdomtahirTgnabmaB noissecnoCgniggoL 375,262 natnamilaKtsaE

asrakakEaratnobaJ otnadujojdraHantaR mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 680,01 natnamilaKtsaE

gnugAarticiruPinarahaM idayiraHitaideHitiS mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP .d.n artamuStseW


2elbaTxennA 2elbaTxennA 2elbaTxennA 2elbaTxennA 2elbaTxennA deunitnoc( seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP) seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP) seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP) seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP) seinapmoCnoitatnalPdnagniggoLylimaFotrahuSfotsiLlaitraP)

ynapmoC renwOylimaFotrahuS rotceSaerA)aH( noitacoL

ayaJnoyaRinarahaM idayiraHitaideHitiS noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 008,602 ayaJnairI

iamrePaladnaM artuPaladnaMomotuH aocoC:noitatnalP 635 avaJtseW

iekitnaM idayiraHitaideHitiS noissecnoCgniggoL 000,04 natnamilaKlartneC

rebmiTipaleM anamkuRitnayidraHitiS noissecnoCgniggoL 000,051 natnamilaKtsaE

anauBnatuHaraneM ojdetusoborP noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 585,862 natnamilaKhtuoS

)VI(anauBirTaraneM ojdetusoborP aocoC,adirbiH,tunocoC:noitatnalP 979 isewaluShtuoS

anauBirTaraneM ojdetusoborP adirbiH,tunocoC:noitatnalP 590,83 isewaluShtuoS

)III(anauBujtreM ojdetusoborP aocoC:noitatnalP 675,4 ulukgneB

irtsudnItubmagitluM idayiraHitaideHitiS mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 540,32 uaiR

adasrePnatuHisuM anamkuRitnayidraHitiS noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 004,692 artamuShtuoS

anahaWgnadniRisuM anamkuRitnayidraHitiS mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 020,7 artamuShtuoS

rumkaMabmiRabakO idayiraHitaideHitiS noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 005,382 ayaJnairI

nagnabmanaP nasayaY noissecnoCgniggoL 687,44 natnamilaKtsaE

hadnIsinaMitkaSakumeP .d.n enaCraguS:noitatnalP 000,03 gnupmaL

itajeSinaTasrakarP idayiraHitaideHitiS mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 970,61 uaiR

oiraMetnaR artuPaladnaMomotuH noissecnoCgniggoL 000,411 isewaluShtuoS

)III(imubirasojeR .d.n rebbuR,aocoC,tunocoC:noitatnalP 314 avaJtseW

)III(imubirasojeR anamkuRitnayidraHitiS natnA,rebbuR,ipoK,heT:noitatnalP 157 avaJtseW

)VI(imubirasojeR anamkuRitnayidraHitiS kanreT,natnA,rebbuR,evolC:noitatnalP 321 avaJtseW

imubirasojeR anamkuRitnayidraHitiS noissecnoCgniggoL 090,75 natnamilaKtsaE

ruhuLitajeSaraduaS onomtakiwduS mlaPliO:noitatnalP 913,2 artamuShtroN

ayaRrablaKraniS idayiraHitaideHitiS noitatnalPpluP/rebmiT 513,27 natnamilaKtseW

gnupmaLodnIteewS ojdomtahirTgnabmaB enaCraguS:noitatnalP 534,52 gnupmaL

gnugAicnireKicnireKradiT idayiraHitaideHitiS mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 334,81 artamuStseW

aisenodnIartuPairtaSnadirT anamkuRitnayidraHitiS enaCraguS:noitatnalP romiTtsaE

itkaSiraSanahaW otnadujojdraHantaR noissecnoCgniggoL 000,001 isewaluSlartneC

anadrePojeronoW otiwusotoN rebbuR,mlaPliO,tunocoC:noitatnalP 190,9 artamuShtroN

:ecruoS .8rebmeceD,tnemecnuonnA.8991.sporCetatsEdnayrtseroFfoyrtsiniM


8991–5891,ecnivorPdnanoigeRybaerAnoissecnoC3elbaTxennA 8991–5891,ecnivorPdnanoigeRybaerAnoissecnoC3elbaTxennA 8991–5891,ecnivorPdnanoigeRybaerAnoissecnoC3elbaTxennA 8991–5891,ecnivorPdnanoigeRybaerAnoissecnoC3elbaTxennA 8991–5891,ecnivorPdnanoigeRybaerAnoissecnoC3elbaTxennA

ecnivorP 5891 0991 1991 2991 3991 4991 5991 6991 7991 8991hecA 000,115,1 00,565,41 005,877,1 007,308,1 009,202,2 007,308,1 001,438,1 008,816,1 416,274,1 00.407,475,1

artamuS.N 000,199 004,520,1 086,990,1 006,080,1 000,978 006,080,1 006,330,1 006,059 099,137 00.887,547

artamuS.W 000,059 000,869 000,089 002,667 002,215 002,667 009,165 009,825 032,214 00.016,054

uaiR 000,130,6 000,534,6 000,541,6 030,184,5 021,138,5 820,184,5 858,230,5 348,284,4 993,351,4 00.984,282,3

ibmaJ 000,883,2 000,266,2 000,943,2 076,812,2 101,486,2 076,812,2 007,251,2 986,451,2 977,744,1 00.994,311,1

artamuS.S 000,689,1 000,162,2 000,115 055,178,1 003,407,1 055,178,1 058,747,1 058,604,1 058,132,1 00.082,021,1

ulukgneB 000,992 000,114 008,505,2 009,253 000,573 009,253 009,253 009,253 009,253 00.009,253

gnupmaL 000,771 000,091 000,591 000,04 0 000,04 0 0 0 0

artamuSlatoT 000,333,41 004,259,31 089,365,51 056,416,31 126,881,41 846,416,31 809,517,21 285,594,11 267,208,9 00.072,046,8

natnamilaK.W 000,209,5 001,258,5 000,695,5 093,905,5 006,131,6 593,905,5 032,472,5 005,718,4 005,351,5 00.630,647,4

natnamilaK.C 000,541,11 000,847,11 000,790,11 057,905,11 252,468,01 057,905,11 465,251,11 905,198,9 577,365,9 00.494,009,7

natnamilaK.S 000,974,1 005,321,1 000,332,1 059,552,1 005,240,1 059,552,1 059,712,1 097,941,1 013,201,1 00.078,209

natnamilaK.E 000,900,21 008,624,21 007,653,11 034,102,31 104,682,21 524,102,31 512,077,21 991,902,11 458,426,01 00.420,794,9

natnamilaKlatoT 000,535,03 004,051,13 007,282,92 025,674,13 357,423,03 025,674,13 959,414,03 899,760,72 934,444,62 00.424,640,32

isewaluS.N 000,294 008,245 000,557 001,995 003,162 001,955 056,676 056,676 056,676 00.056,676

isewaluS.C 000,621,2 000,966,1 000,809,1 005,769,1 001,232,2 005,769,1 005,157,1 097,456,1 014,046,1 00.882,135,1

isewaluS.S 000,621,2 000,972 000,746 002,156 264,785 791,156 755,925 269,734 206,684 00.206,684

isewaluS.E.S 000,442 000,086 000,893 000,156 000,156 000,156 000,156 000,156 000,156 00.005,194

isewaluSlatoT 000,889,4 008,071,3 000,807,3 008,868,3 268,137,3 797,828,3 707,806,3 204,024,3 266,454,3 00.040,681,3

araggneTasuN 000,02 005,09 005,08 005,08 001,18 005,08 005,08 005,08 005,08 00.005,08

ukulaM 000,062,2 000,723,3 008,140,3 039,725,3 003,547,3 529,725,3 321,380,3 321,380,3 321,380,3 00.902,870,3

ayaJnairI 000,218,2 008,437,5 003,227,7 005,791,9 009,466,9 005,791,9 075,710,11 075,710,11 030,622,11 00.377,094,11

AISENODNILATOT 000,849,45 004,188,85 082,993,95 001,798,75 635,637,16 098,527,16 767,029,06 650,388,35 615,862,45 612,225,94

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Annex 3 Data Sources and Technical Notes

Land Cover Data

Natural Forest Cover in 1985

Source: World Conservation Monitoring Centre(UNEP-WCMC). 1996. Tropical Moist Forests andProtected Areas: The Digital Files. Version 1. Cam-bridge: World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Centrefor International Forestry Research, and OverseasDevelopment Administration of the United Kingdom.

Date: Data are from various years in the early 1980s butare generally taken to describe the situation in 1985.

Scale: 1:250,000. The dataset was gridded by GFW at1:500,000 to enable overlay with the GOI/World Bank,2000 dataset (see below).

Comments: The WCMC dataset represents a modifiedversion of the RePPProT survey. It harmonizes the 12forest cover types of RePPProT to 6 classes: mangroveforest, inland swamp forest, montane rainforest, lowlandrainforest, montane monsoon forest, and lowlandmonsoon forest. Total forest area, according to GFW’sanalysis of the dataset, is 117.2 million ha, comparedwith 119.7 million ha reported in RePPProT. Thedifference may be accounted for by our stricter interpre-tation of “no data” or otherwise unclassified areas. Wefound 1.1 million ha of “no data” areas and more than 6million ha of unclassified area, most of which isprobably nonforest, but some of which might plausiblybe assumed to be forest. (See also Box 2.1 of thisreport.)

Natural Forest Cover, Logging Concessions,Industrial Timber Plantations, and EstateCrop Plantations

Source: Directorate General of Forest Inventory andLand Use Planning, Ministry of Forestry, Governmentof Indonesia, and Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations (GOI-FAO). 1996. National ForestInventory of Indonesia (NFI): Final Forest ResourcesStatistics Report. Field Document No. 55 and associateddigital files. Jakarta, Indonesia: GOI/FAO.

Date: Data are from various years in the early and mid-1990s but are generally taken to describe the situation inthe early 1990s.

Scale: 1:250,000

Comment: See Box 2.1 of this report.

Natural Forest Cover in 1997

Sources: Ministry of Forestry, Government of Indonesiaand World Bank (GOI/World Bank). 2000. Digitaldataset on CD-ROM; D. Holmes, 2000. Deforestation inIndonesia: A Review of the Situation in 1999. Consultantreport to the World Bank. Jakarta, Indonesia. Draft, July3.

Date: Most data are from 1996 to 1998 but in a fewareas are from 1994. An average year of 1997 isassumed.

Scale: 1:500,000

Comments: The dataset classifies forest and nonforestareas; it does not distinguish among different forestvegetation types. In the last draft of the report completedbefore his untimely death, Holmes did not provideestimates of forest cover in Java, Bali, or NusaTenggara. For this report, GFW calculated forest coverin these islands from the GOI/World Bank dataset. Wenote throughout where our estimates are being used.

For the sake of avoiding confusion, we quote Holmes’sfindings (supplemented by our own for the islands listedabove) throughout this report. However, in our spatialpresentations that involve the GOI/World Bank dataset(Maps 1, 2, and 3) we make no assumptions about forestcover in “no data” or “cloud cover” areas, and we depictthese areas simply as “no data.” This is not the case inthe maps that analyze the extent and condition of lowaccess forests (Maps 4, 5, and 6). For these maps, “nodata” areas occurring in areas that appear to lie withinpotentially intact forest areas have been “filled” usingland cover data from NFI, 1996. That is, the “no data”areas are classified as forest or nonforest, based on theinformation for those areas contained in the NFIvegetation cover dataset. (See also Box 2.1 of thisreport.)


Selected Tables: Data Sources andMethodology

Table 2.3 Forest Area and Deforestation,1985-1997 (GFW Estimate)

Table 2.2 presented in the body of this report utilizesdata from the original RePPProT survey for forest coverin 1985 and from the World Bank study for forest coverin 1997. Table 2.3 presents GFW’s deforestationestimates utilizing the modified RePPProT datasetdeveloped by UNEP-WCMC and our own analysis ofthe GOI/World Bank dataset. Our analysis of the UNEP-WCMC dataset finds a somewhat lower estimate of totalforest cover in 1985 than that of RePPProT. (SeeComment under Forest Cover in 1985, above).

Holmes reports a total of 12,786,970 ha as “no data”areas. The largest “no data” area was in Irian Jaya,owing to the heavy cloud cover in that mountainousarea. In a limited number of other provinces, listed inAnnex Table 4, Holmes estimated the percentage of “nodata” areas that were likely to be forested.

In total, Holmes estimated that of 5.3 million ha of “nodata” areas, 2.8 million ha (53 percent) should beclassified as forest. The area of assumed forest repre-sents 9 percent of the adjusted forest area for theprovinces presented in his report.

Our analysis of the GOI/World Bank dataset differsfrom that of Holmes in that we make no assumptionsabout possible forest cover in areas obscured by cloud,otherwise classified as “no data” or not classified at all(“unknown”). We categorize all these areas as “no data”;the total forest area is therefore lower (but not necessar-ily more accurate) than that produced by Holmes for the

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isewaluSlartneC 796,298,2 204,251,1 303,705 000,004,3 44

isewaluShtuoS 307,411,2 614,435 792,581 000,003,2 53

isewaluStsaehtuoS 627,579,1 045,923 472,42 000,000,2 7

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three major islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, andSulawesi. As mentioned above, Holmes did not com-plete estimates of forest cover for Java, Bali, or NusaTenggara. Our estimates of forest cover in these islandsare based only on areas positively identified as forest.After eliminating from consideration all “no data” areasin both the WCMC and GOI/World Bank datasets, wefound that deforestation between 1985 and 1997 totaled21.6 million ha, an area equivalent to 18 percent offorest cover at the beginning of the 12-year period. Inaddition, we overlaid the World Bank dataset withspatial data on industrial timber and estate crop planta-tion area from the NFI, 1996. By doing so, we identified6.6 million ha that may have been wrongly classified asnatural forest in the World Bank study. These areas areidentified in the relevant maps as areas “reported asplantations: status unknown.” However, in the absenceof ground truthing, we chose not to remove them fromour estimate of natural forest cover.

Table 2.6 Natural Forest, PotentiallyDegraded Forest, and Deforested Area, Mid-1990s

Source: GOI-FAO, 1996.

Methodology: Using the vegetation cover files of theNational Forest Inventory, the following initial forestcover classes were defined: mountain forest, highlandforest, lowland forest, mangrove forest, and swampforest. These classes were aggregated to one category ofnatural forest. This grid was overlaid successively withthe concession grid, industrial timber plantation andestate crop plantation grids, and spatial data on transmi-gration sites. Natural forest area that coincided with areaunder logging concession was defined as degraded (butsee the caveat in the text preceding Table 2.6). Naturalforest area that coincided with a plantation or a transmi-gration site was defined as deforested, on the assump-tion that natural forest so converted is unlikely to revertto natural forest cover. Where natural forest areacoincided with more than one other land use category,the hierarchy chosen was transmigration site > estatecrop > timber plantation > logging concession. Thus if atransmigration site coincided with a logging concession,the area was defined as deforested. The rationale for thisordering is that logging concessions can precede theother forms of forest conversion but cannot follow them.


Maps: Data Sources andMethodology

Map 1 Natural Forest Cover Change inIndonesia, 1985-1997

Sources: UNEP-WCMC, 1996, and GOI/World Bank,2000.

Methodology: The two forest cover grids were overlaidto highlight forest areas lost since 1985. “No data” areasare identified. In addition, some areas classified as“forest” in the World Bank dataset are classified in theNFI dataset as industrial timber plantations or estatecrop plantations. We identify these areas as “Reported asplantations: status unknown.” Given the lack of groundtruthing in the World Bank dataset, the areas areprobably plantations.

Map 2 Natural Forest Cover Change inKalimantan, 1985 –1997


Methodology: As Map 1 above.

Map 3 Loss of Lowland, Submontane andMontane Forest, 1985-1997


Methodology: The deforestation grid was overlaid witha digital elevation model (DEM) to classify deforestedareas by elevation. Lowland forests were considered tobe below 300m. Submontane forests were classified as

being between 300m and 1,000m. Montane forests werecategorized as being above 1,000m. The majority ofdeforestation has occurred in lowland forests.

Map 4 Extent and Distribution of Low Accessand Accessed Forest, 1997

Sources: Forest cover from GOI/World Bank, 2000;plantation and concession data from GOI/FAO, 1996;river data from Digital Chart of the World; road data(including major logging roads) from sources in theIndonesian Ministry of Transportation; settlements andtransmigration sites from the Ministry of Transmigra-tion, provided by FWI.

Definitions: Low access forests are those believed to berelatively undisturbed by human activity. They aredefined as forest areas that are more than 1 km distantfrom roads, logging concessions, industrial timberplantations, estate crop plantations, or other forestdevelopments. In the case of Kalimantan, forest areasthat are more than 0.5 km distant from navigable riverswith no more than one mapped settlement per 30 kmwere also considered to be low access forests.

Methodology: The GOI/World Bank forest coverdataset was used to map the extent and distribution oflow access forests; “no data” areas in this dataset werefilled using the National Forest Inventory forest coverdataset (1996). Roads were buffered 1 km on either sideand converted to a grid. By overlaying settlement andriver data layers, river segments with no more than onemapped settlement per 30 km were selected. Selectedrivers were buffered 15 km upstream and downstream ofeach settlement and 0.5 km on either side. The resultingcoverage was converted to a grid. Rivers within swampsand hill forest were considered unaccessed and were

excluded from this analysis. The river, road, and forestcover grids were merged. Any forest grid cells outsideroad and/or river linear features were extracted andoverlaid with plantations and estate crops. Forest areasthat overlapped with plantations and estate crops wereeliminated. The resulting forest lands were classified aslow access forest. All excluded forest areas wereclassified as accessed forest. Low access forests werefurther characterized based on whether they are locatedin logging concessions. The low access forest grid wasoverlaid with the concessions grid. Forest areas werethen delineated as either within or outside concessionareas. Forest area falling within concessions may beregarded as “contact zones,” where the probability ofaccess and disturbance is higher. Note that in theabsence of data on the status of concessions (active,inactive, or expired) as well as information on thecondition of protected areas, this analysis of the status ofIndonesia’s potentially intact forest is incomplete.

Map 5 Fragmentation of Low Access andPotentially Low Access Forest

Sources: As for Map 4.

Methodology: Low access forest areas were groupedinto contiguous tracts of forest and reclassified based onthe following size categories:

200 km2-500 km2

501 km2-10,000 km2

Over 10,000 km2


Map 6 Protection Status of Low Access andPotentially Low Access Forest

Sources: Forest cover as for Map 4. Protected area datafrom UNEP-WCMC: subset of V 4.0 UNEP-WCMCProtected Areas Global GIS dataset. March 2000.

Methodology: The low access forest grid was overlaidwith the protected area data. The resulting grid wasfurther overlaid with the concession area grid from theNFI to classify the protected areas further according towhether they are located within or outside loggingconcessions.

Map 7 Extent and Distribution of ProtectedAreas, Kalimantan

Sources: Forest Cover as for Map 4. Protected area datafrom UNEP-WCMC: subset of V 4.0 UNEP-WCMCProtected Areas Global GIS dataset. March 2000.

Methodology: No additional analysis was performedfor this map.

Map 8 Extent and Distribution of LoggingConcessions



Comment: The data in this map are outdated. Morerecent nonspatial data were made available from theMinistry of Forestry, with attribute data, includinglocation, size, and ownership of concession. Unfortu-nately, it was not possible to georeference these data,

and the information in the NFI remains the most recentspatial data that we were able to access.

Map 9 Limited Survey of Reported Cases ofIllegal Logging

Sources: Based on reports of illegal logging publishedbetween 1997 and 1998 in the following Indonesiannewspapers: Suara Pembaruan; Kompas; MediaIndonesia; Bisnis Indonesia; Rakyat Merdeka; RadarBogor, Koran Tempo; Business News; The Jakarta Post;Serambi Indonesia; Cendrawasih Post; Kaltim Post;Kontan; Republika; Suara Karya; Harian Terbit;Harian Ekonomi; Forum Keadilan; Kalteng Post;Kendari Post; Merdeka; Pakuan; Pelita Bangsa; PikiranRakyat; Riau Pos; Samarinda Pos; Sinar Tani; SinarPagi; Terbit; Warta Kota; Banjarmasin Pos; BeritaKeadilan; DR; Tempo. Data were also collected viainvestigative reports from members of the Forest WatchIndonesia network.

Map 10 Extent and Distribution of EstateCrops in Sumatra

Source: GOI-FAO, 1996


Map 11 Plantations in Former LoggingConcessions, Sumatra and Kalimantan


Methodology: The logging concession, estate cropplantation, and industrial timber plantation grids wereoverlaid to identify areas classified as both a loggingconcession and a plantation. The most likely explanation

for such overlaps is that plantations have been estab-lished in former concession areas. Such overlaps are notuncommon in the NFI because the survey was developedin part on the basis of land use (land tenure) documents.Not infrequently, applications for a logging concessionand for a license to convert forest to a plantation willcompete for the same area of forest. Equally, somecompanies hold licenses to operate forest land as alogging concession and, subsequently, convert their ownconcession to a plantation.

Map 12 Forest Uses and Areas Burned in1997-1998: East Kalimantan

Source: A.A. Hoffmann, A. Hinrichs, and F. Siegert.1999. Fire Damage in East Kalimantan in 1997/1998Related to Land Use and Vegetation: Satellite RadarInventory Results and Proposals for Further Actions.IFFM-SFMP Report 1a. ISBN 979-606-044-2.

Map 13 Limited Survey of Reported ConflictsOver Forest Resources

Source: Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Forestryinformation, 1997-1999; reports of forest-relatedconflict published between 1997 and 1998 in theIndonesian newspapers listed for Map 9.

This report, The State of the Forest: Indonesia, is aproduct of Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) andGlobal Forest Watch (GFW). FWI was initiated inlate 1997 by some 20 nongovernmental organiza-tions to play its role as a civil society component,which encourages acceleration of the democratiza-tion process in terms of forest resources allocationand management in Indonesia. GFW was launchedin 1998 by the World Resources Institute (WRI) towork in alliance with nongovernmental organiza-tions and local leaders from forested countriesaround the world.

Forest Watch Indonesia seeks to develop indepen-dent citizen capacity to gather, process and dis-seminate forest data, maps and policy-relevantinformation about what is happening toIndonesia’s forests and forest-dependent peoples.FWI is an independent forest monitoring networkmade up of individuals and organizations that arecommitted to realizing sustainable forest manage-

ment in Indonesia. The objective of FWI’s pro-grams is to build and develop data on forests andforest issues, and to promote information transpar-ency in Indonesia by strengthening alternative dataand information provision.

Global Forest Watch seeks to make informationavailable rapidly to an ever wider audience byproviding forest information and maps on-line anddeveloping a Website (www.globalforestwatch.org)to post results from its multiple field and coopera-tive activities in Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Gabon,Indonesia, Russia, and Venezuela. Reports, mapsand information from credible sources will beavailable for downloading. Anyone with access tothe Internet can consult GFW data and contributeby providing information or views directly on-line.We hope that the array of products and activitieswill lead to a more constructive dialogue betweenforest managers and users at the local, national,and international levels.

The State of the Forest

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