2548036 (1)

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James Fitzjames Stephen-Critic of DemocracyAuthor(s): B. LippincottSource: Economica, No. 33 (Aug., 1931), pp. 296-307Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science and TheSuntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related DisciplinesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2548036 .Accessed: 03/11/2014 06:23

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[AUGUST

James Fitzjames Stephen-Critic of Democracy By B. LIPPINCOTT.

I

UNLIKE Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold, Fitzjames Stephen as a critic of democracy was not an uncompromising opponent of utilitarianism. Instead he was the champion of its earlier principles against the philosophy of its final expression. Reverting to Bentham, he set his lance against the John Stuart Mill who wrote Liberty, Subjection of Women and Utilitariarnism. But his antipathy to Mill was not rooted in Bentham. Bentham but furnished the weapons for a logical, and in part an ethical, assault. His disagreement was based on a far more profound difference; in essence it was what might be called meta- physical. Stephen pitted against Mill a view of life that drew its strength from such elements as are to be found in Hobbes and in Calvin, and from his experience as an Indian administrator. The result of his attack was the most trenchant and elaborate criticism of the democratic tendencies of the utilitarian school of his day.' Hardly less important, in the second place, was his criticism of Positivism. Thirdly, he must be reckoned with as a critic of English parliamentary government.

To appreciate Stephen's position, we may again contrast him with Carlyle and Arnold. Different from both, he was not an isolated critic, but within a tradition. The principles he expounded in his chief political work, Liberty, Equality, Frater- nity, establish him with conservatism. In this sense, which is the most important, his spiritual father is Burke. And his close relatives are those who followed Burke in the great reaction in the early part of the nineteenth century; Coleridge and the later Wordsworth in England, Eichhorn and Savigny in Ger- many, and De Maistre and Bonald in France.

Stephen initiated in England the second conservative intel- lectual reaction. Though Maine and Lecky were to come after him, neither stated the case as forcefully nor as solidly as he.

'See L4eslie Stephen, English Utilitarians, p. 244n. 296


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I93I] JAMES PITZJAMES STEPHEN-CRITIC OF DEMOCRACY 297

Maine probably exerted more influence, but his criticism was less technical. Furthermore, of the three, Stephen gave the most self-contained as well as the most complete view of a conservative faith. But these qualities, indicative as they may be, fall short of placing Stephen with exactness.

Before attempting to fix his position, let us glimpse how an- other has summarised it. Mr. Barker has said that he gave "the finest exposition of conservative thought in the latter half of the nineteenth century."2 This criticism is scarcely satisfactory. It leaves us in the dark on basic questions; the individual nature of his conservatism, and his place in the tradition.3 To answer these Stephen must be considered in relation to Burke; for it is obvious that Burke has set the standard and determined the tradition.

As a preliminary it is necessary to call attention to two distin- guishing characteristics of the conservative; his pattern of men- tality, and the tenets that form the basis of his thought.4 In regard to the former, it need only be said that the conservative point of view has always been the product of emotion and temperament rather than reason. In respect of the latter, it is in- herent in every conservative that the structure of his creed is built upon the acceptance of at least two of three fundamental tenets. First and foremost is religious belief; this is usually its corner- stone. Second, there is the doctrine of the comparative fixity of man's relation to man and to nature, with the first corollary, perhaps its fountain-head, that human nature is a constant. Third, there is what may be called the belief in an " over-evalu- ated," or consecrated past; it takes the form of either one or both, but most always both, of two points of view, excessive veneration of the past, and fear of change.

Anyone who is acquainted with conservative thought recognises these ingredients. But what critics seem to have overlooked is

2 Barker, E., Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to To- day, p. I72.

3 Furthermore, the passage fails to satisfy the canons of sound criticism. First, tho adjective " finest " is, in the above position, too subjective. It does not tell us how good. Second, the phrase " finest exposition," with its implications, is in its particular position vicarious criticism; the rendering of a literary judgment where a political one is due. If this comment on the manner in which Stephen expounded his thought were assigned its proper place, there would be no objection. But to give us an aesthetic rather than a political criticism in the only part of the study where an estimate is attempted, implies impressionist criticism. Such criticism tends less to the elucidation of a work than to the exploiting of personal reactions which the work evokes.

4 " Conservative" in the above discussion is not used in the setse of a party appellation.



298 ECONOMICA [AUGUST

" how " these ingredients have combined.5 They have not, that is, attempted to determiine what occurs when any two of the tenets, if not all, have combined; or the effect of omitting any one; or the result of one predominating; or the result of interaction. If order is to be approached in the tradition, these considerations must be met.

In attempting for our purposes an analysis of Burke by the foregoing method, it must be noted that his religious conviction forms the very bedrock on which his politics are built. The pervasive effect his religion had upon his ideas, and its influence in accentuating his conservatism, has for the most part been either pointed out or indicated.6 What we wish to note are two implications of his religion that not only pertaini to him in particular, but have an especial bearing upon the tradition. First, his religion implied at bottom a consistent attitude, a single point of view. Second, it was the reflection of an intense feeling in his temperament. And this intense feeling was a constructive force that played a major part in making his creed capable of unusual influence. Payne hints at it when he refers to the " solid bullion value which makes it impossible to distil Burke."7 It is our contention that only under the pressure of an intense feeling similar to Burke's is it possible to attain to such coherence between tenets, between ideas, and between ideas and tenets, as he did.8 That only under such conditions can they be welded into a unified body of doctrine with philosophic significance. And when this has been accomplished, as in the case of Burke, and as it was in the case of men like Aristotle and Aquinas, it gives added power to the creed which they advocate. It is a common- place of experience that men find it far more convenient and far less difficult to subscribe to a system of thought than to un- assembled units. The singleness of attitude in a system gives guidance and offers direction. Perhaps more important, it brings the satisfaction of definite conviction at a bargain price. For the dangerous and exhausting demands of the open mind are obviated; none of the hazards of scepticism are entailed; none of the turmoil precipitated by the ceaseless questioning of first

5 Mr. J. MacCunn is to a large extent an exception in his study of Burke, where he shows the primordial significance of Burke's religion. Yet he does not probe deep enough into the result of this, nor does he give us a sufficiently clear synthesis of the relative value of other elements.

6 Cf. MacCunn, J., The Political Philosophy of Edmund Burke; Laski, H. J., English Political Thought from Locke to Bentham.

7 Payne, E. J., Burke Select Works (I874), p. xxvi. 8 Our distinction between tenets and ideas is that which mnay be said

to exist between foundation and superstructure.



I93I] JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN-CRITIC OF DEMOCRACY 299

principles. The history of Catholicism, of mechanistic interpre- tations of the universe, as well as of conservatism, bear witness to the satisfaction found in systems. In regard to their formal appeal Mr. Aldous Huxley has well said that " man's passion for logical coherence is even greater than his love of truth."

To epitomise the standard which Burke has set for our criticism, we may say that no one has so completely integrated the three tenets of conservatism as he did. No one, that is, has combined all three, or so thoroughly fused any two. Furthermore, it appears that the degree of fusion is proportional to the inten- sity of the religious emotion. If the expression of this emotion is absent, it appears that fusion cannot be as comparatively complete. In this circumstance the degree of fusion seems to be proportional to the strength with which is held a particular philosophy of history, in its broadest sense.

By the above standard the exponents of the conservative tradition in the second part of the century may, from one angle, be ordered as follows: Lecky, standing at the end, which is significant, only partially combined but never fused the three tenets. Maine is distinguished from Lecky in that he attained to a limited fusion, but not equally with Stephen. What distinguishes Stephen, then, from Maine and Lecky is the religious element; it is the base on which his political thought rests. He may therefore be denoted as the purest representative of the conservative tradition in England in the nineteenth century. It follows then that Stephen is nearest to Burke in essentials.

But, unlike Burke, Stephen united but two of the conservative tenets; the religious, and the fixed order concept. Moreover, these tenets were of a different nature than Burke's, were differently held, and were modified by intermingling strains of thought largely alien to his. To take the first, religion, it was impossible for Stephen to subscribe to theism; in his system of thought religion could not claim the position of an absolute. Similar to Carlyle, he was essentiallv a Calvinist; but for the most part rejected redemption and had little use for theology. Furthermore, his belief was held conditionally, to be acted upon only as probably true. Because of these characteristics, and the effect of Benthamite utilitarianism, to which he strongly adhered, his religion did not consecrate the past, and was not an ultimate prescription against change. It functioned rather as an element that unduly favoured the existing order. His Puritanism tended, as it must inevitably tend, to the conclusion




that morality is the end of human endeavour; and that the means of its realisation is through the medium of law. Lastly, his Calvi.nism coloured his view of human nature; he apotheo- sized the strong, had no sympathy for the weak, and little but contempt for the ignorant.

The second tenet, the fixed order concept, contains three factors. The first deals with his conception of human nature, which is after that of Hobbes. It consists, on, the one hand, in the belief that life is inevitably a conflict. On the other, it comprises the belief that the general run of mankind is, has been, and always will be, ignorant and indifferent; that no small number are mean if not vicious. This prompted Stephen to maintain that the most successful way of acting upon men is bv means of an appeal to fear, which is most always effected through the sanction of force. Thus his view of human nature led him, not unlike Hobbes, to posit force as the keystone of the social arch. The second constant derives from an interpretation of history; it is that force never changes in amount, only in form. As it shall appear later, this influenced Stephen to scout the efficacy of one of the cardinal principles of democratic government-that of discussion. The third constant pertains to the theory of progress; Stephen denied it, accepting a neutral interpretation. This, as well as the- foregoing constant, constrained him to undervalue change and the possibilities of human improvement.

If Puritanism and a Hobbian view of human nature were two of the three leading strains of Stephen's thought, the third was utilitarianism. On the whole its effect was to augment his conservatism. By itself and in its interaction with conservative elements, it placed a disproportionate emphasis on sanctions, and prevented him from seeing society in scarcely any terms but force and utility.

II

The factors that largely determined Stephen's political ideas were his early family training and his experiences at Eton.9 Born in London in I829, his father came to exert upon him the strongest influelnce of his life. He impregnated Stepheni with the Puritan faith of the Evangelical, from which was to develop his singular variant of Calvinism. At Eton Stephen formulated a view of life that, apart from religion, became the most

" This and the following analysis is based on Leslie Stephen's Life of James Fitzjames Stephen.



I93I] JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN-CRITIC OF DEMOCRACY 30I

important influence in the moulding of his political philosophy. Entering the school a strong-willed individualist, he rebelled against the accepted tvpe. The price he paid for his non- conformity was constant strife. Eton, he says, taught him forever " that to be weak is to be wretched, that the state of nature is a state of war, and Vae Victis the great law of nature." Thus was implanted the roots of his Hobbian view of human nature.

The next event to leave its impress upon Stephen- was the French Revolution of I848. Its effect was to crystallise rather than to accentuate his conservatism. Writing in I867 of his feelings towards the revolution, he says, they were then, as always, " feelings of fierce, unqualified hatred for the revolution and revolutionists; feelings of the most bitter contempt and indignation against those who feared them, truckled to them, or failed to fight them whensoever they could and as long as they could; feelings of zeal against all popular aspirations and in favour of all established institutions whatever their various defects or harshnesses (which, however, I wish to alter slowly and moderately); in a word, the feelings of a scandalised policeman towards a mob breaking windows in the cause of humanity." No remark better illustrates both the tenor of Stephen's political thought and its debt to a temperament.

The influences that gave final shape to Stephen's ideas were Carlyle and, in a still greater degree, India. In passing it must be mentioned that Stephen, while studying for -the law, found a rich response in Bentham. From this time on his philosophic position was substantially that of Bentham and John Stuart Mill (of the Logic and Political Economy); while the superstructure of his belief was a modified but hardened evangelicism.

As Stephen advanced in years, he found Carlyle's denuncia- tion of the parliamentary system more and more congenial; espe- cially was this so after his return from India. The prophet strengthened his conviction for the necessity of strong government and increased his distrust of the democratic method. Tak- ing Maine's place as legal member of the Viceroy's commission in India in I869, Stephen was soon convinced that absolutism was as legitimate a form of government as any other. He saw that the law of force was indisputably the law of life. No less did he observe that a bureaucracy has its merits; and, finally, that a government unhampered by a legislature and an electorate was capable of an efficiency utterly unknown to a democracy.




III

Before turning to Stephen's criticism, it might be well to sum up, under the head of ethics, society, and the state, the charac- teristic views that informed it. His ethics were similar to Bentham's, but he superimposed upon the utilitarian system a theory of Calvinism. This, he would maintain, was indispens- able; for it put morality on a plane with law, providing for a final and universal sanction for its enforcement. His view of society was at once utilitarian and Hobbian, not unmixed with a tincture of Calvinism. Society, he would hold, is an aggregate of independent atoms that can only be bound together in the last resort by force. Because of man's nature, his pervasive indiffer- ence, his tendency to eternal conflict, and the baseness of not a few, he must be restrained and compelled in nearly every action of his life. Hence with Stephen force tends to identify itself with morality. " Force," he says, " is always in the back- ground, the invisible bond which corresponds to the moral frame- work of society."lo Corollaries to these principles are: the strong man always rules; the wise minority are the rightful masters of the foolish majority; and society is less a problem of social and economic relationships than of intelligence versus ignorance.

In reference to the state, it follows from his Benthanism that its sphere of action is as a rule little more than the maintenance of the social bond. Under most conditions Stephen believes in ortho- dox laissez-faire. But it is important to observe that in theory and in special circumstances he would justify state interference for moral and religious ends. For with Stephen the state in its very essence is the great teacher of the moral law so far as its arm can reach. Furthermore, since morality, as he says, de- pends on religion, the state should not shrink from exercising authority here as well."1 Though he disclaims he advocates a State-Church, his doctrines imply it.

Iv This brings us to Stephen's criticism. His gravest objection,

in general, to Mill's theories is that they tend to loosen the social bond, and therefore to unmoralise society. Mill's first doctrine, liberty, states that there is no warrant for interfering with the action of an individual except for self-protection. To the prac- tical application made of this doctrine Stephen has little objec-

10 Stephen, Fitzjames, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 31. I' Ibid., p. 63.



I93I] JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN-CRITIC OF DEMOCRACY 303

tion. But as a principle claiming ultimate truth, he emphatically repudiates it. Not only is it based, he declares, upon an un- sound distinction, the distinction between self-regardinig acts and acts which regard others, but it goes counter to the most significant fact of man's experience-force. Mill's doctrine is contra- dicted by and violates every system of religion, morals, and means for changing government. For all of these are so many forms of coercion extending beyond self-protection. Thus Stephen insists that " force is the essence of life "12; that it " permeates and underlies every institution." This is the leading principle of his book.

In support of his doctrine of liberty, says Stephen, Mill advances the principle that removal of restraints tends to in- vigorate character. On the contrary, the growth of liberty in the sense of democracy tends to diminish, not to increase origi- nality. Make all men equal so far as laws can make them equal, and each unit is rendered hopelessly feeble in the presence of an overwhelming majority. " To tell them in such a condition to be original anld independent is like plucking a bird's feathers in order to put it on a level with beasts, and then telling it to fly." Furthermore, Mill believes that invigoration will be accomplished by free and equal discussion; and, security apart, this can sup- plant compulsion. But such a belief is confuted by the fact that from the most immature up to the most civilised societies the lion's share of the results obtained is due to compulsion. Secondly, how can mankind be improved by discussion when in favourable cases it is just beginning to be conscious that it is ignorant? Thirdly, there will always be in the world an enor- mous mass of bad and indifferent people. The only way to act on them is by compulsion. The utmost liberty would not in the least tend to improve them.

Positivism, which embodies the most definite expression of Mill's doctrine of liberty, is based upon fallacious psychology. It would split life into two spheres, spiritual and temporal, the former corresponding to Mill's province of liberty. Such a distinction is impossible; life is one and indivisible, at the same time spiritual and temporal."3 Secondly, as a substitute for religion, it must remain impotent. Positivists would have a priesthood and a spiritual rule; but reject the conditions that make this possible, they deny hell. Yet without an appeal to the selfish a religion is powerless. " Here and there a horse may be disposed to go by himself, but you can never drive a

12 Ibid., p. io8. 13 Ibid., p. II5 f-




coach without reins and whip." Positivists will never be any- thing more than a Ritualistic Social Science Association.

In advancing his own view of liberty, Stephen says that liberty is a negative term. No general rules can be ascertained about it. Liberty is good not as opposed to coercion in general, as Mill would have it, but as opposed to coercion in certain cases. These are to be ascertained by a Benthamite principle of " expe- diency ": force is good when the end is good, when the means employed are efficient, and when cost of application is not excessive.

Equality, Mill's second and most cherished doctrine, is a plea for the equality of women. To Stephen it was " the most ignoble and mischievous of all the popular feelings of the age." He denies Mill's proposition that justice requires that men live in society as equals. Justice, he insists, has no meaning outside the utilitarian sense of judicial impartiality. Above all it is utterly false when applied to the sexes. Woman is not man's equal, in every test of strength she is inferior. To establish equality would subvert her welfare.

Apart from his legal conclusion that equality is merely a word of relation, Stephen suggests that the utmost equality is to be achieved through the maintenance of marked distinctions. The solution which he says would be ideal is that of the Indian caste system."4

Stephen's most profound disagreement with Mill appears in his essay on fraternity. Mill, he says, proposes that utilitarian morality with the love of humanity as its final sanction is capable of becoming a religion. This can never be. Utilitarian morality stops short of self-sacrifice. It leaves morality too much to the caprice of individual taste. Its great weakness is that it fails to make it a duty to be virtuous. Aside from this, its claim as a religion is preposterous. You cannot love a shadowy abstraction.

In his criticism of democracy proper Stephen holds, first, that universal suffrage does not secure the rule of the good and wise; secondly, that it makes for inefficient administration. The latter is his bete noire. The necessary elements for good government, he affirms, are some degree of permanence, discretionary authority, and continuity. Under the present system these are want- ing. The Cabinet system is as ill-conceived an arrangement as could be contrived. Each department is a little state with its own little king, and the control of the whole is loose and vague

14 Ibid., P- 252-



193I] JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN-CRITIC OF DEMOCRACY 305

to the highest possible degree. But the real difficulty why so little business can be accomplished, he adds, lies in the system of party government which makes every man out of office pick holes in the work of every man in office. And every man in office considers not what is the best thing to be done, but what is most likely to carry in spite of the opposition.

Stephen admits, however, he sees no substitute for universal suffrage. He believes that taxation must be subject to popular consent. His attitude toward democracy, as distinct from -his criticism, may be summed up by his remark that though he realises universal suffrage is irresistible, he does not see " why as we go with the stream we nleed sing Hallelujah to the river god."

The above arguments, however, do not fully represent Stephen's criticism of democracy. In an article written for the Nineteenth Century in I874, entitled " Parliamentary Govern- ment," Stephen both expands and adds to the foregoing. In criticising the party system, he says it prevents men from being chosen Members of Parliament on the score of ability. It involves great waste of talent; half the ablest men in the country spend the greater part of their lives fighting the other half. Furthermore, it induces exaggerated prominence in topics intrin- sically unimportant, and establishes an arbitrary connection between measures that ought to be considered on their own merits. Lastly, it produces instability.

In regard to the Cabinet, Stephen objects to the extent and nature of the principle of responsibility. It makes, he says, for a weak executive; every act and thought of the Cabinet is depen- dent on the shifting currents of public and parliamentary opinion. A king, he deplores, has been reduced to a cypher. Within the Cabinet, he reiterates, there is no unity. But a greater evil still is that a Parliamentary head may treat any member of his department as a mere clerk. And it is no small defect that Parlia- mentary heads are appointed upon party considerations rather than upon grounds of special fitness. Finally, the great evil of the administrative system in regard to the management of particular affairs is the way in which special knowledge is divorced from experience, and authority from responsibility. Stephen assails the competency of Parliament to elaborate details of legis- lation because it lacks special knowledge. And he inveighs against the rules of parliamentary procedure and the uncertainty of office as impediments to legislative continuity.

As a remedy for these shortcomings, he would restore a con-




siderable degree of power to the King, but regrets this is impossible. He would therefore mitigate conditions: first, by arrang- ing that non-party questions be handled by an independent department, subject only to the general control of Parliament; second, by reforming the Civil Service. The latter would be accomplished by appointing the ablest men in the country as permanent heads of departments, by conferring honour and dignity upon the positions, and raising salaries. Permanent heads, says Stephen, ought not to be clerks to Cabinet Ministers, but councillors, whose opinion might be over-ruled if necessary, but should be recorded so that Parliament and the public should know how decisions were taken. Lastly, he would introduce more change in the upper ranks of the Service; this would increase competence through enlarged experience and make the men more receptive to new ideas.

V

No criticism of Stephen can fail to recognise that his exposure of the fallacy in Mill's principle of liberty is not without merit. Yet his criticism is hardly adequate; it reveals none of the basic errors on which the utilitarian philosophy stood, and the greater part rests on a theory of force for which there is no validity. Stephen's conception of equality is a misconstruction of both the term and its meaning. Equality, apart from the judiciary, has, as Karl Marx showed and Matthew Arnold illustrated, no real significance save in the economic interpretation. Nor can any reasonable theory of equality presuppose identity of conditions, which as the root of his conception leads him to recommend as an ideal solution a social system that is the very epitome of in- equality. His opposition to equality between the sexes is based on the argument that brawn gives title to supremacy. This is but a variant on his theory of force, which requires no comment. But it is impossible to deny that Stephen did well to show important defects in Positivism and in the Religion of Humanity.

It goes without saying that Stephen's capital indictment of democracy, his thesis of force as opposed to consent, however acquiescent and implicit, is a misreading of man's nature, history, and institutions that is without parallel except in men like Hobbes and De Maistre. His distorted view of human nature, on which this theory is founded, is no less at fault. Likewise is it so for his religion, which was described for most men when Frederic Harrison termed it " Calvinism minus Christianity." Politically his religion is deleterious, for it makes for a harsh



1931] JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN-CRITIC OF DEMOCRACY 307

individualism and involves ultimately a Church-State. In addi- tion, he is open to most of the objections that can be lodged against the Benthamite utilitarian.

Stephen's criticism of democracy as a mechanism shows him unaware of the fundamental purpose of the franchise and the party system. Nor, apart perhaps from the relationship of Cabinet to Civil Service, does he understand the import of the principle of responsibility. And though he maintains that Par- liament should decide issues of policy, his plea for a stronger Cabinet and his desire to restore power to the King imply the bureaucrat. In a word he pre-eminently embodies the traits that most often typify the Indian administrator of the nineteenth century. No evidence gives him better title than his letters to the Times on the Home Rule dispute of i886. He recommended for Ireland the methods of rule employed in India.

Yet no critic of democracy in the nineteenth century had a more penetrative insight into the Civil Service; many of his suggestions have since been carried out, and some have still to be realised.

MINNESOTA.



Article Contentsp.296p.297p.298p.299p.300p.301p.302p.303p.304p.305p.306p.307

Issue Table of ContentsEconomica, No. 33 (Aug., 1931), pp. i-iv+265-386+v-viFront Matter [pp.i-iv]L. T. Hobhouse: His Life and Work [pp.265-269]Reflections on the Pure Theory of Money of Mr. J. M. Keynes [pp.270-295]James Fitzjames Stephen-Critic of Democracy [pp.296-307]Bentham on Legislative Procedure [pp.308-327]British and American Ambassadors: 1893-1930. A Study in Comparative Personnel [pp.328-341]Book Reviewsuntitled [pp.342-349]untitled [pp.349-351]untitled [pp.351-357]untitled [pp.357-358]untitled [pp.358-360]untitled [pp.360-361]

List of Theses in Economics and Allied Subjects in Progress in Universities and Colleges in the British Commonwealth of Nations [pp.362-380]Books and Monographs Received [pp.381-384]Periodicals Received [p.384]School Notes [pp.385-386]Back Matter [pp.v-vi]

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