Case

Development[Escobar 4] says the US projects its cultural and economic hegemony by the “imposition of norms”. We pose our version of what is moral and what is the correct way of going about economic actions and the best way to solve, holding the western model as the “gold standard” of doing things. It ignores alternative ways of solving problems developed by the people of Mexico. First world experts aren’t able to solve Third world problems and developmental actions empirically hurt the economy of the host country, stripping of autonomy and solidifying its place as America’s pawn. Our efforts at globalization are responsible for the market slavery, structural violence, and war – The K turns the case.

[DuBois] says that the only way to solve is by rejecting the concept underdeveloped and underperforming nations. To oppose the “venerated external aid/Technical transfer”, weakening the paradigm of development. WE must inject doubt into the system. The aff is enforcing doomed policies upon Mexico trickle-down economics, big stick policy options, all fail. We must change the way we understand and decide upon solvency and what even needs solving.

The alternative is the only way to solve the aff – developmental discourse with Mexico is doomed to create systems of exploitation. We must begin from a different epistemic starting point than the aff. The alternative doesn’t preclude the action of the 1AC, but rather it reposes the question of the affirmative without the intent to develop and shifts us away from the discursive analysis presented by the affirmative.

Development ideology oversimplifies complex problems – guarantees error replicationDr. Kea Gorden Gorden earned her Ph.D. in Politics from the University of California, Santa Cruz, completed Master’s degree work in International Development at the School of International Service at American University, and earned her undergraduate degree from Cornell University. Her research is informed by her experiences as a Peace Corps volunteer in Zimbabwe and a Fulbright Research Fellow in South Africa, and her work is attendant to the network of guiding assumptions and constructions of difference that position “Africa” within discussions of poverty, security and resources. Her research interests lie in exploring the politics of democratization and development, with particular attention to the ways that discourses of secular modernity so often shape how these phenomena are understood. She is now engaged in a new research project questioning the ways that

gendered cultural practices in South Africa impact the manner and form of women’s political participation and mobilization. “Depoliticizing Effects of International Development as the Praxis of Liberal Inst/itutionalism” Field Statement #2 May 10th, 2004 YHK//JDIJames Scott in Seeing Like a State explains that failure of state-led projects is repeatedly attributable, regardless of their particular goal , to the inability of the planner to regard as both valuable and crucial the voice of civil societ y. This included, state planning may have a hope of success. Scott analyzes the large-scale attempts of state-engineered social

design, seeking to explain the profound failure of these projects to reach their utopian ends. He argues, “The most tragic episodes of state-initiated social engineering originate in a pernicious combination of four elements”. These include: 1.)

the administrative ordering of society; 2.) high-modernist ideology, which is “best conceived as a strong, one might

even say muscle-bound, version of the self-confidence about scientific and technical progress; 3.) an “authoritarian state that is willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring these high-modernist designs into being; and 4.) “a

prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these plans.”17 The critical element of failure, Scott

emphasizes, is the proclivity of the state to reduce society to a series of standardized indicators , leaving out

the enormous complexity, the “living tissue” that holds together and makes functional any kind of social institution.

Development projects, as an example of social engineering, fail because they ignore the complexity , the local knowledge, the “metis” of a particular setting. Scott describes the failure of forced villagization projects, the failure of high-modernist agriculture, and the failure of dehumanizing, modern urban planning . Scott

articulates the state’s mapping of social life as a means both for increasing the efficiency of the delivery of social services associated with good, modern governance, and the control, homogenization and violence against social life associated with forced standardization of social life. He writes, “Much of this book can be read as a case against the imperialism of high-modernist, planned social order. I stress the word “imperialism” here because I am emphatically not making a blanket case against either bureaucratic planning or high-modernist ideology. I am, however, making a case against an imperial, hegemonic planning mentality that excludes the necessary role of local knowledge and know-how.”18

A2: LinkTurn

He trys to make a link turn, but he needs to win a 0% risk of the link, otherwise the alternative will always be preferable – the aff still re-entrenches biopower which moots any solvency they claim to garner.

A2: Globalization Inevitable

Inevitability does not answer our argument – we are not arguing that we displace globalization, but that discussing its potentiality is necessary to displace their discursive centrality – the Alternative is always “Under Construction” – that is a strength – not a weakness

Escobar 10 – PhD in Philosophy, Policy, and Planning (Arturo, 12 January 2010, 'LATIN AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS', Cultural Studies, 24: 1, 1 — 65, http://www.unc.edu/~aescobar/text/eng/escobar.2010.CulturalStudies.24-1.pdf)

The same with post-liberalism , as a space/ time when social life is no longer seen as so thoroughly determined by the constructs of economy, individual,

instrumental rationality, private property, and so forth as characteristic of liberalism modernity. It is not a state to be arrived at in the future but something that is always under construction. ‘Postcapitalist’ similarly means looking at the economy as made up of a diversity of capitalist, alternative capitalist, and non-capitalist practices; it signals a state of affairs when capitalism is no longer the hegemonic form of economy (as in the capitalocentric frameworks of most political economies), where the domain of ‘the economy’ is not fully and ‘naturally’ occupied by capitalism but by an array of economies solidarity, cooperative, social, communal, even criminal economies that cannot be reduced to capitalism (Gibson-Graham 2006). In other words, the ‘post’ signals the notions that the economy is not essentially or naturally capitalist, societies are not naturally liberal, and the state is not the only way of instituting social power as we have imagined it to be. The post, succinctly, means a decentering of capitalism in the definition of the economy, of liberalism in the definition of

society and the polity, and of state forms of power as the defining matrix of social organization. This does not mean that capitalism, liberalism, and state forms cease to exist; it means that their discursive and social centrality have been displaced somewhat, so that the range of existing social experiences that are considered valid and credible alternatives to what exist is significantly enlarged (Santos 2007a). Taken together, postliberalism, post-capitalism, and post-statist forms point at alternatives to the dominant forms of Euro-centered modernity what might be called alternatives to modernity, or transmodernity (Dussel 2000). Operating in the cracks of modernity/coloniality, this expression gives content to the World Social Forum slogan,another world(s) is (are) possible(Escobar 2004). That this notion is not solely a conceit of researchers but that it can be gleaned at least from the discourses and practices of some social movements and intellectuals close to those movements will be shown in the rest of this paper. I should make it

clear that the argument about the possibility of post-liberal, post-capitalist, and post-statist social orders is at this stage perhaps more an argument about potentiality (about the field of the virtual) than about ‘how things really are’. In this sense, it will remain a working hypothesis to be further refined and a statement of possibility, and it is offered

as such in this paper in the spirit of discussion. But I should also emphasize that this does not make the trends I will describe less ‘real.’ It has been said of today’s social movements that one of their defining features is their appeal to the virtual; movements do not exist only as empirical objects ‘out there’ carrying out ‘protests’ but in their enunciations and knowledges, as a potentiality of how politics and the world could be, and as a sphere of action in which people can dream of a better world and contribute to enact it. It is in these spaces that new imaginaries and ideas about how to re/ assemble the socio-natural are not only hatched but experimented with, critiqued, elaborated upon, and so forth.9

A2: Rusu

Extend [DuBois], development projects are doomed to failure at solving poverty – this means they can’t access this impact

AND [DuBois] says that development projects are empirically proven to make poverty worse – they wreck victims economies in favor of geopolitical domination by the third world

OffCase

CondoNo Link – None of my advocacies are conditional. His interp is dispo but it’s really all just condo bad.

Everything is unconditional, meaning I already decided which advocacies I will go for. I will unconditionally go for only those advocacies, and kick the rest. I’m not disclosing which I will and won’t go for because that would throw fairness out the window. None of this flow is offense.

The CriminalBig mistake – Trippy concedes that he has a criminal record – he already broke the word limit for the 1AC. He’s the only 5’8” in the world that has gone over that word limit – proves he’s the only real suspect. And – ANY risk that Trippy is the murderer means you vote neg immediately – It is your duty as a judge to get your ballot in – that’s what you signed up for. If Trippy murders you too, the whole vdebate tournament will get shut down. That’s a huge procedural voter for fairness and education in all those other rounds. Do the right thing and make sure you get a ballot in by voting neg right now.

1. Trippy’s 5’8” and doesn’t know his metric conversionsMetricConversions ’14 (1/2/14 1:11 AM, http://www.metric-conversions.org/length/centimeters-to-feet.htm) OT172.72cm = 5ft 8in

3. Everything he says here is a lie – A police officer asked for proof, and he failed to produce the evidence of his chubbiness. I also saw ID and he does live in Mississippi.

4. There is an impact – It’s the judge’s duty to get the ballot in (Overview.)

And no warrants as to why the alt doesn’t solve – If you send your ballot in right now you will obviously have solved for sending your ballot in.

Hand Soap1. Really? It’s Non-Unique? Could that be why there’s an alternative?

2. Posner ’05 says AIDS can’t cause extinction – but the impact isn’t extinction. The impact is Squirelloid getting AIDS and potentially dying.

3. No link to the savage evidence – we aren’t establishing an association between race and disease. The card talks about how pinpointing the source of a disease to a certain region is the equivalent of racism – that might link to Squirelloid’s reaction to reading this K, but we don’t associate the bad disease with any sort of race/ethnicity.

4. They say alt causes – The alt solves all instances of hand soap users, because once Squirelloid cuts off his hand, there’s a 0% risk of the impact – literally impossible for somebody to shake his hand. Well… they might be able to shake it but it’d be in the trash can by then

5. Ext Healy ’13 – The hand soap that Trippy uses renders many animals infertile every day, and also create super bugs – viruses that can’t by stopped by modern medicine. Trippy is a biological terrorist for using hand soap. Vote neg.

TExt the interp – He says:

1. “Oceans is only for 2014 – 2015”, but he concedes that we are currently in the year 2014.

2. “It could still be Middle East”, but Squirreloid ’13 leaves no room for misinterpretation – The judge knows he picked oceans, not Middle East, and not Latin America.

And there’s a T version of the aff – Redefine the territory of Mexico as an Ocean, then do the plan – not extra T because it’s still an Ocean.

Next the counter-interp:

Squirreloid is much more qualified to decide the topic of this debate – He’s judging it. David hasn’t been online since the mod elections and isn’t about to waste his time caring about our troll circle over here.

Prefer my interp:

A. Education – I’m aff next round and the topic will be Oceans. Learning about Latin America robs me of the education I need to have a fair chance next round talking about oceans. Topic specific education on a different topic is worthless. I haven’t used my wealth of knowledge about speed cameras or port dredging to gain a fair advantage this round.

B. Limits

There are an infinite number of affs that aren’t under the oceans topic – it would be literally impossible to prepare for an infinite number of alternative resolutions – Bro I’m not Yoda.

And you should vote on potential abuse – the damage to the negative has always been done even if there was no direct in-round abuse. Any small amount of potential abuse or any risk of non-predictably means that their aff is a net-worse thing for debate and should be rejected.

The impact is predictability – the aff’s destruction of predictable neg ground is bad for debate because predictable neg ground is key to:

1. Critical thinking—the more times a predictable debate has been heard, the more high tech it gets and the more critical thinking is employed to outsmart the opponent

2. Educational depth—when an argument is predictable, more research is done on it and the debaters and judges learn more about it

3. Aff strategy—predictable neg ground helps the aff know what to expect and craft greater answers, helping to combat the low aff win percentage

4. Prep— a predictable aff is key to keeping the round within a window of time – wouldn’t want to waste Squirreloid’s time.

And - My interp doesn’t explode the topic. There aren’t infinite affs on the Oceans topic – only the ones related to oceans. There are only a certain number of legitimate affs in this case – whereas they could make the resolution anything they wanted it to be – that would obviously massively explode the topic.

And – their interp expands the topic even further – they allow for any aff that was created during the high school debate season – My interp only allows for affs that have been researched since Squirreloid decided the topic for this debate ;)

Voters

They say reasonability is good but Reasonability is bad –

Judge intervention bad – no brightline for what makes a definition reasonable. This causes judge intervention and should be rejected otherwise decisions are arbitrary and debaters will quit.

Underlimits and links to all of our offense—the affirmative has infinite prep time to create elaborate T defenses this means they can make any AFF seem reasonable with obscure evidence.

They said reasonability precludes trolling – trolling is obviously good

Competing interpretations is the best way to evaluate topicality debates

Increases critical thinking—using the offense/defense paradigm sharpens decision-making and strategy skills useful in other types of debates as well as in life

Fair division of arguments—both the affirmative and negative can generate offense against competing definitions and defend their own

Death Cult

Perm

1. The perm still links – the 1ac without a “focus” on death impacts still introduces and legitimizes death impacts. Forces the neg to read death impacts to stay competitive

2. He severs his death reps – vote neg:

Strategy skew- not knowing whether the plan will change makes it impossible for the negative to form a cohesive strategy.

Ground- the affirmative can permute to do the CP which hurts competitive equity.

Destroys disad ground- the aff could sever parts of plan to avoid disad lnks.

This is a voter for fairness and education.

Overview

In order to weigh the Aff, they have to win that their framing of the 1AC is good. We think that using death imagery is a bad method of politics because it trivializes and destroys value to life.

Treat our argument like a theory debate—it’s not about alternatives and competition, it’s about whether or not we should be allowed to use body counts and mass death impacts to justify our advocacies. This is a gateway issue independent of other Neg offense and a prior question to the solvency or truth claims of the 1AC.

Death isn’t real

Even if we are all wiped from the face of the earth in a hailstorm of nuclear bombs the process of life goes on even at the micro level. There is no unique warrant for why the biological construct of human deserves a place higher than the construct of atoms. This desire to be secure from death is the most personal level of microfascism that negates our ability to live life to its fullest and breeds resentment.Deleuze and Guattari 1972, Anti-Oedipus, 330-39, Murray

But it seems that things are becoming very obscure, for what is this distinction between the experience of death and the model of death? Here again, is it a death desire? A being-far-death? Or rather an investment of death, even if speculative? None of the above. The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming. It is in the very nature of every intensity to invest within itself the zero intensity starting from which it is produced, in one moment, as that which grows or diminishes according to an infinity of degrees (as Klossowski noted, "an afflux is necessary merely to signify the absence of intensity"). We have attempted to show in this respect how the relations of attraction and repulsion produced such states, sensations, and emotions, which imply a new energetic conversion and form the third kind of synthesis, the synthesis of conjunction. One might say that the unconscious as a real subject has scattered an apparent residual and nomadic subject around the entire compass of its cycle, a subject that passes by way of all the becomings corresponding to the included disjunctions: the last part of the desiring-machine, the adjacent part. These intense becomings and feelings, these intensive emotions, feed deliriums and hallucinations. But in themselves, these intensive emotions are closest to the matter whose zero degree they invest in itself. They control the unconscious experience of death, insofar as death is what is felt in every feeling, what never ceases and never finishes happening in every becoming-in the becoming-another-sex, the becoming-god, the becoming-a-race, etc., forming zones of intensity on the body without organs. Every intensity controls within its own life the experience of death, and envelops it. And it is doubtless the case that every intensity is extinguished at the end, that every becoming itself becomes a becoming-death! Death, then, does actually happen . Maurice Blanchot distinguishes this twofold nature dearly, these two irreducible aspects of death; the one, according to which the apparent subject never ceases to live and travel as a One·-"one never stops and never has done with dying"; and the other, according to which this same subject, fixed as I, actually dies-which is to say it finally ceases to die since it ends up dying, in the reality of a last instant that fixes it in this way as an I, all the while undoing the intensity, carrying it back to the zero that envelops it. From one aspect to the other, there is not at all a personal deepening, but something quite different: there is a return from the experience of death to the model of death, in the cycle of the desiring-machines. The cycle is closed. For a new departure, since this I is another? The experience of death must have given us exactly enough broadened experience, in order to live and know that the desiring-machines do not die. And that the subject as an adjacent part is always a "one" who conducts the experience, not an I who receives the model. For the model itself is not the I either, but the

body without organs. And I does not rejoin the model without the model starting out again in the direction of another experience. Always going from the model to the experience, and starting out again, returning from the model to the experience , is what schizophrenizing death amounts to, the exercise of the desiring-machines (which is their very secret, well understood by the terrifying authors). The machines tell us this, and make us live it, feel it, deeper than delirium and further than hallucination: yes, the return to repulsion will condition other attractions, other functionings, the setting in motion of other working parts on the body without organs, the putting to work of other adjacent parts on the periphery that have as much a right to say One as we ourselves do. "Let him die in his leaping through unheard-of and unnamable things: other horrible workers will come; they will begin on the horizons where the other collapsed !"29 The Eternal Return as experience, and as the deterritorialized circuit of all the cycles of desire. How odd the psychoanalytic venture is. Psychoanalysis ought to be a song of life, or else be worth nothing at all. It ought, practically, to teach us to sing life. And see how the most defeated, sad .song of death emanates from it: eiapopeia. From the start, and because of his stubborn dualism of the drives, Freud never stopped trying to limit the discovery of a subjective or vital essence of desire as libido. But when the dualism passed into a death instinct against Eros, this was no longer a simple limitation, it was a liquidation of the libido. Reich did not go wrong here, and was perhaps the only one to maintain that the product of analysis should be a free and joyous person, a carrier of the life flows, capable of carrying them all the way into the desert and decoding them-even if this idea necessarily took on the appearance of a crazy idea, given what had become of analysis. He demonstrated that Freud, no less than lung and Adler, had repudiated the sexual position: the fixing of the death instinct in fact deprives sexuality of its generative role on at least one essential point, which is the genesis of anxiety, since this genesis becomes the autonomous cause of sexual repression instead of its result; it follows that

sexuality as desire no longer animates a social critique of civilization, but that civilization on the contrary finds itself sanctified as the sale agency capable of opposing the death desire. And

how. does. it do this? By in principle turning death against death, by making this turned-back death (la mort ret aurneev into a force of desire by putting it in the service of a pseudo life through an entire culture of guilt feeling. There is no need to tell all over how psychoanalysis culminates in a theory of culture that takes up again the age-old task of the ascetic ideal Nirvana, the cultural extract, judging life, belittling life, measuring life against death, and only retaining from life what the death of death wants very much to leave us with - a sublime resignation. As Reich says, when psychoanalysis began to speak of Eros, the whole world breathed a sigh of relief': one knew what this meant, and that everything was going to unfold within a mortified life, since Thanatos was now the partner of Eros, for worse but also for better. Psychoanalysis becomes the training ground of a new kind of priest, the director of bad conscience: bad conscience has made us sick, but that is what will cure us! Freud did not hide what was really at issue with the introduction of the death instinct: it is not a question of any fact whatever, but merely of a principle, a question of principle. The death instinct is pure silence, pure transcendence, not givable and not given in experience. This very point IS remarkable: It IS because death, according to Freud, has neither a model nor an experience, that he makes of it a transcendent principle."! So that the psychoanalysts who refused the death instinct did so for the same reasons as those who accepted it: some said that there was no death instinct since there was no model or experience in the unconscious; others, that there was a death instinct precisely because there was no

model or experience. We say, to the contrary, that there is no death instinct because there is both the model and the experience of death in the unconscious. Death then is a part of the desiring-machine, a part that must itself be judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the system of its energetic conversions , and not as an abstract principle. If Freud needs death as a principle, this is by virtue of the requirements of the dualism that maintains a qualitative opposition between the drives (you will not escape the conflict): once the dualism of the sexual drives and the ego drives has only a topological scope, the qualitative or dynamic dualism passes between Eros and Thanatos. But the same enterprise is continued and reinforced-eliminating the machinic element of desire, the desiring-machines. It is a matter of eliminating the libido, insofar as it implies the possibility of energetic conversions in the machine (Libido-Nurnen-Voluptas). It is a matter of imposing the idea of an energetic duality rendering the machinic transformations impossible, with everything obliged to pass by way of an indifferent neutral energy, that energy emanating from Oedipus and capable of being added to either of the two irreducible forms neutralizing, mortifying life.* The purpose of the topological and dynamic dualities is to thrust aside the point of view of functional multiplicity that alone is economic. (Szondi situates the problem clearly: why two kinds of drives qualified as molar, functioning mysteriously, which

is to say Oedipally, rather than n genes of drives-eight molecular genes, for example-functioning machinically") If one looks in this direction for the ultimate reason why Freud erects a transcendent death instinct as a principle, the reason will be found in Freud's practice itself. For if the principle has nothing to do with the facts, it has a lot to do with the psychoanalyst's conception of psychoanalytic practice, a conception the psychoanalyst wishes to impose. Freud made the most profound discovery of the abstract subjective essence of desire-Libido. But since he re-alienated this essence, reinvesting it in a subjective system of representation of the ego, and since he receded this essence on the residual territoriality of Oedipus and under the despotic signifier of castration, he could no longer conceive the essence of life except in a form turned back against itself, in the form of death itself. And this neutralization, this turning against life, is also the last way in which a depressive and exhausted libido can go on surviving, and dream that it is surviving: " The ascetic ideal is an artifice for the preservation of life ... even when he wounds himself, this master of destruction, of self-destructing-the very wound itself compels him to live . . . ."32 It is Oedipus, the marshy earth, that gives off a powerful odor of decay and death; and it is castration, the pious ascetic wound, the signifier, that makes of this death a conservatory for the Oedipal life . Desire is in itself not a desire to love, but a force to love, a virtue that gives and produces, that engineers. (For how could what is in life still desire life? Who would want to call that a desire?) But desire must turn back against itself in the name of a horrible Ananke, the Ananke of the weak and the depressed, the contagious neurotic Ananke; desire must produce its shadow or its monkey, and find a strange artificial force for vegetating in the void, at the heart of its own Jack. For better days to come? It must-but who talks in this way? What abjectness-become a desire to be loved, and worse, a sniveling desire to have been loved, a desire that is reborn of its own frustration: no, daddy-mommy didn't love me enough. Sick desire stretches out on the couch, an artificial swamp, a little earth, a little mother. "Look at you, stumbling and staggering with no use in your legs .... And it's nothing but your wanting to be loved which does it. A maudlin crying to be loved, which makes your knees go all ricky."33 Just as there are two stomachs for the ruminant, there must also exist two abortions, two castrations for sick desire: once in the family, in the familial scene, with the knitting mother; another time in an asepticized clinic, in the psychoanalytic scene, with specialist artists who know how to handle the death instinct and "bring off" castration, "bring off" frustration.

Boggs

Fear and demonization of the “new right” is what gives it its power – the more the right is opposed and scapegoated, the more legitimacy and political authority it gains. Instead of fighting for ideology, we need to realize that the line between right and left is meaningless and unhelpful.Baudrillard in 97 [Jean, May 7, “A Conjuration of Imbeciles”]

There has been a shattering reformulation. The right used to embody moral values and the left, by contrast, used to represent an antagonistic mode of historical and political exigency. But today the left is deprived of its political energy. It has become a purely moralistic law-making structure , a representative of universal values, a sacred holder of the reign of Virtue, and an incarnation of antiquated values such as Good or Truth. It now acts as a jurisdiction which asks everyone to act responsibly while still granting itself the right to remain irresponsible. The political illusion of the left (which had remained frozen during twenty years of opposition) turned into a platform of historical morality (and not of historical direction) once it came to power. It then became the holder of a morality of truthfulness, basic rights, and good conscience, having thus reached a zero degree on the political scale and, undoubtedly, the lowest point of the genealogy of morals. Its moralization of all values marked its historical failure (and the failure of thinking in general). Since then, even reality, the principle of reality, has become an act of faith. Try to question the reality of war, for example, and you immediately become a betrayer of moral law. With the left and the traditional right both deprived of political substance , where has the political gone to? Well, simply, it has moved to the far right. As Bruno Latour so accurately noted the other day in Le Monde, the only political discourse today in France is that of Le Pen's Front National. All the rest is moral and pedagogic discourse, teachers' lessons and lecturers' tirades, managers' rhetoric and programmers' jargon. By contrast, having given himself to evil and immorality, Le Pen has been able to take over all of the political, the remnant of what has been abandoned or voluntarily rejected by a political ideology of Good deeds and Enlightenment values. The more he is antagonized by a moral coalition (a sign of political impotence), the more he enjoys the benefits of political immorality , the benefits which come with being the only one on the side of evil . In the past, whenever the traditional right decided to implement an ideology of morality and order, you could always count on the left, always attempting to antagonize those so-called moral values in the name of political claims. But today, the left is experiencing the same condition that once characterized the traditional right. Suddenly responsible for the defense of moral order, the left has no choice but to witness the slippage of abandoned political energies toward political forces which do not hesitate to antagonize its newly created order. Conversely, the left keeps on reactivating the source of evil by continuing to embody the rule of virtue , which of course is nothing more than the rule of supreme hypocrisy. If Le Pen did not exist, we would have to invent him ! Indeed, it is thanks to him that we can get rid of our evil share, of what is the worst part of us. It is as such that we can curse Le Pen. If he were to disappear, however, we would be left begging for pity! We would be left struggling with our own racist, sexist, and nationalist (everyone's fate) viruses. Simply, we would be abandoned to the murderous negativity of society. As such, Le Pen is the perfect mirror of the political class which uses him to conjure up its own evils, just as every individual uses the political class to cast away any form of corruption inherent to society (both are similar types of corrupt and cathartic functions). Trying to put an end to this, trying to purify society and moralize public life, trying to eradicate what claims to embody evil is a complete misunderstanding of the way evil operates, of the way politics itself operates . Opting for a mode of unilateral denunciation, and ignoring the very principle of reversibility of evil, anti-Le Pen supporters have left him with a monopolistic control over the evil share. Having thus been cast away, Le Pen can no longer be dislodged. By demonizing him in the name of virtue,

the political class simply offers him a most comfortable situation . Le Pen simply has to pick up and recycle the discourse of ambivalence, of denial of evil, and of hypocrisy that his opponents constantly throw at him in the course of their battle for the defense of law or the defense of a good cause. Le Pen's enemies provide him with the energy he needs. Too eager to discredit him, they simply transform his mistakes into (his own) victories. They do not see that good never comes from a purification of evil (evil always retaliates in a forceful way), but rather from a subtle treatment which turns evil against itself. All this shows us that Le Pen may be the embodiment of worthlessness and idiocy. No doubt! But he is above all the symptom of his opponents' stupidity. The imbeciles are those who, by denouncing him, blatantly reveal their own impotence and idiocy and glaringly demonstrate how absurd it is to antagonize him face to face. They simply have not understood the rules of evil that his game of musical chairs follow. By continuing to antagonize him, the imbeciles give life to their own ghosts, their negative doubles. This shows, indeed, a terrifying lack of lucidity on their part. But what drives such a perverse effect, the fact that the left remains trapped in a discourse of denunciation whereas Le Pen maintains a privilege of enunciation? What pushes one to gain all the profits from the crime while the other suffers the negative effects of recrimination? What causes one to "get off" [s'eclatant] with evil when the other gets lost with the victim? Well, it's quite simple. By incarcerating Le Pen in a ghetto, it is in fact the democratic left which becomes incarcerated and which affirms itself as a discriminatory power. It becomes exiled within its own obsession and automatically grants a privilege of justice to what it demonizes. And, of course, Le Pen never misses an opportunity to claim republican legality and fairness on his behalf. But it is above all on the imaginary but very pregnant figure of the rebel and persecuted soul that he establishes his prestige. Thus, he can enjoy the consequences of both legality and illegality. A victim of ostracism, Le Pen has an incredible freedom of language and can deploy an unmatched arrogance of judgement, something that the left has deprived itself of. Let's give an example of such a magical thought that today stands in for political thought. Le Pen is blamed for the sentiment of rejection and exclusion of immigrants in France. But this is just a drop in an ocean of social exclusion that has overwhelmed all of society (recently, exclusion itself, as well as the "social breakdown" that politicians like to mention, were all excluded by the decree signed by the President of the Republic to dissolve the National Assembly). We are all both responsible and victim at the same time of this inextricable and complex process of exclusion. There is something typically magical in the need to conjure up this virus, which is everywhere to be found (it is a direct function of our social and technical "progress"), and in the desire to exorcise the curse of exclusion (and our impotence by the same token) through the figure of a hated man, institution, or organization, no matter who or what they are. It is as if we were faced with a tumor in need of extraction whereas, in fact, the metastases have already expanded everywhere. The Front National simply follows the course of the social metastases, and is all the more virulent since people think that they have eradicated the disease when, in fact, it has already infected the entire body. Not to mention that this process of magical projection of the Front National takes place along the same lines as this party's own process of demonization of immigrants. One must always be suspicious of the ruse of contamination, a ruse which, by means of the transparency of evil, mutates positivity into negativity, and a demand for liberty into "democratic despotism." As usual, it is a question of reversibility, of a subtle encirclement of evil whose rational intelligence is never suspected. While modern pathology tells us a lot about the physical body, we do not pay attention to this mode of analysis when it comes to the social body. To remain within the political, we must step away from ideology and look at things through the lens of social physic s . Our democratic society is a stasis. Le Pen is a metastasis. Global society is dying of inertia and immune deficiency. Le Pen is simply the visible transcription of such a viral condition; he is the spectacular projection of the virus. This happens in dreams too. Le Pen is a burlesque, hallucinatory figuration of a latent state, of a silent inertia caused by forced integration and systematic exclusion. Since the hope of finally curing social inequalities has truly disappeared (by and large), it is no surprise if resentment has moved to the level of racial inequality. The failure of the social explains the success of the racial (and of all the other fatal strategies). As such, Le

Pen is the only savage analyst in today's society. The fact that he is placed on the far right is merely the sad result of the fact that analysts are no longer to be found on the left or the far left. Judges, intellectuals no longer analyze. Only the immigrants perhaps, as polar opposites, could become analysts too. But they already have been recycled by a good and responsible humanitarian thought. Le Pen is the only one who operates a radical erasure of the so-called distinction between right and left. This is, no doubt, an erasure by default. But the harsh criticism of this conventional distinction which was unleashed in the 1960s (and culminated in 1968) has unfortunately disappeared from the political scene today. Le Pen simply recuperates a de facto situation that the political class refuses to confront (it even uses elections to deny it), but whose extreme consequences will be felt some day. If, one day, political imagination, political will, and political demand hope to rebound, they will have to take into account the radical abolition of the antiquated and artificial distinction between right and left, which, in fact, has been largely damaged and compromised over the past decades, and which only holds today through some sort of complicit corruption on both sides. This distinction is dead in practice but, by means of an incurable revisionism, is constantly reaffirmed. Thus, Le Pen is the only one who makes up the new political scene, as if everyone else had already agreed to destroy what's left of democracy, perhaps to produce the retrospective illusion that it actually used to mean something.

Fiat Double BindThe affirmative’s imaginary appeal to the State as being the only solution to problems concerning Latin America only reify their existence. Fiat only exports blame and responsibility onto the federal government, robing us of agency as individuals. [Kappler] says the moment that we come to the conclusion that top-down approaches are the only way to resolve problems, we lose our ability to effectively inspire change in the real world because we actually screen out alternative solutions that don’t revolve around the government spheres.

Assumption of normative legal power epistemologically shields people from claiming responsibility for their actions—they destroy the levers of power Schlag in 1991 (pierre, colorado law prof. 139 u. Pa. L. Rev.801, april)

For these legal thinkers, it will seem especially urgent to ask once again: What should be done ? How should we live? What should the law be? These are the hard questions. These are the momentous questions. [*805] And they are the wrong ones. They are wrong because it is these very normative questions that reprieve legal thinkers from recognizing the extent to which the cherished "ideals " of legal academic thought are implicated in the reproduction and maintenance of precisely those ugly "realities" of legal practice the academy so routinely condemns. It is these normative questions that allow legal thinkers to shield themselves from the recognition that their work product consists largely of the reproduction of rhetorical structures by which human beings can be coerced into achieving ends of dubious social origin and implication. It is these very normative questions that allow legal academics to continue to address (rather lamely) bureaucratic power structures as if they were rational , morally competent, individual humanist subjects. It is these very normative questions that allow legal thinkers to assume blithely that -- in a world ruled by HMOs, personnel policies, standard operating procedures, performance requirements, standard work incentives, and productivity monitoring -- they somehow have escaped the bureaucratic power games. It is these normative questions that enable them to represent themselves as whole and intact, as self-directing individual liberal humanist subjects at once rational, morally competent, and in control of their own situations, the captain of their own ships , the Hercules of their own empires, the author of their own texts . It isn't so . n5 And if it isn't so, it would seem advisable to make some adjustments in the agenda and practice of legal thought. That is what I will be trying to do here. Much of what follows will no doubt seem threatening or nihilistic to many readers. In part that is because this article puts in question the very coherence, meaningfulness, and integrity of the kinds of normative disputes and discussion that almost all of us in the legal academy practice.

Extend our double-bind at the top—It’s a reason to vote Neg on presumption:

He’s conceded that his impacts are real, but inevitable: They read no evidence coming out of the 1AC OR 2AC indicating that voting aff somehow inspires political movements within the timeframe that they isolate that can solve their impacts. This means that the best that your ballot can do is vote for the team that creates the best strategy for creating policy which is the Negative.

Their appeal to macropolitics fosters elitism and killing molar engagement—this maintains the arborecent structures that prevent engagement through becoming democracy. Gilbert 2009 (Jeremy, "Deleuzian Politics? A survey and Some Suggestions", New Formations, EBSCO)

The key question which emerges here is one of the most vexed and contentious in the field of studies of Deleuzian politics: namely, Deleuze and Guattari’s attitude to democracy. While it is quite possible to read in their work an advocacy of that ‘plural radical democracy’ which Laclau and Mouffe have also famously advocated,80 it is equally possible to read in Deleuze an aristocratic distaste for democracy which he shares with Nietzsche and much of the philosophical tradition. This is the reading offered by Phillipe Mengue, and it is not difficult to understand his argument. Democracy necessarily implies government by majorities, and as we have seen, ‘majority’ is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a wholly negative term. Deleuze’s express distaste for ‘opinion’, for ‘discussion’, his consistent emphasis on the value of the new, the creative and the different, all seem to bespeak an avant-gardism which is ultimately inimical to any politics of popular sovereignty. On the other hand, as Paul Patton has argued in response to Mengue,81 most of Deleuze’s anti-democratic statements can easily be read as expressions of distaste with the inadequacy of actually-existing liberal democracy, informed by the desire for a ‘becoming- democratic’ which would exceed the self-evident limitations of current arrangements. Taking this further, I would argue that if any mode of self-government emerges as implicitly desirable from the perspective developed by Deleuze and Guattari, then it would clearly be one which was both democratic and pluralistic without being subject to the existing limitations of representative liberal democracy. Deleuze’s earlier work may occasionally be characterised by a Nietzschean aristocratic tone. However, where he expresses ‘anti-democratic’ sentiments in his work with Guattari, these only ever seem to spring from a commitment to that Marxian tradition which understands liberal democratic forms to be deeply imbricated with processes of capitalist exploitation.82 When weighing up the legacy of this tradition today, it is worth reflecting that the degradation of actually existing ‘democracy’ under neoliberal conditions in recent decades , especially in the years since the fall of the Berlin wall, has lent much weight to the hypothesis that a ‘democratic’ politics which has no anti-capitalist dimension can only ultimately fail, as the individualisation of the social sphere and the corporate control of politics progressively undermine the effectiveness of public institutions. From such a perspective, the problems with existing forms of representative democracy are several. Firstly, in ceding legislative sovereignty to elected bodies for several years at a time, they rely on the artificial stabilisation of ‘majorities’ of opinion along party lines which do not actually express the complexity of popular desires i n any meaningful way. While it is clearly true that democracy as such necessarily demands the temporary organisation of ‘molarities’ for the purpose of taking collective decisions, the existing set of relationships between individuals and parties do es not enable these molarities to emerge

with sufficient intensity to effect major change: for example, despite the vehemence of anti-war opinion in the UK in 2003 , the government was effectively at liberty to pursue the invasion of Iraq, safe in the knowledge that this intensity would disperse before the next general election . At the same time, these relationships do not enable the emergence of sites of engagement and deliberation which would enable new ideas and practices to emerge , simply delegating political engagement to a class of professional politicians, journalists, and policy-specialists whose job is not to innovate, invent and transform existing relations of power, but to maintain them , and the arrangements which express them. Most crucially, they do not enable the new forms of collective becoming which a more participatory, decentralised, ‘molecular’ democracy would facilitate, preventing any meaningful institutional expression of those new forms of dynamic, mobile, cosmopolitan collectivity which ‘globalisation’ makes possible . Instead they seek to actualise that potential only in the politically ineffectual forms of a universalised liberalism or banal forms of multiculturalism, two complementary ‘grids’ which are imposed upon global flows within the parameters of either the nation state or legalistic supra-national institutions.84 The drive to find new forms of participative democracy which characterises the leading-edge of contemporary socialist practice,85 and which has informed not only the politics of the social forum movement86 but more broadly the entire history of radical democratic demands (including, for example, the Chartists’ demand for annual parliaments, or the Bolshevik cry for ‘all power to the soviets’), surely expresses just this desire for democratic forms not stymied by the apparatuses of majority and individualisation.

Resist the attempt to take everything and lay the world open to analysis. We must maintain the intelligence of mystery or suffer planetary symbolic extinctionBaudrillard 2010 CARNIVAL AND CANNIBAL p70-3

In the Promethean Perspective of unlimited growth, there is not merely the desire to make everything function, to liberate everything, but also the desire to make everything signify . Everything is to be brought under the aegis of meaning (and reality). In some cases we know that knowledge will forever escape us. But in the immense majority of cases we do not even know what has disappeared and has always already eluded us . Now, science makes a systematic effort to eradicate this secret area, this "constellation of the mystery" and to eliminate this demarcation line between the violable and the inviolable. All that is concealed must be revealed; everything must be reducible to analysis. Hence the whole effort (particularly since the death of God, who restrained this attempt to break open the natural world) leads us to an extension of the field of meaning (of knowledge, analysis, objectivity, and reality). Now, everything inclines us to think that this accumulation, this over-production, this proliferation of meaning , constitutes (a little like the accumulation of greenhouse gases) a virtual threat for the species (and for the planet), since it is gradually destroying , through experimentation, that domain of the inviolable that serves us, as it were, as an ozone layer and protects us from the worst - from the lethal irradiation and obliteration of our symbolic space. Shouldn't we then, work precisely in the opposite direction, to extend the domain of the inviolable? To restrain the production of greenhouse gases, to reinforce that constellation of the mystery and that intangible barrier that serves as a screen against the welter of information, interaction and universal exchange. The countervailing work exists - it is the work of thought. Not the analytic work of an understanding of causes, of the dissection of an object-world, not the work of a critical, enlightened thought, but another form of understanding or intelligence, which is the intelligence of mystery.

The plan is a form of transcendent ethics which disconnects agency from action – the 1AC understanding of agency creates a slave-ontology which replicates oppression and prevents liberatory politicsSmith 1998 (Daniel W. Prof at Grimmell “The Place of Ethics in Deleuze’s Philosophy”; New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy and Culture)

2. How is a mode of existence evaluated? The first ethical question concerning the determination of modes leads directly into the second question: How does one evaluate modes of existence thus determined? This, one might say, is the ethical task properly speaking, and it is here that Deleuze and Foucault have come under criticism, even from sympathetic readers, for their apparent inability (or refusal) to put forward normative criteria of judgment, leading critics to caricature the political consequences of such a philosophy as everything from an "infantile leftism" to "neo-conservative."' What does it mean to evaluate modes of existence according to purely immanent criteria? If modes of existence are defined as a degree of power (the capacity to affect and to be affected), then they can be evaluated in terms of the manner in which they come into possession of their power. From the viewpoint of an ethology of humans, Spinoza distinguishes between two types of affections: passive affections, which originate outside the individual and separate it from its power of acting; and active affections , which are explained by the nature of the affected individual and allow it to come into possession of its power . To the degree that a body's power of being affected is filled by passive affec tions , this power itself is presented as a power of being acted upon ; conversely, to the degree that a body manages to fill (at least partially) its power of being affected by active affections, this capacity will be presented as a power acting. For a given individual, its capacity to affect and be affected (its degree of power) remains constant and is constantly filled, under continuously variable conditions, by a series of affects and affections, while the power of acting and the power of being acted upon vary greatly, in inverse ratio to each other. But in fact this opposition between passive and active affections is purely abstract, for only the power of acting is, strictly speaking, real, positive and affirmative . Our power of being acted on is simply a limitation on our power of acting and merely expresses the degree to which we are separated from what we "can do."' It is this distinction that allows Spinoza to introduce an "ethical difference" between various types of modes of existence. In Spinoza, an individual will be considered "bad" (or servile or weak or foolish) who remains cut off from its power of acting, who remains in a state of slavery or impotence; conversely, a mode of existence will be called "good" (or free or rational or strong) that exercises its capacity for being affected in such a way that its power of acting increases, to the point where it produces active affections and adequate ideas. For Deleuze, this is the point of convergence that unites Nietzsche and Spinoza. It is never a matter of judging degrees of power quantitatively; the smallest degree of power is equivalent to the largest degree once it is not separated from what it can do. It is rather a question of knowing whether a mode of existence, however small or great, can deploy its power, increasing its power of acting to the point where it goes to the limit of what it "can do."" Modes are no longer "judged" in terms of their degree of proximity to or distance from an external principle but are "evaluated" in terms of the manner by which they "occupy" their existence: the intensity of their power, their "tenor" of life.' What an ethics of immanence will criticize, then, is not simply modes of thought derived from base modes of existence but anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting. This is the second positive task of an immanent ethics. When Spinoza and Nietzsche criticize transcendence, their interest is not merely theoretical or speculative (to expose its fictional or illusory status) but rather practical and ethical: far from being our salvation, transcendence expresses our slavery and impotence at its lowest point 5' This is why Foucault could interpret Anti-Oedipus as a book of ethics, insofar as it attempted to diagnose the contemporary

mechanisms of "microfascism" —in psychoanalysis and elsewhere—that cause us to desire the very things that dominate and exploit us and that cause us to fight for our servitude as stubbornly as though it were our salvation. At the same time, the book attempted to set forth the concrete conditions under which a mode of existence can come into possession of its power, in other words, how it can become active.

LBL

The Bleiker ’97 says nothing about policy making or individual responsibility – and schlag directly answers the argument

Gelber ’95 is completely non-specific – It’s a review of one of Kappeler’s books, it has no weight in this round