Verbatim 4.6

2NC Death Cult Firstly . Beres says we need to discuss policy, but has no warrants for including death impacts. Our K proves death debating decreases good policymaking.2. Beres votes neg. The paragraphs above their card proves he thinks the suppression of death impacts is a pre-requisite to meaningful policy education.Louis Rene Beres, professor of international law at Purdue University, 6/5/03 (Journal and Courier, Anarchy and international law on an endangered planet)For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.3. Beres is a hypocritical hack. We have two cards to prove this:Louis Rene Beres, Prof Intl Law Purdue, 94 (Arizona Journal of Intl and Comparative Law, Spring)Fear of death, to summarize, not only cripples life, it also creates entire fields of premature corpses. But how can we be reminded of our mortality in a productive way, a way that would point to a new and dignified polity of private selves and, significantly, to fewer untimely deaths? One answer lies in the ethics of Epicurus, an enlightened creed whose prescriptions for disciplined will are essential for international stability. The creed of Epicurus is not the caricatural hedonism so falsely associated with the philosopher, but an independence of desire and a freedom from fear -- of death especially. When, therefore, in the Letter to Menoeceus, Epicurus maintains that pleasure is "the end," he says explicitly: [W]e do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality, as is supposed by some who are either ignorant or disagree with us or do not understand, but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind. For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfaction of lusts, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choice and avoidance, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbance of the spirit. 67 Sober reasoning, above all, turns our confidence towards death and our caution towards the fear of death. Aware that Socrates called such fears "bogies," Epictetus says, in Book II, Chapter I of the Discourses: What is death? A bogy. Turn it round and see what it is: you see it does not bite. The stuff of the body was bound to be parted from the airy element, either now or hereafter, as it existed apart from it before. Why then are you vexed if they are parted now? For if not parted now, they will be hereafter. Why so? That the revolution of the universe may be accomplished, for it has need of things present, things future, and things past and done with. 68 We are each "a little soul, carrying a corpse," as Marcus Aurelius says, citing Epictetus, but what sort of soul bears such a heavy burden? Is it the soul of the [*23] Platonic tradition described by Descartes as "in its nature entirely independent of the body, and in consequence that it is not liable to die with it"? 69 Such questions of metaphysics lie far beyond the purview of a political scientist -- even one who has been freed from the tyrannies of vacant empiricism -- but they must be raised before we can ask the next question: How can we best liberate citizens from the "bogy" of death in order to rescue an endangered planet from nefarious definitions of self-determination? To answer such questions we need not contrast Descartes with the Epicureans, or with Spinoza, Locke or Hume. All we need to recognize is, as Santayana notes in Volume Three of The Life of Reason, that "everything moves in the midst of death." 70 Raised by this understanding "above mortality," the triumphant soul of constantly perishing bodies acknowledges that everything, everywhere, is in flux, and that even the most enduring satisfactions are not at odds with personal transience. But let us take leave of the metaphysical, and return to the vastly more concrete realm of international affairs. What, exactly, must be done to bring individuals to the liberation offered by Santayana? Very little, if anything! "Immortal reason," Santayana notwithstanding, will not wean our minds from mortal concerns. Perhaps, over time, humankind will envisage the eternal and detach its affections from the world of flux, but that time seems to be far in the future. For now, we must rely on something else, something far less awesome and far more mundane. We must rely on an expanding awareness that States are not the Hegelian "march of God in the world," but the vicars of annihilation and that the triumph of the herd in world politics only hastens the prospect of individual death.t is V. DEATH, REALPOLITIK AND PLANETIZATION: CREATING AUTHENTIC SELF-DETERMINATION This, then, is an altogether different kind of understanding. Rather than rescue humankind by freeing individuals from fear of death, this perspective recommends educating people to the truth of an incontestable relationship between death and geopolitics. By surrendering ourselves to States and to traditional views of self-determination, we encourage not immortality but premature and predictable extinction. It is a relationship that can, and must, be more widely understood.

Louis Rene Beres, Prof Intl Law Purdue, 96 (http://www.freeman.org/m_online/feb96/beresn.htm)Fear of death, the ultimate source of anxiety, is essential to human survival. This is true not only for individuals, but also for states. Without such fear, states will exhibit an incapacity to confront nonbeing that can hasten their disappearance. So it is today with the State of Israel. Israel suffers acutely from insufficient existential dread. Refusing to tremble before the growing prospect of collective disintegration - a forseeable prospect connected with both genocide and war - this state is now unable to take the necessary steps toward collective survival. What is more, because death is the one fact of life which is not relative but of its national mortality deprives its still living days of essential absoluteness and growth. For states, just as for individuals, confronting death can give the most positive reality to life itself. In this respect, a cultivated awareness of nonbeing is central to each state's pattern of potentialities as well as to its very existence. When a state chooses to block off such an awareness, a choice currently made by the State of Israel, it loses, possibly forever, the altogether critical benefits of "anxiety." Also on the turn that is where garner better impacts- firstly a. V2L is decreased when we race to extend the timeline of are exction and how we die they deAlt solvency :Voting neg solves 2 reasons:A. Deterrence. Racist language proves.Alfred C. Snider, Edwin Lawrence Assistant Professor of Forensics - University of Vermont, 4 (http://debate.uvm.edu/ReplyFrank.doc, date from Archive.org, article also cites 2002 articles)The challenges to the game of debate mentioned in my essay also directly address this. The critical move in debate, where debaters step outside of the traditional box to analyze the ethical issues of argumentative perspectives and to analyze the language employed in a debate belies this concern. Almost all American debaters know that making a racist or sexist comment in a debate is one of the easiest ways to lose a ballot, as the opposing team is likely to make that the only issue in the debate, and the judge will make an example of you. There is no time in debate history when falsification and fabrication of evidence has been better monitored or when the behavior of debaters as regards evidence has been better. This may be more due to the ability to check the evidence used by others, but it still is the case. This sort of ethical dimension of argument and presentation has been made an issue in the decision. Winning at all costs could cost you the win.B. Corrective justice. The ballot has to delineate what is acceptable.Alfred C. Snider, Edwin Lawrence Assistant Professor of Forensics - University of Vermont, 84 (The National Forensic Journal, II, Fall, Ethics in Academic Debate)Ethics concerns codes of behavior, specifically in the "ought to" or "should" sense of behavior. Duke notes that the ethics of game use is a very important issue.5 While an issue of importance should be dealt with by strict criteria in the game design process, this is not possible, since many ethical considerations cannot be anticipated during the design process and must be dealt with during the play of the game itself. In attempting to compose an ethical code for the game of debate, the options are either to state a small number of criteria which lack precision or to produce a long list of criteria which restrict the options of the participant. Almost all philo-sophical disputations which attempt to determine whether a given pattern of behaviors is "ethical" or not give special attention to the particulars of the situation and the ends which are at issue. While murder is seen as unethical behavior by most individuals, never-theless these same individuals might find it tolerable if it was committed in self-defense. Once we begin formulating ethical guidelines we are soon lost in a sea of "if. . . then" statements designed to take situational factors and the desirability of certain ends into account. What is true of general ethical guidelines is also true of ethical guidelines for debate. Recognizing that ethical considerations probably must be dealt with inside a given debate situation, it seems appropriate to opt for the course of generating a small number of generally applicable ethical standards.2NC A2: Perm Do BothPermutation is illogical- this is a gateway argument about the nature of the debate community- they should have to justify the inclusion of their death impacts to win- they cant just wish them away

Pedagogical Pollution DA- It invalidates our protest if the institution were protesting continues to exist and functions exactly the way were protesting- also militarization of the public sphere makes critical reflection and dialogue impossible- means the alt is a prerequisite to solving the aff and is better than the perm.Giroux 3/20Henry Giroux, Truthout, Gated Intellectuals and Ignorance in Political Life: Toward a Borderless Pedagogy in the Occupy Movement, 20 March 2012, http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/8009-gated-intellectuals-and-ignorance-in-political-life-toward-a-borderless-pedagogy-in-the-occupy-movementA group of right-wing extremists in the United States would have the American public believe it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of a market society. Comprising this group are the Republican Party extremists, religious fundamentalists such as Rick Santorum and a host of conservative anti-public foundations funded by billionaires such as the Koch brothers(1), whose pernicious influence fosters the political and cultural conditions for creating vast inequalities and massive human hardships throughout the globe. Their various messages converge in support of neoliberal capitalism and a fortress mentality that increasingly drive the meaning of citizenship and social life. One consequence is that the principles of self-preservation and self-interest undermine, if not completely sabotage, political agency and democratic public life. Neoliberalism or market fundamentalism as it is called in some quarters and its army of supporters cloak their interests in an appeal to "common sense," while doing everything possible to deny climate change, massive inequalities, a political system hijacked by big money and corporations, the militarization of everyday life and the corruption of civic culture by a consumerist and celebrity-driven advertising machine. The financial elite, the 1 percent and the hedge fund sharks have become the highest-paid social magicians in America. They perform social magic by making the structures and power relations of racism, inequality, homelessness, poverty and environmental degradation disappear. And in doing so, they employ deception by seizing upon a stripped-down language of choice, freedom, enterprise and self-reliance - all of which works to personalize responsibility, collapse social problems into private troubles and reconfigure the claims for social and economic justice on the part of workers, poor minorities of color, women and young people as a species of individual complaint. But this deceptive strategy does more. It also substitutes shared responsibilities for a culture of diminishment, punishment and cruelty. The social is now a site of combat, infused with a live-for-oneself mentality and a space where a responsibility toward others is now gleefully replaced by an ardent, narrow and inflexible responsibility only for oneself.

And, this begs the question of the framework debate- if we win that the aff is stuck to their pedagogical frame, then the permutation includes a violent pedagogy that should not be included in our vision of debate1. Double-Bind. Either the perm severs its death impacts or doesnt solve. Severance makes the aff a moving target. We base our strategy on the 1ACs choices, so stick them to it.2. Severance fails:A. Severance destroys accountability. Sandra Harris, Prof Emeritus Nottingham Trent, Karen Grainger, Lect Communications Sheffield Hallam, & Louise Mullany, Linguist U Nottingham, 6 (Discourse Society 17, The pragmatics of political apologies)In reply to an audience member who responded to this statement by Patricia Hewitt by shouting You havent, and the prolonged applause for another woman who argued that Mr Blairs conference apology really meant That is saying Im able to apologize but Im not actually apologising, Ms Hewitt made the following statement to the Question Time audience: I certainly want to say that all of us, from the Prime Minister down, all of us who were involved in making an incredibly difficult decision are very sorry and do apologize for the fact that that information was wrong but I dont think we were wrong to go in. It was primarily these words which sparked off the very considerable public debate and controversy which followed. Major newspapers headlined Ms Hewitts apology the next day; a member of the Government appeared on the Radio 4 early morning Today programme; clips from Question Time appeared on the news the next evening; BBC News invited its listeners worldwide to respond by expressing their views as to whether Patricia Hewitt was right to apologise online; Michael Howard (the then Leader of the Opposition) further demanded an apology from the Prime Minister in Parliament the following week in Prime Ministers Question Time (13 October 2004). At a time when it had become increasingly clear that Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction and the Prime Ministers decision to go to war in Iraq was being undermined by arguments not so much concerning the validity of intelligence reports but as to how they were interpreted and used by the Government, it is interesting that the controversy should centre not only on the increasing demand for a political apology but on the substance and nature of that apology. If we look at what Ms Hewitt actually said, she uses both of the explicit Ifid words, i.e. sorry (intensified) and apologise. She emphasizes by way of explanation that the decision to go to war was an incredibly difficult one and that the [intelligence] information was wrong. Moreover, she also in her statement assumes some kind of collective responsibility; her apology is on behalf not only of the Prime Minister but of all of us who were involved. Thus, on the surface, this looks very like an apology, and, indeed, it was widely reported in the media as the first direct apology to be made by a senior member of the Government. It is interesting to note how The Daily Telegraph (9/10/04: 10), for example, defines such a speech act. Miss Hewitt issued her direct apology, using the word sorry, contrasting this usage with Mr Blair and other ministers, who have studiously avoided using the word sorry in this context. Downing Street, on the other hand, claimed that Ms Hewitt was not saying anything that Mr Blair had not said already, i.e. All she was doing was echoing precisely what the Prime Minster had said, which is, of course, that we regret the fact that some information was wrong (cited in The Daily Telegraph, 9/10/04). In a sense, Downing Street is right. In terms of the taxonomy of the strategies which constitute an apology as an identifiable speech act, Ms Hewitt has used both the explicit Ifid words, but her collective responsibility is a spurious one, since it relates to an offence committed (implicitly) by the intelligence services (producing wrong information) rather than the Cabinet, including the Prime Minister. Hence, the Ifid sorry becomes necessarily sorry as regret, as the Downing Street statement which followed Hewitts apology makes explicit. Because sorry as regret carries no acceptance of responsibility or accountability, the offence becomes an implicit part of the explanation, even a justification for an incredibly difficult decision. Reparation, forbearance, absolution are not appropriate in such circumstances. Moreover, Ms Hewitt concludes her apology with a statement (but I dont think we were wrong to go in) which contradicts the demand made by the questioner, i.e. that the Prime Minister should apologize for taking the British nation to war in Iraq. However, though nearly all forms of media who report the Question Time encounter refer to Hewitts statement as an apology, thus at least implicitly categorizing it as such, most of them do call into question in various ways its nature and substance. The many viewers who responded to BBC News are even more critical and also, perhaps surprisingly, more discerning, despite the fact that the invitation was headlined: Ms Hewitt is the first senior member of the government to make a direct apology for the intelligence failings and the question worded as Was Patricia Hewitt right to apologise? Does the apology draw a line under the debate over WMD?, all of which accept as a presupposition that an apology has been made. The most frequent question raised by both the press and viewers has to do with accountability, i.e. that a proper apology involves the acceptance of personal responsibility for the offence by the apologizer. Hence, Patricia Hewitts apology is faulty both because shes apologizing for something for which she bears no responsibility (What does Patricia Hewitt have to do with the security services?, as one viewer asks) and for the wrong offence, i.e. that it was the Prime Ministers misrepresentation of the intelligence reports, not the intelligence reports in themselves, which was wrong (I asked him [the Prime Minister] very specifically about the way in which he misrepresented the intelligence that he received to the country. Why can he not bring himself to say sorry for that? Michael Howard in the House of Commons, 13 October 2004). Both the press and large numbers of viewers, like Michael Howard, question the acceptability of Hewitts remarks on these grounds. Perhaps partly because Hewitts apology comes to exemplify what is seen as the failure of a number of leading politicians to accept accountability, viewers, like the press, also question the ultimate significance of political apologies which appear to be unconnected with meaningful action, both in terms of rectifying the damage caused by the offence (An apology wont bring back the lives of the servicemen lost, nor the civilians, nor rectify the damage, nor pay back the 5bn cost, nor call off the insurgents and terrorists, nor free Ken Bigley BBC News, World Edition 09/10/04) and as an indication of the (lack of) seriousness of the politicians sense of remorse (The only apology that I would accept is the apology of resignation BBC News, World Edition 09/10/04). Examining the controversy which followed Ms Hewitts Question Time statement has highlighted the complexity of political apologies in relationship to the interpersonal types usually explored in the apology literature or at least has demonstrated that different types of complexity are involved. First of all, it is clear that the use of one of the two explicit Ifids (sorry and apologize) appear to be crucial according to the judgements/evaluations of both the press and viewers in order to categorize what a politician says as an apology. The widespread categorization of Patricia Hewitts statement by the press as the first direct apology by a senior minister appears to relate to her use of these Ifids. Tony Blairs conference statement, on the other hand (I can apologize for the information that turned out to be wrong, but I cant, sincerely at least, apologize for removing Saddam) is ambiguous in its use of can as to whether that speech act is actually being performed, and the clear emphasis is, in any case, on his refusal to apologize for the act cited in the latter half of the sentence. Indirection in a political apology is likely to be perceived negatively as evasion and shiftiness. Second, there are clearly disputes over who should apologize; hence, the reaction of much of the press and many viewers who write in online that Patricia Hewitt is not the appropriate person to apologize for something for which she had minimal or no responsibility. There is also the question of the offence itself, which in the Question Time challenge by the studio audience is related to the decision to go to war in Iraq, but in the apology becomes that the information provided by the intelligence services was wrong. And, perhaps most significant, to whom is the apology being made? Who are the victim/s? Unlike Mr Blairs apology for the injustice to those wrongly convicted for the IRA pub bombings, where the victims are named, there are no victims indicated in Ms Hewitts apology. The implication in the studio audience challenge is that it is the British people to whom an apology for the decision to go to war in Iraq should be addressed, for having been misled, but the implications are probably even wider than that. (If there is an implicit meaning in the apology statement itself, it is that the Government itself has been victimized by having been provided with faulty intelligence, especially since Ms Hewitt clearly states that the act of going to war itself was not wrong.) In addition, Ms Hewitts statement is made in the immediate context in answer to a question raised by a member of the studio audience, but the reaction of that audience certainly demonstrates that they regard the apology as directed at the entire audience rather than at the specific individual. Ms Hewitt knew that her statement was also being heard by the unseen wider audience who are watching the programme and must have anticipated that it would be taken up by the press, repeated and published for a wider public yet. Who the victim/s are and the nature of the offence are clearly disputed territory which the apology does little to clarify. Clearly, the political stakes for the Prime Minister are incredibly high, and whatever his current beliefs about Iraq or the demands of a substantial number of the British public for an apology for taking the country to war on the basis of faulty (or misrepresented) intelligence, Tony Blair is unlikely ever to issue a political apology which would satisfy the basic conditions of those demands according to viewer judgements (an Ifid token + an expression which indicates acceptance of responsibility and/or blame for wrongdoing) or to resign (absolution).1 Conclusions We would agree with Luke (1997) that the apology has become a form of political speech with increasing significance and power (p. 344), and across the political spectrum on a global scale has, arguably, become one of the most prominent of public speech acts. Even though it may not as yet be the age of the apology, the relative lack of interest in the political apology as a generic type of discourse by sociolinguistics and pragmatics is both surprising and unwarranted, since they demonstrate some revealing differences as well as significant areas of overlap with the type of interpersonal and individual apologies which have been the primary focus of the now considerable amount of apology research. For example, much of the existing literature on apologies, following Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), adopts a face-needs perspective, seeing the apology as basically a negative politeness strategy which is aimed mainly at the redress of Face Threatening Acts (see Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987; Goffman, 1971; Holmes, 1995, 1998). It is certainly the case that many types of political apologies do represent a potentially serious loss of face for politicians, which may be why they are frequently so eager to apologize for things for which they cannot be held accountable. But to approach political apologies by means of face-oriented definitions is often not particularly helpful and highlights some of the important differences with the interpersonal data on which such definitions are most often based. Holmes (1998), for instance, defines apologies as follows: An apology is a speech act addressed to Bs face-needs and intended to remedy an offense for which A takes responsibility, and thus to restore equilibrium between A and B (where A is the apologizer, and B is the person offended). (p. 204) Clearly, this is a definition which assumes that it is two individuals who are involved in the process of apologizing and that addressing the face-needs of the person offended is the primary motive for the speech act, with the restoring of equilibrium its main goal. Such definitions do not take us very far in understanding the significance and issues raised by political apologies. Given the magnitude of some of the offences we have considered, describing what the apology addresses as the face-needs of the person offended seems neither accurate nor enlightening. To claim that it is the face-needs of Samantha Roberts which are in some way damaged or that she is the person offended seems somehow to trivialize events which are of a very serious nature. Nor would these terms be very helpful in describing the motives held by the various persons and groups who call on the British Prime Minister to apologize for taking the country to war in Iraq or for allegedly misrepresenting the intelligence reports to members of Parliament. Moreover, the process of restoring equilibrium is again likely to be a much more complex process if it can be achieved at all than is the case when apologies are negotiated between individuals acting in a private capacity. Indeed, its hard to imagine how Robinsons (2004) notion of a preferred response (one which offers absolution to the apologizer rather than merely accepting the apology) could possibly be applicable in the case of most political apologies. Even in the instance of fairly low level offences such as the British diplomat who described Nottingham as a more dangerous place than Saudi Arabia, city officials agreed to accept the apology rather than to offer absolution to the offender. However, Holmes emphasis on the apologizers accepting responsibility for the offence and Robinsons argument that Apologizing is an essential component of the maintenance of social harmony because it communicates awareness and acceptance of moral responsibility for offensive behavior (2004: 292) both foreground the essential sense of morality which generates the need for such apologies and which goes well beyond face-needs. What Samantha Roberts demands is an apology from the Minister for Defence which explicitly accepts his own moral responsibility for the actions which led to her husbands death. From both the press and viewers, Ms Hewitts political apology produces responses which are concerned essentially with morality, i.e. what is right or wrong, what the politician/s should or should not do; and these responses most often centre on the question of accepting personal responsibility. Eelen (2001: 249) argues in conjunction with new directions in politeness theory that morality is no longer regarded as a fixed higher-order set of rules that determine the individuals behaviour, but as something that people do to or with each other. This seems to us an arguable point but one which is overstated. Though what constitutes an acceptable political apology may not be based on a fixed higher-order set of rules, there does seem to exist a cultural consensus that is morally grounded and goes beyond the merely individual response, i.e. it is right for a politician to offer an apology in which s/he explicitly accepts responsibility for his/her own acts and wrong to attempt to evade that responsibility. This is not to deny that the political apology is a contested concept or that it not only arises out of discourse struggle but generates further struggle and controversy. It is that very discourse struggle which is, indeed, part of their interest for linguists and which is reflected in the substantial amount of media coverage and public debate that political apologies often provoke. However, once again, we would argue that apologies, nearly always regarded in apology research as a quintessential politeness strategy, are more than an argumentative social tool with which the individual can accomplish things (Eelen, 2001: 249) and also that political apologies are perceived as more than a politeness strategy. It is interesting that the British data on political apologies which we have examined contains no references at all to the question of (im)politeness, though that too frequently evokes impassioned public debate. Like Eelen, Mills (2003) also regards apologies as a contested concept and stresses the importance of evaluation. Apologies are often composed of elements which cannot be recognised easily by either interactants or analysts as unequivocal apologies (p. 111). Hence, apologies cannot be considered to be a formal linguistic entity (p. 222) but rather a judgement made about someones linguistic performance (p. 112). This, again, is probably true in a general sense, and as we maintained earlier, apologies are unlikely ever to be defined precisely as a fixed set of semantic components. However, once again, though the evaluative component is highly significant, the responses (from both media and public) to the political apologies in our data are more than merely individuals making disparate judgements about someones linguistic performance. They do instead, we would argue, reflect a set of cultural expectations as to what constitutes a valid apology as a formal speech act, and, as such, contain also a quite considerable degree of predictability. Indeed, it is in large measure the fact that listeners and viewers do have a sense of what constitutes an unequivocal apology that perpetuates the discourse struggle. In contrast to many apologies between individuals, which may take a wide variety of forms and often contain a high degree of implicitness, it seems to be crucial if political apologies are to be regarded as valid by those to whom they are addressed that they are not implicit or ambiguous, i.e. that they contain an explicit Ifid (sorry and/or apologize) and that there is an (explicit) acceptance of personal responsibility for a stated act which has been committed by the apologizer. The widely expressed cynicism with regard to political apologies which are made by major politicians long after the events concerned have occurred and for which they cannot be accountable reflects these cultural expectations, along with the clear sense that apologies are morally grounded. B. Rhetorical accountability is key to value to life and education.Jerry Blitefield, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, 6 (Rhetoric & Public Affairs 9.4, Book Reviews)Wayne Booth, who passed away in October 2005, has long been rhetoric's most ardent ambassador, having pressed his claim for rhetoric's value in the halls of literature, science, and philosophy. With his last book and self-described "manifesto" The Rhetoric of RHETORIC, Booth takes his message beyond the intramural back-chatter of academe and straight to the public at large. His case: "that the quality of our lives, moment by moment, depends upon the quality of our rhetoric" (171), and that the discursive, ethical, and epistemic impoverishment of contemporary democratic politics and culture results from practicing bad rhetoric, what he calls rhetrickery"dangerously, often deliberately, deceptive [rhetoric]: just plain cheating that deserves to be exposed . . . the art of producing misunderstanding" (x). As a mend, Booth posits that by reviving rhetorical education across the board, by attuning the general population upward toward heightened rhetorical awareness, rhetorical hucksters and cardsharpsfrom shady politicians and corporations to the shading presswould find no truck among the people. Or at least a lot less. So firstly we control V2L Next that is a gateway into education*The more we talk about nuclear war the less we fear it the turn is linear.Carol Cohn, Senior Fellow, CGO and Wellesley College, 87 (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June, 43, Slick Ems, Glick Ems, Christmas Trees, and Cookie Cutters)MY CLOSE ENCOUNTER with nuclear strategic analysis started in the summer of 1984. I was one of 48 college teachers attending a summer workshop on nuclear weapons, strategic doctrine, and arms control that was held at a university containing one of the nation's foremost centers of nuclear strategic studies, and that was cosponsored by another institution. It was taught by some of the most distinguished experts in the field, who have spent decades moving back and forth between academia and governmental positions in Washington. When at the end of the program I was afforded the chance to be a visiting scholar at one of the universities' defense studies center, I jumped at the opportunity. I spent the next year immersed in the world of defense intellectuals--men (and indeed, they are virtually all men) who, in Thomas Powers's words, "use the concept of deterrence to explain why it is safe to have weapons of a kind and number it is not safe to use." Moving in and out of government, working sometimes in universities and think tanks, they create the theory that underlies U. S. nuclear strategic practice. In other words, what I learned at the program is that talking about nuclear weapons is fun. The words are quick, clean, light, they trip off the tongue. You can reel off dozens of them in seconds, forgetting about how one might interfere with the next, not to mention with the lives beneath them. Nearly everyone I observed--lecturers, students, hawks, doves, men, and women--took pleasure in using the words; some of us spoke with a self-consciously ironic edge, but the pleasure was there nonetheless. Part of the appeal was the thrill of being able to manipulate an arcane language, the power of entering the secret kingdom. But perhaps more important, learning the language gives a sense of control, a feeling of mastery over technology that is finally not controllable but powerful beyond human comprehension. The longer I stayed, the more conversations I participated in, the less I was frightened of nuclear war. How can learning to speak a language have such a powerful effect? One answer, discussed earlier, is that the language is abstract and sanitized, never giving access to the images of war. But there is more to it than that. The learning process itself removed me from the reality of nuclear war. My energy was focused on the challenge of decoding acronyms, learning new terms, developing competence in the language--not on the weapons and the wars behind the words. By the time I was through, I had learned far more than an alternate, if abstract, set of words. The content of what I could talk about was monumentally different. We must oppose nuclear war without talking about it the reverse causes obsession.Mick Broderick, Assoc Dir Center for Millennial Studies, 92 (http://wwwmcc.murdoch.edu.au/~mickbrod/postmodm/m/text/witness.html, Antithesis 6.1)However, the sleight-of-hand superpower oxymoron that is "arms control" fumbles occasionally, slipping into brinkmanship. The habituation of Mutually Assured Destruction across a generation escalates towards potent fears of apocalypse, both dreaded and desired. The maxim of this secular, post-Hiroshima atomic age must be, surely, "to avoid nuclear war, we must first imagine it". In order to apprehend this imaginary signifier, we have dredged our unconscious fears, desires and fantasies. Richly inscribed by the apocalyptic metatext of history as genre, these phantoms are exposed for public consumption and spectatorship -- visions of the end simultaneously prophetic and proscriptive. To face Armageddon either individually or collectively, to continually peer at the unthinkable event, we give witness to a primary desire to foresee our own death. Nuclear war, its imaginary signifier and its cathartic textuality (e.g. film, television) encourages the audience to participate in not only the death of the subject, but the post-structural death of the author and the death of the species. The precise site and moment of signification comes with the nuclear explosion. A true totem of the atomic age, the mushroom cloud dwarfs all which precedes or follows it. It is the temporal and narrative nodal point from which we assess the (human) text. It is a sublime object at once striking terror and awe. It is the Alpha and Omega connoting universal death and, contrarily, selective rebirth. Nuclear war, at the moment of ignition, is the anticipated eschatological juncture -- literally end-time. In apocalyptic discourse it becomes the radical intervention into linear human causality by the external cosmos operating outside of our spatio-temporal strictures, ushering-in the millennium. Indeed, for fundamentalists nuclear rupture connotes transcendental 'rapture'.3 All of this philosphico-theological baggage is present when we observe the nuclear sublime.4 It's echo can be found in the feeble pseudo-religious, yet spontaneous, discourse employed by observers of atomic detonations right from the original Trinity blast, where some scientists half-expected to witness the ignition of the atmosphere and with it the extinction of all life on the planet. Thanatos and Sadistic Scopophilia Susan Sontag has described the innurring effect of cinematic disaster, particularly evident in Japaneses science-fiction films acting as metaphors for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.5 Psychologist Robert Lifton has clinically charted pathologies of denial and psychic numbing when confronting nuclear issues.6 While both are correct, unfortunately neither acknowledge the pleasure afforded audiences by such imagery of global conflagration. Cinematically, pre-Hiroshima iconography of disaster, catastrophe and cataclysm employed the 'natural' devastations of tidal deluge, the tempests of hurricane, cyclone and typhoon, or the rumblings of earthquakes and volcanic erruptions. In Dr Strangelove: or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb [1963] director Stanley Kubrick recognised the inherent beauty of the mushroom cloud as well as its horror, a truly sublime image, instilling both awe and terror in its audience. Kubrick's genius was to merge Swiftian social critique with Pentagon/Atomic Energy Commission footage with a song of absence/presence ("We'll meet again, don't know where, don't know when...") which could be read as either ironic apocalypse or proclaiming a new world order. Wittingly or unwittingly, as spectators we often embrace apocalypse, or desire some form of unconscious, idealized notion of it. For example, in Dr Strangelove, Major Kong straddles a 20 megaton thermonuclear bomb as it plummets towards a soviet ICBM site hollering inane Texan warwhoops. The huge missile jutting from his flanks, an atomic phallus which he whips in a masturbatory frenzy, stetson in hand, his image and voice trailing off into the background leaving a final few seconds of silence before the screen is engulfed in the brilliant over-exposure of nuclear detonation, the perfect oneness of jouissance where the intersecting vectors of sex, death and speed collide headfirst in an orgasmic explosion of fission, fucking and fallout.52NC A2: Cede the Political/Political Action GoodCede the political is a reason to vote neg- Giroux says fascination with spectacles of violence trade off with our ability to focus on real political action- debaters cede the question of real political change in favor of finding a policy that is connected with the most nuclear wars or world destructions- that cedes real political questions to the spectacle of death and painThe K flips all their cede the political arguments- continuous refusal to subject militarization to scrutiny is the ultimate cessation of the public sphere- makes politics impossible and proves our framework is a prior question to any of their offense.Giroux 11Henry A Giroux, Truthout, Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals, 21 November 2011, http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=5046:occupy-colleges-now--students-as-the-new-public-intellectualsOf course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual community."[1] Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[2] Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance - and more than critical - to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation.[3]

And, their form of engagement with policymaking only leads to endless pain and suffering - the cultural of violent imagery the aff promotes crystalizes militaristic power relationships that cede the political to a war machine, which fuels its furnace with human misery at home, in order to fund the destruction of civilians abroad Giroux 12Henry A Giroux, Frequent author on pedagogy in the public sphere, Truthout, Youth in Revolt: The Plague of State-Sponsored Violence, March 14, 2012, http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=7249:youth-in-revolt-the-plague-of-statesponsored-violenceMarked by a virulent notion of hardness and aggressive masculinity, a culture of violence has become commonplace in a society in which pain, humiliation and abuse are condensed into digestible spectacles endlessly circulated through extreme sports, reality TV, video games, YouTube postings and proliferating forms of the new and old media. But the ideology of hardness and the economy of pleasure it justifies are also present in the material relations of power that have intensified since the Reagan presidency, when a shift in government policies first took place, and set the stage for the emergence of unchecked torture and state violence under the Bush-Cheney regime. Conservative and liberal politicians alike now spend millions waging wars around the globe, funding the largest military state in the world, providing huge tax benefits to the ultra-rich and major corporations and all the while draining public coffers, increasing the scale of human poverty and misery and eliminating all viable public spheres - whether they be the social state, public schools, public transportation, or any other aspect of a formative culture that addresses the needs of the common good. State violence, particularly the use of torture, abductions and targeted assassinations, are now justified as part of a state of exception that has become normalized. A "political culture of hyper punitiveness"(24) has become normalized and accelerates throughout the social order like a highly charged electric current. Democracy no longer leaves open the importance of an experience of the common good. As a mode of "failed sociality," the current version of market fundamentalism has turned the principles of democracy against itself, deforming both the language of freedom and justice that made equality a viable idea and political goal. State violence operating under the guise of personal safety and security, while parading species of democracy, cancels out democracy "as the incommensurable sharing of existence that makes the political possible."(25) Symptoms of ethical, political and economic impoverishment are all around us.