2nd set property cases

7/27/2019 2nd Set Property Cases

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G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.

Acting Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee Director of Lands.

Benjamin H. Aquino for appellee Laureano Veleriano.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with anarea of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion.To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. TheDirector of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessoryinformation title under the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely undera bona fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by theBureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.

It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a freepatent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of theManila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, andthat his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession was distributed by oppositorValeriano.

On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore,formed part of the public domain.

After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain. In his appeal, Ignacio assigns the

following errors:

I. The lower court erred in holding that the land in question, altho an accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to himbut forms part of the public domain.

II. Granting that the land in question forms part of the public domain, the lower court nevertheless erred in not declaring the same to be thenecessary for any public use or purpose and in not ordering in the present registration proceedings.

III. The lower court erred in not holding that the land in question now belongs to the applicant-appellant by virtue of acquisitive prescription,the said land having ceased to be of the public domain and became the private or patrimonial property of the State.

IV. The lower court erred in not holding that the oppositor Director of Lands is now in estoppel from claiming the land in question as a landof the public domain.

Appellant contends that the parcel belongs to him by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, andhe cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that:

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of thewaters.

The article cited is clearly inapplicable because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case wascaused by action of the Manila Bay.


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Appellant next contends that Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and thatManila Bay cannot be considered as a sea. We find said contention untenable. A bay is a part of the sea, being a mere indentation of the same:

Bay. An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea,distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law ofWaters and Water Rights p. 6)

Moreover, this Tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil.732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property ofthe State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of thetides of the Manila Bay).

Then the applicant argues that granting that the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial courtshould have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for privateownership. Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 reads thus:

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment ofspecial industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estatesadjacent thereto and as increment thereof.

Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:

Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is notnecessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shaldeclare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executiveand possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, isnot necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declarationhas been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands , 93 Phil., 134, (citedin Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52).

. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public land are to beused for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that theland in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, notavailable for private appropriation or ownership.

Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years.In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co .19 Phil., 505 this Court said:

The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous permission from the proper

authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner for seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegaland is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended forpublic uses and for the benefit of those who live nearby.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L40474 August 29, 1975


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CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.

HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES Presiding Judge, Branch XV, 14th Judicial District, and JOSE L. ESPELETA, Assistant Provincial Fiscal,

Province of Cebu, representing the Solicitor General's Office and the Bureau of Lands, respondents.

Jose Antonio R Conde for petitioner.

Office of the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney David R. Hilario forrespondents. .

CONCEPCION, Jr., J.:

This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title over a

parcel of land situated in the City of Cebu.

The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of

Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an

abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. 1Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu

passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. 2Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to

the herein petitioner being the highest bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolutesale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. 3By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an

application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered. 4

On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be

registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man

Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. 5

After hearing the parties, on October 11, 1974 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title. 6Hence

the instant petition for review.

For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:

(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a

road as abandoned? and

(2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common

contract?

(1) The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:

Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following

legislative powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or

conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City of

Baguio, 7where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly

assailed, this court said:

5. So it is, that appellant may not challenge the city council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use and

converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem

to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.


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Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a

plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served

incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such

withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shallform part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from

public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a

registerable title over the lot in question.

WHEREFORE, the order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby

set aside, and the respondent court is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J, Fernando, Barredo and Aquino, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-2017 November 24, 1906

THE MUNICIPALITY OF OAS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

BARTOLOME ROA, defendant-appellant.

Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher, for appellant.

Enrique Llopiz for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The plaintiff brought this action for the recovery of a tract of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was a part of the public square of said town.

The defendant in his answer alleged that he was the owner of the property. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant has

brought the case here by bill of exceptions.

As we look at the case, the only question involved is one of fact. Was the property in question a part of the public square of the town of Oas? The

testimony upon this point in favor of the plaintiff consisted of statements made by witnesses to the effect that this land had always been a part of the

public square, and of certain resolutions adopted by the principalia of the pueblo reciting the same fact, the most important of these being the

minutes of the meeting of the 27th of February, 1892. In that document it is expressly stated that this land was bought in 1832 by the then parish

priest for the benefit of the pueblo. It recites various proceedings taken thereafter in connection with this ownership, including among them an order

of the corregidorof Nueva Caceres prohibiting the erection of houses upon the land by reason of the fact above recited namely, that the land

belonged to the pueblo. This resolution terminated with an order to the occupant of the building then standing upon the property that he should notrepair it. The defendant signed this resolution.

It further appears that the same building was almost entirely destroyed by a baguio on the 13th and 14th of May, 1893, and that the authorities of the

puebo ordered the complete demolition thereof. The resolution of the 31st of May, 1893, declared that the then owner of the building, Jose Castillo,

had no right to reconstruct it because it was situated upon land which did not belong to him. This resolution was also signed by the defendant.

The evidence on the part of the defendant tends to show that in 1876 Juana Ricarte and Juana Riquiza sold the land in question to Juan Roco, and

that on the 17th day of December, 1894, Jose Castillo sold it to the defendant. No deed of conveyance from Juan Roco to Jose Castillo was

presented in evidence, but Castillo, testifying as a witness, said that he had bought the property by verbal contract from Roco, his father-in-law. The

defendant, after his purchase in 1894, procured a possessory of information which was allowed by an order of the justice of the peace of Oas on the

19th day of January, 1895, and recorded in the Registry of Property on the 28th of March of the same year.


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In this state of the evidence, we can not say that the proof is plainly and manifestly against the decision of the court below. Unless it is so, the finding

of fact made by that court can not be reversed. (De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 201 U. S., 303.)

The two statements signed by Roa, one in 1892 and the other in 1893, are competent evidence against him. They are admissions by him to the

effect that at that time the pueblo was the owner of the property in question. They are, of course, not conclusive against him. He was entitled to, and

did present evidence to overcome the effect of these admissions. The evidence does not make out a case of estoppel against him. (sec. 333, par. 1

Code of Civil Procedure.)

The admissibility of these statements made by Roa do not rest upon section 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to declarations or

admissions made by persons not a party to the suit, but it rests upon the principle that when the defendant in a suit has himself made an admission

of any fact pertinent to issue involved, it can be received against him.

This action was commenced on the 17th of December, 1902. There is no evidence of any adverse occupation of this land for thirty years

consequently the extraordinary period of prescription does not apply. The defendant can not rely upon the ordinary period of prescription of ten years

because he was not a holder in good faith. He knew at that time of his purchase in 1894, and had so stated in writing, that the pueblo was the owner

of the property. So that, even if the statute of limitations ran against a municipality in reference to a public square, it could not avail the defendant in

this case.

It appears that Roa has constructed upon the property, and that there now stands thereon, a substantial building. As early as 1852 this land had

been used by the municipality constructed thereon buildings for the storage of property of the State, quarters for the cuadrilleros, and others of a likecharacter. It therefore had ceased to be property used by the public and had become a part of the bienes patrimoniales of the pueblo. (Civil Code

arts. 341, 344.) To the case are applicable those provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the construction by one person of a building upon land

belonging to another. Article 364 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Where there has been bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner

of the latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in good faith.

Bad faith on the part of the owner is understood whenever the act has been executed in his presence with his knowledge and tolerance and without

objection.

The defendant constructed the building in bad faith for, as we have said, he had knowledge of the fact that his grantor was not the owner thereof.

There was a bad faith also on the part of the plaintiff in accordance with the express provisions of article 364 since it allowed Roa to construct thebuilding without any opposition on its part and to so occupy it for eight years. The rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both

had acted in good faith. Their rights in such cases are governed by article 361 of the Civil Code, which is as follows:

The owner of the land on which the building, sowing, or planting is done in good faith shall have a right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing,

or planting after the indemnity mentioned in articles 453 and 454, or, to oblige the person who has built or planted, to pay him the value of the land

and to force the person who sowed to pay the proper rent.

The judgment of the court below is so modified as to declare that the plaintiff is the owner of the land and that it has the option of buying the building

thereon, which is the property of the defendant, or of selling to him the land on which it stands. The plaintiff is entitled to recover the costs of both

instances.1wphil.net

After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and at the proper time thereafter let the record be remanded to

the court below for proper action. So ordered.

Johnson, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24440 June 30, 1969

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,defendants-appellants.

R E S O L U T I O N


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REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Professing respect for the principles enunciated by this Court in its decision of 28 March 1968, in Case G. R. No. L-24440, entitled Province of

Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, et al., 1 the appellant City seeks reconsideration of our decision in so far as the latter declares that

Republic Act 3039 is unconstitutional and void in so far as the same seeks to deprive the Province of Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the 26 lots

situated within the City of Zamboanga, and hereinafter enumerated, without just compensation, for the reason that said 26 lots are patrimonia

property of the old Province of Zamboanga. Said 26 lots are declared in the main decision to be the following:

TCT Number Lot Number U s e

The movant City contends that the 26 lots aforestated were not patrimonial property of the former Province of Zamboanga, for the reason that

said 26 lots have always been used for public purposes, such as school sites, playgrounds and athletic fields for schools.

To bolster its contention, the City of Zamboanga submitted photographs, plans and a sworn certification of its City Engineer to the effect that:

(a) Twenty-one lots (Nos. 17, 177, 179, 181-A, 181-B, 182 to 197) are part and parcel of the Zamboanga Trade School;

(b) Three lots (Nos. 169, 175 and 176) are part and parcel of the Zamboanga Normal College;

(c) Lot No. 127-D is the Pasonanca Elementary School;

(d) Lot No. 4147 is the Bolong Elementary School;

(e) Lot No. 159-B is part and parcel of the Baliwasan Elementary School.

Appellant City of Zamboanga, therefore, prays that the main decision be partly reconsidered and that all title to, and ownership of, the 26 lots

be declared to have been validly vested in said City free of charge by Republic Act No. 3039.

The motion for reconsideration is vigorously opposed by plaintiff-appellee Province of Zamboanga del Norte, which contends that the evidence

sought to be filed by the appellant City is not newly discovered evidence and is, therefore, inadmissible at this stage of the proceedings.

Alternatively, the appellee Province of Zamboanga contends that the 26 lots are vacant, or that the buildings existing thereon were constructed in

bad faith; and that the said Province has additional evidence to show that most of these properties are not actually devoted to public use or

governmental purposes.1awphil.nt

Considering that both contending parties are actually subdivisions of one entity, the Republic of the Philippines, so that public interest is

involved and demands that the issues presented be determined speedily without regard to technicalities, the Court resolved that, in the interest of

justice and equity, its main decision and that of the court below be reconsidered and set aside, in so far as they affect the twenty-six lots heretofore

enumerated, and the monetary indemnities awarded. Instead, the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for a new trial, wherein the

parties shall be given opportunity to adduce and submit any evidence in their possession to show whether or not the 26 lots aforesaid were or were

not actually devoted to public use or governmental purposes prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 3039. Thereafter, the Court of First Instance

shall decide the issues anew, taking into account the evidence submitted by the parties and the principles of law laid down by this Supreme Court in

its main decision of the present case, dated 28 March 1968.

So ordered. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur

Dizon, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-5631 October 17, 1910

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, opponent-appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellant.

Provincial fiscal Barrios, for appellee.


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TORRES, J.:

On June 19, 1908, the municipal president of the pueblo of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, filed, in the name of the municipality, an

application with the Court of Land Registration in which he asked for the registration, in conformity with the Land Registration Act, of a parcel of land

of which the said municipality was the absolute owner, bounded on the north by calle Corto south of the church square, on the east by Second

Avenue, on the south by land belonging to Smith, Bell & Co., and on the west by First Avenue; the application states that the said land has an area

of 666.60 square meters and its description and boundaries are given in detail in the map attached to the application, which sets forth that the

property described was appraised at the last assessment levied for the purpose of the payment of the land tax, and that there is no encumbrance on

it; that no one other than the applicant, to the latter's best knowledge and belief, has any right or interest therein; that the said land was acquired by

possession and material occupation for a large number of years and is at present occupied by the applicant as a municipal corporation duly

organized; and that, in the unlikely event of the denial of the said application, made in accordance with the Land Registration Act, the applicant

invokes the benefits of chapter 6 of Act No. 926, since the said corporation has been in poossession of the land mentioned, which is entirely

surrounded by a fence, and has been cultivating it for a great many years.

On March 18, 1909, the Attorney-General, in representation of the Director of Lands, filed a writing opposing the registration solicited and

alleged that the land in question belonged to the United States and was under the control of the Government of the Philippines Islands. He asked

that the applicant's prayer be denied and that, in case the said property should be declared to belong to the Insular Government, the same be

awarded to it, together with the issuance thereto of the proper certificate of registration.

The case having been heard on March 22, 23, and 24, 1909, and oral evidence adduced by both parties, the judge, on the 24th of the said

month, overruled the opposition of the Director of Lands, and decreed, after a declaration of general default, that the property in question be awarded

to the applicant, the municipality of Catbalogan, and be registered in its name. The Attorney-General, in representation of the Director of Lands,

excepted to this ruling and announced his purpose of filing a bill of exceptions. He asked at the same time for a new trial on the grounds that the

findings of fact of the court were openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence, and that the latter did not justify the said decision

which, he alleged, was contrary to law. This motion was denied and exception was taken thereto by the Attorney-General, who duly presented the

required bill of exceptions which was certified and forwarded to this court.

The question submitted to the decision of this court, through the appeal raised by the Attorney-General in representation of the Director of

Lands, is whether the lot occupied by the court-house of the municipality of Catbalogan, of the Islands and Province of Samar, belongs to the said

municipality or is state land under the control of the Insular Government.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the final conclusion to be established in this decision, it is meet to state: That for the purpose of theestablishment of new pueblos in this Archipelago, at the beginning of its occupation by the Spaniards, an endeavor was always made to find, in

favorable places, a nucleus of inhabitants and, later, near the pueblos already established, barrios, which ordinarily served as a basis for the

formation of other new pueblos that became a populated as the centers on which they were dependent.

The executive authorities and other officials who then represented the Spanish Government in these Islands were obliged to adjust their

procedure, in the fulfillment of their duties with regard to the establishment and laying out of new towns, to the Laws of the Indies, which determined

the course that they were to pursue for such purposes, as may be seen by the following:

Law 6, title 5, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, provides, among other things:

That within the boundaries which may be assigned to it, there must be at least thirty residents, and each one of them must have a house, etc.

Law 7 of the same title and book contains this provision:

Whoever wishes to undertake to establish a new town in the manner provided for, of not more than thirty nor less than ten residents, shall be

granted the time and territory necessary for the purpose and under the same conditions.

It may be affirmed that years afterwards all the modern pueblos of the Archipelago were formed by taking as a basis for their establishment

the barrios already populated by a large number of residents who, under the agreement to build the church of the new pueblo, the court-house, and

afterwards the schoolhouse, obtained from the General Government the administrative separation of their barrio from the pueblo on which it

depended and in whose territory it was previously comprised. In such cases procedure analogous to that prescribed by the Laws of the Indies was

observed.


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For the establishment, then, of new pueblos, the administrative authority of the province, in representation of the Governor-General,

designated the territory for their location and extension and the metes and bounds of the same; and before alloting the lands among the new settlers

a special demarcation was made of the places which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the erection of the church, and as sites for

the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa real, as well as of the lands which were to constitute the commons, pastures

and propios of the municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town were laid out, as many be seen by the following laws:

Law 7, title 7, book 4, of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, provides:

The district or territory to be given for settlement by composition shall be allotted in the following manner: There shall be first be set apart the

portion required for the lots of the pueblo, the exido or public lands, and pastures amply sufficient for the stock which the residents may have, and as

much more as propios del lugar or common lands of the locality; the rest of the territory and district shall be divided into four parts one of them, of

his choice, shall be for him who takes upon himself the obligation to fund the pueblo, and the other three shall be apportioned equally among the

settlers.

Law 8, of the same title and book, prescribes, among other things:

That, between the main square and the church, there shall be constructed the casas reales or municipal buildings, the cabildo, concejo

customs buildings, etc.

Law 14 of the said title and book, also directs among other things:

That the viceroys shall set aside such lands as to them appear suitable as the common lands (propios) of the pueblos that have none

therewith to assist in the payment of the salaries of thecorregidores, and sufficient public lands (exidos) and pasture lands as provided for and

prescribed by law.

Law 1, title 13 of the aforesaid book, provides the following:

Such viceroys and governors as have due authority shall designate to each villa and lugarnewly founded and settled the lands and lots which

they may need and may be given to them, without detriment to a third party, as propios, and a statement shall be sent to us of what was designated

and given to each, in order that we may have such action approved.

The municipality of Catbalogan, as the provincial seat of Samar, must have been the first and oldest pueblo established in the said province

and has been occupying, if not since time immemorial, as affirmed in the application, at least for a long period of years, some forty or forty-five years

according to the evidence given at trial, the lot in litigation on which it had built the successive court-house buildings constructed for the public

service of the head municipality authority and his council. Some of these buildings were burned and others were ruined by typhoons. The court-

house building aforesaid has been used and enjoyed quietly and peaceably and without any opposition up to the present time, wherefore it is to be

presumed that, on founding the pueblo and on proceeding to designate and demarcate the area of land to be occupied by the town of Catbalogan,

with its square, streets, church, and other public buildings, the said lot was also designated as a site for the municipal or court building, in

accordance with the laws hereinbefore mentioned, and that the adjudication of the lot to the municipality for its court-house was duly confirmed by

the Spanish Government, as must be inferred, in view of the continuous possession for so long a time up to the present; nor does the record show

that the court-house of the said pueblo was ever built on any other lot than the one in question.

It is to be noted that, in former times, the court-house buildings of the pueblos were called casas reales(royal buildings), undoubtedly for the

purpose of giving greater dignity to the principle of authority represented in them and inculcating respect among the inhabitants of the pueblo toward

the building where the chief local authority exercised his governmental duties and at the same time administered justice, for the old pedaneos o

petty mayors, later called capitanes or gobernadorcillos, while they had governmental powers, at the same time administered justice as local judges.

In paragraph 92 of the royal ordinances of February 26, 1768, the following appears, among other things:

And because, while there is a notable excess of pomp in the buildings of the ministers and parish priests, there is, on the other hand, great

abandonment of the casas reales which, as a general rule, are not habitable on account of their uncomfortable and ruinous conditions, etc., . . . it is

ordered that in all the pueblos, and especially in those of the seats of government, the native inhabitants thereof shall erect decent and convenient

municipal buildings modeled after the plans to be furnished by the central government, and that therein the gobernadorcillos shall have their cour

rooms and their jails for the security of prisoners, and all leaks and other damages shall be repaired in time in order that, through neglect they may

not cause greater detriment and expense.


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If the inhabitants of a pueblo, at the time of its foundation, were obliged to erect their casa realof municipal building, it is to be supposed that

they built it on their own ground after a designation of the site had been made by the governmental authority of the province a designation which

had to be made, according to the Laws of the Indies, at the same time as that of the main plaza and of the site to be occupied by the temple of

church, which latter building is so necessary and indispensable for every pueblo as well as the casa realor court-house, since in them, respectively

divine worship is had and the local authorities perform their duties. The land designated for the church is considered to belong thereto, and likewise

the land intended for the court-house should be deemed to be the property of municipality, since no pueblo was able to exist administratively without

having a church of its own and a court-house which should be the seat of its local authority and its municipal government.

It should be remembered that the court-house and the church of every pueblo were always built, in accordance with the provisions of the Laws

of the Indies, on one of the sides of the plaza mayoror main square of the town, either together or the same side, or each buildings on an opposite

side; but the said square nearly always occupies a central site within the territory of the pueblo, with the frequent exception of where the town has

extended toward only one end or side of the territory, in which event its main square ceased to be in the center of the town. However, the said

square was never located outside of the inhabited place, as were the commons and pasturages. (Law 13, title 7, book 4, Recompilation of the Laws

of the Indies.)

It is of course to presumed, in accordance with the provisions of the laws aforementioned, that the main square of the pueblo of Catbalogan

occupies nearly the central part of its territory, and that the lot on which were successively constructed the several court-houses which the said

pueblo has and, in situated on one of the sides of the said square and consequently in a central point and not outside the town. It can not, however,

on account of this circumstances, be concluded that the said lot formed a part of the commons, exido, or the pasturage lands of the said pueblo, bu

consisted of land which belonged to the pueblo and was legally acquired through the distribution and adjudication of lots made at the beginning of its

foundation, as proved by the laws hereinbefore quoted.

In technical administrative terms bienes propios are: Cultivated real properties, pasturage, houses or any other property which a city, village,

or hamlet has for the payment of the public expenses. The administration of this class of property lay with the municipalities, and they could be

alienated after proper procedure and authorization of the competent superior authorities in accordance with the administrative laws.

It is therefore unquestionable that the assets of each pueblo comprised its bienes propios and the revenues or products derived therefrom

and this fact is recognized in the Ordenanza de Intendentes of 1786, the forty-seventh article of which reads:

The funds which any pueblo may have left over as an annual surplus from the products of its property and its taxes, after meeting the

expenses specified in its own particular ordinance, shall be invested in the purchase of real estate and revenue-bearing investments, so that, having

a sufficient income for the payment of its obligations and to aid in defraying its ordinary needs, the excise taxes, which are always a burden to thepublic, may be abolished; and in case it should have no such taxes, nor annuities to redeem on its common properties (propios), the said surplus

shall be applied to promote establishments useful to the pueblo and to its province, or by investments to be previous proposed by

the intendentes and approved by the junta superior.

From the foregoing it is concluded that the land in question is the common property of the pueblo and is comprised within the patrimonial

property of the municipality of Catbalogan, to which it was awarded for the construction thereon of the court-house, on the demarcation and

distribution being made of the lands which were to be occupied by the town in its development, in accordance with the provisions of the Laws of the

Indies, and other complementary laws, at a time when there was an excess of land and a few inhabitants to occupy them. It was for this reason that

the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, directed that neither the possessors of unappropriate crown lands, nor their successors in interest, should be

disturbed or denounced, although they had no titles, it being sufficient for them to prove their prior possession to obtain a title by just prescription.

The said municipality is today in possession of the land in litigation, as the owner thereof, under the protection of the civil and administrativelaws which guarantee the right of ownership of the corporations that are capable of contracting, acquiring, and possessing real and personal

property.

Article 343 of the Civil Code reads:

The property of provinces an of towns is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property.

Article 344 of the same codes prescribes:

Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters,

the promenades, and public works of general services supported by the said towns or provinces.


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All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be governed by the provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribed in

special laws.

Section 2 of Act No. 82, entitled "The Municipal Code," is as follows:

(a) Pueblos incorporated under this Act shall be designated as municipalities ( municipios), and shall be known respectively by the names heretofore

adopted. Under such names they may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, acquire and hold real and personal property for the genera

interest of the municipality, and exercise all the powers hereinafter conferred upon them.

(b) All property and property rights vested in any pueblo under its former organization shall continue to be vested in the same municipality after its

incorporation under this Act.

By this last-cited administrative Act the rights of the old municipalities to acquire real and personal property, in accordance with their former

organization, are recognized, and it is declared that the said property and rights shall continue to pertain to the municipalities created in harmony

with the provisions of the Municipal Code, on account of such property being the patrimonial property of the municipalities.

Under these principles, perfectly in accord with both the old and the mother legislation of this country, the municipality of Catbalogan ought to

be considered as the owner of the land in question, on account of the same having been awarded to it as its own, under its exclusive ownership, on

the founding of the pueblo, for the erection of the courthouse, the record of the case showing no proof nor data to the contrary. As the plaintiff

municipality, the applicant, has been occupying the property on which its court-house is situated during such a long space of time, much longer thanthat required for extraordinary prescription (art. 1959 of the Civil Code), it can not be denied that the presumption exists, in its favor, that it has been

holding the land in its character of owner, since the trial record exhibits no proof that any other parcel of land, distinct from that in controversy, was

awarded to the said municipality for the erection thereon of its court-house, a court-house and the land on which to build it being necessary and

indispensable for the existence of the pueblo.

The title under which the municipality of Catbalogan holds and enjoys the said lot is the same as that under which it is recognized as a pueblo

and under which the municipality is justified in its present occupancy of the territory where the town is established with its streets, squares, and

common lands (terreno comunal), a title identical with that now held by the church, as a religious institution, to the land now occupied by the temple

that exists in the said pueblo. 1awph!l.net

At the time of the beginning of the foundation of the pueblo mentioned and of the distribution or allotment of the lands among its first

inhabitants, who, in accordance with the Laws of the Indies, must have numbered at least thirty men with their respective families, for the purpose offounding a pueblo, perhaps none of them was provided with any particular title to accredit the fact that this or that parcel of land had fallen to him in

the allotment. Possibly the facts pertaining to the distribution of the lands were entered in the record kept of the organization of the pueblo, if one

such was made, for it must be remembered that, in ancient times and up to the years immediately preceding the beginning of the nineteenth century

fewer records were made than in modern times, and, besides, the Laws of the Indies themselves recommended that, in administrative proceeding,

the institution of suits should be avoided in so far as possible where verbal information and investigations could be had to enable proper action to be

taken.

Besides the reasons hereinabove noted, there is that of the continuous and constant renovation of the personnel which composed the officials

of a municipality in the Philippines, for the pedaneo or gobernadorcillo, histenientes, judges, and other subordinates were first chosen and appointed

annually, and after every two years; and, though in the beginning the capitan pedaneo of the pueblo may have had in his possession the record of

the necessary concession and award of the land on which the court-house was built, and that of the pueblo of Catbalogan was constructed of stone

it would in nowise be strange that, in spite of the zeal and diligence which may have been exercised by his many successors, the said record or titleshould have disappeared or been destroyed in the case of Catbalogan, during the lapse of so long a time; indeed, it would be marvelous and

extraordinary that such a document should exist, intrusted to the more or less diligent care of so many municipal officials who, at the most, occupied

their offices but two years. It is certain, however, that the successive court-houses which the said pueblo has had have occupied the land in question

without opposition on the part of anyone, or of the state, and including the building which served as a court-house, together with the land on which it

is built, as one of the properties which form the assets of the pueblo of Catbalogan, as they should be classed, it is incontrovertible that the right of

the said municipality therein must be respected, as the right of ownership is consecrated and sanctioned by the laws of every civilized county in the

interest and for the benefit of society, public order, and civilization itself.

As has been shown in the preceding paragraphs, the land in litigation, which is a lot occupied by the court-house, anciently termed the casa

real, of the pueblo of Catbalogan, pertains to the said pueblo, awarded to the same, not gratuitously, but on account of the necessity arising from its


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organization, and forms a part, as a patrimonial property, of its municipal assets, and therefore it is not comprised within the common land ( terreno

comunal) which may have been granted to the said pueblo. Law 8, title 3, book 6 of the Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, is not applicable to

the question at issue with respect to the said land or lot, nor are the provisions of article 53 of the ordinances of good government, before cited, of

February 26, 1768, nor the subsequent royal decrees of February 28, August 1, 1883, and of January 17, 1885, relative to the legua or terreno

comunal; and, consequently, the doctrine laid down in the decision rendered in the case of The City of Manila vs. The Insular Government (10 Phil

Rep., 327) is likewise inapplicable, for the reason that the land in dispute is not that of a common, but of a building lot of which the pueblo of

Catbalogan had absolute need at the beginning of its organization for the erection thereon of its court-house. This was duly proved at trial, without

possible contradiction.

Notwithstanding the number of years during which the municipality of Catbalogan has been in possession of the lot, once it has been shown

by unquestionable evidence that the property was assigned to it as its own, in order that it might erect its court-house thereon, as it did do at the

beginning of its foundation, and its possession of the said land not being by mere unlawful occupation, the municipality has no need to rely upon the

right of prescription, although, being entitled to acquire and possess property in the character of owner, according to its organic law, it is not

understood why it could not acquire such right by prescription in accordance with law, it being, as it is, a juridical person susceptible of rights and

duties.

The present case has nothing to do with any contract made by the old municipality of Catbalogan, nor administrative acts or procedure of the

applicant herein, but relates to its right of ownership in a parcel of land vested with the character of bien propio of its own, or patrimonial property; fo

which reason the doctrine established in the decision rendered in the case of Aguado vs. The City of Manila (9 Phil. Rep., 513) is also inapplicable

inasmuch as the said municipality, in the exercise of the right of ownership in its own property, has an independent personality of its own, recognized

by law, and does not act as a mere delegate of the central authority.

For the foregoing reasons, and considering that the municipality of Catbalogan is the owner of the land occupied by its court-house and that it

is entitled to have the said property registered in its name in the Court of Land Registration, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm and we hereby affirm

the judgment appealed from in its present form.

Arellano, C.J., Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-7054 January 20, 1913

MUNICIPALITY OF HINUNANGAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendant-appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellant.

Provincial Fiscal De la Rama, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Land Registration, ordering the registration of the title of the petitioner to the lands described in

the petition. The appeal is taken by the Insular Government from the registration of the title of one of the parcels of land only. It is situated in the

municipality of Hinunangan, Province of Leyte, and contains an area of 10,328.8 square meters. It is bounded on the northeast by the maritime zone

on the southeast by North America Street; on the southwest by Manilili Street, and on the northwest by San Isidro Labrador Street. Upon this lot is

built a stone fort which has stood there from time immemorial and was in times past used as a defense against the invasion of the Moros.

Formerly, as now, the defense of the national territory against invasion by foreign enemies rested upon the state and not upon the towns and villages

and for this reason all of the defenses were constructed by the National Government. In volume 2, book 3, title 7, law 1 of the Laws of the Indies

appears the following:

We command that all the ground roundabout the castles and fortresses be clear and unoccupied, and if any building is erected within 300 paces of

the wall or other building so strong that even at a greater distance it would prejudice the defenses, it shall be torn down, and the owner of the same

shall be paid from the Royal Treasury for the damages caused him.

Book 4, title 7, law 12, reads as follows:


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We order that, for the security and defense of the cities as is now assured by the castles and fortresses, no building shall be erected within 300

paces of the walls or stockades of the new cities.

Article 339 of the Civil Code is as follows, in part:

ART. 339. The following are public property:

xxx xxx xxx

2. That which belongs privately to the state, which is not for public use and which is destined for the public good or to increase the national riches,

such as walls, fortresses and other constructions for the defense of the country, and the mines as long as no concession in regard to them is made.

Article 341 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 341. Public property, when it ceases to be used for the public good or for the necessities of the defense of the country, becomes a part of the

property of the state.

From these provisions it seems clear that the fortress in question was erected for the national defense and was a part of the property of the state

destined and used for that purpose. As a necessary result, the land upon which it stands must also have been dedicated to that purpose.

The fact that said fortress may not have been used for many years for the purposes for which it was originally built does not of necessity deprive thestate of its ownership therein. As we have seen, the Civil Code provides that, when the fortress ceases to be used for the purposes for which it was

constructed, it becomes the property of the state in what may be called the private sense. That the municipality may have exercised within recent

years acts of ownership over the land by permitting it to be occupied and consenting to the erection of private houses thereon does not determine

necessarily that the land has become the property of the municipality. We have held in several cases that, where the municipality has occupied lands

distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or other necessary municipal building, we

will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from the state in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may

be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes. It cannot be applied against the state when occupied for any other

purpose.

The evidence does not disclose that the municipality has used the land for purposes distinctly public.

The judgment in relation to the parcel of land heretofore described is reversed and the petition as to that parcel dismissed. In all other respects thejudgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-24950 March 25, 1926

VIUDA DE TAN TOCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO, defendant-appellee.

Arroyo & Evangelista for appellant.

Provincial Fiscal Borromeo Veloso for appelle.

VILLAMOR, J.:

It appears from the record that the widow of Tan Toco had sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40, being the purchase

price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59 square meters,

which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to pay

the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the said judgment was on appeal affirmed by this court. 1

On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the

property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, the


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police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo,

Molo, and Mandurriao.

After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion which the Court of

First Instance praying that the attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and

violative of the rights of the defendant municipality.

Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion but the court, by order of August 12, 1925, declared the attachment levied upon the aforementionedproperty of the defendant municipality null and void, thereby dissolving the said attachment.

From this order the plaintiff has appealed by bill of exceptions. The fundamental question raised by appellant in her four assignments of error is

whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from execution.

The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code, provides that:

Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and through

their respective municipal government in conformity with law.

It shall be competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire and hold real and

personal property for municipal purposes, and generally to exercise the powers hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred upon them by law.

For the purposes of the matter here in question, the Administrative Code does not specify the kind of property that a municipality may acquire

However, article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces and towns (municipalities) into property for public use and patrimonia

property. According to article 344 of the same Code, provincial roads and foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and public waters, drives and public

improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or provinces, are property for public use.

All other property possessed by the said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the provisions of the Civil Code except as

provided by special laws.

Commenting upon article 344, Mr. Manresa says that "In accordance with administrative legislation" (Spanish) we must distinguish, as to the

patrimonial property of the towns, "between that a common benefit and that which is private property of the town. The first differs from property for

public use in that generally its enjoyment is less, as it is limited to neighbors or to a group or class thereof; and, furthermore, such use, more or less

general, is not intrinsic with this kind of property, for by its very nature it may be enjoyed as though it were private property. The third group, that is,

private property, is used in the name of the town or province by the entities representing it and, like and private property, giving a source of revenue."

Such distinction, however, is of little practical importance in this jurisdiction in view of the different principles underlying the functions of a municipality

under the American rule. Notwithstanding this, we believe that the principle governing property of the public domain of the State is applicable to

property for public use of the municipalities as said municipal is similar in character. The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not

within the commerce of man and, consequently, is inalienable and not subject to prescription. Likewise, property for public of the municipality is no

within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also inalienable.

The American Law is more explicit about this matter as expounded by Mcquilin in Municipal Corporations, volume 3, paragraph 1160, where he says

that:

States statutes often provide the court houses, jails and other buildings owned by municipalities and the lots on which they stand shall be exemptfrom attachment and execution. But independent of express statutory exemption, as a general proposition, property, real and personal, held by

municipal corporations, in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants, and used for public purposes, is exempt.

For example, public buildings, school houses, streets, squares, parks, wharves, engines and engine houses, and the like, are not subject to

execution. So city waterworks, and a stock of liquors carried in a town dispensary, are exempt. The reason for the exemption is obvious. Municipal

corporations are created for public purposes and for the good of the citizens in their aggregate or public capacity. That they may properly discharge

such public functions corporate property and revenues are essential, and to deny them these means the very purpose of their creation would be

materially impeded, and in some instances practically destroy it. Respecting this subject the Supreme Court of Louisiana remarked: "On the first view

of this question there is something very repugnant to the moral sense in the idea that a municipal corporation should contract debts, and that, having

no resources but the taxes which are due to it, these should not be subjected by legal process to the satisfaction of its creditors. This consideration,


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deduced from the principles of moral equity has only given way to the more enlarged contemplation of the great and paramount interests of public

order and the principles of government."

It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used for a public purpose but for quasi private purposes, is subject to execution

on a judgment against the municipality, and may be sold. This rule applies to shares of stock owned by a municipal corporation, and the like. But the

mere fact that corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily used for private purposes does not make it subject execution.

If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed, the insurance money stands in lieu thereof and is also exempt.

The members or inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are not personally liable for the debts of the municipality, except that in the New

England States the individual liability of the inhabitant is generally maintained.

In Corpus Juris, vol 23, page 355, the following is found:

Where property of a municipal or other public corporation is sough to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such

corporation, the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held. The rule is

that property held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares parks, promenades, wharves, landing places fire engines, hose and

hose carriages, engine houses, public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not subject to

levy and sale under execution against such corporation. The rule also applies to funds in the hands of a public officer. Likewise it has been held that

taxes due to a municipal corporation or country cannot be seized under execution by a creditor of such corporation. But where a municipalcorporation or country owns in its proprietary, as distinguished from its public or governmental capacity, property not useful or used for a public

purpose but for quasiprivate purposes, the general rule is that such property may be seized and sold under execution against the corporation

precisely as similar property of individuals is seized and sold. But property held for public purposes is not subject to execution merely because it is

temporarily used for private purposes, although if the public use is wholly abandoned it becomes subject to execution. Whether or not property held

as public property is necessary for the public use is a political, rather than a judicial question.

In the case of City of New Orleans vs. Louisiana Construction Co., Ltd. (140 U. S., 654; 35 Law. ed., 556), it was held that a wharf for unloading

sugar and molasses, open to the public, was property for the public use of the City of New Orleans and was not subject to attachment for the

payment of the debts of the said city.

In that case it was proven that the said wharf was a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River where all shipments of sugar and molasses taken

to New Orleans were unloaded.

That city leased the said wharf to the Louisiana Construction Company, Ltd., in order that it might erect warehouses so that the merchandise upon

discharge might not be spoiled by the elements. The said company was given the privilege of charging certain fees for storing merchandise in the

said warehouses and the public in general had the right to unload sugar and molasses there by paying the required fees, 10 per cent of which was

turned over to the city treasury.

The United States Supreme Court on an appeal held that the wharf was public property, that it never ceased to be such in order to become private

property of the city; wherefore the company could not levy execution upon the wharf in order to collect the amount of the judgment rendered in favor

thereof.

In the case of Klein vs. City of New Orleans (98 U. S., 149; 25 Law. ed., 430), the Supreme Court of the United States that a public wharf on the

banks of the Mississippi River was public property and not subject to execution for the payment of a debt of the City of New Orleans where said

wharf was located.

In this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River, which formerly was the shore of the river and which later enlarged itself by accession,

was converted into a wharf by the city for public use, who charged a certain fee for its use.

It was held that the land was public property as necessary as a public street and was not subject to execution on account of the debts of the city. It

was further held that the fees collected where also exempt from execution because they were a part of the income of the city.

In the case of Tufexis vs. Olaguera and Municipal Council of Guinobatan (32 Phil., 654), the question raised was whether for the payment of a debt

to a third person by the concessionaire of a public market, the said public market could be attached and sold at public auction. The Supreme Court

held that:


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Even though a creditor is unquestionably entitled to recover out of his debtor's property, yet when among such property there is included the specia

right granted by the Government of usufruct in a building intended for a public service, and when this privilege is closely related to a service of a

public character, such right of the creditor to the collection of a debt owed him by the debtor who enjoys the said special privilege of usufruct in a

public market is not absolute and may be exercised only through the action of court of justice with respect to the profits or revenue obtained under

the special right of usufruct enjoyed by debtor.

The special concession of the right of usufruct in a public market cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would be to permit a

person who has contracted with the state or with the administrative officials thereof to conduct and manage a service of a public character, to be

substituted, without the knowledge and consent of the administrative authorities, by one who took no part in the contract, thus giving rise to the

possibility of the regular course of a public service being disturbed by the more or less legal action of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the

public interests.

The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy the usufruct of a public market cannot lawfully be attached and sold, and a creditor of

such person can recover his debt only out of the income or revenue obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said privilege, in the

same manner that the rights of such creditors of a railroad company can be exercised and their credit collected only out of the gross receipts

remaining after deduction has been made therefrom of the operating expenses of the road. (Law of November 12, 1896, extended to the overseas

provinces by the royal order of August 3, 1886.)

For the reasons contained in the authorities above quoted we believe that this court would have reached the same conclusion if the debtor had been

municipality of Guinobatan and the public market had been levied upon by virtue of the execution.

It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the

payment of a judgment against the municipality. The supreme reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is

devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the municipality be exempt from execution just as it is necessary

to exempt certain property of private individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted authorities, is exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1, page 467, Municipal

Corporations by Dillon we find that:

Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the public good. They exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a

portion of the sovereign power. The main object of their creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and to provide for the police and

local government of certain designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are invested with certain governmental powers and charged withcivil, political, and municipal duties. To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these duties, they are clothed with the

authority to raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes as by licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of the public

corporation is the essential means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work. Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such

a corporation is practically destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based upon considerations of this character, it is the settled doctrine of

the law that only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them,

either in the treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law,

are not subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained

although the corporation is in debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes which i t is authorized to collect.

Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the holding of the court a quo that the proper remedy for collecting the judgment in favor of the

plaintiff was by way or mandamus.

While this question is not necessarily included in the one which is the subject of this appeal, yet we believe that the holding of the court, assigned as

error by appellant's counsel, is true when, after a judgment is rendered against a municipality, it has no property subject to execution. This doctrine is

maintained by Dillon (Municipal Corporations, vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based upon the decisions of several States of the Union upholding the same

principle and which are cited on page 2679 of the aforesaid work. In this sense this assignment of error, we believe, is groundless.

By virtue of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-4012 June 30, 1952


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MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS, plaintiff-cross-defendant-appellee,

vs.

ALBINO N. CANTOS, JULIA B. CANTOS, ANACLETO BERANA AND HILARIA GAMBOA, defendants-appellants.

ALBINO N. CANTOS, and JULIA B. CANTOS, cross-plaintiffs.

JOSE CAEDO, et als., cross-defendants-appellees.

Provincial Fiscal Mateo L. Alcasid and Eulalio Chaves for the cross-defendant appellee.

Mariano A. Albert and F. Agrava for cross-plaintiffs appellants.

Gutierrez and Blay for cross-defendants and appellees.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an action for specific performance brought by the municipality of Batangas against the spouses Albino N. Cantos and Julia B. Cantos, as

principals, and Anacleto Beraa and Hilaria Gamboa, as sureties to compel the latter "to remove the Cine Batangas Building from the public school

site -situated on the parcel of land" belonging to the municipality at their expense, and to the recover the sum of P2,000 as liquidated damages.

Defendants answered he complaint setting up certain special defenses and a counter-claim. In a counter-claim, defendants included as cross-

defendants Jose Caedo, Pedro M. Bernabe, Roman L. Perez, Olegario B. Cantos, Jose M. Montalvo, Atilano Magadia, Juan Buenafe, Francisco

Atienza, Gabriel D. Gomez, Esteban R. Luna Francisco Medrano and Federico Blay, the first two as former mayors of the municipality of Batangas

and the rest as the acting mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the same municipality, respectively. In the counter-claim, it is prayed that the plaintiffand the cross-defendants be sentenced to pay the sum of P10,000 as punitive damages, and the sum of P200 daily from August 16, 1946, until the

possession of Cine Batangas has been actually returned to the defendants, as actual damages.

On October 17, 1947, defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging as main reason the fact that the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful

detainer and as such the case comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court, to which plaintiff filed an opposition, and the

motion was denied in an order of November 27, 1947, the court holding that the cause of action alleged in the complaint is not one of unlawful

detainer but of specific performance of the contract entered into on October 27, 1945.

On June 14, 1948, after trial, the court rendered judgment as prayed for in the complaint. From this judgment the defendants took the case to the

Court of Appeals, which, however, certified it to this Court upon the ground that one of the questions raised by the appellants in their brief is whether

the present action is one of illegal detainer which places this case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court of Batangas, or

one of which comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, a jurisdictional issue should be passed upon by this Court.

The principal allegations of the complaint are: plaintiff is the power of a parcel of a land in the province of Batangas, which is the site of Batangas

Elementary School No. 2; this property was acquired by plaintiff sometime in 1908 or 1909 for the purpose of devoting it exclusively to school

purposes, but the building existing thereon was burned on December 26, 1941; in view of the officer of spouses Albino N. Cantos and Julia B.

Cantos to lease for a period of five years a portion of said site consisting of 800 square meters on which they planned to erect a cinematographic

building for Japanese propaganda, the municipal council of Batangas approved resolution No. 20 whereby said offer was accepted subject to the

following conditions: the municipality of Batangas can cancel the contract "at any time the government finds a need for the said site", in which case

the lessee should give up the land leased, and remove the building constructed thereon, and upon failure on his part to do so, the municipal

government will have the right to demolish the building at the expense of the lessee, or claim ownership over said building; on July 1, 1943, a

contract of lease was entered into between the municipality of Batangas and Albino N. Cantos embodying the terms and conditions specified in said

resolution No. 20; after the execution of said contract, Albino N. Cantos constructed a cinematograph building on the portion of the school site

covered by the lease; on October 27, 1945, another agreement was entered into between the municipality of Batangas and the spouses Cantoswhereby the latter agreed to vacate the site occupied by the building beginning April 1, 1946, and to definitely remove the building therefrom and

their expense on April 15, 1946, and to insure the due fulfillment of this agreement the spouses, Cantos, as principals, and their co-defendants

Anacleto Berana and Hilaria Gamboa, as sureties, executed a bond in favor of the municipality whereby they bound themselves to strictly comply

with the condition stipulated, and in case of court action to pay the sum of P2,000 as liquidated damages; the spouses Cantos failed to remove the

building as agreed upon, and so on August 10, 1946, said spouses were served with notice by the municipality informing them of the imperative

necessity to remove the building in view of the urgent need it has of the site for school purposes, and as said spouses failed to heed the demand, the

present action was brought.

The counterclaim of the defendants contains the following averments: plaintiff municipality is the owner of the parcel of land situated in a commercia

zone on which it built and a school building known as Batangas Elementary School No. 2; this property was not appropriate for school purposes as


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the motor and the other vehicular traffic along the streets bordering he same endanger the lives of the children attending the school and so the

Division Superintendent of schools recommended that it be sold and another more suitable property be acquired for school purposes; sometime in

April, 1940, the spouses Cantos offered to buy the property for P30,000; this offer was rejected in Resolutions Nos. 132 and 136 of the municipal

Council of Batangas, but later the action was reconsidered and Resolution No. 126 was approved recommending the sale at public auction of the

property for the sum of P30,000, but before the sale could be carried out; on April 9, 1943, Resolution No. 20 was approved authorizing the lease of

a portion of the property to spouses Cantos for a period of five years at a yearly rental of P120, and on July 1, 1943, the corresponding contract of

lease was executed; spouses Cantos constructed a theater building thereon and equipped the same with the necessary cinematograph machinery

and accessories, and after its constructions, it was operated and opened to the public until shortly before the liberation of the Philippines; in the early

part of 1945, spouses Cantos sought to retake possession of the building, but acting mayor Jose Caedo, instead of acceding to the request,

denounced the theater as enemy property as a result of which it was taken possession by the United States Military authorities; after certain effort on

their part, the spouses were able to regain possession of the theater from the military authorities and applied to the municipal authorities of Batangas

for a permit to resume the operation of the theater, but far from granting their request, the then mayor Pedro M. Bernabe reffered the matter to the

municipal council which on October 16, 1945, approved Resolution No. 24 declaring null and void the contract of lease entered on July 1, 1943, and

on October 26, 1945, said spouses were obliged to execute a contract whereby they promised to demolish the building on or before April 15, 1946

(Exhibit "B"); considering said contract exhibit "B" to be null and void because their consent was obtained through fraud, deceit and intimidation,

spouses Cantos refrained from demolishing the theater is stipulated and informed the municipal authorities of their decision and accordingly; and

because of this attitude of spouses Cantos, the municipal authorities made the use of authorities made use of the police force to take possession of

the theater and placed guards thereon with instructions not to permit the spouses to enter it thus preventing them from enjoying a right by law

belongs to them.

These special defense are practically reiterated in this appeal by this appeal by appellants with the addition of the ground invoked in their motion to

dismiss to the effect that this case, being one of unlawful detainer, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court of

Batangas.

The claim that the nature of the action instituted by the plaintiff is one of unlawful detainer is not well taken. A mere perusal of the complaint will

clearly show that its purpose is to exact specific performance of the contract entered into by the plaintiff and the spouses Cantos on October 27,

1945, whereby the latter bound themselves to vacate the premises leased and to remove the building they had constructed thereon or before April

15, 1946. There is no allegation in the complaint that the defendants are still in possession of the premises leased which would necessitate their

ejection therefrom so much so that in the prayer the only relief invoked by the plaintiff is an injunction directed against said spouses, including their

bondsmen, ordering them to remove the building they had constructed thereon at their expense in accordance with their stipulation. That this is

exactly the situation of the parties is well understood by the defendants so much so that in their answer, far from alleging the defense of jurisdiction,they concentrated their effort in disputing the validity of the contract exhibit "B" upon the plea that it was executed by the spouses Cantos through

force, deceit and intimidation. It was only later when they thought of invoking this defense in a separate motion to dismiss. Another circumstance

which negatives their contention that the nature of this action is one of unlawful detainer is their express allegation in their answer that the plaintiff

had already taken possession of the leased premises, including the theater, when the municipal authorities came to realize that the defendants

adopted an unflinching determination not to demolish the theater because of their belief that said contract was illegal and has no binding effect upon

them. The attitude of the defendants in bringing into this case the cross-defendants who intervened in the execution of the disputed contract in an

attempt to make them responsible for certain punitive damages they have allegedly suffered, furnishes another proof of their understanding and tha

the nature of the action is really one of specific performance. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower court did not err in denying the motion to

dismiss.

Defendants contend that Resolution No. 24 approved by the municipal council of Batangas on October 16, 1945, declaring null and void the contract

of lease exhibit "1", entered into on July 1, 1943 on the ground that the property in question is of public use, and cannot be the subject of a privatecontract as decided by the Supreme Court in Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 Phil. 603, has been illegally approved, and as a corollary the contract exhibit "B"

which was subsequently entered into in the line with the suggestion contained in resolution No. 24, is also null and void, and they predicate their

contention upon the ground that the property in question has already become patrimonial or private property of the municipality of Batangas for the

reason that said municipality has long abondoned its plan of using it for school purposes because it was not appropriate for school in view of its

proximity to the street and the danger it offers to the lives of the school children. They contend that if that property to be considered patrimonial or

private property of the municipality, the resulting conclusion is that the contract exhibit "1" is valid and binding, whereas the contract exhibit "B" is nul

and void, there is no contract to enforce and so the complaint must fail for lack of sufficient cause of action.

The claim that the leased premises have ceased to be public property and have become patrimonial or private property of the municipality of

Batangas has no foundation in fact nor in law. The evidence shows that the leased premises were only a portion of parcel of land owned by the


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municipality of Batangas containing an area of about 7,104 square meters on which the municipality had built prior to the war a school building which

was known as the Batangas Elementary School No. 2. This property has always been devoted to school purposes. It is true that the school building

was destroyed or burned by the retreating Philippine-American Forces on December 26, 1941, and for that reason the Division Superintendent of

Schools has recommended that the property be sold and another one be acquired which is more suitable for school purposes and, in line with said

recommendation, the municipal council of Batangas recommended its sale for the sum of P30,000; but war broke out and the sale was never carried

out. The offer of spouses Cantos to purchase it was never accepted. The plan to buy a new lot did not materialize. Then th

2nd set property cases

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