2nd assignment of cases
TRANSCRIPT
1. In Re Cunanan
IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.Resoluti, 1954onMarch 18
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation.In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6678 October 9, 2006
JOCELYN A. SAQUING, complainant, vs.ATTY. NOEL A. MORA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Jocelyn A. Saquing seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Noel A. Mora for grave misconduct for allegedly conspiring with spouses Paulino and Manuela Mora in inducing her to buy an unregistered parcel of land, and for performing a notarial act without a commission, he being a lawyer of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).
Complainant alleged that in June 2004, she bought from the spouses Mora 7,828 square meter parcel of allegedly registered land located at Sitio Paquiel, Camasi, Peñablanca, Cagayan, for P782,800.00.1 On July 8, 2004, she paid the amount of P550,000.00 to the spouses Mora at the house of the respondent,
who prepared a handwritten acknowledgment receipt, which reads:2
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT
This is to acknowledge receipt the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P550,000.00) from MS. JOCELYN [A.] SAQUING as partial payment of the Lot 108-3, PSU-(2f) 02-165983 Amd3 with an area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Eight (7,828) square meters located at Camasi, Peñablanca, Cagayan.
The balance in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P232,800.00) shall be paid within the period of three (3) months.
Executed this 8th day of July, 2004 at Tuguegarao City.
(Sgd.) JOCELYN [A.] SAQUING
(Sgd.) PAULINO MORA
(Sgd.) MANUELA ASPA MORA
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
____________________________
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day of July, 2004 at Tuguegarao.
(Sgd.) ATTY. NOEL A. MORA3
After payment of the remaining balance, respondent prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land,4 but complainant refused to affix her signature on the deed because it was stated therein that the land was unregistered, contrary to the representations of the spouses and the respondent.5
When the spouses Mora refused to return the contract price, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against them at the City Prosecutor’s Office, Tuguegarao City, and an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent at the Office of the Bar Confidant.6
Respondent denied conspiring with spouses Mora regarding the sale of the land. He alleged that before he prepared the acknowledgment receipt, the parties had already agreed on the terms of the contract; thus, there was no need for him to convince complainant to buy the land. He admitted that he asked the parties to subscribe the acknowledgment receipt and swear before him but claimed that he did it only for complainant’s protection in case any problem would arise. He denied giving any assurance that the land was registered. In fact, he explained to her the status of the case with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that the spouses were facilitating the titling of the property in their names.7
Complainant filed a Reply8 to respondent’s comment, after which the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.9 In its Resolution No. XVII-2006-238, dated April 27, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, Lolita A. Quisumbing, finding respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for notarizing the Acknowledgment Receipt without notarial commission and recommending that he
be reprimanded with warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.10
This resolution is now before us for review.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence.11 Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.12
Complainant’s evidence consists mainly of her Affidavit-Complaint, Acknowledgment Receipt, Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land and her testimony before the Commission attesting to the truth of the allegations in her affidavit.
We agree with the Investigating Commissioner that while the evidence of complainant is sufficient to support the charge that respondent notarized the Acknowledgment Receipt without a notarial commission, the same however is insufficient to prove that respondent conspired with spouses Mora in inducing her to purchase the land. Thus,
Other than complainant’s bare allegation, there is no extant proof adequately showing that respondent told her that the property was registered land. Instead, we find sufficient evidence to support the finding that there was no connivance and that complainant was aware that the property was still to be titled:
1. The Acknowledgment Receipt describes the property as "Lot 108-3, PSU (2f) 02-165983 xxx" and not by TCT or OCT Number.
2. The Acknowledgment Receipt provides that the balance shall be paid within a period of three (3) months. Thus, complainant had sufficient time to demand or verify if the property was registered with the Registry of Deeds. But instead of doing so, she made further payments on 16 August 2004 and 8 September 2004.
3. Complainant was present when the property was being surveyed for the purpose of segregating the lot to be adjudicated to her. The status of the property was further explained to her by Engr. Camb[r]i during the segregation survey of the property she bought.
4. The Lot Descriptions attached to the Survey Plan prepared by Engr. Cambri specifically states that Lot No. 15 was complainant’s.
5. The property was adjudicated to the spouses Mora by the DENR in the Order dated 5 October 2001 which already became final and executory. In a way, the title of spouses of the lot was confirmed and in the process of making it perfect through the approval of the subdivision plan and the appropriate public land application. This was explained by respondent to complainant since he is the lawyer of the spouses in the DENR case.13
Anent the charge of notarizing a document without a notarial commission, we agree that such an act violates Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In Nunga v. Viray,14 the Court held that:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
For such misconduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers with suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.15
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.16
In Joson v. Baltazar,17 the Court suspended a lawyer for three months for unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale. Considering, however, that in the instant case, it was only an Acknowledgment Receipt that was notarized; that it was done to protect the complainant; that it was the first offense of the respondent; and the heavy workload of the respondent as Public
Attorney, we find the recommended penalty of reprimand sufficient under the present circumstances.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Resolution No. XVII-2006-238, dated April 27, 2006, of the IBP Board of Governors which adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing, finding respondent Atty. Noel A. Mora GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for notarizing an acknowledgment receipt without a notarial commission and recommending that he be REPRIMANDED with warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Footnotes
1 As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-16912 duly signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.
2 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.
3 Heck v. Santos , A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.
4 In re Atty. Marcial Edillon , A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.
5 Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
6 Id.
7 Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.
8 Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.
9 Section 17, id.
10 Sections 18 and 19, id.
11 In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.
12 Section 139, RA 7160.
13 Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for Members of the IBP).
14 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R. No. L-23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.
15 See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII.
16 In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902).
17 Section 2, RA 9225. Emphasis supplied.
18 Section 5(4), id.
Case Digest: Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II23 February 2006
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter. When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were dishonoured by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt. Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the administrative case for the respondent’s disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping; and2. Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
1. No. The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping. Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal cases of the respondent’s violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from the administrative case at hand. The former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of his debts.2. Yes. Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His refusal to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable cause, despite acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to comply with the expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings – be it in their professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to file his answer and verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.
EN BANC
MARIA DIVINA CRUZ-
VILLANUEVA,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 7123
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA and Promulgated:ATTY. ALEXANDER P. SIMEON, JR.,
Respondents. November 20, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - -x
D E C I S I O NCARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by
Maria Divina Cruz-Villanueva (“complainant”) against Atty. Carlos
P. Rivera (“respondent Rivera”) and Atty. Alexander P. Simeon,
Jr. (“respondent Simeon, Jr.”) for grave misconduct and violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“Code”).
The Facts
Sometime in January 2004, complainant engaged the
services of respondent Rivera to prepare the documents, and to
pay all the necessary expenses, relating to the sale of
complainant’s property to Samson B. Bautista (“Bautista”). As
shown by an acknowledgment receipt,[1] respondent Rivera
received P80,000 from complainant to cover expenses payable to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Register of Deeds, the
City Treasurer’s Office, and others.
On Bautista’s death in February 2004, complainant learned
that the property had been transferred in Bautista’s name based
on a Deed of Reconveyance[2]executed by
complainant. Bautista’s widow also informed complainant that
final payment for the property would be withheld pending payment
of all the necessary taxes.[3] The BIR also directed complainant to
explain why no tax evasion charges should be filed against her for
non-payment of taxes on the transfer.[4]
Respondent Rivera then convinced complainant to file an
adverse claim on the property and to file cases for estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 against Bautista’s
widow. Respondent Rivera requested and received P13,000 as
acceptance fee and representation expenses.[5]
After repeated verbal requests, complainant wrote a
letter[6] to respondent Rivera to clarify the issue on the non-
payment of taxes and the alleged Deed of Reconveyance, which
complainant claimed she did not execute. Complainant likewise
inquired about the adverse claim supposedly filed by respondent
Rivera on her behalf. Complainant also directed respondent
Rivera to pay immediately the necessary taxes to the BIR.
Complainant later learned that respondent Rivera had
no notarial commission for the years 2003 and 2004.[7]
Complainant also charged respondent Simeon, Jr., Regional
Director, Registry of Deeds, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, of
conspiracy with respondent Rivera in registering the property
under Bautista’s name based on the Deed
of Reconveyance without payment of the proper
taxes. Complainant alleged that respondent Simeon, Jr. allowed
the registration despite knowledge that there was a prior Deed of
Sale[8] and that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of
the P80,000 to facilitate the transfer.
In an Order dated 18 October 2004, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondents to answer the complaint. Respondent Rivera asked
for an extension of ten days to file his answer. [9] However,
respondent Rivera did not file any answer.
In his Answer[10] dated 22 November 2004, respondent
Simeon, Jr. denied complainant’s allegations and prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint against him. On the registration in
Bautista’s name without payment of the required taxes,
respondent Simeon, Jr. claimed that he “relied on the
genuineness and authenticity of the documents” presented by
respondent Rivera. Respondent Simeon, Jr. denied that he
received money from respondent Rivera to facilitate the
transfer. Respondent Simeon, Jr. also disavowed any knowledge
of a prior Deed of Sale.
IBP Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco (“Commissioner
Pacheco”) set the case for mandatory conference on 11 March
2005. Only complainant and respondent Simeon, Jr. appeared in
the 11 March 2005 hearing. The hearing was canceled and reset
for 15 April 2005. Only complainant appeared in the 15 April
2005 hearing. Despite receipt of notices of hearing, respondent
Rivera did not attend any of the hearings.
Commissioner Pacheco required all the parties to submit
their position papers and documentary evidence. Complainant
and respondent Simeon, Jr. both filed position
papers. Respondent Simeon, Jr. submitted a reply to
complainant’s position paper. Respondent Rivera did not submit
any position paper, thus waiving his right to comment and
participate in the investigation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-
2006-07 dated 28 January 2006 adopting with
modification[11] Commissioner Pacheco’s Report and
Recommendation finding respondent Rivera guilty of grave
misconduct and serious violation of the Code. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended the imposition on respondent Rivera of
a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended the dismissal of
the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. for lack of merit.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the instant case to
the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[12] of the
Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent Rivera liable for violation of the
lawyer’s oath and the Code.
The Court agrees with the IBP that the complaint against
respondent Simeon, Jr. should be dismissed.
Complaint Must be Supported by Substantial Evidence
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving with substantial evidence the allegations in the
complaint.[13] Mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.[14]
Aside from complainant’s bare allegations, complainant did
not present any evidence to prove that respondent Simeon, Jr.
conspired with respondent Rivera in registering the property in
Bautista’s name based on the Deed of Reconveyance without
payment of taxes. Likewise, complainant did not present any
evidence to prove that respondent Simeon, Jr. received part of
the P80,000 from respondent Rivera for the registration. Hence,
the complaint against respondent Simeon, Jr. should be
dismissed.
Respondent Rivera Not Commissioned as Notary Public
A member of the Bar who notarizes a document when he
has no authorization or commission to do so may be subjected to
disciplinary action. Notarization is not an empty act. It is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.[15]
Respondent Rivera notarized the Deed of Sale and the
Deed of Reconveyance sometime in January 2004. However, the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial
Court, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, issued a certification that
respondent Rivera had no notarial commission for the years 2003
and 2004.[16] Respondent Rivera did not present any evidence to
the contrary. Therefore, when respondent Rivera notarized the
two deeds, he had no authority to do so.
In performing notarial work without a commission,
respondent Rivera violated the lawyer’s oath to obey the law,
specifically the Notarial Law, and to do no
falsehood. Respondent Rivera also violated Rule 1.01[17] of the
Code because he deceived complainant into believing that he
was authorized to act as notary public when he was
not. Respondent Rivera’s conduct constitutes malpractice and
falsification of a public document.[18]
Respondent Rivera Failed to Account for the Money
He Received from Complainant
The Code mandates that every lawyer shall hold in trust all
funds of his client that may come into his possession.[19] The
Code further states that a lawyer shall account for all money
received from the client.[20]
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer must render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose.[21] Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the
money to the client.[22]
Respondent Rivera specifically received P80,000 from
complainant for expenses to the BIR, the Register of Deeds, the
City Treasurer’s Office and other related purposes. Respondent
Rivera also received P13,000 from complainant as acceptance
fee and representation expenses for the filing of the adverse
claim and criminal charges against Bautista’s widow. However,
respondent Rivera did not pay the taxes to the BIR and did not file
an adverse claim. Hence, respondent Rivera should have
promptly accounted for and returned the money to complainant.
Respondent Rivera’s failure to make an accounting or to
return the money to complainant is a violation of the trust reposed
on him. As a lawyer, respondent Rivera should be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional
capacity because the Code exacts a high degree of fidelity and
trust from members of the bar.[23]
The Court also notes respondent Rivera’s lack of respect for
the IBP and its proceedings. After filing the Motion for Extension
of Time to File an Answer[24]and despite receipt of the IBP’s
orders and notices, respondent Rivera did not participate in the
investigation. Respondent Rivera’s actuation shows a high
degree of irresponsibility which stains the nobility of the legal
profession.[25]
On the Appropriate Penalty Against Respondent Rivera
Notaries public who notarize documents without the
requisite commission are penalized with revocation of
their notarial commission and are barred from being
commissioned as notary public.[26] Thus, respondent Rivera
should be barred from being commissioned as notary public for
one year and his notarial commission, if any, revoked.
On the other hand, lawyers guilty of violation of Canon 16
and Rule 16.01 of the Code are suspended from the practice of
law for six months to one year.[27] Considering respondent
Rivera’s lack of prior administrative record, suspension from the
practice of law for one year and not disbarment, as prayed for by
complainant, serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the
public and the legal profession.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos P.
Rivera GUILTY of violation of the lawyer’s oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 16, and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Carlos P. Rivera from the practice of law for one year effective
upon finality of this decision. Further, respondent Atty. Carlos P.
Rivera is BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for
one year and his present commission, if any,
isREVOKED. Furthermore, respondent Atty. Carlos P. Rivera
is ORDERED TO ACCOUNT to complainant, within 20 days from
notice of this decision, for theP80,000 and the P13,000.
We DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty.
Alexander P. Simeon, Jr.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents’ personal record as
attorneys. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice
DANTE O. TINGAAssociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIAAssociate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 10.[2] Id. at 8.[3] Id. at 13.[4] Id. at 12.[5] Id. at 17.[6] Id. at 14-15.[7] Id. at 16.[8] Id. at 32.[9] Id. at 21.
[10] Id. at 25-28.[11] Commissioner Pacheco recommended the disbarment of respondent Rivera.[12] Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 12. Review and Decision by the Board of
Governors. — x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority
of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
[13] Adarne v. Aldaba, A.C. No. 801, 27 June 1978, 83 SCRA 734.[14] Navarro v. Cerezo, A.M. No. P-05-1962, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 626.[15] Nunga v. Viray, 366 Phil. 155 (1999).[16] Rollo, p. 16.[17] Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[18] Joson v. Baltazar, A.C. No. 575, 14 February 1991, 194 SCRA 114.[19] Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 16.[20] Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 16.01.[21] Garcia v. Manuel, 443 Phil. 479 (2003).[22] Barnachea v. Quiocho, 447 Phil. 67 (2003).[23] Medina v. Bautista, 120 Phil. 787 (1964).[24] Rollo, pp. 21-22.[25] Sencio v. Calvadores, 443 Phil. 490 (2003).
[26] Zoreta v. Simpliciano, A.C. No. 6492, 18 November 2004, 443 SCRA 1; Nunga v. Viray, supra note 15.[27] Meneses v. Macalino, A.C. No. 6651, 27 February
2006, 483 SCRA 212; Villanueva v. Ishiwata, A.C. No. 5041, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 401; Emiliano Court Townhouses v. Dioneda, 447 Phil. 408 (2003).
EN BANC
MARILI C. RONQUILLO,
ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and
JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact
SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL,
Complainants,
-versus-
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 6288
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
*YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
June 16, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for unlawful, dishonest,
immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold
them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest,
and that he refuses to return to them the amount they have paid
him for it.
Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently
residing in Cannes, France, together with her minor children,
Alexander and Jon Alexander.
In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a
Deed of Assignment.[1] For the price of P1.5M, respondent
transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and interests
over a townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas
Subd., BF Homes, Quezon City. Respondent also obligated
himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell
he executed with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer,
dated April 19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price,
respondent further undertook to have Crown Asia execute a Deed
of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of the complainants.
Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon
execution of the Deed of Assignment. The balance was to be
paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments
of P187,500.00 each. Thus, complainants issued in favor of
respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00
each. Respondent was able to encash the first check
dated August 17, 1999.[2]
Complainants subsequently received information from
Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full the price of the
townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of
Assignment. Respondent also failed to deliver to complainants a
copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia. For these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered
the bank to stop payment on the second check she issued to
respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.
On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel,
wrote respondent, informing him that they were still willing to pay
the balance of the purchase price of the townhouse on the
condition that respondent work on Crown Asia’s execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. In the alternative,
complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00,
plus legal interest, within ten days.[3] The amount of P937,500.00
represents the P750,000.00 down payment and the first quarterly
installment of P187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.
In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants,[4] respondent claimed that he was “working now on a private
project which hopefully will be realized not long from now,” and
requested for “a period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within
which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at
your (complainants’) option.” The period lapsed but respondent
did not make good his promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return
the amount paid by complainants.
On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent
respondent a second letter[5] demanding the return of the amount
of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for failing to comply with
his promise. The demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint[6] that respondent
engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he ought
to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instant
disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and
recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest and
deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October
9, 2003, she recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board
of Governors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226,
dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of
Commissioner San Juan.
We agree.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.” “Conduct,” as used in this rule, does not refer
exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional
duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases[7] that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private
capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse
unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking,
respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it
was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one
has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty
of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of
right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that
he has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit
and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign
said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price
amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it,
made matters worse for him.
Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant
Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of
her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is
morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live
up to the strict standard of morality required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect
reposed in him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the
court.
Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He received a
letter from complainants’ counsel demanding the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the
alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In reply
to said letter, respondent acknowledged his obligation, and
promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:
x x x
I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a little time to fix some things over. May I please request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your option. (Emphasis supplied)
In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full
ownership over the subject townhouse unit and lot, as he has yet
to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to
produce the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown
Asia over the subject unit, which would show the extent of his
right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in
question.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to
fulfill his obligation. It was only after almost two years had
passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to
complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sent
respondent a second letter[8] demanding solely the return of the
amount ofP937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, it
was indubitable that respondent would not be able to perform his
end of their agreement.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted
only to those of good moral character.[9] The Bar must maintain a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing.[10] Lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they
are dealing with their clients or the public at large,[11] and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment.[12]
Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer that
respondent be directed to return the money he received from
them in the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its
officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings
is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue
as a member of the Bar. [13] Thus, this Court cannot rule on the
issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the
complainants.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T.
Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(on leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
* On leave.[1] Annexes “C” to “C-1”; rollo, pp. 13-14. [2] Annex “D”; id at 15. [3] Annexes “E” to “E-1”; id at 16-17. [4] Annex “F”; id at 18. [5] Annexes “G” to “G-1”; id at 19-20. [6] Id at 1-20.[7] Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA
227, 232; Ong v. Unto, A.C. No. 2417, February 5, 2002, 376 SCRA 152, 160; Calub v. Suller, A.C. No. 1474, January 28, 2000, 323 SCRA 556; Narag v. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451; Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998, 286 SCRA 758.
[8] Annexes “G” to “G-1”; rollo, pp. 19-20.
[9] People v. Santodides, G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999, 321 SCRA 310. [10] Maligsa v. Cabanting, A.C. No. 4539, May 14, 1997, 272 SCRA 408, 413. [11] Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza,
A.C. No. 4017, September 29, 1999, 315 SCRA 406. [12] Ere v. Rubi, A.C. No. 5176, December 14, 1999, 320 SCRA 617. [13] Suzuki v. Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, September 30, 2005,
471 SCRA 129, citing In re Almacen, G.R. No. 27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17and P5,000 for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
x x x
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest, malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat without the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a
specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
x x x x
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its management.
x x x x
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the
preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52
Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee."53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
x x x x
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBANChief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAsscociate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZAsscociate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice
RENATO C. CORONAAsscociate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.Asscociate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAssociate Justice
DANTE O. TINGAAsscociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 153.
2 Id. at 128-129.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Id. at 1, 240.
5 Id. at 240.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 21.
8 Id. at 22.
9 Id. at 75.
10 21 Taggat employees filed their Affidavits alleging that complainant failed to pay them 31 quincenas of their salaries and wages, thus 651 Informations were recommended for filing.
11 Article 288 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: "Penalties. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless the acts complained of hinges on a question of interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or penal
in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. x x x."
12 Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: "Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. – It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the worker’s consent."
13 Rollo, p. 82.
14 Id. at 2.
15 Id. at 3.
16 Id. at 110-111.
17 Id. at 112-113.
18 Id. at 114.
19 Id. at 243.
20 Id. at 242.
21 Id. at 244.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 243.
24 Id. at 245.
25 Id. at 244.
26 Id. at 246, 483.
27 Id. at 247.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 249.
30 Id. at 247-248.
31 Id. at 350.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 248.
34 Id. at 155-157.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 84-89, 99-103, 232, 237-239, 268, 273, 276-279, 282-284, 294-296, 299-300.
37 Id. at 330-331.
38 Id. at 362.
39 The IBP Commissioner imposed a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law.
40 Rollo, pp. 549-554.
41 Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. —
x x x x
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
42 Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
43 Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6.
44 Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 15.03.
45 R. Agpalo, Comments On The Code Of Professional Responsibility And The Code Of Judicial Conduct 165 (2001 ed.)
46 Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258.
47 RA 6713, Section 7(b)(2).
48 A.C. No. 6708, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 1.
49 Id. at 10-11.
50 Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 178.
51 Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.
52 Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 447 Phil. 750, 759 (2003).
53 Exhs. "B," "B-2," "B-3," rollo, pp. 110-114.
54 Id. at 241-242.
55 Endaya v. Oca, A.C. No. 3967, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 244, 255.
56 Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws as mandated by Section 12 of RA 6713.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 54171 March 31, 2006
AMADOR Z. MALHABOUR, Complainant, vs.ATTY. ALBERTI R. SARMIENTO, Respondent
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by Amador Z. Malhabour against Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento.
Complainant was private respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, "HY2LB Shipping & Management Services, Inc. and New Ocean Ltd. v. The National Labor Relations Commission and Amador Malhabour."
Respondent, then a lawyer of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), was complainant’s counsel in National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Case No. 009719-95. After the respondent retired from the PAO in March 1997, complainant asked him to continue assisting him in said labor case.
The facts are:
On May 29, 1993, HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., (HY2LB Shipping), a local manning agency, hired complainant as electrician for M/V Gold Faith, a vessel owned by New Ocean Ltd., a foreign principal based in Hongkong. The employment contract was for a period of 12 months and that complainant’s monthly salary would be six hundred US dollars ($600.00). He had to work 48 hours a week with 30% overtime pay.
Complainant rendered service on board the vessel for four months and nine days only. On August 5, 1993, HY2LB Shipping asked him to disembark on the ground that the foreign principal was reducing its personnel. Thus, complainant filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration Office (POEA), a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation.
On June 14, 1995, the POEA Adjudication Office rendered judgment in favor of complainant, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents HY2LB Shipping and Management Services, Inc., New Ocean Ltd. and Premier Insurance are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay complainant or in Philippine Peso at the exchange rate prevailing during actual payment, the following:
1. The sum of US$4,680.00 representing the unexpired portion of the contract;
2. The sum of US$220.00 representing the unpaid salary of complainant; and
3. The sum of US$774.00 representing the fixed overtime pay of complainant.
No other pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal by HY2LB Shipping, New Ocean Ltd., and Premier Insurance and Surety Corporation, the NLRC rendered its Decision affirming the POEA judgment. Their motions for reconsideration were denied.
HY2LB Shipping then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari against NLRC and complainant.
In its Decision dated June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed HY2LB Shipping’s petition, holding that in affirming the POEA judgment, the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. HY2LB Shipping filed a Motion for Reconsideration, invoking Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.2 The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution of February 15, 2000, modified the NLRC Decision, in
the sense that complainant is entitled to only three (3) months’ salary "considering that this is the lesser amount of his one year employment contract;"3 and overtime pay since this was provided in the parties’ contract of employment.
Immediately upon receipt of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution, complainant requested respondent to file a motion for reconsideration. But the latter merely filed a "Notice to File Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to File an Appeal in case Same is Denied."4 Respondent advised complainant " to accept" the Decision of the Court of Appeals and that filing a motion for reconsideration will just prolong the litigation. Complainant did not heed respondent’s advice and filed the motion for reconsideration himself. But it was denied by the Appellate Court for being late by 43 days.5 At this point, complainant urged respondent to file with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Respondent agreed but delayed its filing. On July 24, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution6 denying complainant’s petition for being late.
Meantime, unknown to complainant, respondent sent a letter dated April 7, 2000 to the NLRC stating that complainant gave him a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to receive the "judgment award." Respondent then filed a Motion for Execution alleging that complainant decided to terminate the case and will no longer file a motion for reconsideration of the February 15, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals.7
On June 16, 2000, respondent received from the NLRC a check8 dated June 14, 2000 in the amount ofP99,490.00 which he deposited with the Ecology Bank, Banawe Branch, under his personal account.
Subsequently, complainant came to know of the NLRC Order dated June 6, 2000 directing the NLRC cashier to release to respondent the sum of P99,490.00 representing the money judgment.
Thereupon, complainant sought the assistance of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force.9 Then he filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document. The NBI referred the matter to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
During their confrontation at the NBI, respondent paid complainant P40,000.00 as partial payment of theP60,000.00 awarded to the latter.
Later, or on January 30, 2001,10 respondent paid complainant only P10,000.00, leaving a balance of P10,000.00. This prompted complainant to file with this Court the instant complaint for disbarment.
In his Comment dated June 1, 2001, respondent alleged inter alia that this case arose from "a quarrel between a client and his counsel;" that after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 50835, HY2LB Shipping filed with this Court a Petition for Review of Certiorari; that at this time, he (respondent) filed with the NLRC a Motion for Execution; that the NLRC partially granted his motion by issuing a check in the amount of P100,000.00 "by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney signed by complainant;" that pursuant to their agreement that their shares in the award is on a "40-60 ratio," he (respondent) kept complainant’s share of P60,000.00; and that he was ready to give complainant his share but he did not make any demand and refused to receive the balance on June 30, 2001.
On August 27, 2001, this Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In its Report and Recommendation11 dated April 15, 2002, the IBP through Investigating Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, made the following findings:
It was apparent that the complainant did not agree with the modified decision of the Court of Appeals and instructed respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. All the while and without his knowledge and consent, respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the NLRC who awarded complainant the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Respondent admitted that he was able to encash the check awarded to complainant by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney which complainant denies having executed. x x x.
x x x. When respondent received the amount of money awarded to complainant by the NLRC, he took it upon himself to divide the money into 60-40 ratio because complainant owed him his attorney’s fees; however, he failed to inform complainant beforehand of his plan, and only when complainant filed a criminal complaint against him that respondent paid complainant and on installment basis at that. Respondent in fact still has a balance of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Respondent claims that complainant exceeded and abused his goodness and kindness but it is the other way around.
and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for one year.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-397 adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Maala.
We sustain the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent failed to comply with the above provisions. Records show and as found by Investigating Commissioner, respondent committed deceit by making it appear that complainant executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him (respondent) to file with the NLRC a Motion for Execution and to collect the money judgment awarded to the former. Worse, after receiving from the NLRC cashier the check amounting toP99,490.00, he retained the amount. It was only when complainant reported the matter to the NBI that respondent paid him P40,000.00 as partial payment of the "award." In fact, there still remains an outstanding balance ofP10,000.00. Moreover, as correctly found by IBP Commissioner Maala, respondent has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally his lawyer’s lien12 by dividing the money into 60-40 ratio. Obviously, such conduct is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.13 He was clinging to something not his and to which he had no right.1awph!l.net
It bears stressing that as a lawyer, respondent is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.14 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.15 This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession16 and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.17 Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.18 And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which
made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.19 Respondent’s conduct blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. His conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice.
Accordingly, administrative sanction against respondent is warranted. In Lao v. Medel,20 we considered a lawyer’s violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as in this case, as an act constituting gross misconduct. In line with Lao, citing Co v. Bernardino,21 Ducat, Jr. v. Villalon, Jr.,22 and Saburnido v. Madroño23 – which also involved gross misconduct of lawyers – we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year sufficient.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alberti R. Sarmiento is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for his distribution to all courts of the land, the IBP, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and entered into respondent’s personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZAssociate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNOAssociate JusticeChairperson
RENATO C. CORONAAssociate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNAAsscociate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIAAssociate Justice
Footnotes
1 A.C. No. 5335 was filed by same complainant against same respondent but on different cause of action.
2 Entitled "The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."
3 Rollo, p. 25.
4 Id., p. 26.
5 Id., p. 28.
6 Id., p. 31.
7 Id., pp. 73-74.
8 Id., pp. 46, 59.
9 Id., pp. 61-62.
10 Id., p. 86.
11 Id., p. 72.
12 Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.¸ A.C. No. 5082, February 17, 2004, 423 SCRA 132, citing Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, 360 SCRA 6
(2001); Eustaquio, et al. v. Rimorin, A.C. No. 5081, March 24, 2003, 399 SCRA 422, citing Cabigao v. Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20 (1932).
13 Id.
14 Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 108.
15 Id.
16 Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.¸ supra, citing Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, supra; Eustaquio, et al. v. Rimorin, supra.
17 Id., citing Manalang, et al. v. Atty. Francisco F. Angeles, 398 SCRA 687 (2003); Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 408, 413 (1997).
18 Id., citing Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227 (2003); Dumadag v. Lumaya, 334 SCRA 513 (2000); Arrieta v. Llosa, 346 Phil. 832 (1997); NBI v. Reyes, 326 SCRA 109 (2000); Eustaquio, et al. v. Rimorin, supra.
19 Id., citing Eustaquio, et al. v. Rimorin, supra, citing In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, 601-602 (1970); In Re: Paraiso, 40 Phil. 24 (1920); In Re: Sotto, 38 Phil. 532, 549 (1918).
20 A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003, 405 SCRA 227.
21 285 SCRA 102 (1998).
22 337 SCRA 622 (2000).
23 366 SCRA 1 (2001).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 07-3-13-SC, February 27, 2008]
IN RE: COMPLIANCE OF IBP CHAPTERS WITH ADM. ORDER NO. 16-2007, LETTER-COMPLIANCE OF ATTY. RAMON EDISON C. BATACAN
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is the Letter of Atty. Ramon Edison C. Batacan, (Atty. Batacan), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region, dated April 27, 2007, claiming that the election of Atty. Rogelio Vinluan (Atty. Vinluan), IBP Governor for Southern Luzon, as Executive Vice-President (EVP) for the term 2007 to 2009, is null and void on the ground that it violated the “rotation rule.†�[1]
Atty. Batacan asserts that under the “rotation rule,†� embodied in Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws, all IBP regions must take turns in having a representative as EVP, who shall automatically succeed to the IBP Presidency. He posits that since Atty. Pura Angelica Y. Santiago (Atty. Santiago) of IBP Southern Luzon was validly elected as EVP on June 13, 2005, said region is disqualified from fielding another candidate for EVP until all the regions have taken turns in holding the position. Considering that Atty. Vinluan comes from IBP Southern Luzon and the other regions have not yet taken their turn in fielding an EVP, Atty. Vinluan's election as EVP on April 25, 2007 is null and void as it contravened the rotation rule.[2]
Atty. Batacan further argues: The fact that Atty. Santiago was never able to assume the presidency of the IBP is immaterial in the application of the rotation rule following the Court's pronouncement in Velez v. De Vera[3] that “the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption of Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency.†Voluntary renunciation of the office will� not change the fact that Atty. Santiago was validly elected to the position which commenced the new rotation representing the Southern Luzon Region. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the rotation rule as any duly elected EVP would just conveniently resign before his term ends thus qualifying his region again in the same round of rotation. Since he (Atty. Batacan), as Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region, was the remaining candidate who was qualified and was voted upon to the position, he is rightfully entitled to assume the EVP position. In any event, equity dictates that he, the Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region, be allowed to effectively act as EVP since the said region was denied meaningful participation in the rotation rule when Atty. De Vera of Eastern Mindanao was removed as EVP in 2005.[4]
In its Comment, the IBP National Office through its Deputy General Counsel Atty. Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo, stated that the election of Atty. Vinluan representing Southern Luzon is a violation of the rotation rule since the election of Atty. Santiago of Southern Luzon began a new cycle of rotation and it is only after the rotation is completed that a Governor from the Southern Luzon Region can be elected again.[5]
In his Comment, Atty. Vinluan avers that his election as EVP on April 25, 2007 is valid for the following reasons: Atty. Santiago never took her oath of office; she never assumed the position of EVP; she did not function as EVP at any time; neither did she have the chance to serve out her term as evidenced by the fact that 12 days after her election, Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar of the IBP Bicol Region was elected EVP and eventually assumed
the IBP Presidency beginning 2005. As stated in Atty. Batacan's letter, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP Position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. Then IBP President Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz stated in the June 25, 2005 IBP Board of Governors Meeting that Atty. Santiago's letter is clear that she is foregoing her assumption of the EVP position. Atty. Santiago herself made clear that “considering that she has not taken her oath, she thinks that the more appropriate term to use is to forego her assumption of the position.†Thus, the election of� Atty. Santiago cannot be considered as one turn within the meaning of the “rotation rule.†�
Atty. Vinluan further maintains that the election of Atty. Santiago did not trigger the beginning of a new rotation cycle and that it was only with the term of Atty. Salazar of IBP Bicol Region, who was elected after Atty. Santiago, and who eventually served out his term for 2005 to 2007, as EVP that the new cycle began. Atty. Vinluan argues that Atty. Batacan's invocation of the Court's statement in Velez “that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency†is misplaced since Atty. De Vera had in fact served� as EVP for the term 2003 to 2005, while the same cannot be said in the case of Atty. Santiago. IBP Southern Luzon has not been represented yet in the new rotation cycle for EVPs.
Atty. Vinluan further asserts that he was elected pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws where he obtained the majority of votes cast thereat. He also cites the Court's pronouncement in Velez that Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase “as much as practicable†to indicate that the rotation rule is not a� rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances, such as this case. Finally, Atty. Vinluan claims that Atty. Batacan contradicted himself when he said that equity dictates that the Governor of the Eastern Mindanao Region be allowed to act as EVP since the region was
denied meaningful participation in the rotation rule when Atty. De Vera was removed as EVP; while in the instant case, Atty. Batacan seeks to deny IBP Southern Luzon of meaningful participation.
Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP, as amended, provides:Sec. 47. National Officers. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex officio Vice President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board. (As amended pursuant to Bar Matter 491).
The Executive Vice President shall automatically become President for the next succeeding term. The Presidency shall rotate among the nine Regions. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]It is a product of Bar Matter No. 491[6] dated October 6, 1989, In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, where the Court, seeing the need to protect the non-political character of the IBP and to reduce, if not completely eliminate, the expensive electioneering practices of those who vie for the top IBP posts, ordered the repeal of Bar Matter No. 287, dated July 8, 1985, which provided for the direct election by the House of Delegates of the IBP President, EVP, as well as officers of the said House.
Bar Matter No. 491 restored the former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors from among themselves as well as the right of automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the
presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term. It amended Sections 37 (Composition of the Board)[7] and 39 (Nomination and Election of the Governors), both of Article VI of the IBP By-Laws.[8]
As the Court explained in Garcia v. De Vera:[9]
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Court's vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-political and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of the Philippine society.[10]
Based on the foregoing, one can see that the Court introduced the rotation rule in order to give all the regions and chapters their respective turns, each for a term of two years, in having a representative in the top positions, with the aim of restoring the non-political character of the IBP and reducing the temptation of electioneering for the said posts.
The principal question is whether the election on June 13, 2005 of Atty. Santiago of IBP Southern Luzon for the term 2005 to 2007 as EVP constitutes one turn under the rotation rule; corollarily, whether Atty. Vinluan who comes from the same IBP region is barred from being elected as EVP for the term 2007 to 2009.
The Court’s answer is in the negative.
On June 13, 2005, Atty. Santiago of Southern Luzon was elected as EVP.[11] On June 20, 2005, seven days after her election, she tendered her resignation, which resignation was approved by the
IBP in a Resolution dated June 25, 2005.[12] On the same day, Atty. Salazar of the IBP Bicol Region was elected as EVP, replacing Atty. Santiago.[13]
Based on these circumstances, one can readily see that the election of Atty. Santiago as EVP did not result in any meaningful representation of the Southern Luzon Region which would satisfy the spirit of the rotation rule. The proximity of the dates, from the time that she was elected to the time she tendered her resignation (seven days) and the time the same was accepted by the IBP (five days) shows that there was no sufficient opportunity for her to discharge the duties of an EVP. Significantly, records do not show that Atty. Santiago took her oath of office.
There is no merit to Atty. Batacan’s claim that in view of the removal of Atty. Leonardo de Vera, IBP Eastern Mindanao Region was denied meaningful participation.
In Velez, the Court held that “the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. De Vera to the IBP Presidency.†�[14] Atty. De Vera's removal from the position of EVP took place on the twenty-third month of his term for 2003 to 2005.[15] Only a month short of completing his term, it is clear that he had effectively exercised the functions of an EVP as representative of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region.
Moreover, the Court held in Velez that Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase “as much as practicable†to clearly� indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.[16]
The Court agrees with Atty. Vinluan that the instant case is an exception to the rotation rule.
Atty. Batacan himself narrated that in the election on April 25,
2007, which was the first meeting of the IBP Board of Governors for 2007 to 2009, he objected to the nomination of Atty. Vinluan as EVP citing the rotation rule. Despite his objections, the Board of Governors proceeded with the election of its EVP, pursuant to Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws and Atty. Vinluan emerged as the winner.
The Board acted correctly in not upholding the objections of Atty. Batacan. It applied the rotation rule with flexibility, an act that is valid, concommitant with the tenor of Section 47 which qualifies the application of the rotation rule with the phrase “as much as practicable.†�
There being no grave abuse of discretion or gross error in the conduct of said election, the Court must uphold the election of Atty. Vinluan as EVP for the term 2007 to 2009.
As the Court held in Velez:While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP, it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the Court’s interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Board’s action or resolution.[17] [Emphasis supplied]WHEREFORE, the Court hereby RESOLVES to AFFIRM the election of Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan on April 25, 2007, by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as its Executive Vice-President for the term 2007-2009.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.Quisumbing, J., on official leave.Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, p. 135.
[2] Id. at 139-140.
[3] A.C. No. 6697, Bar Matter No. 1227, A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, July
25, 2006, 496 SCRA 345.
[4] Rollo, pp. 140-141.
[5] Id. at 226-227.
[6] In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Bar Matter No. 491, October 6, 1989, 178 SCRA 398, 419.
[7] Sec. 37. Composition of the Board. -- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from the region only. The position of Governor shall be rotated among the different Chapters in the Region.
[8] Sec. 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one (1) month before the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.
[9] In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31, IBP Elections, A.C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003, 418 SCRA 27.
[10] Id. at 44-45.
[11] Rollo, pp. 136, 223.
[12] Rollo, p. 224.
[13] Id. at 224.
[14] Velez v. De Vera, supra note 3 at 398.
[15] Id. at 399.
[16] Id.
[17] Velez v. De Vera, supra note 3, at 392-393.