2q16 earnings conference call august 11th, 2016 · 2q16 earnings conference call august 11th, 2016...
TRANSCRIPT
Rule 12g3 – 2(b) Exemption #82-35186
Free English Translation
2Q16 Earnings Conference Call
August 11th, 2016
OPERATOR: Good morning, everyone and thank you for waiting. Welcome to
Banco do Brasil’s 2Q2016 earnings conference call. This event is being
recorded and all participants will in a listen-only mode during the Company’s
presentation. After this there will be a Q&A session. At that time further
instructions will be given. Should any participant need assistance during this
call, please press *0 to reach the operator. This event is also being broadcast
live via webcast into Banco do Brasil’s website at www.bb.com.br/ir, where the
presentation is also available. Participants may view the slides in any order
they wish. Before proceeding let me mention that this presentation may
include references and statements, planned synergy, estimate projections and
forward-looking strategy concerning Banco do Brasil, its associated and
affiliated companies and subsidiaries. These expectations are highly
dependent on market conditions and on the performance of domestic and
international markets, the Brazilian economy and banking system. Banco do
Brasil is not responsible for updating any estimate in this presentation. With us
today we have Mr. José Maurício Pereira Coelho, CFO and Mr. Bernardo
Rothe, Head of Investor Relations. Mr. Bernardo, you may now begin.
BERNARDO – Good morning. Thank you for participating in this conference
call of the earnings release of Banco do Brasil.
I would like to start in page 3, where we have the highlights for this quarter.
Starting with the pre-tax, pre-provision earnings that increased by 14.9% in
comparison to the 2Q2015. NII grew by 17.5% in the same comparison.
Income also grew by 12.8%. Administrative expenses continue under control
with a 2.7% growth. And cost income ratio, as a result, improved to 39.7%.
On page 4, we have the net income and how we got to the adjusted net
income, in the 1H, of R$ 3,87 billion. Starting with the last year, 1H, of R$ 6.0
billion, we have a positive impact of R$ 3.8 billion in NII, a negative impact of
R$ 3.1 billion in provisions. Fee income contributed positively with R$ 824.0
million. Administrative expenses R$ -402.0 million. Other items and taxes are
R$ -2.3 billion, where we get to R$ 4.8 billion in adjusted net income, before
specific cases of increase of provisions. These specific cases, net of tax got to
R$ 1.8 billion. Then we get R$ 3.7 billion adjusted net income. One-off items,
R$ 1.7 billion, in this half, getting to R$ 4.8 billion in the booking net income.
On this quarter we also bring to you some other measures of ROE. The
adjusted ROE that Banco do Brasil calculated is little bit different from what the
analysts calculate. We have here the booking ROE of 12.3% in the 2Q. The
adjusted ROE, the way that we calculate, that is 7.7%. The market adjusted
ROE, that is 9.2%. And we also include here, the shareholders ROE of 10.2%.
These shareholders ROE doesn’t consider the impacts of the instruments that
is eligible for capital in that profit and also in the equity side, to really give to
everyone what we have, what the shareholders have as ROE, 10.2%.
In page 5, we bring to you the pre-tax, pre-provision earnings. As you can see
it grew 14.9% in comparison to the 2Q2015, to R$ 10.7 billion, a growth of
3.9% in comparison with the 1Q2016. If we look at the accumulated earnings
before provisions, 12 months, a comparison between the 2Q2016 and
2Q2015, that growth is 13.5%. These earnings before provisions came in line
as made by analysts. All the analysts that cover Banco do Brasil came pretty
much in line with what we forecast.
Market ratio is in page 6. Earnings per share R$ 0.88 cents and R$ 0.63 cents
for adjusted earnings per share. Dividend yield came at 7.62%, price earnings
12 months, 4.6%. And price book value R$ 0.57. All of these indicators, at the
end of June 16.
In page 7, funding. We reached R$ 624.0 billion at the end of last quarter. The
highlight is the growth in savings of 0.7% nominal against June 15. And for
agribusiness letters of credit, mortgage bonds of 1.7% growth, the same
period. Funding expenses as percentage of SELIC reached 74.7%, stable in
relation to previous quarters. And the adjusted net loan portfolio to commercial
funding, it is also stable at 91.3%.
In page 8, we have other sources of funding through our subsidiaries. Starting
with BBDTVM in the left side, reached R$ 668.0 billion of assets in the
management, 20.0% market share. A continuing leadership in the market. And
BrasilPrev, also a leader in the market, with 59.1 market share and net inflow
reaching R$ 9.5 billion in the quarter.
Page 9, loan portfolio in a broad concept decreased by 1.2%, reaching R$
751.0 billion. The highlight here is the agribusiness with a growth of 9.6% and
individuals, 6.3%. Nowadays, agribusiness, individuals almost amounts to
50.0% of our total portfolio, against 45.0% that we had 12 months ago.
Page 10, we bring you more information in the individuals portfolio and the
concentration that we have in lower risk lines of credit. Starting with mortgages
on the left side, a growth of 17.1% to R$ 51.6 billion at the end of June 16.
Being 5.7% growth in the mortgage with companies and individuals growing
20.9% over June 15. Delinquency ratio in this portfolio is 1.29, still very low.
Payroll loans, we are leaders in the market, with a market share of 22.6%. We
had a growth of 3.1% against June 15, reaching R$ 63.0 billion. Delinquency
ratio for this portfolio is 1.25%. Salary loans grew by 9.0%, R$ 20.0 billion and
delinquency ratio in this portfolio is 2.52%. Auto loans had a decrease of
12.0%, reaching R$ 21.5 billion and a delinquency ratio of 0.95%.
Slide 11, we have loans to companies, where we have this decrease of 5.4%,
R$ 327.0 billion at the end of June 16. By type of company, very small, small
companies had a decrease of 13.7%, and the rest of the portfolio -2.4%.
Slide 12, we bring you the agribusiness portfolio, growth of 9.6%, reaching R$
184.0 billion. The growth in the companies portfolio was 11.8% and individuals
portfolio, 8.7%. Still number one in the market with 62.0% market share. We
still use a lot of mitigators in our working capital transactions, reaching almost
65.0% of all these types of transactions. And the last harvest we had R$ 82.4
billion in disbursements, 12.4% growth compared to the previous harvests.
Slide 13, given that a new resolution by the Central Bank of Brazil was
published recently, the 4512, we decided to bring to you some information
about our guarantees portfolio. We had, at the end of last quarter, R$ 19.3
billion in guarantees provided and a provision for this portfolio of R$ 430.0
million, represent 2.2 of the total portfolio.
Slide 14, we start to talk about, you know, the quality of the portfolio, with all
delinquency ratios. Given that Banco do Brasil decided to treat a specific case
in oil and gas as delinquency for more than 90 days, different from our peers in
the market, we decide to bring you these ratio taking out the impact of this
particular case. As you can see, our delinquency ratio without the particular
case would be 2.85% at the end of June. Considering this case in oil and gas,
the delinquency ratio reaches 3.27%. By segments, individuals is still stable at
2.4, companies increased to 4.82. Here we have also a calculation what would
be the delinquency of this portfolio if the portfolio stays stable in the same level
as of March 16. So we have an impact of 20 bps that comes from the
decreasing portfolio, the delinquency ratio would be 4.62%. Agribusiness
decreased 2.94, 0.95%, again below 1.0%, like in the previous quarters before
March 16.
Slide 15, asset quality. We have here cover ratios and the balance of
provisions. We reached almost R$ 37.0 billion in provisions at the end of the
quarter and we have a cover ratio of 109.0% for delinquency over 15 days and
163.0% for delinquency over 90 days. Here also is important to consider the
impact of this particular case, so that you have a number that can be
comparable to our peers. So taking out the impact of this particular case, the
cover ratio for transactions delinquent more than 15 days would go to 119.0%
and for more than 90 days, would go to 187.0%. And below in this slide, you
can see that most of the provisions were made for companies in the quarter.
Slide 16, we have the average risk and the evolution of provisions. We
highlight here what came in this flow of provisions for each quarter in the last
two quarters, what came from specific case and increasing risk for some
transactions, involving separate segments in the corporate portfolio. If you
consider only the organic flow of provisions in our portfolio, in this quarter, it
would have R$ 6.9 billion in provisions, instead of 8,3; 8.9 is lower than what
we had in December 15. Every risk reached 5.36, still lower than the market as
a whole. And also to make things easier to compare, we bring to you what
would be the average risk without the specific case that we have been
mentioning. That ratio would be 4.94 and that is more comparable to 6.3, given
that this specific case is booked in our offshore branches. So 6.3 does not
consider offshore branches of Brazilian banks.
Slide 17, NPL formation. We start on the top of the NPL formation, excluding
the specific case that I mentioned, so the index would come at 0.28, below
than the previous quarter and the cover ratio for the NPL formation would turn
at 120.0%, this quarter. Below in this same page we have the same calculation
including this specific case. So with that, including this specific case, the index
would be 1.39.
Slide 18, again, more exercise of the NPL formation. Now, including the
portion of the renegotiated loan portfolio that is due more than 90 days. So, for
some of you that would like to make this adjustment in the NPL formation. We
have done the calculation for you and then the index would be close to the
March 16, at 1.19 and the cover ratio would be 98.84%.
Slide 19, we have the renegotiated overdue loan portfolio. Details on that
particular portfolio. In the last quarter, we had R$ 5.0 billion in new contracts
and we received almost R$ 1.0 billion in cash as payments of principal and
interest, net capitalized interest. A very high volume, almost 5.0% of the
previous portfolio. NPL 90 days for this portfolio reached 22.5%. Cover ratios,
183.3% and this particular portfolio now represents 3.6 of our total portfolio.
Below in the slide, we have the NPL formation rates for renegotiated overdue
loan portfolio. It stands at 10.78 at the end of quarter.
Slide 20, we start up showing that the net interest income and net interest
margin. At the end of the quarter, we had 17.5% growth in the NII, reaching R$
14.6 billion. Looking at the 1H as a whole, R$ 28.9 billion, a growth of 15.6%
against the 1H2015. Global spread reached 4.9%. Spread by segments, the
highlight here is individuals that increased by 50 bps to 16.3. The total portfolio
also grew by 20 bps, 7.7. Companies portfolio stable at 5.9. And have a small
increase in the agribusiness as well, to 4.9.
Page 21, fee income. We ended the quarter with 6 billion in fees, a growth of
12.8% against 2Q2015 and 9.1% against the 1Q2016. Looking at the 1H2016,
it’s R$ 11.6 billion, 7.6 growth against 1H2015. Highlights here, account fees
and asset management fees growing 24.0%, 11.0% against the 1H2015.
Page 22 have some information about our insurance arm, BB Seguridade.
Adjusted net income reached more than R$ 1.0 billion, a growth of 9.3%. And
we are still leaders in certain segments, like pension plans, rural insurance and
life insurance.
Slide 23, we have our service channels, more than 64 million clients and
counting on more than 66,000 points of service, present in 99.30% of the
Brazilian municipalities. And we have, as a highlight, been even increasing
more digital bank. Our app is the number 5 most present in all, you know,
smartphones in Brazil, losing only to WhatsApp, Facebook, Google and
Instagram. Our new cycle of serving clients through the digital world of Estilo
Digital and Exclusivo keep growing. Estilo Digital now has 552,000 clients,
through a 143 digital branches; 240 branches by the end of 2016, that is our
goal to support 1,3 million clients. Exclusivo that covers individuals that have
earnings R$ 4.0 to 8,000 per month. Now have a 52,000 clients through six
Exclusivo offices and the idea is to have 32 offices by the end of 2016, to
support 650,000 clients. Automated service channels is still the main way of
our clients to deal with Banco do Brasil. Mobile is the highlight with 33.8%
participation, a incredible growth of 51.0% in 12 months, reaching 2.5 billion
transactions.
Page 24, we have administrative expenses and cost income ratio. In cost
income ratio, in the quarter, reached 39.7% and comparing 1H2016 against
1H2015, that indicator would be 39.1. You can see our expenses continue
under control. Other expenses are flat quarter against quarter. Comparing
1H2016 to 1H2015, a very small increase.
Slide 25, we have the Basel III BIS ratio, where we reached 16.45% and the
core capital reached 8.42%, growing for fourth quarter in a row.
Slide 26, we have the full application of Basel III rules under the BIS ratio,
going from 16.45 to 15.42, fully loaded. And considering the use of tax credits,
we go back to 16.59. Tier I 11.34. Same behavior we reached 11.42.
Slide 27 we have the guidance of Banco do Brasil and how we are performing
against the guidance. Adjusted return on equity, 6.6, below the guidance, but
we still believe that we are going to be within the guidance until the end of the
year. Given that we expect a better behavior in the 2H2016. Net interest
income came over the guidance, at 15.6. Given that is, now, 11.0% seems to
be the base of the guidance, we decided to change to 11-15. The net loan
portfolio, in a broad concept, came up with 1.2% growth, below the guidance
of 3-6, impacted by the companies portfolio, that grew only 5.4, below the
guidance as well. Given what we expect for the rest of the year, impact of the
foreign exchange behavior, in Brazil, recently, and the lack of demand, we
decided to change the guidance to -10 to -6%. With that change, there is in an
impact in the domestic loan portfolio as well, as a whole. So we decided to
change to -2 to 1.0%. Individuals portfolio grew inside the guidance and we
expect to be inside the guidance until the end of the year. Agribusiness, a little
bit over the guidance and we expect that agribusiness is going to move to the
guidance until the end of the year. Allowance for loan losses, inside the
guidance at 4.3. Although we had a very high level provisions in the 1H, we
don’t expect to change this guidance. We believe that the 2H, we are going to
have a better behavior, in terms of loan provisions. Fee income, 7-11. We
came at 7.6, inside the guidance. And administrative expenses, 2.6, below the
guidance of 5-8. But we expect that, until the end of the year, the
administrative expenses should move to being inside the guidance. With that
we finish the presentation and we would like to open for Q&A. Thank you very
much.
OPERATOR – Ladies and gentlemen, we will now begin the Q&A session. If
you have a question, please press *1 on your touch tone phone now.
Our first question comes from Mr. Tito Labarta from Deutsch Bank.
LABARTA - Hi. Good morning. Thanks for the call. A couple of questions.
First, with the use of excess reserves, now that you are pretty much depleted
your excess reserves. Is it safe to assume that you feel comfortable, I guess,
with the outlook for provisions and asset quality for the rest of the year, that
you may not need any or see any other specific cases that we saw in the
1H2016? I just want to get a sense, because otherwise it could impact, you
know, provision levels going forward. And just to make sure that the use of
excess reserves is not included in your ROE and cost of risk items. Is that
correct?
BERNARDO – Hi, Tito. Yes, talking about the excess reserves, the additional
reserves, provisions that we used to have. Just to clarify and make it a bit
clearer, when we create the additional provisions and when we use it, it
doesn’t go through the recurring net income. As we create as a one-off item
when we transform the required provision, it is also a one-off item. So, the
existence or not of additional provisions makes no difference for you, guys,
when you project our recurring net income. So, you know, something that we
do when we believe it’s necessary and, as I mentioned before, we have rules
to do that, and how we are going to use it, when we are going to use it. The
privilege for transforming additional in required provision and that’s exactly
what we did now. We don’t see the need of doing additional provision at this
point in time as our guidance indicates the level of provision in the 2H needs is
going to be lower than what we had in the 1H2016. So, we are very
comfortable with our guidance for allowance for loan losses, for provisions
and, even performance in the 2H2016 is going to be better than what we had
the 1H. But, again, excess reserves makes no difference in terms of the
recurring net income of the bank. Nor when we create and also when we
transform that in require.
TITO LABARTA – Alright. Thanks. That’s very helpful. And then just a
question in terms of capital. We have seen you have reduced your risk with
assets around 10% already, so far this year. Is there room to reduce risk with
assets further? And do you still feel confident that you won’t need to issue
equity to reset 9.5% core Tier I by 2019, meaning that you can too retain
earnings, grow your capital base through the control of growth and risk with
assets? Also issuing the pressure we have seen that you are looking to sell
your stake in Patagonia. Any other asset sales that you think you would need,
can happen as well?
BERNARDO – Ok, Tito. About capital, we are going to still be managing our
growth in the RWA. The idea is that density to go down in the near future. You
know, we are shifting our asset, not only credit but our asset strategy that
consume that capital. We are going to continue doing that. In the credit side,
as you can see, you have been growing through lines that comes from that
capital. And we have, you know, a decrease on lines that are, you know, have
a high consumption of credit as well. So [27:38] behind that. So, our WA’s
should go down overtime and in terms of density, the ROE should go up, as
we are saying, with the provisions going down, the pre-provisions, pre-tax
earnings going up. We have been doing for quite a while now. You know, so,
both, you know, behaviors are going to help us reach the 9.5% by 2019 and
that’s what we expect. We don’t consider selling assets to reach the 9.5%.
TITO LABARTA – Ok. Does that include the potential sale of Patagonia?
Would you mention? And how much do you think that would help?
BERNARDO – What we have right now is what we informed to the market,
that we are now rising the possibility of doing something with our, you know,
other shareholders of Banco Patagonia. That’s what we have at this time.
Exactly what we informed to the market last August 5th.
TITO LABARTA – Ok. Great. Thank you.
OPERATOR – Our next question comes from Mr. Carlos Macedo from
Goldman Sachs.
CARLOS MACEDO - Good morning, Bernardo, gentlemen. A couple of
questions. First, could you give us some color on your NPL’s and SME book?
We know that the corporate had a big one time provision for the large
corporate that went bad. But the SME book, from we can see in your vintage
line, it’s turning the wrong way. How much of that is just your pull back, with
your portfolio coming down? And how much of that is actually the quality? If
you could give us some color, that would be great. And then, once you’re done
with that I will ask second question.
BERNARDO – Ok, Macedo. Thank you for the question. As we don’t have the
breakdown of the company’s portfolio, the delinquency by size, you know,
would be very hard to give you the exact figures on that. But what I can tell you
is the book of the delinquency in the company’s portfolio comes from the very,
small, small companies. That’s the bulk of the delinquency, that’s the segment
that, you know, suffers more with the economy downturn that we are
experiencing. So, the new vintage is suffering as well with the decrease in the
portfolio. That’s why, you know, you can see in the vintage graphic that we
have in the MD&A that for the first time the new vintage is running over the
previous vintages. By the way, that’s what our performance that anyone would
expect given two years of recession in Brazil. So, you know, still we have good
things in the portfolio. Portfolio suffering with a decrease in the denominator,
when we calculate the delinquency ratio but, you know, that’s the bulk of the
delinquency that we have.
CARLOS MACEDO – Ok. So, second question is on the guidance. I mean,
you have been pretty clear that you are keep 9-12 guidance on the adjusted
capital. You know, just doing the math here, a lot of this contingent on your
cost of risk coming down from the 1H2016, which shouldn’t be too difficult
given that one time provisions that went into those two quarters. But from
what I calculated, maybe the calculation is wrong, it would have to come down
to the average of the 2H2015, around 3.5% cost of risk. Isn’t that a little bit
challenging given the environment now, compared to the 2H2015? I mean you
just mentioned that, you know, asset quality, SME is weak, probably we’re
going to see more weakness in consumer through the end of the year,
beginning of next, with unemployment still being high. Now, wouldn’t it be
more conservative to guide for a slightly lower ROE, given all these headwinds
that you are facing?
BERNARDO – Well, Macedo, we have several things to consider here. One is
level, the flow of the provisions over the SME portfolio. As the SME portfolio is
going down, the forward provision would go down, if we keep the same levels
risk in the portfolio. Just to give an idea, so we have impact of the decrease in
the portfolio, with provisions as well. So we have a much lower level, a much
lower balance in SMEs right now, than what we had in the 2H2015. Second
thing, 2H2015 is when the program really started, when we had the pickup in
delinquency and so on. So, somehow the 2H already represents you know, a
high level of provisions and to keep at that high level difficult is not difficult. In
fact, as we showed in one of the slides in the presentation, the level of
provisions without some specific cases that we mentioned, would be below the
4Q2015 already. The R$ 6.9 billion that we mentioned, we are not excluding
the, you know, chapter 11 that happened in the 2Q. You know, even the big
chapter 11 that we had in the 2Q are included in the R$ 6.9. Without one
specific case that balance would be R$ 6.3, as you can see, much lower than
what we had in the 4Q. So, you know, we believe that the guidance is correct
and we are going to move to the guidance until the end of the year.
CARLOS MACEDO – But, just as follow up, I mean, you have 9-12. To get to
the bottom end of the guidance would imply on R$ 5.6 billion in earnings for
the 2H2016. That’s a big pickup. I mean, what’s the, is the up end of the
guidance realistic? Or are we here targeting the bottom end at this point?
BERNARDO – You know, we believe that the guidance is the one that we
have. We are going to be inside the guidance until the end of the year.
CARLOS MACEDO – Ok. Thanks, Bernardo.
OPERATOR – Our next question comes from Mr. Nicolas Riva from Citibank.
NICOLAS RIVA – Yes. Thank you, Bernardo, for taking my question. So, the
first one is in loan loss provisions. So, your guidance for this year implies
about R$ 6.6 billion in loan loss provisions for the next two quarters. My
question goes more to 2017, because assuming that we have some real GDP
growth in 2017 and the economy gets out of the recession, then, if you run at
about R$ 6.6 billion, even with some growth in that number, maybe loan
growth, we could see a decline in loan loss provisions in 2017 versus 16. So,
my question is if you are seeing that, if you are seeing a decline in 2017
versus 16, based on what you are seeing already for the 2H2016. And then,
my second question on the ROE guidance. So the guidance for this year
remains at 9.0%- 12.0%, given that in the 1H your ROE was 6.6%, what it
implies for the 2H2016 is about 14.0% in the ROE 2H2016. So, my question
once again more going to 2017, assuming things get a bit better, if you see
that 14.0% ROE, which is expected to get in the 2H are to be with your
guidance as, maybe, the floor for next year. And the minimum level maybe
being 14.0% ROE for next year. Thank you.
BERNARDO – Thank you, Nicolas. Well, I am not going to give any indication
for 2017 as we don’t have the guidance approved. So anything that I say
would be speculation on my side. But talking about the loan loss provisions,
yes, we are going to reduce the floor of loan loss provisions in the 2H. And we
are going to be inside the guidance that we have. So we are comfortable with
the guidance that we have right now. I am not going to confirm your figures.
You know, depending on how we calculate can have very different figures. So
what I can say to you that you can expect us to be inside the guidance until the
end of the year. About the ROE, same thing. We believe that with the, you
know, continue improving pre-provisions and results that we are still seeing
that flow through the 2H and also to next year. And the decrease in the flow of
provisions, the guidance is going to be achieved by the end of the year. For
next year, you know, we are going to see a continue improvement in terms of
provisions as the economy should pick up, according to what you can see in
the [36:16] report. So, provisions should behave better than this year, overall.
And our results, you know, should reflect that.
NICOLAS RIVA – Ok. Thanks, Bernardo. Maybe my only follow up, this in
terms of NPL formation or the NPL cycle. Do you see more the peak being 3Q
or 4Q2016, you know, things improving next year?
BERNARDO – As you can see, you know, if we take out this particular case in
[36:42] get the NPL formation already decreased. So, you know, we expect
that NPL should still go up until the end of the year, then we are going to have
a big impact, because this particular case is going to be in losses until the end
of the year. Then, only with that, NPL ratio should go down. So what we are
saying, and we are confirming that NPL should go up until the end of the year,
and be stable in 2017.
NICOLAS RIVA – Thank you.
OPERATOR – Our next question from Mr. Mário Pierre from Bank of America.
MARIO PIERRE – Hi, everybody. Good morning. Let me ask you two
questions as well. Let me go back to the capital ratio. You do have your target
of 9.5%, common equity Tier I ratio by 2019 and the ratio is moving in the
right direction now, although it is lower than one year ago. So, my question is,
if you could provide us with guidance rather than 2019 is, where do you expect
to be at the end of 2017? This would help us or this would make it easier for us
to understand your need to sell assets to get to your target. So, you know, if
you can provide us more like a shorter term target that would be very helpful.
Second question is related to, you know, if I understand, your message is that
things are improving, [39:00] feeling more comfortable with asset quality, but at
the same time, those are significant change in the risk rating of your corporate
book. So, what I don’t understand is why now? What happened that made you
become a lot more cautious of your corporate book, that you are now
classifying your portfolio as much more riskier than you were one quarter ago?
What happened in this quarter to make you more cautious? Thank you.
BERNARDO – Ok. Starting with the capital ratio, the only goal that we
released to the market is the 9.5 by 2017. So that’s the figure that we have.
Sorry. And about what we did this quarter, you know, it’s very simple. We
analyze the portfolio all the time. We check what we have and what we expect
for the near future. We don’t wait for companies to release their balance
sheets or interim balance sheets to take decisions in terms of risk. And we
decide to downgrade some risk that we have in our portfolio that are nothing
judicial recovery, chapter 11 or delinquency. That’s the decision that we took
this quarter based on our expectations for the portfolio. But we are pleased
that what we have right now is the right level of risk in the portfolio, represents
what we really are running in terms of risk.
MARIO PIERRE – Ok. So if you could be more specific then. Which sectors in
particular have you become more concerned about?
BERNARDO – Ok. The sectors are oil and gas, steal and mining too and
ethanol and a little bit of construction as well.
MARIO PIERRE – Ok. Thank you.
OPERATOR – Our next question comes from Mr. Olavo Arthuzo from Banco
Safra.
OLAVO ARTHUZO – Hi everyone. Thank you for taking my question. I would
like to raise here [40:15] about dynamic the 2Q related to the revenue
generation. Despite the strong [40:47] net interest growth, if we look the bank’s
results, we can notice a significant distinction between the segment of
individuals and companies. The individual portfolio is growing in almost all
lines and credit spread is increasing at a strong pace. For example, at the
beginning of the last year, it was 13.5% and in this quarter it reached 15.3%.
And finally, the segment is presenting a significant [41:23] impact on the NPL
in comparison to the corporate segment. By contrast, the corporate portfolio
has shrunk and the credit spread increased only 30 base points compared to
the same period of the last year. And this is the main segment responsible for
the peak in default. In this sense, my question is, to adjust the increase of the
risk in the corporate segment, is the bank discussing some increase in credit
spread in the segment, in the corporate segment? And was there some
specific issue that was, that have presented to the bank to adjust over that
period as the same way it was done with the individual segment? And finally,
can we expect that are demands of this strategy for the next quarters? Thank
you.
BERNARDO – Thank you, Olavo. In terms of credit spreads for the companies
portfolio, if you compare what’s going on, given the size of the companies in
the portfolio, you know, the very small, small companies decreased by 13.0%.
The rest of the portfolio -2.0%. Where we have the highest spread, in this
portfolio, is exactly in the very small, small companies. So there is a big
change in make that everything else is the same would go against that the
spread, making the spreads go down, not up. Right? So, the small increase
seems small but it’s not that small if you compare the change in the [42:57] of
the portfolio. Sorry. So, credit spread in companies are going up as well, but
the change in the mix is affecting the growth, the total growth in spread, in this
comparison that you are making. If you don’t mind, could you repeat the
second question, please?
OLAVO ARTHUZO – Was there some specific? Sorry. Can we expect the
[43:29] of this strategy for the next quarter growing your loan portfolio in
individuals? Is there some room for increasing spreads in the segment? And
the dynamics of the corporate segment should continue to be the same one?
BERNARDO – Ok. Well, the individuals’ size, you know, we have, you know,
repricing loans that we gave two years ago. So, a big portion of our portfolio
can see that these loan types lines of credits which represents more than
75.0% of the portfolio with individuals, are loans that have a higher duration,
but it tends to go to five years or even more, in case of mortgages. But it’s a
type of loan, the salary loans and payroll loans that the clients, usually, they
pay and take a new loan every two years. So, on average, we reprice the
portfolio every two years. So, what we are doing now is repricing what we did
in 2014. So we still have room to keep repricing this portfolio to be in line with
the interest rate that we have in the market right now. So, that is a process,
still going that direction. The rest of the portfolio, you know, we have lines of
credit that are repriced very quickly, like the credit cards and overdraft are
repriced immediately, repricing was done and we control the growth for this
line because they are the higher risk in our portfolio. So we are not going to
increase, just make, you know, more interest through these lines of credit. We
are serving our clients in a controlled way, to avoid, you know, increase in the
risk of the total portfolio. And, if you look at the MD&A, just to give an idea how
we are performing, for example, in credit cards, you know, delinquency ratio
was 3.9, is going down. I would say stable. So the very low delinquency ratio
compared to the rest of the market. So, it’s a good line of credit but we have to
keep it under control, to keep the delinquency ratio as good as it is right now.
So, both individuals are coming through lines of credit with low risk. So
mortgages are going to perform better than the average of the rest of the
portfolio. Payroll loans and sallary loans are still going to be our focus but we
make some increase in other parts of the portfolio as well. Even the demand
that we have coming from our clients. The companies segment, you know, we
are serving our clients with the demand that comes to us. But there’s a
decrease in terms of demand as well. Another thing that impact the companies
portfolio is the FX rates. So, FX rates [47:02] a portion of the decrease. If you
compare quarter to quarter, around 40.0% of the decrease in portfolio came
from FX rates. So, you know, we are serving our clients, clients that have the
capacity to take, you know, loans from Banco do Brasil, that reached the
guidelines that we have to underwrite loans. So there’s no change in strategy,
we are still doing FX.
OLAVO ARTHUZO – Ok. Thank you, Bernardo. It was very helpful.
OPERATOR – Our next question comes from Marcelo Telles from Credit
Suisse.
TELLES – Hi. Good morning, gentlemen. Thanks for your time. I have two
questions. The first question when you look in terms of your NII performance in
the quarter, we see that it was very much driven, you know, on a quarter on
quarter base by, you know, higher credit recoveries, right? Once we exclude
that, your NII actually went down, quarter over quarter. So what is the, you
know, the expectation for, you know, NII, you know, going forward? I’m
excluding your credit recoveries, now that, I mean, [48:15] to the leverage,
optimizing RWA. Would you expect, you know, the NII environment to be a
little bit more difficult? I have, you know, in light of what you are doing to
optimize RWA, in spite of your performance in spreads. And the other question
is related on the credit recoveries. We saw a big spike in credit recoveries, you
know, in the quarter. Some of your peers, in the past, when they had some of
those big spikes, in some cases, they had, you know, like, specific recoveries
that were only provision, right? So, pretty much, they were non-cash
recoveries. So just to try to understand the sustainability of that. You know,
can you disclose to us if there was anything that was no-cash in these
recoveries that was a 100.0% provision? So those are my questions. Thank
you.
BERNARDO – Thank you, Telles, for your questions. Starting with the credit
recovery, you know, you have all the data in the MD&A. How much we
recovered in cash. How much we recovered in installments. So, usually, you
know, close to 50.0% in cash. The information there we can compare with the
performance in the previous quarters as well. So it’s a 50.0% recovery in cash
versus losses. So as there are recovery in installments, they have to go to the
renegotiation overdue loan portfolio, 100.0% provided [49:46]. So that is
exactly what is going on. It happens like that. It goes back to the book as
100.0% provision.
MARCELO TELLES – So, the remaining, what is not cash, of course I need to
look, you know, through history, right, but that I should assume that was
100.0% provision. Is that a good assumption?
BERNARDO – It has to be, you know, according to the resolutions of the
Central Bank. So it has to be 100.0%. Ok? And it impacts the renegotiated
overdue loan portfolio. Part of the new contract that we have there comes from
recoveries in installments. All the recovery in installments in order to get the
portion of the recovery has to be paid in cash, in a way it’s not 100.0% going to
renegotiate overdue loan portfolio, that, you know, without any payment in
cash to be considered recovery. So, even though, there is installments on that,
a portion of this has to be paid in cash when we do the recovery. So,
performance in this quarter was higher than the 1Q quarter because, you
know, 1Q usually we have lower recoveries. We have two months that are not
considered for recovery, January and February. Also, 3Q you have July
vacation, so recoveries in July, usually, you know, every year, is lower than the
previous months. So it should have a lower level recovery in the 3Q. But in the
4Q is usually the highest level recovery that we have every year. So it should
pick up in the 4Q again. In terms of the NII, we are comfortable with our
guidance. The guidance represents what we expect for the full year. The level
of NII that we have with the, you know, credit operations is stable. More
reduction given the impact of the FX in some of the lines that we have outside
of Brazil. You know, foreign branches, they are making the same amount of
money but impact in NII was lower, given the FX. So it’s not something that,
depending on the FX to even go up or stay stable, you are going to see a
pickup again in the 3Q. So we are not worried about that. We are very
comfortable with the guidance that we provide you, guys.
TELLES – Excellent. Very helpful. One final question if I may. Just on the
asset quality side, I mean, we’ve seen you have a more constructed view
regarding the provisions’ outlook for the 2H2016 and you are going to have
this for next year as well. So, how do you reconcile that, you know, with the
fact that, you know, those are big, if you look in your NPL formation numbers,
there was a big spike in the renegotiated portfolio, you know, in the 1Q and the
2Q. If you look at the NPL formation, including renegotiating portfolio, not only
90 days but, you know, your overall number, that was, probably, about R$ 8.5
billion, already excluding the specific oil and gas case, which is more like
similar to the levels of provisions that you had in the 2Q. And given that, you
know, the formation rates of bad loans were being negotiated in the portfolio
has actually been quite high, compared to historical levels. You still feel
comfortable that you don’t see a risk that, maybe, you know, provisions could
be stable or maybe higher in the 2H, that the risk is just out there?
BERNARDO – First of all, you know, as I mentioned before in our
conversations, we don’t agree that we should put back all the renegotiated
overdue loan portfolio in the NPL formation. It’s totally incorrect. Just one
example, you know, we have a big portion of the renegotiated overdue loan
portfolio that came from losses. So there is no delinquency there. We are
recovering things. So if you put that back you are distorting the number. To
consider that NPL formation over 90 days, what would be in the NPL that
wasn’t because we negotiated, ok, we agree that, like, if you do that
calculation to give you a number that is not close to what would be NPL
formation, without that particular cases. But we provide you also the
breakdown of the portfolio to give some level of comfort that, not everything
that we have is bad loans. You can see that we have double A, transactions A,
B, C, D, E and so on. The levels of B-H increased by 10%, if you compare with
the previous quarter last year. So the policy of the portfolio is better. Of course,
it is a stressed portfolio and some of the renegotiations that we did before, you
know, the 2H2015 was done given a particular scenario that changed pretty
much after that. So, you know, there is things that we have to do, but we
recovered a big portion of the renegotiated overdue loan portfolio. Just to give
an example, you know, the historical level of delinquencies 18-20.0%, let’s say
20.0% and that is all the NPL [54:59] renegotiated overdue loan portfolio. It is
going to be a lot. So we are recovering 80.0% of it. It’s not correct, the number
is even higher than that. So, you know, to assume that everything that we are
renegotiating to be back and it seems, in spite of the NPL formation, my point
of view, it’s not really the right way of looking at it. Going back to [55:21] we
are very comfortable with our guidance. So we are going to be inside the
guidance.
TELLES – Yeah. You know, the part I make on the NPL formation on the
renegotiated portfolio is that, historically, you were, you know, about 30.0%
would fall back to NPL. You look today, depending on which base you use,
because [55:48] would get something between like 58.0% and 87.05%, you
know, formation rates, using, you know, [55:58]. But we can discuss that more,
off line. I appreciate your answers. Thank you very much.
BERNARDO – Thank you, Telles.
OPERATOR – Our next question comes from Mr. Anibal Valdez from
Barclays.
ANIBAL VALDEZ – Hi. Good morning, Bernardo. I have a similar question to
one previously asked. Just trying to assess the apparent stability on recovery
of the individuals portfolio. Pretty much because we saw the spike in the
delinquency loans in the 1Q, then a drop in this 2Q, which I assume it has to
be explained by some seasonality. But also we see the increase in the
renegotiated loans. So, the question is, I’m trying to assess the merits of the
apparent stability of the delinquency rates of the retail portfolio, and just to
understand if it is just because during the quarter, renegotiated loans
increased and that kind of explains the reduction in the early delinquency rates
for that portfolio. I mean, that line, I know, everybody seems to be more
optimistic about the next quarters, but we continue to see companies to make
material adjustments in their payrolls. For example, Odebrecht yesterday there
is a headline that they fired 75,000 people. So it seems like the adjustment
cycle for the labor market is likely to continue. So, what gives the comfort that
the apparent stability in your delinquency rates, the quality of that portfolio is
likely to continue to improve and not get worse later in this cycle? And then the
second question, it is regarding the potential sale of your stake in Banco
Patagonia. Have you run a theoretical scenario? What would be the impact
today or after the 2Q if you were to sell your stake in Banco Patagonia? What
would be the impacts on Tier I capital ratio? Thank you.
BERNARDO – Ok. Thank you, Anibal. First, you know, if you look at table 37,
in our MD&A, we have the breakdown of the renegotiated portfolio for
individuals and you can see what happened, in terms of increase in balance in
this quarter against quarter. So the increase was not that big and it is just a
small part of the new contract of the renegotiated overdue loan portfolio comes
from individuals. I didn’t mention this call on the previous, anyway, 75.0% is
companies, 25 comes from agribusiness. So most of [58:56] not individuals
and agro are in companies portfolio. But anyway, you have the balance, the
renegotiated credit for individuals in the table 37. You can see the behavior of
that portfolio. The first question also, you were talking about the companies
portfolio, right? So going for that, we have that concentration of, you know,
downgrades for some big risk that we have in the portfolio, that we are not
expecting to happen again in the 2H. And about Banco Patagonia, the answer
to your question is no. As we mentioned, we are analyzing the possibility of,
eventually, doing something.
ANIBAL VALDEZ – Alright. Thank you. So just part of my question, is it in
your view that we might be ahead of a late deterioration cycle in the asset
quality portfolio? What I really need, want to understand is that once making
sure, after we get off the cycle of the corporate portfolio, we don’t enter
another one in the individuals portfolio. This concerns comes from the fact that
we continue to see companies and the corporate side to reduce their payroll,
their employees. So, if it’s not the case, tell me why. But what really assures
that the asset quality in the individuals portfolio is not going to get worse as
unemployment continues to rise?
BERNARDO – Ok. You know, we have very low risk type of portfolio with
individuals. You know, payroll loans is totally concentrated in pensioners and
retirees and civil servants. You know, the overall [1:00:47] individuals end up
being like that. As we shifted to be like that as the economic downturn
approached. So we didn’t start in 2015, we started changing the mix way
before that. So our individuals loan portfolio concentrates in people that
receive their salaries through the bank, also by the sector. I mean,
unemployment impacts the low income portion of the population much more
than the medium income and high income portion of the population, it’s
affecting everyone but it’s disproportional, unfortunately. So, socially speaking
it’s unfortunately that people less resilient, they are the ones that are suffering
the most. But that is a segment that has no access to bank. In fact, in the end,
they don’t finance themselves through banks. So that is why, you know,
delinquency goes first in other places of the economy, it doesn’t come to
banks as the same proportion as the unemployment goes up. But the way we
prepare our booking for individuals is to be, you know, a less risky portfolio.
That reflects in the spread that we have in our portfolio, compared to the other
players in the market. It is very different because we run a low risk type of
portfolio so we don’t expect the delinquency rate for individuals to go up as the
economic scenario plays up. Ok?
ANIBAL VALDEZ – Ok. So we are clear. Thank you.
OPERATOR – Our next question comes from Mr. Carlos Gomes from HSBC.
CARLOS GOMES – Hello. Good morning. Thank you for taking my questions.
I have a question about the payroll lend. As you mentioned on page 37, we
can see that it has grown 1.2% year on year. You have, actually, a slightly
declining market share. Now, we know that some of the states and
municipalities in Brazil are having financial difficulties. Has that changed your
willingness to lend to some of these entities? Or have you created any
provisions for them? Or have you had it changed the pricing for these entities?
BERNARDO – Hi, Carlos. [1:03:04] clarification, just to let your know, what
you have on the page 37 is considered the overall payroll, including not only
what we generate through our branches but also, you know, a transaction
acquired from the market, so the decrease coming from, you know, the
portfolio that we bought in the market, you can see in table 39 that it went
down by, you know, 46.0% against June-15. So to take that out, you get to a
growth we had in the presentation, that is 3.2, that is basically what we are
doing in our own branches and we are doing, we are still serving our clients
and this is important line of credit. It’s very low delinquency ratio. We don’t
have any problem with any of the employers in the market. So it’s very
comfortable business for us.
CARLOS GOMES - We know that there are some States that have had to
delay the payments of their payroll. Have you had any such cases? And have
you made any provisions in case some of these entities do have that problem?
BERNARDO – The level of delays from employers to Banco do Brazil is less
than one bps.
CARLOS GOMES – Thank you very much.
OPERATOR – This concludes today’s Q&A session. I would like to invite Mr.
Bernardo Rothe to proceed with his closing statement. Please, go ahead sir.
BERNARDO ROTHE – I just want to thank everyone for participating in our
conference call and to say, have a good afternoon. Thank you.
OPERATOR – That does conclude Banco do Brasil conference call for today.
As a reminder, the material used in this conference call is available on Banco
do Brasil investor relations website. Thank you very for your participation and
have a nice day. You may now disconnect.