61

C H ll P ! E R III

mi THE QUESTIOU OF SIEZDG POOEi

!!19 !eleagano Armed Stl.'Ug(flo of 1948-51 \7&S the first expsriment

r::~ of the Indian oollllll1llisto ni th ~ism. Mter tm crushi.J18 of tm

Tolon«ana ~ed Struggle, tha Maoist tboor.y of revolution foll into

disfavour for a period of sb:tecn years. It oos only in 1967 that,

o~isations which planned to implement Maoist preocriptiono,

ro-omerged.

This chapter consists of tr.o sections. Tba first examines

Tariouo conditions and circumstances cilich preoodod and made posoi•

ble tho re-emergence of Maoist tmor.y and practic:J on the Indiaa

political scene in general and in the State of Andhra Pradesh in

particular. The second section describes tm breakina anay of so~

«1'QUPS of people from the Communist Pari7 of Indio ( Harxiet)

( 0PI (H) ) and their for1101lation of th8 ~ism to bo applied to

Indioo

I

The conditions which pzovod important for the ro-emergonce

and iDi tial development of Maoism in India can be vie-ced as a

oories of concentric oircleo, at vhose csntre nas the Co1111m1niot

~ ~vement in India. Various international events, the national

situation, the local ciroamstances and somo, developments ~thin

the Commanist movement, toget~r cansed tho split within OPI(M)

and led to the emeraence of the lfaoist organisations.

§iDa-Soviet Splits

In the 20th Congress of Collllllllnist Party of =wviet Union

( CPSD') in 1957 Nikita Klu!uschev made a statement ooademnina lll8D7

or tb3 mistakes committed by Stalin's regime. This statement had

many far reaching implications, and ws a otartina point or an

acrimonious debate bet~on the CP.SU and Communist Party of China

( CPC) on various issues ranging from the nature of intemational

balance of forces to the pzoblems ot oonstrQotina EOcialisc.

EiGhty-one ComllliUlist parties of tho l10rld met in Moscon to thrash

out the iseues and arrive at a common understandins of the 'si -Qla­

tion and tasks facing them. The result ss th9 Moscon Statement

or 1960. BDllC.lVer the statement uas given TJido~ divergent

interpretations by CPC and CP.SU. Conoequently severe debates

arose tTithin various Colllllll1nist parties, as to trbich of tba con­

flicting interpretations was the correct one. Th9 Commnnists

in India ~re no exception to this and a polarisation took place

in them according to their divergent viel78 on ths general line

ot intemational communist mowment and its' ioplied concrete

cou%Se of action for particular countries.

62

Tm Chineae Foreign PoliCll

It also had 801119 impact on communist politico in India.

Until 1959 the Chinese took a friendly atti wdo totrards the Indian

Government. The trouble o~r Tibet and border isaeo holiOvor

souNd tm Bandung spirit. From that time onT~&rds Pekina PJ.oeso

unleashed an attack on Indian Government. Tm Peoples Dai].y

m:ote several editorials viz. "ZIP tmth about a.nti-Cbineu

ga.mnaitm leunghed bx Hehrp.'* '*Jieyolution in :J:ibet and liohl:ph~ -

Philosophy", "More on Heb:I,W', nhioh alleged that In dieD Govemment

had become a part of International Imperialist plots B!fainst

China aD ~11 as national progress. These articles ebaraoterised . 1

tho Indian State as feudal and oomp:radoro The Chinese alEO asked

the IDdian CoiDIIIWliots not to becolll9 challviniots but to behave in

tho spirit of proletarian internationaliso. Thsy appoalod to t•

Indian CollllllUDists nho supported them to dispense ni th ths "~ ~- -

clique 'Chich he embarked on national challviaiom and olaoo oapi tula-

2" tionism. Durins 1965, (by 'Chich time tb9 oulwral revolution TJ&S

gainina hold in China) ths Chinoee adopted nhat later came to be

kno'O'Zl as tb3 Lin thesis. Thio vas a otrateQ to counter tu United

State a• (U.s.A.) poli07 of encircling China• It ail!3d at linld.na

all tho 'people's wars' in the third world into a alobal front

against the U.s .t\. The Lin thesis advocated implementation of

Maoist model ot agrarian guerilla revolution in all the oountrieo

of the third T.Orld. It exp:ressed tbe opinion that mass theo~ of

63

peoplo' o t7ar has bsoome "co1111110n asset of the revolutionary peoplo

of the. t7hole v;orli.n ~se viotm oould not bu.t have had II!Uch impaot

on 1D8D7 of the Indian CoDlm!Uliot leadore t7ho held China in hiGh

regard. This is more particularly tme of the Andhra CoDIDWlisto

~th their Maoist past of 1948-51•

Oth2r International Eventsc

· To some extent various other intemational events had alao

a contributory value for the re-emergence of Indian Maoism. baG

are tho Cuban Revolution, Ch3 Guevara's t7ritings, the French

student revolt of Mq 1968, and the Tet offensi w of t.b.1! Vietac-

meae. As early as 1963-64 Castro's speeches aDd Guevara• o

t1ri tinge uere oir01lated in Indii, and many Andhra 14aoists parti­

cularly in the student front had been ini tiall7 inspiJ:Qd b.T Gu.evare• s

lite and \71'i.tings. The Cuban MegaziDo fricontinenta1 had a fairly

GOOd circulation among Maoist cb.'cles of ~derabad in 1967-68, and

Cho Guevara' a Guerilla Y/ar:taro1 , along l'li th legia Debrq1 s and

Cohn Bandit's book '08re disousaed in their stuq circles. Tb8 'l'et

offensive and French student revolt also had much impact on maD7

youn6 men. In fact these events t7er3 decisive for the rejection

of C.P.I. and CPI (14) by' many revola.tionar,y minded young men. Their

choice cgainst the established communist parties and ia favour of

t~ ~ist path l78S a result of several factors among trhioh th3

most important nere books like Cohn Bendit' s The Left t1in~t Coma­

Diem Regis Debra,y's Revola.tion within Revolution and events lilro

64

5 fet offensive and ~ upris~.

On an individual level despair of betterinc one' e material .

position and social status within the existing fre.mework of social-

struoture, political institutions and economic organisation, makee

one favourable to think of revolutionary solutions. The same is

tme at a social level where the despair is about tin dine solu tiona

to the national problema. 4n attitude of ioonoclas;t• and in

favour of radical solution arises when such despair is combined

with visions of a better society and hopes of being able to :realise

such a society.

India in 1967 was caught in an • economic oris is' which might /

:reasonably be expected to have led to despair atleast amongst some

people. .lt the same title India was in the thl.'oes ot a. 'political

crisis' which might have given some people mpes of beinc able to

dest~7 existing st~cture ot political system and replace it with

an entirely new one. The social. turmoil which also existed around

this time can be held as an indication or the tendenoy in which

the maoist movement &1'0se.

Economic Crisis

After the initial success ot the First Five Year Plan, the

Indian eoono1117 seemed unable to fulfil its' prolllise and in 1967

65

it ~ in a condition tibioh nas oharaoterieed as a crisis b.T ono 6

and all. This period sa\'7 "tho doceloration of growth rato vhich

hed sot in towards the end of 1965 and persioted dllring 1967 •

~re tJas near staenation in tbs induotrial output in 1967 ....

In~strial activit7 \'7BS adverse~ otfeoted b.1 shortaaos of reo mate­

rial, pouor, components and spores, uncertain aid outlook aDd cb:ought

oonditions .. eo acCUIIIl1lation of lar&o stoo!ts •• ~(and) cu.t back iD 7

productioil". Statistically ths industrial produ.ction t7hioh had shom -

a 6.7 per cent increase in 1965 January-March period o"tar tm pJ:Odu.o-

tion of 1964 January-March period, steadily decelerated untU it

sho'C3d only a 1 per cent increaoe in 1967 Octcbe~cembor poriod 8 .

as comparod to 1966 October-D3cember ·period. The indox of Indian .. .

industrial produ.ction shol<Sd an increase of only eight points 9

bettJecn ths years 1965 and 1967. Th:a fall in ~ricultural PJ:Oduction

t18.S even more drastic. The aver888 annual growth rate of attricultural

prodllction vhich as 3·1 per cent betueen 1953-54 to 1~6}-64 crashed 10

dom to minus 8. 7 per cent during 1965-67. The actual production

figures are 89 million tonnes during 196+-65, 72 millioo tonnes in t

1965-66 and 74 million tonnes in 1966-67G1 Tb9 food situation -

forced tm country to import a record 10.4 million tonnes food graino 12

durins; 1966-67 and snother 8.7 million tonnes durinc 1967-68. Tm

re~otion in food ~pplies had the chain effects of reducing the

availability of ra\'7 materials for &Bricu.ltural based industriesa

causing rise in food priceof reducing the real incom2 of a larp

sec$or of mral house-holdo; ctivorting the urban pg.rchesi~ PQUOr

from manufactured goods to food grains dl1e to the sharp riee in tho

6~

. 67

prices of the latter, causing e fall in intemal demand of induotrial I

goodsJ and contributing to the setting in of a recession~ tendency /

in industri~.

Tm years 1965-67 TJa& a period of inflationary rise in the priceo.

!fh3 oholosale price indox TJhich shot:.ld an average t\llllual gl.'Otrth of

4 per cent rioe in tM priceo of "all commodities", a 2o} per cent -.

rise in tho price of "all coreald' and a 2o4 por cent rise in tm - -

prioeo of 11 ll&lluf'acturQd goods" in docado 1953-54 to 1963-64, sho"Ced - .

during 1965-66 and 1966-67 a 12o7 per cent rise in tb:J prices of "e.ll ~

eoamodi tieo" 9 14•6 per cent rise in ths prices of "all oarealoet and 14

an 8o1 per cent rise in the prices of "manufactured BOodo"• The risa

in pricos tJerG accompanied by fall in the incomes. Tm psr capita

income which showed a 2 per cent average annual groTJth rate durins th3

dooado 1953-54 to 1963-64, shot:ed a minus 4•1 per cent average annual

fall dllring 1~65-66 and 1~66-67. The real national income nbich

shot;:)d an average 4·1 per cent grotrth bett~eon 1953-54 to 1963-64 15

deoo.do, showed a minus 2 per cent decrease during 1~65-66 and 1966-67 •

This resulted in a fall of savings and oonsaquently of investments.

The total domestic savings trhich sholj'Sd an annual gzonth rate of

15·8 per cent during 1953-54 to 1963-64 fell do~ to 3·8 per cent

dllring 1965-66 to 1966-67. In fact the savings of the Govement

sector ware minus 12.2 per cent during 1965-66 to 1966-67, and tm

house hold sector which had previously shol711 an average of nearly

3 per cent rise in its savings showed only a 9 per cent inoreaso 16

dllriQ!t 1965-66 and 1966-67.

Tho ~hole si~ation ~rsened b,y t~ difficulties in ~tting

foreign aid. Follotling the 1965 Indo-Pakistan ~ tho United States

had su.spended its aid oommi tment to Indiao India also had tm burden

of immense foreign debt repayment r~hioh ~as compounded by tm urgent

necessity of importing food grains and badly needed spare parts for

industrial purposes. These diffi~lties led to tbe devaluation of

the Indian rupee and also to the abandonment of the fourth fiye year

plan trhich ~as replaced with an annual plan.

i'lraso economic conditions compounded the alreaccy serious 11

ooom.ployent problem. The follotting table sho~s this clearly.

Unemployment in India 51-56 56-61 61c66 66-69 (in millions) I Ple.D II PlOD m Plan } &lnual

Plans

1. Ro. of unemployed }o} 5·} 7·1 9o6 parsons at the beginning of

2. ~di tion to the 9·0 11.8 17.0 14·0 labour fo roe dllring

}· Total No. of Jobs 12·3 17·1 24.1 2}.6 required GD.ring

4• t\clditional jobs 7·0 10.0 14·5 1·4 ore a ted dllring

5· No. of persons 5·3 7·1 9.6 22o2 unemplpyed at the end of

There bsrdly seemed to be better employment prospects in th9

futuro. In fact the industrial sector sbol:3d a doo:reat;:) in its• 18

emploJ'IDent capacity during tho year 1966 and 1967 o

68

flms tm Indian economy vas e. crisis in tt:O sonseo. First

it vas unable to maintaiu the rates of prodllotion and mailltaiD a ~al­

t~ mouetary system. Secoud, it fell far short of tm demands placed

upoD it ill an era or "revolution of rising expectationa"o

Political Orisign

India in 1967 seem to be poised on the eve of political

crisis nhich had two aspects - a) Instability and b) Illogitimaqy.

a) Instabilityn The general elections in 1967 endod tho

ono partx doad.nanQ! in India. In eight States parties othor than

Congress Call19 to the 1Uling position. Eveu in the Central Parlie!!lent

inspite of a forty-nino vote majoriQ" there TJere doubts about otabi­

lity of the Go"Vemment in vieu of the factionalism in th9 Congresso

Frequent dofections, and illtel'-party quarrels vithin the coalition

Govomments added to the illstability of the situation. The 1~7

elections also sav the streugtboning of various regional and commnnal

parties liko the mnc ill Madras, ths .akalis ill Panjab, the ~slio

Jaaeuo and the Jana SaDgh. This election also sav the victor¥ of

ID8J11" independents vbo had no party lo7al tios. All these added to

tbe instability of the situation.

b) Illegi tima.gn This period vas aptl7 characterised as 19 '

"democratic anarcqy•• impl7ing th2 GoveJ.'Ilments inability to tackle

effectively the deteriorating economic and political conditions.

Tharo tras tt.i.despread impression that tm Government ~s a prisoner

69

·or indocision, and '\788 incapable of sbo'\7ing. a '\78'3 out ot th2

economic crisis. The Governments 1~ l'SS shatterocl not onl7 in

respect of its effectivity but also in regard to its integrity.

".almost every morning ne"spaper reporto 0010 out ri"th yet another

report of a head bllnt, eup~miotica.ll7 put foroarcl as exposure of 20

scandals, and scandals and oorxuption are neve1'-0nding•" Tm roport

on Kairon • s conuption, the episode of Bi,ju Patneilt, Lohia' s allesa­

tions about the Prime lfinister receiviD& personal gifts and the

far~ of &\.yarams and Ga.yarams had destroyed t:M imsge of tm Indian

Government and redlloed its aura of authority and legitima07 to I!I8DY

peopleo

»oscribing the chaQges in the Indian political systoo BaJni

Kothari notes "The tremendous shift tlm country has been goina

through for some time nov •.. disintegration of old symbols of to b»

70

sion and identity, the e:rosion of the insti tu. tional consenaas, repro- ··

sented by the Congress system ot dominaDC3t th3 obsoleo013Doo of

traditional ot mdia of oomum.nication end pat1'0neCo, th3 loosening

ot bonds that held discreet strata of population and. traditional

affiliations, the accumulating discontent against those in authority 21

and th3 revolution in rising exPectations". Tmso changes in tm

natu.1"3 of the political system "ero accompanied by "e1112rgenoe of J

pockets of discontent and anol!li.e, in politioall7 crucial aroao

such as th9 urban intelligentsia, the youth and tbe students, sectiono

ot the minorit7 communities and the administrative servioso and 22

various professional middle class 81'QUPS•"

iSo cial Turro il

The acute discontent with the economic conditions and the dis-

illusionment with the political system led to a situation in which

"Bandhs and hartals, marches and meetings have almost become 23

a way of life". Sba.nti Swamp describes India of that time as

"seetbing Tlith discontent and protest, which have been growing

very rapidly for almost a decade. They exist today at all levels

of society. Strikes, processions, fgher~s' and a series of new 24

fol.'llls of protest have been gaining in respectability".

The year 1966-67 vas particularly marked by student unrest

71

throughout the country. Th.e country also witnessed during this period

a movement for ban of cowslaughter which culminated in a mammoth

march on the Parliament; the border dispute betneen l~Vsor.e and .Ma.ha­

rashtra which led to ugly incidents; the 4kali agitation, and the lan-

guage riots in Madras. This was also a period of increasing indus-

trial strife. The number of roan days lost due to strikes in 1966

was more than double that of 1965 10.3 million in 1966 as compared 25

to 4•6 million days in 1965. This period also shovs a rise in the

crime rate. Vlhile in 1965 there was a 0.97 per cent decrease in

crime rate as compared to the previous year, theN was a 6 per cent

increase in crime-rate in 1966 as compared to 1965 and a 11 per cent 26

increase in 1967 as compared to 1966.

lb- &ldhra Pradesh presents not only tho general features ot · hQS

economic, political, and social crisis in the oountr;r but it also".oex-

tain s~cific conditions dlioh account for the relativo oucooss of

Maoiots in forming a comparitively lazge organisation.

Egonomic Si tllations

T~ general .features of national economic oriois t;Sre also

to be found in .Andhra. .&ldhra Pradosh is predominantly an agrioul-

tural State. The contribution of 85rioulture and animal lm.sbandry

to the income of this State was 56.5 per cent where as for ths country

as a cllole it ws 47.9 per cent. In the rest of the income only

11 per cent came from industrieo and " per cent from other £Ourceo.

The othor sources consisted mostly of trading etc. which t'18re depen­

dent on aenoral prosperity of the people, which in ~ depended on

the State of agricul tu.ral production. BetTJeen 1965-1969 th9 tzeather

t:'&& unfavourable to agriculture. This period sau dl:oughts in 1966

and 1968, and a severe cyclone in 1969 t7hich destroyed all standi~

01'0PO• Tlr3 index numbers of agricultural production in Andhra

Pradoah (Bason 1956-57 a 100) clearly show this. Th:3y (for all proauc­

tioD commodities, including both foodgrains and no~-food crops)

stood at record height of 127 •9 in 1965-66, t7hich crashed to 100.2 in

1965-66, sbot;ed slight improvement in 1966-67 ( 113o9) and 1967-68 27

( 121.9) to crash once again to 104.3 in 1968-69. Tho index numbers

of induatrial production in Andhra Pradesh (Base 1960 = 100) also

shoued a slight fall, from 179 in 1965 to 170 in 1966 and 167 in 28

.1967.

72

Fall in agricu.l tural pzoduction had effect on tm incomss

and prices in the State. Tlr;l per capita income indo: ( tdth 1960-61

as base, at constant prices) uhich "OU at 112·4 in 1964-65 fell to

100o2 in 1965-66, slightd7 iap:r:oved to 102 .o in 1966-67 and 10'o' 29

in 1967-68, and tell to 97•4 in 1968-69. At the sams timo priceo

m!re rising sharply i.e. Indox numbers of uholesale pricea ill

lq'derabad city for food articles (Baso ~at 19,9 a 100) uao 755

in 1965, zose to 866 in 1966 and jWlped to 1001 in 1967. Tm

genoral index also sho~d similar obangoo. It uas et 761 in 1965, 30

rose to 992 in t66 and 1020 in ~967• This being the oa~ cl.th trholo-

oalo prices, one can easily imagine the otate of retail prices

ubich -could be mch more dl1e to hoarding and blackmarlteteering.

:SOcial Unrestc

After a long period of oolm ( uhich lasted from for 10 years

from 1955) .iandhra Pradesh uas again a sceno of severe social unrest

in the post 1965 period. l\n ~i tetion for location of steel plant

in Visakhapatnam uas the oa11se of huge rallies, rioting and polioa

firinas uhi ab. culminated in. tm .&ldhra Bandb of November 1966. In

this agitation '5 peoplo died and 5000 ~re injured, anotmr 5000

'1 \78ro o.r1'9sted on various ohar«es• The 1965-68 period also tli tnessed

a kind of student strikes uhioh t7erc previously unlmot;za. Tu

University autonomy agitation of 1966-67, and th:l lor.er teen asita­

tion of 1967-68 in Osmania University, heralded an era of student

politics in &dhra Pradesh 't'lhich uas marked by lmge processions,

73

74

·rio tinge, and otrikes, lasting for DI9Dthc toaethero Tho indue-

trial fmnt also shon&d a marked increase in tho incidence of

strikes in tm three years or 1%4-65 and 1966. T.mt neber of iDdllo­

trial dispu"es nhich never c1'0saed 85 before, mae to 111 in 1964,

113 in 1965 and 114 in 1966. !he number of ID8Il days lost in these

three years tl&re 5·29 laltbs, 4·91 lakha and 5.12 lakhs, as compared

to the previous highest of 1 o9 lakhs in 1960. The number of uorkers

involved vas 85, 31 and 58 thousand as compared to the previous 32

highest of 29 thousand in 1960. .Mother probable indicator of tm

social situation in Andhra Pradesh is the increasing incidence

of dacoity. While the country as a whole shotJed 2.7 per cent

decrease in the incidence of dacoity in 1966, Andhra Praciesh shotted

a 25.8 per cent increase over the previous year, in the incidence 33 34

of dacoity. The next year showed another 30·8 per cent increase.

Th9 point to be clarified here is that dacoit7 in Andhra Pradesh

does not mean the sams thing as it does in Bajasthan or Hadb.Ya

Pradesh. Many of these were oases of looting of food by :tm.asry

villagers from hoarded stocks of traders, landlords and transport

lorries etc.

Political Envimnmentn

Politically there usa stability in the senso of a over-

dlelming Congress majority in &sembly. But faationalism '08S

rampant, and its area of o~ration ws not limited to menipalations

at the levels of legislature and ParV organisationo 1Jiani£estation

of Congress factional politics are to be found even in tho mass

social unrest. According to one oomsnentater, Brah!Denanda Baddy th:J

Chief Uini ster of Andhra Pradesh at that time TnlS r hand in glove

nith the (oteel) agitation' and 'deliberately organi83d violence' -

at many places, to lower the image of his factional rival H. Sanjeeva . }5

Boddy, ttbo t'laS at that time Minister of Steel in Ceatral Cabinet.

:&sidos the general ecoaom:ic, social and political eavironment,

it is the peculiar characteristics of Andhra Pradesh CoiDIIIllnist move­

ment, tthicb go a long t183' to help ex;plain th9 emsrgenoe of llaDism

75

in &dhra Pradesh. tie can note five of these hel.'Ch a} Tho present V

loo status of Andhra 0oiDIIJI1nists in terms of their mass folloning,

electoral strength and general political respect, oontr,asted stroaglf

with its past days, when it had lod tbe Telengana Peasant l!ovement,

tho Visalandhra Movement, the Navya Bhasba movemeat etc. and vas

regarded as a strong claimant to political poner, TJi th lot of elec­

toral and mass support. This contrast might obviously have led to

much discontent and search for ttqs to regain and l.'Oooup previous

pol'Uarity. b) The contrast betoeen past popularity end present

t78almess also led to an inconsisteaey bet'D88n organisational and

political development of the party. l"Jbile it had a -call clevelopad

tightly lmit party organisation whose cells existed in most vill~eo

of th'l Stato, its wrld.ng mas at a low key given the lack of mass

support. This led to increasing search of alternate lines by tlrJ

~arty under the organisational pressure. c) The search for al te:rnato

· lines might have been influenced· by the fact that Andhra CollllmUliat

movement had a Maoist past ( 1948-51) - in fact thoy oere tm pioneers

of Maoist movement in India - and most members remember th9 popul.a-

rity and leadership position which they enjoyed among people in thoss

d.qs. d) After their initial electoral victories ( they vsretm

single largest party in Telengana as t~ell as among Andhra legislators

in &.dras dssembly in tltl 1952 elections, and in 1955 they vero

expecting to emerge as the xuling party of nevly for112d i\ndhra Stato)

the Communists in Arldhra suffered severe reverses on the electoral

trent. In the 1962 Aosembly they had only 23 members in the Legis­

lature. In the 1967 elections also inspite of th9 national ci.do

anti-Congress wve they failod to make Dlch h9acigQ and had onq

19 soats ( C.P.I. 10, CPI (11) 9)• !fore important, JD&rq party members

had a feeling that the electoral defeats tiero a result ot pbl'sioal

repression by landlords, their goondas and police. The party revietr

of the 1967 elections sqs "the police the Congreso laD4l.ords and

thoir 600ndas had conducted mass raids on more than hundred

villages ( Tlhere CPI( M) ws strong). In Thungathurti Constituency

alono toenty villages -oere raided ••• eigbt@Pl (M) -corkers Tlere ~

11111rdered during and after elections and bllndreds of them t:OWldod· a

There "Cere many other allegations about party TJOrlters being beaten 37

and sympathisers being harassed ~riqg elections. In these circams-

taace some wrkero might have felt that arm.Gd activity ms necessary

to pin poner. o) By far the most important reasoD "CaS tm feeli.Da

· amona 11 strong section of tm:t party that the peasant movement

76

'UOund "Ohich their party m.s- based could not be sucoessfull7 carried

out t'li tbout armed resistance. In thio period thero "CSre t"a) areas

in Andhra Pradesh t7here CPI (H) 't7&S carry~ out a militant pecsaDt

EOvement. These tt:O are ill (a) S:dkakulam and (b) in KhaDIID8lll,

Uar8118al and .Nalgonda districts of Telengane area. In both th!!se

77

areas CPI ( :M) "COrkers "Oere faoina a bad tiDHt. Seventy of their ®liters

r.sre killed bet"Oeen 1952 -and 1968 of these 20 died bet~n 1966 and 38

1968. Many at1'0oi ties uere committed on the mzkers like t~ bumin8 39

alive of a seven-year old son of a CPI( H) "a)rkero T~ir sympa.thicsro

liQro driven aT18:3' from the vUloges, beaten harassed and looted.

Their livestock& "CS1'0 killed, grain and crops destro78d, and proparty

damaged' thsir leaders "Oere beaten u.p and their ora~isations preven­

ted from functioDiD8• The cadre l"l&S involved in many cases in t~se

areas. In Khammam Taluq alono {)here t;Sre one thousand and three . ~

lmndrod cases in which CPI(H) peasant -corkers 178re invol W:d. Thesa

oasos trere very costly, tmublesome, time-consuming and dismpting

the normal life pattems of the people. For e.g. ono case had thirty

adjoUl.'ilments in one year. This meant that the ®rkers had to leave

their villages and go to the district headquarters ®ere tho court

was situated for thirty times in that year. lD th!so oircumatancea

the leadership of the peasant movements in these azeaa staanchly

aupported the maoist foction, "Ohioh argued that the peasant movement

can bo taken fortnlrd only by armed resistan oe. The advice to boycott

courts and resist attacks on them appealed to the leaders or both

Srikakulam and Telengana regions where at this tia ( 1967) the movement

·ll&c facing a severe crisis. In beth these regions tho leadero

U3re practically functioning illegally ( sin 0:1 on each of them many

cases t<8re pending) and the peasant moveant ws facing the nccee­

si~ to choose bet~en going ab9ad by forcible occupation of land­

lord' a land (which· tJOUld d.efini tely involve armod st:ruggle) or co~~>t

pzomisina and consolidating existing gains on various issues lilto 41

rise in -cegeo, reduction of rents etc.

Th9 question of vhy the Andhra maoists -cere able to o.ttraot

nearly 10,000 party cadres has been ans-aered both by the CPI( H)

and the maoists. The CPI(H)•o viev ll&S that in Andhra pai.ty•s

links TJi th poor peasants and egricu.l tural labour had got ri3aker

and the party leadership for -focz of alienating allies in th9

electoDBl front had taken up only issues amouni vhioh all people

caD rally for e.g. Visalandhra, Steel agitation etc. Class iscues

vero neglected. .A.cti vi ty among liOrking class vas confined to

eoonomism. The leadership in the party uas predominantly petty-42

bou.raeois. Thoori tically the party ti&.S verr poorly equ.ippedo

In t~~ circumstances the maoiot leadore relying on the "moods

and sentiiD9nts of frastrated part)r members (a fmstration ceu.sed

by staanation iD mass and class movements, and shallov marxist-

leninist understanding - both of t'lhich tm result of a lens refor­

miot past.) and impatient petti-bourgeoic youth in .Md.bre." mana&ed 43

to attract a large following.

The ADdhra Haoist leadership explained their success iD the

78

· follo'O'ing terms. UUe woere able to gain victor;y in our State becau.~

(a) from 1962 onu~ds 'C3 translated international Col!lllWlist dDCil•

menta and circulated them amng party members tlms raisill8 their

political level. (b) \'Je relentlessly carried on ideological expo­

sure c£ tm CPI( H) leadership from 1964 onuards ovon -aben t73 t78re in

jail. (c) Our party based on peasantry and esricul inral labour

cloth ita ~morieo of Teleoganc. a~d stmggle, easily accepted

peoplo'o 'Carpath. (d) Th9 issue of :rosistance uas already before

UD in Srikaku.lam and \7arangal o XhaJnmam and Karicnagar &r3aS• & 44

Damlbari could easily convince us."

Tho Ba~ of CPI - CPI(M) Splitn

Mter initially tollo-ning a radical and militant liDo bott780n

1948 and 1951 the ComiiCUlist Party of India ( CPI) slouly shif'ted its

.79

stand "to support constitutionalism and parliamsntar.y action coupled

\lith support given to specific policies of Indian National Congresa ••••

The Amritsar Thesis signifies acceptance of parliament~ democraQY 45

as principal avenue through nhich party "COuld secure pot::)r iD India."

Briefly the cPI' s underotanding of the Indian si talation and tho

motbod in ubiob pouer uas to be oaptuzed is ns follouso Tb3 State

in India is the organ of the class l.'U.le of the national bourgeoisie

~ich upholds and develops capitalism in tho national econoiJI1' of

·India. In ths changed intemational conditions of tjSakened

imperialism in comparision to the socialist camp it is possible

for the Indian capitalioto to independently industrialise the

oountey-. But they are obot.ruoted by ·various roaotionarr forc3o

liko tM monopoly groups, landlordo, UC'llrQo, ubolesalo dealero etc •

On its onn ths national bou~ioie cannot overco~ these obst.ruo-

tiona and build an independent and strong India. & the role of _

ooiBmllnists in this context is to ally l7i th the progressi vo notions

of the bouzgeoisio and build an alliance of all patriotic olasseo

to dof'eat ths roaotionaries. Th9 leadership of this alliance

t7ill be shared bet'C'Sen national bourgeoisio and r:orkina class. In

oth9r wms betncon the political maniteotations of these classes -

tho Congress and the CPI. In this process ths ocnotitutiOD of India

with its universal franchise and fundamental rights provide a good

platform and instrument for the struggle of people to dofeat th2

reactionaries. Ho"t"JQver there vas al\78YS a section in the CPI which

had reservations about the increasing support to Congross and th2

matters oame to a head on ths issue of Sino-Indian clasheo and the

CPI' s attitude towards it. tlhile the ri8htist faction gave unstin-

tod support to the Government stand, including c decision to suspend 46

all t:arking class militant otruggleo, tM leftist faction called

this cbanvinism. This along vith the issue of Dange'o role in the

l!eemt conopiracy case vas ths imm.sdiate cause of a raptuN bet-neen

th:) t'OO factions in the CPI. Consequently the CPI( 11) uas formed

in July 1964 at Tenalio

80

Those t1ho came out from the CPl whilo agreed on their

disagreement of CPI's policy of constitutional struggles and supw

port to Government did not have any clear-cut altemate program~

on which all of them t;ere united. In the wrds of CPI(H) Central

Commi tteo ( CC) "majority of the party membership responded to the

oall of thirty-ttso national council members in 1964 not so rmch

because of the completo theoretical and ideological olari t7 they

had o'Ar th3 iseuoo under dispute but becmse of their own practi­

cal experience of th$ increasing mass discontent and disillusion-

t.l9nt t7i th Congress policies on th9 one hand and the revulsion ri th

th2 patently revisionist and class collaborationist practice of

Dango' s party and the revisionist policies of CPSD', leadership ••••

a good cll!lnk of it ( tho CPI) rallied behind our party duo to ito 47

militant sentiments". Tlhile the party as a whole did not have a

clear cut programmo the same cannot be said for all the individual

me!®ors l't.ithin th9 CPI(M). t1hile some of th9m had spooifically 48

repudiated armed ineuri:ection as wsll as peaceful transition

oth9rs were openly and fimly preaching that Haoism vas the only

oorroct line for the party.

The Maoist Propoganda upto 1967

The all-India parallel centre rithin the CPI circulated

variouo pamphlets of the CPC outlining its viet1s on intemational

and In dian issues, between December 1962 and .dpril 1~6 ,. These

incluclod, '\'thence th! »iff'erencea - Beplx to Thoz:t»", "Jon on

81

82

<Difroreacos Betoeen Togliatti and un", "&ro on llehru'o PhilocoAAf", 49 ' ~ . .. ~

oto • In 196 3 many ueeklies \re:rG startod in various regional lall@U8ges

by the pro-Chinese Communists. These gave PQblici~ to Pekiaa's "

viot78 oa all important ideological and practical questions for 8•1Jo

there nero articles in "Js.neMkti" and "Sengodi" calling tor armed . 50

guerilla struggle and tollou th2 teachings or Mao Toe Twl6• tialq

individllal members also exbortod party "COrkero to pJ:eparo tor

guerilla otmggle -for e.g. ~al Singh uraod party" BOmbers to

prepare for a Telengana type or revolu tioa tihilo P .IC. Chakravartl::\Y 51 .

reminded tmm of 'l'elengana and Kakadueop atmggleso

During 1964 several poups tor e.g. "T~ Revolutionary Council" ~

lod by Parimal Das Gupta, th:l "Chintha group" led by &!!alya Sen etc.

and "The Marx- Engelo Institute" fomed by Sushital Hoy Choudary etc. 52

~re conducting maoist propoganda.

The major propogandist tor Uaoist causo in this period was

Cham Ha3\\Ddar· Bett18en 1965 and 1~67 he t7JDto eight letters to th9

party members analysing th:l Indian situation, and laid do'OD tlr::l

otrategy for carrying out revolution in the country. 'fhe main

formulations of these eight documents '0'8re that "( 1) the Indian ~

revolution must take th9 path or armed struggle, (2) it should b3

on the pattern not of the Soviet revolution but of tm Chinoso

revolution, and ( 3) the armod ot:ruggle in India should take tm

form of' peoples• t7&r as advocated by llao Tae Tu.ag and not tm 53

guerilla t'18r of Che Gu.ovara". Be even laid dot:n that he t::Ould

co-operate with only those indi vidtlals and groupo uho regarded l!a.o

~~ Tuag as the leader of l10rld revolution, his thoughts as tm

higmot form of Haniom-Leninism in the present era, vho believe that

a zevolutionar;r situation exists every oheze in India, tbat Indian

revolution can advance only tlu:ough area-cl.se seizure of pot70r

ancl finally t7ho believe that only through ~erilla l7&r revolution 54

CBJ'l begin and advance. Chsm Majumdar also formed tho "Siliguri

group" consisting of Kanu Sanyal, Jangal Santhal and otmr maJor

III&Oists of Bengal. This group published six cyclootyled lealllots

during 1965-66 calling for instant armed peasant revolution. In

April 9, 1965, they had publis~d a document, rlhat is th? me@liM

of the spontaneous Revolutiona;r Qutbarat in India uhich stated

I

J "It is necessary nou to come ror't7ard poTJe~ly and tell tho

people forcefully that capturing of poTJGr area-rise is our t78T'

I and another pamphlet on ~st }0, 1966 call~d &in Task at Present

Is To Build Ileal RevolutionarY Pa;t.y Through unoompromisintt iSt~lo

Against RevisionismM

fm differences m thin the CPI( H) became public as early ao

1965 ®en the staunchly pro-Chinese sections of the party caJDo out ---'t1ith the document called Tho Differences among tbe jail leade~

tihich severely criticised the attitudes towards CPO end CPSU eo 56

I :XP:.iD:::t:~~= :·.:~:od::::t::-~:: CPC tonards CPSO leadership and on the question of unity of action r

83

·in Vietnam. He certified that OPSU leadership inapite of certain

mistakes nas greatly helping the national liberation struggles.

1W condemned the attitude of CPO towards Kashmir border issue

and Mr~ian Conferenoe. :& declared that CPSIJ leaderehip mu.st

be treated as a friend and not as a foe, and that points of common

agreement betveen CPC and CPSU ,ere greater than points of disagree- ... 57

ment."

CPI(X) and the Fourth Genera! Eleotione

Ttra CPI(H) found itself in a position to form Gowrnment in

tt:O States - Iterala and t1est Bengal. Ho"C&ver in its third strona­

holcl &dhra Pradesh, it found itself in a very poor position

having wn only 10 sea te. To the Lok Sabhe. they had t:On 19 sea teo

Follo'Oing this major electoral gains CPI( H) came out t7i th a

docu•nt call~ The Nev Situation alld Our Tsekno l!'lre they aau

a deepening economic crisis as engulfing the oountry and leadin8

it to a political crisis. Ho~ver the political crisis uas seen

aa being in its initial stagoo and otill leaviQg a lot of room

for the bourgeoisie to manoouvro. To take advantage of this

situation they outlined three tasks (a) "Since the fortunes of the

entire part.y, at the present stage of development are closely

linked tri. th the successful mnning of these Ministries • • • •• , our

party shotld mobilise ever lJ'ider popular support for tho programmes 58

<?f these Governments and expose all attempts to torpedo them.ct (b)

84

·"Tho single biggest lesson (of tbs fourth general elections) io

that by determined strQggle to ~ allies and concentrating main

fire and driving main edge against Congress Party and its Govern-

85

ment uhiC3h is the chief instru.Dl8nt of oleos :tUlo and exploitation •• ••

by leaving no :room for revisionists scare of non-Congress right 59

reaction at present state, •••• -ce can 'Cin JDaD7 victories".. Tmy

felt that by uniting all parties and groups in opposition Oongreos

it is possible in :fUture to establish a "non-Congress alternate 60 -

Government at the Centre". (c) "l!obilising the masses of the

people around specific issues as they arise, and carXYinB fo~ 61

unity of the allies in the fronts and Govemmentsn. In sum they

thought that by uniting all the anti-Congross Parties includina

JeiK, .iAkali Dal, Muslim League etc. and by auoceosfully mnnin6 - -

the United Front Government in Korala and West Bengal e.nd by .-

building mass movements they can captuJ."e Govemantal poti8r evea

at ths Centre. The Maoist sections of CPI(M) nero by no means

o.menablo to this kind of a pmgrallllll9. Their ansoer to the Iiov

Situation and Bep Tasks . uas Unxalbari.

Naxalbqi Peasant lfovecent

llaxalbari is a police station covering about 200 cq • km. in

area in the Siliguri sub-division of 1larjeelin6 district. Tho

Bengal fiaoists had a stronghold in this area. This area had a

tradition of militant peasant stl.'Uggle. CPI(H) t:ao planning to

· otacse a militant agitation in this area but changed its plano 62

attor the unelG)ected victo:ey at tm polls. But the stage leader-

ship of CPI( M) could not enforce their vieus on the local loade%1-

ship 'Chich tras in the hands of tt:O devoted Haoists - Cham Majuodar

86

and Kanu Sanyal. As early as l!q 1966 the;r had fored a parallel part;r 63

centre in Darjeeling and l'8re propogating Heoism. They tmnted

"Naxalbari to be the first testing ground of the tbeory of area-- 64 wise siozure of potrer". As a result they launched the mowment

-ohich tras described as "a st1'11BSlO not f()r land_QJLOrops bu't_for . 65 ..., . ·===----.::--. . political pot78r"• Nualbari's importance in the history of th3

Indian maoist movement io baoed not on the intensit;r ot the moV3-

ment or its success (both of tlmse trere quite licited) but on its

symbolic significance and tmoretical valuo. fo the Indian ComlltllDist

move ant it posed the question of siezina political pot78r and of

directing all stl.'Uggles tosrds that direction. It vas the first

modem instance of the implementation ot an agrariaD, peasant

basod guerilla st1'Uggle in mral areas tri th a vie-o to destroyiaa

oxisting potrer stJ:Ucture. In other t:Ords it ns the first recent

exanple of the practice of meoist path in IDdia. It forced dooisive­

noss on many of the vacoillating cadre of CPI(li). Acoordias to the

~dhra Pradesh BevolutioDary Communist Committee (~:ace) "Naxalbari

peasant armed stJ.Uggle brought forward the issuo of peoploo'.

tmrpath; led to ideological discussioDs in tb9 partya plqed a his-

. tori cal l.'Ole by exposing nee-revisionist ideasJ it brought out tho

.internal straggle in the Part.7J it encouraged revolutionar,y 66

stmggle in other States to intensify ideological stmggles" •

Naxalbari also had a great symbolic value in the sense that it

came to represent in a nay idealism and revolutionary ardour foJ:

many young people vbD came to join the maoist moveant as a

result or the impact of the lfaxalbari peasant struggloo It

raised maoism in India !:rom the level ot idea to the level ot

implementation. It raised the hopes ot mal\f and goaded them

into action.

Chinese support to the Indian yapi~tg

Tho Chinese t78re not satisfied tri.th the CPI(H)• s soBOnhat

reserved step to their stand on various issues. Nor -cere thoy

entirely happy with CPI(H)'s strategy tor Indian revolution as

it w.s reflected in the viet'1S ot E.l!.a. lamboodiripe.d, Jyoti Basu,

Swularayya and other "moderates". In this contorl they did not . . .

-celco!D3 the formation of United Front Governments in Xerala and

'l1est Bengal and san them as no different fzom other State Gowrn­

ments nhich were characterised as ttlocal feudal and compradOr

forces". They also accused parts of CPI( M) leadership ot being 67

inclined to revisionism. Mter the Naxalbari peasant stru.gglo

tha Chinese clearly ranged theoselws against the CFI(H) loader­

ship and on the side of emerging Maoist groups. Badio Pekina

87

deocribed Naxalbari as 0 the front pau of revolution~ ~d

' struggle launched by the Indians" The bzoadcast further held

that Baxalbari shotj8d the future path of revolution in India

t~hich t1as to closely fol1ov that of the path of revolution in . 68 7

China, since both countries has similar socio-economic st~oturo.

This b%0adcast was folloued by a series of reports in Cbineoo

net7Bpapers which supported the Naxalbari kind of stNgglo and

advocated the maoist straw~ of "armed agrarian revolution as tu 9 .

road to emancipation of India·" This attitude of China had an

88

immense impact on many of the CPI( 14) cadrO. Given th2 interna tionali.st

orientation and perspectives of the colllllllnist movement the Chinese

support to Naxalbari greatly helped legitimation of asrarian basod

guerilla stmggle as a propsr path for Indian revolution. It gavo

moral support and strength to those of the maoisto uho t18re still

hesitating to have an organisational break mth the CPI(M) for e.g.

t~ .IAndhra group led by T. Jfegi Roddy, C. Plllla Reddy' and others.

It helped them make up their minds and lmr:q up t~i th t~ o:L"gani­

sational split from the CPI(H). :Eo-oever it is pe1tentl7 false to

maintain as :Bible.{ Das Gu:pta does~ that it was onl7 attor t~ Chinese criticism that the Andhra Naxalites became critical of

·.J 70 CPI(M) prograDIID8. We have already' pointed out that th9 .Andbra

leaders t18re critical of various CPI(M) attitudes even while they

were in jail during 1965-66 and were propogating through .

1Janasalcti' as well as translations of Chinese doc:uments and Mao•o

-uritings the path of agrarian revolution. Even ths Madurai

document of CPI(JA) accepts that the diffel.'enoes ~re as old a.o 71

from 1964./

I I

Th2 first section has outlined the environment ia 'Chich

contributed to the re-eme~enoe of Maoism. The second section

describes the process of this emergence, and its ideological and

organisational manifestations. fie have seen that oleotions,

formation of United Front Governments in Kerala and \'Jest Bengal, '" -

· Naxalbari Peasant uprisins and Chinese r::upport to it had polarised

people opposing and supporting the agrarian, guerilla, path of

revolution. By June 68 this polarisation led to a clear cut

organisational bxeak and to the emergence of t'CO distinct idcolo-72

gical and political lineso

The development of the t"CO distinct lines is studied under

tM folloTJing heads. 1) Th3 stand of CPI(H) on the lfaxalbari

events and the maoist cri ticiscs of it, 2) the CPI( H) defensa

or its positions in its various theoritical formulations and

assessment of the situation, 3) the maoist altemative to the

OPI(M) position which leads to the 4) final irreconciliability

betnoen the two lines and the split.

89

Naxelbari and the Maoist Cri ticf.@!

Tm CPI(:M) reacted to Naxalbari initially trith csu.tion

and moderation. The issue vas treated simply as a peasant agita­

tion for land and its political implications igno~d. Police TJElrct

asked to keep away from the area and CPI( H)' a ki san leader Haro

Krishna Konar who t1as revenue W.nister at that time visited Naxal-

bari td. th proposals of land distribution to stop the agitation.

Bu.t as it became clear to the CPI(H) loadership that the maoista

of :SUigllri backed by Chinese moral support 'C81'G determined on

making Naxalbari an example of their political line they hardened

in their attitude. The police vere asked to treat Naxalbari as a

lat7 and order situation. The CPI(U) also made a statement dic-74•

avo\1ing themselves from the Chinese assessment of :Naxalbarie

/ These steps of CPI( H) leadership invited much criticism

from Andhra maoists. They had majority in the CPI(11) 1 s State

90

committee, which passed a resolution criticisit15 central leadez­

ships attitude towards Haxalbari, and demanding that it necessary CPI 75

(u.) should nithdraw from Bengal Ministry. This t1&8 follot7ed by

much propaganda on the part of &l.dhra lfaoists on tm Baxalbari

issne. Kolla Venkaiab a member of CPI(H) Central Committee gave

an open press statement condemning repression on Naxalbari.

c. Pu.lla Reddy a member of the State Secretariat of CPI(U) ~te

an article callod Haas movement and ComiiWlist attitude, in tu

.party organ Japa $a4tbi. In this article be maintained that

\!roal ooiDil!!1llists" haw no right to condemn a movament iD TJhioh

tm pe c:ple participa tea. In another essay in the samo paper b9

shotJOd Lenin t s efforts to correct mistakes in communist parties

of other countries, tlms iflPl.ying that Chinese tJere correct in

commenting on Indian Co1117Z11nist affairs. Be rejected th9 Central

Committee of' CPI( M) • 8 chargoo about CPC interference in Indian 76.

Party1 s af'f'airs.

Following the Naxalbari events the &ldhra maoists inten-

sified their propagation of' People1 s War Path• They translated

and circulated the Chinese documents. In the &ldhra Pradesh

Political School held in June 1967 by the CPI(ll) they conducted

pl.'Opoganda about their vi0\18• They also used the issue of Govern­

ment suppression and landlord attacks on tm OPI(H) led peasant

movements in Srikakulam and Telengana areas to advocate guerilla

stJ.Uggle. They argued that only by armed resistance can tm

mo1ement be taken to a 'higher stage' and succeed over the attacks ' 77

of' Police, landlords and their goondas.

JThe Central leadership of CPI(M) decided to ignoxe tm

~dhra maoists activities for ~e time being, sinca tbe latter

-aero too strong in the State unit, and concentrated their firo

on Bengal maoists. In Bengal Charu. Majumdar and 3\lshi tal Boy

9houdbury had established a parallel party oontre in 1~66 nhioh

91

-nas propagating •Peoples \'Tar Path' and criticising CPI(ll)

leadership policies. This centre vas called Committee to Fight

Inner Party BevisioniSI!l. It brought out tuG letters entitled

letters to the Poli tbureau Numbers 1 and 2. These letters aocu.sod

the Politbureau of CPI(H) for forgetting the basic Marxist

teaching that tome is the m:icl-mfe of every old society and said

that the Poli tbureau of CPI( H) nas folloning a line nhioh nao

"nee-revisionist b,y their participation in elections, praoti03

of forming electoral blocs and alliance ni th bouraoois social

reformists, trl.th the serious intentionKorming coalitio~ Govsm-78 '

menta." Further, these letters stated, that the Indian peoplo

had no illusions a lx>u t bourgeois democracy and it nas necessary

to boycott elections for raising people's consciousness. They

opposed participation of comWQnists in Governments and felt that 79

political poner comes only through the path of armod st1UgglOo

The Bengal Maoists also atarted many journals for e.g. 1Dakshill•

.9&.§1!, Commune, Bid1'0ha eto. ®ich criticised the CPI(l!) line and

propagated guerilla struggle.

CPI( M) Replies

At this stage it became icperative for the CPI(M) to

str:lko back at the Maoist ranks for ta> reasons. Firstly unless

th9y cleared their oJ:ganisation of the maoist elements and dis-

associated themselves from their activities it wuld have becoiDQ

92

iDJOssible for them to continue in the United Fzont Governments • . ' v

(Ajoy l!nltherjee of t7est Bengal TIBB already threatening to resip

booause of CPI(H)•s anti-national activities)• Secondly unless

tb3y clarified their stand on ideological as vell au programmatic

issmeo it would have beoomo iepossible to maintain th9ir identit.J

'O'ithin the pa.rty' and they ~uld have given an opportunity to th2

maoiots to spread their ideas among party members uho did not have

any alternative ideas in front of them. Tow.rds these ends th9

CPI(H) took ~ steps.

The first tms to expell the maoist members from the part7•

Tmy dissolved the party' o Darjoeling District Committee and ~

Siliguri sub-divisional committee and replaced them t4 th cdhoo

Committees. Prominent members of' tbeso Committees liko Cham

1(Qjumdar and Souren Bose Tiere ex,pelled from the party. This tlBB

follo\7ed by State-'O'ide expulsions of p1'0minent maoist leaders for

e.g. Sushital Bop Chaudhary, Ashim Chatterjee, Parimal Das Gupta,

~sit Sen, Suniti Ghosh, Sal:Oj Du.tt, Mahadeb Mu.k:her~oo etc. Accord­

ing to Sankar Ghosh ••the purge continued for quite soatimo and

at th9 end about thousand extremists had been expelled from the 80

party". CPI( H) follot1Bd up the expulsion by p}V"sicall7 capturing

th9 part7 Deshahitaishi office 'Chich vas at tlmt time being edited

by a maoist, Slshital Boy Chouclhary. CPI(M) also gave a press

statement branding the .Maoists as "CIA. agents", "agent provo-81

catours" and ''left opportunisto."

93

Tho second step nas to clarif)' CPI( 11) position on variouo

ideological and pDOgrammatic issaes b,y a series of articles and

documents. The first set of articles came from u. B&savapu.nni&h

a Politbureau member of CPI(li). He accused tm maoists as beillfl

agents of vested interests and ruling classes and felt that th9

political objectives and policies set by maoists "have absoluteq

no relationship to the reality of class alignments obtaining

either on the State of West Bengal or in the count~ as a whole,

and the slogan of boycott of the Parliamentary insti tu tiona

they (the Naxalites) are raising is nothing but left sectarian 82

and adventurist". Basavapu.nniah1s m tinge nere follo-aed by B.T.

Ba.ndi vee articles and then the various documents of Central Com-

mi ttee of CPI( M) submitted at the Madllrai :Meeting. These clari­

fied the issues whidl had been avoided since 1964 for :pragmatic

reasons (like avoiding further splits in the organisation).

~ CPI( M) vas formed in April 1964 but they did not oo112

out ~th a definite stand on international ideological issues.

Thio has been due to tl70 reasons. Firstly they tJere in jail

during 1964-65 and vere busy tti tb ·elections in 1966 • Secondly

in viet1 of the severe inner party controversy on the issues it

might have been felt that to take a definite position might bo

organisational!¥ disruptive. lloT;3ver by 1967, the event·s bad

made it necessary to clarity the issues if CPI(H) vas to maintain

. its ideological and programmatic identity apart from the maoists.

94

.This tras attempted to bo done in tt:O levels. In the first place

B.T. Banadive TIJ.'Ote a aeries of articles in Peoples Democracy

trbich defined their position vie-a-vis the Naxalites on some ques-

tiona of programme. And in August 1967 the Central Committee ot

CPI(M) met at Madu.rai and put out a draft clari.f;Ji.Dg their stand

on various ideological issues.

Ranadive's articles clearly differentiated the CPI(M)'o

position trcm those of the maoists on various questions of stra~,

tactics and the assessment of oi tu.atim in India. CPI( H) position

tJ&S that while India is in the midst of an economic crisis, t:M

political crisis has still not .tUlly matured. And in this situation

they should work carefully using all forms and instmmen ts of

struggle. From this perspective Ranadive criticised the Maoist

position on elections, armed struggle, etc. Ranadive's argument

" is briefly as follon. Material oondi tiona and economic crisis

alone cannot determine the kind of s~gle to be taken up for

95

carrying out revolution. The level of mass consciousness and st~te ../ ..... , ' ' "

of party organisation are ver.r important considerations in the

choioo of the revolutionary path. The feudal, imperialist and

bourgeois ideas haw still a ver.r stronghold on peoples minds. Th9

level of party's organisation is l:Sako Given tb&se tt;o circumatan-

ces it is necessar.y to use any instrument and opportunity available

for strengthening party organisation and increasing peoples• level

o£ consciousness. In the existing situation elections provide very

·useful instmment for strengthening organisation, raising con-

sciouoneso and organising struggles. In this perspective the

Maoist calls for immediate armsd struggle, and abandonment of elec-

tiona uas rejected as leading to disorganisation of the party and

e' as remo1ad from existing level of peoples• consciousness. /

Tho Madllrai Drart explained the CPI( M) • s position on

variouo international issues like the character of the neu epooh,

the question of main contradiction, the possibility of avoidability

of uar and the chances of peacefUl-transition to socialism. Though

in general they followed the Chinese vieua on thesa matters there

-cere significant differences. This document characterises the neu

epoch as that in which imperialism has been t7eakoned on a world

scale and the forces of revolution have strength9ned. As such it

is an era in which Socialism and comiiWlism tdll triumph on a t:Orld

scale. Imperialism though weakened TJBS seen as still strong enough

and to defeat it a unity of all revolutionary forces ll&S necessary.

The armed might and the diplomacy of the socialist cam.p, the forces

of national liberation movements in colonial and neo-colonial coun-

tries, the proletarian :l'evolutionary mowment in the advanasd capi­

to talist countries and the peace movements td.ll be a ble,..dofeat

imperialism provided they unite and eXPloit the contradictions 84

~thin imperialist countries.

On tho question of contradiction the,y held that the contra-

diction betneen the '\"X)rld socialist camp and tin imperialist camp

96

-ao tho central one. lht in the present stage of development tm

antagonism bettJeen imperialists and oppressed nations beooa "tm 85

focus of all other contradictions in our time" As such ths revolu--

tiona.ry stJ:Uggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America take on impor-

tance for the success of socialism not only in these countries bu.t

on a t<Orld wide scale. On the questions of l'l&r and peace they

generally folloned the Chinese vieu that rrars can '00 eliminated

only after the destmction or Imperialism and for the time being

they can be avoided by unity, dete1'111ination and inczeased armed

strength of the socialist camp. In this context disarmament, peaco

movements etc. are tactical slogans because, strategically only 86

the victory of revolutionary forces can stop l'J'&r• On the questi.on

or peaceful co-existence they held that it is a concept o£ respite

necessary for the consolidation of the socialist State, economically, rli

politically and militarilyo But thq added that it is na fi.ghtins

and revolutione.r,y concept l'J'hich permits no breediDB of pacifist 88

and utopian illusions about imperialism" and on this ground the;r

denied the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism in

advanced countries as also the possibility of non-capitalist J>ath

ot at'ro-ilsian and Latin American countries before the defeat of 89

imperialism.

The Uadurai draft also criticised Soviet Union for several

concrete steps like transforming ths dictatorship of the proletariat

to the dictatorship of the peoplos; offering material incentive

to workers; differentiating bet~n physical and mental labour etoo

97

I!o"OeVer they tel t that unity of socialist countries was essential

for &Qccess of revolution in any plaoe and advised China to "Unite 90

in action" tt.l th the Soviet Union in giving aid to Viotnam.

The Madurai ideological draft ~s supplemented nith the document

Divoment viemt betpeen our Party and the c.P.c. on certain .fwl<lamen­

ta1 issues of P1'0gramme and Poliqy;. The differences enumerated in

this document fall roughly into three categories. In the first

categor,r are the questions about class character of Indian State.

In the second are the questions about tactics and toms of strugglo

to be adopted in India. In the third are questions ooncerning tm 91;

relationship between Co~nist partiea of different countries.

The document denied validity to the Chinese vieu that Indian

big bourgeoisie is a parasi to class fostered by imperialism and

as such the stage and nature of Indian revolution is principall.7

anti-imperialist. Jll though the struggle against feudal-landlordism

and bureaucratic capital is also important. The CPI( 14) vieu point

vas that the Indian big bourgc:!oisie is fundamentally different from

the oomprador type which existed in China beforo revolution. It ms

98

essentially industrial bourgeoisie and not a commercial one with

servile links to foreign capital. The CPI(H) felt that whilo Indian

biG bourgeoisie had a tendency of comp1'0mising with foreigD capital ·~

it tJaS also interested in eXPansion of Dational eooDomy and ~h9

industries. They did not think that servility vas the maiD oharao-92

t~ristic of the Indian bourgeoisie.

Tho CPI(K) also disassociated itself from the Chinese vieTI

that the sharpening social contradictions in IDdia have forced Indian

Govemment to becoll$ "puppet", "stooge" and "lackey" of imperialism.

In their vie" tm Chinese 178re exaggerating the degree, dep'ijl and

maturity of the contradictions in India because though the crisis

in Indian economy is deepening, there exists "an excessively marked

lack of correspondence bet~en the objective revolution&~ si~tion 9}

and tho treakness of su.b~ective factors." In other mrds th9y

held that the Congress Party still has considerable politioal influ-

ence among the people, inspite of th9 worsening economic situation.

Uhile on the other hand the :revolutionary party \78S far f'1'0m properly

organissd and as such to talk about imediate :revolution is not to 94

take into consideration, the realities of the situstiono

Another resolution passed at .Madurai t78S called On Left Bsv1rt­

tion and Left op:portunism. It endorsed the line elaborated in tm

part,r1 s diff~rent documents and tactics about elections and parti­

cipation in the United Front ~nistr,y and rejected the formulations 95

of the Left Opportunists."

The Maoist .lllternative

The Hadtlrai dooumen t faced severe criticism f1'0m the Andhra

unit of the CPI(K). The maoists criticised it "for supporting

Soviet neo-revisionist policies and opposing the revolutionary 96

line brought fort1ard by the CPC." They also introduced four

99

100

·rosolutions in the State Committee or CPI(M). One proposed disou.e­

sion or the Madurai draft at all levels of the party, another

sought :Permission for presentation of an alternate draft, the third

oondomnod the release of the document before it reached party

members and the fourth suggested that in vieu of the importance or

the document it should be finalised in a party Congress and not by

the Central Plenum of the party. All except the last of theso 96a

resolutions received majority ~pport.

after the State Committee meeting the Andhra maoists sent .

a draft containing alternate proposals on ideological isCQeo uritten

by Dovulapalli Venkatesvara Rao (hereafter DV) a member of the State

Secretariat to the Central Committee and requested that it be cirou-

lated among party members throughout the country as an alternative

to the Madurai proposals. The request t~as tumed dOlm• The .Andhra

maoists followed this up by a propoganda campaign of touring various

districts, distributing the Chinese documents and holding discussions

vi th the party cadre.

The reaction of Bengal Maoists to the Madurai documents

and resolutions, nas to give a call to overthrow the leadership

of CPI( J!) • These views TJ8re pre sen ted in an article TJri tten by

Cbaru Majumdar called It is time to build up a revolutionarz Par\v•

Ue held that the CC of CPI( M) bas become class collaborationist

and revisionist in idoology because it has opposed the Chinese

party by regarding Soviet Union as still a member of the socialist

· camp; it has favoured peaceful transition and prog7;ess through

Parliamentary democracy; it has refused to lead the coun trywido

mass upsurge and ths mass movements by its policy of continuing

in the United front; it has be~tified the reaction~ Indian

Government by pointing out that the Congreos Party still holdo

considerable political influence among ths people and it has 97

rejected the entire doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. Bocause of

these reasons they held that "the duty of every Marxist-Leninist 98

is to oust th9 CC from ths revolutionary front."

The document held that economic crisis in India nas ripening

into a political crisis thxough mass upheavals and that "agrarian 99 -

revolution uas tbe only path for liberating the country." But

they sau that it t7SS necessary to have a strong revolutionaJ:7

party to realise the potential! ties of the situation. They felt

that their defeat in Naxalbari uas due to lack of such a party.

But as yet they did not advocate formation of a separate part,y

but felt that by remaining within the CPI(H) and concl.ucting

101

sustained ideological campai«<s in favour of maoist lines ui thout

pa_ying any heed to party discipline or Central Committee• s commands 100

they could wild up a revolutionary partyo According to Sankar

Ghosh "At this stage Mazumdar l78S thinking more of transforming

the CPI(M) into a revolution~ party than of forming a neu

po.rtJr • • • • For hie tbe party uas still the CPI( H) he repudiate4 101

only the leadership."

102

Within a month after the abo va article of Cham HaJumdar the

maoiats formed a provisional committee of revol~tionaries insid3

CPI(H) (in November 1967)• The main idea expressed in thia mset-

ing tTas that though a revolutionary party is necessary for the

~ccess of the revolution it can neither be willed from above by a

few people nor brought abo~t b,y ideological stJ:Uggle ho'C&ver intense

that might be. Therefore revolutionary stru.gglea w.st be unleashed

wherever possible and out of these struggles will emerge a revolu-

tionary party. "The birth and grotTth of the gen~e revolutionary

party is possible only thxo~gh the storm and stress of sharp revo-102

lutionar,y class struggle"•

The .Andhra Pradesh State Committee of CPI(M) held its' Plenum -

11!9eting at Palakoll~ from 9th to 1}th January 1~8. This meeting

provided the 4\ndhra Haoists vith aD opportunity to bring out

their ideological and programmatic stand in fl.'Ont of the entire

Stato party-cadre as wellas to manoeuvro for capturing the State

organisation of CPI(14). T-go lm.ndred and thirty one delegates from

various districts and taluq levels participated in this meet~.

It \788 also attended by P. Sundara,yya and M. Be.savapunniah, (both

members of CPI(M) Politbure~) t1bo tried to persuade the maoists

to reconcile themselves to tm Centre's vietTS but they did not

meet with much success.

The plenum elected to th2 Presidium two Maoiats Tarimela

Nagi Bedq (hereafter T .N.) and D. V. and ono follover of Central

103

,loadership Guntum Bapanayya. The meeting was dominated by th2

maoist faction and it passed by an overwhelming majori~ a reso­

lution demanding the CC of CPI(!i) to prepare a nev draft on tm

basis of the general line proposed by CPC. This resolution reoeived

158 positive votes while 52 opposed and 8 remained neutral. Tm

meeting also approved tw resolutions each of which submitted a 83t

of formulations on the basis of nbich tb CC t1aS J.'Eiquested to

reconsider its' ideological d.rat't. One of this l.'Eisolutions TJ&S

written by T.N. and c. Pu.lla Bod~ (hereafter c.P.) and the other 103

by BOlla Venkayya.

The resolutions criticise the Ma~rai draft for presenting

a,wrong understanding of the international situation. Specific8ay

they alleged that the Kadu.rai draft does not expose Soviet leade1'-

ship's anti-revolutionar.y activities; it does not point out the

class roots of Soviet revisionism; it does not realise that Soviet

Union is trying to destroy th9 socialist system end restore capita­

lism; it does not realise that Soviet Union is implementioa a class

collaborationist line with u.s. imperialism; it does not see the

decisive role of national liberation movement; it does not realise

that China is functioning as the ~rld centre for revolutionary 104.

movements.

The resolutions held that the nev epoch "is characterised by

the final collapse of imperialism and the final victory of mrld 105 .

· mdo socialism." It was an era in which "the national liberation

stzuggles are becoming the decisive foroo for the final destruction 106

of imperialism." They uere undermining the imperialist system b,y

~akening the foundations of the system in the metzopolitan oount17

itself. They were also contributing to the cau.se of peaoe and

104

strengthening the socialist countries b,y tbvarting the plans of u.s. imperialism for world domination. Because of this "the u.s. imperia-

lirm trith its 3000 military bases throughout the wrld is concan-

trating its main military strength in the continents of asia, l\.f'rica 107

and Latin America to dzom tbe national liberation movement in blood."

For this ~aeon th9 countries of Asia, Mrioa and Latin runerica

have become the main arena in vhich the st~le bet~n ~rld revo­

lutionary forces and imperialism is taking place. As such it ns

th3 task of the international working class movement and the socialist

countries of the \70rld to extend all possible support to the national

liberation movemento

Thoy fUrther held that the CPSU leadership TJ&.S collaborating

vith U.S. imperialism in their plano to gain wrld hegemony. For

this purpose they have come to an agreement to maintain the monopoly 108

of nuclear -oeapons so as to blackmail -oeaker nations." They l7EIJ:O

also trying to isolate China vhioh is the centre of \.Orld revolution.

In different mays both u.s. and USSR are obstmcting v.orld revolution.

While u.s. is trying to p~sioally suppress tbe revolutionar,r movements,

Soviet Union is "sapping the fighting will of the proletariat• and

"demoralising, dismpting and sabotaging the national liberation

· movemsnt" by its concepts of peaooful tranaition to socialism,

peaceful co-existence, ''local t1ars lead to vorld conflagaration" 109

etc.

They described the CPSU leadership as representing the

bourgoois elements "who hsve usurped the leadership of tb9 part.J 110

and the State". These privileged strata in Soviet Union havo

transformed the dictatorship of the proletariat in~ a capitalist

iStato and ~re trying to co"Var up tm fact tri. th talk about the

&viet Union being the "State of th9 whole people". They had

also subverted the ComiDilllist Party and turned it into an instm­

ment of bou~eois rule - They had restored capitalism in Soviet

Union by 1) introducing material incentives (2) allowing ~mpe­

titive economy and free market (') investing all authority in tho

hands of the bureaucrats managing industries ( 4) by collaboration

agreements with international imperialists for e.g. with the

Japanese capitalists for joint exploitation of Siberian mineral 111

wealth. In this situation it ~s not possible for the world

revolutionary forces to join hands with ths Soviet Union for

forming an United Front against u.s. imperialism. The Soviet Union

"sees possibilities of peacefUl coexistence and visualises broad

areas of co-operation with the United States" and is in fact ' 112

"planning collaboration vi th U.s. imperialism for world aomination.n

Therefore the Soviet Union's call for Unity of Action in Vietnam

"is a clever camouflage for greater disunity and greater disruption

105

113 ·m thin the socialist camp and ci. thin the t%)rld.ng class movement".

The resolutions agree ci.th the CPC 1 s position on its relations

clth the Soviet Union dlich is that "there can be no unity of

action regarding Vietnam sinoe" while the Vietnam uar aims at a

decisive defeat of u.s. imperialism the sole aim of CPSU leader-

ship is to bring the Vietnam issue into the U.s. - i&viet colla-114

boration."

The al te rna ti ve draft viened China "as th9 base of TJOrld .115

revolution". They opined that China vas in the forefront of tho

atmggle against the global strategy of u.s. imperialiso for

t;arld domination.

106

Heoism vas described as tbe ~am-Leninism of the modern

times and was regarded as being applicable to tma problems of an

era in which imperialism was fast disintegrating and national

peace in the world scene. 11aoism vas defined ae "Peoplos Democraqy,

Peoples War, completion of the socialist revolution through tb9

cultural revolution, an ir.reoonciliable ideological battle against 116

MOdern Bevisionism.a The resolutions folloued up their formulations

on international issues with their analysis on Indian situation.

They thought the big bourgeoisie in India was becoming more and more

comprador in its nature. The dependence of Indian in~stries for

imported machinery, technical knowhow and foreign capital nere

making the Indian bourgeoise agents of foreign imperialismo Tm

·gro~ing number of foreign collaboration agreements ~ seen

as a clear evidence of this. »svaluation, liberalisatiom of

import and export policy etc. -oere the concessions Indian bour-

geoisie \78S offering the foreign imperialists. India \788 regarded

as completely dependent upon u.s. imperialism not only for

oilitar,y hardvare and food supplies but also for funds to imple­

ment the five yea:r plans. They did not think tbat the Soviet

aid make any difference to the situation but \788 only serving

the monopoly interests and helping the foreign Imperialist 117

penetration.

This document expressed certain significant vie\78 on

strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution 'flhich set tm

&dhra maoists apart from both the CPI{ll) and the Bengal

llaoists". According to this document''Prolonged agrarian armed

revolution is the only path left open to all backward countries 118

for social emancipation." The Andhra Maoists did not objeot

to the CPI(ll)'s formulation that legal and illegal work must

be combined and so must be parliamentar,y vork vith mass struggles.

But they maintained that unless a perspective of armed resis-

tance TillS added to these, the revolution v:ould not become a

reality end the revolutionaries "endlessly remain waiting for an 119

insurrection to take place •" This line varies from the :Bengal

maoists' complete rejection of legal and mass work and insistence

107

·on immediate armed struggle. Thus they rejeoted the vieu that

armad struggle was the beginning of the revolution, as well as

the view that the armed stJ.Uggle came only at the end. of the

revolution. In their perspective armed struggle was a pro~ot

of a certain stage of revolutionar,y development and nas necess~

for taking the revolutionar,y process to higher stages.

This document did not take a clear cut stand either for or

against the participation in the elections and Ministries. They

criticised the understanding and the aimo with which CPI(M)

entered the elections and Parliament. In their opinion represen-

tative institutions were just a facade, since they axe "part and

parcel of the bourgeois landlo~ constitution which is pledged to 120

the preservation of bourgeois-landlord system of exploitation".

So the CPI( M) • s tactical slogan of participating in the provin-

cial !!inistries "to bring into exi.sten ce Governments• pledge

to carry out a modest programme of giving immediate relief to tm 121

people" vas mrong. The CPI( H) leadershipst understanding of the

role of llinistries, they felt vas leading to ntbe subordination

of mass agitations to the need of existence and continuation of 122

108

the Ministries. Citing an example th9y said that on the question of

food shortages the attitude of the u.F. Governments was to eXPlain

to the people that the.y were not responsible for the situation

while the revolution~ attitude to take vas to mobilise the

I

· massea against the Central Government on this issue and unleash

militant mass movements. But this vas not being done sinoe it

might come in the way of continued existen oe of the Ministries.

Thus the Andhra Maoists vhile criticising CPI(M) participation

in elections and the Ministries limited their criticioms to the

tactical plain and it did not make it an issue of strategy or ~~~~ .

-obstmct theory. There was no total rejection of tm Parlia-

m9ntar,y institutions but only in the particular~ of partici-

pating in them. In March 168 the Maoists leaders in Andhra

formed ths Andhra Pradesh Bevolu tionary ComiiiWlist Committee -·

(.al'RCC). This vas to mn ideological propaganda and co-ordinate

the acti vi ties of Maoists t1i thin ths CPI( M). This gave orga;..

nisational shape to the Andhra Maoists. It implied that they

t:Ould not as yet leavo ths CPI{ U) but tr7 to convert the wbolo

of CPI(M) to its point of vietr.

In May 1~68 the All India Coordination Committee of the

Communist revolutionaries (.aiCCCR) ws folDied 17ith Susbital Boy

Cboudary as its Convenor. It called upon all ths revolutionaries

who believed in maoist path to join it with the ultimate vietr of

forming a party to implement the maoists line. At that tiiD9

it did not specify ant detailed programme on t~hicb .AICCCR has to

be based. This is because though all the maoists of India at

"that time liSre agreed on certain general issues like the Soviet

109

.Union having become revisionists and the necessity of armed

struggle in India, many divergencies of opinion existed among

th9m viz. on the attitude to be taken totrards mass movaments,

elections, partial struggles etc. In such a situation the

founders of .tUCCCR did not think it TJise to risk splits in th9

mo 1ement by imposing uniform vie-as on ideological issues.

The Andbra Maoists did not join tuCCCR immediately

beoau83, inspi te of its all India pretensions l\ICCCR ms essen-

tially an organisation of the Bengal maoists. The Bengal maoists

-aere also maintaining direct contacts -aith certain secUons ot

the Andhra Maoists and this was not linked by the dominant T.N.

C.P. faction of the Andhra :Maoists. The pl.'O-:Bengal faction

of .Andhra maoiats was at this time centred around tm :Naxalbari

Solidarity Committee whose activists consisted mainly of students

and erstwhile S.F.I. cadre. The leading lights of this organi-

sation were NUrlapudi Venkataratnam a student of Guntur Medical

College, and Chauganti Bhaskara Rao an eminent Surgeon with a

thriving practice at Ongole. They acted as a catalyst for the

split within the ~dhra maoists in which the Srikakulam maoist

leaders and many other senior members of Telengana area broke 12:5

atJSY with the T.B., D.v. leadership. Several other maoist

gmups also for e.g. Kerala and ltfaharashtra kept away fmm the

aicc:m at this time.

110

The Andhra Maoists spent the months following the Palakollu

Conference in mobilising support for their stand and preparing

for the :Bu.rdwan Plenum. To this end they nere utilising all

kinds of party meetings. In this situation tm CPI(M) leadez­

ship decided to discontinue its practice of holding summer

schools for political classes. The decision ~s disregarded b.J

the .Mdhra branch of the Student Federation of India (This

students ring of the CPI(H) ws completely in the control of

111

the maoists) 9 which held political scbool in various di.stricts

during May 1968. In the scbool held in Guntur district the

differen~s bet\?Qen !ll.N.- D.V. faction and the pro-:Bell€al faction

came to the surface. There flas mu.ch confusion in the school

with mutual recriminations taking up most of the time.

The Burdli8.D Plenum of CPI(M)' s Central Committee met in

June 1;168. Here the Maoists from Andhra Pradesh carried out a

relentless struggle over ideological isSiles. Though the al tez­

native drafts presented by T.N., C.P. and Kolla Venkaih nere

defeated by big margins ( 22 for and 158 against), they TiSre

successful to the extent of forcing the leadership to accept nino

amendments to the official draft. These amendments made the

draft more ori tical tonards Russia and cbanged some original

formulations like the ono calliQg for unity in action betl78en CESU

112

124 and OPe. Ibwever the acceptance of these amendments did not

conciliate Andhra maoists who did not see any fUndamental change

in the leaderships vievs on strategy and tactics of Indian Bevo­

lu tion. (Only D. V. seems to have been temporarily placated by

tm sharp criticism of OPSU, which was incorporated in tm Ideo-

logical resolution. He voted for it, but soon under preswre

from fellow Maoists he wrote a letter to the party leadership

l7ithdrawing his support).

The split

Bllrd\'1811 made it clear to the Andhra Haoists that there

vas going to be no change in leaderships' attitude and that

their days in OPI( :M) vere numbered. They decided to mako

most of the situation and convert as many as possible to their

line of thinking so that vben the split came they could take the

maxiDtU.m number of party cadre 'C1i th them.

The OPI( M) leadership took various steps to meet the

situation. The party Politbureau nominated tw members to tm

provincial Committee Secretariat and four members to the provin­

cial Exe011tive Committee, tbls creatingQ..majorit7 for the anti-125

maoist faction. The Politbure~ also prohibited T.B., D.V., C.P.

and Kolla Venkaih from addressing any meetings and from touring

the State to explain to the District Committees the decisions

· ot llurdTI&D. Plenum. It also directed the CPI(H)• a local commit't-

ee in vhich the pro-leadership faction vas in majority tc take

a~ steps required to discipline the members. Though T.N., C.P.

etc. ~re spared, notices of' expulsion vere served on many loner

level Maoists, particularly in Khammam district. The cultural

troupe of SUbbarao Panigrahi which vas propagating peoples ~ 126

path vas also disciplined.

The Central Committee of CPI(l!) tollo-ced up the various

organisational steps vi th a Letter to .dncihra Comrades in vhi.ch

they held that the Andhra Maoists posi tiona vere in "fundamental c'

opposition" to the CPI( 14) 'a stand on variou.s issues conceminG

Indian Revolu.tionar.y movement and International Commu.nist move-

ment. They criticised the lmdhra Maoists for holding that the

Soviet Union had joined u.S.A. in order to destroy China vhich

ws the only base of world revolution and liberation. They

also disagreed with the viev that t~ national liberation move-. 127

menta play the decisive role in the destmction of Imperialism.

Tma -cm.s f'ollo~d by a detailed criti~sm of .Andhra maoist's

stand on various aspects of Indian reality. They disagreed with

the maoist llieu that India vas no more than a neo-cololl1" of U.s.,

and her independence vas "formal". They held that th9 present

day circumstances present Indian bourgeoise ruling class vith an

113

opportunity to take advantage of the antagonism betgeen ImPQ-

rialist end Socialist camps, as well as the antagonism bettJeen

the various Imperialist countries. So they can maintain their

independence to some extent b.r using these antagonisms as well 128

b.r using the State pol48r tthioh they are controlling since 1~50o

The CPI(M) letter then goes on to point out to a inconsis-

tency in the Maoist stand on the stago of revolution. They felt

that since maoists hold the stage of revolution to be peoples

democratic ( that is one involving agrarian revolution) they become

inconsistent when they s~ that the main contradiction is bet~en

nation as a whole and U.s. Imperialism and its lackeys on the

114

othsr hand. Because in a agrarian revolution ths principal con-

tradiction is bettJ6en people and feudal elements, on the other /v hand if principal contradiction is with Imperialism, then the

129 stage of revolution should be national democratic.

The CPI(M) leadership did not agree t'lith the assessment of

maoists on the character of Indian big bourgeoisie. Th3 stand of

maoists w.s that the Indian big bourgeoise vas totally dependent

on foreign Imperialism and as such unable to assert its indepen-

denoe in any t'I&Yt and consequently there TISS increasing dominance

of foreign monopoly capital and the consolidation of feudal and

semi-feudal land relations. In this situation the econolllic 'aid'

\·

. of Soviet Union vas functioning as lever through which U.s.

capital was penetrating our national econo~. Soviet aid ubich

helps the public sector in India was seen as oreating the profi•

table climate for u.s. investment. CPI(H) stand on the other

hand l78.S that Indian bourgeoise inspite of its compromises nth

Imperialism, uas to some extent developing capitalist relations 130

in India b.1 taking advantago of Soviet aid eto.

The Letter to Andhra Comradeg, also sevexely criticised

the maoist estimates of the situation prevailing in India at

that time. The maoists nero holding that in India a "revolu­

tionary situation" existed and demanded armed fo mo ot struggle

and guerilla mathoda of organisation. In their viet~ th2 people

nere fully conscious of th$ need for revolution. They also '

held that representative institutiono in India tj8re a sham. They

felt that revolution t~as being prevented only by the armsd might

of counter-revolutionaries forces. As such they felt forms of

115

stl.'Uggle such as "strikes, demonstrations, peti tiona and elections •••

building class and mass organisations.... these tasks azoe impoc-

sible to be fulfilled, unless they are integrated t~ith and carried 1:31

side by side with the peasant partisan t~ar". This estimate vas

discounted by the CPI( li) leadership t~hich held that the people

nere still under the ideological domination of bourgeoise and

the level of party organisation in trado union, peasant and other

fronts l78S not strong enough to make revolution.

The stand of maoists as described in tbe Letter to ~dh;a

Comrades vas accurate only in so far as the Baxalbari maoist fao-

tion vas concerned. T.N., D. v., C.P. and their followers in

andhra bad many dif.ferenoes Tlith this stand. ( 'C8 had already

noted that they vere not totally opposed to participation in

elections, United Front Governments etc.). They clarified their

position as well as mounted a severe criticism of the CPI(M)

leadership in The open letter to party memberp vhioh was circu-

lated as their reply to Letter to Andhra Comrades.

The o-veral attitude of The open letter to Party membero

vas a hardening of attitudes both organisationally and theoreti­

cally towards the CPI(M). While the previous discussions and

criticism of CPI(M) leadership were conducted at inter-committee

level nov the criticism of part.J leadership vas made PQblicly

and aimed directly for the party members. It signified tba t

the Andhra Maoists could no loJ18er see the party leadership

voluntarily reforming and as such decided to abandon them and

take as many of the party members on the 0oor~ct line" ao possi-

blo. The open letter symbolises a clear polarisation on ideolo-

gical issues and an oxganisational separation.

The CPI(M) leadership and its political line was clearly

characterised as "nothing but a neo-revisionist line covered . 1~

with deceptive revolutions~ phraseology." The CPI(H) ~menta 1:~3

t7Bre seen as aimed at TJ8akening revolutionary struggles and it -cas .

116

ac~sed of supporting repressive mea~res against Naxalbari

peasant movement, and of attempting to disrupt the movements in

Srikakulam and Telengana areas. The letter rejected CP.I(H) 1s

"middle path'' (one 17hioh is different from both Chinese and

Soviet posi tiona) as a "myth" and said tba. t they 't'J8re destroying

revolutionary content of concepts like peoples democracy and

agrarian revolution and replacing them in practice with reformist

ideas like non-Congress democraqy.

The Open-Letter expressed the view tn.t the Socialist 134

117

Camp came into existence only after the Chinese Bevolution. China

vas seen as a centre of world revolution which vas struggling

to complete socialist revolution, internally thxough the cultural

revolution and externally through help to national liberation 135

movements. On the other hand the CPSU leadership vas acting as

an agent and friend of imperialism. Its policy tl&S preserva-

tion of capitalism in capitalist countries and restoration of

capitalism in socialist countries. It had joined hand with th9

imperialists and reactionaries to suppress revolutionar.r movements

and conspired to encircle and isolate China, economically, politi-136

oally and militarily.

Inspite of the counter revolutionary collusion an ttexcellent ~ 137

revolutionary situation existed in the world11 • Imperialism '1188

fighting its last-ditch battles and its complete destruction TJaS

on the agenda. This task vas to be fulfilled by the national

~iberation movements, on whose victory the fate of V10rld humanity 138

depends." It was the duty of all socialist countries to help

these movements. But it was wrong to hold like the CPI(M) does

that their yictory depends on the "revolutionary combination of

socialist diplomacy and the armed help of the socialist countries"•

On the other hand the national liberation movements can stand upon

their om legs and can play a decisive role in destroying imperia-

lism in colonial aDd semi-colonial countries as uell as at a 139

~lid level.

The Open-Letter resolutely declared that "Peoples' War" ~

nas the "universal method for national liberation movements".

They felt that "in all backuard countries the mass movements

after reaching a particular stage have to face severe repression

of the Government. After this stage has been reached tm peoples

movements could make further advanoo only b,y beating back the

repressive measures, only b,y combining the mass movements with 140

armed struggle." But the letter took caution that 1 t by no

meana vas calling for an immediate armed. revolt. They said "Ours

is a vast country with uneven development. Peoples movements

are also developing unevenly. In these conditions, in today' s

economic and political crisis, militant struggles are bound to

break in various parts of the country. The Commnist Party must

boldly lead these st:tUggles ••• resist the repressive measu.res •• ••

"develop the anti-landlord otrugglos •••• coordinate all these

118

\ \ I i

•t~les and according to a plan develop theso struggles to~rds 141

a peoples war''.

The Open-Letter took a tougher stand on United Front with

non-Congress parties and .formation of Ministries. They felt,

such alliances and Ministries vere only leadina to increasing

119

illusions among the masses. They dubbed such alliances as "nothing

but renunciation of the theory of class struggle and adoption of 1~ /

a class collaborationist poliQY• An interesting aspect of the I

Open Letter vas that it contained no specific and clear Glt

condomnation of participation in elections.

Sisnificantly the Open Letter characterised India as a neo-143

colony of American Imperialismo Thus they IBOV3d to the left of

their previous stand in which they seemsd to have allol'8d soiD8

independence for Indian bourgeoisie. This shift must have been

duo to the realisation that acceptance of even a little indepen-

dence for the Indian bourgeoisie would imply acceptance of a

contradiction between Indian bourgeoisie and imperialism and thus,

some possibility for progressive role of the Indian bourgeoisie,

thus soms necessity for the communist movement to help the bourge-

oisie and thus acme possibilities of acting within the existing

framwork. Thus to totally differentiate themselves from the CPI(H)

stand point they denied any possibilities of industrial development

under the Indian bourgeoisie and also denied 81lY progressive oontent 144

for India's foreign poliQY•

120

The Open-Letter ended b.y giving a call to "build a strong

and disciplined communist party through struggles based on Marxism-145 ,,

Leninism.

In June 1968 the exPelled State Oommi ttee members held a

meeting in Vijayawada, vhich was attended by representatives

from various districts. Here it ws decided to completely break

nith the CPI(H) and the Andhra Pradesh Coordination Committee

for Communist revolutionaries (~COR) TlaS fol.'mSdo

Various accounts exist of the strength of ths msoists

when they broke ava:y from CPI( H). Sundara_vya stated to th9 press

in June 1::t68, that of the 16 ,000 party members in .&ldhra a quarter

r.ould go to the maoist, another quarter go to the CPI(H) l7hilo 146

fifty per oent of them Ti'Ould remain inactive. The CPI(H) Political

and Organisational Report submi. tted to the Cochin Congress ( 1968) -

noted a fall from 16456 to 9428 in th2 membership figures of .Andhra

Pradesh. This figure seems to be unrealistic, and a loss of about

more than 10,000 in the membership of the CPI(lil) seems to bea.more

accurate number. The CPI(M) figures submitted for their Ninth

Congress at Madurai show the membership of CPI(K) at Andhra, only

at 5,870. The 14aoists themselves claimed about 10,000 defections

from CPI(:M). Bot~ever the defections from CPI(:M) need not be taken

as an accurate indicator of the actual strength of maoists at that

tiiD3. For this we must deduct those of wl:om who becamo inactive

to various degrees and add all those nev members wm started their

12

· political career not in CPI(H) but directly in l\FOCCR.

Not many details are available as to the exact break-up

of the defections from the CPI( H) ei th&r area-'Oise or in respoct

of kinds of organisation. lb-oever an attempt at analysis can bo

made. At the top leadership level the break split seems to have

been even.People more closely connected 'Oith the Central leadership

like Su.ndarayya, Basavapunniah, Moturi · Hanumantha Bao and Nanduri

Prasada Rao, who are either members of the Politbureau. or orga­

nisationally linked to running party o~ans at Central level

remained with the CPI(M}. l'ihile those leaders vhose political

fortunes and interests vere more doeply rooted 'Oith tba state of

movsment in Andhra Pradesh nent over to the maoists. At the

district and taluq level of the leadership also, the split seems to

haw been even• It does not seem to have been determined by any

faotors other than ideological proclivities or personal loyalties •

.L\mong the rank and file though the split seems to have been even

more of the older cadre vhich l78S in the Telengana peasant mo wment

seems to have opted for the maoists. In the tredo union front

most of the units seemed to have stqed Tlith the CPI(H) while

a few units like the railway workers in l.'larangal area, the jute

unions in Uest Godavari and some units in Singareni Collieries

seemed to have gone over with the aiCCCR. The Kisan Sabha in

andhra Pradesh was almost defunct, but whatever little organi­

sation Ttas there, ws under the influence of Nanduri Brasada BaD

and Uddamaraju Ramam and seemed to have stayed with tb9 CPI(H).

·Probably the reason Tlas that after years of a united front line in

village areas the Kisan Sabha TlaS firmly ill the hands of the rich

peasantry vho TIE!re sceptical about the radical intensions o£ tho

m&Oists. The students federation of India, Andbra unit seemed

to have totally gone into the maoists-hands. A majorit,y of CPI(M)

aympathisers in the Teachers organisations vere sympathetic to

the maoist cause. All the top Maoist leaders in Telengana and

Srikakulam areas like K.G. Satyamurthi, Kondapalli Seetharamiah,

Vempatapu Satyanarayana etc. \'f8re teachers. The majority of

CPI(M) cultural oxganisations after some initial vaccillation

went over to the maoist side led by their Presiden~ Sri Sri. The

party leadership as Tlell and l10rkers in areas vhere there vas a

militant peasant movement going on, -aent over to the side o£

maoists. This ws the case both in Srikakulam and in Mul.ug,

Yollandu, Bayyaram etc. taluqs in Telengana• Thexe l788 no

rural-~ban dichoto~ significance in tho spli~. Th9 maoists

had as mu.ch following in the urban party committees as in the

rural. The Maoist folloving tras spread more or less evenly over

all the districts. They had the max:illlllm following in districts 147

where CPI( M) TlaS stronger.

122

D 0 ~ E S

1. See tiD ti-Nationa1 actin ties ,gl PljO=Pokinc Cot:::mistn -Statement of the lti.nister of Hoe!9 Mfairo laid on tm table of Parliament on February 18, 1965· . .

Balph Betzlatf, "Revisionists and Sscbriano", in Scala­pine (ed.), Tb9 Comll!lllliat Revolution iB AS.o, (PzeDtice Hall, 1969), p. 336. .

3• See Mohan :Bam, lfaoiSI!l.!!! India, Opocit., Pp.2-3 and also Lin Piao, "Long Live Victory in Peoples War", Peking Beyieg, September 3, 1969 •

4• See "~-liational Aativities•••..!is.&• Op.cit., P• 39 alld P• 41•

5• See Biblab »as GuptG, !b! Nazpl ite Hovemegt, .QJ!.cit., Pp.216-217 and also Auhok Buclra, "Namlite International", Fzontier, June 13, 1970•

6. See Reserve Bank~ India Balletin, 1~6-68.

7. Reoerve Bank of- India ( llBI) Curl.'8ncY AD!\ FinapciM, Be port for the year 1967-68, P• 10.

a. Ibid.

9· 189·9 in January-Harch of 1965, and 197•8 in October­Dscember 1967 •

10. P.D. Ojha, "Some Aspects", Sel!!d.nar No.172, Po 27 •

11. BBI, Cur;rency ~ Financigg, .QE.cit., P• 41o

12. Ibid.

13• See .!lli•

14• P.D. Ojha, .Ql?•J!i!•, P• 27 •

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. Chamanlal Dosa~h, /} Stud.y ~Indian Eoonov Jtince Independence, ( 1972), Po 461o

123

18. Report of the Committee Jm Unemployment, (Govemment ot India, Mq 197}), lulnexu:a:o 6 9 Po 16}•

19• Bomssh Thapar, "Th9 Tt:i8ntieth Deal", Eoonoll!:i.c e Political Weekly, ~~at 20, 1966 •.

124

20. Editorial, Economic .11!.9....Politicall1eeklx, September 10, 1966.

21. Bajni Kothari, Context o.,l Electoral Change J:!l India, (~cademic Books, 1969), P• 1}1·

22. ~., p. 1}2.

2}. Editorial, Economic A!!A Political Ueekly9 ~ptember 24, 1966o

24. Shanti Stmmp, ''Student Unrest in India" in :Bemard Criclt (ed.), Protest~ Disoontent (Penguin,-1970).

. . 25. Be port .sm the Survey AI _m b>_p; p?rkers mp{Grt th9mael vea ~ retrenchmento ..!!g., Labour :Bu.reau, Govemmsnt of India), Table 1o8, P• 1.

26 • Crims .in India - J221, IH.niotry of HoiD9 .Affairs, Po 5•

27. Fourth Five ~ .E.!!Q .is &dhra ~radefJb ( Gove:mment of L\ndhra Pradesh}, Tablo III, Po 154•

28. ~., Table X, Po 162.

2~. ~., Table I, P• 152.

30• .!lli•t Table XVIII, P• 170o

.. }1• "&ldhra' s 4lger'', Economic S,Q Political Weeldy, November 25, 1966, p. 618.

}2• Fourth!!!!~ Plan.!!! Andhra Pradesh, .Q;eooit., P• f(,<t.

}}• Crime in India - .122§., .QR.cit., P• 13•

34· Crime ,in India- J2.21, .QJ!.cit., P• 25.

}5. ~eekly Notes" 1 Economic J!Bd Political \'Ieek:l:r, November 5, 1966, P• 478•

.. ". "1.1ey setback in Andhra" - statement of the &ldhra Pradesh Committee of CPI( H), Peoples .Democrao:r, Barch 26 t 1~6 7 o

..

.YI• See Raise ~ (iPI BJair:ui!t landlord Termrise J:D An~a Pradesh, CPI(H , 1968)o .

~· Ibid., P• 34•

39· ~· a:n these facts cannot bs dismissed e.s being e~rated or falGS b3cause these allegations treN ce.do in a letter addressed to the PriEe Hinister.

40·

41· For details see Chapter V and Chapter VII.

42· !l!LY Jib! Ul tra-Lsft deviation, ( CPI( 1'1), 1968), Pp. 35-41-

125

4'· 44·

"The Detectors in .t\ndhm", Peoples DemocracY, Jul7 14, 1968o

»ooumant Q-28 ot H. c.c., "Re.j~a Nirmana Sam3eksb:L", (·Poli tide.l end Organisational Report.) • .

v45. Balph lhatslaf't, Op.cit., P• 336 and also see Victor Fie, Peace:f\11 transition jQ commnism ,!D India, ( Nichiketa, 196 3) •

4£).

47·

48·

See Da.Dse 1 s stateant NPJ:Oduced in Peopleo Dsmoongy, January 1, 1967·

.!!At .l!1! Tlltra-Lett ••• etc., .QR•.ill•• Pp.14-15•

For e.g. cee E~M.S. Mactboodiripad, Letter j2 PnrtY Comrades ( 1964)• · ·

51• ~., P• 40•

52. See .Qa Lefj; Daviation, .QE.cit., Ppo1,_20o

53• Sankar Ghosh, lh! Baxalite l!ovemegt, <m,.~., P• 2;. For originals of these letters see Haas Line {Keralc.), ~...Juno-J~ 1975·

Ibid. -55· .t\sish Ku.mar Bo7, §prins; Thunder ... etg., Q:a.Q!J;., Po 6>7 •

56 • Doou.ment, Q-28, ,QJuqll., P•4•

57. T. liagi Redq etc., .QE!! Lstte0 ,!2 Puj.J He!lbero, · {Printed doOWDent)o _

56. (he (eJ Situation m l!'!! Nep l'aska CogfrogtintL()y garv, PI H , 1967), P• 67• .

59· Ibid., Ppo?f>-37•

6o. Ibid., P• 76•

61. Ibid., P• 62.

62. See Sankar Ghosh, ~·, P• 26.

63. &.ish Kumar Boy, Qe.cit., P• 67•

64. Sankar Ghosh, .2R• cit. , p. 21·

65. Cham Majumdar, "One Year of liaxalbari", Liberation, June 1968o

66. Doc:A1mnt, 9-26, .QR•~•t P• 7•

67 • ~e "Mter the Indian Election", Pelting Beviep, Uarch 24, 1967 and also "DoDge's plot to sabotage Indian People • s Revolution", Peldgg Reviev, June 9, 1967• .

66o For a f'ull text of th9 Peking Badio broadcast oee Sankar Chosh, l!l! Dipinheri ted State, {Orten t Longmen, 1971), Pp. 110-114·

69. For a collection of Chinese artioles in papero, of this period on Naxalbari and Indian Bevolution. See ~pendioes ~ to M, in Biblab Daa Gupta, Opcit., Pp.241-27'•

70 • ~., P• 186.

71• HadD.rai Dratt Resolution, (OPI(H) 1966), Po 58" and also soc .QE!!! Letter, QE.cit., Pp. 26-27.

72· Bllt not_~grammatio clariv. The people vho b1'0ke &T/&'3 from CPI{ M) in favour of "People • s War Path" t:"Sre agreecl on tJeneral framer;ork td.tbi.D cllich they t1il.L 't:Orlto but th9y wsre neitmr clear nor sure about the exact details of th9 prograi!IID3 and policies vhich they would follOt7• The tactical and strategic details t;are not 'COrked out. Theso emerged later and only after l!l8D7 acre spli tao

126

13· ,see the ... Statement of the ~est Bengal State Comud. tteo of CPI( H) in People • s DemocracY, June 4, 1967 o

-74· Peoples Decocracz, July 2, 1967.

75· J)OCI11119nt, C..28, ,2RoJa$o

76o ~· 77· Ibid.

78· Aoish Kumar Boy, ,2Eo oi t., P• 76e

79· Ibid. See Pp. 76-77 o

80o Sankar Ghosh, QR..ill•, P• 34•

81· BiruJnatan Standard, Juno 22, 1~67 o

82o Basavapunniah "Our Party's stand on Naxalbsri"t Peoploa• »emcraay, J.aly,23, 1967•

83• See B.T. Ranadivo, "&ti-Party Tendencies", Peo:plon' »omoorac;;y, July 16 to l\&l&Ust 20, 1967 •

84o S3e !e Draft .sm the ldeologicaJ. §uestiop, (CPI(11) 1%7)•

85. Ibid., P• 11·

65. See~., Pp. 15-16.

87o Ibid., P• 21.

ea. Ibid., P• 23.

89· Ibid., See Pp.28-32 •

90· Ibig., &3e Ppo37-38•

91• Ibid., P• 51·

92o .Stand ,gp Ideological Ispes, CPI(D), November 4, 1969o pP. 52-55·

93• Ibid., P• 57 •

94• Ibid.

95• llsish Kumar Boy, QR_.cito, P• 121.

127

96• J)oou.mnt, G-28, ~g!b, P• 6.

96o• Ibido -97 • tfest Bengal State Coa!mi ttee o£ CPI(UL), Colleotegl'lritinga

o£ Our Bespeote~ leader oocrade Cheru.J!tdW!lclS't Volums 2 \CPI(:ML), 1972); P!;). 1-}o

98o Ibid., P• 5·

99· Ibid.

100. $ee Ibid., Po 6 •

101. Ssnkar Ghosh, D»...AA1•t P• 40·

102o Libaration, Hay 1968o

103• Both tmse resolutions are published togeth9r along vith an int:roduotion in a book, ~ Plenuc Be.1eots !Is Nee-Revisionist Ideolo&ica1-!Jiill, (Janoseltti, 1968)o

104o Ibid. Seethe int1'0chlctiODo

105o Ibid., P• e. 106. Ibid.

107o Ibid., P• 20.

108o Ibid., P• 19·

109. Ibid.

110· Ibid., P• 23.

111· See Ibid. , P• 23·

112. ll!!g., P• 35•

113· Ibid.

114· ~., P• }8.

115· Ibid., Po 45·

116. ~· 117· Ibid., Ppo48-50o

128

118. ~-. P• 57•

119. ~·· P• 60.

120. .!2!9·· P• 52.

121. Ibid., P• 57·

122. ,D!g.

123. The details of the differenoes and the OJ8&nisational results of these differences between f.J.- ]).V. g1'0up and Cham Ke.jumdar g1'0up is traced in the next Chapter.

124• Bee ilsish Kumar Roy, Op.cit., p. 138·

125. Besolutions.2l jFCCCR, 15·6. 1689 (printed), P•1•

126 • Ibid., P• 2.

127. "Letter to Andhra Comrades", in Stand .sm ideological issues, ( CPI(M), 1969), P• .6.

128. ~·· Pp.8-10e

1~. Ibid., P• 11.

130· See~., Pp.12-15·

131· ~., P• 23.

132· .2R!g Letter, Q:2...QU.., P• 5•

133· ~·· P• 7 •

134· .DE!·· P• 5·

135· ~·· P• 19.

1,S. See .n!,g., Pp.16-18e

137. Ibid., P• 5•

138· ~·· P· a. 1;9 • .!W-·· Pp. 8-10.

140· ll!9-•t P• 14•

129

130

141. Emphasis. added. Ibid., P• 13· In tho Jlajald:.rn Nirmant !aaeksl)o (Doc., 0..28) publismd in 1969, the &RCC maintained that their denial in the Open Lstter of giving a call for iemediate &rllt9d struggle, uao only meal'lt to eocaps immediate arzeot of th9ir cadre. This sell-criti­cism doeo not ssem to be sincere. The ..QE!B lAtter had clearly taken inw acoouat (a) the necessity of st:mggleo to develop to a certain extent ~fore they can take an armed form and (b) UDeven development of stmggles in tm various areas of India. It loolm mch moro probable that APRCC 1 s ealt-criticisn of 1969 ue.s a reeult of thei~ efforts to appease the radicals and to assure tb9ir revo­lutionary bonafides to the cadre t7ho t:ere qu.estionioa their intentions because of the influence of 8Jikaku.lac stmggle which l7&B baing conducted under the guidance of C:t:aru Majumdar faction. Thus this self-ori ticism l7&8 more a part of the 1969 "Left-line" taken by APRCC rather than intrinsic part or their theoretical foralations.

142· 1Ri4•t p. 15·

144• For e.g. see P• 24 Ibid. for ths ridicule they pour on CPI(M) for saying 1he.t the "Congress Government may be able to achieve to soms extent in~strial development (emphasis added) • -

145 • Ibid., P• 32 •

146. Statesman, June 26, 1968.

147. For details see :Document, C..28, .2E•.ill•