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paperA bridge too far: aid agencies and the military in humanitarian responseby Jane Barry with Anna Jefferys

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Since the early 1990s, military forces have becomeincreasingly involved in humanitarian assistance. Thisencroachment into what has traditionally been seenas ‘humanitarian space‘ raises significant issues ofprinciple, as well as policy and operational questionsnot only for humanitarian agencies, but also for theinternational community as a whole. These questionshave only become more urgent in the wake of the warin Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September,and the increasingly explicit linkage of military, polit-ical and humanitarian aims that it has engendered.

Some analysts consider this merging of humanitarian,political and military roles and goals inevitable, practical and desirable. Others believe that, in theattempt to bring political, military and humanitarian

objectives within the same framework, there is a danger that humanitarian objectives and principleswill be compromised; as a result, the capacity to alle-viate suffering will be diminished. Still others take apragmatic approach to civil–military cooperation,establishing policy and negotiating the more contentious ‘grey areas’ on a case-by-case basis.

Despite its importance, the debate over the properroles of humanitarian actors and military forces andthe relationship between them is relatively young andanecdotal. Detailed analysis is lacking, and fewguidelines for policy or practice have been devel-oped. This paper aims to clarify the key issues ofdebate, and puts forward recommendations to further dialogue, and to guide policy and practice.

January 2002

ABSTRACT

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Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)Overseas Development Institute111 Westminster Bridge RoadLondon, SE1 7JDUnited Kingdom

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Notes on the Authors

Jane Barry is an independent consultant specialising in humanitarian policy, assessments and evaluations.When she wrote this paper, she was Emergencies Policy Advisor at Save the Children UK. Anna Jefferysworks as a policy officer in the Emergencies section of Save the Children UK.


Table of contentsExecutive summary 1

Chapter 1 The politics of peace operations 3

Areas of contact 4

Military policies and doctrines 5

Countervailing pressures 6

When is military intervention legitimate? 9

Chapter 2 The humanitarian perspective 11

Problems of principle 11

Problems of utility 13

Chapter 3 Towards a framework for civil–military relations 15

Recommendations 15

Principles of engagement 16

Conclusion 19

Annex 1 21

Annex 2 25

References 27

Interviews 30

List of boxesBox 1:The main parties to the debate 2

Box 2: Defining ‘peace operations’ 3

Box 3: Non-Western regional peace and security bodies 4

Box 4:The European Rapid Reaction Force 6

Box 5:The Brahimi report on UN peace operations 8

Box 6: Crossing language boundaries: Kosovo as a ‘humanitarian war’ 9

Box 7: Existing guidelines 12

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Since the beginning of the 1990s, military peace-keeping forces have increasingly intervened in coun-tries in conflict, forcing a more direct engagementthan ever before between the military, local popula-tions and humanitarian agencies.Within this context,the military has, to varying degrees, become involvedin a relatively new territory, namely humanitarianassistance. This engagement has ranged from theprovision of armed protection for humanitarianconvoys to the direct implementation of relief aiddistributions.As the UN’s Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) puts it, there is an‘evolution of military thinking in regard to the provi-sion of humanitarian aid and services. In NATO andelsewhere there has been an evolution of the doctrineof military–civilian operations, with an increasingtendency for military forces being used to support thedelivery of humanitarian aid, and sometimes even toprovide this aid directly’ (OCHA, 2001).

Military movement into what has traditionally been‘humanitarian space’ raises significant issues of prin-ciple, as well as policy and operational questions, forthe entire international community, including govern-ments, the military, humanitarian agencies and theUN.While members of the international communitydiscuss ways to clarify and improve relations betweeninternational peacekeeping forces and humanitarianactors in conflicts, these debates have tended to focuson improving relations through increased under-standing, with an eye to developing an integrated, orat least closely coordinated, ‘military–humanitarian’relief response.This view is based on the premise thatthe military should maintain – and in some cases evenincrease – its involvement in humanitarian relief andrehabilitation. This issue has become much moreurgent in the wake of the terrorist attacks in the USon 11 September and the subsequent US-led militaryaction in Afghanistan, with some key Western politi-cians explicitly calling for a merger of political,

military and humanitarian aims. In January 2002, theUK government’s Conflict and Humanitarian AffairsDepartment (CHAD) announced that it wouldconsider bids from the UK-led International SecurityAssistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for ‘humani-tarian’work in Afghanistan, should these projects meetCHAD’s selection criteria.

Despite a proliferation of conferences, reports andpublications on the subject, analysis of civil–militaryrelations is limited, and practical policy guidelines arerelatively undeveloped. Most publications concludethat increased military engagement in humanitarianassistance is inevitable, and to a certain degreewelcome and acceptable. According to this view,increased cooperation between groups is required inorder to improve the overall effectiveness of the peacesupport operation, thereby also enhancing humani-tarian assistance efforts.The main barrier to improvedcooperation is simple ‘misunderstanding’, to beresolved through more joint training, conferences andacademic programmes. This will bring the relevantgroups closer together, and resolve the ‘cultureclashes’ that seem to engender mistrust.

This paper argues that these propositions are based onseveral faulty premises. First, while increased militaryengagement in humanitarian assistance activities maybe a possible future trend, a number of military, polit-ical and humanitarian analysts have begun to seri-ously question whether this is an appropriatedirection for peace support operations, concludingthat the differences in approach and aims go beyondmere misunderstanding. Second, the idea thatincreased cooperation – and with it coordination –will itself improve humanitarian assistance is a perva-sive but relatively unchallenged assumption.However, there is no clear evidence that indicates asignificant correlation between military and humani-tarian coordination in the field and the quality or

Executive summary

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a i d a g e n c i e s a n d t h e m i l i t a r y

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effectiveness of humanitarian assistance efforts.Finally, the simplistic perception that barriersbetween humanitarian agencies and the military arebased in misunderstandings and cultural clashesglosses over much deeper, intrinsic differencesbetween core aims and principles.

There are profound differences between the mandates,missions and principles of formal military forces and

humanitarian agencies.The military has a core mandateto foster security and protect civilians by establishingand enforcing a safe and stable environment.Humanitarian agencies, by contrast, have a mandate todirectly implement humanitarian aid programmes. It isessential that these two roles – impartial humanitarianassistance as a response to an urgent and inalienableright, and peace operations with their inevitably partialand political mandates – are kept separate.

Box 1: The main parties to the debate

The civil–military debate involves a vast array ofactors, including UN agencies, governments,military forces, NGOs and academics. While manyof these actors do not always fit into homogenous orclearly defined categories, for the purposes of thispaper it is possible to identify three discrete groups:

• humanitarian actors;• political actors; and• military actors.

Humanitarian actorsThe Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response(SCHR) defines humanitarian agencies as ‘all thoseoperational organisations whose work is basedupon the principle of humanity: to prevent and alle-viate human suffering wherever it may be found …to protect life and health and to ensure respect forthe human being’ (McClellan, 2000). Theseagencies can be classified into the following foursub-groups, based on an adaptation of ICRC’shumanitarian system typology (Bonard, 1999):

• National and international non-governmentalorganisations (NGOs). This group comprisesorganisations that provide humanitarian or reliefassistance, such as Save the Children (SCF),Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam.

• All ‘mixed’ organisations. A ‘mixed’ organisationis any organisation that lies between an NGOand an implementing body. This includes UNagencies such as the UN High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) and the UN Children’s Fund(UNICEF), and non-governmental organisationswith an international mandate, such as themembers of the Red Cross movement.

• Human rights organisations. This group includesNGOs that advocate on issues to do with humanrights law, such as Amnesty International andHuman Rights Watch.

• All implementing legal bodies. This group coversbodies that uphold human rights law, refugeelaw or international humanitarian law, forexample the European Court of Human Rights,the UN Human Rights Committee, the interna-tional criminal tribunals for the formerYugoslavia and Rwanda and the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC).

Political actorsIn terms of the CIMIC debate, this paper understandsthe political sector to mean state governments andinter-governmental organisations, notably the UNand the European Union (EU), as well as donor andother government agencies.

Military actorsThe military comprises national and regional forcesand UN peacekeeping forces; third-party militaryservice providers; mercenaries; and private militaryand security companies.

Other actors also play a role in influencing thedebate over civil–military relations. The media, forexample, can be instrumental in decisions onmilitary involvement in humanitarian activities byinforming the public and swaying opinion throughcoverage of emergencies. Commercial organisa-tions, ranging from businesses such as oil compa-nies to implementing contractors like the Britishcompany Crown Agents, may also play a role, ascan academics (as observers and commentators)and the general public, in beneficiary areas, donorcountries and internationally.


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Three main types of ‘peacekeeping’ bodies havehistorically engaged in conflict resolution, peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations: the UN,regional security coalitions and national armies –each with different agendas, jurisdictions, aims andapproaches. The UN has launched all of its peace-keeping operations under Chapter VI of its Charter,that is, with the consent of the opposing parties.These missions have involved the deployment ofpeacekeepers to implement an agreement approvedby those parties. An operation under Chapter VII –peace enforcement – does not require the consent ofthe parties. In this case, the Security Council givesmember states the authority to take all necessarymeasures to achieve a stated objective.The SecurityCouncil has approved Chapter VII operations incases such as the Gulf War, and in Somalia, Rwanda,Haiti, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and East Timor.However, the UN did not control these Chapter VIIenforcement operations; they have always beenimplemented by either a single country or a group ofcountries. In addition to UN-sanctioned operations,there have been several ‘unilateral interventions’ thathave not enjoyed Security Council authorisation.NATO’s Operation Allied Force against Yugoslaviain March–June 1999 is perhaps the most well-known recent example of such a unilateralintervention, which was essentially ‘self-mandated’by the NATO Council, the Alliance’s political leadership. Only after the air strikes ended on 10 June did the Security Council retrospectivelyauthorise the operation.

Until the 1990s, ‘humanitarian’ activities were notincluded in peacekeeping mandates (Thornberry,1996). The 1956 United Nations Emergency Force(UNEF), established at the time of the Suez crisis, isregarded as the model for ‘classic’ or ‘traditional’peacekeeping operations (Laurence, 1999). Thepeacekeepers were lightly armed, and only permitted

to fire in self-defence. This type of peacekeepinginvolved the following tasks:

• investigating and monitoring ceasefire violationsand other incidents;

• undertaking stabilising tasks, such as brokeringlocal commanders’ agreements over demarcationof boundaries;

• defusing incidents, for example by brokering ‘mini-ceasefires’ halting local incidents of conflict; and

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The politics of peace operations

Box 2: Defining ‘peace operations’

Peace operations – ‘operations other than war’, inthe military lexicon – are generally understood torefer to military actions conducted in support ofnon-military efforts to establish and maintainpeace. Within this broad description, there arevarious ‘degrees’ of activity. Peacekeeping meansmilitary operations undertaken with the consentof all the major parties to a dispute, primarily tomonitor and facilitate the implementation of anagreement, commonly a ceasefire or a truce.Traditionally, this has meant the interposition of aneutral military force between the warring sides.For nearly three decades, for instance, the UNDisengagement Observer Force on the GolanHeights has monitored the ceasefire betweenIsraeli and Syrian forces that ended conflictbetween the two countries in 1974. Peaceenforcement, by contrast, means the applicationor threat of military force without the consent ofall warring parties and generally in the absence ofan agreed ceasefire. It is designed to compelcompliance with measures aimed at maintainingor restoring peace. Such interventions include theUS-led action in Iraq in 1991 and NATO’s Kosovoair strikes in 1999.



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• communicating between parties with no diplo-matic relations.

This model gave way to a ‘new’ form of peacekeepingwith the end of the Cold War.This comprised threemajor changes (Lowe, 2000):

• increased numbers of peacekeeping operations;• an expanded and more dangerous form of opera-

tions; and • an emphasis on ‘humanitarian intervention’ in many

of the operations.

With the introduction of more robust, expandedpeacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in the1990s, civil–military relations gained increasing rele-vance.This is particularly the case around the inter-ventions in the Balkans, and in Afghanistan.Threats tosecurity have evolved to encompass military threats,threats to stability posed by ecological damage,poverty, population growth, inequality and terroristattacks. Under this rubric, donor governments havegained greater leeway to disregard sovereignty tomonitor such things as the status of women, anddomestic economic policy (Curtis, 2001).At the sametime, the arena of peacekeeping has also changed inline with the developing strategic priorities of themajor players. Thus, Western disengagement withAfghanistan prior to 11 September stands in starkcontrast to developments since then. Similarly, there islittle likelihood that the US will substantially reduceits presence in the Balkans unless stability there

significantly improves. However, in other, less pressingregions, countries like the US and the UK may beslower to intervene directly, preferring instead tochannel efforts through train-and-equip programmesaimed at ‘regionalising’ peacekeeping.

Areas of contactOn the ground, contact between humanitarianworkers and the military tends to focus on three keyareas, in addition to the rare cases where the militaryhas itself directly delivered large-scale assistance: theuse of military assets such as aircraft to assist agenciesin delivering relief; the use of military forces toprotect relief supplies, convoys and staff against theftand attack; and information-sharing. Although the

Box 3: Non-Western regional peace and securitybodies

The debate over civil–military relations has tendedto focus primarily on Western militaries. As a result,‘non-Western’ regional peace and security bodies,particularly from Africa and the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS), are often overlooked. Fivemajor African organisations are involved in peace-keeping in one form or another. All of them functionunder the Organisation of African Unity (OAU):

• the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS) in the west;

• the Southern African Development Community(SADC) in the south;

• the Inter-Governmental Developmental Authority(IGAD) in the east;

• the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the north; and• the Economic Community of Central African

States in the central region.

Of these five, only ECOWAS, the SADC and IGADhave to date mobilised peace support operations.The best-known of these interventions are theECOWAS deployments of Monitoring Group(ECOMOG) troops to Liberia, Sierra Leone andGuinea Bissau during the 1990s. Notably, the oper-ations in Liberia and Sierra Leone were undertakenwithout UN Security Council authorisation.

The other major site of ‘non-Western’ peacekeepingin the 1990s has been the CIS. Since 1992, Russiaand other CIS countries have launched ‘peace-keeping operations’ in the former Soviet republicsof Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan. The operationsin Georgia and Tajikistan were monitored bysmaller UN missions, although none of the CISdeployments was authorised by the SecurityCouncil. Instead, all were based on bilateral agree-ments between the Russian president and theleaders of the various warring factions.

In the 1990s, peacekeeping and peace enforcementmissions became more robust

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military forces of nations that are signatories to theGeneva and Hague conventions have minimum obli-gations under international humanitarian law tosupport humanitarian action, given the nature of theissues at stake the extent of this involvement is subjectto intense debate.

Humanitarian agencies have accepted military escortsas protection for civilian aid workers and/or goods insome conflict-affected countries. UN humanitarianconvoys, for instance, use military or armed escorts inseven of the 22 complex emergencies where OCHAis currently involved (OCHA, 2001). However, thispractice remains highly contentious, and many otherhumanitarian agencies are reluctant to accept it.As faras has been regularly reported, NGOs only use armedprotection on a regular basis in four of the approxi-mately 50 conflict-affected countries worldwide:northern Iraq, Somalia, Russia (Ingushetia/Chechnya) and northern Kenya. Agencies also occa-sionally use armed escorts on a case-by-case basis involatile security situations that may require rapidassessments, for example Rwanda, or if an escort isrequired at a border, as between Pakistan andAfghanistan.

The decision to use armed escorts, be they stateforces, international peacekeepers or private militaryformations, is not systematised within most humani-tarian organisations. In cases like Rwanda in 1994, forinstance, armed protection was essential to protectthe lives of aid workers; in other cases, protection isurged on agencies by the state, leaving humanitarianorganisations with little choice.The kind of protec-tion force available is also highly dependent oncontext. NGOs used international protection forcesin northern Iraq, partly to protect themselves againstthe state; in northern Kenya, agencies used state-armed police. In rare circumstances, NGOs and UNagencies have used private armed escorts, sometimesinadvertently when state forces were sub-contractingto private companies, as happened in Sierra Leone(Tufts, 2001). International peacekeeping protectionis possible only in East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia andSierra Leone, where there are UN-mandatedmissions, and in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia,where deployments are NATO-led.

The third main point of contact – information-sharing – may initially appear less contentious.Indeed, certain types of information should beshared between humanitarian agencies and themilitary to enhance the activities of both. Thismight include information on the general securityclimate, conditions in areas used by both themilitary and civilian agencies, such as airfields andtransport routes, and general estimates about the

scope and degree of the emergency. But there arealso reasons for caution; there is, for instance, noguarantee that information passed on by the militarygives a complete picture of any given situation, andthere may well be operational reasons why acommander might seek to manipulate this informa-tion to influence agency operations. The essentialpolitical neutrality of humanitarian agencies couldbe compromised by providing some kinds of infor-mation to the military, especially where the force isa party to the conflict. In conflicts, information isnot a neutral commodity, but may have importanttactical or political value.

Military policies and doctrinesThe range of peacekeeping actors and the variety ofdoctrines governing their actions is wide; forexample, countries such as Canada, the Netherlandsand Belgium emphasise ‘relief operations as a coretask for NATO’, whereas countries such as the UK,France and the US remain more ambivalent (Bymanet al., 2000). National contingents, even if deployed inmultinational forces, tend to follow national doctrine,and will behave in different ways. Despite thesedifferences, it is nevertheless possible to identify somegeneral trends in military policies and perceptions ofhumanitarian activity based on a broad analysis ofBritish, NATO and UN doctrine.The key message toemerge from interviews with policy-makers is that,first and foremost, the military works in a conflictsituation in order to secure the environment.According to the UK Ministry of Defence’s JointDoctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), the UK’soperational principles guiding engagement inhumanitarian activities are:

• if at all possible, do not get involved in humani-tarian aid activities;

• if UK forces must get involved, this should be insupport of a lead civilian agency, where themilitary stays in the background; and

• only as a last resort would the military get directlyinvolved in aid delivery, namely if the humani-tarian assistance process was seen as failing.

NATO’s principles are similar. While policy-makersbelieve that the best people to implement humani-tarian operations are humanitarian agencies, not leastbecause they understand the needs of the local popu-lation and sustainability issues, Alliance officialsacknowledge that there are times when troops will bedrawn into humanitarian work. In these cases,NATOdoctrine lays down the conditions under whichinvolvement will occur:

• always in collaboration with mandated organisa-tions;




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• with a finite plan of what, why and how longhumanitarian work will last, and a clear strategyfor handing over operations to the relevantagency; and

• with the aim of withdrawing from humanitarianactivities as soon as possible.

The approach of the UN’s Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to themilitary implementation of humanitarian projects isframed under the management of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary General (SRSG),which provides the mechanism and procedures tobring all elements together.Again, there is a declaredreluctance to engage in humanitarian work. As onekey UN policy-maker pointed out in an interview inOctober 2001, ‘there is a large [humanitarian]community out there – why would we ask themilitary to carry out operations that are the speciali-sation of others? It doesn’t make sense’.

Countervailing pressuresAlthough in terms of policy, major peacekeepingactors may regard humanitarian activity as asecondary function for their armed forces, to beundertaken only in extreme circumstances and onlyfor limited periods, there are a number of reasonswhy humanitarian activities may become increasinglyattractive.These reasons are both internal to militaryforces themselves, and part of a wider tendencytowards the politicisation of aid and relief. Thereappear to be two distinct points of view explainingthe reasons for military interest in the humanitariansector. The first suggests that increasing militaryinvolvement in humanitarian space is essentiallyunplanned and circumstantial.The second proposes amuch more deliberate, intentional move by militaryand political policy-makers to develop humanitarianassistance provision as a core competence; humani-tarian work is, for example, one of the so-called‘Petersberg Tasks’ that form the mandate of the EU’sprojected Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).

The ‘circumstantial rationale’The circumstantial rationale – most often suggestedby military policy-makers – is based on the premisethat the military always prefers to avoid directinvolvement in the provision of humanitarian assis-tance. This is primarily because many national mili-taries already feel over-stretched in terms of budgets,human resources and materials. Getting involved inhumanitarian assistance also complicates militarymissions, makes it difficult for troops to pull out in atimely fashion, and dilutes the war-fighting role.Finally, it involves troops in activities that they are notfully trained to carry out.

Against this reluctance, there is an inevitable ‘pressure’to intervene for various reasons. Lieutenant-ColonelJohn Rollins, a British army officer seconded toNATO headquarters at Mons in Belgium, explainshow ‘demand–pull’ and ‘supply–push’ pressures influ-enced NATO’s involvement in humanitarian activi-ties in Bosnia (Rollins, 2001). This analogy alsoreflects the UK’s approach to ‘providing militarysupport to the civilian component’ (Spence, 2001).

Demand–pull pressures revolve around perceived gaps inhumanitarian coverage. Such gaps may be due to ashortage of agencies or resources on the ground.However, it is less clear who identifies these gaps, deter-mines that they are significant enough to require amilitary response and then applies pressure to respond.It is also not always clear whether these gaps stem fromunavoidable difficulties to do with the situation inquestion; rather, a lack of political support for humani-tarian agencies can result in their diminished capacityto intervene.The long-term failure of donor states toinvest in civil capacity has the effect of under-resourcing the humanitarian system and underminingits capacity to respond effectively. In Kosovo, forinstance, UNHCR was sidelined by the EU countriesand ECHO in favour of a bilateral approach. Just 3.5%of total funding from the top six EU contributors wentto UNHCR.As Ed Schenkenberg puts it,‘in overstep-ping UNHCR’s mandate and bypassing UNHCR’srole as co-ordinator, governments unilaterally (andthrough NATO) started to run the humanitarian oper-ation’ (Schenkenberg, 2001).

Box 4: The European Rapid Reaction Force

Western European governments formallycommitted to the RRF in November 2000. Oncefully operational – scheduled for 2003 – the forcewill comprise an estimated 60,000 troops from14 EU states. The RRF’s mandate was set out inthe so-called ‘Petersberg Tasks’. Incorporated intothe Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into forcein May 1999, these tasks include:

• humanitarian missions; • peacekeeping missions;• crisis management, including peace-enforce-

ment; and• environmental protection.

Although there are concerns about its ambitious –and ambiguous – mandate, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has welcomed the RRF as auseful addition to global peacekeeping.


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Political leaders take the decision to deploy troops in amilitary intervention, and in most cases decide whetherto involve the military in humanitarian activities. Thiswas the case, for example, in Albania, when the NATOCouncil ordered troops to construct refugee camps.According to Colonel Fiona Walthall, the AssistantDirector of Peace Support Operations at the JDCC,twoconcurrent factors triggered this directive – an Albaniangovernment request for assistance with the massiverefugee influx, and UNHCR’s lack of response capacityat the time.On rare occasions, field commanders on theground determine that a humanitarian response by themilitary is required.

Finally, humanitarian agen-cies sometimes directly re-quest assistance from the military themselves.When political or militaryleaders decide to directlyintervene in the provisionof humanitarian assistance,the significance of the ‘hu-manitarian need’ is mostoften measured against itsperceived potential todestabilise the political andsecurity situation. For ex-ample, the UK’s conflicttheory assumes a directcorrelation between secu-rity conditions and theprovision of humanitarianassistance.According to this theory, conflict can be trig-gered or exacerbated if aid is not reaching the civilianpopulation, and/or is not provided impartially.

Supply–push pressures are primarily driven by require-ments to ensure that the peace operation is successful,rather than considerations based on addressing actualcivilian needs.These pressures trigger so-called ‘heartsand minds’ activities designed to:

• win the goodwill of the local population in orderto protect forces on the ground;

• maintain staff morale; and• generate positive reports of the operation so as to

maintain support.

One such ‘hearts and minds’ operation took placeduring the air campaign over Afghanistan. Concurrentwith the air strikes that began in October 2001, the USairdropped approximately 37,500 humanitarian dailyrations (HDRs), along with propaganda leaflets.Theseso-called ‘humanitarian’ airdrops continued for severalweeks, as part of a US pledge of $320 million in

humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan. In his addressto the nation at the start of the air strikes, US PresidentGeorge W. Bush stated that the operation aimed toensure that ‘the oppressed people of Afghanistan[would] know the generosity of America and ourallies’.

Finally, a much vaguer yet frequently cited motive is asense of moral obligation – the ‘natural desire’ to getinvolved.This is often cited along with the point thatsoldiers are not ‘uncaring fighting machines’; rather,they are fellow human beings with a sense of compas-

sion. In simplistic terms,‘militaries have the goodwilland humanitarian motiva-tion to engage in these newendeavours’ (Teale, 1996).

Deliberate involvementThe factors described aboveimply that military involve-ment in humanitarianactivity is essentially ad hocand unplanned, and not partof a deliberate strategydesigned to encroach upontraditional humanitarianspace. However, someacademics and humanitarianagencies posit a secondtheory about increasingmilitary engagement inhumanitarian activities.This

suggests a considered and deliberate military move intohumanitarian work, out of both practical necessity andas a part of the wider tendency among policy-makersto merge political–military and humanitarian activities.

In practical terms, increased engagement in humani-tarian work offers a new role and new funding sourcesfor the West’s post-Cold War armed forces. SeniorOxfam staff member Nicholas Stockton suggests thatlarge-scale redundancies and budget cuts within theBritish military have triggered a search for new tasks.In its draft policy document on civil–military relationsin humanitarian emergencies, the Swiss Agency forDevelopment and Cooperation (SADC) notes thatincreased state participation in peace support opera-tions ‘is due to a relatively stable political environmentand the continued excess of military forces in mostfirst world nations’. The SADC also suggests thatparticipation in peace support operations, in particulardisaster relief and humanitarian assistance, ‘allows forthe exercise of military capability, without the diplo-matic and political inconvenience of designating anenemy’ (Lang, 2001). An emphasis on humanitarian


The ‘new’ peacekeeping? An Australian trooperin East Timor

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activity may also be a useful recruiting tool; Britisharmy and navy advertisements, for instance, use imagesof soldiers providing humanitarian assistance to attractyoung recruits.

In political terms, the increased emphasis on linkingmilitary and humanitarian activities can be seen aspart of a wider trend towards the politicisation of aidpolicy, whereby humanitarian action is increasinglyused as an instrument of political intervention inviolent conflicts, or as a substitute for political actionin regions deemed to be peripheral to the strategicinterests of the major powers: another ‘tool in thetoolbox’ of conflict management (Macrae andLeader, 2000a).Thus, providing facilities for refugeesor displaced people in their home regions, forinstance, could be seen as a way of ‘containing’ theirpotentially destabilising effects elsewhere, and ofminimising the political inconvenience that illegalimmigration causes in Western democracies.Conversely, the humanitarian label has increasinglybeen used by policy-makers to explain or justifypolitical or military action. The lack of a commondefinition of key concepts such as ‘humanitarian’,‘military–humanitarianism’ and ‘impartiality’ leavesthese terms acutely vulnerable to such manipulation.In the 1980s, for instance, the US government soughtto justify its war against Nicaragua on humanitariangrounds. (In this instance, the International Court ofJustice (ICJ) rejected the US claim to a right to inter-

vention on the basis of human rights protection,stating that ‘the argument derived from the preserva-tion of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford alegal justification for the conduct of the UnitedStates’ (Boyle, 2001).) Other cases where the ‘human-itarian justification’ has been invoked include:

• India’s invasion of East Pakistan in support ofBangladeshi independence in 1971;

• Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and removal ofthe Khmer Rouge in 1978;

• Tanzania’s overthrow of Ugandan dictator IdiAmin in 1979;

• US and British air strikes against targets in Iraqsince February 1991; and

• NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999.

In addition, there were references in the internationalpress to a ‘humanitarian justification’ for the militarycampaign in Afghanistan.

As early as the mid-1990s, humanitarian agencieswere expressing concern about this increasing politi-cisation of aid effort. In 1994, for instance, Save theChildren warned that ‘humanitarian assistance isincreasingly perceived as a means to [political andsecurity] ends rather than an urgent and inalienableright in itself. Within complex operations involvingpolitical, military, and humanitarian programmes, thedanger is that the humanitarian role takes third place.

Box 5: The Brahimi report on UN peace operations

In September 2000, the UN released the Report ofthe Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. Thedocument, dubbed the Brahimi Report after thepanel’s chairman Lakhdar Brahimi, a formerAlgerian foreign minister and UN envoy toAfghanistan and Pakistan, bluntly analysed currentweaknesses in the way the UN mounts and sustainspeace operations, and set out some 60 recommen-dations for change, covering questions of doctrine,strategy and decision-making, deployment capaci-ties, headquarters resources and informationmanagement. The report’s key conclusions were:

• peacekeeping objectives should not outrun thepolitical will and resources necessary for the jobin hand;

• the Security Council should craft and authoriseclear, precise and robust mandates;

• greater resources are needed to be able todeploy sufficient, trained forces rapidly (within30–60 days); and

• peacekeeping planning and support capacity isoverloaded, and needs more personnel and thecreation of a strategic planning and analysiscapacity. The report recommended that a newinformation and strategic analysis secretariatshould be created.

The Brahimi Report presents an extreme example ofthe merging of humanitarian aid and politicalagendas by suggesting a need for an overarchingcommand-and-control structure that uses humani-tarian aid as simply a ‘tool in the toolbox’ of conflictmanagement. Thus, for instance, Brahimi refers toquick-impact projects as a means of winning heartsand minds, and persuading belligerents to ‘submit’to a peacekeeping operation. From the humani-tarian perspective, criticism of Brahimi has crys-tallised around the report’s definition of impartiality.For Brahimi, impartiality means fidelity to the UNCharter and to Security Council resolutions. This isnot the same as the definition applied by humani-tarian agencies, where impartiality means the allo-cation of resources on the basis of need.


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In any complex emergency, humanitarian objectivesas distinct from politico-military objectives need tobe kept clearly in view and constantly reaffirmed toall sides’ (SC-UK, 1994).

When is military intervention legitimate?Any analysis of civil–military relations from theperspective of humanitarian agencies requires a prioranalysis of the decision to intervene in the first place– in legal terms, the jus ad bellum.The key tests of thedecision to intervene are that such an intervention ismorally acceptable and practically useful, accordingto a set of specific criteria, including:‘right authority’,‘right intentions’,‘just cause’,‘last resort’,‘proportion-ality’ and ‘chances of success’.

Generally, humanitarian policy positions on militaryinterventions fall into three broad categories(International Council on Human Rights, 2001):

1. Force is never acceptable. Humanitarian agenciesshould consistently maintain a pacifist point ofview and publicly oppose military interventionsof all kinds.

2. On the fence. Humanitarian agencies do not take apublic stand against military interventions, butshould never call for or endorse the use of force.

3. Force is acceptable in certain circumstances. NGOs havea responsibility to call for foreign interventionwhere it could put a stop to crimes againsthumanity or war crimes.

There is limited ‘humanitarian consensus’ aroundmilitary interventions – very few humanitarianagencies have published policies, and most seem todevelop specific positions on a case-by-case basis.Oxfam has produced one of the most clearly-articu-lated policies to date. Under this policy, Oxfamwould not support armed intervention unless therewas no other way to prevent widespread loss of life,and subject to the following criteria:

• peaceful methods of resolution are exhausted;• protection by the controlling authorities has

demonstrably failed;• there is adherence to the norms of international

humanitarian law;• there is proportionality to the protection needs of

the people at risk; and• there is accountability to the UN.

A consistent factor in humanitarian debates aroundmilitary interventions is the requirement that suchinterventions should be sanctioned by an interna-tional legal framework (as noted in Oxfam’s criteria).However, although the UN Security Councilprovides the single most important mechanism to

sanction traditional military interventions, there issignificant debate around the legal and moral basis ofmilitary intervention, particularly when ‘humani-tarian aims’ are invoked as justification. The UNCharter does not explicitly articulate a legal right toinitiate a ‘humanitarian’ intervention. In fact, the term‘humanitarian’ – much like the term ‘peacekeeping’ –is never used in the Charter (Wedgewood, 1999).Rather, under Article 42 the UN Security Councilhas the right to authorise the use of force to ‘maintainor restore international peace and security’ (Simons,


Box 6: Crossing language boundaries: Kosovo asa ‘humanitarian war’

Language use and misuse is at the heart of muchof the confusion surrounding the civil–militarydebate. Participants do not share a commonlanguage, and often employ the same terms,while applying different meanings to them.

NATO’s Chief Press Officer, Jamie Shea, coinedthe phrases ‘humanitarian war’ and ‘humanitarianbombing’ to describe NATO’s 1999 interventionin Kosovo, on the grounds that one of thecampaign’s stated aims was to end Serb violenceagainst the province’s ethnic Albanian majority.However, although the campaign eventuallysucceeded in ejecting Serb forces from Kosovo, italso triggered a major humanitarian catastrophe inthe form of mass refugee outflows. In addition,civilian casualties were deemed acceptable forthe sake of a military strategy that demanded zerolosses among NATO forces. This strategy wasdenounced by Amnesty International as a viola-tion of international humanitarian law, specific to‘the prohibition of attacks on military targetsexpected to cause incidental loss of civilian life“which would be excessive in relation to theconcrete and direct military advantage antici-pated”’ (Amnesty International, 1999). As JoMacrae and Nick Leader explain: ‘The use ofexpressions such as “humanitarian war” triggeredan almost universal reaction among humanitarianagencies and established a clear “line of demarca-tion” in the humanitarian language debate. Mosthumanitarian organisations denounce the term“humanitarian war”, deeming it an unacceptablemanipulation of the word “humanitarian”’(Macrae and Leader, 2000a). In December 2000,UN Secretary-General Annan drew a clear distinc-tion between military intervention and humani-tarian intervention, saying: ‘Let’s get right awayfrom using the term humanitarian to describemilitary operations’ (VOICE, 2000).



10

2000). Although this article does not explicitly referto military interventions on humanitarian grounds, ithas been interpreted to confer ‘an exclusive right to

authorise the use of force for the purpose ofpreventing or stopping gross and widespread violations of fundamental rights’ (Simons, 2000).


11

The difficulties humanitarian agencies face in decidingwhether to take advantage of military assistance stemfrom fundamental issues of principle around thecentral ideas of impartiality, neutrality and indepen-dence in humanitarian action. To humanitarians,impartiality means that relief is given solely on thebasis of need – that is,without discrimination and irre-spective of other criteria such as race, religion or polit-ical affiliation. It also means that aid cannot be used tofurther political, military or any other objectives oraims other than addressing such human needs as food,water, medical care, shelter and protection. If political,racial, religious or other criteria are used to decidewho is assisted and how, the aim of meeting humanneed is, inevitably, subordinated to other goals – theachievement of a particular political outcome, forinstance.

Problems of principle Humanity is the foundation of humanitarianism,and impartiality is the fundamental principle ofhumanitarian action. As a means to ensure impar-tiality, humanitarianism also needs a number ofpractical principles of action: neutrality (not takingsides, or being seen to take sides, in a conflict) andindependence are the two most obvious ones. Ifhumanitarian actors are not neutral players in aconflict, it will be very hard for them to act impar-tially. If humanitarian actors are not perceived asneutral by the parties to the conflict, their impar-tiality and trustworthiness will be in doubt, andtheir access to all people in need, as well as theirown security, will be in jeopardy.

This is crucial to the civil–military debate becauseany association between humanitarian agencies andmilitary forces risks compromising this impartiality.Because military forces are deployed to meetmilitary and political aims, they are not impartial as

this is understood by humanitarians. Military inter-ventions, by their nature, are partial, political, ‘highlyselective and inequitable’ (Slim, 2001). Internationalmilitary interventions are not launched on universalhumanitarian principles; they are initiated for acombination of reasons including political andnational interests; their aims can include such thingsas the resolution of a conflict, the conquering of anenemy force, the establishment of democracy, theprotection of national interests or the promotion ofa particular political agenda.These aims may some-times coincide with humanitarian objectives –conquering an armed group, for instance, may affordagencies access to previously inaccessible popula-tions in need. But peace operations do not have, astheir fundamental aim, the delivery of impartial,universal humanitarian assistance.

Military involvement in relief raises the possibilitythat political and military objectives could influenceor determine how needs are assessed, and how theyare addressed. A person may be offered help notbecause he or she is a human being, but because he orshe has particular political or religion convictions, orbelongs to a ‘friendly’ or potentially friendly group, orlives in a strategically important place. People whoare not in a favoured category would not be assisted.This is not an argument against the value and impor-tance of ethical political action, nor does it imply thatjust conflict resolution and peace-building should notbe pursued. It simply recognises that these tasks aredifferent, maybe parallel, initiatives or activities, andthat this distinction must be respected. As theSteering Committee for Humanitarian Response(SCHR) puts it:

The raison d’etre of humanitarian action is not theachievement of peace, and most certainly not theachievement of the enforced peace of the Security

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The humanitarian perspective



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Council. As unattractive as this may seem, it is thefact that separates any Peace Operation from truehumanitarian action. It is not humanitarian action whena Force Commander assuages a host community withthe introduction of new resources – irrespective of theneeds of that community within the larger population. Itis not humanitarian action when a UN HumanitarianCo-ordinator, sitting as a senior cabinet member of aPeace Operation, plans activities that complement themission’s political objectives. It is most certainly nothumanitarian action when a civilian population in needis denied assistance as a result of its location or perceivedaffiliations. Each of these scenarios is what the humani-tarian community comes to expect when PeaceOperations presume to have any humanitarian remit(SCHR, 2000).

Any integration of humanitarian aid into wider polit-ical and military strategy compromises humanitarianprinciples, making it harder for humanitarian actorson the ground to assert their independence andimpartiality, and to negotiate access to people inneed. Associating with a military force in a conflictzone implies that the agency in question is in someway identifying with that group, against others.Whenthis association becomes too close, local hostility mayresult, as in Somalia in 1993 (Oxfam, 2000). As theSCHR points out, ‘there is a risk that too close arelationship between the peacekeeping mission andthe humanitarian operation implicates humanitariansin political action to which elements of the localpopulation are opposed, thereby putting them at riskof retaliation’ (HPN, 2001).

Box 7: Existing guidelines

In 1994, OCHA published the Oslo Guidelines, anon-binding document outlining the use of militaryand civil defence assets in natural and technologicaldisasters. In April 2001, OCHA initiated a consulta-tion process with UNHCR, UNICEF and the WorldFood Programme to broaden these guidelines toencompass complex humanitarian emergencies.Although initially excluded from the consultationprocess, humanitarian organisations now participateon an Advisory Panel, represented by theInternational Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).As a result of this consultation, the Secretariat of theOslo Guidelines Process produced the DraftGuidelines on the Use of Military and Civil DefenceAssets to Support United Nations HumanitarianActivities in Complex Emergencies on 12 June 2001.

Critically, the draft guidelines state that military andcivil defence assets supporting UN humanitarianactivities will normally not be used in the directdelivery of assistance. When possible, the supportedagencies will try to use military and civil defenceassets in a manner that limits their visibility, and ontasks that do not call into question the neutrality orimpartiality of the agency, implementing partners orother humanitarian actors. The paper sets out threecore operational principles for the use of militaryand civil defence assets, as follows:

• Complementarity. Military and civil defenceassets are means of last resort in responding to ahumanitarian emergency. UN agencies will notrequest these assets unless they are urgentlyneeded, and civilian assets are not available.

• Civilian Control. Military and civil defenceassets employed in the support of UN humani-

tarian activities will be under the supervisionand control of a responsible civil authority, suchas the UN humanitarian coordinator.

• No Cost. Military and civil defence assets, as withall other humanitarian assistance, are provided atno cost to the affected population or the receivingstate. States sending such assets should not attemptto recover these costs through other planned andprogrammed assistance, such as development aid.States providing military or civil defence assetsmust not exploit these missions to gather intelli-gence, or to undertake psychological operations.

Finally, these assets must be used within a limitedtime-frame. The humanitarian coordinator shouldplan for the earliest possible release of any military orcivil defence asset provided to support humanitarianactivities, and avoid developing any dependency onthese assets once the emergency has passed(Secretariat of the Oslo Guidelines Process, 2001).

A draft proposal of principles and guidelines for the use of military and civilian defence assets tosupport humanitarian assistance in humanitarianemergencies – developed to influence Swiss policy– outlines the following core principles:

• Last resort. Military forces are a last resort forproviding relief in humanitarian emergencies.Over-reliance on the military will severelydamage the humanitarian system, and placehumanitarian activities and workers at risk.

• Civilian control. Military forces should be indirect support of civilian actors. In all interna-tional humanitarian emergencies, civilian andmilitary actors are urged to coordinate activitiesthat impact on the delivery of assistance tovictims.


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Problems of utilityBoth humanitarian agencies and military policy-makers agree that, in principle, the military shouldnot normally engage in the direct delivery of human-itarian assistance. However, there are sometimes‘exceptional circumstances’ when traditional human-itarian agencies do not have the logistics capacity tolaunch an immediate response. In these exceptionalsituations, it may seem that the military is the onlybody with both the available capacity and the distinc-tive competence to respond to humanitarian need ina timely way. In such cases, there is often a clear caveatthat such a response is only filling a gap until theappropriate agencies can take over. Therefore, itshould last for a very short period of time, and shouldbe handed over immediately to civilian managementas soon as this is in place.

In the last decade, therehave only been three occa-sions when the military hasdirectly delivered humani-tarian assistance in conflict-related emergencies:

• in northern Iraq in April1991;

• in eastern Zaire in July1994; and

• during the Kosovo crisisin April 1999.

While military supportprovided in such excep-tional circumstances is notideal, it may be acceptable.However, the followingfactors have not beenappropriately analysed:

• how often capacity and time is really an issue; and• if the ‘exceptional’ interventions have actually

resulted in significant, cost-effective assistance tothe target populations.

While it may seem that the military has the capacityand the competence to initiate a ‘humanitarian’response in exceptional circumstances, how appropriateand cost-effective is this action? Although the evalua-tion of the response to the Kosovo crisis gives a partialanalysis of NATO’s relief work, to date there has beenno significant external evaluation of military ‘humani-tarian’ activities. In the absence of such a consideredevaluation of these efforts, it is extremely difficult toappropriately analyse the short- and long-term impacts– including benefits and harms – of military support to,or implementation of, humanitarian projects.

There is, however, anecdotal evidence that raises seri-ous and specific concerns.Aid delivered by the militarycan, for instance, be unsustainable and damaginglyshort term, with project horizons set not by the exis-tence and persistence of need, but by deployment pat-terns. During the Rwandan crisis, for instance, Britishforces set up an army field hospital which ran for justsix weeks. Once the military operation ended, the fa-cility was closed and bulldozed, despite the fact that theregion was experiencing a Shigella outbreak.A hospitalestablished by Austrian troops in Albania during theKosovo crisis was demolished with their departure.Military ‘humanitarian’ interventions may also not becost-effective; the British field hospital in the Rwandancrisis, for instance, used 60 staff, whereas an equivalentNGO facility would employ perhaps one or two.The

Austrian hospital cost $12m,to serve a refugee camp ac-commodating between twoand three thousand people –equivalent to between fourand six thousand dollars perhead. Camp tents, whichwere also erected by Austriantroops, were reportedlyequipped with built-in radios tuned to Radio Austria. In Albania, the costof a small camp run by theAustrian military was DM70m, compared with a muchlarger MSF facility, whichcost just DM2m. In theRwanda crisis, the BritishRoyal Air Force (RAF)quoted cargo rates six timeshigher than those of a civil-ian airline for the transport of

supplies (Borton et al., 1996). In Afghanistan, the USspent $40m on food airdrops weighing 6,000 tonnes,equivalent to $7.50 per kilo. This compared with theWFP average of 20 cents per kilo.

Military-delivered aid and care can also be inappro-priate for the conditions and for target populations.Military forces are trained and equipped to providemedical care and facilities to a predominately male,adult, healthy population – yet 80% of refugees arewomen and children. At the height of the 1994Goma crisis, US forces were charged by UNHCRwith supplying clean water to 700,000 refugees.However, the water purification equipment theydelivered was inappropriate for the task, as it wasdesigned for keeping small numbers of soldiers inpeak condition (Oxfam, 2000). Military supplies donot contain sufficient quantities of many of the essen-tial medicines used in emergency settings, such as oral


How appropriate is military medical care inhumanitarian emergencies?

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rehydration salts and vaccines, and facilities are notadapted to the needs of refugees. The French armyhospital in Goma in 1994, for example, providedexcellent care to some refugees, but given the scale ofthe cholera epidemic that began soon after theirarrival (some 50,000 deaths in a matter of weeks), itwas an inappropriate use of resources. Instead, allo-cating one helicopter to transport potable watercould have alleviated the supply problem caused bythe congestion of roads with refugees (Terry, 2001).US military airdrops in Afghanistan each containedone meal, consisting of shortbread, peanut butter,jam, salad and vinaigrette, when what was needed waswheat, oil and sugar for long-term cooking needs. InKosovo, NATO set up refugee camps barracks-style,

thus failing to accommodate the needs of largerefugee families. The service facilities failed to meetSphere standards (Pelton, 2000).

In some circumstances, aid delivered by the militarycan be not only inappropriate, but also dangerous.Using air drops to deliver aid is notoriously inaccu-rate; in a heavily-mined country like Afghanistan, it islikely that some supplies will end up in a mined area.This raises the risk of casualties if local people aretempted to try to retrieve them. The food packetsdropped by the US in Afghanistan in late 2000 werethe same colour as the cluster bombs also being deliv-ered, raising fears that one might be mistaken for theother.


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Questions need to be faced concerning the properroles of military forces and humanitarian actors inconflict situations, and the relationship between them.The issues confronting both sides encompass funda-mental principles, as well as concerns around the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of the militarydelivery of aid, and the security and access implica-tions that cooperation with the military raises. Yetdespite these problems, the nature of modern conflictand the evolving political and strategic agendas of themajor intervening powers mean that ‘cooperation’ inone form or another is likely to remain a feature ofthe aid response, at least in key politically strategicareas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan. Against thisbackground, this chapter outlines a series of recom-mendations for further work, and suggests a possibleframework to guide relations between humanitarianactors and the military.

RecommendationsThe recommendations are three-fold:

• the civil–military debate needs to be realigned tocentre first and foremost on the people in need ina humanitarian response;

• an independent evaluation of military engagementin humanitarian activities should be carried out; and

• those working in the humanitarian and themilitary spheres should establish agreement on acommon language to describe what they do.

Realign the debateAs individuals and as members of the internationalcommunity, we have an individual and collectiveresponsibility to ensure that the needs and rights ofpeople who are vulnerable and suffering as a resultof conflict and disaster are recognised and addressed.They must be firmly located at the heart of thedebate about the role of the various actors in

humanitarian response, and civil–military relationsin humanitarian response. Parties to this debate mustbe mindful of the primary responsibilities ofhumanitarian action, and reaffirm the key humani-tarian principles. If the people who need assistanceand protection become invisible, excluded or objec-tified as passive recipients of largesse, then thehumanitarian content of this work becomesobscured, its manipulation in the service of one oranother state’s political objectives becomes easier,and the principle of humanity will be dangerouslyundermined.

Evaluate military engagementIn addition to issues of principle, a key aspect of thecivil–military debate has to do with whether aiddelivered by the military is of adequate quality. Tobring substance to these questions, the secondrecommendation is that an independent evaluation ofmilitary engagement in ‘humanitarian’ activitiesshould be conducted to gather clear evidence of theeffectiveness and appropriateness of humanitarianprojects implemented by the military.This evaluationshould be field-based and participatory, with a partic-ular focus on the following:

• cost–benefit analysis;• impact, both in the short and in the longer term;• cultural appropriateness;• participation levels;• implications for local economic, political or social

structures; and• sustainability.

Such an assessment would be invaluable in bringingdetailed, consolidated data to the debate, in the placeof the current reliance on anecdote and assumption.This would help to answer some of the key practicalquestions around the military delivery of aid.

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Towards a framework forcivil–military relations



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Agree on common languageHumanitarian language quite literally defineshumanitarian space. Thus, the civil–military debaterequires very clear parameters and definitions of corehumanitarian concepts.Without such clarity, we willbe unable to take the debate forward. As AustenDavis, General Director of MSF Holland, puts it: ‘theword humanitarian needs to be carefully definedwithin this debate. Governments callpolitical–military interventions “humanitarian”. Butcivil agencies have a different definition of the word… even to the letter of the law’. In place of thisconfusion, we must instead ‘agree to talk about:humanitarian intervention when referring to civilianaction, military intervention when referring tomilitary action, and to forget the fallacious slogans ofmilitary humanitarianism, and military-humanitarianinterventions’ (Tanguy, 2000). Humanitarian organi-sations should push for a redefinition of the term‘humanitarian’ to be incorporated into militarydoctrine.The Swiss government – the only govern-ment to confirm its commitment to humanitarianprinciples in domestic law – may provide a helpfulexample: ‘States and military forces must avoid theuse of the term humanitarian when their actions aremotivated by political or military objectives, regard-less of the benefits to the population. This includesthe use of feeding, shelter, and other services to legit-imise the military mission, collect information, orenhance security’ (Lang, 2001).

There is also a need for clarity about some keyconcepts among civilian agencies themselves. Theprinciple of impartiality, for instance, can be inter-preted in different ways by different agencies.According to the UN’s Report of the Panel onUnited Nations Peace Operations:

Impartiality for United Nations operations musttherefore mean adherence to the principles of theCharter: where one party to a peace agreementclearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms,continued equal treatment of all parties by theUnited Nations can in the best case result in ineffec-tiveness and in the worst may amount to complicitywith evil (Brahimi, 2000).

This politicised rendering of the term is very far fromthe definition used by humanitarian agencies, whereimpartiality is understood as something quitedifferent, based on a stated obligation to deliver aidon the basis of need, regardless of race, creed ornationality.There are solid reasons why the UN as apolitical organisation should define impartiality in theway it does, and this is not an argument for unifor-mity across agencies with very different mandates andaims. But it does suggest that, where there is diver-

gence, we need to be clear how terms are being used,and clear on the limits of their application.

Principles of engagementIn addition to the work outlined above, there is aneed for clear agreement between the military andhumanitarian organisations on specific ‘terms ofengagement’within a theatre. Such guidelines should,in particular, clarify the ‘exceptions to the rules’ –those exceptional and often unpredictable circum-stances when it seems that military engagement in atraditionally humanitarian activity is required as theonly practicable means of saving lives and/or signifi-cantly alleviating suffering.

This section describes proposed guidelines that couldbe used to govern relations between the military andhumanitarian organisations in a conflict zone. Theyare premised on three fundamental principles. First,the humanitarian organisation has primacy inhumanitarian work. In the first instance, humani-tarian work should be performed by humanitarianorganisations (this is one of the three guiding princi-ples on the relationship between the humanitariancommunity and external military forces proposed byOCHA (2001)). Civilian implementation is alwayspreferable to military implementation. Second,civilian humanitarian agencies can never operateunder the command of the military.This violates thecore principle of independence. Third, from theperspective of humanitarian agencies, the primaryaims of international military peace support forcesshould be:

• to establish and maintain order and security;• to protect civilians; and • to facilitate a comprehensive settlement of the

conflict.

Military activities in general circumstancesIt is not appropriate for the military to directlyimplement humanitarian activities in ‘generalcircumstances’, that is, when humanitarian agenciesare present and capable of delivering services. Generalcircumstances are situations where there are enoughhumanitarian agencies operating to address humani-tarian needs. In such cases, military implementationof ‘humanitarian’ projects is unnecessary and inappro-priate. Often, these are situations when nationalcontingents that are already on the ground decide toimplement quick-impact projects, such as minorrepairs of schools and clinics. Such so-called heartsand minds operations are conducted for the sake ofpublicity and psychological benefits, such as ensuringcommunity goodwill, maintaining positive mediacoverage and sustaining staff morale.They are partialactivities intended to ensure the success of the


17

military operation. They are not humanitarian andshould never be confused with impartial, principledhumanitarian assistance based on community needsand priorities.

Military activities in exceptional circumstancesIt is generally inappropriate for the military todirectly implement humanitarian activities. Theremay, however, be rare occasions when the scale ofhumanitarian need is such that agencies requireshort-term assistance. In such exceptional circum-stances, military or civil defence resources will becalled for only when the following criteria are met:

• the military are means of last resort: there is no otherhumanitarian option, and the absence of assistancewould result in unacceptable human suffering;

• there is a significant level of need, as determinedby civilian agencies, including the UN;

• assets and interventions must always remain undercivilian control; and

• military interventions are always clearly time-bound.

(These criteria are drawn from the Draft Guidelines onthe Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to SupportUnited Nations Humanitarian Activities in ComplexEmergencies (Secretariat of the Oslo GuidelinesProcess, 2001).)

The use of military escorts and protection forhumanitarian staff and goodsAs a rule, humanitarian agencies do not use armedprotection as it compromises impartiality. This isparticularly the case if the protection is not providedby a ‘neutral force’. Humanitarian agencies shouldonly use military armed protection as a last resort inextreme circumstances, and only when the followingcriteria are met:

• The decision to request or accept the use ofmilitary or armed escorts must be made by human-itarian organisations, not political or militaryauthorities, and based solely on humanitariancriteria.

• Parties to the conflict – including peacekeepingforces – should not be used.

• The sovereign power or local authorities areunwilling or unable to provide a secure environ-ment.

• The use of an armed or military escort does notcompromise: the impartiality of humanitarianorganisations; the security of the affected civilianpopulation; and the longer-term capacity of theorganisation to safely and effectively fulfil itsmandate.

(These criteria are adapted from OCHA and ICRCguidelines on the use of armed protection (OCHA,2001; ICRC, 1995).)

Sharing informationCertain types of information can and should beshared between humanitarian agencies and themilitary. However, there is a need to clearly definewhat types of information should and should not beshared; in many conflict situations, such informationhas military or political value. Information-sharingcould be acceptable on the following issues:

• security conditions affecting the humanitariansituation;

• conditions in shared space (transport, aid move-ments and common-use airfields, for instance); and

• general estimates about the scope of the emergency.

Information should not be shared if it could, in anyway, endanger communities, risk staff security orcompromise the neutrality of humanitarian agencies;agencies should be guided by point four of the Codeof Conduct for the International Red Cross and RedCrescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief:

We will never knowingly – or through negligence –allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gatherinformation of a political, military or economicallysensitive nature for governments or other bodies thatmay serve purposes other than those which arestrictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instrumentsof foreign policy of donor governments.




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Much of the analysis of the barriers to effectivecivil–military cooperation locates the root cause in asimple ‘lack of understanding’ between the actors,exacerbated by cultural and organisational differ-ences. The solution typically put forward involvesmore joint training and information-sharing, allaimed at allowing the two sides to get to know eachother better.This approach casts civil–military coop-eration as primarily a technical matter. In this view,the real issues at stake are to do with practicalities andmethods. All the two sides need to do is align theirprocesses and working practices, thereby immeasur-ably improving assistance.

This paper argues that, far from a technical or culturalissue, civil–military cooperation in fact raises difficul-ties of a much more fundamental nature. Althoughboth humanitarian and military policies suggest anumber of cooperation ‘vectors’ that allow forcomplementary activities, and in some instancescooperative efforts within the same area of opera-tions, there are significant points of divergence.

The first centres around the principle of impartiality.Humanitarian agencies are first and foremostcommitted and accountable to the people they aremandated to serve.This commitment is central to allhumanitarian policy debates and decisions.The coreprinciples of humanity, impartiality and indepen-dence form the foundation of agency policy. TheSwiss Agency for Development Cooperation offersan uncompromising, principles-based description of ahumanitarian act:

Humanitarian work is guided by humanitarianprinciples. In short, humanitarian assistance isprovided based on need. It is given in an impartialmanner, without the expectation of payment andwithout any political conditions attached, other than

it should reach those in need. Humanitarianproviders strive to deliver this help in a neutralmanner, without taking sides in disputes or politicalpositions on the underlying issues (Lang, 2001).

The mandate of humanitarian agencies is straightfor-ward: to alleviate human suffering amongst those leastable to withstand a disaster. Humanitarian activitiesmust be clearly impartial and independent of politicaland military motivations, or they violate the coreprinciple of the humanitarian imperative, that ‘whenwe give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such’(Sphere, 2000). Assistance delivered by Western mili-taries can never be impartial in the sense that agenciesunderstand the term, not least because it is deliveredonly in theatres where these forces have a presence. Inother words, military involvement in humanitarianresponse is a possibility exclusively in areas of politicalor strategic interest to the interested powers.Deployments are, in fact, relatively few: UN andNATO peacekeeping missions are currently present inless than a third of the 50 or so countries in conflict inthe world (see Annex 1). Humanitarian agencies, bycomparison, are active in most countries in conflict.

The second issue is to do with the questionable effec-tiveness of assistance as delivered by the military.There is simply not enough evidence to support theargument that military involvement in humanitarianactivity works – that it is appropriate, cost-effective,even necessary. While agencies and militaries mayagree that such assistance should be contemplatedonly in exceptional circumstances, this does not getus far since it is unclear how such circumstances areto be identified. It is also not safe to assume that theexistence of such ‘exceptional circumstances’ in agiven emergency is not itself a deliberate result ofpolicy and a failure to adequately support humani-

Conclusion



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tarian structures.Also little examined are the implica-tions of this growing preoccupation with humani-tarian assistance for what might be regarded aspeacekeeping’s primary function in a conflict zone: toprotect civilians from the effects of violence. Atvarious points in the past – in Rwanda in 1994, inBosnia (Srebrenica) in July 1995 and in Zaire in 1996– international forces have conspicuously failed toprotect civilian populations because the political willto do so has been absent.

Although doubts about the wisdom and efficacy ofmilitary engagement in the delivery of humanitarianassistance are being raised, the push for greatermilitary involvement in traditionally humanitarianareas is likely to persist. Developments in Afghanistansince late 2001, for instance, indicate that policy-makers in the West still believe that humanitarian

assistance can exist, not as an impartial response tohuman need, but as a tool of diplomacy and foreignpolicy in areas deemed of strategic importance.Given that the issue is unlikely to disappear quietly,agencies must fully engage in current efforts todefine and clarify civil–military relationships inconflicts, emphasising in particular the standards andguidelines they insist upon around the militaryimplementation of humanitarian assistance. Thisengagement should firmly disentangle humanitarianassistance from politics by reclaiming both humani-tarian space and the core principles of impartiality,neutrality, independence and the humanitarianimperative.This is not a shift to humanitarian mini-malism, purism or isolationism – it is a clear affirma-tion of a commitment to the principles and valuesenshrined in the Geneva Conventions and in theRed Cross Code of Conduct.


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Annex 1Major conflicts worldwide since 1960


Start Status/ States directly Conflict type Deaths (by Deaths Current Past peacekeeping intensity involved end 1999) in 2000 peacekeeping presence

(blank if presence (asunknown) at August 2001)

1978 Ongoing Afghanistan Civil war 1,000,000 >3,000 None UNGOMAP (1988–90)(high)

1991 Ongoing Algeria Civil war (Islamic 40,000 >1,000 None None(sporadic) militants)

1975 Ongoing Angola Civil war 1,000,000 >1,000 None MONUA (1997–99) (high) (UNITA) UNAVEM I (1988–91)

UNAVEM II (1991–95) UNAVEM III (1995–97)

1990 Suspended Azerbaijan Ethnic war 15,000 None None1997 (Nagorno-Karabakh)

1975 Suspended Bangladesh Ethnic war 25,000 None None1992 (Chittagong Hills)

1992 Suspended Bosnia Ethnic war (Serbs, 200,000 UNMIBH IFOR (1995–96)1995 Croats, Muslims) SFOR (NATO) SFOR (1996–98)

UNPROFOR (1992–95)

1993 Ongoing Burundi Ethnic war 100,000 Approx None None(medium) (Tutsis vs Hutus) 1,000

1990 Suspended Cambodia Civil war 5,000 None UNAMIC (1991–92) 1997 (Khmer Rouge) UNTAC (1992–93)

1996 Ongoing Central African Factional Under 2,000 None CIS and MISAB (1997–98)(sporadic) Republic skirmishes MINURCA (1998–2000)

BONUCA (2000–2001)

1965 Ended 1994 Chad Civil war 75,000 None UNASOG (1990–94)(sporadic)

1980 Repressed China Ethnic violence 10,000 None None1998 (Uighurs, Kazakhs)

1984 Ongoing Colombia Civil violence >30,000 >1,000 None None(medium) (insurgency and

drug lords)

1999 Ongoing Comoros Political (Anjouan) None None(sporadic)

1997 Suspended Congo- Civil war 10,000 None ONUC (1960–64)(tenuous) Brazzaville1999

1991 Suspended Croatia Ethnic war 40,000 UNMOP UNPROFOR (1992–95)1995 (Serbs) UNCRO (1995–96)

UNMOP (1996–present)UNTAES (1996–99)



22



1964 Ongoing Cyprus Civil violence 5,000 UNFICYP UNFICYP (1964–present)(non-violent)

1998 Ongoing Democratic Rebel violence 2.5 million >2,000 MONUC – SADC (1998–present)Republic of and inter-state June 2002 MONUC (1999–present)Congo conflict SADC 1998-

present

1965 Suspended Dominican Civil war 4,000 None DOMREP (1965–66)1974 Republic

1992 Repressed Egypt Civil violence 2,000 None UNEFME or UNEF II 1999 (Islamic militants) (1973–79)

1991 Suspended El Salvador Civil violence 125,000 None ONUSAL (1991–95)1995

1998 Ongoing Eritrea/Ethiopia Inter-state war 50,000– >1,000 UNMEE June 2000–present(high) 100,000

1998 Suspended Georgia Ethnic war 1,000 UNOMIG UNOMIG (1993–present)(tenuous) (Abkhazia) CIS CIS (July 1992–present)

1960 Suspended Guatemala Civil war 150,000 None MINUGUA 1996 (Jan–May 1997)

1996 Ongoing Guinea Inter-state violence Over 1,000 None None(military coup)

1998 Suspended Guinea-Bissau Civil war (coup 6,000 None ECOMOG (1998–99)(tenuous) attempt)1999

1991 Suspended Haiti Internal violence 5,000 None UNMIH (1993–96) 1994 (military coup) UNSMIH (1996–97)

UNTMIH (1997) MIPONUH (1997–2000)

1990 Ongoing India/Pakistan Ethnic war 30,000 >200 UNMOGIP UNIPOM (1965–66)(medium) (Kashmiris)

1999 Suspended Indonesia Ethnic violence >2,000 100–300 UNTAET UNTAET(tenuous) (East Timor

independence)

1991 Iraq/Kuwait Monitor cease-fire UNIKOM

1996 Suspended Iraq/Iran Ethnic war (Kurds) 2,000 UNIIMOG (1988–91)(tenuous)1998

1974 Israel/Syria UNDOF 1974–present

1965 Ongoing Israel/Palestine Arab Palestinians 13,000 325 UNTSO UNTSO (since 1948)(low) vs PLO

1999 Suspended Ivory Coast Civil war Unknown None None(tenuous) (military coup)2000

1999 Kosovo Promote autonomy UNMIK UNMIK (June1999–present)

1978 Resolved Lebanon International 5,000 UNIFIL UNOGIL (1958)violence (PLO UNIFIL (since 1978)factions)

1998 Suspended Lesotho Civil violence 1,000 None SADC (1998) (tenuous) (elections)2000




1990 Sporadic Liberia Civil war 40,000 None ECOMOG (1997)

2001 Ongoing Macedonia Political/ethnic/ Unknown NATO UNPROFOR (1992–95)(medium) (Macedonian UNPREDEP (1995–99)

Albanians vs Macedonian Slavs)

1991 Suspended Moldova Ethnic violence 2,000 None CIS (1992)1997 (Trans-Dniester

Russians)

1975 Suspended Morocco Colonial war 15,000 MINURSO MINURSO (since 1991)1989 (Western Sahara)

1975 Resolved Mozambique Civil war 900,000 None ONUMOZ (1992–94) 1993

1948 Ongoing Myanmar Ethnic war (Karen, 1948–50: 50–200 None None(low) Shan, others) 8,000

1981–88: 5,000–8,000

1966 Resolved Namibia Civil war 13,000 None UNTAG (1989–90)1990

1996 Ongoing Nepal Civil violence (UPF 2,000 None None(low) ‘People’s war’)

1990 Suspended Niger Ethnic violence 1,000 None None1997 (Azawad and Toubou)

1999 Ongoing Nigeria Ethnic (Delta 1,500 None None(low) and northern regions)

1983 Repressed Pakistan Ethnic 5,000 UNMOGIP UNIPOM (1965–66)1998 (Sindhis, Mohajirs) UNMOGIP (since 1948)

1988 Suspended Papua New Ethnic war 1,000 None UNSF (1962–63)1997 Guinea (Bougainville)

1982 Repressed Peru Civil violence 30,000 None None1997 (Sendero Luminoso)

1999 Ongoing Russia Ethnic war 40,000– >10,000 None None(Chechen separatists) 70,000

1994 Sporadic Rwanda Ethnic warfare 15,000 None UNAMIR (1993–96) (ousted Hutus vs Rwanda/Uganda: Tutsi regime) UNOMUR (1993–94)

1991 Sporadic Senegal Ethnic violence 3,000 None None(Casamance)

1991 Ongoing Sierra Leone Civil/ethnic warfare 25,000 UNAMSIL UNOMSIL (1998–99) (medium) (RUF/Mende)

1988 Sporadic Somalia Civil war 100,000 None UNOSOM I (1992–93) UNOSOM II (1993–95)

1983 Ongoing Sri Lanka Ethnic war (Tamils) 50,000 >4,000 None None(high)

1983 Ongoing Sudan Ethnic war (Islamic 37,000– >1,000 None None(high) vs African) 40,000

1992 Suspended Tajikistan Civil war 25,000 None UNMOT (1994–2000)(tenuous) CIS (1993)

1984 Ongoing Turkey Ethnic war (Kurds) >30,000 200–400 None None(low)

23




24



1986 Sporadic Uganda Ethnic violence 10,000 None None(Langi and Acholi)

1991– Western Sahara Conflict for autonomy None MINURSO (1991–2001)2001

1962 Suspended Yemen Inter-state violence 100,000 None UNYOM (1963–64)1970

1998 Suspended Yugoslavia 15,000 UNMIK, KFOR UNPROFOR (1992–95)1999 Current since June 1999

Ongoing Zimbabwe Ethnic violence Over 2,000 None None

This data is based on research compiled by Monty G. Marshall, Director, Center for Systemic Peace,(http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm), and information from the Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute (SIPRI: http://projects.sipri.se/conflictstudy/majorarmedconflicts.html). Additional sources are: UNDPKO(www.un.org/depts/DPKO); the University of Maryland Development and Conflict Management website(www.bsos.umd.edu/cid.cm); Recent Peace Agreements and Cease-Fires, INCORE, February 2001 (www.incore.ulst.ac.uk);and Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946–1999 (http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/cspframe.htm).


25

Annex 2Initiatives in civil–military relationsThe NGO Military Contact GroupThe NGO Military Contact Group (NMCG) was established on the joint recommendation of NGO andmilitary delegates, and was mandated to take forward initiatives conducive to developing a greater under-standing between both sectors. Currently, the group’ membership comprises two NGO representatives – onefrom ActionAid and one from Oxfam – one military representative, and a representative from the Conflict andHumanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), part of the UK government’s Department for InternationalDevelopment (DFID). Since it was established, the NMCG has implemented several initiatives aimed at facilitating a wider dialogue between military and humanitarian actors.These include:

• The ‘Bandundo Workshop’ – a joint training event exploring military and NGO planning processes inresponse to humanitarian crises in complex emergencies;

• a three-month military attachment to ActionAid;• NGO participation in military-led conferences and courses; and• military participation in courses run by the international NGO RedR.

Cranfield University Disaster Management CentreThe Disaster Management MSc at Cranfield University in the UK covers both complex emergencies andnatural disasters. Modules include: training in emergencies, including security training; logistics; securityand communications; and the essentials of humanitarian practice. The course covers: hazards, disasters,research skills, complex emergencies, urban risk management, human-made disasters and public healthconsequences.

Cranfield also runs international and national courses (over five weeks, or an intensive one-week course) that include complex emergency modules. These courses are attended by government officials, as well as representatives of aid agencies and the military. Cranfield is also negotiating with the UN to run pre-missionconflict training at both strategic and operational levels.This training would be funded by DFID’s ConflictPrevention Fund.

The Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian AssistanceThe Center of Excellence is a partnership of the US Pacific Command, the Pacific Regional MedicalCommand, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the University of Hawaii. It is the only WorldHealth Organisation-designated Collaborating Centre for humanitarian civil–military cooperation. The Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building programme runs a series of seminars, symposia and exercisesto facilitate multinational dialogue on the nature of peace operations. Representatives from the UNDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the US army have participated.

Wilton Park conferencesIn April 2001, the Wilton Park centre in the UK ran a conference on ‘The Role of the Military in ComplexEmergencies’ (see www.wiltonpark.co.uk). The conference, which covered issues such relations betweenNGOs and governments, NGO coordination, lessons from Kosovo and the future of civil–military relations,was attended by representatives of the British government, NGOs, the ICRC, the British military and academics. In October–November 2002, a further conference is scheduled on ‘Post-conflict Reconstruction: Lessons Learnt and Best Practice’, covering the division of responsibilities betweencivilians and armed forces.




26

The UK Ministry of DefenceStaff coursesThe British military has a number of relevant courses.The advanced one-year course at Major/Lieutenant-Colonel level has a two-week segment covering peace support operations.The first week comprises talks froma range of speakers, including NGO and UN agency personnel.The second week includes a mapping exercise,in which NGO staff participate.The course is attended by officers from all three service branches.The HigherCommand and Staff Course, aimed at officers of the rank of Colonel, includes several civilian personnel fromother government departments. NGO personnel have not yet attended, but are welcome to do so.The JointOperations Planning Course trains officers about to join the Permanent Joint Headquarters or the Joint ForceHeadquarters. The course includes a peace support operations module, with contributions from an NGOrepresentative, who also takes part in a mapping exercise.

Operational Training and Advisory GroupsThe Operational Training and Advisory Groups (OPTAG) is responsible for overseeing the pre-deploymenttraining of military units, usually includes a session on NGOs. OPTAG also runs courses for UN MilitaryObservers, and has run a course for civilian OSCE observers.

The Joint Doctrine and Concepts CentreThe Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC) is attempting to develop a more integrated approach totraining for peace operations that involves civilians right from the start.A five-phase strategy has been developed.

• Phase one involves running seminars and conferences.• Phase two involves funding places on existing Ministry of Defence courses for representatives from the

UN, from UN troop-contributing countries and from NGOs.• Phase three involves making existing courses more suitable for civilian participation.• Phase four involves developing bespoke courses for the UN and NGO staff.The UK is running a Mission

Headquarters Orientation Programme course in September 2002. This two-week course is aimed atmilitary, police or civilian middle and senior managers who may form part of a UN mission headquarters.

• Phase five would establish a civilian-run Peace Support Training Centre.This would bring together civilianadministration staff, military personnel, police, lawyers, humanitarians and academics from around theworld.

British Military Advisory and Training Teams British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs) work closely with a number of African peacekeepingtraining centres, for example in Kenya and Ghana, and with a centre in the Czech Republic aimed at theCaucasus region. BMATTs assist these centres in running their own courses and exercises.


27

ReferencesAaronson (2001) ‘NGOs and the Military in Complex Emergencies: The New Realities – The NGOPerspective’, paper presented by Save the Children UK at the Wilton Park conference on ‘The Role of theMilitary in Complex Emergencies’,April.

Amnesty International (1999) ‘Amnesty International Concerns Relating to NATO Bombings’, AmnestyInternational Press Release, 18 May.

Bonard, P. (1999) ‘Modes of Action used by Humanitarian Players: Criteria for OperationalComplementarity’, International Committee of the Red Cross.

Borton, J. et al. (1996) The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience.Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

Boyle, F. A. (2001) ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Law’, Doctor Irma M. Parhad Lecture,Faculty of Medicine, University of Calgary, 13 March.

Brahimi, L. (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc.A/55/305, 21 August.

Byman, D. L. et al. (2000) Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies andAllies in Humanitarian Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

Curtis, D. (2001) Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension, HPG Report 10. London:Humanitarian Policy Group.

HPN (2001) ‘The Brahimi Report: Politicising Humanitarianism?’, Humanitarian Exchange 18,April.

ICRC (1995) Report on the Use of Armed Protection for Humanitarian Assistance, ICRC and InternationalFederation, Council of Delegates, Geneva, 1–2 December.

International Council on Human Rights (2001) ‘Behind the Lines – Assessing NGO Responses to MilitaryIntervention’, International Council on Human Rights Newsletter, vol. 4, no. 2, June.

Lang, C. (2001) Improving International Civil–Military Relations in Humanitarian Emergencies, draft, Swiss Agencyfor Development and Cooperation.

Laurence,T. (1999) Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping:An Uneasy Alliance, unpublished thesis, St.Antony’sCollege, Oxford University.

Lowe, S.W. (2000) ‘Peacekeeping, Peace Building, Human Security and Self-Interest:Why Canada Remainsthe Prolific Peacekeeper’, paper presented at the Conference of Defence Associations Third Annual GraduateStudent Symposium, 3–4 November 2000.

Macrae, J. and N. Leader (eds) (2000a) Terms of Engagement: Conditions and Conditionality in Humanitarian Action,report of a conference organised by ODI and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva, 3–4 May.

Macrae, J. and N. Leader (2000b) Shifting Sands: The Search for ‘Coherence’ between Political and HumanitarianResponses to Complex Emergencies, HPG Report 8. London: Humanitarian Policy Group.




28

UK Ministry of Defence (2001) UK MOD Civil–Military Co-operation Philosophy. 10 August.

OCHA (2001) ‘Use of Military or Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys, Discussion Paper’, June 2001.

Oxfam (2000) ‘The Roles of Civilian Humanitarian Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Crises’, draftfor discussion at the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, 26 July.

Pelton, E. (2000) ‘Mission Creep? Peacekeepers Influence on Humanitarian Aid Delivery in Kosovo and EastTimor’, CARE, 15 August.

Rollins, J. (2000) ‘Operational Models for Civil–Military Cooperation: Possibilities and Limitations’,Humanitarian Exchange 18, September.

Schenkenberg, E. ‘NGOs Must Seriously Reflect on their Roles following the Kosovo Refugee Crisis’,Focus:Balkans, September 2001, www.oneworld.org/voice/crisis.html.

SCHR (2000) Some NGO Views on the Humanitarian Implications of Implementing the Brahimi Report. Geneva:Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response.

SCHR (2001) Draft Position Paper on Humanitarian–Military Relations, January.

SCF-UK (1994) The United Nations and Humanitarian Assistance, SCF-UK Position Paper, March 1994.

Secretariat of the Oslo Guidelines Process (2001) ‘Draft Guidelines on The Use of Military and Civil DefenceAssets To Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’, Geneva, September.

Simons, P. C. (2000) ‘Humanitarian Intervention:A Review of Literature’, Ploughshares Monitor, December.

Slim, H. (2001) Military Intervention to Protect Human Rights:The Humanitarian Agency Perspective. Paper preparedfor the International Council on Human Rights Policy, March.

Slim, H. (2001) Violence and Humanitarianism: Moral Paradox and the Protection of Civilians. Oxford: OxfordBrookes University.

Spence, N.A. (date unknown) ‘Developing a Comprehensive Approach: Civil–Military Co-operation – Morethan a Field Application’, discussion paper, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre.

Sphere (2000) The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Oxford: OxfamPublishing.

Stockton, N. (1998) ‘Non-Governmental Organisations and Forced Migration’, speaking notes for the‘Conference on Forced Migration, New Directions in Research, Policy and Practice’, Refugee StudiesProgramme, University of Oxford, 25 March.

Tanguy, J. (2000) ‘Intervention, Protection and Humanitarian Assistance at a Crossroads’, paper presented at theWorld Affairs Council, San Francisco, CA, March 2000.

Teale, P. (1996) Whose Job Is It? Policy Development and the Roles for NGOs and the Military in ComplexEmergencies, Canadian Council for International Cooperation, March.

Terry, F. (2001) ‘Military Involvement in Refugee Crises:A Positive Evolution?’, The Lancet, vol. 357, 5 May.

Thornberry, C. (1996) ‘Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Conflicts’, in Whitman, J. and D. Pocock(eds), After Rwanda:The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. Basingstoke: Macmillan.


29

Tufts (2001) The Politicisation of Humanitarian Action and Staff Security – The Use of Private Security Companies byHumanitarian Agencies – An International Workshop Summary Report,Tufts University,April.

VOICE (2000) ‘K.Annan Fears New Threat of “Humanitarian Bombing’”, VOICE Newsletter, vol. 7, no. 17,10 December.

Wedgewood, R. (1999) ‘Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention”: Editorial Comments: NATO’sKosovo Intervention’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, no. 4, October.




30

InterviewsChris ColemanUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), New York, US.

Major David CouzensJoint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), Shrivenham,Wiltshire, UK.

Austen DavisGeneral Director, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)–Holland,Amsterdam,The Netherlands.

Andrew HarperFormerly Manager, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Joint Operations Center, East Timor.

Sarah LongfordWorld Food Programme, Rome, Italy.

Major Ross NicholsCranfield University Disaster Management Centre, Shrivenham,Wiltshire, UK.

Lieutenant-Colonel John RollinsSupreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mons, Belgium.

Craig SandersUNHCR, Geneva, Switzerland.

Ed Schenkenberg von MeiropDirector, International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), Geneva, Switzerland.

Hugo SlimCentre for Development and Emergency Practice (CENDEP), Oxford Brookes University, Oxford, UK.

Nicholas StocktonOxfam, Oxford, UK.

Colonel Fiona WalthallAssistant Director, Peace Support Operations, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), Shrivenham,Wiltshire, UK.

Roger YatesEmergencies Director,ActionAid, London, UK.


1 MSF-CIS (Celula Inter-Secçoes), Mozambique: A DataCollecting System Focused on Food Security andPopulation Movements by T. Dusauchoit (1994)

2 Responding to the 1991/92 Drought in Zambia: The Programme to Prevent Malnutrition (PPM) by D. Mukupo (1994)

3 An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia by M. Duffield (1994)

4 Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours - The PoliticalEconomy of Relief and Rehabilitation in the SomaliRegion 5, Eastern Ethiopia by K. Van Brabant (1994)

5 Advancing Preventive Diplomacy in a Post-Cold WarEra: Suggested Roles for Governments and NGOs byK. Rupesinghe (1994)

6 The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: initial successes and failures in food assistance by S. Jaspars(1994)

7 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross andRed Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Reliefed. J. Borton (1994)

8 Targeting the Poor in Northern Iraq: The Role of Formaland Informal Research Methods in Relief Operationsby P. Ward and M. Rimmer (1995)

9 Development in Conflict: the Experience of ACORD inUganda, Sudan, Mali and Angola by ACORD (1995)

10 Room for Improvement: the Management and Supportof Relief Workers by R. Macnair (1995)

11 Cash-for-Work and Food Insecurity in Koisha, SouthernEthiopia by P. Jenden (1995)

12 Dilemmas of ‘Post’-Conflict Transition: Lessons fromthe Health Sector by J. Macrae (1995)

13 Getting On-Line in Emergencies: A Guide andDirectory to the Internet for Agencies involved inRelief and Rehabilitation by L. Aris, P. Gee and M.Perkins (1996)

14 The Impact of War and Atrocity on CivilianPopulations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventionsand a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects by D. Summerfield (1996)

15 Cost-effectiveness Analysis: A Useful Tool for theAssessment and Evaluation of Relief Operations? by A. Hallam (1996)

16 The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance toRwanda: Study III ed. J. Borton (1996)

17 Monetisation: Linkages to Food Security? by J. Cekan, A. MacNeil and S. Loegering (1996)

18 Beyond Working in Conflict: Understanding Conflictand Building Peace (The CODEP Workshop Report), by

J. Bennett and M. Kayitesi Blewitt (1996)19 Human Rights and International Legal Standards: what

relief workers need to know by J. Darcy (1997)20 People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the

Management and Support of Aid Personnel ed. S.Davidson (1997)

21 Humanitarian Principles: The Southern SudanExperience by I. Levine (1997)

22 The War Economy in Liberia: A Political Analysis by P. Atkinson (1997)

23 The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case ofSri Lanka by K. Van Brabant (1997)

24 Reproductive Health for Displaced Populations by C. Palmer (1998)

25 Humanitarian Action in Protracted Crises: the newrelief ‘agenda’ and its limits by D. Hendrickson (1998)

26 The Food Economy Approach: a framework for under-standing rural livelihoods by T. Boudreau (1998)

27 Between Relief and Development: targeting food aidfor disaster prevention in Ethiopia by K. Sharp (1998)

28 North Korea: The Politics of Food Aid by J. Bennett(1999)

29 Participatory Review in Chronic Instability: TheExperience of the IKAFE Refugee SettlementProgramme, Uganda by K. Neefjes (1999)

30 Protection in Practice: Field Level Strategies forProtecting Civilians from Deliberate Harm by D. Paul(1999)

31 The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Health and Well-being by R. Garfield (1999)

32 Humanitarian Mine Action: The First Decade of a NewSector in Humanitarian Aid by C. Horwood (2000)

33 The Political Economy of War: What Relief AgenciesNeed to Know by P. Le Billon (2000)

34 NGO Responses to Hurricane Mitch: Evaluations forAccountability and Learning by F. Grunewald, V. de Geoffroy & S. Lister (2000)

35 Cash Transfers in Emergencies: Evaluating Benefits andAssessing Risks by D. Peppiatt, J. Mitchell and P. Holzmann (2001)

36 Food-security Assessments in Emergencies: ALivelihoods Approach by H. Young, S. Jaspars, R. Brown, J. Frize and H. Khogali (2001)

37 Aid Agencies and the Military: Roles and Relationshipsin Humanitarian Response by J. Barry with A. Jefferys(2002)

38 HIV/AIDS and Emergencies: Analysis andRecommendations for Practice by A. Smith (2002)

Network PapersNetwork Papers are contributions on specific experiences or issues prepared either by HPN members

or contributing specialists.

Good Practice ReviewsGood Practice Reviews are commissioned ‘state of the art’ reviews on different sectors or activities withinthe relief and rehabilitation field. Prepared by recognised specialists, and subject to peer review, they are

produced in a format that is readily accessible to field-based personnel.

1 Water and Sanitation in Emergencies by A. Chalinder(1994)

2 Emergency Supplementary Feeding Programmes by J. Shoham (1994)

3 General Food Distribution in Emergencies: fromNutritional Needs to Political Priorities by S. Jasparsand H. Young (1996)

4 Seed Provision During and After Emergencies by theODI Seeds and Biodiversity Programme (1996)

5 Counting and Identification of Beneficiary Populationsin Emergency Operations: Registration and itsAlternatives by J. Telford (1997)

6 Temporary Human Settlement Planning for DisplacedPopulations in Emergencies by A. Chalinder (1998)

7 The Evaluation of Humanitarian Assistance Programmesin Complex Emergencies by A. Hallam (1998)

8 Operational Security Management in ViolentEnvironments by K. Van Brabant (200)


H U M A N I T A R I A N P R A C T I C E N E T W O R K

Background

The Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN) was established by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in1994 under the name Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN). It is run as part of ODI’s Humanitarian PolicyGroup (HPG).

Purpose

To stimulate critical analysis, advance the professional learning and development of those engaged in andaround humanitarian action, and improve practice.

Objectives

To provide relevant and useable analysis and guidance for humanitarian practice, as well as summary informationon relevant policy and institutional developments in the humanitarian sector.

Activities

• Publishing in three formats: Good Practice Reviews (one per year), Network Papers (four to six per year)and Humanitarian Exchange (two per year). All materials are produced in English and French.

• Operating a resource website: this is one of the key reference sites for humanitarian actors.

• Collaborating with international ‘partner’ networks: this increases the reach of the HPN, and brings mutualbenefit to the participating networks.

• Holding occasional seminars on topical issues: these bring together practitioners, policy-makers and analysts.

HPN target audience

Individuals and organisations actively engaged in humanitarian action. Also those involved in the improvementof performance at international, national and local level – in particular mid-level operational managers, staffin policy departments, and trainers.

While a project and Network with its own identity, the HPN exists within the Humanitarian Policy Group atthe ODI. This not only ensures extended networking and dissemination opportunities, but also positions theHPN in a wider ‘centre of excellence’ which enhances the impact of the HPN’s work.

Funding

The HPG is supported by the British Red Cross, CARE, DANIDA, the Department of Foreign Affairs Ireland,DFID, ECHO, Oxfam, MFA Netherlands, MSF, OCHA, SCF(UK), SIDA, UNDP, USAID and the WFP.


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