a pattern of argument in lucretius

8/14/2019 A Pattern of Argument in Lucretius

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A Pattern of Argument in Lucretius

Author(s): Michael WigodskySource: Pacific Coast Philology, Vol. 9 (Apr., 1974), pp. 73-78Published by: Pacific Ancient and Modern Language AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1316572

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A PATTERNOF ARGUMENTIN LUCRETIUSBY MICHAEL WIGODSKY

The Magna Mater passage in Book 2 of De Rerum Natura has been oneof the stock examples of l'anti-Lucrece hez Lucrece ever since Patin firstintroduced the phrase.' This paper is not intended to reargue the questionwhetherLucretiusdwells at inordinate ength on religiousideas to which he isemotionally attractedin spite of his reason, as Patin thought, or whether heis rather satirizingthe worshippersof the Great Mother.2Instead, I wish tocall attentionto the structureof the passage,in which allegoricalinterpretationsof the myth and the cult of the goddessare set forth without criticsm,only tobe rejectedat the end, where Lucretiussays (2.644-60),quae bene et eximie quamvis disposta ferantur,longe sunt tamen a vera ratione repulsa.omnis enim per se divum natura necessestimmortaliaevo summa cum pace fruatursemota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe.nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri,nec bene promeritiscapitur neque tangiturira.terraquidem vero caret omni tempore sensu,et quia multarumpotitur primordiarerum,multa modis multis effert in lumina solis.hic siquis mare Neptunum Cereremquevocareconstituet fruges et Bacchi nomine abutimavult quam laticis propriumproferre vocamen,concedamus ut hic terrarumdictitet orbemesse deum matrem, dum vera re tamen ipsereligione animum turpi contingere parcat.

The same patternoccurs at the beginningof the poem, where the invoca-tion of Venus, and the prayer that she grant peace to the poet and the world,are followed, in the manuscripts,by the same six lines about the untroubledexistence of the gods which are found in the MagnaMater passage (1.44-49 =2.646-51). The denial that the gods concern themselves with our affairs isgood Epicureandoctrine (indeed, these six lines are a paraphraseof Epicurus,Kyriai Doxai 1); but its apparentinconsistencywith the prayer for peace isso strikingthat many scholars,from Marulluson, have removed 1.44-49 as aninterpolation.The inconsistencyis, however, only apparent,and what is saidabout Venus, like the allegorical interpretationsgiven in the Magna Materpassage,is true in a sense-perhaps in more than one sense; for Venus can beinterpretedboth as a symbol of Epicureanvoluptas, and as one of the godswho, according to Epicurus, do literally exist in the intermundia,and who,though untouchedby the troubles of men, are well-disposedtoward wise men

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MICHAELWIGODSKYand providethem with a model of calm and virtuous life.3 The closing linesof the two passagesaremeantto indicatehow the readeris to understandwhathas gone before; but the abrupttransitions,and the superficialappearanceofcontradiction,are puzzling. My object in this paper is to lessen the difficultyby showingthat the structuralpatternfound in these two passagesis one whichLucretius follows in other places where no one has alleged inconsistency.

We may set aside the much briefer retelling of the story of Phaethon(5.396-404), which is introducedwith ut fama est, and which is not reinter-preted, but simply denied, in the following lines. There is one much closerparallel which is, unfortunately, just as unhelpful; that is the passage aboutthe use of wild beasts in warfare, of which Bailey says, I confess . . . thatthisparagraph,morethananythingelse in the poem, makesme wonder whetherJeromewas not right,and that Lucr.'smind was from time to time deranged. 4Like the allegoricalinterpretations f the cult of the Great Mother, the storyof the experimentof releasingwild bulls, boars, and lions against the enemyis first presentedas fact; then Lucretiusgoes on (5.1341-46),si fuit ut facerent. sed vix adducor ut, antequamcommune malum fieret foedumque,futurumnon quierint animo praesentireatque videre;et magis id possis factum contendere n omni,in variis mundis varia ratione creatis,quam certo atque uno terrarumquolibet orbi.

Here again Lucretiusqualifies his foregoing flat assertionby a reference tobasic Epicureandoctrines;but this, and the telling of the Phaethon myth,seem on the surface to supportPatin's account of Lucretiusas carried awayby his poetic imagination,and having to recall himself to the plain prose ofphilosophy.We must look elsewherefor parallelsthat do not smack of incon-sistency and vacilation.Warningthe reader against a possible misinterpretation f what one hasjust said, is analogousto anticipatinga possible objection, or to mentioning,in orderto refute it, an alternativeexplanationof the phenomenonunder dis-

cussion;and of coursesuch sequencesof thoughtare common in Lucretius,asin all argumentativewriting.Thus at ithevery beginningof the exposition,theargumentsfor the propositionsthat nothing is created from nothing or de-stroyed to nothing imply the existence of particlestoo small to be perceived;the next section then begins (1.267-70),ne qua forte tamen coeptes diffidere dictis,quod nequeuntoculis rerum primordiacerni,accipe praetereaquae corpora tute necessestconfiteare esse in rebus nec posse videri.

Similartransitionsare often made less explicitly, as when, in the account ofthe beginningsof social organization,we find a referenceto stammeringcom-munication by cries and gestures, vocibus et gestu cum balbe significarent(5.1022), which is then taken up a few lines later by the account of the ori-gins of language.Other instancescome closer to the exampleswith which westarted, in that a possible implication of something that the poet has just

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A PATTERN F ARGUMENTN LUCRETIUSsaid is denied. Thus the account of the monstersbroughtforth by the youngearth, lacking limbs or made up of ill-assortedlimbs and so unable to sur-vive (5.837-77), is followed by a denial that centaursor the other monstersof myth, includingmen of gigantic size (913-15), ever existed; the next sec-tion begins, at genus humanummulto fuit illud in arvis/ durius (925-26),the at clearly referringback to the statement ten lines earlierthat giants neverexisted.

An even more strikingparallel is the sequence of thought in the sectionimmediatelyprecedingthe Magna Mater passage. One of the argumentsforthe propositionthat there are an infinite numberof atoms of each shape runsas follows (2.532-46):nam quod rara vides magis esse animaliaquaedamfecundamqueminus naturamcernis in illis,at regione locoque alio terrisqueremotismulta licet genere esse in eo numerumquerepleri;sicut quadrupedumcum primis esse videmusin genere anguimanuselephantos, India quorummilibus e multis vallo munitureburno,ut penitus nequeat penetrari:tanta ferarumvis est, quarumnos perpaucaexempla videmus.sed tamen id quoqueuti concedam,quamlibetestounica res quaedamnativo corpore sola,cui similis toto terrarumnon sit in orbi;infinita tamen nisi erit vis materiaiunde ea progignipossit concepta, crearinon poterit,neque, quod superest,procrescerealique.

The further developmentof this idea leads to a section on the balance ofcreativeand destructiveforces in the universe,after which Lucretiuscontinues(2.581-85), illud in his obsignatumquoquerebushabereconvenitet memorimandatummentetenere,nil esse, in promptuquorumnaturavidetur,quodgenereex uno consistatprincipiorum,nec quicquamquod non permixtosemine constet;that is to say, You must not misunderstandwhat I said about elephants fortylines back; rare animals may have in their make-up some atomic shapes notfound in other, commoneranimals,but there are no elephantatoms as such.This limitation on the comparison between atoms and animals is itselfpart of a larger example of the patternunder discussion,which can be seenin the way Lucretiususes one of his key metaphorsthroughoutBooks 1 and 2(and it is, after all, about metaphorsthat Lucretius is talking when he says,at 2.655-60, that one may call wine Bacchus or grain Ceres). It has oftenbeen remarkedthat not only such explicit comparisonsas this, or the famouscomparisonof atomic motions to the movements of troops in battle (2.118-20,323-32), but also the metaphorsbuilt into Lucretius'very language insistentlypersonify the atoms, representingthem as miniature Romans, who meet inconcilia (assemblies), form nexus (contracts), and so on;5 and the same in-

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MICHAEL IGODSKYtention to deny implicitlyany gulf betweenanimate and inanimatenature canbe seen in the fact that, when talking about things, that is, about compoundbodies in general, Lucretius regularly gives the first and most conspicuousplace among his examples to living things.6But of course the comparisonisonly partly valid; and so the treatment of the propertiesof atoms in Book 2ends with an accountof how color, heat, cold, sound, taste, odor, and finallysensation and thought can be produced by the combinationsof the atoms,which themselvespossess none of these properties(2.730-1022). Sensation,Bailey observes,7 is not quite on the same plane as the other qualities ;andin fact Epicurus, in the Letter to Herodotus, treats it separately from theothers;8but Lucretiushas placed it here, at the end of the section, as a nec-essary correctiveto his own personificationof the atoms, which neverthelessdo not laughand cry and discoursesubtlyof the atomswhich make up them-selves (2.976-79). Book 2 then ends with a section in which Lucretiusturnsfrom the microcosmto the macrocosm,and comparesour world as a wholeto a living being, to this extent, that it is not unique but one of many of itskind, and that it had a beginningand will have an end; once again, the nec-essaryqualification, hat the world,unlike a living being, does not have sensa-tion and thought, follows only later (5.114-45).

If we ask why Lucretius followed this pattern of argument, it may behelpful to start from an observationwhich Clay has made in connection withthe prayerto Venus, namelythat De rerum naturadoes not presentitself fromthe outset as an Epicureanpoem, but rather begins with things that mighthave been said, subjectto differing interpretations,by any philosopher,or byany pagan poet.9To this one may add that the poem is not a complete, nora completelysystematic,expositionof Epicureanism;many importantdoctrinesare alludedto only in passing,or not at all. Lucretius'object is not to establisheverypoint in the system by rigorousargument,but to put Memmius,and laterreaders,on the right path, which, like sagacioushunting dogs, they can thenfollow for themselves (1.400-09).His object, in other words, is persuasion;and persuasionwas generallycon-sideredthe objectof rhetoric.Yet Epicuruscondemnedrhetoric;and althoughthe EpicureanPhilodemuswrote on rhetoric,what he meant by the word was

the studyof style for its own sake, since he held that there was no such thingas a science of persuasion.NeverthelessClassen and Kenney have explainedmany of the peculiaritiesof Lucretius'exposition in terms of his persuasiveintentionand his use of the teachingsof the rhetoricalschools;while Schrijvershas argued, n effect, thattherecould be such a thing as an Epicureanrhetoric,based on the supposed physical congruence of words and larger utteranceswith the thoughtsthey evoke and the things they refer to.10CertainlyEpicurusmaintainedthat there was such a congruence-else how could languagehavebegun at all? 1The idea is also impliedby Lucretius'comparisonbetween thecombinationand arrangementof atoms to make compound bodies and thatof lettersto makewords (1.196-97, 823-26, etc.), and his consequentfondnessfor atomic puns such as ignis in lignis (1.901-14).12It might seem that such a congruence theory of language could not beused to justify anythingbut the plainest style and the most direct statement,since any ornamentsof language must produce a different, and presumably

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A PATTERN F ARGUMENTN LUCRETIUSless suitable, meaning; and in fact Philodemus does recommend a plain style,and disapproves of the practice of paraphrase.13 But congruence is not neces-sarily perfect congruence; and if different words may resemble the same thingin different ways, then one may indeed, as Lucretius says, be justified in call-ing wine Bacchus, and the earth the mother of the gods, provided that oneknows what one means. Epicurus seems to have used a similar justification forparticipation in the rites of the state religion (with which Lucretius' prayer toVenus and his account of the worship of the Great Mother have obvious ana-logies); at least, a fragment which is plausibly attributed to Epicurus himselfspeaks of the philosopher, in so participating, as doing honor to his owntheoria by means of the inborn pleasures of the flesh. l4

Similar justifications might be offered for using metaphors that point toreal, though partial resemblances, such as those between atoms (or the world)and living organisms. Philodemus, at any rate, discussed metaphors at somelength in Book 4 of his Rhetoric, complaining that some rhetoricians willridicule a metaphor without explaining why it is faulty or how a good metaphoris to be invented. While they divert the attention of young men from philosophythey do not give specific instructions when to use metaphors and allegories,for they consider that the use of metaphors is of advantage only to teachers,but to one engaged in the intercourse of active life they are superfluous bag-gage. If the use of literal expressions is extended over so wide a field, everyart will fall silent because deprived of the helpful assistance of metaphors. 15Later he adds that a poet who has studied philosophy must consider the na-ture and origins of both figurative language and philosophical discourse, orelse he will choose and reject metaphors at random. ' The implied approvalof metaphor as such suggests that the Epicureans stopped somewhere shortof supposing an exact congruence between language and reality; and the samecaution is implied in Philodemus' quasi-Aristotelian definition of poetry(Peri poiematon 5.23.14-15) as to mimoumenon hOs endechetai, an imitation,in so far as that is possible.STANFORD UNIVERSITY

NOTES'H. J. G. Patin,etudes sur la poesie latine 13 (Paris,1883), pp. 117-137, esp. p. 126.2Forthe latter interpretation, f. P. De Lacy, Distantviews: the imagery of Lucre-tius 2, CJ 60 (1964-65), p. 53.30n Venus as a symbol of pleasure, cf. P. Boyanc6, Lucrece et I'&picurismeParis,1963), pp. 64-68; on the favor shownby the gods to good men,W. Schmid, GotterundMenschen n der TheologieEpikurs, RhM 4 (1951), pp. 97-156, and J. M. Rist,Epicurus,an Introduction Cambridge, 1972), pp. 156-162.4C. Bailey, TitiLucretiCari De RerumNatura LibriSex (Oxford, 1947) III,p. 1589.5Cf. H. S. Davies, Notes on Lucretius, he Criterion11 (1931), pp. 25-42.6Cf. Boyanc6,op. cit., pp. 92-93.70p. cit. II, p. 918.

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MICHAELWIGODSKYsCf. G. Muller, Die Darstellung der Kinetik bei Lukrez (Berlin Akad., Arbeitsgruppefur hellenistisch-r6mische Philosophie, Veroffentlichung 7, 1959), p. 54, pointing outhowever a parallel to Lucretius' classification in Simplicius's anti-Epicurean polemic.9See D. Clay, De rerum natura: Greek Physis and Epicurean Physiologia (Lucretius1.1-148), TAPA 100 (1969), pp. 31-47.10C. J. Classen, Poetry and Rhetoric in Lucretius, TAPA 99 (1968), pp. 77-118;E. J. Kenney, Doctus Lucretius, Mnemosyne ser. 4, 23 (1970), pp. 366-392, and Lu-cretius De rerum natura Book III (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 14-29; P. H. Schrijvers, Horrorac divina voluptas, ttudes sur la po6tique et la po6sie de Lucrece (Amsterdam, 1970),

pp. 87-147.A convenient account of the Epicurean view of language is T. Cole, Democritusand the Sources of Greek Anthropology (APA Monograph 25, 1967), pp. 60-63.

l2Cf. P. Friedlander, Pattern of Sound and Atomistic Theory in Lucretius, AJP 62(1941), pp. 16-34.

13Cf. the summary, with references, in G. M. A. Grube, The Greek and RomanCritics (Toronto, 1965), pp. 196-198.14P. Oxy. 215.2.2-5; on the authorship, cf. H. Diels, Ein epikureisches Fragmentuber Gotterverehrung, Berlin Akad. Sitzungsber. (1916), pp. 886-909; on its relevanceto Lucretius, K. Kleve, Lukrez und Venus (De rerum natura I. 1-49), SO 41 (1960),

pp. 86-94. For the actual participation of the Epicurean scholarch Phaedrus in theEleusinian cult, see A. E. Raubitschek, Phaidros and his Roman Pupils, Hesperia 15(1949), pp. 96-103.

151 pp. 173-74 Sudhaus; the (abridged) translation is from H. M. Hubbell, TheRhetorica of Philodemus, Transactions Conn. Acad. 23 (1919-20), p. 298.16p. 180 Sudhaus; to the student of Lucretius, it is tempting to restore philosti, rather than Sudhaus's philosti- a poet who is going to deal withphilosophical subject matter.

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a pattern of argument in lucretius

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