a security systems installation project case study

A Security Systems Installation Project Case Studyan Australian Perspective

By the Numbers

Australia/USA Comparison

NSW - 309,000 sq. miles

47 x Hawaii’s

5 x Florida’s

2 x California’s

1 x Texas

Myths about Australia

Kangaroo Lesson #1

Security & Critical Infrastructure Resilience

• The Security & Critical Infrastructure Resilience Branch manages the protection of critical transport infrastructure and the provision of security services to RMS

• Critical Infrastructure sites are those listed at State and Commonwealth level as having significant economic, social or national security importance to the nation

• Currently monitoring 20+ Critical Infrastructure sites across NSW

• The S&CIR Program enables transport network resilience through the prevention, preparation, response and recovery from adverse events impacting on these assets

BACKGROUND

Security & Critical Infrastructure Resilience

• Transport Modes within the transport cluster are broken down into:• 53% Rail - 42% Bus - 3% Ferries - 2% Light Rail

• 100% Road

• Road Infrastructure accounts for 100%, in the operations of the other Critical Infrastructure services such as food, water, energy, transport, telecommunication and health

• The National Terrorism Threat Advisory Level is currently set at PROBABLE by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) indicating a terrorist attack is likely

BACKGROUND

Security Landscape

• First ‘Terrorist Attack’ in Australia was in 1915

• 7 x Significant Bombings

• 2 x Active Shooter Events

• 3 x Stabbing Attacks

• 2 x Sieges

• 4 x Assassinations

THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT

Security Landscape

• Plots Foiled

• 2 x Assassination

• 5 x Bombing

• 1 x Designer

• 13 x Active Shooter

THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT

Critical Infrastructure Assessments

Critical Infrastructure Resilience

the capacity of CI to withstand disruption, operate effectively in crisis, and deal with and adapt to shocks and stresses. It includes the flexibility to

adapt to present and future conditions

Critical Infrastructure Protection

minimises vulnerability to criminal or malicious threats via physical, procedural, person-based, and electronic defences. Critical Infrastructure

Protection is a key part of Critical Infrastructure Resilience

RESILIENCE -v- PROTECTION

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsDEFINING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

18 x Pedestrian Lifts

Shopping Centre Underpass

Cycleway Underpass

Bus Interchange

Transit WayPedestrian Tunnel

• What is and is not CI

• Measurable & Quantifiable

• Scalable & Responsive

Roundabout


• Survivability of the Asset

• Death and Injury

• What you are Protecting

• Calling out all of the details

• Provide Options & Priorities

• Honesty

• Use Experts

• Assess & Reassess

THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS


• Investigation / Assessment

• Reports

• Data

• Open Source

• Imagery

• Signature

CONFIDENTIALITY & INFORMATION

Kangaroo Lesson #2

Kangaroo’s in the Workplace


• Site Details• Formal Detail

• Owner

• Operator

• Designation

• Location

• Maps

• History

• Background

THE DETAIL

• Specifics• Road Length, Lanes, Directions

• Tunnel Height

• River Width


• Scope

• What is in and out of scope

• Previous Assessments

• Asset Functions & Utilisation

• Maintenance Requirements

• Traffic Modelling & Social Impact

• Criticality & Iconic Status

THE DETAIL

• Local Area & Topography

• Roads & Local Area• Flood Plains

• Utilities


• Construction Details• Construction Methods

• Concrete Density

• Power (HV), Substations• Feeds

• Switch Rooms

• Remote Switching (Security)

• Communications Systems• Radio

• RRB

• Lighting

THE DETAIL

• Access Points

• Underground Layouts• Internal

• External


• Construction Details (cont.)

• ITS• Road Loops

• VMS

• Camera’s (Speed, ANPR, Rest)

• Traffic Detection

• OHVD

• Maintenance Monitoring

• Life Safety Systems

• Security Systems• Control Rooms, CCTV, Guarding

THE DETAIL

• Technologies• Servers

• UPS

• Fibre (Redundancies)

• Wi-Fi & Security


• Construction Details (cont.)

• Fire Safety Systems

• Roadways & Access• Rights

• Alternatives

• Neighbours

• Exhaust/Intakes

• HVAC

• Unique Systems

THE DETAIL


• Emergency Systems• Evacuation

• Plans

• Diagrams• Road/Tunnel Users

• Staff

• Contractors & Visitors

• Exercises (Recency)

• Incident Management Systems

• Spill Management

THE DETAIL

• Fire• Water Sources

• Responders

• Foam


• Emergency Systems (cont.)• Detection

• Suppression

• Emergency Services Familiarisation• Local Police Responders

• Fire, Ambulance

• Negotiators

• Rescue

• Sniper & Counter Sniper

• Specials

• Environmental Detection• CO2

THE DETAIL

• Public Address Systems• Testing Regime

• Entry/Exit Overrides

• Dangerous Goods Storage

• HAZMAT & HAZCHEM

• Panels• Locations

• Access

• Mimic


• Security Systems• Access Control

• Fencing & Perimeter

• Cameras• Locations

• Diagrams

• Access

• Intelligence & Incident Reports• Administrative Security

• Security & Response Plans• Evacuations

• Resilience Integration

THE DETAIL

• CCTV System• VMS

• Servers

• Cabling

• Remote Access

• Security• Information• Access Control • Storage• External Connection


• Dependencies & Interdependencies• Government Departments

• Businesses

• Transport Hubs

• Heavy Vehicle Routes

• Stakeholders

• Legislative

• Local Area

• Combat Agencies

THE DETAIL


• Standard Treatments• Barriers, Fences & Bollards

• CCTV & Guarding

• Motion Detection

• Lighting.

• Site Specific Treatments• Training

• Procedures

• Incident Procedures

• Drills & Exercises

TREATMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS

• Behavioural Treatments• Staff Security

• Security Culture

• Westminster Bridge Analysis

• Proactive Treatments• ANPR

• Facial Recognition

• Movement Analysis

• Review


• Threat List & Methods of Delivery

• Likelihood Analysis Matrix

• Likelihood Analysis Table

• Consequence Analysis Matrix

• Consequence Analysis Table

• Security & Threat Assessment Matrix

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION

Kangaroo Lesson #3

Kangaroo’s & Sport

Risk Matrix

CONSEQUENCE

Negligible impactSome impact, adverse

results

Impacts begin to

change the ability to

maintain normal

operations

Likely to have

significant impact

High-probability risk

likely to have an

extended impact.

Sudden disaster of

immense proportions

that has severe

consequences, often

accompanied by

destruction of assets

and/or loss of life.

Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Severe Catastrophic

L

I

K

E

L

I

H

O

O

D

The risk with assigned consequence could occur multiple times

(>10) during any given year.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur at least 1 in every 4

times the event or action occurs I.E. > 25% chance of occurrence. This

risk is known to occur frequently.

Almost certain Medium High High Very High Very High Very High

The risk with assigned consequence could occur occasionally

(<10) during any given year.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur between 1 in 4 and 1

in 10 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 10% to 25% chance of

occurrence.

Very likely Medium Medium High High Very High Very High

The risk with assigned consequence could occur once during any

given year.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur between 1 in 10 and 1

in 100 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 1% to 10% chance of

occurrence.

Likely Low Medium Medium High High Very High

The risk with assigned consequence could occur once over 10

years.

The risk with assigned consequence is expected to occur between 1 in

100 and 1 in 1,000 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 0.1% to 1%

chance of occurrence.

Unlikely Low Low Medium Medium High High

The risk with assigned consequence could occur once in the next

100 years.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur between 1 in 1,000

and 1 in 10,000 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 0.01% to 0.1%


Very unlikely Low Low Low Medium Medium High

The risk with assigned consequence is not expected to occur in

the next 100 years.

The risk with assigned consequence may occur less than 1 in 10,000

times (if ever) the event or action occurs. I.E. < 0.01% chance of

occurrence.

Almost

unprecedentedLow Low Low Low Medium Medium

Level Likelihood Semi-Quantitive Quantitative

1Almost

Unprecedented

The risk with assigned consequence is not expected to

occur in the next 100 years.

The risk with assigned consequence may occur less than 1 in

10,000 times (if ever) the event or action occurs. I.E. < 0.01%


• There is very little or no real chance of this risk occurring.

• History shows that this risk hardly ever happens, if at all.

• We have a high level of confidence and faith in the controls to prevent the risk.

• Everyone would be shocked and surprised if this risk occurs.

• No reasonable person would ever consider that the risk could occur.

• No-one would have seen this risk coming.

2 Very Unlikely

The risk with assigned consequence could occur once in the

next 100 years.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur between 1 in

1,000 and 1 in 10,000 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 0.01%

to 0.1% chance of occurrence.

• There is only an unusual chance of this risk occurring.

• History shows that this risk rarely happens, usually under unusual circumstances.

• We have a strong level of confidence that the controls will prevent the risk.

• Most staff would understand the risk could happen but would still be surprised.

• Most reasonable people would consider it rare or unusual for the risk to occur.

• You can be forgiven for not anticipating the risk was about to occur.

3 Unlikely

The risk with assigned consequence could occur once over

10 years.

The risk with assigned consequence is expected to occur

between 1 in 100 and 1 in 1,000 times the event or action occurs.

I.E. 0.1% to 1% chance of occurrence.

• There is a chance of this risk occurring but not very often.

• History shows that this risk does happen but not very frequently.

• We have a reasonable level of confidence that the controls will prevent the risk.

• Most staff while surprised, would not be shocked if this risk occurs.

• Most reasonable people would have expected the risk to occur at some time.

• You should have been anticipating the risk.

4 Likely

The risk with assigned consequence could occur once

during any given year.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur between 1 in 10

and 1 in 100 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 1% to 10%


• There is a chance of this risk occurring in the current period.

• History shows that the risk has occurred on a number of occasions.

• Moderate confidence in the controls, may not work under certain circumstances.

• Most staff would have considered the risk was possible.

• Most reasonable people would have expected it to occur.

• You should have been watching/monitoring for this risk to occur.

5 Very Likely

The risk with assigned consequence could occur

occasionally (<10) during any given year.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur between 1 in 4

and 1 in 10 times the event or action occurs. I.E. 10% to 25%


• There is a good chance of this risk occurring.

• History shows that the risk occurs unacceptably too often.

• Controls may help prevent its occurrence but wouldn’t rely heavily on them.

• Most staff would not be surprised if and when the risk occurs.

• Most reasonable people would have expected it to occur on a semi regular basis.

• You should have expected this risk to occur.

6 Almost Certain

The risk with assigned consequence could occur multiple

times (>10) during any given year.

The risk with assigned consequence could occur at least 1 in

every 4 times the event or action occurs I.E. > 25% chance of

occurrence. This risk is known to occur frequently.

• There is a very strong chance of this risk occurring.

• History shows that it is something that occurs frequently.

• We have little or no faith in the controls to prevent its occurrence.

• No-one will be surprised if and when the risk occurs – in fact it’s expected to.

• A reasonable person would consider it obvious and certain that the risk would occur.

• You should have seen this risk coming.

Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Severe Catastrophic

PEOPLE

Mortality • Not Applicable • Deaths greater than 1 in 10,000,000 people for the population of interest • Deaths greater than 1 in 1,000,000 people for the population of interest • Deaths greater than 1 in 100,000 people for the population of interest • Deaths greater than 1 in 10,000 people for the population of interest • Deaths greater than 1 in 1,000 people for the population of interest

Injuries/Illness • Less than 1 in 1,000,000 people of the population serious injured or any minor injuries• Greater than 1 in 10,000,000 people of the population critically injured with long-term or permanent

incapacitation or 1 in 1,000,000 people of the population seriously injured

• Greater than 1 in 1,000,000 people of the population critically injured with long-term or permanent

incapacitation or 1 in 100,000 people of the population seriously injured

• Greater than 1 in 100,000 people of the population critically injured with long-term or permanent

incapacitation or 1 in 10,000 people of the population seriously injured• Greater than 1 in 10,000 people of the population critically injured with long-term • Greater than 1 in 1,000 people of the population critically injured with long-term

BUSINESS

Financial

• Revenue, OPEX or non-infrastructure CAPEX impact < $10K

• Fines, penalties, compensation < $10K

• Infrastructure CAPEX impact/overrun per project or program <$100K

• Revenue, OPEX or non-infrastructure CAPEX impact < $100K

• Fines, penalties, compensation < $100K

• Infrastructure CAPEX impact/overrun < 0.1% not exceeding $2.5M per project or program

• Revenue, OPEX or non-infrastructure CAPEX impact < $1M

• Fines, penalties, compensation < $1M

• Infrastructure CAPEX impact/overrun < 1% not exceeding $25M per project or program







• Revenue, OPEX or non-infrastructure CAPEX impact > $50M

• Fines, penalties, compensation >$50M

• Infrastructure CAPEX impact/overrun > 10% or exceeding $250M per project or program

Program / Project Management

• Minor delay(1 – 2 days)

• No reduction in functionality

• No discernible impact, benefit realisation largely intact

• Delay (<1% to max of 1 week)

• < 1% reduction in functionality

• Benefit realisation partially impaired but still adds value and economically sound.

• Delay (< 5% to max of 8 weeks)


• Benefit realisation impaired return on investment breakeven to negative.

• Delay (< 10% to max of 5 months)


• Cost/benefit analysis may not have supported the Program go ahead

• Delay (< 10% to max of 5 months)


• Cost/benefit analysis may not have supported the Program go ahead

• Total blow out in time (> 9 months or > 15%)

• > 15% reduction in functionality

• Will probably require a major project in the foreseeable future to either rectify or complete the results of this

project

Service Delivery

• Insignificant disruption (<1hr)

• Single minor delay low network road outside peak period

• Some small impairment to services probably not even noticed

• Internal customer annoyed but performance not impaired

• Few localised customer complaints

• Traffic delay for up to half an hour outside of City peak periods.

• Approximately 24 hours delay in non-network services.

• A high number of users impacted

• Incident escalated to senior management – multiple complaints.

• Internal customer delayed for up to 24hours or requires rework

• Traffic delayed for more than half an hour outside of City peak periods.

• 2 to 3 days delay in non-network services.

• Large number of users impacted

• Incident escalated to executive management – many complaints.

• Internal customer delayed by 2 – 3 days and/or it’s performance is impaired/delayed

• Major road closure for one City peak period.

• < 1 week delay, non-available services

• Significant numbers of customers impacted

• Large numbers of complaints.

• Incident escalated to TfNSW and/or the Ministers Department

• Internal customers are unable to perform normal duties or simply by-pass the services required

• Main road closure multiple peak periods and/or during holiday times

• Inability to provide services for a several weeks

• Bulk of customers impacted

• Continuous large numbers of complaints

• Internal customers severely impacted, cannot operate as normal

• Very large event (e.g. News Year Eve) - large numbers of the community (>100,000)

• Main road or freeway closure for several weeks or longer

• Long term outage or inability to provide services for an extended period.

• Internal customer support all but ceased.

Government Policy, Legislative and/or Regulatory , Contract

Compliance

• Technical non-compliance with a minor Government Policy - not reportable

• Low level non-compliance

• Technical non-conformance

• Minor non-compliance to a low impact contract clause – little or no interest by either party to pursue or

rectify

• Non-compliance with whole or significant aspects of Government policy not reportable but requiring internal

activity to put in place.

• Non-compliance

• Formal investigation and/or formal notification to regulator.

• Minor breach of contract by either party rectified through local management discussion

• Non-compliance with key Government policy - reportable and/or explanation required – need to put in place

as soon as possible.

• Non-compliance – key obligation

• Formal notification to regulator

• Agency on notice.

• Breach of contract by either party rectified at GM level management discussion

• Non-compliance with high profile, Government policy – reportable and/or action to put in place required

immediately.

• Continuous breach resulting in enforcement action

• Service restrictions

• Breach of significant, key aspects of contract by either party requiring Legal and Director

involvement/discussions

• Non-compliance with high profile, outward facing Government policy or Ministerial decree - immediately

reportable to Government body (e.g. Treasury) and action to put in place required immediately (high priority).

• Continuous breach resulting in prohibition notices.

• Breach of significant, key aspects of contract by either party leading to lodgement (threat) to sue and

recompense at severe financial levels

• Cessation of contract may occur

• Non-compliance with high profile, outward facing Government policy or Ministerial decree - immediately

reportable to Ministerial level, action to put in place immediately (high priority) and progress reported to

Minister.

• Litigation and potentially imprisonment.

• Licences restricted

• Continued breach cannot be tolerated

• Breach of major contract by either party leading to significant litigation and recompense (financial costs)

• Total breakdown and cessation of contract

Reputation

• Little community interest

• Single negative article in local media.

• Goodwill, confidence and trust retained.

• Confined to the Branch

• Local council may want to discuss

• Isolated interest – local community

• Series of negative articles in local media.

• Confidence remains - minor loss of goodwill

• Confined to Branch but requiring notification to Division

• Council requires written explanation

• Extended local media coverage with some broader Regional media coverage.

• Confidence and trust of stakeholders dented

• Division and/or RMS formal response needed to State Government/Regulator.

• State media coverage.

• Project/activity credibility under question

• Confidence/trust impaired.

• TfNSW and/or Ministers Department requires update

• Extended negative State media coverage.

• Regular ‘talk-back’ programs questioning credibility and capability

• Confidence and trust are severely damaged

• Regular updates demanded by Minister

• Sustained, high profile media attention to National level

• Material change in the public perception of the Agency.

• Confidence and trust non- existing. Government forced to reverse decision

External Stakeholder Intervention

actual intervention action taken by external parties to change,

direct or control any aspect of RMS strategy or operations.

• Ministerial/Transport request to alter or amend existing practices/activities or to change priorities – low

impact area

• Localised to a Branch or Regional activity

• Union demand direct involvement and say in new policy and work practices beyond normal IR practices.

• Regulatory body issues ‘improvement’ notices requiring actions and improvement and/or places short term

(< 1 week) restriction notices on certain RMS wide activities.

• Regulatory body issues ‘improvement’ notices requiring actions and improvement and/or places mid- term

(3 months) restriction notices on certain RMS wide activities.

• Ministerial intervention into and significant change of RMS strategic direction

• Minister/Transport demand removal of one or more senior Management

• Regulatory body issues ‘major improvement’ notices requiring immediate improvement and/or places long-

term (6 months) restriction notices on multiple RMS wide activities.

• Ministerial/Transport intervention into RMS directing what and how operations and projects are to occur

• Regulatory body (e.g. Work Cover) intervention requiring RMS to seek sign-off on all actions prior to

occurring.

• The Chief Executive and/or multiple RMS Executives relieved of duty with external ‘caretaker’ appointed.

Workplace Health & Safety

employees, contractors and visitors to work sites

• Illness, first aid or injury not requiring medical treatment

• No lost time

• Minor injury or illness requiring medical treatment

• No lost time post medical treatment• Minor injuries or illnesses resulting in lost time

• 1 to 10 serious injuries or illnesses as defined under S36 of the WHS Act resulting in lost time or potential

permanent impairment

• Single fatality and/or 10 to 20 serious injuries or illnesses as defined under S36 of the WHS Act resulting in

lost time or potential permanent impairment

• Multiple fatalities and/or more than 20 serious injuries or illnesses as defined under S36 of the WHS Act

resulting in

• lost time or potential permanent impairment

Employees

• Little employee interest/impact

• Confidence and trust of employees retained.

• Confined to small number of people < 5

• No performance impairment

• Little or no impact on workload, employee numbers, work/life balance

• No cultural impact

• No noticeable excess stress or excessive absenteeism of key staff during/after workload peaks.

• Impacts employees at a specific location and/or of a specific discipline (e.g. accountants) (<50)

• Employees concerned as to their wellbeing and future

• Employees frustrated but still willing to proactively contribute to meeting objectives

• Isolated incidence of excess stress or excessive absenteeism of key staff during/after workload peaks

• Impacts large numbers of employees (<500)

• Employees wellbeing and future is at risk

• Employees frustrated and are largely only ‘doing what needs to be done’

• Culture and morale dropping

• People are actively looking to leave

• Noticeable incidence of excess stress or excessive absenteeism of key staff during/after workload peaks.

• Majority of employees potentially impacted (50%)

• Employee morale is low

• Employees not willing to proactively engage – lack of commitment

• Key people are actively looking to leave

• Unions are being called upon to take up employee cause – IR tension is high

• Widespread incidence of excess stress or excessive absenteeism of key staff

• All employees potentially impacted

• Employee morale is poor

• Employees not willing to proactively engage

• Key people are leaving, workforce churn rates increase (loss of IP)

• Unions action – work to rule, stop work

• Stress and other work related injuries/health issues increasing

• High incidence of excessive absenteeism of staff.

• Employee brand significantly impaired

• All employees potentially impacted

• No confidence and trust of employees

• RMS wide dissatisfaction – bad, dysfunctional morale

• Performance significantly impaired – little or no immediate sign of improvement

• High staff turnover– poor corporate culture

• Doubling of workload, stress levels dangerously high

• Long-term (months) of ongoing rolling industrial action.

Governance & Control Environment

includes governance structure, reporting, policies and procedures,

planning, and general internal control activities.

• Localised ‘housekeeping’ improvement required – can live with the problem if necessary

• Errors or omissions controlled within normal operations with little to no impact in operations.

• An event, the impact of which can be absorbed as part of normal activity

• Overall governance solid with only occasion small in-house issues arising.

• Minor, low priority improvements required to ensure operations continue to work as intended.

• Can accept the problem but will need to keep monitoring it

• Errors, incidents occur occasionally and some ‘annoying’ inefficiencies exist that partially impact operations

• An event, the impact of which can be absorbed but some additional management effort is required

• Management receiving relevant and timely information most of the time and governance/decision making

issues only impact Branch or localised functions

• Controls not always working as intended – partially effective requiring some priority (say 12mth)

• Issue or problem needs o be addressed, cannot be ignored

• Systems impairing operational performance and delaying outcomes

• An event, the impact of which can be absorbed but much broader management effort is required

• Data/information inconsistent and often incomplete leading to poor decision making and inefficient

operations

• Controls largely not working as intended – largely ineffective and requiring formal mitigation and tracking

• Cannot be ignored as it is impacting day to day delivery

• Errors, omissions, incidents occurring on a regular basis due to poor controls

• An event, the impact of which can be absorbed but substantial management effort is required

• Data/information not only inconsistent and incomplete but often misleading and out of date

• Little Governance overview and restricted to ‘good news’

• Controls considered to be ineffective.

• Errors, omissions, incidents occurring on a regular basis due to poor controls

• Data/information not only inconsistent and incomplete but often misleading and out of date

• Severe event which requires extensive management effort but can be survived

• No real governance oversight, errors can go undetected for long periods of time

• Major errors, omissions and incidents occur frequently and are only identified by good luck not good

process

• Data/information has little or no credibility

• Catastrophic event with a clear potential to lead to a total overhaul of services and delivery.

• Decision making cannot rely on existing data or information

• Governance processes and controls totally ineffective

STATE ECONOMY

Loss in economic activity and/or asset value • Decline of economic activity and/or loss of asset value <0.004% of gross domestic area (GAP) of the area • Decline of economic activity and/or loss of asset value • Decline of economic activity and/ or loss of asset value >0.04% of GAP of area • Decline of economic activity and/ or loss of asset value >0.4% of GAP of area • Decline of economic activity and/ or loss of asset value >1% of GAP of area • Decline of economic activity and/or loss of asset value

Impact on important industry • Inconsequential business sector disruption• Significant industry or business sector is impacted by the emergency event, resulting in short-term (i.e. less

than one year) profit reductions

• Significant industry or business sector is significantly impacted by the emergency event, resulting in

medium-term (i.e. more than one year) profit reductions

• Significant structural adjustment required by identified industry to respond and recover from emergency

event• Significant structural redesign required by identified industry to respond and recover from emergency event • Failure of a significant industry or sector

ENVIRONMENT

Loss of species and/or landscapes • No damage to ecosystems at any level • Minor damage to ecosystems and species recognised at the local or regional level• Minor damage to ecosystems and species recognised at the state level

• Significant loss or impairment of an ecosystem or species recognised at the local or regional level

• Minor damage to ecosystems or species recognised at the national level

• Significant loss or impairment of an ecosystem or species recognised at the state level

• Severe damage to or loss of an ecosystem or species recognised at the local or regional level"

• Major damage to ecosystems or species recognised at the national level

• Severe loss or impairment of an ecosystem or species recognised at the state level

• Significant damage to or loss of an ecosystem or species recognised at the local or regional level"

• Permanent destruction of an ecosystem or species recognised at the local, regional, state or national level

• Permanent damage to or loss of an ecosystem or species recognised at the national or state level

• Permanent loss or impairment of an ecosystem or species recognised at the national level

Environment• Localised impacts rectified by on site resources.

• Isolated, easily contained, no lasting effects• Short term repairable damage or social impact on local population <12mths)

• Short to mid-term (<24mths) impact

• Notification to regulator.

• Long term (>24mths but < 5years)

• EPA Tier 2 incident

• Partial impairment of the ecosystem

• >5years and <10years impact.

• Irreparable damage of cultural significance


• Irreversible large-scale impact

• Permanent damage


SOCIAL IMPACT

Community wellbeing

• Community social fabric is disrupted

• Existing resources sufficient to return the community to normal function

• No permanent dispersal

• Community social fabric is damaged

• Some external resources required to return the community to normal function


• Community social fabric is broken

• Significant external resources required to return the community to normal function


• Community social fabric is significantly broken

• Extraordinary external resources required to return the community to functioning effectively• Community social fabric is broken

• Significant permanent dispersal

• Community social fabric is irreparably broken

• Community ceases to function effectively, breaks down

• Community disperses in its entirety

Community services • Inconsequential/short term impacts • Isolated/temporary reductions • Ongoing reductions • Reduced quality of life • Quality of Life significantly impacted • Community unable to support itself

Culturally important objects • Minor damage to objects of culture significance • Damage to objects of identified culture significance • Widespread damage to objects of identified culture significance • Widespread damage or localised permanent loss of objects of identified culture significance • Widespread permanent damage and large scale permanent loss of objects of identified cultural significance • Widespread permanent damage and loss of objects of identified culture significance

Culturally important activities • Minor delay to a culturally important community event • Delay to or reduced scope of a culturally important community event • Delay to a major culturally important community event • Temporary cancellation or significant delay to a major culturally important community event • Some isolated cancellation of events to a major culturally important community event • Permanent cancellation of a major culturally important community activity

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsRISK MATRIX - CONSEQUENCE• STATE

• Economic Activity

• Industry

• ENVIRONMENT• Environmental

• Species & Ecosystems

• SOCIAL• Community Wellbeing

• Community Services

• Cultural Activities

• Cultural Objects

• PEOPLE• Mortality

• Injuries & Illness

• BUSINESS• Financial

• Project/Program

• Service Delivery

• Policy & Contract Compliance

• Reputation (Confidence)

• External Stakeholder Intervention

• WHS

• Employees

• Governance & Control

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsTHREATS


• Is Paul getting Drunk on Thursday Night ?• Do I drink?

• How hard is it to get a drink?

• What times and are there restrictions on drinking?

• What are the Size and Types of the Drinks?

• What is the Alcohol Content ?

• What is my favourite Drink?

• Do I have enough Money?

• Will I be alone and are there triggers?

• What is the frequency of me getting Drunk?

• How do you measure that?

LIKELIHOOD v PERCEPTION TEST

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsLIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS MATRIX

MATERIALS ATTAINABILITY OPERATIONAL EASE EASE OF RECONNISSANCE THREAT ATTRACTIVENESS

The ease with which the explosives, devices, weapons or other objects required to

carry out the attack according to the level of the presumed actual accessibility in

NSW at the time of the assessment

Evaluates the skills, situations and the environment a terrorist needs in order to plan and successfully execute each threat to the facility. This relates to the ease in which the specific threat analysed, within the context of the security/complexity and

structure, allows an attack at each location under review

Evaluates the availability and ease of attainability of information on building layouts, security systems, critical elements, vulnerable locations and possible security

breaches

The actual or perceived vulnerability of the site to a specific threat and the attractiveness of the threat in the eyes to a potential attacker. The potential media

attention, the iconic nature of the site, the relative probability of an attacker using the method to carry out an attack against the facility. "What is in the head of the

attacker"

GRADE

Attainability

GRADE

Security

GRADE

Device Complexity

GRADE

Site Structure

GRADE

Need for Information

GRADE

Ease of Obtaining

GRADE

Threat Preference based on

RTX

GRADE

Threat Method Factor

The ease in which the object or parts can be

obtained

The level of effective Security response (e.g.

Patrols, CCTV (Monitored and Unmonitored),

On Site Security, Access Control, Locks,

Barriers)

The complexity in which the device is required

to be sourced, constructed, transported and

used / detonated (e.g. how difficult is it to build,

transport and place an IED)

The physical structure of the facility that would

contribute to the success or any restriction to

the carrying out of an attack (e.g. hardened

facility, design, open plan, easily accessible,

proximity to road)

The information required to successfully carry

out an attack including the structure and

operations of the facility along with the

requirements and instructions to build a device

or obtaining the object and/or parts

Open Source Reporting, Common Knowledge,

Details of any Facility Vulnerability, Experience

of Attacker / Group (e.g. site plans available on

the internet)

A rating specifically based on the result of the

'Red Team' Exercise against the facility (e.g.

the ease in which access was gained, the

impact that interruption might have with

information gained during exercise)

The attractiveness of the facility to an attacker

to carry out the attack, including the possibility

of copying previous attacks and the trends

identified by intelligence and incident analysis

(e.g. returning foreign fighters, overseas

incidents)

Very Easy

(10)

None

(10)

Very Basic

(10)

No Restriction

(10)

No Information Required

(10)

Very Easy

(10)

Highly Attractive

(10)

Highly Attractive

(10)

Somewhat Easy

(7 - 9)

Ineffective

(7 - 9)

Somewhat Basic

(7 - 9)

Easy

(7 - 9)

Little Information

Required

(7 - 9)

Somewhat Easy

(7 - 9)

Attractive

(7 - 9)

Attractive

(7 - 9)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Basic

(4 - 6)

Basic

(4 - 6)

Restrictive

(4 - 6)

Basic Information

Required

(4 - 6)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Difficult

(1 - 3)

Effective

(1 - 3)

Complex

(1 - 3)

Somewhat Restrictive

(1 - 3)

Detailed Information

Required

(1 - 3)

Difficult

(1 - 3)

Possible

(1 - 3)

Possible

(1 - 3)

Very Difficult

(0)

Very Effective

(0)

Very Complex

(0)

Very Restrictive

(0)

Very Detailed

Information Required

(0)

Very Difficult

(0)

Unattractive

(0)

Unattractive

(0)

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsMATERIAL AVAILABILITY

• How easy is it to obtain ?• Edged Weapons

• Firearms

• Explosives

• Chemicals

• Trucks

• How easy is it to be detected ?

• What is required for storage ?

• Who makes the decision on Material Availability ?• Industry Variants

• Targeting supplies and suppliers


MATERIALS ATTAINABILITY

The ease with which the explosives, devices, weapons

or other objects required to carry out the attack

according to the level of the presumed actual

accessibility in NSW at the time of the assessment

GRADE

Attainability

The ease in which the

object or parts can be

obtained

Very Easy

(10)

Somewhat Easy

(7 - 9)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Difficult

(1 - 3)

Very Difficult

(0)

OPERATIONAL EASE

Evaluates the skills, situations and the environment a terrorist needs in order to plan and successfully execute each threat to the facility. This relates to the ease in

which the specific threat analysed, within the context of the security/complexity and structure, allows an attack at each location under review

GRADE

Security

GRADE

Device Complexity

GRADE

Site Structure

The level of effective

Security response (e.g.

Patrols, CCTV (Monitored

and Unmonitored), On Site

Security, Access Control,

Locks, Barriers)

The complexity in which the

device is required to be

sourced, constructed,

transported and used /

detonated (e.g. how difficult

is it to build, transport and

place an IED)

The physical structure of the

facility that would contribute

to the success or any

restriction to the carrying out

of an attack (e.g. hardened

facility, design, open plan,

easily accessible, proximity

to road)

None

(10)

Very Basic

(10)

No Restriction

(10)

Ineffective

(7 - 9)

Somewhat Basic

(7 - 9)

Easy

(7 - 9)

Basic

(4 - 6)

Basic

(4 - 6)

Restrictive

(4 - 6)

Effective

(1 - 3)

Complex

(1 - 3)

Somewhat Restrictive

(1 - 3)

Very Effective

(0)

Very Complex

(0)

Very Restrictive

(0)


EASE OF RECONNISSANCE THREAT ATTRACTIVENESS

Evaluates the availability and ease of attainability of information on building layouts, security systems, critical

elements, vulnerable locations and possible security breaches

The actual or perceived vulnerability of the site to a specific threat and the attractiveness of the threat in the

eyes to a potential attacker. The potential media attention, the iconic nature of the site, the relative

probability of an attacker using the method to carry out an attack against the facility.

GRADE

Need for Information

GRADE

Ease of Obtaining

GRADE

Threat Preference (RTX)

GRADE

Threat Method Factor

The information required to

successfully carry out an attack

including the structure and

operations of the facility along with

the requirements and instructions to

build a device or obtaining the object

and/or parts

Open Source Reporting, Common

Knowledge, Details of any Facility

Vulnerability, Experience of Attacker /

Group (e.g. site plans available on the

internet)

A rating specifically based on the

result of the 'Red Team' Exercise

against the facility (e.g. the ease in

which access was gained, the

impact that interruption might have

with information gained during

exercise)

The attractiveness of the facility to an

attacker to carry out the attack,

including the possibility of copying

previous attacks and the trends

identified by intelligence and incident

analysis (e.g. returning foreign

fighters, overseas incidents)

No Information

Required

(10)

Very Easy

(10)

Highly

Attractive

(10)

Highly

Attractive

(10)

Little Information

Required

(7 - 9)

Somewhat

Easy

(7 - 9)

Attractive

(7 - 9)

Attractive

(7 - 9)

Basic Information

Required

(4 - 6)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Problematic

(4 - 6)

Detailed

Information Req

(1 - 3)

Difficult

(1 - 3)

Possible

(1 - 3)

Possible

(1 - 3)

Very Detailed

Information Req

(0)

Very Difficult

(0)

Unattractive

(0)

Unattractive

(0)

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsLIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS TABLE

LIKLIHOOD ANALYSIS - LOCATION

THREAT LISTMATERIALS

ATTAINABILITY

OPERATIONAL EASE EASE OF RECONNISSANCE THREAT ATTRACTIVENESS

TOTAL

SecurityDevice

ComplexitySite Structure TOTAL Need for Information Ease of Obtaining TOTAL Threat Preference based on RTX Threat Method Factor TOTAL

Abduction / Kidnapping 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Active Armed Offender - Firearm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Active Armed Offender - Basic Weapon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Aircraft - Large 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Aircraft - Small 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Arson / Fire Bomb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Assassination 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Communicated Threat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Crude Biological 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Crude Chemical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Crude Cyber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Crude Radiological 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Hostile Vehicle / Vessel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Nuclear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Person Borne IED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Placed IED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Riot / Demonstration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Siege & Hostage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sophisticated Biological 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sophisticated Chemical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sophisticated Cyber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Sophisticated Radiological 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Vehicle Borne IED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Vessel Borne IED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsLIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS TABLEVEHICLE BORNE IED – Targeting Vehicles

MATERIALS ATTAINABILITY

The ingredients for a VBIED can be easily sourced through retail outlets (i.e.. Fertiliser, LPG, Chlorine). Explosives, although appearing difficult, can be obtained as has been demonstrated in a number of recent incidents or manufactured such as the incident with the Australian Student in Sydney. Vehicles are also easily obtained and can be brought to the tunnel without detection as their are no access controls for vehicles.

GRADE 5

OPERATIONAL EASE

Security Although there are CCTV Cameras there is no On Site Security or Mobile Patrols. 10

Device ComplexityThe device would be required to be driven over a long distance to reach the tunnel and similar incidents have shown that the complexity surrounding the device (including trigger, safety and Detonator) requires considerable experience.

2

Site Structure There are no barriers to a VBIED entering the Tunnel. 6

GRADE 5.94

EASE OF RECONNAISSANCE

Need for Information The need for information is low, as the target is users of the tunnel and the structure and its makeup is irrelevant to a degree 4

Ease of Obtaining As above, the ease of determining information such as peak times and accessing traffic cameras on line is high 10

GRADE 7

THREAT ATTRACTIVENESSLIKELIHOOD WEIGHTING 25%

Threat Preference (RTX)Easy access, up to 400 people in the tunnel during peak/stoppage, easy to approach and detonate, use of Secondary Attack during Panic at opposite entrance. Worldwide Attention.

8

Threat Method FactorSignificant use of VBIED's overseas to target groups of people, continuing trends of similar incidents coupled with large numbers of foreign fighters returning to Australia with the knowledge and experience of carrying out similar attacks.

9

GRADE 8.5

OVERALL GRADE 26.44

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsCONSEQUENCE

• Both Likelihood and Consequence are equal partners in the process

• It can be considered as the driver for the process

• ‘Now What’

• It can assist with prioritising and budget allocation

• Unlike Likelihood, it is not subject to fluctuations • There are some inputs subject to change such as traffic flow, costs,

interdependencies

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsCONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS MATRIX

DAMAGE & OPERATION IMPACTS

Damage to Asset Replacement Cost Return to Operation Corridor Impact Population Exposed and/or ImpactedNumber of Fatalities and/or

CasualtiesDependencies Economic Impact

Media, Social Impact &

Social Disruption

Environmental Impact

(Urban)


(Natural)

A percentage is assigned to rate the

overall estimated damage to the

facility and structural elements

The cost to replace the asset in

current costs

The estimated time taken to rebuild,

repair or construct

diversion/alternate and return to

normal functioning

The impact that the unavailability of

the asset has on the operations of

other Infrastructure within defined

RMS Corridors including Traffic

Corridors, Heavy Vehicle Corridors,

Dangerous Goods Corridors and

Emergency Evacuation Routes

The Impact on the population in affecting their normal day-to-day

activities

The estimated number of fatalities

and injuries are based on a 'worst

case' scenario

What other Critical Infrastructure or

Utilities Depend on this Facility

divided into Vital (Communications,

Power), Major (Water, Transport)

and Significant (Business

Operations, Community Facilities)

Level of direct and non direct loss

due to the facility not in operation

Social impact caused by fear,

anxiety & stress including

behavioural changes such as people

not using public transport, not going

to work in the CBD, changing their

normal behaviour

The impact on the urban

(surrounding buildings &

infrastructure) environment,

depending on the type and location

of the attack

The impact on the natural

environment

Catastrophic

80 - 100%

$500 Million + + 14 Days Critical Corridor

500,000 + 200 +

1+ Vital or

4+ Majors or

8+ Significant

$1 Billion +Extended Worldwide Coverage,

Confidence in Government /

Authority by Population non-existent,

Population remained confined with

little or no activity, Irreversible Brand

Damage

Large part of target city affected

Change at the ecosystem level,

Permanent damage to the Natural

Environment(9 - 10)

Total Loss - Completely destroyed

buildings with no possibility of repair.

Sydney Basin

Multiple Regions

High Fatality Levels

High Casualty Levels

Creating a major state economic

crisis

Major

60 - 80%

$100 Million to

$500 Million7 - 14 Days Major Corridor

150,000 - 500,000 50 - 199

2 - 4 Majors or

6 - 8 Significant

$500 Million to

$1 BillionSome Worldwide Coverage with

Extensive National Interest,

Confidence and Trust in

Government / Authority Severely

Damaged. Significant Behavioural

Changes within Population with Few

Activities and Movements,

Significant Brand Damage

Entire section or precinct of city

affectedMortality within some species

(7 - 8)

Extensive critical structural damage

to facility

Regional Level

Multiple Local Government Areas

Many Fatalities

High Casualty Level

Creating a major level economic

loss - affects sectors, industries or

people in the immediate and

surrounding areas

Moderate

40 - 60%

$10 Million to

$100 Million3 - 7 Days Significant Corridor

30,000 - 150,000 10 - 49

2 Majors or

4 - 6 Significant

$100 Million to

$500 MillionNational Coverage with Extensive

Local Interest, Confidence and Trust

in Government / Authority

Questioned, Large Behavioural

Change within Community with

Activities and Movements No Longer

Occurring, Some Brand Damage

Many roads blocked, surrounding

buildings and facilities affected

Stress or behavioural changes on

ecosystem(5 - 6)

Some structural damage with

extensive superficial damage

(debris, shattered windows etc.)

Local Government Area

Multiple Suburbs

Some Fatalities

High Casualty Level

Creating a moderate level economic

loss - affects sectors, industries or

people only in the immediate area

Minor

20 - 40%

$1 Million to

$10 Million1 - 3 Days Minor Corridor

10,000 - 30,000 4 - 9

1 Major or

2 - 4 Significant

$50 Million to

$100 Million Local Coverage with some

Community Interest, Confidence

levels remain with Trust Questioned,

Some Behavioural Change with

some Activities Affected, Little Brand

Damage

Target building / facility affectedPhysical or chemical level changes

only(3 - 4)

Non-structural damage with some

superficial damage (debris,

shattered windows etc.)

Whole Suburb

Multiple Streets

Some Fatalities

Some Casualties

Local economic loss without major

effect on surrounding areas

Insignificant

0 - 20%

$0 to

$1 Million

a period of a few hours to a

maximum of 24 HoursNo Corridor

0 - 10,000 0 - 3

1 - 2 Significant

$0 - $50 MillionLittle or No Coverage, Confidence

and Trust Remain Unaffected,

Normal Behaviour and Activities

Continue Unaffected, No Brand

Damage

Little or No ImpactLittle or No impact – no change in

ecosystem(0 - 2)

Little or no damageWhole Street

Multiple Homes

No Fatalities

Some CasualtiesMinimal economic impact


DAMAGE & OPERATION

Damage to Asset Replacement Cost Return to Operation Corridor Impact

A percentage is assigned to rate the overall

estimated damage to the facility and

structural elements

The cost to replace the asset in current

costs

The estimated time taken to rebuild, repair

or construct diversion/alternate and return

to normal functioning

The impact that the unavailability of the

asset has on the operations of other

Infrastructure within defined RMS Corridors

including Traffic, Heavy Vehicle,

Dangerous Goods & Emergency

Evacuation Routes

Catastrophic80 - 100%

$500 Million + + 14 Days Critical Corridor(9 - 10) Total Loss - Completely destroyed

buildings with no possibility of repair.

Major60 - 80%

$100 Million to

$500 Million7 - 14 Days Major Corridor

(7 - 8) Extensive critical structural damage to

facility

Moderate40 - 60%

$10 Million to

$100 Million3 - 7 Days Significant Corridor(5 - 6) Some structural damage with extensive

superficial damage (debris, shattered

windows etc.)

Minor20 - 40%

$1 Million to

$10 Million1 - 3 Days Minor Corridor(3 - 4) Non-structural damage with some

superficial damage (debris etc.)

Insignificant0 - 20%

$0 to

$1 Million

a period of a few hours to a

maximum of 24 HoursNo Corridor

(0 - 2)Little or no damage


IMPACTS

Population Exposed and/or

Impacted

Number of Fatalities

and/or CasualtiesDependencies Economic Impact Media, Social Impact & Social Disruption


(Urban)

Environmental

Impact (Natural)

The Impact on the population

in affecting their normal day-

to-day activities

The estimated number of

fatalities and injuries are

based on a 'worst case'

scenario

What other Critical Infrastructure or Utilities

Depend on this Facility divided into Vital

(Communications, Power), Major (Water,

Transport) and Significant (Business

Operations, Community Facilities)

Level of direct and non direct

loss due to the facility not in

operation

Social impact caused by fear, anxiety & stress including

behavioural changes such as people not using public

transport, not going to work in the CBD, changing their

normal behaviour

The impact on the urban

(surrounding buildings &

infrastructure) environment,

depending on the type and

location of the attack

The impact on the

natural environment

500,000 + 200 +1+ Vital or

4+ Majors or

8+ Significant

$1 Billion +Extended Worldwide Coverage, Confidence in

Government / Authority by Population non-existent,

Population remained confined with little or no activity,

Irreversible Brand Damage

Large part of target city

affected

Change at the

ecosystem level,

Permanent damage to

the Natural

Environment

Sydney Basin

Multiple Regions

High Fatality Levels

High Casualty Levels

Creating a major state

economic crisis

150,000 - 500,000 50 - 199

2 - 4 Majors or

6 - 8 Significant

$500 Million to

$1 Billion Some Worldwide Coverage with Extensive National

Interest, Confidence and Trust in Government /

Authority Severely Damaged. Significant Behavioural

Changes within Population with Few Activities and

Movements, Significant Brand Damage

Entire section or precinct of

city affected

Mortality within some

speciesRegional Level

Multiple Local Government

Areas

Many Fatalities

High Casualty Level

Creating a major level

economic loss - affects sectors,

industries or people in the

immediate and surrounding

areas

30,000 - 150,000 10 - 49

2 Majors or

4 - 6 Significant

$100 Million to

$500 Million National Coverage with Extensive Local Interest,

Confidence and Trust in Government / Authority

Questioned, Large Behavioural Change within

Community with Activities and Movements No Longer

Occurring, Some Brand Damage

Many roads blocked,

surrounding buildings and

facilities affected

Stress or behavioural

changes on ecosystemLocal Government Area

Multiple Suburbs

Some Fatalities

High Casualty Level

Creating a moderate level

economic loss - affects sectors,

industries or people only in the

immediate area

10,000 - 30,000 4 - 9

1 Major or

2 - 4 Significant

$50 Million to

$100 Million Local Coverage with some Community Interest,

Confidence levels remain with Trust Questioned, Some

Behavioural Change with some Activities Affected,

Little Brand Damage

Target building / facility

affected

Physical or chemical

level changes onlyWhole Suburb

Multiple Streets

Some Fatalities

Some Casualties

Local economic loss without

major effect on surrounding

areas

0 - 10,000 0 - 3

1 - 2 Significant

$0 - $50 Million Little or No Coverage, Confidence and Trust Remain

Unaffected, Normal Behaviour and Activities Continue

Unaffected, No Brand Damage

Little or No Impact

Little or No impact –

no change in

ecosystemWhole Street

Multiple Homes

No Fatalities

Some CasualtiesMinimal economic impact

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsCONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS TABLE

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS - LOCATION

DAMAGE & OPERATION - CONSEQUENCE WEIGHTING OF 50% IMPACTS - CONSEQUENCE WEIGHTING OF 50%ANALYSIS

TOTAL

(40)Damage to Asset Replacement Cost Return to Operation Corridor Impact

TOTAL

Population Exposed

and/or Impacted

Number of Fatalities

and/or CasualtiesDependencies Economic Impact

Media, Social Impact &

Social Disruption

Environmental

Impact (Urban)


(Natural)TOTAL

THREAT SUB THREAT (FACILITY)Damage & Operation

Weighting - 25%

Damage & Operation

Weighting - 25%

Damage & Operation

Weighting - 25%

Damage & Operation

Weighting - 25%

Impacts

Weighting - 20%

Impacts

Weighting - 15%

Impacts

Weighting - 15%

Impacts

Weighting - 15%

Impacts

Weighting - 15%

Impacts

Weighting - 10%

Impacts

Weighting - 10%

Active Armed Offender - Firearm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Active Armed Offender - Basic Weapon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Accidental Impact 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Aircraft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Arson / Fire Bomb 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Communicated Threat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Concerted Ill Discipline 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Crude CBRN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Crude Cyber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Demonstration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Hostile Vehicle / Vessel 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Natural Disaster 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Malicious Damage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Person Borne IED Destruction of Facility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Person Borne IED Targeting Vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Placed IED Destruction of Facility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Placed IED Targeting Vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Riot / Demonstration 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

RPAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Sabotage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Siege & Hostage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Sophisticated CBRN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Sophisticated Cyber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Supply Interruption 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Trusted Insider 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Vehicle Borne IED Destruction of Facility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Vehicle Borne IED Targeting Vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Vessel Borne IED Destruction of Facility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Vessel Borne IED Targeting Vessels 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsASSESSMENT TABLE - BASIC

THREAT LIST SUB LISTLIKELIHOOD

GRADE

CONSEQUENCE

GRADE

Active Armed Offender - Firearm 1 29

Active Armed Offender - Basic Weapon 2 28

Accidental Impact 3 27

Aircraft 4 26

Arson / Fire Bomb 5 25

Communicated Threat 6 24

Concerted Ill Discipline 7 23

Crude CBRN 8 22

Crude Cyber 9 21

Demonstration 10 20

Hostile Vehicle / Vessel 11 19

Natural Disaster 12 18

Malicious Damage 13 17

Person Borne IED Destruction of Facility 14 16

Person Borne IED Targeting Vehicles 15 15

Placed IED Destruction of Facility 16 14

Placed IED Targeting Vehicles 17 13

Riot / Demonstration 18 12

RPAS 19 11

Sabotage 20 10

Siege & Hostage 21 9

Sophisticated CBRN 22 8

Sophisticated Cyber 23 7

Supply Interruption 24 6

Trusted Insider 25 5

Vehicle Borne IED Destruction of Facility 26 4

Vehicle Borne IED Targeting Vehicles 27 3

Vessel Borne IED Destruction of Facility 28 2

Vessel Borne IED Targeting Vessels 29 1

Active Armed Offender - FirearmActive Armed Offender - Basic

WeaponAccidental Impact

Aircraft

Arson / Fire Bomb

Concerted Ill Discipline

Communicated Threat

Crude CBRN

Crude Cyber

Arson

Forced Entry/Riot

Natural Disaster

Malicious Damage

Person Borne IED

PBIED (Targeting Vehicles)

PBIED (Collapse of Tunnel)

PIED (Targeting Vehicles)

PIED (Collapse of Tunnel)

RPAS

Sabotage

Siege & Hostage

Sophisticated CBRN

Sophisticated Cyber

Trusted Insider

VBIED (Targeting Vehicles)

VBIED (Collapse of Tunnel)

Vessel Borne IED

Supply Interruption

0

15

30

0 15 30

Consequence

Likelihood

Critical Infrastructure AssessmentsASSESSMENT TABLE - LOCATION

THREAT LIST SUB LISTLIKELIHOOD

GRADE

CONSEQUENCE

GRADE

Abduction / Kidnapping 26.6 9.6

Active Armed Offender - Firearm 33.4 17.0

Active Armed Offender - Basic Weapon 39.1 14.6

Aircraft - Large 19.6 36.9

Aircraft - Small 27.1 29.6

Arson / Fire Bomb 27.1 25.8

Assassination 24.1 12.0

Communicated Threat 33.1 9.0

Crude Biological 21.0 15.3

Crude Chemical 21.5 20.1

Crude Cyber 17.3 10.9

Crude Radiological 19.0 26.1

Hostile Vehicle / Vessel 35.8 24.3

Nuclear 7.9 40.0

PBIED Collapse of Tunnel 19.1 32.5

PBIED Targeting Vehicles 23.0 22.7

PIED Collapse of Tunnel 21.3 33.3

PIED Targeting Vehicles 26.6 24.5

Riot / Demonstration 23.8 13.1

Sabotage 19.5 17.6

Siege & Hostage 31.6 14.6

Sophisticated Biological 10.0 19.1

Sophisticated Chemical 11.5 25.4

Sophisticated Cyber 11.5 13.1

Sophisticated Radiological 6.8 32.9

VBIED Collapse of Tunnel 19.3 33.5

VBIED Targeting Vehicles 26.4 30.1

VIED 0.0 0.0

Abduction / Kidnapping

Active Armed Offender -Firearm

Active Armed Offender -Basic Weapon

Aircraft - Large

Aircraft - Small

Assassination

Arson / Fire Bomb

Communicated Threat

Crude Biological

Arson

Forced Entry/Riot

Crude Radiological Hostile Vehicle / Vessel

Nuclear

PBIED (Targeting Vehicles)

PBIED (Collapse of Tunnel)

PIED (Targeting Vehicles)

PIED (Collapse of Tunnel)

Riot / Demonstration

Sabotage

Siege & Hostage

Sophisticated Biological

Sophisticated Chemical

Sophisticated Radiological VBIED (Targeting Vehicles)

VBIED (Collapse of Tunnel)

VIED

Sophisticated Cyber

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20.0

40.0

0.0 20.0 40.0

Con

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qu

en

ce

Likelihood

Kangaroo Lesson #3

How to Deal with a Kangaroo

Project Case StudyBACKGROUND

• Threat & Security Assessments were carried out at each location and as a result, 60% of cameras originally planned were removed and the new cameras placed in new positions to provide better coverage.

• The assessment also included the maintenance aspects of each installation along with the removal of EWP’s as part of the maintenance and installation process.

• The tender’s technical requirements were very specific, resulting in a small number of cameras meeting the requirements. The scope was changed to provide the industry with performance standards (not technical) to encourage competition, driving down price.

Project Case StudyTENDER SELECTION

• Price & Value for Money

• Service Delivery, Service Provider Experience and Competency

• Implementation of Works, Minimised Operational Risk and Disruption

• Quality of Systems, Policies and Procedures

• Technical Detail and Equipment

• Compliance with Documentation

• Innovation & Value Added Proposals responding to the Scope of Works

• Sustainability Practices in delivering the Scope of Works

Project Case StudyKEY ISSUES

• The major challenge was its predefined and narrow scope.

• Before starting the tender process for Stage 2, a review of Stage 1 was conducted and as a result, the scope for Stage 2 was amended.

• A full review was conducted including interviews with the Security Operations Manager, Operating Assets & Security Manager, the Tenderer, Contractors & Sub Contractors and Control Room Operators. The project was re-scoped and re-budgeted as a result.

• Confidentiality was also an important consideration, although there were non-disclosure agreements in place, the information was released in stages as the tendering process progressed.

Project Case StudyKEY ISSUES CONT.

• There was also no industry engagement, it was left to a remote and sterile tender process.

• Site visits were arranged with interested tenderers and a presentation provided for all tenderers 4 weeks prior to tender closing for questions and clarifications.

• The engagement with tenderers also resulted in a number of alternate proposals that generated new and emerging technologies that were not specified in the original tender.

• Technical Drawing's did not exist.

Project Case StudyCONTRACT

• The contract was amended to include: • The introduction of Value Added Proposals and Innovations to the assessment

criteria, to drive those efficiencies.

• Introduction of Sustainability as criteria for assessment, to promote the RMS focus on Environment and Sustainability Strategies.

• A Monthly Contract Performance Meeting was introduced and formed part of the contractual requirements. This required all invoices for the previous month were required for presentation and approval with only invoices paid from that month.

• Previous invoices were not accepted with the aim to ensure accurate financial tracking and projections.

Project Case StudyCONTRACT CONT.

• Parameters for the measurement of KPI’s which included an overall score and a minimum standard applied to each KPI so substandard performance in one, was not artificially raised by an average across the board.

• Adding ‘Asset Tagging’ to the contract to allow for projections for replacement and upgrades over the life of the cameras and the start of an asset register of assets.

Project Case StudyCONTRACT CONT.

Project Case StudySAFETY

• Relocating Cameras removing the use of EWP for cleaning and servicing reducing exposure to incidents.

• Linking with Infrastructure Managers to facilitate the removal of cameras above road decks areas during already programmed road closures, saving cost and traffic impacts.

• Relocating Camera’s causing access issues and/or injuries.

• Giving operators at Lift Bridges control over the camera’s locally, to give them better traffic coverage at drop gates and coverage of pedestrian accesses during lift operations.

• Some camera’s remaining in position until suitable works are undertaken that can be utilised for their safe removal.

Project Case Study

Project Case StudyCAMERAS

• Camera location assessments were carried out at each location supported by a detailed Risk Assessment along with specific location requirements and a number of recommendations were made that include:

• 74 Cameras (60%) were found to provide little or no Infrastructure Protection value or that provide traffic coverage only.

• 48 Cameras (40%) were upgraded, relocated to increase coverage, improve access for maintenance and remove the use of EWP’s and equipment to reduce the exposure to safety hazards.

• Reduction on local staff travel times

Project Case StudyCAMERAS CONT.

• A new Asset Tagging and Mapping System to be able to identify individual cameras, their life cycle, location and servicing/maintenance details.

• The potential for a ‘whole of government approach’ with other government agencies provided with footage/analytics from the system such as;• Bridge Readings (Alignment Deviation, Load Limits, Power/Fire Boards)

• Water/Flood Level Readings

• Air Quality (Pollution, Bush Fires)

• Road Traffic Incidents

• Marine Traffic

Project Case StudyBENEFITS

• The use of analytics (camera and software warning systems) to reduce the workload on operators in the Control Room and dramatically increase the ability to detect potential risks to Infrastructure;

• Some limited access to other key RMS departments to monitor footage for maintenance, processes.

• Analytics capability to supplement fire & life safety systems.

• Better Bandwidth

• Reduced Storage

Project Case StudyBENEFITS CONT.

• Documentation supporting project requirements

• Consultation with Asset and Region Managers.

• Pricing per Unit

• Consolidating a number of fixed camera’s with dual PTZ / Thermal providing the same or enhanced Infrastructure Protection coverage (Dual IP)

• Prioritising and Categorising of Cameras to store the footage for either 28 Days, 7 Days, on No Recording at all

Kangaroo Lesson #4

You are not safe, anywhere

Questions

a security systems installation project case study

Documents