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Urban's Crusade--Success or FailureAuthor(s): A. C. Krey

Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Jan., 1948), pp. 235-250Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1842819 .

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Urban'sCrusade-Successor Failure

A. C. Kiuy*

THE success of the First Crusade in its capture of Jerusalem and in the

foundation of the Latin states in Syria was so unprecedented and so stirring

that historians generally have overlooked the possibility that from the point

of view of Urban II, who inspired the Crusade, it may have fallen far short

of the goal which he hoped to attain when he set it in motion. It is this

possibility which the present paper seeks to explore.

In recent years, it is true, there has been an ever widening awarenessof the fact that Pope Urban may have sought by way of that Crusade to

bring about a union between the Greek and Latin churches. La Monte, for

example, in commenting Upon an early copy of the present article, which was

then unpublished, found support for its thesis in the writings of Norden,

Munro, Leib, Duncalf, and Baldwin.' Some thirty years earlier, Munro also

referred, in considering the possibility, to K6hler and Fuller as exponents of

the same idea;2 and a number of others, especially Brehier, might be added

to the list.3 But the references just cited will serve, perhaps, to indicate the

growing conviction among historians that the union of the Latin and

Greek churches was one of the impelling motives in the call for the First

Crusade.

A number of the scholars named above have reached this conclusion

through a variety of shrewd conjectures that, since the material considera-

tions in the agreement with Alexius were so heavily in favor of the latter,

there must have been certain less tangible considerations, such as the union

of the two churches, perhaps, to establish the balance. Others, including

Leib, Brehier, and Norden, have arrived at a similar inference through a

systematic examination of the previous relations of the churches; and both

of these approaches have served to throw new light on the whole discussion.

But in striving to weigh and canvass the full extent of the problem more

The author is professor of history and chairman of the department in the University ofMinnesota.

1 John L. La Monte, "La Papaute et les croisades,"Renaissance, I and III (New York, 1945),156-58.

2 Dana C. Munro, "The Popes and the Crusades,"Proceedings of the AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,LV, no. 5 (I9I6), I-2.

3Louis Brehier, L'eglise et l'Orient au moyen age: Les Croisades (5th ed.; Paris, I928),pp. 57-62. See also his two chapters in the CambridgeMedieval History, IV (London, 1927),chaps.X, XIX.

235



236 a. C. Krey

thoroughly, ne mustalsotakeintoaccounta numberof otherfactorswhich

are to be found in the intricate nterplayduring the Crusadeof all the

separate lementswhich theseresearchesmply.

Some inkling, for instance,of Pope Urban'sdesireto bring about theunion of Greekand Latin Christendoms furnishedby the reportsof his

speech at Clermont.'Yet, since none of these was writtenat the time and

since all, furthermore,were naturallyinfluencedby later events,Urban's

ambitionto achievethis resultis much moreclearly ndicatedn the letters

which he addressed o the assembling rusaders.n thesehe assignedgreat

prominence o the plight of "ecclesiasDei in Orientispartibus";nd sincehechose, in addition, o single out the liberationof "orientaliumcclesiarum"

as the major objectiveof the expedition,5 ne may reasonably ssumethathis identification f the "oriental hurches" s "Churches f God" was no

merecasualstatement.Rather, t mayquitewell have beendeliberate nd,as

such, intended to stressthe fact that he proposed o make no distinction

between Greek and Latin Christiansbut to regardthem all, instead, as

common membersof one fold, of which the popeat Rome was the proper

shepherd.

Otheritems of evidence to this effectmay likewisebe drawn from thefact that Urbanhad alreadyestablished recordof friendlyrelationswith

EmperorAlexiuslong beforeClermont.Furthermore,art of the correspon-

dence of the emperorwith the abbotof MonteCassinohassurvived,and itstone is also one of friendlyco-operation.6Moresignificantperhaps,was the

actionof Urban in sendingmilitaryaid, howeversmall,in response o theemperor'srequest, in Io92.7 This action, as well as the presence of theenvoys of Alexius at the Council of Piacenza,aboutwhich we know too

little,must be counted as important vidence n establishing he probabilityof some friendly understandingbetween Urban and Alexius before theFirst Crusade.8

Moreconvincing, houghstill inferential, rethe deductions o be drawn4 Dana C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II," American Histor-icalReview, XI (1905-

I906), 231-42.

5 The letter of Pope Urban II to the crusadersin Flanders in Heinrich Hagenmeyer, ed.,Epistulac et Chartae (Innsbruck, I9OI), pp. 136-37. (Hereafter abbreviated,H. Ep.)

6fTwo letters to Oderisius, abbot of Monte Cassino, H. Ep., pp. 140-41, 152-53. See alsoBernard Leib, Rome, Kiev et Byzance (Paris, 1924), pp. 103-105.

7Anna Comnena, Alexiad, VIII, 5. (Unless otherwise specified the edition ofchronicles ofthe Crusades cited in this article is that of the Recueil des Historiens des Croisades,published

by the Academy of Inscriptionsand Belles-Lettres,Paris ['4 vols., Paris, i869-I906]. Referencesto Latin chronicles are abbreviatedH. Oc. References o the works of Anna Comnena [abbreviatedAlexiad], of William of Tyre [abbreviated W. T.], and of the anonymous Gesta Francorum[abbreviatedGesta], are made in terms of book and chapterto permit use of convenient editions.)See also Brehier, pp. 6I-62, and Leib, pp. 20-26.

8 Dana C. Munro, "Did the Emperor Alexius Ask for Aid at the Council of Piacenza?"Am. Hist. Rev., XXVII (I922), 731.



UJrban'sCrusade-Success or Failure 237

fromthe conductof the pope'spersonalrepresentativer representativesn

the expedition tself. These were, in the first instance,Bishop Adhemarof

Puy and, secondly,Count Raymondof Toulouse,who was presentat Cler-

mont; and it may be safely assumed that Urbandiscussedhis hopes andplans with Adhemar,9and possibly also with Count Raymond.Inasmuch

as Adhemaraccompaniedhe count's orceson the long journey o the Holy

Land, that military eadermust likewise have become acquaintedwith the

pope'splans rom the bishop, f not from the popehimself.

The first importantoccasionfor the revelationof any previousunder-

standing between pope and emperor was in connection with the treaty

which the several leaders of the expedition were requiredto make with

Alexius.This includedthe agreementbetweenthem thatall cities andterri-torieswhich had been previouslyheld by the empirewere to be returned o

Alexius; and, though no definite date for the earlierboundaries f the em-

pire was specified,Antioch and its environs were apparently ncluded.10

This fact in itself is enoughto make one wonder whether so substantial

concessiondid not depend on other considerationswhich may, in turn,

have rested upon some previousunderstandingwith the real leaderof the

Crusade,Pope Urban.For over a year and a half, at any rate, his agreement

wasfaithfullyrespected y the crusaders.

In further supportof this general thesis let us return,for the moment,

to Urban n Italy,wherecontinued fforton his partwas required o persuade

the Italiansto respond to his call for a crusade.Finally, however,he was

successful,enlisting not only southern Normans but the maritime cities,

Genoa,Pisa, and Venice, and, last of all, the Lombardregion,whoselargest

contingentsstartedafter his death. More significantfor our immediate

argument,however, is the fact that he carefullyplanned a churchcouncilat Bari to considerthe union of Greek and Latin churches.This council,

in which the momentarily xiled Anselm, archbishop f Canterbury, layed

such an importantpart, met in October, 098; and though it is not certain

that any of the prelates rom Constantinoplewere present, t adjourned o

meet again in Rome the following spring for furtherconsideration f the

union of the two churches."

Turning againat this point to the crusadingarmy,and especially o its

protracted iegeof Antioch, t is clear hat, since much of the territorywhichhad been recoveredfrom the Muslim was garrisonedby crusaders, he

9The letter to the crusaders n Flanders, H. Ep., p. 136.10A. C. Krey, "A Neglected Passage in the Gesta," The Crusadesand OtherHistorical Essays

Presented to D. C. Munro (New York, I928), pp. 57-78.11J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Florence and Venice,

175998), XX, cols. 947-52.



238 S. C. Krey

policy which was adopted n filling churchoffices n theseregionsrequired

carefulconsideration, nd the decisionsbear on our problem.This becomes

evidentas soon as one recalls that whenevera formerGreekprelate was

availablehe was reinstated.In no instance up to the death of Adhemar

were the two churchesprovidedwith separateeadership n the samearea.

So harmonious, ndeed, was the relationshipat that time between the

Greek and Latin churches hat Simieon, he Greekpatriarch f Jerusalem,

who was then a refugee n Cyprus, oined Adhemar n a letterto the West

asking for reinforcements.'" gain, when Antioch was finally securedby

the crusaders,Adhemar,who seemsto have assumed hat the two churches

were to be united, arrangedfor theceremonialrestorationof the

Greek

patriarchhere;13and in followingthis policy there is little reason o doubt

that he was faithfullycarryingout the instructions f Pope Urban.In fact,

the entireconsistencyof his actionswith both the words and the deedsof

the pope would seem to indicatethat their common understandingmust

have been basedupon somethingmore definitethan a vague hope that the

unionof the two churchesmight result romtheCrusade.

Assuming for the moment, hen,that somesuchagreementbetweenpope

and emperordid exist,or at least that the union of the Greekand Latinchurcheswas a definitepartof Urban'splan for the Crusade,why do we

not hear more about it later? The answer to this questionmust be sought

first of all, the evidencesuggests, n the events aroundand aboutAntioch,

and particularlyn those which occurredafter the death of Adhemar;and

to go very far on this line of inquiry, it is important o remember hat

Bohemond'sdesire to keep Antioch for himself was already plain, even

beforethe bishop'sdeath.Moreover,t is Bohemond'sown chroniclerwho

assuresus most clearly of all that the other leaders,presumablyAdhemaramong them, did not agreewith Bohemond's mbitionbut, on the contrary,

consideredAntiochas part of the territory o be returned o Alexius.This

dispositionon their part is clearlyconfirmedby the anonymousauthorofthe Gestawho reportsthat, after the final captureof Antioch, the council

of leaders ent an embassy, f whichHugh the Great'4was chief, to Alexius

inviting him "ad recipiendam. ivitatem"and to the fulfillment of his

treatyobligations.

So specifica statementcan hardlybe disregarded; nd it is clearfrom it

12 Letter of Simeon and Adhemar to the faithful of the northernregions, H. Ep., pp. I41-42.

It is noteworthy that Adhemar gives precedenceto Simeon as befitted the latter'ssuperiordignity,a further reflection of his assumption that there was to be but one church.

13 W. T., VI, 23.14 Hugh of Vermandois, brother of the king of France.



Ur-ban's Crusade-Success or Failure 239

that, to acquire egal title to Antioch,Bohemondwould have to bolsterhis

claim by some morepersuasive rgument han merepossession."5o doso, of

course,his most obvious strategywas to discredit he emperor's ulfillment

of his treatyobligations;and, if we areto believeAnna, the wily Bohemondwasalready ngagedupon this policyeven beforeAntiochwas first entered.

No doubt he was, as is furthersuggestednot only by his treatmentof Tati-

cius, the militaryrepresentative f Alexius but also by his insinuationsas

to the motivesfor the latter'sdeparturerom the siege of Antioch."6Never-

theless, t would be difficultto maintainthe thesis that Alexius had failed

to live up to his obligationsat this time, for he was personally eadingan

army to aid in the captureof Antioch in I098 and was well acrossAsia

Minor when he was dissuaded from his purpose by the panic-stricken

Stephen of Blois, who assured him that the crusadingarmy had already

been destroyed.Upon hearing that report, the energiesof the emperor's

expeditionwere accordingly pent in applying the "parchedearth"treat-

ment to cover its retreat;and when Hugh finally arrivedat the imperial

court it was too late for Alexius to launch a new expedition mmediately.

But he did prepareanotherfor the next year, and his envoys announcing

the coming of this expeditionreachedAntioch as early as Februaryandthe main army of the crusadersat Arka by April.'7 In addition,Alexius

must also be given credit for the supplieswhich came by ship from Cyprus

andeven fromConstantinoplehroughouthis period.

How soon Alexius became convincedthat the agreement concerning

Antioch was to be repudiateds uncertain, or, though Bohemond's nten-

tions in the matter must have becomeincreasinglyclear before the year

I098 hadrun its course, he letter n which they are statedspecifically, long

with a reportof Adhemar'sdeath,was not sent beforeSeptemberi. Thisletterfrom the crusadingchieftains o Urban was editedor supplemented

by Bohemondwhen most of the other leaderswere absentfrom Antioch;

and in it the pope was urged "now that his vicar was dead, to come in

personand establishhis see at Antioch'the originalsee of Peter himself'-

'urbemprincipalem t capitalemChristianinominis."' Writing in the first

person,Bohemondassures he pope that he feels quite competent o cope

with the Infidel but that the heretics (Greeks,Armenians, Syrians, and

15Anonymi Gesta Francorum et aliortumHierosolymitanorum, ca. XXX. See also Ralph B.Yewdale, Bohemond 1, Princeof Antioch (Princeton, I924), pp. 72-73. Hagenmeyerdates Hugh'sarrival at Constantinople July 2T, I098. Heinrich Hagenmeyer, Chronologie de la Premi?reCroisade (Paris, I902), No. 304. (Hereafter abbreviated H. Chron.)

16 Alexiad, XI, 6.17 Yewdale, pp. 77-78. See also W. T., VII, 2o.



240 i'. C. Kr-ey

Jacobites are specified) are beyond him. To deal with them, he needs the

pope's help "omnes haereses, cuiuscumque generis sint, tua auctoritate et

nostra virtute eradicas et destruas";8 and there in those few words he an-

nounces not only his determination to hold Antioch, even though it may

mean war with the Greeks to do so, but his not too subtle purpose, further-

more, to gain sanction for his usurpation, at least in the eyes of the Latins,

by having the pope establish his see in that city. By I098, therefore,Bohemond

was embarked upon a course that was certain to lead to a war with Alexius

for the possession of Antioch, a struggle which was to engage his energies

for the rest of his life.

Bohemond's intentions and policy now being clear, it becomes neces-

sary to discover their effect on (i) the pope, (2) Alexius, and (3) the crusad-

ing leaders.

To begin, then, with Urban: How startled he must have been, if our

conjecture about his hopes and his plans is correct, to receive the letter of

September ii, which, though written ostensibly by all the crusading leaders,

ended so clearly as a personal appeal from Bohemond alone. And indeed

he had reason to be surprised by its whole general tenor, for he was not

accustomed to thinking of Greek Christians as "heretics"nor had his repre-sentative, Adhemar, ever treated the Greek clergy as such; and as he pon-

dered over the letter in question, it must have been very soon clear to him

that he had hardly to read between its lines to gather that Bohemond was

at least contemplating, if not already set upon, a course which could only

lead, if carried out, to a complete reversal of the policies which had hitherto

been followed.

Just when Urban received this portentous communication we do not

know; for ships and fleets traveled with so little speed in these years thatthere are instances during the early twelfth century when certain important

messages from Syria to Italy were as long in transit as all of six months.

So it is doubtful whether this special letter could have reached any Italian

port much before the end of the year; and even after it arrived there, it had

still to be carried to its final destination.1"

As uncertain, therefore, as we must remain about the date of its arrival,

we are no more sure as to what its immediate effect upon Urban may have18 The letter of Bohemond and the other leaders to Pope Urban II, H. Ep., pp. I6I-65.19The best basis for calculation on this point is afforded by two voyages which are fairly

definitely dated, first that of the Bruno of Lucca who left Antioch July 20, I098, and reachedLucca the first week in October, I098, an interval of nearly three months (H. Chron. Nos. 303,3I9), and second, that of the Genoese who left Laodicea some time in September, I099, andreached Genoa December 24, I099 (H. Chron. Nos. 430, 437). It is safe to assume that theletter of Bohemond and the other leaders of the Crusade, dated September ii, I098, did notreach Italy much before late December of I098.



Urban's Crusade-Success or Failure 24I

been.From the natureof its contents,however,one might suppose hatno

hastyreply was likely to be sent.For,as the popethoughtoverthe informa-

tion whichwas thusconveyed o him, he couldhardlyhave failedto under-

standthat its import was such as to representconsiderablymore than apassingthreat to the forthcomingcouncil at Rome, where the questionof

unity with the Greek church,which had alreadybeen debatedat Bari in

the previousfall, was again to receivemajor attention.As to-how soon

that was clearto him, we can only speculate,of course;but the very fact

that the reports of this council contain almost no mention of the chief

question which it was supposed o considermight lead one to infer that

Bohemond's etter had been so disturbing o both pope and Greeksalike

asto render urtherdiscussion f unitymomentarilympossible.20

Some new courseof actionwas obviouslyrequired;but on what Urban

decidedor, indeed,whetherhe everreacheda conclusionon this matter s

not at all clear,forhe lived little morethan threemonths afterthe Council

of Rome,and he may have been ill most of this time. It has usually been

assumed, however, that Daimbert or Dagobert,archbishopof Pisa, was

sent by him to succeedAdhemaras the papalrepresentativen the Crusade.

But this is pure assumption.All the chronologicalndexes that we possessindicatethat Daimbertand his Pisan fleet were alreadyat sea long before

Urbanreceivedor could havereceived he officialnotification f Adhemar's

death.21At most, Daimbertwent as ecclesiasticaleader of the Pisan con-tributionto the Crusade,which he had done so much to enlist.True, he

was the rankingLatin prelate n the East when he arrived,and therefore

assumed a position of ecclesiasticaleadership,but that is another story.

For our immediatepurposes, t is importantonly to rememberhat he was

not Urban'sappointee o succeedAdhemar.It is doubtful, n fact,whetherUrbanevernominateda successor; nd there is reasonto believethat Car-

dinal Maurice,who was appointedby Paschal II in April, IIOO, was the

firstpapal vicarafterAdhemar.22f so, every crucialevent of the Crusade

from August i, ioQ8,until the arrivalof CardinalMaurice,must have oc-20 Mansi, XX, cols. 96I-70. See also Leib, pp. 296-97.21 The arrival of Daimbert, archbishop of Pisa, at Laodicea approximatelya year after the

death of Adhemar, the first important prelate from the West since Adhemar, has led most his-torians, even Leib (p. 269), to assume that he was the papal legate to succeed Adhemar. It isprobable that the Pisan fleet left some time in the late summer of I098 for it is known to havewintered on the islands in the eastern Mediterraneanwhich it had captured (H. Chron., No.428). He had therefore left Italy before the news of Adhemar's death had been received. Thereis no letter of Urban's or Paschal's which describes him as papal legate in the Holy Land asthere is of Adhemar or Maurice. Nor does he so style himself in his letter of September, I099

(H. Ep., p. i6i), nor does a close study of his conduct after his arrival in the East justify suchassumption; indeed, there is much to the contrary.

22The letter of Pope Paschal II congratulating the triumphant crusaders in Asia (H. Ep.,T78-79).



242 A. C. Krey

curred without the presence or the guidance of any official representative

of the pope. And, if we accept this view, we may therefore conclude not

only that Bohemond's letter quite probably served to paralyze the efforts

of Urban II to push forward his plans for unifying the Greek and Latinchurches but also that the pope himself died before he was able to go any

further with that hope or expectation.

As to what may have been the effect of Bohemond's actionison Alexius,

whatever disquieting rumors may have reached the emperor by the time

Hugh the Great arrived at Constantinople toward the end of July, 1098,

they must have been more than offset by the reportsof that official messenger,

for Alexius immediately began preparations for another expedition, and he

furthermore sent envoys to the crusaders to announce its coming. These

envoys reached Antioch in February, IO99; and then and there only did

they learn for certain that Bohemond meant to keep that city. Nor did they

know until they moved on to Arka in April23 that the crusading army

meant to go on to Jerusalem without waiting for the forces of the emperor.

As a consequence, the expedition which Alexius had prepared to aid the

Crusade was diverted into an attack upon Antioch and the region there-

about. Thus unexpectedly, at least on the part of Alexius, was the war

between him and Bohemond begun;24 and until that should be settled,

the emperor was hardly in a mood to co-operate in any plan looking toward

unity between the two churches.

Having considered the effect of Bohemond's policy upon Pope Urban

and Emperor Alexius, we must also try to estimate its impact on the rest

of the crusading leaders. To proceed with that inquiry, then, it is highly

important to recall not only the fact that the council of crusading leaders

had sent Hugh the Great to urge Alexius to come to receive Antioch andfulfill his obligations to the crusaders but also, in addition, that this action

was taken after the captureof that city in i098 and likewise after Bohemond

had won, it is thought, the promise of the majority of the leaders to give

him possessionof it. Furthermore,Hugh had been sent on his mission before

the death of Adhemar; and, to judge from all this whole series of events,

one can only conclude tha.t, on sober second thoucrht and after the crisis

at Antioch was past, the crusaders' leaders must have repented of their

earlier action in promising Bohemond the city which was so manifestlydue Alexius under terms of their agreement with him. Doubtless it was

Adhemar's influence which thus prevailed; but whatever may have moved

23 H. Chron., No. 36I. See also Yewdale, p. 73, and W. T., VII, 20.24 Yewclale. p. 87. Ferdinand Chalandon, Essai stir la r?gne d'Alexis etrComnacne Paris,

I 900).



Urban's Crusade-Success or Failure 243

them to this decision, heirattitudeat the end of June or early n July,Io98,

was based apparently, s officiallyvoiced,on the understandinghat even

if any considerablenumberof them had made concessions o Bohemond

about Antioch before its capture,their previous agreement with Alexiuswas boundto supersede ny orall such commitments o Bohemond.Whether

this general decision of the council also implied that, if Alexius failed to

live up to his full contractwith the crusading eaders, they would then

approveBohemond's laim to Antioch, s not certain.

After the death of Adhemar,Count Raymondof Toulouse becamethe

leaderof the opposition o Bohemond'splans,25 nd muchof the bickering

that went on among the crusading eadersduringthe fall and winter of

I098-IO99 wasconcerned,n general,with the disposition f Antioch.Thoughtherewere many otherquestionsthat came up duringthat time, this was

the most persistentand far-reaching, o much so, indeed, that when the

decisionto march on Jerusalemwas finally made, Bohemondseems to

have given a somewhat equivocalpromiseto participate.At any rate,he

apparentlyaccompanied he rest for only a short distancesouthward,and

thenreturned o Antioch in a withdrawalwhichRaymond,who felt himself

toofarcommittedo abandon he march,vigorously esented.2"

The next test of the opinion of the crusading eaderscame in April,

IO99, at Arka, near Tripoli,where the envoysof Alexius,aftertheirfruitless

stay in Antioch,reached he main crusadingarmyand urged the crusaders

to await the comingof Alexius and his expedition,whichwas promisedon

St. John'sDay. CountRaymondstronglyurged that course also,27 nd the

decision of the leadersto rejectthis advicewas compoundedof so many

diverse nterestshatit can scarcelybe regardedas a clear ndicationof their

attitude toward either Bohemondor Alexius.For the rank and file were

impatient and anxious to complete their vows; and since Raymond had

indicateda deep interest,which arousedno enthusiasmamong the other

leaders, n capturingTripoli for himself, his motives in counselingdelay

were questionedeven by his own followers. Thus losing the position of

leadershipwhich he had held since Bohemondabandoned he march to-

ward Jerusalem,Raymondnever regained it, either during or after the

captureof Jerusalem.His wishes, and possiblyhis hopes, regardingthe

dispositionof the Holy City were thwartedby the otherleadersof whomRobertof Normandywas his leadingopponentat Jerusalem, s he had been

at Arka earlier.2825 H. Ch/ont.,No. 352; Yewdale, pp. 73-78.26 Yewdale, p. 87; H. Chron.,No. 349.27 Raymond d'Aguilers, H. Oc., III, 268; Alexiad, XI, 9; W. T., VII, 2o.28 H. Chron., No. 4I1 s; Raymond d'Aguilers, H. Oc., 111,301-303. It was Robert'schaplain,



244 J. C. Krey

In the light of these developments,he incidentsat Laodicea,where the

homeboundcrusaders ncounteredBohemond,may seem strange, or thereboth Robertof Normandyand Rroertof Flanders29 ided with Raymond

when he took an active stand againstBohemond,who was energeticallyengagedin the siege of that Greektown. In this effortBohemondhadwon

the aid of ArchbishopDaimbertand his recentlyarrivedPisanfleet.With

this help the captureof the city was assured;and,underthe circumstances,it is hardlysurprising hat his old rival,Raymondof Toulouse,expressed

strongopposition o Bohemond'splans.Yet even if Raymond'spositioncan

be thus accounted or, that of the two Roberts s far from clear,for thereis every reasonto believe that they personallypreferredBohemond.That

they nevertheless oined Raymondin the threatto take up arms against

Bohemond,unlesshe desisted romthe siege,canonly be explainedon muchhigher groundsthan personalantagonism;and the fact that they added

theirvoices to Raymond's anbest be accounted or on the assumptionhat

his oppositionreflectednot only his own interests but also the original

plan of Urbanas executedby Adhemar up to the latter'sdeath. In sucha

situation,of course, the two Robertscould do no less than acknowledge,

as they had done in the council of leadersin Antioch after Karbuqa'sdefeat, the justice of Raymond'scontention;for Bohemond'saction at

Laodicea,which was included n theenvironsof Antioch,hadagainbrought

into sharpfocusthe whole questionof the returnof that city to Alexius.

As a resultof so many combinedprotests,ArchbishopDaimbert alledoff his

Pisanfleet, and devotedhis energies o reconcilinghe Latinleaders,"0 hile

Bohemondwas forcedto give up the siege. In spite of that, however,andeven though the two Roberts returnedto the West with their troops,

Raymondand a considerableportion of his troopsremainedin or near

Arnulf of Choques, who broke Count Raymond's leadership by questioning the validity of theHoly Lance which Peter Bartholomew, a humble cleric and visionary in Raymond's army hadfound in Antioch. Count Raymond, wealthiest of the leaders, had granted subsidies to the fourprincipal eaders after Bohemond'sdefection.This leadershipby purchasehe reinforcedby keepingPeter Bartholomew close to himself. The latter continued to report visions and supernaturalrevelations so obviously in the interest of Count Raymond at Arka that Arnulf became skepticaland questioned the validity of the lance upon which Peter Bartholomew's reputation and in-fluence rested. This led to the trial of the visionary by the ordeal of fire which he did not survivea sufficientnumber of days to prove a miracle. The other leaders had been restive to move onfor some time. Now the rank and file, many of Count Raymond's troops among them, refusedto stay at Arka any longer. Count Raymond was thus compelled to follow on to Jerusalem.SeeCharles Wendell David, Robert Curthose (Cambridge, 1920), pp. iII-i5. The legend thatRaymond was offered the rule of Jerusalem,which David unfortunatelyrepeats,was started byRaymond's chaplain and can mean only that some of Raymond's immediate friends may havesuggested the possibility but there is no evidence that any of the other leaders made, or wouldhave acquiesced n such an offer.

29 Yewdale, pp. 88-89; H. Chron., No. 430.

30 The letter of Daimbert, Godfrey, and Raymond to the pope, H. Ep., pp. i67-74.




Laodicea to assure protectionof the Greek city; and when he himself

finallysailed to Constantinopleo confer with Alexius, he left his family

and his troopsbehind.81Looking closely,therefore,at this whole episode,

one is led to concludethat Raymondand the two Robertsmust have re-gardedBohemond'sconduct at Laodicea as a violation not only of their

commonagreementwith Alexius but also of the plansof Pope Urban.In

addition, he circumstanceswould seem also to implythat Daimbertcould

hardlyhavebeenUrban'sappointee o succeedAdhemar.

And now to go a stepfurther n the thesis whichis herebeingadvanced,

let us turn our attentionmore directly on the war between Bohemond

and Alexius.The troopsof Alexius had beenoperatingaboutthe periphery

of Antioch in the summerand early fall of IO99, but militaryoperations

had ceased at the approachof winter. The respite which the unfavorable

seasonofferedmade it possiblefor Bohemond o fulfill his crusader's ow

by going to Jerusalem or Christmas;and on this pious excursionhe was

joinedby ArchbishopDaimbert,who had spent the betterpart of the fallin flittingbetween the troopsof Raymond at Laodiceaand those of Bohe-

mond at Antioch. These two ambitious men, Bohemondand Daimbert,

were thus able to perfect their plans; and when they arrivedat Jerusalemit was Bohemondwho engineered he project or the depositionof Arnulf

as patriarchof Jerusalem nd the elevationof Daimbertto that office.32twas also Bohemondwho, when this had been accomplished, rranged or

the joint submissionof Godfrey and himselfas vassalsfor theirrespective

principalitieso PatriarchDaimbert.33This was no boon to Godfrey,butit was to Bohemond,who hopedthereby o commit the Latinchurch o the

full supportof his claim to Antioch,whichneither he crusadingeadersnor

Alexius had recognized; and the fact that this ambition on his part wasinvolved in his dealings with Daimbert is amplyconfirmedby the much

disputedletter of Daimbert to Bohemond,which the troopsof Raymondinterceptedand William of Tyre published."4 either of these schemers

81 H. Chron.,No. 460.32 Godfrey, who had been left with no more than 200 knights and i,ooo foot soldiers, was

too helpless to resist this carefully planned conspiracy. He did not have the force to opposeBohemond, and he so pathetically needed the fleet which Daimbert commanded to obtain aseaportto serve as a gateway to the West. Count Raymond'sclergy had bitterlyopposed Arnulf'selection to the patriarchate,and they had filled Daimbert's ear at Laodicea with

charges againstArnulf, some real as well as imaginary. This afforded Bohemond and Daimbert the openingneeded to achieve their ends. Most writers, confused by later events, accepted the convenientexplanation that Daimbert had been sent to occupy the patriarchate.The true story, however, isprovided, oddly enough, by two writers, neither of whom favored Arnulf but much preferredDaimbert: Bartolf de Nanges (H. Oc., III, 5I9) and William of Tyre (W. T., X, 4). See alsoYewdale, p.91-94.

3s W. T., IX, IS; Fulcherof Chartres, II, 34, i6.84-W.T.X, 4.



246 A. C. Krey

profited too much, it is true, from this transaction, or Bohemond was

capturedby the Turks in iioi,3' and the new papal legate, Robert, who

arrivedat Jerusalem n II02, deposed Daimbert,who then sought refuge

in Antioch,where he remaineduntil Bohemondwas released romcaptivityand decided o return o the Westfor reinforcements.36

It was doubtlessbefore or on that westwardjourney that the further

plans of these two were perfected.Embracingnot only Bohemond'splans

for a new crusadeand Daimbert'sdesire to recover the patriarchate f

Jerusalem, hey may also have included the decision to spreadabroad a

much edited revision of the anonymousGestaFrancorumas propaganda

material for Bohemond'sprimarydesign.37Whatever these conspirators

may have had in mind, their plans receiveda very favorablereception n

Rome in IIO5 at the hands of Paschal II, who had succeededUrban as

pope; and the end resultof theireffortswas thatDaimbertwas reinstated,38

and Bohemondwas given the help of a papal egate in his appeal or a new

crusade, especiallyin France.39This change in papal attitudeneed not,

however,concernus at the moment,for the warbetweenAlexiusand Bohe-

mond had altered any prospectof a union betweenthe Greek and Latin

churchesuntilthe questionof Antiochwas settled.Turning once more to Alexius, then, we find that monarch intent,

from the year io99, upon the recoveryof Antioch;and in this privatewar

of his own, Bohemond'senemies were his friends-a circumstancewhich

must have causedhim no little embarrassmentn dealingwith the Crusade

of iioi. For Bohemond'senemies, then, including the Turks who lived

near Antioch,were now Alexius'friends.Thus Alexius was asked to help

the crusadersmany of whom would doubtless urn againsthim when they

discovered hat he was at war with the Latins of Antioch) against theTurks who were his allies in that war. It was a difficult spot to be in, so

difficult,in fact, that the disasterswhich befell the Crusadeof IIOI in its

marchacrossAsia Minor were in part blamedupon Alexius.When Bohe-

mond was released from captivityand resumedactive leadershipof the

war against Alexius, he found the allianceof the latter with the Turks

too strongfor his limited forces.It was this fact which led him to seek

additionalaid from the West. Alexius suspectedhis design and began re-

35 Ibid., X, 26; Bartolf, H. Oc., III, 538. The dismissal of Daimbert and subsequent eventsare reviewed in the letter of Pope Paschal II (Reinhold R6hricht, Regesta regni Hierosolymitani[Innsbruck, I893], No. 49). See also Yewdale, p. 92.

86 Yewdale,pp. 99-I02.

87 Krey, in Crusades. . . Munro, pp. 57-78.38R6hricht,No. 49.39 Yewdale, p. io8.




cruiting a strongarmy with which to meet Bohemond n the West, andArabicchroniclersnform us that he had no difficulty n recruitingMuslim

troops orthispurpose.40

As Alexius had correctly urmised,Bohemond andedhis "Crusade"fII07 in the neighborhoodof Durazzo, and it was there that Alexius had

concentrated is greatestefforts in meeting the threat.To repel it and to

defeat Bohemond,he used persuasion,bribery,and force, and Bohemond

was forcedat last to an ignominiouspeace.4'What interestsus most aboutthe terms which were then drawn up between him and Alexius is thefact that he, Bohemond, was not only required by it to recognize the

previousagreementof I097 but also to reinstate n Antiocha single Greek

patriarch,who was to be nominated by Alexius. This provision, whichimpliesthat Alexius, too, had accepted he ideaof a unifiedchurch,recalls

the actionof Urban'srepresentative dhemar, n settingup a formerGreek

patriarchn Antioch as the soleecclesiastical eadof that city.That nothingcame of this treaty is beside the point, for the great efforts of AlexiusagainstBohemondin the West had made it impossible or him to exertanythinglike an equal amount of pressure n the East; and, as a natural

consequence f that fact,Tancredwas able to hold out so successfullyhatAntioch remainedan independentprincipalityof the Latins until thetime of Manuel,grandsonof Alexius. But when it becameat last a fief of

Manuel,the discussionsof the union of Greek and Latin churcheswereagainresumedwithsomeprospect f success.

That, however, s to anticipateevents;and we are concernedhere onlywith the fact that when the treaty was signed and Bohemond'shostileforceshad left the Balkanpeninsula,Alexius seemsto have felt a sense of

greatrelief,as well he might sinceBohemond's areerwas virtuallyended.Though the latterreturned o Italy and startedto raiseanotherarmy, hehad made little progress n that endeavorwhen illness and deathovertookhim March7, iiii." No doubtthe news of his deathaffordedAlexiuseven

greaterassurance,and we soon find him reopeningnegotiationswith thepope that involved specificreference o the reunionof Greek and Latin

churches.As evidencethat the initiativecame from the emperor,one hasonly to readthe letterof PaschalII to Alexius in iii2;" andthe longerone

meditateson that letterthe more one is temptedto reflect hat the overtures40 Hamilton A. R. Gibbs, The Damascus Chronicleof the Crutsades,xtractedand translated

from the Chronicle of Ibn al-Qalinisi (London, i932), pp. 8o, 9i-92.41 Yewdale, pp. I25-31 Alexiad, XIII,8-i2, inclusive.42 Yewdale, p. I33, n. 97.43 Jaffe,Reg. i, No. 6334, pp. 747-48.



248 J. C. Krey

which Alexiusput forwardat that time may have been but a repetitionofthose which his envoyshad conveyedto Urban II at Piacenzain I094 oreven earlierand which may,therefore,haveconstitutedhe basisof Urban's

greathopesand plansforthe FirstCrusade.If the pope'sinstructionshad been more fully carriedout, it is easy to

see now, the prospectof that union betweenthe Greekand Latin churches

would have come much nearerfulfillment;but that greatopportunitywas

lost, or ratherdefeated,by the unbridledambitionof one man,Bohemond,who seemedto carry hat strain n his blood.For poets and novelistsmight

find an abundanceof materialin the remarkable imilarityof the roles

which he and his father,RobertGuiscard,bothplayed in two papalefforts

to unifythe two greatbranches f the Christian hurch.Suchunity,indeed,had beenoneof thedearestwishesof GregoryVII; andthoughcircumstancespreventedhis launchinga crusade,yet the prospectof the unionapparentlyneverleft his mind-a fact whichGuiscardwas cannyenough to recognizeand make use of in furtheringhis own attemptsto gain support for his

attack on the GreekEmpire.44And so, as eventsturnedout, Gregorywas

thus forcedinto a positionwherehe seemedto be tryingto attainby force

what could only have been attainedthroughpersuasionand co-operation.In the sameway, also, Bohemondstrove n his turnto commit Urban to a

programof force which he virtuallysucceeded n winning from Urban's

successor;45nd as an end resultof this doubleschemingof fatherand son,the two popeswho might otherwisehave succeededn bringingaboutthemuchsoughtunion between the two churcheswere both thwarted n their

purposes.

Takingintoconsideration,hen,all the factorswhichbearon thequestion

we have been surveying, t would seemthat,howevermuch Urban desiredtheotherobjectives f the Crusade, ischiefaimwasto bringabout he union

of the Greekand Latin churchesunderthe headshipof thebishopof Rome;and this conclusion,which forms the thesis of this paper, s not inconsistent

apparentlywith the courseof churchhistory.For too much has beenmade

of the so-called"definitivebreak"betweenthe Greek andLatin churches n

1054, and too little of the efforts that were made during the great reform

movement of the eleventh century to achieve uniformityof Christian

doctrineand practice.As a matterof fact, there was nothingdefiniteaboutthe affair of I054, for negotiationsfor union and for the eliminationof

44Brehier in Cambridge Medieval History, IV, 598. Both Guiscard and Bohemond usedfraudulent pretenders to the Greek throne, chiefly, no doubt, to entice papal support for theirventures.

45 The letter of Bohemond and the other leaders to Pope Urban II, H. Ep pD. i6i-65.




variantpractices n the two churcheswere resumed rom time to time after

that date, and the initiation of such negotiationswere undertakenby

Greeksas well as Latins. Furthermore,such negotiationshave recurred

through hecenturies ightdown to thepresent.The mostremarkableeatureof the affairof I054, it seems in retrospect,

was the uncompromisingnsistenceof the Latin church that the union or

reunion of Greekand Latin churchesmust be under the headshipof the

popeat Rome; and this change of emphasis, t would alsoseem,must have

developedas a logical consequenceof the great Western churchreform

program.This movement,which nearlyall textbookson medievalhistory

describeas devotedto the eliminationof simony,marriageof the clergy,and lay investiture, lso supplied, n addition,as is seldomrecognized, he

over-alldrive to re-establish niformityof churchserviceand practice,and

even of dogma, which had seriouslydisintegratedunder the effects of

earlyfeudalism.That this drivefor so muchreformcamefromnorthof the

Alps, not from Italy,and that its core was consistentlymonastic,seems-

again on the long view-important; for the north,unlikeItaly,was scarcely

consciousof any Greek influence, nor did it share any tradition of oc-

casional submissionto Constantinople.On the contrary, the people ofthatregionwereconscious nly of the factthattheirreligionhadcomefrom

Rome; and the monasticcore of the reformers'drive explains ts uncom-

promisingattitudeon the fundamentals f ecclesiasticalniformity.Further-more,the congregationof Cluny,which in a sense epitomizesthe whole

movement,supplieda sustainednucleusfor its propagation;and whetherwe date the beginning of the movementin 9IO or at some later time in

easternFranceor southernand westernGermany,the reform drive had

still gained such momentumthat its force was effectivelyfelt in nearlyevery portionof WesternChristendombefore it capturedRome in I046.46

After that time, the identificationof the popes with the leadershipof

thatgreatreformmovement nspired hem with a consciousnessf strength46 It seems strangethat Brehier (CambridgeMedievalHistory, IV, 272) should have repeated

the expression "definitive rupture"when so much of his writing (ibid., IV, 594, in particular,and all of chapter XIX in general) proves the contrary.Deno Geankoplis,who assistedthe writerin preparing this article for publication,assembledso much evidence from both Greek and Latinsources of continuing friendly relations and negotiations between Greeks and Latins after I054

as to render such characterizationabsurd. He was especially impressedby the fact that the edict

of excommunication issued by the pope's representativeswas directed at certain Greek officials,e.g., PatriarchMichael Cellularius,and exempted Greek Christians;by the very friendly attitudeof the popes toward the Basilianmonasteries n Italy, one of which, GrossoFerrata,servedalmostas an unofficialembassy of the Greek church to Rome and bv the very cordial relationsbetweenthe Greek church and GregoryVII until the latter lent his support to Robert Guiscard.Leib hastraced the continuance of friendly relations during the days of Urban II until these were inter-ruptedby the conduct of Guiscard's on Bohemond. and virttually loses his book with the resump-tion of friendlyrelations n III2 (pp. 310 ff.).



250 A. C. Krey

and a confidenceborn of a long succession f victoriesover manyobstinate

difficulties; or though they were now confrontedwith the practical roblem

of dealing with Greek churches n southern taly,they had alreadymet and

overcome a variety of other troublesomedifferences.So when Leo IXaddressedhimself to that specificproblem,he was able to do so in the very

same spirit that had servedto iron out other such difficulties n the North

and West. When viewed in this light, therefore, he affair of 1054 meant

merely that Constantinoplewas gaining at that time its firstacquaintance

with this new revival in the Latin church,and that that experienceproved

momentarilyo be nothing ess than breath-taking.

In general, this confident attitude continued in the papacy,and meni

of Cluny were there to sustain it throughout the rest of the eleventh

century. Abbot Hugh, for example,who became head of Cluny in 1048,was still abbot n 0IO9,having lived to see at least two of the monks whomn

he had trained become popes. He was abbot when Leo IX took up the

Greek problem,was with Gregoryat Canossa,and counseledUrbanbefore

the memorablemeeting at Clermont;and doubtlesshe too was fired on

all these occasionsby the dreamof Urbanthat all Christendommight be

united.Doubtless,also,he sharedUrban'sdisappointmenthat the Crusadehad failed to realize hat dream, or fromUrban'spoint of viewthe Crusade

that he plannedcouldhardlyhavebeencounteda completesuccess.

a.+c.+krey +urban s+crusade

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