administración tributaria en españa

Administración Administración Tributaria Tributaria en Españaen España

4º Symposium on Fiscal Federalism - IEB4º Symposium on Fiscal Federalism - IEB

Barcelona, May 31 2006

Alejandro Esteller-Moré (UB & IEB)

Index of the presentationIndex of the presentation

1.1. Basic Concepts regarding the Administration of Taxes in SpainBasic Concepts regarding the Administration of Taxes in Spain

2.2. Basic institutional organizationBasic institutional organization

3.3. Constitutional principlesConstitutional principles

4.4. AEAT (State Tax Administration)AEAT (State Tax Administration)

5.5. Regional Tax Administration(s) (RTA’s)Regional Tax Administration(s) (RTA’s)

6.6. Examples of Collaboration between AEAT & RTA’sExamples of Collaboration between AEAT & RTA’s

7.7. Some representative (chosen) problems of the current institutional Some representative (chosen) problems of the current institutional organizationorganization

8.8. (Some) Proposals of Reform(Some) Proposals of Reform

9.9. (A little bit of) Economic Analysis(A little bit of) Economic Analysis

1. Basic Concepts Regarding the 1. Basic Concepts Regarding the Administration of Taxes in SpainAdministration of Taxes in Spain

Gestión/ Liquidación Gestión/ Liquidación (art. 117, LGT: tasks (application of taxes in the widest (art. 117, LGT: tasks (application of taxes in the widest sense); arts. 123-: procedures): recepción y tramitación de declaraciones sense); arts. 123-: procedures): recepción y tramitación de declaraciones (liquidación provisional), autoliquidaciones; comprobación y realización de (liquidación provisional), autoliquidaciones; comprobación y realización de devoluciones; reconocimiento y comprobación de beneficios fiscales; devoluciones; reconocimiento y comprobación de beneficios fiscales; realización de actuaciones de control del cumplimiento de la obligación de realización de actuaciones de control del cumplimiento de la obligación de presentar declaraciones tributarias; comprobación de valores; información y presentar declaraciones tributarias; comprobación de valores; información y asistencia tributaria; elaboración y mantenimiento de los censos; asistencia tributaria; elaboración y mantenimiento de los censos; verificación de datos… -verificación de datos… - calculus of the tax due calculus of the tax due

Inspección: investigación de hechos no declarados; comprobación de la veracidad y exactitud de lo declarado,… (comunicaciones, diligencias, informes & actas)

Recaudación: ejercicio de las funciones administrativas conducentes al cobro de las deudas tributarias (período voluntario vs. período ejecutivo)

Revisión TEA & TEARRevisión TEA & TEAR: in the case of taxes of the AC’s (not-ceded), they : in the case of taxes of the AC’s (not-ceded), they have their own tribunals (“órganos económico-administrativos”; e.g., have their own tribunals (“órganos económico-administrativos”; e.g., Catalonia: Catalonia: Junta de FinancesJunta de Finances); ceded taxes: organism of the State (although ); ceded taxes: organism of the State (although the current law foresees the participation of the AC’s in the TEAR); TEAR in the current law foresees the participation of the AC’s in the TEAR); TEAR in hands of the State: mix of paternalism & uniformity (CE: “igualdad ante la hands of the State: mix of paternalism & uniformity (CE: “igualdad ante la ley”), although it is incoherent: recommend to permit the entrance of the ley”), although it is incoherent: recommend to permit the entrance of the AC’s (AC’s (Informe sobre la reforma…, Informe sobre la reforma…, 2002)2002)

The administration of taxes in Spain: Tasks & ProceduresThe administration of taxes in Spain: Tasks & Procedures

2. Basic Institutional Structure2. Basic Institutional Structure

AEAT (1)

(“State Tax Administration”)

RTA’s (15)

(“common regime”)

Basque Country (3)

Navarra (1)

Álava

Guipúzcoa

Vizcaya


AEAT (1)


RTA’s (15)


Basque Country (3)

Navarra (1)

Álava

Guipúzcoa

Vizcaya

“Diputaciones Forales” (DF)


AEAT (1)


RTA’s (15)


Basque Country (3)

Navarra (1)

Álava

Guipúzcoa

Vizcaya

“Full” competence to administer all taxes due within their territory (“tributos concertados (o “convenidos”) (except: import taxes; withholding of PIT for State civil servants; and withholding of assets issued by the State or the AC’s; so there is some representation of the AEAT in the BC & Navarra)


AEAT (1)


RTA’s (15)


Basque Country (3)

Navarra (1)

Álava

Guipúzcoa

Vizcaya

“Full” competence to administer all taxes due within their territory (“tributos concertados (o “convenidos”) (except: import taxes; PIT withholding for State civil servants; and withholding of assets issued by the State or the AC’s; so there are “Delegations” of the AEAT in the BC & Navarra)

Órgano de Coordinación Tributario de Euskadi (1989)3-representatives of the BC & 3 representatives of each DF


AEAT (1)


RTA’s (15)


Basque Country (3)

Navarra (1)

Álava

Guipúzcoa

Vizcaya

“Full” competence to administer all taxes due within their territory (“tributos concertados (o “convenidos”) (except: import taxes; PIT withholding for State civil servants; and withholding of assets issued by the State or the AC’s; so there are “Delegations” of the AEAT in the BC & Navarra; VAT: competence for the design of tax returns and timing for submitting returns as long as there are no great differences with the rest of the State)

-Each DF is obliged to communicate foreseen legal tax changes

- Mutual exchange of information

Comisión de Coordinación & Evaluación Normativa (4 State repr. & 4 BC (3 DF’s))


AEAT (1)


RTA’s (15)


Basque Country (3)

Navarra (1)

Álava

Guipúzcoa

Vizcaya

• Consejo Superior de Dirección (2002)

• Comisión Mixta de la Coordinación de la Gestión Tributaria (1997)

• Consejos Territoriales de Dirección (1997)

Since territorialized share of 15% in PIT by AC’s (1994), but fully effective since 1997

3. Legal Principles Regarding the 3. Legal Principles Regarding the Administration of TaxesAdministration of Taxes

CONSTITUTIONCONSTITUTION

Art. 156.1: “Las CCAA gozarán de Art. 156.1: “Las CCAA gozarán de autonomía financieraautonomía financiera para el desarrollo y para el desarrollo y ejecución de sus competencias con arreglo a los principios de ejecución de sus competencias con arreglo a los principios de coordinacióncoordinación con la Hacienda estatal y de con la Hacienda estatal y de solidaridadsolidaridad entre todos los españoles” entre todos los españoles”

Art. 156.2: “Las CCAA podrán actuar como Art. 156.2: “Las CCAA podrán actuar como delegados o colaboradoresdelegados o colaboradores del del Estado para la recaudación, la gestión y la liquidación de los recursos Estado para la recaudación, la gestión y la liquidación de los recursos tributarios de aquél, de acuerdo con las leyes y los Estatuos”tributarios de aquél, de acuerdo con las leyes y los Estatuos”

LAW OF FINANCING OF THE AC’S (LOFCA)LAW OF FINANCING OF THE AC’S (LOFCA)

Art. 19.1: “La gestión, liquidación, recaudación e inspección de sus propios Art. 19.1: “La gestión, liquidación, recaudación e inspección de sus propios tributos corresponderá a la CA, la cual dispondrá de tributos corresponderá a la CA, la cual dispondrá de plenas atribuciones plenas atribuciones para la ejecución y organización de dichas tareaspara la ejecución y organización de dichas tareas, sin perjuicio de la , sin perjuicio de la colaboración que pueda establecerse con la Administración Tributaria del colaboración que pueda establecerse con la Administración Tributaria del Estado, especialmente cuando así lo exija la naturaleza del tributo”Estado, especialmente cuando así lo exija la naturaleza del tributo”

Art. 19.2: “En caso de tributos cedidos, cada CA podrá asumir por Art. 19.2: “En caso de tributos cedidos, cada CA podrá asumir por delegacióndelegación del Estado la gestión, liquidación, recaudación, inspección y del Estado la gestión, liquidación, recaudación, inspección y revisión (…) sin perjuicio de la revisión (…) sin perjuicio de la colaboracióncolaboración...”...”


Collaboration/ Coordination 1: Collaboration/ Coordination 1: Transmission of InformationTransmission of Information

Art. 113 (LGT): “los Art. 113 (LGT): “los datos, informes o antecedentesdatos, informes o antecedentes obtenidos por la obtenidos por la Administración tributaria (…) tienen carácter reservado (…) salvo Administración tributaria (…) tienen carácter reservado (…) salvo que la cesión [de la información] tenga por objeto: b) la que la cesión [de la información] tenga por objeto: b) la colaboracióncolaboración con otras Administraciones tributarias a efectos del cumplimiento de con otras Administraciones tributarias a efectos del cumplimiento de obligaciones fiscales en el ámbito de su competencia”obligaciones fiscales en el ámbito de su competencia”

Disp. ad. 1ª (LCT): “…. La Disp. ad. 1ª (LCT): “…. La Dirección General del Catastro, los Dirección General del Catastro, los Notarios y los Registradores de la Propiedad remitirán a los órganos Notarios y los Registradores de la Propiedad remitirán a los órganos competentes de las CCAAcompetentes de las CCAA a los efectos de gestión tributaria la a los efectos de gestión tributaria la información correspondiente a los documentos por ellos autorizados información correspondiente a los documentos por ellos autorizados o inscritos de los que se deriven alteraciones catastrales de cualquier o inscritos de los que se deriven alteraciones catastrales de cualquier orden”orden”

It does not always work: delays, bad functioning (e.g., difficulties in It does not always work: delays, bad functioning (e.g., difficulties in reading the data: different computer systems) or simply no transfer reading the data: different computer systems) or simply no transfer of information (apparent improvement since the set up and of information (apparent improvement since the set up and development of mechanisms of participation of the AC’s in the AEAT)development of mechanisms of participation of the AC’s in the AEAT)


Collaboration/ Coordination 2 : Collaboration/ Coordination 2 : Tax AuditingTax Auditing

Art. 18.1 (LCT): “Uno. Las Administraciones del Estado y de la Comunidad Art. 18.1 (LCT): “Uno. Las Administraciones del Estado y de la Comunidad Autónoma de que se trate, (…), colaborarán en todos los órdenes de Autónoma de que se trate, (…), colaborarán en todos los órdenes de gestión, liquidación, recaudación e inspección de los tributos…”. 2. En gestión, liquidación, recaudación e inspección de los tributos…”. 2. En particular, a) Se facilitarán toda la información que mutuamente se particular, a) Se facilitarán toda la información que mutuamente se soliciten, estableciéndose los procedimientos de intercomunicación soliciten, estableciéndose los procedimientos de intercomunicación técnica precisos; b) Los Servicios de Inspección prepararán planes de técnica precisos; b) Los Servicios de Inspección prepararán planes de inspección coordinados inspección coordinados

Art 18.2 (LCT): “Cuando la inspección de los tributos del Estado o de las Art 18.2 (LCT): “Cuando la inspección de los tributos del Estado o de las Comunidades Autónomas conocieren con ocasión de sus actuaciones Comunidades Autónomas conocieren con ocasión de sus actuaciones comprobadoras e investigadoras hechos con transcendencia tributaria comprobadoras e investigadoras hechos con transcendencia tributaria para otras administraciones, lo comunicarán a éstas en la forma que para otras administraciones, lo comunicarán a éstas en la forma que reglamentariamente se determine” reglamentariamente se determine”

In some cases (: not always), according to the annual report of the In some cases (: not always), according to the annual report of the Auditing Services of the State regarding the tasks of the RTA’s, Auditing Services of the State regarding the tasks of the RTA’s, inexistence of those joint plans; on the contrary, it is more common the inexistence of those joint plans; on the contrary, it is more common the exchange of suggestions between the AEAT and the respective RTA, and exchange of suggestions between the AEAT and the respective RTA, and then each administration decides whether to take them into account or then each administration decides whether to take them into account or notnot


Coordination / Collaboration 3: Institutions (I: past)Coordination / Collaboration 3: Institutions (I: past)

Probably, those areas of collaboration won’t be operative unless some institutions are created (:Probably, those areas of collaboration won’t be operative unless some institutions are created (: truetrue))

Law 30/1983 (<1997): “orgía de relaciones interadministrativas e incluso de órganos que al Law 30/1983 (<1997): “orgía de relaciones interadministrativas e incluso de órganos que al parecer nunca se han puesto en marcha” (Ramallo Massanet, 1994)parecer nunca se han puesto en marcha” (Ramallo Massanet, 1994)

Art. 24 LCT prevé la constitución de una Comisión Coordinadora paritaria entre el Estado y cada Art. 24 LCT prevé la constitución de una Comisión Coordinadora paritaria entre el Estado y cada una de las CCAA con el objeto de lograr una adecuada coordinación (4 representantes de cada una de las CCAA con el objeto de lograr una adecuada coordinación (4 representantes de cada una de las partes)- acuerdos no vinculantes, meramente deliberativos y de intercambio de una de las partes)- acuerdos no vinculantes, meramente deliberativos y de intercambio de impresionesimpresiones

Art. 19.3 LCT prevé la creación de Oficinas Ejecutivas de Colaboración, Coordinación y Enlace Art. 19.3 LCT prevé la creación de Oficinas Ejecutivas de Colaboración, Coordinación y Enlace (una en cada administración)- materializar los acuerdos de la Comisión Mixta(una en cada administración)- materializar los acuerdos de la Comisión Mixta

Absoluto fracaso de ambas instituciones: dichas Comisiones no llegaron ni a constituirse ni a Absoluto fracaso de ambas instituciones: dichas Comisiones no llegaron ni a constituirse ni a reunirse ni una sola vez. Por ejemplo, informe 1992: “la Generalitat dispone de la oficina reunirse ni una sola vez. Por ejemplo, informe 1992: “la Generalitat dispone de la oficina correspondiente (Oficina Ejecutiva de Colaboración, Coordinación y Enlace)…; dada su correspondiente (Oficina Ejecutiva de Colaboración, Coordinación y Enlace)…; dada su inexistencia en la Administración del Estado, su operatividad es nula”).inexistencia en la Administración del Estado, su operatividad es nula”).

Art. 103.3bis, Ley 21/1993, de 29/12 PGE (1994): set up, on the one hand, of the Art. 103.3bis, Ley 21/1993, de 29/12 PGE (1994): set up, on the one hand, of the Comisión Mixta Comisión Mixta de Gestión del IRPFde Gestión del IRPF (design of general guidelines of administration (including auditing), computer (design of general guidelines of administration (including auditing), computer systems and tasks of assistance and information for the taxpayers; and on the other hand, systems and tasks of assistance and information for the taxpayers; and on the other hand, institutional organisms of mutual relation (“órganos de relación”) (in charge of making effective institutional organisms of mutual relation (“órganos de relación”) (in charge of making effective those general guidelines)- first attempt, but not effective (those organisms started to be those general guidelines)- first attempt, but not effective (those organisms started to be operative 1/1/1997: next) (see negative assessment of the Agreement 1/1996 for the new operative 1/1/1997: next) (see negative assessment of the Agreement 1/1996 for the new financing system of the AC’s)financing system of the AC’s)


Coordination / Collaboration 3: Institutions (& II: present)Coordination / Collaboration 3: Institutions (& II: present)

Art. 33 (LCT): Art. 33 (LCT): Comisión Mixta de Coordinación de la Gestión TributariaComisión Mixta de Coordinación de la Gestión Tributaria

a) Studies in order to have a a) Studies in order to have a proper functioning to the tax systemproper functioning to the tax system regarding the PIT but also the regarding the PIT but also the fully ceded taxes, including the establishment of harmonization policiesfully ceded taxes, including the establishment of harmonization policies

b) Analyze and b) Analyze and report the foreseen tax reformsreport the foreseen tax reforms concerning the previously cited taxes concerning the previously cited taxes

c) Design the c) Design the general policy of administration of the PITgeneral policy of administration of the PIT

d) Establishment of d) Establishment of uniform criteria regarding administration of taxesuniform criteria regarding administration of taxes, and coordination and , and coordination and exchange of informationexchange of information

e) Coordinate e) Coordinate assessment criteriaassessment criteria

f) Issue the reports asked by the CPFF, the State, the AC’s (or one AC), or by the “Junta Arbitral (i) f) Issue the reports asked by the CPFF, the State, the AC’s (or one AC), or by the “Junta Arbitral (i)

g) Assess the results of the administration of ceded taxesg) Assess the results of the administration of ceded taxes

h) Carry out any other kind of studyh) Carry out any other kind of study


Coordination / Collaboration 3: Institutions (& II: present)Coordination / Collaboration 3: Institutions (& II: present)

Art. 34 (LCT): Art. 34 (LCT): Consejos Territoriales de Dirección para la Consejos Territoriales de Dirección para la Gestión TributariaGestión Tributaria

Communication & coordination between the RTA and the AEAT Communication & coordination between the RTA and the AEAT following the guidelines established in the “Comisión Mixta”. In following the guidelines established in the “Comisión Mixta”. In particular, regarding the PIT particular, regarding the PIT

a) Direction of its administrationa) Direction of its administration

b) Analysis and assessment of its administrationb) Analysis and assessment of its administration

c) & d) Analysis and development of proposals to improve its c) & d) Analysis and development of proposals to improve its administration administration


Collaboration/Coordination 4: OtherCollaboration/Coordination 4: Other

Art. 21.4 (LCT): “La Agencia Estatal de Art. 21.4 (LCT): “La Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria podrá convenir con Administración Tributaria podrá convenir con las Comunidades Autónomas la aportación por las Comunidades Autónomas la aportación por éstas de medios financieros y materiales para éstas de medios financieros y materiales para la mejora de la gestión de los Impuestos sobre la mejora de la gestión de los Impuestos sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas y sobre el la Renta de las Personas Físicas y sobre el Patrimonio” Patrimonio”


OTHER: Administrative EffectivenessOTHER: Administrative Effectiveness

Art. 103.1 (CE): “Art. 103.1 (CE): “La Administración Pública sirve con objetividad los intereses generales y actúa de acuerdo con los principios de eficacia, jerarquía, descentralización, desconcentración y coordinación, con sometimiento pleno a la ley y al Derecho””

Art. 2.2 (LDGC): “Art. 2.2 (LDGC): “La aplicación del sistema tributario se La aplicación del sistema tributario se basará en los principios de generalidad, proporcionalidad, basará en los principios de generalidad, proporcionalidad, eficacia y eficacia y limitación de costes indirectos derivados del limitación de costes indirectos derivados del cumplimiento de obligaciones formalescumplimiento de obligaciones formales asimismo asegurará asimismo asegurará el respeto de los derechos y garantías del contribuyente el respeto de los derechos y garantías del contribuyente establecidos en la presente Leyestablecidos en la presente Ley””

4. The State Tax Administration: “Agencia 4. The State Tax Administration: “Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria” (AEAT)Estatal de Administración Tributaria” (AEAT)

Starting date: Starting date: 1st January, 19921st January, 1992 (Law 31/1990, 27th December, 1991) – no design of (Law 31/1990, 27th December, 1991) – no design of taxes: Dirección General de Tributos (DGT) – previously, the Ministry of Finance was in taxes: Dirección General de Tributos (DGT) – previously, the Ministry of Finance was in charge of the administration of taxescharge of the administration of taxes

Entity of Public LawEntity of Public Law depending on the Ministry of Finance and Budget; own legal regimen depending on the Ministry of Finance and Budget; own legal regimen within the Public Sector (: certain budget autonomy & personnel management) (no clear within the Public Sector (: certain budget autonomy & personnel management) (no clear legal nature within the Spanish System: Autonomous Organism, e.g., Ortiz-Calle, 1998) legal nature within the Spanish System: Autonomous Organism, e.g., Ortiz-Calle, 1998)

Aim:Aim: promoting tax compliancepromoting tax compliance through 1) information provision and assistance to through 1) information provision and assistance to taxpayers (i.e., minimizing indirect costs of taxation), and 2) detection and regularization taxpayers (i.e., minimizing indirect costs of taxation), and 2) detection and regularization of tax obligations through control activities. of tax obligations through control activities. Plan anual de ObjetivosPlan anual de Objetivos (general aims: 1) (general aims: 1) amount of taxes collected; 2) best assistance to the taxpayer (quantified); and 3) fraud amount of taxes collected; 2) best assistance to the taxpayer (quantified); and 3) fraud detection/ detection/ Plan General de Control TributarioPlan General de Control Tributario (Auditing Plan) / (Auditing Plan) / Programa Especial de Programa Especial de Calidad Calidad (compromises of quality)(compromises of quality)

Taxes administeredTaxes administered: PIT, VAT, CIT & Specific Taxes, Custom Taxes: PIT, VAT, CIT & Specific Taxes, Custom Taxes

# Staff: 27.415# Staff: 27.415 (2004) (2004)

BudgetBudget: : 1.148,634 millions of euros1.148,634 millions of euros (2004) (transfers from the State & a share of the (2004) (transfers from the State & a share of the amount taxes collected from actions carried out by the AEAT, 2006: 5% (max.: 105 amount taxes collected from actions carried out by the AEAT, 2006: 5% (max.: 105 millions of euros), source of revenue affected, since 2001)millions of euros), source of revenue affected, since 2001)

Taxes Collected / # Staff = Taxes Collected / # Staff = 5,14 millions of euros per worker5,14 millions of euros per worker (2004) (2004)

Budget / Taxes Collected = Budget / Taxes Collected = 0,815 € per 100 millions of taxes collected 0,815 € per 100 millions of taxes collected (2004)(2004)

Basic DataBasic Data

4. The State Tax Administration: “Agencia 4. The State Tax Administration: “Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria” Estatal de la Administración Tributaria”

(AEAT)(AEAT)Organization (I)Organization (I)

President (Secretary of State of Finance & Budget)

General Direction

“Delegaciones Especiales”

“Delegaciones”

“Administraciones”

Functional departments

Territorial

services





General Direction


“Delegaciones”


The respective central departments have power over those decentralized ones


Territorial

services





General Direction


“Delegaciones”



Territorial

services


Art. 19.5 (RGIT): “Cuando a propuesta, en su caso, de uno o varios Delegados de Hacienda especiales, los Directores generales o Centros competentes lo estimen oportuno, podrán aprobarse planes especiales de actuación de carácter sectorial o territorial” (centralized

nature of the General Auditing Plan)




General Direction


“Delegaciones”



Territorial

services

Consejo Superior de DirecciónComisión Mixta de Coordinación

Comité de Coordinación de la Dirección Territorial


4. The State Tax Administration: “Agencia 4. The State Tax Administration: “Agencia Estatal de la Administración Tributaria” (AEAT)Estatal de la Administración Tributaria” (AEAT)

Organization (II)Organization (II)Direction Board

“Consejo Superior de Dirección”: advisory role to the President of the AEAT (political member: Secretary of State of Finance & Budget), Planning (“Plan de Objetivos” & “Plan de Control”) and coordination with the AC’s; the AC’s also participate (6 members out of 15 AC’s, selected every year in the CPFF) (since 2002)

“Comité Permanente de Dirección”: also advisory role (also composed by the Directors of Department); the AC’s do not participate

“Comisión Mixta de Coordinación de la Gestión Tributaria”: board where all the AC’s are represented (since 1997); report in advance of reforms of ceded taxes; exchange of information (AEAT-AC’s); establishment of specific criteria of coordination; general design of the policy of administration of the ceded taxes – equal representation (AEAT vs. AC’s)– it has a permanent Secretary (staff of the AEAT)

“Comité de Coordinación de la Dirección Territorial”: the AEAT itself coordinates with its regional units

Several Commissions that guarantee that the procedures of the AEAT follow the general rules regarding the administration of taxes


(AEAT)(AEAT)Organization (III)Organization (III)

Central Services: organized by functional areas

• Depart. of Tax Management (“Gestión Tributaria”)

• Depart. of Tax Auditing (“Inspección Financiera & Tributaria”)

• “Delegación Central de Grandes Contribuyentes” (> 100 millions of euros: VAT; > 1 million euros: PIT, etc.) (since 2005, previously: “Oficina Nacional de Inspección” within the Depart. of Tax Auditing)

• Depart. of Tax Collection (“Recaudación”)

• Depart. of Customs & Specific Taxes (“Aduanas e Impuestos Especiales”)

• Depart. of Organization, Planning & Institutional Relations

• Depart. of Computer Tax Systems

• Depart. of Human Resources and Economic Administration

• Law Service


(AEAT)(AEAT)Organization (& IV)Organization (& IV)

Territorial Services: reproduces the previous areas, but territorially (i.e., within each AC)

• “Delegaciones Especiales” (one per each AC: 17)

• “Delegaciones” (min., one per each province: 51)

• “Administraciones” (Local offices: 202)

• “Administraciones de Aduanas” (Custom Administrations: 37)

• “Consejos Territoriales de Dirección para la Gestión Tributaria” (17: relationship AC-”Delegación Especial”): 3 representatives of the AEAT & 2 of the respective AC

5. The Regional Tax Administrations (RTA’s)5. The Regional Tax Administrations (RTA’s)

15 RTA’s

They carry out a delegated competence from the State (later to be specified tax by tax), subject to the principle of coordination and collaboration among the tax administrations of the AC’s and the AEAT

Usually, in contrast with the AEAT, they do not have a general planning of activities (see Annual Reports of the General Auditing Dept. of the Ministry of Finance & Budget, several years)

The AC’s have the chance of self-organizing their tax administration, including the set up of public firms to carry out certain tasks (e.g., services of tax collection: “Organismo Autónomo Agencia Regional de Recaudación” en Murcia, and others)

Basic DataBasic Data


NameName Year Year createcreatedd

# Staff# Staff Taxes Taxes Collected / # Collected / # StaffStaff

Agreements with AEATAgreements with AEAT

AndalucíaAndalucía Dirección General de Tributos Dirección General de Tributos (DGT)(DGT)

19851985 881881 1.911 €1.911 € FullFull

AragónAragón DGTDGT 19851985 139139 2.885 €2.885 € Ex. CollectionEx. Collection

AsturiasAsturias Dirección General de Finanzas y Dirección General de Finanzas y HaciendaHacienda

19861986 6363 3.638 €3.638 € PIT / Ex. Collect. (out)PIT / Ex. Collect. (out)

BalearesBaleares Departamento TributarioDepartamento Tributario 19861986 9494 4.090 €4.090 € Idem. Idem.

CanariasCanarias DGTDGT 19851985 165165 2.396 €2.396 € Idem. Idem.

CantabriaCantabria Dirección General de HaciendaDirección General de Hacienda 19861986 3939 3.713 €3.713 € Comp. syst. / PIT / Ex. Collec.Comp. syst. / PIT / Ex. Collec.

CatalunyaCatalunya DGTDGT 19821982 355355 7.480 €7.480 € PIT / Ex. Collect. /ITP-VAT/ PIT / Ex. Collect. /ITP-VAT/ Language WGLanguage WG

Castilla-LeónCastilla-León DGTDGT 19851985 331331 1.823 €1.823 € Ex. Collect. / ITP-VATEx. Collect. / ITP-VAT

Castilla-La ManchaCastilla-La Mancha DGTDGT 19851985 196196 1.485 €1.485 € Comp. system / PIT / Ex. Coll.Comp. system / PIT / Ex. Coll.

ExtremaduraExtremadura Dirección General de IngresosDirección General de Ingresos 19841984 8787 1.565 €1.565 € Ex. Coll. Ex. Coll.

GaliciaGalicia DGTDGT 19851985 342342 1.567 €1.567 € Idem.Idem.

La RiojaLa Rioja DGTDGT 19871987 4242 2.298 €2.298 € Comp. System / PIT / Ex. Coll. Comp. System / PIT / Ex. Coll.

MadridMadrid DGTDGT 19951995 345345 6.484 €6.484 € Ex. Coll. Ex. Coll.

MurciaMurcia DGTDGT 19871987 141141 1.945 €1.945 € Idem.Idem.

ValenciaValencia DGTDGT 19841984 314314 4.832 €4.832 € Comp. System / PIT / Collect.Comp. System / PIT / Collect.

General View (2002)General View (2002)


NameName Year Year createcreatedd

# Staff# Staff Taxes Taxes Collected / # Collected / # StaffStaff

Agreements with AEATAgreements with AEAT

AndalucíaAndalucía Dirección General de Tributos Dirección General de Tributos (DGT)(DGT)

19851985 881881 1.911 €1.911 € FullFull

AragónAragón DGTDGT 19851985 139139 2.885 €2.885 € Ex. CollectionEx. Collection

AsturiasAsturias Dirección General de Finanzas y Dirección General de Finanzas y HaciendaHacienda

19861986 6363 3.638 €3.638 € PIT / Ex. Collect. (out)PIT / Ex. Collect. (out)

BalearesBaleares Departamento TributarioDepartamento Tributario 19861986 9494 4.090 €4.090 € Idem. Idem.

CanariasCanarias DGTDGT 19851985 165165 2.396 €2.396 € Idem. Idem.

CantabriaCantabria Dirección General de HaciendaDirección General de Hacienda 19861986 3939 3.713 €3.713 € Comp. syst. / PIT / Ex. Collec.Comp. syst. / PIT / Ex. Collec.

CatalunyaCatalunya DGTDGT 19821982 355355 7.480 €7.480 € PIT / Ex. Collect. /ITP-VAT/ PIT / Ex. Collect. /ITP-VAT/ Language WGLanguage WG

Castilla-LeónCastilla-León DGTDGT 19851985 331331 1.823 €1.823 € Ex. Collect. / ITP-VATEx. Collect. / ITP-VAT

Castilla-La ManchaCastilla-La Mancha DGTDGT 19851985 196196 1.485 €1.485 € Comp. system / PIT / Ex. Comp. system / PIT / Ex. Coll.Coll.

ExtremaduraExtremadura Dirección General de IngresosDirección General de Ingresos 19841984 8787 1.565 €1.565 € Ex. Coll. Ex. Coll.

GaliciaGalicia DGTDGT 19851985 342342 1.567 €1.567 € Idem.Idem.

La RiojaLa Rioja DGTDGT 19871987 4242 2.298 €2.298 € Comp. System / PIT / Ex. Coll. Comp. System / PIT / Ex. Coll.

MadridMadrid DGTDGT 19951995 345345 6.484 €6.484 € Ex. Coll. Ex. Coll.

MurciaMurcia DGTDGT 19871987 141141 1.945 €1.945 € Idem.Idem.

ValenciaValencia DGTDGT 19841984 314314 4.832 €4.832 € Comp. System / PIT / Collect.Comp. System / PIT / Collect.

General View (2002)General View (2002)


TasksTasks

ManagemeManagementnt

““Calculus of Calculus of the tax the tax due”due”

AuditinAuditingg

CollectioCollectionn

OtherOther

Wealth Tax (NWT)Wealth Tax (NWT) Tax returns Tax returns submitted joint submitted joint with PIT - AEAT can with PIT - AEAT can carry out tax auditscarry out tax audits

Inheritance & Inheritance & Donations Tax (ISD)Donations Tax (ISD)

Tax returns might Tax returns might be submitted be submitted through “Of. through “Of. Liquidadoras de Liquidadoras de Distrito Distrito Hipotecario” (in Hipotecario” (in charge: charge: “Registrador de la “Registrador de la Propiedad”)Propiedad”)

Tax on Transfers of Tax on Transfers of Wealth (ITPAJD)Wealth (ITPAJD)

Idem.Idem.

Personal Income Tax Personal Income Tax (PIT)(PIT)

Comisión Mixta & Comisión Mixta & Consejo TerritorialConsejo Territorial

Vehicles Tax & Vehicles Tax &

Retail Fuel TaxRetail Fuel Tax

Pending Law of Pending Law of Cession (to be Cession (to be asked for by the asked for by the AC)AC)


TasksTasks



AuditinAuditingg


OtherOther





Idem.Idem.




Retail Fuel TaxRetail Fuel Tax> 2003> 2003 Pending Law of Pending Law of

Cession (to be Cession (to be asked for by the asked for by the AC)AC)

• Incoación de expedientes de comprobación de valores (utilizando los mismos criterios que el Estado: conflictividad, no-uniformidad- quiebra del principio de seguridad jurídica (Defensor del Pueblo))-prioritarias vs. no-prioritarias (Catalunya)

• Realización de actos de trámite y de liquidación (ISD: el contribuyente puede “renunciar” a la auto-liquidación; en el resto de casos, auto-liquidación)

• Calificación de infracciones e imposición de sanciones

• Publicidad e información al público (papel muy importante de Internet)

• Modelos de declaración (excepto IP)


TasksTasks



AuditinAuditingg


OtherOther





Idem.Idem.






• Fuera del territorio de la CA: Inspección de la AEAT o de la CA competente (e.g., caso de Andorra en Catalunya)

• Deber de comunicar hechos con trascendencia tributaria a otras administraciones

• Planes de Inspección conjuntos (art. 19.9: RGIT) (Galicia o Catalunya)


TasksTasks



AuditinAuditingg


OtherOther





Idem.Idem.






• Concesión de aplazamientos y fraccionamientos (normativa Estado)

• Todos en período voluntario y ejecutivo (normalmente convenio con la AEAT, especialmente fuera del territorio de la CA)

• IP: período voluntario – liquidaciones de la CA; en ejecutivo, todas

• ITPAJD: no efectos timbrados

6. Collaboration in the 6. Collaboration in the Spanish Tax AdministrationSpanish Tax Administration

Is Is VerticalVertical Collaboration Needed? (I) Collaboration Needed? (I)

1) Externalities in tax administration: the presence of wealth taxes (net wealth tax, inheritance and donations tax, and tax on wealth transfers) in a tax system is usually partly justified because of its value in providing cross-information for the administration of the PIT (that is why, it is justifiable that the tax returns of the NWT are submitted through the AEAT: “comprobación limitada” – “liquidaciones provisionales”; however, the AC’s should also have the adequate technical means to properly control tax compliance in the NWT, i.e., have full access and on time of the information regarding the PIT). NWT-PIT: “Los mecanismos de “Los mecanismos de información y asistencia mútua no siempre funcionan de manera ágil” información y asistencia mútua no siempre funcionan de manera ágil” ((Informe sobre la reforma del sistemaInforme sobre la reforma del sistema…., 2002)…., 2002)

2) Externalities in the legal definition of the obligation to pay taxes: VAT vs. ITPAJD (especially, in the case of ITP and transmission of dwellings). It might not always be clear whether a transfer of wealth is subject to one or to another tax. In those cases, it might be the case that the taxpayer pays the VAT, and later the corresponding AC asks the taxpayer for the payment of the ITPAJD. This certainly creates a situation of defenselessness (in some cases, depending on the timing of the resolution of the legal claims, it could even expire the right to get the money back from the tax authority that improperly collected the tax) and in any case creates indirect costs for the taxpayer (against the arguments set by the LDGC) (even criticized by the “Defensor del Pueblo”, 1998)


Is Is VerticalVertical Collaboration Needed? (& II) Collaboration Needed? (& II)

1) Solution - Externalities in tax administration: agreements to share information, although there are still problems related with the different computer systems, the delay of the “Oficinas liquidadoras” in providing the required information, no full access to all the relevant information (e.g., whether the person who makes the transfer of wealth is subject to pay the VAT), and so on; in any case, much more limited results concerning collaboration in tax auditing

2) Solution - Externalities in the legal definition of the obligation to pay taxes VAT vs. ITP: WP in each “Consejo Territorial de Dirección para la Gestión Tributaria” (normally, in all AC’s it is working) – basically, before carrying out a new action (that is, making the taxpayer paying a new tax), it should be agreed between the representative of each layer of government in the commission, and if they do not agree, it will be discussed in the corresponding commission created in the “Consejo Territorial”


Is Is HorizontalHorizontal Collaboration Needed? (I) Collaboration Needed? (I)

Puntos de conexiónPuntos de conexión (art. 10 LOFCA): en aras a la eficacia (art. 10 LOFCA): en aras a la eficacia administrativa. Determinar a quién corresponde la administrativa. Determinar a quién corresponde la recaudación & qué CA debe gestionar la declaración (ITP: recaudación & qué CA debe gestionar la declaración (ITP: bienes inmuebles: donde esté radicado; constitución bienes inmuebles: donde esté radicado; constitución hipoteca: donde hayan de ser inscritos; bienes muebles: hipoteca: donde hayan de ser inscritos; bienes muebles: residencia del adquirente; valore: donde se formalice la residencia del adquirente; valore: donde se formalice la operación; AJD: comunidad donde se otorguen los operación; AJD: comunidad donde se otorguen los documentos notariales; OS: domicilio fiscal; IS: lugar de documentos notariales; OS: domicilio fiscal; IS: lugar de residencia del fallecido; ID: bienes inmuebles: donde esté residencia del fallecido; ID: bienes inmuebles: donde esté radicado; en otro caso, donde tenga su residencia el radicado; en otro caso, donde tenga su residencia el adquirente). Prof. Gimeno: case of ISD (Madrid adquirente). Prof. Gimeno: case of ISD (Madrid vs.vs. Cantabria: Cantabria: Emilio Botín)Emilio Botín)

Junta arbitralJunta arbitral (arts. 23 & 24 LOFCA) de resolución de (arts. 23 & 24 LOFCA) de resolución de conflictos: entre la AEAT y la de una o varias CCAA o entre conflictos: entre la AEAT y la de una o varias CCAA o entre éstas entre sí en la aplicación de los puntos de conexión.éstas entre sí en la aplicación de los puntos de conexión.


View- “Puntos de conexión” : in some cases, the AC’s keep the money from those other AC’s in debt with them (C-León vs. Madrid); in some case, there is not a person in charge of solving the problem (problem of communication: Extremadura); and in other cases, there is simply a delay in transferring the money to the corresponding AC.

Solution: “Comisión Mixta de Coordinación de la Gestión Tributaria” (July, 2000) issues a report about the “Establecimiento de mecanismos específicos y seguros de control que permitan detectar la correcta aplicación de las normas de competencia funcional & territorial” (DGT: Instrucción 2/2001): submission of documents: incompetent (communicated to the competent AC) & documents are sent back to taxpayer; tax already paid: transfer of money

Is Is HorizontalHorizontal Collaboration Needed? (& II) Collaboration Needed? (& II)


““Puntos de conexión” (Example of Horizontal Collaboration?)Puntos de conexión” (Example of Horizontal Collaboration?)

Basque Basque CountryCountry

NavarraNavarra Other Other neighbors neighbors (*)(*)

Rest (*)Rest (*)

AragónAragón 00 00 22 33

CantabriaCantabria 11 00 33 1010

Castilla-LeónCastilla-León 22 00 9999 66

La RiojaLa Rioja 00 00 1616 33

(*): Approximate average

Source: Informe Recaudación Tributos Cedidos, LGPE (2004)

Transfers received (2002)





Rest (*)Rest (*)







Transfers done (2002)





Rest (*)Rest (*)







CLM: problems in the constitution of the “Junta Arbitral” with AC’s of “Foral Regime”; LR: Navarra does not even provide the bank account number to carry out the corresponding transfer!

Transfers done (2002)


The task of “executive collection” (“even” with Navarra The task of “executive collection” (“even” with Navarra (1995) & DF de Guipúzcoa (1995))(1995) & DF de Guipúzcoa (1995))

““Convenio para el suministro de información para Convenio para el suministro de información para finalidades no tributarias” (for departments different finalidades no tributarias” (for departments different from the DGT: con ocasión de la convocatoria de from the DGT: con ocasión de la convocatoria de ayudas, becas & subvenciones) ayudas, becas & subvenciones)

““Convenios en materia de informática tributaria”: in Convenios en materia de informática tributaria”: in order to posses integrated computer systems order to posses integrated computer systems ((Andalucía (Proyecto “SUR”), Principado de Asturias (Proyecto “TRASGU”), Baleares (Proyecto “MARES”), Canarias, Cantabria (Proyecto “MOURO”), Castilla-La Mancha (Proyecto “GRECO”), Rioja (Proyecto “ORIA”) & Valencia (Proyecto “TIRANT”).

Particular agreements (“Convenios de Particular agreements (“Convenios de colaboración”)colaboración”)

7. (Some) Representative (Chosen) 7. (Some) Representative (Chosen) ProblemsProblems

In no particular order:In no particular order:

Currently, the Currently, the regional governments have a share of 33%regional governments have a share of 33% in the personal in the personal income taxincome tax, but this share (with or without taxing power) has already been in , but this share (with or without taxing power) has already been in force since 1994 (not uniformly across regional governments). The question is: force since 1994 (not uniformly across regional governments). The question is: has the AEAT administered properly those shares?has the AEAT administered properly those shares? Intuitively, the central Intuitively, the central government – through the AEAT – might be tempted to re-direct its efforts to government – through the AEAT – might be tempted to re-direct its efforts to collect taxes in those regions where that share is lower for the region and/or re-collect taxes in those regions where that share is lower for the region and/or re-direct its efforts to collect those taxes with a lower share for regional direct its efforts to collect those taxes with a lower share for regional governments. Esteller (2005) has empirically confirmed that hypothesis governments. Esteller (2005) has empirically confirmed that hypothesis (“substitution effect”). (“substitution effect”).

Similarly, Valencia was worried about the Similarly, Valencia was worried about the poor tax control of their tax credits poor tax control of their tax credits in PITin PIT (need to establish specific filters (report: 2002). (need to establish specific filters (report: 2002).

Financial effect against the regional governments Financial effect against the regional governments due to the systematically due to the systematically biased downwards calculus of the transfer of the tax shares administered by the biased downwards calculus of the transfer of the tax shares administered by the AEAT and delay in the payments. For instance, for the case of the personal AEAT and delay in the payments. For instance, for the case of the personal income tax share (2003) and for Catalonia, Sánchez-Saché (2006) has estimated income tax share (2003) and for Catalonia, Sánchez-Saché (2006) has estimated a financial cost of 36.000 thousand euros (approx.).a financial cost of 36.000 thousand euros (approx.).

Need to have Need to have more information regarding the PITmore information regarding the PIT, including power to decide , including power to decide the tax auditing plan within their territory. Galicia: difficulties for making the the tax auditing plan within their territory. Galicia: difficulties for making the annual budget giving the lack of information regarding the PIT (recall: shared tax annual budget giving the lack of information regarding the PIT (recall: shared tax between the AC’s and the State, but administered by the AEAT)between the AC’s and the State, but administered by the AEAT)


Better service for the taxpayerBetter service for the taxpayer: language (WG in : language (WG in Catalonia) & more offices (e.g., LLeida does not have Catalonia) & more offices (e.g., LLeida does not have administrations, just a “Delegación” for the whole province)administrations, just a “Delegación” for the whole province)

Audit Plans adapted to the territory: PITAudit Plans adapted to the territory: PIT (better (better knowledge of local conditions by local authorities?)knowledge of local conditions by local authorities?)

Low Efforts in administering & auditing NWT by the Low Efforts in administering & auditing NWT by the AEATAEAT: Extremadura (2002): “La AEAT considera que los : Extremadura (2002): “La AEAT considera que los Inspectores Jefes tienen instrucciones de hacer actas sobre el Inspectores Jefes tienen instrucciones de hacer actas sobre el IP cada vez que se comprueba el IRPF, pero que es cierto que IP cada vez que se comprueba el IRPF, pero que es cierto que el número de actas ha disminuido, en estos últimos años, al el número de actas ha disminuido, en estos últimos años, al haberse dirigido las actuaciones inspectoras en mayor haberse dirigido las actuaciones inspectoras en mayor medida a IVA, ISOC & Actividades Económicas en el IRPF; no medida a IVA, ISOC & Actividades Económicas en el IRPF; no obstante, la AEAT insistirá en prestar más atención a la obstante, la AEAT insistirá en prestar más atención a la comprobación de este impuesto”- Valencia (2002): no enough comprobación de este impuesto”- Valencia (2002): no enough effort in institutionally advertising the tax obligations effort in institutionally advertising the tax obligations regarding the NWTregarding the NWT


AEATAEAT RTARTA

# Tax Audits# Tax Audits € € / Tax Audit/ Tax Audit # Tax Audits# Tax Audits € € / Tax Audit/ Tax Audit

AndalucíaAndalucía 9797 945945 267267 514514

AragónAragón 142142 1.6121.612 77 325325

AsturiasAsturias 1616 30.15730.157 2626 1.5791.579

BalearesBaleares 1111 10.04710.047 4141 13.64413.644

CanariasCanarias 123123 142.538142.538 00 n.a.n.a.

CantabriaCantabria 5858 994994 00 n.a.n.a.

CatalunyaCatalunya 186186 12.23212.232 123123 4.7564.756

Castilla-LeónCastilla-León 5151 2.0802.080 7878 1.0091.009

Castilla-La ManchaCastilla-La Mancha 4343 304304 00 n.a.n.a.

ExtremaduraExtremadura 00 n.a.n.a. 6666 615615

GaliciaGalicia 239239 577577 00 n.a.n.a.

La RiojaLa Rioja 2020 351351 44 316316

MurciaMurcia 5959 43.21843.218 00 n.a.n.a.

ValenciaValencia 1414 4.6364.636 99 1.5831.583

Tax Auditing in the NWT (2000)Tax Auditing in the NWT (2000)


AEATAEAT RTARTA



AragónAragón 142142 1.6121.612 77 325325










La RiojaLa Rioja 2020 351351 44 316316



Tax Auditing in the NWT (2000): More & More ProductiveTax Auditing in the NWT (2000): More & More Productive


AEATAEAT RTARTA



AragónAragón 142142 1.6121.612 77 325325










La RiojaLa Rioja 2020 351351 44 316316



Tax Auditing in the NWT (2000): More ProductiveTax Auditing in the NWT (2000): More Productive

8. (Some) Proposals of Reform8. (Some) Proposals of Reform

(i) (i) Informe sobre el actual sistema…, Informe sobre el actual sistema…, 1995, Grupo de Trabajo CPFF, VVAA.1995, Grupo de Trabajo CPFF, VVAA.

Implementation of Implementation of aa “Agencia Tributaria integrada”, in order to administer those “Agencia Tributaria integrada”, in order to administer those taxes shared by the State and the regional governments (and potentially those fully taxes shared by the State and the regional governments (and potentially those fully ceded to the regional governments) – sth like a decentralized consortium (“proceso de ceded to the regional governments) – sth like a decentralized consortium (“proceso de fusión empresarial”: new entity)fusión empresarial”: new entity)

(ii)(ii) Las claves de la financiación autonómica Las claves de la financiación autonómica, 2001, Sevilla., 2001, Sevilla.

Implementation of Implementation of aa “Agencia Tributaria compartida”, and with a professional “Agencia Tributaria compartida”, and with a professional managementmanagement

(iii)(iii) Informe sobre la reforma del sistema…, 2002, Informe sobre la reforma del sistema…, 2002, Grupo de Trabajo CPFF, VVAA.Grupo de Trabajo CPFF, VVAA.

Implementation of Implementation of aa “Agencia Tributaria única y compartida”, in order to administer all “Agencia Tributaria única y compartida”, in order to administer all State taxes (including those ceded) – sth like a centralized consortium (?)State taxes (including those ceded) – sth like a centralized consortium (?)

Introducing representation of regional governments in the Tribunals in charge of Introducing representation of regional governments in the Tribunals in charge of judging claims from taxpayers (i.e., “Tribunal Económico-Administrativos”)judging claims from taxpayers (i.e., “Tribunal Económico-Administrativos”)

(iv) Other: Pacto Fiscal (CiU, 1999) (iv) Other: Pacto Fiscal (CiU, 1999) (transfer of AEAT to Catalonia)(transfer of AEAT to Catalonia); Técnicos de Hacienda ; Técnicos de Hacienda (GESTHA, 2006)(GESTHA, 2006) (consortium AEAT-regional governments; one or one in each region?) (consortium AEAT-regional governments; one or one in each region?); ; General Director AEAT (2004): General Director AEAT (2004): centralized tax administration but shared (should be centralized tax administration but shared (should be compatible with a higher level of services by some AC’s, language diversity and better compatible with a higher level of services by some AC’s, language diversity and better use of information… why then centralized?)use of information… why then centralized?)

(v) Project of Estatuto of Autonomía de Andalucía (“Agencia Tributaria de Andalucía” + (v) Project of Estatuto of Autonomía de Andalucía (“Agencia Tributaria de Andalucía” + consortium), Valencia (“Servicio Tributario Valenciano”) o Catalunyaconsortium), Valencia (“Servicio Tributario Valenciano”) o Catalunya

8. (Some) Proposals of Reform8. (Some) Proposals of Reform

Project of “Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya” (2006)Project of “Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya” (2006)

Set up of the Set up of the “Agència Tributària de Catalunya (ATC)”“Agència Tributària de Catalunya (ATC)” in order to administer in order to administer the own taxes and those taxes fully ceded by the central government (novelty: the own taxes and those taxes fully ceded by the central government (novelty: legal character of agency; more flexibility)legal character of agency; more flexibility)

Rest of taxes administered by the AEAT, but in two years time a Rest of taxes administered by the AEAT, but in two years time a consortiumconsortium will will have to be set up in order to administer (with equal representation of the AEAT & have to be set up in order to administer (with equal representation of the AEAT & the ATC) the rest of taxes due in Cataloniathe ATC) the rest of taxes due in Catalonia

Finally, the Finally, the Estatut Estatut foresees the possibility of transforming the consortium into foresees the possibility of transforming the consortium into the the “Aministració Tributària a Catalunya”“Aministració Tributària a Catalunya” (no further issues specified: e.g., (no further issues specified: e.g., representation)representation)

Others: single-point of contact for the taxpayer (i.e., AEAT or ATC): “finestreta Others: single-point of contact for the taxpayer (i.e., AEAT or ATC): “finestreta única”; legal claims regarding those taxes administered by the ATC will be única”; legal claims regarding those taxes administered by the ATC will be addressed to regional organisms (addressed to regional organisms (Junta de FinancesJunta de Finances) (PIT still addressed to TEAR)) (PIT still addressed to TEAR)

Previous Estatut (art. 46.3), 1979, already provided for a collaboration between the regional and the central government to administer those taxes not ceded but due in Catalonia

Agencia Estatal Administració Tributària (AEAT)

Agència Tributària de Catalunya (ATCat)

Own Taxes

Fully ceded Taxes

The rest of taxes due in Catalonia

Consortium

(equal representation)

PIT (should the AEAT be also involved in the administration of the ceded taxes?)

in 2 years time in 2 years time

The Consortium might transform into:

Administració Tributària a Catalunya(to be developed)

8. (Some) Proposals of Reform8. (Some) Proposals of ReformProject of Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya (2006)Project of Estatut d’Autonomia de Catalunya (2006)

Source: Sánchez-Saché (2006)

Nominal debate or sth more? (Gimeno)

9. (A little bit of) Economic 9. (A little bit of) Economic AnalysisAnalysis(i) Levels of Tax Compliance:(i) Levels of Tax Compliance:

Incentives on the side of the Tax Administration (i.e., Incentives on the side of the Tax Administration (i.e., forcedforced tax tax compliancecompliance): ):

– ““Tax competition” effect: lower tax compliance (Cremer & Gahvari, 2000; Tax competition” effect: lower tax compliance (Cremer & Gahvari, 2000; Stöwhase & Traxler, 2005)Stöwhase & Traxler, 2005)

– ““Equalization” effect: lower tax compliance (Baretti Equalization” effect: lower tax compliance (Baretti et al.et al., 2002), 2002)

Incentives on the taxpayers’ side (i.e., Incentives on the taxpayers’ side (i.e., voluntary tax compliancevoluntary tax compliance or “tax or “tax morale”):morale”):

““Tax morale [and so tax compliance] is decidedly lower when taxes are spent Tax morale [and so tax compliance] is decidedly lower when taxes are spent centrally than when they are spent locally” (sth similar to a “common pool” centrally than when they are spent locally” (sth similar to a “common pool” problem) – from an experimental study by Güth problem) – from an experimental study by Güth et al.et al. (2005) (2005)

““A tax administration closer to the taxpayers will permit to detect more easily the A tax administration closer to the taxpayers will permit to detect more easily the tax fraud and increase voluntary tax compliance” (Costa-i-Solà, 2006) tax fraud and increase voluntary tax compliance” (Costa-i-Solà, 2006) vs.vs. “The “The further the entity responsible for detecting tax fraud, the better” (De la Torre, further the entity responsible for detecting tax fraud, the better” (De la Torre, 2006) – stickers: case of the “Diputación Foral de Navarra” (Muguruza, 2002)2006) – stickers: case of the “Diputación Foral de Navarra” (Muguruza, 2002)

Therefore, the net effect on tax compliance of decentralizing tax enforcement policies is ambiguous

ForcedForced tax compliance & Decentralization of tax compliance & Decentralization of Enforcement Tax Policies:Enforcement Tax Policies: A Synthesis (i)A Synthesis (i)

First, let’s define the budget constrain of a region, which might include an equalization grant. First, let’s define the budget constrain of a region, which might include an equalization grant. Applying it to the Spanish case, where the equalization grant is so-called “Fondo de Suficiencia” (Applying it to the Spanish case, where the equalization grant is so-called “Fondo de Suficiencia” (FSFS), ), we have:we have:

)( BtENFS

EN: expenditure needs; B: tax base; t: “standard” tax rate; te: “effective” tax rate (including expected penalty); and TR: total resources

ENBttBtENBtFSBtTR eee )()()()(

Which are the incentives to raise the standards of the enforcement tax policy? (i.e., how TR varies when those standards are raised, which are identified by p (: tax auditing probability))


Brief remark:Brief remark:

ENBttTR e )(

SPAIN

CANADA (equalization system/ tax capacity)

)()()()( BtBttBBtBtTR ee

Analytically, both systems are equivalent. Just note EN =t B

ForcedForced tax compliance & Decentralization of tax compliance & Decentralization of Enforcement Tax Policies:Enforcement Tax Policies: A Synthesis (ii)A Synthesis (ii)

Tax competitionTax competition No-Tax No-Tax competitioncompetition

No- EqualizationNo- Equalization

EqualizationEqualization

)()(

pB

tBp

t

pTR

ee

Note: we do not take into account the (possible equalization) of the costs of tax enforcement (see Stöwhase & Traxler, 2005)





)()(

pB

tBp

t

pTR

ee

)()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

Cremer & Gahvari (2000), Stöwhase & Traxler (2005): disincentive to enforce taxes due to tax bases mobility (capital?)





)()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

)()()(

pB

tpB

tBpt

pTR

ee

)()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

Baretti et al. (2002): disincentive to enforce taxes (“tax on tax revenue”).

)()()(

pB

tpB

tBpt

pTR

ee





(if (if tte e t t ))

)()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

)(

Bpt

pTR e

)()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

Baretti et al. (2002): disincentive to enforce taxes (“tax on tax revenue”). However, somehow equalization mitigates the negative effects of tax competition (regions are immune to mobility of tax bases).

)(

Bpt

pTR e

ForcedForced tax compliance & Decentralization of tax compliance & Decentralization of Enforcement Tax Policies:Enforcement Tax Policies: A Synthesis (& ii)A Synthesis (& ii)




(“lump-sum”)(“lump-sum”) )()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

)()(

pB

tBp

t

pTR

ee

)()(

p

BtB

p

t

p

TRe

e

Best of the worlds: would it be possible to make the “equalization formula” independent of the real tax base of a region (i.e., implementation of a lump-sum grant)? (Paradox: is the Spanish equalization grant system working properly?- due to discretionary calculation of “recaudación normativa” (Esteller, 2002))

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pB

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pTR

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ENBttBtENBtFSBtTR eee )()()()(

Which are the incentives to raise the standards of the enforcement tax policy? (i.e., how TR varies when those standards are raised, which are identified by p (: tax auditing probability))



)( BtENFS


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9. (A little bit of) Economic 9. (A little bit of) Economic AnalysisAnalysis(ii) Efficiency in the (ii) Efficiency in the DesignDesign of Tax Enforcement Policies: of Tax Enforcement Policies:

In the presence of Interrelated Taxes (e.g., Net Wealth Tax & In the presence of Interrelated Taxes (e.g., Net Wealth Tax & Personal Income Tax), some kind of Personal Income Tax), some kind of coordinationcoordination and and collaborationcollaboration within the Tax Administration would be convenientwithin the Tax Administration would be convenient

CollaborationCollaboration: the results of auditing one tax have effects on the other : the results of auditing one tax have effects on the other (interrelated) tax(interrelated) tax

CoordinationCoordination: efforts in tax auditing should be relatively homogeneous in : efforts in tax auditing should be relatively homogeneous in those interrelated tax in order to achieve a significant deterrent effect on those interrelated tax in order to achieve a significant deterrent effect on tax evasion tax evasion

If both previous conditions hold (either because only one tax If both previous conditions hold (either because only one tax administration administers those interrelated taxes, or there being administration administers those interrelated taxes, or there being two tax administrations involved, they certainly coordinate their two tax administrations involved, they certainly coordinate their actions actions andand collaborate with each other), it is possible to achieve collaborate with each other), it is possible to achieve significant gains in tax compliancesignificant gains in tax compliance (Esteller, 2004; even this (Esteller, 2004; even this framework of analysis can partly explain the “paradox of tax framework of analysis can partly explain the “paradox of tax evasion”).evasion”).

Therefore, some kind of coordination & collaboration (being the institutional alternative: integration; see also Keen & Ligthart, 2006a & 2006b) is necessary to maximize the efficiency of tax enforcement policies

9. (A little bit of) Economic 9. (A little bit of) Economic AnalysisAnalysis(iii) Tax Autonomy & Administration of Taxes:(iii) Tax Autonomy & Administration of Taxes:

(Example: (Example: Auditors of AEATAuditors of AEAT: in Spain, “tax fraud is not dealt with as intensively as it should, and : in Spain, “tax fraud is not dealt with as intensively as it should, and one of the causes is the lack of political will”, one of the causes is the lack of political will”, El PaísEl País, 10/24/2005); Legal definition of tax , 10/24/2005); Legal definition of tax autonomy regarding tax administration: corresponsabilidad fiscal “impropia”autonomy regarding tax administration: corresponsabilidad fiscal “impropia”

Tax Enforcement Policies designed to achieve efficiency might be Tax Enforcement Policies designed to achieve efficiency might be regressive (Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Scotchmer, 1987)regressive (Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Scotchmer, 1987)

The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an additional instrument to overcome shocks in the public budget additional instrument to overcome shocks in the public budget (positive or negative?) (Esteller, 2002, 2005 & 2006)(positive or negative?) (Esteller, 2002, 2005 & 2006)

The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an additional instrument to obtain gains in electoral productivity additional instrument to obtain gains in electoral productivity (negative) (Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Toma & Toma, 1986; Young (negative) (Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Toma & Toma, 1986; Young et al.et al., , 2001; Esteller, 2001; Esteller, op.op. cit.cit.))

In order to develop an optimal tax policy, a government needs to have In order to develop an optimal tax policy, a government needs to have updated information about the process of tax administration (Slemrod, updated information about the process of tax administration (Slemrod, 1990; example: Boadway & Richter, 200?)1990; example: Boadway & Richter, 200?)


Tax Enforcement Policies designed to achieve efficiency might Tax Enforcement Policies designed to achieve efficiency might be regressive (Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Scotchmer, 1987)be regressive (Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Scotchmer, 1987)

The instruments in hands of the tax administration might The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an additional instrument to overcome shocks in the become an additional instrument to overcome shocks in the public budget (positive or negative?) (Esteller, 2002, 2005 & public budget (positive or negative?) (Esteller, 2002, 2005 & 2006) 2006) – uniformity will be time-violated– uniformity will be time-violated

The instruments in hands of the tax administration might The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an additional instrument to obtain gains in electoral become an additional instrument to obtain gains in electoral productivity (negative) (Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Toma & productivity (negative) (Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Toma & Toma, 1986; Young Toma, 1986; Young et al.et al., 2001; Esteller, , 2001; Esteller, op.op. cit.cit.) ) – uniformity – uniformity will be cross & time-violatedwill be cross & time-violated

In order to develop an optimal tax policy, a government needs to In order to develop an optimal tax policy, a government needs to have updated information about the process of tax administration have updated information about the process of tax administration (Slemrod, 1990; example: Boadway & Richter, 200?)(Slemrod, 1990; example: Boadway & Richter, 200?)Therefore,

The tax administration processes might have political consequences


Tax Enforcement Policies designed to achieve efficiency might Tax Enforcement Policies designed to achieve efficiency might be regressive (Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Scotchmer, 1987)be regressive (Reinganum & Wilde, 1986; Scotchmer, 1987)

The instruments in hands of the tax administration might The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an additional instrument to overcome shocks in the become an additional instrument to overcome shocks in the public budget (positive or negative?) (Esteller, 2002, 2005 & public budget (positive or negative?) (Esteller, 2002, 2005 & 2006)2006)

The instruments in hands of the tax administration might The instruments in hands of the tax administration might become an additional instrument to obtain gains in electoral become an additional instrument to obtain gains in electoral productivity (negative) (Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Toma & productivity (negative) (Hunter & Nelson, 1995; Toma & Toma, 1986; Young Toma, 1986; Young et al.et al., 2001; Esteller, , 2001; Esteller, op.op. cit.cit.))

In order to develop an optimal tax policy, a government needs In order to develop an optimal tax policy, a government needs to have updated information about the process of tax to have updated information about the process of tax administration (Slemrod, 1990; example: Boadway & Richter, administration (Slemrod, 1990; example: Boadway & Richter, 200?)200?)

Therefore,

The tax administration processes might have political consequences, and

Tax Autonomy should preferably be accompanied by some competence regarding the administration of taxes for a proper design of tax reforms

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