air intelligence report, v1n12

8/8/2019 Air Intelligence Report, V1N12

1/9

PAU 10

PAl)l 6

PACil 7

5"'T UIUTIOH

e MAP Of DAMAGETO H"'GOY"

C1U11Uoat101l ~ ~ ~ , ~ l O t l " 2I1cl'. eeWD DldC'rlV1Io0 28 NUMBEREDTARCinS HIT


2/9

XXI B 0 hl BE R COM MAND~ I . T E l L i G E N C E REPORT

26 - '1 1945XXI BOOCCII opmATIONS

Two strikes on NagoyaSIlloke over NagoyaPicture of Nagoya Burning28 N u m b e r e ~ Targets HitMap of Nagoya DamageKawanlshl Plant Vissed:5 Mining MissionsAirfield Strikes HaltedJAPAnESE Am OE'FEI1SEPeashooter Pete Co.Co_Pl1otReluctant KamikazePass the Saki, suzak!Combat va Heavy BombersLit t le Cl'lg1nal Thinkingl7anted: I . ~ o r e Into on this Ship

INTELLIGENCEsaturat ion ot AA DefelUl8Flak Changes in Jap HomelandIolap o f Jap AA Defenses

SPECIAL REPORTSJapanese surrender PrOllpectsMorale Low on Okinawa11 M are X Xt h Crewmen Rescued01 te h 1s sarer

' ~ c ~ o v - C e r - - p h " " - o ~ t - o - t a ' - ' ' ' ' ' - n ~ b = 1 C - : - : a 1 r C r a t tor 873rd squadron, 4ttattr o r ~ P I73rd . "ins_ '

,,56,666

101010111112

131516

1720""


3/9

t ~ : l - ~

I t 11 intended that th is "eakly re port be a source or information to r eO:ll-b at c re ", and s tarr of ricers who hava aleSl t1lllate interest 1n t he opera tions orth e XXI BOI IIbv Command. " 'I 1th1n thoselimits it s h o ~ receive the ~ l e e s t poss ible clrculnt lon p . r ~ 1 5 s 1 b l . under theprov1.aloDS of AR ~ e o . ! l .

In order that a 1PX11la11ll or inte11tgenee may be i nc lu ded , th e report 1.given an overall classification or Secre t . 7fhen the natura of t he mater ia lwarrants, individual IU"t lcles have ra eeivld a lowar security classification.The report 1s 10 . s s e l D b l . ~ that theeOlllponent sections lIIay be r erl \o ved andclreulated or f11ad separately. It portions are reproduced, security regulations ~ s ba obs erved and the sourcecredi ted .Correspondence regudlng this publ1eatlon should be a4draslIed to th e CQIII-IMMin General, XXI Bomber C O I l l i l I U ~ ,APO 234, c/o Pos tmaa te r Sen Jl'ranc1sCo,Ca11rcrn1e, Attent10n: At or s . A-e.

4 J k -' 4BS D ,' GARCIACOIODII1, G.S.C ...e or s, ...-2AUTH: C.G.XXIB.C. lnitialsllibDATI 26 Kay 194.5

paid I in a dd iti on to ~ to hl.Scity . 23 [1ghters destroyed 12probablY destroyed and d a ~ ! e d .The miSsion 1t65 notable Cor an)ther innovation: Rether than bCDbby wingS. th e groupS assembled intocor.l'posi te w1ngS without resard towhether they were [ r tn l the 13rd,313th. etc . 'l'1e idea was to sa ntioe in th e assembly. It warJ!l;dwell, accord1ng to the reports.statiStiCS of the miSs10n are astallOWs: 66th Wlng, 141 aU'borDt ,125 effective, 639.6 t9 n5 MOp';lldi73rd, 160.146. 950.3 tons; 31.3th.79.66, 433.3 tons; 31+th, 144-132,658 tonS. on. 58th iUrli aU'craf tand flve frOCl the 313th attaeked

targets or opportunitY.OPPCSITIOW

APproXlOatelY 142 ene-Y aU'crattwere encountered. result1n1 in 180200 unabgreSSlve and !eneraUJ in effective a tt ac1t :l dur ing t h ~ , . r J D ,rrom tn e oSs8lllb11 area until I te rbOll1bS a1l'&Y' Th1"8e silver un1denU.ried single en!1n8 a1tCra!t, withextretrrelY smaU 1dni s p a n . a p p r o a ~ ~ ded 9_295 or th e 7:'ll'd ' lng ~

DAY InSSION

Bil1owin& sooke['rom burning tlagoya 1Sseen 1n this shotfrom t he nos e or a 4.S7thGroup, 8715t S q u ~ d r o nplane of the 73rOWing on 14 llarch. TheB_29 Which took th epicturo waS p i .loted by L t. carrol l

G. Rornor

1ha r ir s t mUsion, f lo 'f fn on 11.r against north llagoya. "a s th eluSlSt a tt ac k t he command had made1ts Urs t daylight incendiary,tr1ke. Al l [our wingS pa r t 1cipa t lI5, launching 4'11 effec t ive so rues .Iroppina 2,722 tons of banbs. The.ba1on cost 11 B.29s bUt th e enemY

~ xXJ


4/9

not r1.re . ~ 8 t e of closure was ex tre-ely fest end they were fi rstthoUght to be Je t_propel led, but noJEts were observed.One aircraft of t h 313th Wing,

forced to drop out of tomation "1 thOlle engine out snd a fire 1n th ebO:Db bay, received 24 attacks byeight eoeo)' fighter!. Four of thefLght er s were destroyed and th eB-29 continued on and bombed Seta.::'lak over the target was of hae_vy caliber, meager to intense, ac cill'ate to inaccurate.~ e a t h e r "as generally clear with1110 low clOUd, base 2,000 reettop 4,000 feet and 8110 middle cloud11th bese at 21,000 feet . Allcrews reported vis ibl l i ty greatly

restricted by sooke after the f i rs tireraft bo:nbed.or the 11 aircraft lost , threeditched, two were lost to enemyaircraft, one crashed at Iwo, three'ere abandoned over Iwo (Which was

J o c y . e ~ in ) and one was l ~ s t to un Snown causes. Airsea rescue picked up 27 cr6lJlllen.Weather conditions at two causedcancellation or the fighter escort"hich had been scheduled.The damage asseSSment fo r thisoission is 2. 8 sqU8r& mUes. Rea_sons for this comparatively smalltotal were given by those who par.ticipated as bad bombing, lac k o fsurface Wind to Spread the flamest he h ig h concentration on a smaliarea. Some inaccuracies in timing

~ i . . , ~ o m b i n g end the bombing of wrongs m ~ k ~ p r ~ ~ t ~ ; s o v ~ ; s g h e i ~ : : e Q t s e d th e,;ge !IIGHT IdISSlon

On the night ot 1617 l lay, 516

B-29s were a lrbo rne rengagement at lIagOYa I)r l469 effectives d r o p p ~ ' S1of bo:nbs on the Mrth ~ ~ ~ Ici ty. Two B-29s W8re lCilt {(,eneIllY' fighters destl'G7tl1, IlII

N.l.IlIbers of alrCl'&tteffect ive, and tons d r l ) P p ~en by Will8S as toll.Clws:122, 903; 73rd, lSe_l!?313th, 93.81, 59'1; 3 1 4 t . h , ' ~664. Five aircraft hCllll ~ " one frOID th e 731'd, three .. .th e 3l3th and 3l4th, bG:lbedtargets .OPPOOITHII

Forty four eneiD1 a 1 J ' ~sighted, With only a rA t I I 1111sive passes being made. lof bal ls of fire were rePGMIIf(lllll'ing B-2gs as ta r ~ as 111The 7:3rd and 314th 'Un&' .. ~ strayed one eteoy aircraft.

Flak was medium and herrr,er and inaccurate ill the rta l though seven B_29s r1Cll1'"damage over the targe t.Weather ove r t he tar,.,3/10 10'lf cloud to 9/10I1P,vis ib i l i ty restricted to 11in haze.Two aircraf t of thll

"ere los t . one, returll.1DIcrashea short of tM runliin g five cre'lJlllen and Il1There was one operatiClna].th e ere" bailed out w 1 t ies over T1niao. 0:...ai rcraf t crashed at d 11 na'rUrJ'IJay on takeoff an bllCllll'in the agave t o ~ 1 S crillnever airborne. - em' 115Cl1hpicked up by aU_sea r11151101DMage from thiS ( s . e t ~ 13.1 square mi le s.

- - - ~ - - - . - - - - - - '- NAGOYA on 15 MAY The smoke '018 to 20,000

,


5/9

' h ~ . \ ~ ~ ~ I W i . ; \ l ' l _ , \ ~ ~ ' I _ < " ' ~ " " __~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

,

'C/)

r-

I .6--!!!IiiI!!!iiiiii-b ?.. :;II . . . . . .

.i\ Cl 0,. .0'""

severe 4.,.a&1.

severe 4al1&&l.

d8I:l$ie.

onlla ".ch1nery "orka -- dutrOyed.RokolN v.ach1nery plant, r .,sadera Plantt1e1c)0 l'.ch1ntry c ~ p a n y . ' severe c)aJ!I&&a.toloahu L1ght 1.:etalS Co, Otsuta Plant,~ 1 k e n Alun1te Plant __ savere c)aa8ga Tolta1 Electroda Co, J'' 'Coya Plant No.2 -- s e v e r e ~ ' "...cany 41,trto\al.1 nlctrocll Co, tl:l.gOyll plant 110. . - practt "lstr07ec!0.1 111ppon cellophanl Plant __ about ~ pe rcen --001.estreJr""A1ch1 Alc ':'Icrka, Tluk1j1 Plant __ severe l bull

d1n6SYahe.g1 Steal plant __ about 25 percent destrOyed.

2040 _ SUI:I1tOCllo Light ! 'etall Co __ H : : : ~ ) l;ulld1ngs dl st r0z-6'Target nl B.C. 4058 Un1dent1fied Sh1pYard _. sUght d ~ g l . ~ ~ ~ & g : ~ i B,'C, 4059 Un1dentH1ed __ sl1ght d a m a & ~ o perc80t 4es' t .t tor1 c o t t ~ ' .."067 SUldtOlllO L1ght t le te . ls Co na n Silk r1ll 111 -- severe 4a:nage O ~ . a : a . - :::e.,en dlW4ge.cnoclow Ale "lorks -- levere da::l!.6e ~ ! ~ o r t ~ l s n t __ ~ v e r ~ 4 ~ ~ r ~ .

''''''''1'"1" 7

1'"

, -.>0 -'" -114& -:7E9 -n9 8""0001818

''''

2 4 ~ D _ OaUlo Electric s teel , "1n8:T\1 Plant . - severe de.mage.eMB _ MallOY' ilepair ShOPS -- several smal l b ul 1lUngs destroyed.251 _ 1:,,010. HerOOr dalll4ge

~ l t s U b l l h l Electric ~ r COl'lpany . - Carnage.Toyeda },!aehlnery "rg company . - d8Jll8g fl O\cUlllA Iron ~ o r \ o ; l , Otan1 Plant - - c)aoage.Okul!l& lroo. ':'1or'KS. Hag1M i ' lant - - severa da!:klloga.A1ch1 Alc "/ork5, E1to}oJ. P la nt _ . several bullc)lr.g s c)esU'07ea.

24'lC _ De.1do Slaeule Steel, Tsulllje Branch

Total d ( l t l 4 ~ ' to r.all:0Y' taUS" by XXI Bonber Co=e.nd da,,1''' ". ,,,.! . ". ,, , " " .17 I"Y U , "uor' .11 ; "" ' ' ' ' ' "", . n'' ' ' ' ' ' ' IT'" thO '" "",. ". ,. , IT " th o , , , h t ..: . ; or thb.01".'" t . . . " "" ,,,,OS' (


6/9

I KAWANISHI PLANT

141AIRFIE I t . ~ S n l ~ 1h"tutiv e missions on Uk!_313th ',7ing brought to an dseries of strikes aga1!l9t it.'ai r f ie lds on Y.yushU.On " ~ l s s i o n s 167 and lS!,'l/as h it by 17 aircraft, e10 0 tons and Saek1 by sin'craf't dropping 45 tons. flO

bombed targets of oppcrtuDltr.Five enemy a i rc ra f t -one of \vhich dropped a oJphosphorus bombs,eau.silll llfThree bursts of flak'"tered over Saeki ao1 1& " .There were no casualties,1I.issions 169, 170 and illriby th e 313th ',11ng, ~ cloud and bombed as ~ I t . . . of ~ i y a z 8 k i , 16 '11tcr-o"!' ! lyazakl Airfield, caltons; town of "1:

craf t , 46 tons; oneho:nl 'ed y 'ochi A/F.Jlaval Air BSSe,Shl'\8 and KubOkad opposition and nO

11[Uting7I(isstThree times durlai rcraf t of the ~ ~ ! \ .v is i te d the h0!!l8 l I a ~ } I ~Japan on mining U l t s S 1 Q ! I S ~ bn th e night of 13.1C It.12 B-29s mined S h t : ~ 1St ra i t s . Twenty ettlt171 n in es in the Jap hlXlt:ers on th e night of 16.11There were no lCIs!llI.18-19 34 aircraft 'ere bi..eta !Dining miSSion. FOIlred early. (Secret)

>< -.' " " " ~ '. . . . . . . . : ~

rarge t 1702, th e }(awanlshl Alr-crBft Company p la nt I n K o b ~ , e s c a p e dalmost unscathed on 1 1 Val ' I' fhen at_tacked by a small force frO'll threewings under very poor bombing condi-tions.

!'he target, though no t a majorplent. Is important In th e largeKawanlshl system. I t o ff er ed pos -sibilities as a good visual target.Ho-;vever, th e B_295 found i t largelycloud-covered and achieved poor re-sults frO!!! 17,500 feet , bO'llblng byradar end ,I n e few cases I visual ly.The 58th ",ling had 38 a i rc ra f tairborne, 35 of which dropped 167tons. The 73rd mounted 22, 17 ofwhich dro?ped 169 tons. Forty of42 from t ile 314th dropped 204 tons.One 58th "ling plane bombed a t a rgetof 0lJPortunl ty . Bombs were 500-pocnd GFs. fused to b ur st elBht to10 feet below the roof and causeinternal da!!lage to the plant t whichis unusually \"1ell constructeeJ.

OPPOSITI OIl-All winp:s !!let with 1:35 to 150. a t-tacks from enemy aircraft betvreenthe IP and land's end, mostly justafter th e bomb run. Two ineffec_tive attenpts ''lere made to dropphcsphorus bonbs on th e B-29 forma-t ims. One Single engine ai rcraf t

v r a . ~ observed firing from a f lexible~ u mounted on top the fuselage.Claims against the enemy were 11destroyed, 25 probably destroyedand two dal:l8ged. Flak was h'"'avy ,!:laager to intense and accurate t inaccurate over the target .

One 3l4th Wing alrcraft crashedi nt o t he water shortly art"r tar:e-off, 11 crel1l:len being killed Thi7 ~ e ~ ; ~ i ~ a r t received battle d a m a g ~ :

... - - -


7/9

hold out the nope of tuture disunity among the Allies. 1M Japanes e may consider that the share offraming th e peace settle-:ent clai::led by each l:Iember of the .HUedNations may arouse mutual resentments. I t is certain that they'11'111 depend on disunity, obtusenessand war_weariness amotll their conquerors to soften, to so::e extentth e peace t e r ~ and to blind th ' ;to the war that will be preparedover the next few decades.

Time not a,.,.i"edHOw8VtJ', i t is u n . U k e ~ that theJapanese believe that the oO:\lIIOthas ye t a rr ived when diSun1ty canbe expected or when nr_weariDISSha ' reached 1t! I l:l&XillUll, and therear e other considerations 1lbie'l _k aa genaral surrender 1Clprobable , be fore the oa1n1and i t s , l f ba s beeninvaded. In ,pite ot naval dUasttJ" and the predominance of thenavy in th e new cabinet, arflJ1 influ,nc ' 11 !Itill strong and thaarlllY bU alway' been on the sHle orbe.d'tl"OClI a4nntur- and of f18tltl,to the t in l ,b . t"W'tber. the tu.tr 'eftlth or th l erC1 cannot yet bt..td to ba " MeD .. .lo,-d 1I*1. . ttb e A lU - .

I n l l wlthoat . -J . I Q p ~ t .'UI _''1,>10 ... _ . '1-1:. o r ' tbU 1..17 _, ibelU"l"lf"

'ft)e folloWing ar t ic le ha5 been prepared by a Starr QUlcer otthe R.A.A.F. COIIllD6ncS 1'Iho has l 1ve( l soot years 1n Japan. AS it ssubject 1s a semlMpolltlcal one, i t should be clearly understoodthat the vUI7S expressed are 1n no sense official. The article1s publ1shed as presenting new angles on a subject which 1s ezercUing !:lOst minds a t present.

11th the Japanese i:sv,y committedluicide tactics on a large scaleuil the homeland threatene(l byillltd luoe,!,. ' 1n t he 1yukyu. andIbnbere. the question ot a gentl'l1 Japallllse capitulation hns nat .11."111)' arisen, bu t i t 15 consideredtblt surrender at this stege is unUktl1. Rowever, such a courser.al4, to the realist , heve much toe. . it . 'n'Ie main islands "ithUl1r beavy industries, communicat l ~ , and their scanty natural re;:eel would be preserved trClllther devutation. 'nl,e sacredut i or Japan with a l l that 'i t means~ ~ . p U b U e _orale and national pres.. , Would no t be invaded ~ . lIilht . e l l be thought that ,I t r l e ~ reace conditions misht re,,.1 nttustry, they could no tbGlbi the errect 0(' continuous heavyC l : I P l t ~ 8 , while the presen ce ot 00 -'oitl on forces in Japan, at te rP l t 1 n ~ t 1 u had ended, could be ex_'lid With less da'llage to I:'IUita1'7Oll&b ~ t i o n a l prestige than a thorel:qnt::re,at Witnessed by a l l in th e

o t s eu .tlet;rhnder now would permit or.to illJ btory in a ve.ry short t l......teo. ent a -s ta b i n th e back- b1~ e native or fozoelgn grOllp~ I b a z l ' s mat!le the ' cap . ,oa t fo rranure. I t IIUht Illao

J::I'T1>1., , -C::">t>010 -1'T1)"TI ZmOZVImVI

!f.:J

!

~

I;

.. ,~ . " , ~ ' t ' t ' 4,'~ " " C V ' . .,J -----------,...---

Z, ,. 0,, c !o,! , 0 rn" ", : ' .. .( -I ..". " o ,..!" . ' ~ '" ".: ".cl:, ( ' '" ,o. , " "-!' ".' "" : ~ , 0-0 ~ t , .,c . .C ' ""I' 0 ,'. "'" '. .." ,-$I; . , 0' ..," .,0' , .'' "

Z< o .00 '." ,c o. .., t 0 , '.' '.'0 - ", ,- Ct,. ' ,- o ' "'," , ,0 " ". o ,0 '. ~ ~ " o ' 0:- "" " " : " oC o ', I;i " ', 0/l ,

.... 'KbM __ - *- ..


8/9

l,:ontinued oc -.-.-..nough 8I:!lona ~ ~ a t l o n u n p o ~ ~their falll1l1es at lied troops andpublic opinion ~ o l : l e to intluencanuence increas; s pacitist in-~ a easily be r e ~ ~ e l ! l ; ~ ~ : ~ ebruPtiomes e diplomacy 'I Japan_but natural r e : ~ the regrettablepeople to foreign ~ ~ ~ ~ n a ~ , r a proudn.

To produce the d1sord 1t ions most suitable t er y eondi_Allied invasion r or this, ant ag es t han p e a c e ~ i e n t s core advan.surrender would ot occupation, butstrable before' d cour,e, be de_country and l O S 5 e : v ~ ~ t a t i o n ot thecoune a l!Ierioul!I tlroblel:' l l I ~ n p O ! r e r be_ KONO Y Bl!.0s."bte peatemoller'/het. surrender does COl:li:t t: ~ i ~ p ~ o b a b l e that the chief' ~ e D ~ ;e a governcent healled bcivllian--pret'erably. l1ke "on/ aot the nobili tJ . Al though t e ~ m Swil l be asked tor, i t is probab18that a f1rlll delll8nd to r uncornUtion.a l surrender wi l l eventually lI"twith acceptance by any &overmentso anxious to r peace as to ope.a ~ gotlations

Rere i t may be recalled thatthe Japanese ar e adept at 8ft l '1form or large and smell scala subterfuge in turning negotiatIons totheir own advantage; subSequtet dl nial ot a represenuti,.. 'S author-i ty il!l perhaps the COOlllOnest trick,bu t on such 1& gran 15,UI a; thes u r r e ~ e r ot' the natioD, it ..ouldaccord with traditlO1l. aDl! popularbeliet's tor the ehiat ' negotiator tocan i t suicide as a sigD that hi taction had bean talren under dureSS.orders may be iSsued br sar"iciministerS to cease bost! Uies buti t 15 unlikelY that IIJ1 a r ornavy c(l ll ll lnd8l" would obe7 tbla,whU. there 15 alV ' bope ot infliCt.i08 .. OIl Allied t r o o ~ . l'bUS,altboush f irst poUc, end than Mcassit,. .. , torce ~ a p 1 t u l a t l O ! l rroatile J a GOf'8I"Qa8Dt IICtual IDdcc*plaW , \ !HtI.laD nb ool1 be..a. wb,n baa.,. dat'aats b a " bHDslIIta1Dtd b7 tb a toroeI 111 lapaD,whU. toroel tb I Atu\1e . . .!aDd'" coat.... bal'Ullt1el 1011I: .. ~ . l b 1 a l " ' - ' :a re i .n ee ! t r _ toIlP! (1'&. . .', 'C_ I l ltol. _ , ( c . o r ~

..

fiPERS"C war los tj{lOW less it is more thanIOnt thethe high command ful ly1k*l1 tbS t that in th e present~ r l t a n c l ~ ! d e r e ~ t is now certain ._ , J.p6nth n$Xt t r i a l ot strengthpUBS tor dye have been laid and,flU .lr&a planl!l the building upt h ~ : war p ~ t e n t i a l will haveof J'panrOlDinant place. To thisUUI\' P.ould o b v i o u ~ l 1 y be desireod, t avoid rurther ~ a m a g e a t.bll t to industry, communicationsprt'ln - r Howsver, surrender~ . . A . . n p , , ~ ~ - ill order to preserve these as~ 15 tOO palpable a ~ e v l c e to: , . Sleh appeal ra r t he Japanesealr.l ,tarfs: They wou ld no doubtrepl th.t control and restr ict ionof iMll5try by the victors "ould bestrieter and more thorough i f i tlI S eO::lp8rstively undall l8ged whentbt nr ended, than if i t had surrued '0 mucb 6evastation as to ap p-.r .lready impotent.

~ e the initie. l " h a r ~ " perio("or PM-el was over, i t would be hopK that A1l1ed corumissions could bebOQd.. .inked and toreign governmentsbW'tld by the usual alternation ofthreet, and blandishments in whieh. ~ p e e . 1 5 to humanitar ian and pacitu t unttment would rigure. F'urtbIr, tor rea,ons d i s c u s s e ~ above,ID;J talk or surrender a t presentIOIllcl not 01\17 discredit th e goVen.nt and lose i t i ts army sup~ bu t would mean that i ts pollt r ~ e : O U h l d a lways be suspect by pa _1 erearter. But when the~ l a n d s have been i nva ded ,IDd hi re has been heavy action'IbII1 avy lossel!l on both sIdes. andjOift ClX:ll:lUnlcatlons ar e breakingtloU an orter to r peace negotiaj1\10l\l1ll81 be expected. These eon_-1441 " 1 not be rult 'illed to r e. .. c r ab l e time a t' t8 r ia va slo n- .nced.!bat th'_i l l IS rulers ot J a he.....\lOtl.. r id th,e probab1l1 t7 or OCICU-_. d s eertain. aDd that t h uh I l' Il ll raed measures to aueneWlItI.lcb i 0 shorten th e period dUl ' lq~ t WIll be canled ClQt. 11

' _ I ' . ~ t ~ : ' O b a b l e . Ol'SGnlsedl bUt-.; ",4J spontaneous aoU or 10-1 be eouated 011 to .....

to recent eventfora SUdden d1$11i' ~ ! t .be expected. l l S l ~ l ~ ,They believed thga1nst China was !It ..and that i t a .rltlA......l iberation or ~ III ~

from th e dominatioll O l l ~ ~and foreign BOVerlt! Of __protection of Japaflei'tsThey believed thatdent could not be s e t ~ 1 4 Q 1 b r . 'of the aS S1stance BtfKai Shek by Britalll ~ l ...and that war against the 111!,th e only \7ay to end thatThey believed that t h e A . l ~ i ft r i es hed been tor Year,by European PO;rers ll'llJapanese in ItalaYa , _th e Philippines "ere nlt-'\'lhere as liberators. llItJated th e great " ~ t e r 1 a l ' IItIth e Allies t dispOSalthat it could be OYereO"..I "they termed the greater ' I pOI'fer of Japen al'lll ot!lIrnations. 'lery l1ttlt bIcurred in the experience of Iin th e Japanese hblaafllthese bel iets .

It is true t h a t ., . .ceived 1 n c r e a s ~ prIG.success of "material" ....bombing raids on tile IlIfU'th e approach ot iDnI_main islandsi but IIpV1t11'in any way that.oald "1Japanese tend.ocr to ......h ar dl y y et been in ",I"

The loss of face by any governl : I ~ n t which even discussed terms ofslrrender now would be so enormoustJ.!!.t a l l credi t would be los t , notonly by the governwent i t se l f , butby the class f rom which i t was re cruited. I t must also be borne innind that Japan, unlike most ~ u r o _~ a and Asiatic countr ies, ha snever experienced foreign occupat ion. ~ ' h a t e v e r their feel ing as tooverseas adventures, the populationas a whole would have!.. on ly one ideaas to th e course o action to betaken rlhen .Japan i t se l f is attack_Ed, and that would certainly be toresis t .

Nl l t DisillusionedI t is t r u ~ th at in th e l ~ n g serte s of acts of bad faith and aggresSion, c o ~ ~ e n c i n g With the Manchur_tan inCident and ending With th epresent war . J ap an ha s been le dalong the road to disaster by aninority who were very powerful,butthat minority,none th e less . thought~ ~ o r t h while to pander to publicopinion by f i t t ing high-soundingprinciples to their unscrupulous~ o l i c i e s . I t is necessary to under_stand that very great n U ~ b e r s or~ h Japanese completely believed inthe applic3tiin of those principles

that i t could r:al'e lendings on th emainland a t le:lst as c ostly , in nrelative sense, as th e Iwo JiDOoperations, and thus b ri ng a bout amajor contribution to th e "1aI'-weariness hoped fo r in AlUed nntions.Japanese indifference to heavyloss of l i fe , coupled with the i rkr.O'11ledge of All ied cau t ion on thisscore, must here be considered. Thectvi l population can be expected toplay i ts part by providing passive

resistance and any obstruction poss tb le to Allied moves ,and an Alliedi ~ V 8 s i o n and occupation \'1111 Decounted on to plant th e seeds ofhEtred among th e J ap an es e p eo pl e a snothing e l ~ e ~ l o u l d . True, th e nl)t: 'on's heavy inoustr ies would behs t , bu t this o1ght be expected ifsurrender tooK nlace now. Furtherth.e main islar.jS, \vith their r u g g e ~m)untain ranges across which comlliunications ar e scanty, and the i risolated centres of populationoffer good ground fo r long t e r ~hosti l i t ies again st supe rio r forces.


9/9

ItfDAE XX 7# Clln'''''/tRESCUEDThe 11 Cl'etr..l'Oen of the 1(Xtb,Bomber COllIaaIldreferred to 1ttth e last Para.graph on P ~

21 of A. 1. R.No. 10 as beill8in a Jap prisonin Rangoon havebeen liberated.According to ateleeon frotlthe XXth, the,ar e in goodbealth. (Secret)

d Seasonal advice f'rCZl the lip'"io on harvesting the 1lIlut 11'gives this t imely t ip :"The l7heat harvesting St&SlCll

drawing near. 1'l'e mtUltwheat, which is a n o u r 1 S h l ~ ! ~ fran being dall8ged by ai r raidS."If yOU are (J"{U "U1lJlll, ellw111 hBlllper the productlOD orThe re fo re . i n order to sta1 It 11as much as possible, i t 11 1IUI ffSelect an Air nef.ns' x - : r ~ .th e vil lage to g1,e D!!.,nent danp;er by proper sw- '..'"Also as yOU art ' ~ tth e field, ge t t.nto ,=-,-'wear1ng a str . - r d : ifillease ot emergeDC7,1C ~ ~ face down in the .- J" J ~ P 1 D & 1Il12 d1tiIllJlll'!2! s e t _ " \RestriOiilJ

The morale 1s l among the Jap-'anese front l ine troops and Iss teadily deter iorat ing . The sol_diers continually complain of thecomplete absence ot the Japanese, a ir power or land reinforcements.The genera! teeling is that Okinawawill be lost. As evidence that theJapanese military authorities onth e i s l a ~ beiieve that, the POWs8id,e1l troops ar e receiving largerations or tood, equipment and cig-aret tes on the theory that a ll suchs to res w i ll eventually be lost endthat they mey 85 well enjoy themwhile they s t i l l have them.

At present the Japanese Army onII Okinawa has a six months supply ottood and sufrieient ammunition.However, sOlDe soldiers ar e begin_ning to lluf"fer trorn lllI1lputrition be_cause they ar e unable to build firesto cook their r o and their dietis pr1mE.rlly Japanese hard tack.(Secret)

,I,,on

Froo 8 1st Lt . PO"I taken on Okln_: 8" 8 additional information 1s ob-I talned on the state of morale of! the Japanese soldier., The follow_ing Inforoatl?n Is taken from a G-2I report or th e 1 0th Army.

Amons the Japanese troops I andespecielly those in the front l ines,: t he re Is an appreciable number whowould 11k8 to surrender to the Amer-: toans. T ~ pcrJ had heard soldiersdlsCU3S1ng our surrender leafletsI and there Is a growing belief amongthem th3t the statements made inthe leaflets ar e true and that theywill be rrell taken care of it theysurrender. However, they are pre_'vented from doing so by t ~ e l r lead-ers.

air intelligence report, v1n12

Documents