amazon hydro_a different approach

8/6/2019 Amazon Hydro_A Different Approach

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Adding a Continental Perspective to the Development of HydroPower in the Amazon Region

Alan Douglas PooleApril 26, 2005

Brazil is endowed with abundant hydropower potential and hydroelectric plants have been thedominant source of electricity supply since the beginning of the electricity industry in the country,providing an increasing share of generation until the late 1990s.

With the reforms and substantial privatization of the power sector begun in 1995, hydroelectricdevelopment slowed down. Generation with natural gas became the new focus of policy and businessinterest. At the same time, public sector planning never abandoned hydro as the predominantmedium and long term source of expansion. Successive ten-year plans at the time treated natural gasgeneration as a short-term stop-gap.

1However, by this time the public sector plans were merely

indicative, rather than determinative. For various important agents in the market, continued largeincreases in generation from natural gas were seen as the preferred solution. There was a certainschizophrenia of policy.

A key characteristic of the Lula Administrations energy policy is to make the development of Brazilsremaining hydro potential an explicit priority and to try to design a process to make this viable inpractice. It is reflected in various actions taken, such as strengthening centralized planning and thecreation of a central pool for commercializing generation.

Since the Amazon region has most of the remaining hydro potential that is not already operating orunder construction, the question of large new dams there is beginning to return to prominence, afterbeing in the background of energy policy for more than a decade.

The government has announced its intention to implement the first phase of the Belo Monte dam(5681 MW, with a possible expansion of 5000 MW in a second phase) on the lower Xing river andtwo dams on the Madeira river near Porto Velho - Santo Antnio (3580 MW) and Jirau (3900 MW).

Both are essentially run-of-river plants, with small reservoirs in areas already transformed by morethan 30 years of migrations. Detailed project definition has been underway for some time and adecision as to which of these two projects will begin first will be taken soon.

These announced mega-projects have several other things in common. They are on southerntributaries of the Amazon and have very large river flows with large seasonal variations. The sites arealso at the transition from the sedimentary basins of the Amazon and its tributaries to the crystallinegeological formations of central Brazil. This geologic transition provides opportunities for dams toprovide head for the turbines. Together with a third site on the Tapajs river (So Lus de Tapajs,of approximately 9000 MW), they have long been recognized as the remaining sites with by far thelargest potential in the Amazon region.

However, it should be remembered that the Madeira Complex and Belo Monte together represent only

a small share about 15% at most - of the hydro potential estimated for the region (which excludesthe Tocantins/Araguaia basin). The emphasis of discussion on two relatively attractive mega-projectsmay create a false impression regarding the characteristics of most of the remaining potential in theAmazon region. What does the rest of the theoretical potential look like? Very little has beenpublished.

The author is most familiar with the Belo Monte project and the Xing river basin which is also theAmazonian basin which has been most studied. I will focus my comments on this basin. Thecharacteristics of the Xing cannot be extrapolated to the other basins. However, it is a good example

1 See for example the plans prepared by the GCPS/Eletrobrs: Plano Decenal de Expanso 1999-2008 (1999) and Plano

Decenal de Expanso 2000-2009 (2000).


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to raise basic issues about the strategy to provide firm energy from a natural resource which variesenormously over time.

Belo Monte and the development of the Xing River

Planning of the Belo Monte project began in the late 1970s. In 1980 a detailed inventory of the Xingbasin was published. At that time the dam was called Karara and was conceived as being thesecond dam of a complex to be built above and below the city of Altamira a regional center along theTransamazon highway. The first dam to be built was called Babaquara, whose site is locatedupstream of Altamira. Its function, besides generating power, was to provide regulation of the river forthe Karara dam, whose generating capacity was to be roughly double that of Babaquara.

The two dams were denominated the Altamira complex. Major economies in construction costs wereforeseen in building the two dams in a coordinated way. For example, as civil construction labor andequipment needs passed their peak for the first dam they would be transferred to starting the seconddam.

As planning evolved during the 1980s and more attention was given both to environmental issues and

problems of financing, Karara became the first project in the construction sequence. Not only that,Babaquara was put firmly off-stage. There was no more mention of the Altamira complex. In 1986a strategic plan for the power sector was published the Plano 2010. The Karara dam was to be thefirst in a sequence of projects to develop Amazonian hydro on a massive scale (the equivalent of anItaip every 2 years or less).

The proposal provoked an intense reaction among the indigenous groups in the effected area and inthe environmental community both in Brazil and internationally. Indeed, this reaction consolidatedBrazils still very incipient environmental movement. The emblematic moment came in a publicmeeting in Altamira in 1989, when the Indian woman Tura dramatically and symbolically touched bothcheeks of a Director of Eletronorte with a machete. Brazils continued economic stagnation soonremoved any urgency for such a large project, as well as the financial capacity to implement it. Thesubject receded to the background.

After the public relations disaster of Karara in 1989, the project was given a new name - Belo Monte.Not only that, by 1994 a new configuration of the dam began to be conceived which dramaticallyreduced the area of the reservoir from 1160 km

2to ~500 km

2, of which about 2/3 is the bed of the

river. By the parameter of kW/hectare of reservoir it would be one of the most attractive large damsever built in Brazil. It is also expected that the cost of delivered power will be relatively low (lower thanmost hydro capacity being constructed today) despite the long distance to the main load centers 2400-2600 km. If there is any site in the Amazon region worth developing, this is certainly one of them.

However, the project presents serious challenges for the system. Belo Monte is a run-of-river plantand the Xing rivers flow varies enormously, more than the rivers in the Southern, Southeastern andNortheastern regions of Brazil (Figure 1).

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Figure 1: Seasonality of Flows of Some Major Brazilian Rivers

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

Jan Feb Mar Abr Mai Jun Jul Ago Set Out Nov Dez

Month

%LongTermAverageFlow

Paran (Itaip)

So Francisco (Sobradinho)

Tocantins (Tucuru)

Xing (Belo Monte)

Those planning the development of the basins potential have long been aware of this problem.Indeed, as already observed, the original proposal in the 1980s was to first build a dam upstream withhuge storage capacity - (Babaquara, renamed Altamira). Later other dams would be constructed

upstream on the Xing to provide additional storage. Together, they would provide >180 billion cubicmeters of useful storage volume see Table 1.

Table 1: Characteristics of Planned Hydro Plants on the Xing River

Hydro Plant Capacity Reservoir Area & Ratios Useful Volume Approx Head (MW) (km2) (kW / ha) (106 m3 / km2) (billion m3) (m)Belo Monte (Karara) 10681 500

1213,6 2,40 1.2 90

Altamira (Babaquara) 57502

6140 9,4 15,78 97.0 68Ipixuna 1900 3270 5,8 6,85 22.4 43Kokraimoro 1490 1770 8,4 10,40 18.4 49Jarina 620 1900 3,3 6,53 12.4 24

Iriri 770 4060 1,9 7,64 31.0 40Total Xingu River 21,530 18,300 11,8 9,97 182.4 xxxxTotal w/o Belo Monte 10,530 17,800 5,9 10,18 181,2 xxxxNotes: Composite based on the 1980 inventory of the Xing River2, the Plano 2015 (Eletrobrs, 1993; volume 2) and morerecent information on Belo Monte3. Except for Belo Monte these are all very preliminary estimates, subject to change.1 The Belo Monte reservoir was originally 1160 km2 then reduced in a new configuration prepared in 1994. I have takenupper value of range of 440-500 km2 cited in literature. 2 Another value cited for Babaquara is 6590 MW.

2 CNEC (Consrcio Nacional de Engenheiros Consultores); Inventrios Hidreltricos: Bacia do Rio Xing; for Eletronorte,1980.3 O. Seva; Vale do Xingu; chapter 2; University of Campinas; May, 2004.

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To give an idea of what this volume of storage represents, the useful storage capacity of all of Brazilsreservoirs today is 268 billion m

3. The storage capacity of all the reservoirs of generators in the

Southeast/Midwest region is 178 billion m3. Two thirds of the existing storage capacity would be

required for the equivalent of only 1/4 of the existing hydro capacity, and even less of the firm energycurrently supplied.

Looking from another angle, Table 2 summarizes information about the largest existing storagereservoirs in Brazil with more than 10 billion m

3of useful capacity of which there are only eight. The

upstream reservoirs on the Xing would add five. Four of the seven largest reservoirs (in terms ofuseful storage volume) would be on the Xing.

Table 2: Largest Existing Storage Reservoirs in Brazil(More than 10 billion m

3of useful storage capacity)

Dam River/Basin ReservoirArea

Storage Generation Reservoir AreaRatios

(km2) (109 m3) (MW) (106 m3 / km2) (kW / ha)

1.Serra da Mesa Tocantins 1784 43,3 1275 24,27 7,152.Tucuru (Phase I)1

Tocantins 2430 36,9 3890 15,19 16,01

3.Sobradinho So Francisco 4214 28,7 1050 6,81 2,494.Furnas Grande/Paran 1440 17,2 1312 11,94 9,115.Trs Marias So Francisco 1042 15,3 396 14,68 3,806.Emborcao Paranaba/Paran 455 13,1 1192 28,79 26,207.Itumbiara Paranaba/Paran 778 12,5 2280 16,07 29,318.Nova Ponte Araguari/Paran 443 10,4 510 23,48 11,51

Total 12586 182,6 11905 14,51 9,46Total w/o Sobradinho 8372 153,9 10855 18,38 12,97

Note: No other reservoirs have more than 6 billion m3 of useful storage capacity.1 With the additions of Phase II (to be completed in 2006) Tucuru will reach 8370 MW.

Unlike most existing storage reservoirs, which have sites with topography favoring this function, theupstream storage plants on the Xing would all be artificial at sites with relatively flat topography. Inthe course of almost 1200 km the river falls only 185 m to the level of the reservoir of Belo Monte. Inaddition to the main dams, extensive dikes would be required.

As illustrated in Figure 2, the Xing would become a series of lakes for 1300 km (plus more than 500km on the Iriri river), covering both tropical forest and various indigenous reserves. Large areaswould be subject to seasonal drying and flooding both ugly and a breeding ground for mosquitoes.Water quality problems at each site are likely to be severe, with the decomposition of vast amounts oforganic matter. Substantial quantities of methane (a potent GHG gas) would be released. GHGemissions from deforestation in the vicinity are also likely to result, based on past experience. The

dams upstream of Belo Monte are all very problematic, though some are clearly worse than others.None are likely to be cheap.

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Figure 2: Map of the Proposed Reservoirs on the Xing River

Source: Lobato, C.S. et alii; A importncia do zoneamento ecolgico-econmico para o Estado doPar, Par Desenvolvimento, N

o. 23, pp 34-52

This reservoir lakes are highlighted in blue the reservoir of Tucuru is also highlighted in light blue.The map refers to configurations in the late 1980s. The area of the reservoir of Kararo (Belo Monte)

will be reduced by more than half.

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The current proposal of the government sidesteps these issues. Instead of the full 11,000 MWtraditionally projected, a Phase I of only 5681 MW is planned.

4In this reduced format, the load factor

is improved, however at the cost of losing a large amount of generation potential during the period ofhigh flow.

This pragmatic solution has in effect left the options open to be decided at a later date. Whileintelligent from a planning and especially a political marketing perspective, it can also be said that itrepresents a refinement of the strategy in the late 1980s to present Kararo as an isolated dam whenin fact it was the first step in a strategy to massively develop the hydroelectric potential of the region.This approach raises questions and could cause problems.

If Belo Monte were indeed to be left at 5681 MW, with no dams built upstream, it would imply that theestimates of Amazonian potential that can be implemented must be drastically reduced. This outcomeseems unlikely. It is more probable that a vigorous effort will be made to build Phase II as part of anas yet undisclosed plan of expansion. The problem would remain, how to deal with the variation ofriver flow? The traditional logic for optimization of the large investment would create great pressure toimplement the upstream projects to regulate the river flow. Without the presentation of a convincingalternative strategy, Belo Monte may well be seen again by many as a Trojan horse and be

considered not on its own merits but on what it may bring in its wake.

Is there another approach possible to address the challenge of the huge variation of flows of water onthe Xing river? My proposal is to look at the classic alternative in hydroelectric planning to buildingmore storage capacity: seek to develop dam sites with complementary hydrology. Where might thesebe?

Seeking complementary hydrology outside Brazil

There is a large undeveloped hydroelectric potential in the northern tier of South America Venezuela, the Guyanas and Colombia. This northern tier is also in the Northern Hemisphere, whichis a fundamental climatological divide, even quite close to the Equator. For this reason a strategy to

exploit hydrological complementation in the humid tropics could be called an inter-hemisphericinterconnection.

The rivers in the northern tier of South America have a very different hydrology than that of theXing, Tapajs and Madeira not to mention the basins already mostly developed in Brazil(Tocantins, So Francisco, Paran, etc). The difference in average seasonality of river flows isillustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 is a map of South America summarizing the seasons ofmaximum flow and the % of river flow during the 3 months of maximum flow. Figure 4 showsestimated average monthly flows for the northern tier and Peru (in the western tier) compared withthose of the Xing.

Peak flows in the rivers of the northern tier are generally during July-November, the period of lowflows in both the Eastern Amazon and the river basins of Southeastern and Northeastern Brazil. As in

the rivers of the Brazilian Amazon, maximum flow is often concentrated in a short period.

In addition to complementary seasonal flows, there is also diversity in the variation of annual flow,though this is harder to evaluate with the data available to the author. In the years of lowest flow onthe Xing (below 80% of the average long term flow, roughly the 20% percentile) in the period 1931-85), in only one year was the flow in the northern tier in the lowest 20% percentile for that region. Inall other years flow in the northern tier was near or above average, while the average flow on theXing in these 12 driest years was 73% of normal

4 In this new configuration there are 11 turbines of 500 MW the main powerhouse. In the secondary powerhouse there are 7turbines of 25.9 MW.

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Figure 3: Three Month Periods of Maximum River FlowAnd Their Share of Annual Runoff

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Figure 4: Examples of Hydrologic Diversity

0%

50%

100%

150%

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300%

Jan Feb Mar Abr Mai Jun Jul Ago Set Out Nov Dez

Month

Percen

tAverageLongTermF

low

Xing (Belo Monte)

"Northern Tier"

Essequibo (Guyana)

Magdalena (Colombia)

Orinoco

Peru

The total hydro potential of the northern tier is large perhaps roughly equivalent to Brazils hydropotential, as shown in Table 3. The estimates are from OLADE and it is not explicitly clear that thecriteria are broadly the same (as they should be). However, even assuming the worst case that theestimates for the northern tier are for installed capacity instead of average output (as they are forBrazil) the future potential of the northern tier is large and the share that has been developed,especially outside Venezuela, is very small.

Table 3: Hydro Potential and Development Brazil and Selected Regions of South America

Hydro Potential Installed Capacity (GW) Generation (GWh)(GW-years) Total Hydro Total Hydro

Brazil 143,380 82,458 65,311 344,512 275,609

Guyana 7600 308 0.5 914 0Venezuela 46,000 20,577 12,491 87,406 58,728Colombia 93,085 13,788.5 9077.3 45,242 32,870Northern Tier 146,685 34,674 21,569Ecuador 21,760 3233.9 1486.5 11,884 7605Peru 61,832 5935 3098.8 21,982 18,629Bolivia 39,850 1273.3 456.6 4188 2244Western Tier 123,442 5042

These characteristics of the northern tier hydrology which complements that of Brazil and a largeundeveloped potential - makes a strategy of inter-hemispheric interconnection feasible in principle asa strategy for the optimization of hydro development in the humid tropical regions of South America.

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This strategy opens the possibility for more development of hydro with less environmental impacts andlower costs on a continental scale.

If successful, it could also open the way for developing a regional strategy for the development of thelarge hydro resources in the central Andean nations or western tier Ecuador, Per and Bolivia. Ascan be seen in Table 3, the potential is almost as large as that in the northern tier and a much

smaller share has been developed. The proposed hydro complex on the Madeira river could serve asthe anchor on the Brazilian side for this interconnection and integration of development, just as theBelo Monte project on the Xing river would serve as the first Brazilian anchor for the interconnectionwith the northern tier.

The hydrology of the western tier of the Amazon region is much less complementary to Brazils thanis that of the northern tier, but there is some diversity in seasonal flows. More important, there maybe sites with relatively low economic costs and environmental impacts which could only be viable ifdeveloped in a regional context.

A problem for the development of larger hydro projects in countries with relatively small electricitymarkets is how to absorb a large block of new capacity. Superior sites may not be developed for lackof a market. By creating the necessary transmission infrastructure, it would be possible in principle to

select the best hydro projects in the continent and develop them on an integrated basis.

Outside the Amazon region, along the more developed southern borders of Brazil, a process ofintegration and exchange has already begun in addition to the existing or planned bi-national damson the frontier such Itaip and Garab. Though there have been difficulties with fulfillment of somecommitments, economically useful exchanges have been made too. The strategy for Amazoniaproposed here would complement and reinforce this on-going integration.

Begining the inter-hemispheric interconnection

A strategy to develop this regional potential would begin with a serious investment in bulk transmissionbetween operating hydro generating plants. The most obvious northern anchor for this

interconnection would be the complex of dams on the Caroni river in Venezuela (Table 4). The exitingcapacity of the complex is about 14 GW. Of this, the Guri dam accounts for about 8,9 GW. Another 9-10 GW of expansion is planned. Essentially all of Venezuelas hydro production is on this river.

Table 4: Installed and Potential Capacity on the Caroni River in Venezuela

Hydro Plant Status Capacity Firm Energy Turbines Head(MW) (GWh) (m)

Lower Caroni 16,136 74,170Macagua I Operating 360 2952 6 ~27Macagua II-III Operating 2570 9,048 14 ~27Gur (Raul Leoni) Operating 8,850

139,400 20 143

Caruach Operating 2196 11,350 12 36Tocoma Detailed project 2160 10,520 12 36Upper Caroni 7,250 n/aTayucay Pre-feasibility 2450

27 85

Aripich Pre-feasibility 12003

4 90Eutobarima Pre-feasibility 2400

46 315

Salto Auraima Pre-feasibility 12005

6 N/aOperating 13,976 63,650

Planned New Capacity 9,410 n/aSource: EDELCA Annual Report for 2003. Notes: 1 Reduced from 10,000 MW 2 Reduced from 3100 MW. 3 Reducedfrom 1300 MW. 4 Reduced from 2900 MW. 5 Reduced from 1800 MW

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The southern anchor would be Belo Monte, presumably with a capacity closer to the total 11,000MW originally planned than the 5681 MW of Phase I. Tucuru could also be part of the southernanchor, and would be well prepared for this role with the completion of the super-turbinizationexpected in 2006. Later, the proposed dam on the Tapajs at So Lus de Tapajs (~9000 MW) couldbe added to the southern anchor. The distance of the interconnection for this dam would be about300 km less than for Belo Monte.

The distance between Guri and Belo Monte would be about 3000 km, if one followed the route ofexisting highways (2500 km) and or transmission lines (as the bird flies would be somewhatshorter).

5Although long, this interconnection is perfectly feasible in technical terms, including the

crossing of the Amazon river. The distance is comparable to the distance from Belo Monte or thePorto Velho complex on the Madeira to the main load centers in Southeastern Brazil, roughly 2500km.

The Guri dam is on the lower Caroni river and is rather distant from the frontier with Brazil, about 450km. Four dams are planned upstream. Of these, two Aripich and Eutobarima are only 50-75 kmfrom the frontier. If the northern anchor were in their proximity the total distance to Belo Monte woulddecrease to about 2600 km. The two dams have a potential capacity of between 3600 and 4200 MW.Of course, there would have to be reinforcement of the transmission system within the Caroni

complex, but the marginal cost of the reinforcement would be less than an entirely new line and rightof way.

Guri already supplies Boa Vista, the capital of Roraima (a distance of 650-700 km). Before the optionfor natural gas, it was considered a serious alternative to supply Manaus, at a distance of about 1450km if it were to follow the highway from Boa Vista.

The main function of this interconnection would be to transfer energy (kWh) from one system toanother, the direction of the flow depending on the season. For example, from January to May Brazilwould typically export power to Venezuela; from June to November the flow would reverse. Thedirection of the flow in December would depend on who had the drier year. The interconnectionscontribution to capacity (kW) would be secondary an outage should not compromise the ability tomeet peak demand in each countrys system.

Since much of the output of Belo Monte during the season of high flow would not be sent to the loadcenters of SE and NE Brazil the capacity of the transmission lines to these centers might be reducedsomewhat with savings in investment (I am referring here to the case of Belo Monte having acapacity near the 11000 MW originally planned). At the same time, the availability of power from theCaroni basin during the season of low flow would mean that the transmission capacity that is built totransmit Belo Montes output to the SE and NE markets would have a higher load factor. Theinterconnection with the Caroni modulates the use of the transmission system, flattening the curve.The modulation of seasonal output should also facilitate the commercialization of Belo Montes power.These are economic benefits which could be substantial and should be taken into account whenevaluating the economics of the interconnection with Venezuela.

Once operations were consolidated with Venezuela, the next logical steps would be to interconnect

with Colombia and the Guyanas the former probably from Guri, the latter perhaps from Boa Vista.The Guyanas are much closer, which makes them the most interesting medium term candidates.However, Colombias potential is much larger. As the interconnection expands in time the relativeamounts of energy transported in each direction may also change.

5 Segments of the route are estimated to be: Guri to border ~450 km; border to Boa Vista ~215 km; Boa Vista to Manaus~765 km; Manaus to Santarem ~870 km; Santarem to Belo Monte ~700 km. About 500 km of the distance between Manausand Santarem does not follow an existing road.

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Follow-up

In the authors view, a successful strategy to develop the viable hydroelectric potential of the BrazilianAmazon must modify the planning paradigm than has been used in the past. Large reservoirs formulti-year regulation of river flows, a traditional aspect of Brazil`s hydro development, seem less cost-

effective in Amazonia than they have been in other regions. While we have looked in detail only at theXing basin, and all river basins are different, the problem does not seem to be restricted to the Xing.An interesting calculation in the Plano 2010 never since published in updated form is that onaverage each MW of firm power would require inundating an area 3.5 times larger than the average ofthe rest of Brazil.

6This area would be in humid forest biomes.

In this context greater priority should be given to investments that exploit possibilities to complementnatural river flows. Various approaches are possible. The proposal outlined here is one importantexample of a complementation strategy which exploits the diversity of natural flows in differentbasins.

This proposal is very preliminary. However, the analysis to assess whether it is worth pursuing furtherneed be neither expensive nor time consuming. This pre-feasibility analysis should address points

such as: Estimate the investment and losses of the interconnection between the two anchors.

Create a database on the hydrology of the main basins (and potential sites) in the northerntier that is as consistent as possible with data for the Brazilian inventory.

Analyze the inventory of potential sites in the northern tier and the Brazilian Amazon,including: generating capacity, reservoir area and useful storage capacity; head; averageenergy; estimated cost key environmental/social concerns.

Perform at least simplified energy modeling to simulate impacts on the systems of thecountries involved.

It is probable that information on many sites is either incomplete or subject to large uncertainty.However, the purpose of the analysis would only be to determine whether this approach is trulypromising not yet to determine that it be implemented.

Fortunately there is time available before major decisions need be made and to allow for moredetailed studies to be performed. There is probably no need to alter the design of Phase I of BeloMonte. However, the timing and capacity of Phase II (including transmission to SE and NE Brazil)may well be influenced. The biggest near term impact in Brazil may be on the presentation of theproject and perceptions regarding the upstream development of the Xing river.

On the Venezuelan side, a key issue to address is the timing and capacity of the four dams plannedon the middle and upper Caroni river basin. From Table 3 it can be seen that there may be someuncertainty regarding the configuration of these dams. Their planned capacity, as estimated in 2003was 9410 MW. This is 1850 MW less than the previous estimate. The reasons for this change areobscure, but may be related to the ability of the Venezuelan market to absorb the peak output duringthe rainy season why install turbines you cant use? It is relevant to remember that essentially all ofVenezuelas hydro capacity is on the same river, so there is almost no hydrological diversity in thatcountrys system. Guri itself has been derated by 1150 MW. With the market opened by theinterconnection to Brazils national grid, investments in greater turbine capacity may well be justified.

The negotiation of such a structurally significant project between various countries will be a complexprocess. Political instability and tensions between countries (for example, Venezuela with Colombiaand Guyana) make negotiations and planning more difficult. However, this kind of structural projectwhich can bring long-term benefits to all parties is the type of initiative that can help to overcome these

6 The calculation is based on the inventory available at that time (1985) and assumes that all inventoried potential within acertain economic threshold were developed. The 36.2 firm GWs from Amazonia (including the Araguia/Tocantins) wouldinundate 10 million hectares (100,000 km2), while the 53.6 firm GWs from other regions would inundate a total of 4.2 millionhectares. See the tables on pages 145 and 150 of the Plano 2010.

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differences and increase the economic and political ties between the countries of the Amazon basin,including Brazil, a frequently stated goal of governments in the region.

With or without a strategy of broader regional interconnection and hydro development, the viablepotential within Brazils Amazon region is probably substantially smaller than has been generallydivulged - though the viable potential is probably larger with regional interconnection. Being more

realistic about its own Amazonian potential, Brazil can help its neighbors develop theirs. This wouldopen the way for projects that have lower economic and environmental costs than, say, the projecteddams of the middle Xing and their like in the Brazilian Amazon. Of course, this needs to be confirmedby deeper studies, but it is time to change the geographic scope of the planning of hydroelectricexpansion in the humid tropics of South America.

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amazon hydro_a different approach

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