flickers of freedom and moral luck 1. introductionsartorio.arizona.edu/files/flickers.pdfall roads...

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FlickersofFreedomandMoralLuck*

1.Introduction

Thethoughtthattoomuchmoralluckisunacceptablehasledsometoshrinkthelocusofour

moralresponsibility.Forexample,followingtheKantiantraditionofthe“goodwill”astheonly

thingthathasmoralworth,somehavesuggestedthatallthatwecanberesponsibleforis

mentalactslikedecisions,orforthecharactertraitsissuinginthosedecisions,giventhatthese

arelessdependentonexternalinfluencesandthuslessvulnerabletocertainformsofluckthan

otherthings(see,e.g.,Richards1986,Thomson1989,Graham2014,andRivera-López2016).

Theliteratureonthefreewillproblemcontainsasimilarmovementinsupportofshrinkingthe

locusofourresponsibility.Ontheseviews,whatwearetrulyorultimatelyresponsibleforis,

notwhatwedecidetodoperse,butsomethingmorefine-grainedandarguablyevenmore

immunetoluckthanourdecisions:whatwedecideonourowntodo.Inwhatfollows,I’llrefer

tothisviewastheTripleOview.TheTripleOviewcomesupinadefenseoftheclassicalmodel

offreedom(whichunderstandsfreedomintermsofalternativepossibilities)fromFrankfurt’s

famousobjection(Frankfurt1969),asaversionoftheso-called“flickersoffreedom”replyto

thatobjection(see,e.g.,vanInwagen1983,Naylor1984,O’Connor2000,Speak2002,Timpe

2006,Robinson2012,andCapesandSwenson2017).1Althoughtheconnectionwiththemoral

*ThankstoJustinCapes,AndrewKhoury,MichaelMcKenna,MichaelRobinson,andPhilipSwensonforhelpfulcommentsanddiscussion.1Theterm“flickersoffreedom”isfromFischer1994:137-47,anditreferstothosealternativepossibilitiesthatallegedlyremainopentoagentsinFrankfurt-stylecases.

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luckproblemissomewhathiddeninthesedebates,thereisclearlyaconnection,andoneworth

exploringinmoredetail.

Thegoalofthispaperistoexaminethisissue,bylookingataseriesofinterrelated

questions.Firstofall,whatmightbemeantbythecentralclaimoftheTripleOview:theclaim

thattheultimatelocusofourresponsibilityismakingdecisions“onourown”?Also,what

motivationcouldtherebeforthisview,andhowplausibleisit,attheendoftheday?In

particular,howplausibleisitasanapplicationoftheideathatourmoralresponsibility

shouldn’tbetoovulnerabletoluck?

2.TheTripleOView

Let’sstartwithabriefoverviewofhowtheTripleOviewcameintoexistence.vanInwagenfirst

suggestedaviewofthiskindinresponsetoFrankfurt’sargumentagainsttheclassicalmodelof

freedom(theconceptionthatunderstandsfreedomintermsofalternativepossibilities).

Frankfurt’sargumentappealedtospecificcounterexamplestothatconception—examplesthat

sincethenhavebeencalled“Frankfurt-style”cases.AFrankfurt-stylecaseisascenariowhere

anagentseemstomakeadecisionfreely,completelyonhisownandonthebasisofhisown

reasons,butitisadecisionthathecouldn’thaveavoidedmaking.Thereasontheagent

couldn’thaveavoidedmakingthedecision,thestandardstorygoes,isthataneuroscientist

whohadbeenmonitoringtheagent’sbrainwouldhaveensuredthathemadethesame

decision(bymanipulatinghisbrainintherequiredway)ifhehadn’tmadeitonhisown.

Frankfurtnotedthatscenariosofthiskindseemtounderminetheclassicalmodeloffreedom

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becausetheysuggestthatthekindoffreedomrelevanttoresponsibilitydoesn’trequirehaving

alternativepossibilities.

Inturn,vanInwagen(1983)respondedtoFrankfurtindefenseoftheclassicalmodel.

Hisresponseiscomplex,butpartoftheresponseappealedtotheideathatincertaincases

whereitmighthaveseemed,atfirst,thatagentsareresponsibleforunavoidablebehaviorsor

statesofaffairs,thoseagentsarenotactuallyresponsibleforthosebehaviorsorstatesof

affairs(sincetheywereunavoidable);instead,theyareresponsibleforhavingdonethemor

broughtthemaboutontheirown(wherethisissomethingthattheycouldhaveavoided).

AccordingtovanInwagen,onewaytomotivatethistypeofdistinctionisbyreflecting

onexamplesofthefollowingkind:

AllroadsleadtoRome:Ryderisridinganout-of-controlhorse,Dobbin,whenhegetsto

aforkinthepath.RydercannotstopDobbinbuthecanchoosewhichdirectionhewill

gobyusingthebridle.AlthoughheissurethatoneofthepathsleadstoRome,heis

unsureabouttheotherpaths.RyderhatesRomans,andpredictsthatsomeRomanswill

gethurtbythepassageofthehorse,sohemakesDobbingointhedirectionofthepath

heknowsleadstoRome,andsomeRomansgethurt,aspredicted.Asitturnsout,

however,allpathsledtoRome.(vanInwagen1983:176-7;thelabelismine)

AsvanInwagenpointsout,RyderseemsnottoberesponsibleforDobbin’spassingthrough

RomeorfortheRomansgettinghurt.ThesearebothoutcomesthatRydercouldn’thave

avoided.WhatRyderisclearlyresponsibleforisthehorse’stakingaparticularrouteorforthe

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Romansgettinghurtasaresultofthehorsetakingthatparticularroute.Butthesearemore

fine-grainedoutcomesthathecouldhaveavoided.Sothisexamplesuggeststhat,atleastin

somecaseswhereagentscouldhaveavoidedonlythemorefine-grainedoutcome,whatthey

areinfactresponsibleforisthemorefine-grainedoutcome(theonethattheycouldhave

avoided),andnotthemorecoarse-grainedoutcome(theonethattheycouldn’thaveavoided).

vanInwagenthensuggeststhatthisgeneralizestootherkindsofcases.Forexample,

thesamegoes,hesuggests,foracaselikethis:

GunnarandRidley:GunnardecidesonhisowntoshootRidley,butifhehadn’tdecided

thatonhisown,someexternalforcewouldhaveforcedhimtoshootRidley,andsohe

wouldhaveendedupshootinghimanyway.(vanInwagen1983:181;thelabelismine)

vanInwagensuggeststhatasimilaranalysisshouldbeofferedofthiscase:whatGunnaris

clearlyresponsibleforis,notthefactthatheshotRidley,whichissomethingthathecouldn’t

haveavoided,butthefactthatheshotRidleyonhisown,orwithouthavingbeencausedtodo

sobyanexternalforceoutsidehiscontrol(whichissomethingthathecouldhaveavoided).

AftervanInwagen,severalothershavemadesuggestionsalongsimilarlines.In

particular,Naylor(1984)offeredasimilaranalysisofthefollowingcase:

Honestchild:Achilddecidestotellthetruthonhisown,buthisparentswouldhave

forcedhimtotellthetruthifhehadchosentolie.(Naylor1984:251;thelabelismine)

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Naylorsuggestedthat,whereasitisobviousthatthechilddeservesmoralcreditfortellingthe

truthonhisown,itismuchlessobviousthatinthosecircumstanceshedeservesmoralcredit

fortellingthetruthsimpliciter.Inparticular,Naylornotedthatthechildcanberesponsiblefor

themannerinwhichhetoldthetruth(fordoingit“willingly”,or“bychoice”,or“justbecause

hewantedto”)withouttherebybeingresponsiblefortellingthetruth,whichhecouldn’thave

avoided.

Inturn,Robinson(2012)givesasimilaranalysisofthefollowingcase:

Box:Anevildemoncreatesaworldinwhichallthatexistsisalargeboxcontaininga

singlehumanbeing,Jack.ItisphysicallyimpossibleforJacktoleavethebox.However,

Jackneverattemptstoleavetheboxandspendshiswholelifehappilyinsidethebox.

(Robinson2012:181)

RobinsonsuggeststhatJackisnotresponsibleforstayinginthebox;whatheisresponsiblefor

isdecidingonhisowntostayinthebox,nottryingtoleavethebox,ortheparticularwayin

whichhestaysinsidethebox.

AndCapesandSwenson(2017:976)offerasimilaranalysisofacasediscussedin

FischerandRavizza(1998:125):

Sharks:Johnseesachilddrowningintheseaanddecidesnottojumpintosavehim.

Thechilddrowns.UnbeknownsttoJohn,somehungrysharkswouldhaveattackedhim

andpreventedhimfromsavingthechildifhehadtried.

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CapesandSwensonsuggestthat,althoughJohnisnotresponsiblefornotsavingthechildin

thiscase,heisresponsibleforfailingonhisowntosavethechild—thatistosay,withouthaving

beenforcedtodosobythesharks.

Thecommonideabehindalloftheseresponsesseemstobethethoughtthat,onceone

distinguisheshavingdonesomething(amorecoarse-grainedbehaviororfact)fromhaving

doneitonourown(amorefine-grainedbehaviororfact),itbecomesmuchlessclearthat

agentscanberesponsibleforinevitablebehaviors.Onthatbasis,then,wecanbuildadefense

oftheclassicalmodeloffreedomfromFrankfurt’sattackbyarguingthatFrankfurthasn’t

successfullyshownthatwecanactfreelywhilelackingalternativepossibilities.Whatis

sufficientlyclearaboutFrankfurt-stylecases,theargumentgoes,isthattheagentsinthose

casesareresponsibleforhavingmadethedecisionontheirown,orwithoutthehelpofthe

intervener(whichissomethingthattheycouldhaveavoided).Itismuchlessclear,however,

thattheyareresponsibleforhavingmadethedecisionsimpliciter.Thus,itismuchlessclear

thattheyareresponsibleforanyunavoidablebehaviors.

Actually,therearedifferentwaysofcashingthisideaoutmoreprecisely,andthus

differentversionsorformulationsoftheTripleOview.Theseareallwaysofexpressingthe

thoughtthatthe“ultimatelocus”ofourresponsibility,atleastincasesofthiskind,ismaking

decisionsonourown,notmakingdecisionssimpliciter.Inthefirstplace,theoriginaland

simplestversionoftheview,suggestedbybothvanInwagenandNaylor,isthatanagentina

Frankfurt-stylecaseisonlyresponsibleformakingthedecisiononhisown,andnotatallfor

makingthedecision,sincehecouldn’thaveavoidedmakingit.TheresponsetoFrankfurt’s

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argumentofferedbythisviewissimplythatFrankfurtiswronginthinkingthatanagentina

Frankfurt-stylecaseisresponsibleforhisunavoidablebehavior;whatheisresponsibleforisa

morefine-grainedstateofaffairsorfactthathecouldhaveavoided:havingmadethedecision

onhisown.

Inturn,asecondandmorerecentversionofthisview,onesuggestedbyCapesand

Swenson(2017),agreeswiththesejudgments,butatthesametimedrawsonadistinctionthat

isfamiliarintheliteratureonmoralluck:thedistinctionbetweenthescopeandthedegreeof

one’sresponsibility(see,e.g.,Zimmerman2002).Accordingtothisview,eventhoughtheagent

inaFrankfurt-stylecaseis,again,notresponsibleformakingthedecisionthathemade,forit

wasinevitable,thisiscompatiblewithclaimingthatheisjustasblameworthyashewouldhave

beenintheabsenceoftheintervener.Theunderlyingthoughtisthatluckcanaffectwhatyou

areresponsibleforwithoutaffectingthedegreeofyourresponsibility,whichwouldremainthe

sametotheextentthatyoumadethedecisiononyourown.Thisviewhasthepotential

advantagethatitallowsaproponentoftheTripleOviewtocapturemoreofFrankfurt’s

originalintuitionsaboutFrankfurt-stylecases,whichmanypeoplehavefoundconvincing.Forit

allowsustosaythatthereisasenseinwhichagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesarejustas

blameworthyasiftheyhadbeeninordinarycircumstances,althoughtheyareresponsiblefor

fewerthings.

Finally,athirdandinsomewaysimportantlydifferentversionoftheTripleOview,

whichisformulatedanddefendedinRobinson(2012,2014,andForthcoming),istheviewthat

anagentinaFrankfurt-stylecaseisinfactresponsiblebothformakingthedecisionandfor

makingitonhisown,butheisonlybasicallyresponsibleformakingitonhisown,andonly

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derivativelyresponsibleformakingthedecision.AsRobinsonnotes,themostplausible

interpretationoftheprincipleofalternativepossibilities(theprincipleaccordingtowhich

responsibilityrequiresalternativepossibilitiesofaction)isonethattakesittobeaprinciple

aboutbasicresponsibilityonly.Otherwise,forexample,drunkdriverswouldbeoffthehookfor

causinganaccidentsimplyonthegroundsthattheycouldn’thaveavoidedcausingitatthe

timeoftheaccident,whentheywerealreadydrunk.Byrestrictingtheprincipleofalternative

possibilitiestobasicresponsibility,weavoidthisunacceptableresult(for,evenifdrunkdrivers

couldn’thavedoneotherwiseatthetimeoftheaccident,theycanstillbederivatively

responsiblefortheharmtheycausedbecauseoftheirearlierdecisiontodrinkanddrive,ifthey

couldhaveavoidedmakingthatdecision).Giventhis,Robinsonsuggests,ifwhatanagentina

Frankfurt-stylecaseisbasicallyresponsibleforisonlyhavingmadethedecisiononhisown,it

followsthatFrankfurt-stylecasesdon’tunderminetheprincipleofalternativepossibilitiesthus

understood(sincethoseagentscouldhaveavoidedmakingthedecisionontheirown).Notice

thatthisviewhastheaddedpotentialadvantagethatitallowsproponentsoftheTripleOview

tocaptureevenmoreofFrankfurt’soriginalintuitionsaboutFrankfurt-stylecases,ascompared

totheversionssuggestedbyvanInwagenandNaylor,andbyCapesandSwenson.Foritallows

themtoagreewithFrankfurtconcerningtheagents’responsibilityfortheirdecisions;the

disagreementonlyconcernsthelocusoftheirbasicresponsibility.

ThecentraltenetoftheTripleOview,then,istheclaimthat,atleastinthesekindsof

cases,theultimatelocusofourresponsibilityisnotmakingdecisionsbutmakingthemonour

own.Aswehaveseen,thiscanbeinterpretedeitherastheclaimthat(atleastinthesekindsof

cases)makingdecisionsonourownistheonlythingthatwecanberesponsiblefor,orasthe

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claimthatthisiswhatfixesthedegreeofourresponsibility,orastheclaimthatthisiswhatwe

arebasicallyresponsiblefor.Ourfocus,then,isafamilyofviewsratherthanasingleview.

Notethatalloftheauthorsthatwehavereviewedarespecificallyconcernedwith

responsibilityinscenarioswithinevitableoutcomes(Frankfurt-stylecasesbeingjustonetypeof

exampleofthatkind).Onenaturalquestionthatarises,then,iswhetherthoseauthorswould

wanttoextendtheirclaimstootherkindsofscenarios.Thatistosay,arewesupposedto

concludefromtheiranalysesthatitisingeneralthecasethatallthatwecanbetruly

responsibleforismakingdecisionsonourown,andnotmakingdecisions?Orthatthisiswhat

fixesthedegreeofourresponsibility?Orthatthisiswhatwearebasicallyresponsiblefor?Of

course,iftheseclaimsholdgenerally,thepositiononFrankfurt-stylecasesjustfollowsasa

specialcase.Asaresult,ifthegeneralclaimweresufficientlywellmotivated,thiscouldhelp

reinforcetheplausibilityofthisstyleofresponsetoFrankfurt’sargument.

Now,Iamnotclaimingthatalloftheseauthorswouldnecessarilybetemptedto

embracethemoregeneralclaims.2But,assuggestedabove,itisinterestingtonotethatthe

generalclaimcanatleastbemotivatedbymoralluckconsiderations.3Frankfurt-stylecases

seemtosuggestthatwecansometimesbemoreincontrolofwhetherwewillmakeadecision

onourownthanoverwhetherwewillmakethatdecision.So,bylimitingtheultimatelocusof

ourresponsibilitytowhatwedecideonourowntodo,astheTripleOviewdoes,wecan

2Infact,CapesandSwenson(personalcommunication)rejectthegeneralizationofatleastsomeoftheirviewstoothercases.3ThemoralluckconsiderationsIhaveinmindarediscussedinRobinson2012:187,CapesandSwenson2017:974-5,andRobinsonForthcoming:n.16.

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protectourresponsibilityfromcertainformsofluckthatsomemayfindproblematic.Thisisthe

kindofmotivationfortheTripleOviewthatIaminterestedinexamininghere.

3.Responsibilityfordeciding“onourown”

Now,howexactlyshouldweunderstandtheproposalthattheultimatelocusofour

responsibilityisnotmakingdecisionsbutmakingdecisionsonourown?Whatarethe

conditionsforbeingresponsibleformakingadecisiononourown?

The“onourown”locutionmightmeandifferentthingsindifferentcases.4Butnote

that,onaverynaturalinterpretation,inthiscontextdoingsomethingonyourownhastodo

withyourdoingitasaresultofacertainsetofmotivationsorcausalinfluences.Whenyoudo

somethingonyourown,youracthasaparticularkindofcausalhistory:onethatcontainsyour

owndeliberationandreasons,andonethatdoesn’tcontainexternalforcesormanipulatorsof

acertainsort.Forexample,inNaylor’sexampleofthehonestchild,thechildtellsthetruth“on

hisown”inthesensethatheismotivatedbyhisownreasonstotellthetruth,andisnotforced

byhisparentstodoso.Thatistosay,hetellsthetruthonhisowninthesensethathistelling

thetruthhastherelevantkindofcausalhistory.Arguably,thesamegoesfortheother

exampleswehavereviewedandthatwerediscussedbytheproponentsoftheTripleOview:in

vanInwagen’sGunnarandRidleyexample,GunnardecidestoshootRidley“onhisown”inthe

sensethatheismotivatedbyhisownreasonstoshoothimandnotbyexternalcoerciveforces;

inRobinson’sBoxexample,Jackdecidestostayintheboxmotivatedbyhisownreasonstostay

4Forexample,insomecontextsitseemstomeansomethinglike“alone,orunaccompaniedbyothers”,aswhenwesayofashypersonthatwhatshelikesmostisspendingtimeonherown.

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andnotcausedtodosobyexternalphysicalforces;etc.Thisisinlinewithwhatmostofthe

advocatesoftheTripleOviewexplicitlysay.Forexample,CapesandSwensonidentifytheclaim

thattheagentmakesthedecisiononherownwith“anobservationabouttheetiologyof[the

agent’s]decision,viz.,thatitwasnottheresultofoutsidecoercionorforce”(Capesand

Swenson2017:978;seealsoCapes2014:433).AndRobinsonsaysthatwhatitmeanstosay

thatanagentdecidesonhisowntoAis“simplythathedecidestoAandthathedoesso

withoutbeingcausallyforcedorinterferedwith”(RobinsonForthcoming:n.31).

Arguably,then,theclaimthattheultimatelocusofourresponsibilityismakingdecisions

onourown(insteadofmakingdecisionssimpliciter)hastobeinterpretedastheclaimthat

whatweareultimatelyresponsibleforis(notourdecisionsbut)afactaboutthecausalhistory

ofourdecisions:thefactthatourdecisionswere(orwerenot)causedinacertainway.This

seemstobe,atleast,themostnaturalinterpretationofthesuggestionmadebyTripleOviews,

andthebestwayIseetomakesenseofit.5So,inwhatfollows,I’lladoptthisinterpretationand

examineitsprospectsofsuccess.(Ofcourse,ifI’mwrongandthisisnotwhatsomeofthese

5Naylorseemstobeexplicitlyembracingthisinterpretationwhenshesays:“Ifsomeoneismorallyresponsiblefordoingsomethingonhisown,thenevenifheisnotmorallyresponsiblefordoingwhathedid,hecanstillbemorallyresponsibleforthemannerinwhichhedidit.”(Naylor1983:257).Capesalsoseemstobeembracingthisinterpretationwhenheclaimsthatwhattheagentisresponsibleforisnotadecisionbutamorepreciseormorefine-grainedfact:thefactthathedoesitonhisown(Capes2014:433).Robinsonsayshewantstoremainneutralontheissueof“justwhatitmeanshereforanagenttodecideonhisowntoA”,butoneofthepossibleinterpretationshementionsistheinterpretationaccordingtowhichdecidingonone’sowntoAis“justawayofdecidingtoA”(RobinsonForthcoming:n.14).vanInwagenisaspecialcase,Ithink,inthatheembracesaformofcausalessentialismabouteventsthatentailsthatyourdecisionwouldhavebeenadifferenteventifithadbeencausedinadifferentway(vanInwagen1983:169).Onthisview,yourdecidingonyourowncouldjustbetheactualeventofyourdecision.(ThisviewisalsosuggestedinthefirstpartofRobinson2012.)Butmostpeoplefindcausalessentialismabouteventstobehighlyimplausible,andIagree.(Capesmakesthispointtooinhis2014:section3.)

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authorshaveinmind,thisshouldbetakenasaninvitationtosaymoreabouthowweshould

interpretthecentralclaimoftheTripleOviews.)

Let’sstartbyasking:Couldweberesponsibleforfactsaboutthecausalhistoryofour

decisions?And,ifso,how?

Thefirstthingtonoteisthatafactaboutthecausalhistoryofadecision(amentalact)

isnot,itself,anact(ofanykind).Itisnotsomethingthatwedo,butafactaboutsomethingthat

wedo:afactaboutwhyitisthatwedowhatwedo.Butaprettystandardassumptionof

theoriesofresponsibilityisthatwhatwearebasicallyresponsibleforis(ifanything)certainacts

ofours(perhapsincludingactsofomission);mostcommonly,thesearetakentobementalacts

suchasdecisions.Asaresult,thereisapotentiallyseriousproblemhere.Theproblemisthat

theTripleOviewwantstosituatetheultimatelocusofourresponsibilityinthingsthatarenot

acts(ofanykind),but“features”ofacts,orfactsconcerningthecausalhistoryofacts.And

thesearenottypicallyregardedasthekindsofthingsthatwecanbebasicallyresponsiblefor.

Asaresult,itishardtoseehowtheycanbetheultimatelocusofourresponsibility,asthe

TripleOviewsays.6

Toclarify,Iamnotdenyingthatwecanberesponsibleforthingsthataren’tacts.In

particular,Iamnotdenyingthatwecansometimesberesponsibleforfactsaboutthecausal

6Forarelatedobjection,seeStump1999:301-2.StumpsuggeststhattheTripleOviewcouldonlyworkifdoinganactonone’sownwereanact,andonethatisdifferentfromtheactthattheagentwouldhaveperformedotherwise(sheisskepticaloftheseassumptions).ForaresponsetoStump,seeCapes(2014).Therearesomeviewsaccordingtowhichwecanbebasicallyresponsibleforthingslikecharactertraitsormentalstatesthatarenotacts(see,e.g.,Adams1985,Smith2005,andGraham2014).Note,however,thatfactsaboutthecausalhistoryofourdecisionsareverydifferentfromthingsofthatkind.So,whatevermotivationtherecouldbeforacceptingcharactertraitsandthelikeasthingsthatwecanbebasicallyresponsibleforwouldn’tobviouslycarryovertocausal-historyfacts.

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historiesofouracts.Itcertainlyseemsthatwecanbe,inthesamewaywecanberesponsible

forothermoreordinaryeventshavingthecausalhistoriesthattheydo.Butthepointisthat

thesedon’ttendtobethingsthatwearebasicallyresponsiblefor;rather,ourresponsibilityin

thosecasesisinheritedfromotherthingsforwhichweareresponsible.

vanInwagen’s“AllroadsleadtoRome”caseisagoodillustrationofhowwecanbe

responsibleforafactaboutthecausalhistoryofanordinaryevent.Inthiscase,asvanInwagen

notes,RyderisnotresponsiblefortheeventoftheRomansbeinghurt.Butheisresponsiblefor

theRomanshavingbeenhurtasaresultofthehorsetakingacertainpath(theonlyonehe

recognizedasleadingtoRome).SoRyderisresponsibleforafactaboutthecausalhistoryof

theeventconsistingintheRomansbeinghurt.But,ofcourse,inthiscase,hisresponsibilityfor

thisfactisnotbasic,butinheritedfromtheearlierdecisiontoturnthehorseinthatdirection.

Sharksisasimilarcase:theagent,John,isnotresponsibleforfailingtosavethedrowningchild,

andheisresponsibleforthefactthatthesharkswerenotpartofthecausalhistoryofhis

failuretosavethechild.Butthisisbecauseheisresponsibleforhisdecisionnottoattempta

rescue,whichinturnresultedinthesharksnotpreventingtherescue.7

Similarly,therecouldbecaseswhereweareresponsibleforafactaboutthecausal

historyofourdecisions.But,inthosecasestoo,ourresponsibilitywouldhavetobederived

fromotherthingswedid(orfailedtodo)andforwhichwearebasicallyresponsible.For

example,athiefcouldberesponsibleforthefactthathisdesiretostealcausedhisdecisionto

7Inmyview,exampleslikevanInwagen’sGunnarandRidleycasearedifferent,inthatIthinkGunnarisresponsibleforRidley’sdeath,andnotjustforafactaboutthecausalhistoryofRidley’sdeath.ThebasicdifferenceisthatGunnarcausesRidley’sdeath;incontrast,theagentinSharksdoesn’tcausethechild’sdeath,andRyderdoesn’tcausetheharmtotheRomans.IdiscussthesignificanceofdifferencesofthiskindinSartorio2016,chapter2.

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steal,butthiscouldbebecausehefailedtoresistthat(resistible)desire.Inthatcase,Isubmit,

heisbasicallyresponsibleforhisfailuretoresistthedesiretosteal,andonlyderivativelyfor

thefactaboutthecausalhistoryofhisdecision.Asanillustration,imaginethatthethiefknows

thatheisgenerallyabletoresisttheurgetostealifhelooksatapassageonKantianphilosophy

fromamoralphilosophytextbook,andonthatparticularoccasionhedecidednottolookatthe

passage,whichresultedinhisstealingact.Clearly,whatheisbasicallyresponsibleforinthis

caseishisdecisionnottolookatthepassage.Healsoseemsresponsibleforthefactthathis

desiretostealwascausallyefficacious;however,hisresponsibilityforthisfactisinheritedfrom

hisresponsibilityforthedecisionnottolookatthepassage.

Ingeneral,then,itishardtoseehowwecouldbebasicallyresponsibleforfactsabout

thecausalhistoriesofourdecisions,sincethesearefactsthatwetendtoberesponsibleforina

derivativeway.ButthismakestroublefortheTripleOview.Forimaginethatwewantedtosay

thattheagentinaFrankfurt-stylecaseisnotresponsible,ornotbasicallyresponsible,for

havingmadethedecisionthathemade,butonlyforhavingmadeitonhisown.Howcouldthis

be,ifthisisafactaboutthecausalhistoryofhisdecision?Presumably,ifhewereresponsible

forthatfact,hisresponsibilitywouldhavetobeinherited,asintheexamplesabove,fromother

thingsforwhichheisbasicallyresponsible.Butthereisn’tanysuchthing;afterall,theseare

supposedtobecasesofbasicmoralresponsibility.(Recallthattheyhavetobe;otherwisethey

wouldhavenobearingontheprincipleofalternativepossibilities,sincethisprincipleis

restrictedtobasicresponsibilityonly.)

Atthispoint,theproponentoftheTripleOviewmightprotest:But,surely,theagentin

aFrankfurt-stylecaseisresponsibleformakingthedecisiononhisown!Thismuchseemsclear.

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So,giventhatmyreasoningabovesuggeststhatheisnot(giventhatthereisnothingfrom

whichthatresponsibilitycouldbederived),theremustbeaflawinthatreasoning.

Itis,indeed,temptingtothinkinthisway.But,asIgoontosuggestinthenextsection,

thiswayofthinkingreliesonaconfusion.Uncoveringthatconfusionwillallowustocomeup

withadiagnosisthatwillhelpusseemoreclearlybothwhytheTripleOviewfails,andalsowhy

itmayhaveseemedattractive.

4.Adiagnosis

Therootoftheconfusion,itseemstome,couldbethatinthesecasesofbasicresponsibilityit’s

easytoconflatewhatweareresponsibleforwithwhyweareresponsible—thatistosay,with

thegroundsofourresponsibility.Recallthat,onwhatseemstobethemostnatural

interpretationofthe“onourown”locution,beingresponsibleformakingadecisiononour

ownamountstobeingresponsibleforafactaboutthecausalhistoryofthedecision.Thecausal

historyofthedecisionmadebyagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesisonethatincludestheirown

deliberationandtheirownreasons.So,inorderforagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasestobe

responsibleformakingthedecisionontheirown,theywouldhavetoberesponsibleforthe

factthattheirdecisionhadthatcausalhistory.But,dowereallythinkthatagentsinFrankfurt-

stylecasesareresponsibleforthisfact?Thatis,dowereallythinkthattheyareresponsiblefor

thefactthattheirownreasonsanddeliberationbroughtabouttheirdecision?

It’snotatallclearthatwedo.Whatmostpeoplewouldcertainlywanttosayisnotthis

but,instead,thattheagentisresponsibleforhisdecisionbecausehisownreasonsand

deliberationbroughtabouthisdecision.Thatistosay,thefactaboutthecausalhistoryofthe

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agent’sdecisionisnotsomethingthattheagentisresponsibleforbut,instead,somethingthat

groundshisresponsibilityforthedecision.IfanagentinaFrankfurt-stylecasemayhave

seemedresponsibleformakingthedecisiononhisown,then,perhapsthiswasjusttheresult

ofconflatingthegroundsofhisresponsibilitywithsomethingthatheisresponsiblefor.

Inacoupleofrecentpapers,Robinsonofferedanargumentthatisrelevantforour

purposeshere(seeRobinson2012andForthcoming).Thisisanargumentforthethirdversion

oftheTripleOviewdiscussedabove:theviewthat,althoughagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesare

responsiblebothformakingthedecisionandformakingthedecisionontheirown,theyare

onlybasicallyresponsibleformakingthedecisionontheirown.Thatistosay,althoughtheyare

responsibleformakingthedecision,theirresponsibilityforthedecisionisderivedfromtheir

responsibilityformakingthedecisionontheirown,whichisthe“ultimatelocus”oftheir

responsibility.Robinsonnotesthat,ifthoseagentsareresponsibleforboththings,makingthe

decisionandmakingitontheirown,thenthesefactsmustbeeitherunrelatedoronemust

explaintheother(hedoesn’tconsiderthepossibilitythattheymaybothbeexplainedbythe

agent’sbeingresponsibleforathirdthing,probablybecauseit’sunclearwhatthatthirdthing

couldbe).AsRobinsonnotes,itseemsimplausibletosuggestthattheyareunrelated.Sothat

leavestwopossibilities:either(i)theagent’sresponsibilityforthedecisionexplainshis

responsibilityformakingthedecisiononhisown,orit’stheotherwayaround:(ii)theagent’s

responsibilityformakingthedecisiononhisownexplainshisresponsibilityforthedecision.

But,Robinsonargues,(ii)ismuchmoreplausiblethan(i).Fordecidingonourownseemstobe

morebasic,ormorewithinourcontrol,thandecidingsimpliciter.So,inthesamewaythatour

responsibilityforovertbodilyactionsisderivedfromourmorebasicresponsibilityforour

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antecedentdecisionsormentalactions(whicharemorewithinourcontrol),itseemsthatwe

wouldhavetoconcludethatourresponsibilityforourdecisions,too,isderivedfromourmore

basicresponsibilityformakingdecisionsonourown.(AccordingtoRobinson,thisgoesatleast

forFrankfurt-stylecases,ifnotmoregenerally,foranycasewhereweareresponsiblefora

decision.)

Asexplainedabove,IthinkthatRobinson’sinitialassumptionisnotquiteright:itisnot

thecasethatagentsinFrankfurt-stylecasesareresponsibleforboththings,makingadecision

andmakingitontheirown.Instead,theyareonlyresponsibleformakingthedecision.Still,we

canexplainawaytheappearancethatisarguablydrivingRobinson’sargumentinthefollowing

way.ItistrueofFrankfurt-stylecasesthatagentsmakethedecisionsthattheymakeontheir

own.Anditistruethat,insomesense,thisisa“morebasic”ormorefundamentalfactthan

theirresponsibilityforthosedecisions.Itisamorebasicormorefundamentalfactinthatit

groundstheirresponsibilityforthedecisions.Butitdoesn’tfollowfromthisthatitismorebasic

orfundamentalinthesensethattheagents’responsibilityfortheirdecisionsisderivedfrom

theirresponsibilityforthoseotherthings,whichiswhatRobinsonwantstosay.

Inotherwords,basicresponsibilityfactscan(ofcourse)begroundedinotherfacts.But

thoseotherfactsarenot,themselves,responsibilityfacts(otherwisetheywouldnotbebasic

responsibilityfactsbutderivativeresponsibilityfacts).Whatkindsoffactsarethey?Thisis

somewhatcontroversialbut,attheveryleast,itisclearthattheymustincludesomecausal

historyfacts(sincehowyoumakeadecision,orthecausalhistoryofyourdecision,isclearly

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relevanttowhetheryouareresponsibleforit).8So,inparticular,factsconcerningthecausal

historyofdecisionswillhaveanimportantroletoplayingroundingtheagent’sbasic

responsibilityforthosedecisions,withoutbeingfactsthattheagentisresponsiblefor.9

Ontheotherhand,notethatifonefollowsRobinsoninsayingthattheagent’s

responsibilityformakingthedecisionderivesfromher(basic)responsibilityformakingthe

decisiononherown,thenthequestionarises:Whatcouldpossiblygroundthatbasic

responsibilityfact?Weseemtobeleftwithoutananswertothisquestion.10Whichmakesme

thinkthatwehavegonetoofar:weshouldhavestoppedearlier,atthegroundsoftheagent’s

responsibilityforherdecision.Inotherwords,whatweshouldhavesaidis,again,thatalthough

theagentisresponsibleforherdecisionbecauseofthewayshemadethatdecision,thisisn’t

aninstanceofderivedresponsibility,butafactaboutthegroundsofbasicresponsibility.

8Onmyview(developedinSartorio2016),causalhistoryfacts(togetherwiththegroundsofthosecausalhistoryfactsthemselves)areactuallytheonlyfactsthatarerelevanttothetypeofcontrolthatisrelevanttoanagent’sresponsibility.9AtonepointRobinsonraisesthechallenge:“Ifapersonisnotmorallyresponsiblefordoingathingonherown,itisdifficulttoseehowshecouldbemorallyresponsiblefordoingitsimpliciter.”(Robinson2012:186-7).AsIhaveargued,Ithinkthatthechallengecanbeansweredbypointingoutthatshecanstillbemorallyresponsiblefordoingitsimpliciter,aslongasherdoingitonherowngroundsherresponsibilityfordoingitsimpliciter.10Swenson(personalcommunication)notesthatonepossibilitywouldbetosaythatthecausalhistoryfactitself(thefactthattheagentmadethedecisiononherown)groundsthebasicresponsibilityfact(thefactthattheagentisbasicallyresponsibleformakingthedecisiononherown).Accordingtothissuggestion,therearesomefactsconcerningthewayinwhichdecisionsaremade,whentheyaremadeintherightway,thataresuchthatsimplybyobtainingtheycangroundtheagent’sbasicresponsibilityforthoseveryfacts.Althoughthisisaninterestingsuggestion,Iremainunconvinced.For,again,althoughit’sveryplausibletosaythatthefactabouthowthedecisionwasmadegroundstheagent’sresponsibilityforthedecision,itseemsmuchlessplausibletosaythatthefactabouthowthedecisionwasmadegroundstheagent’sresponsibilityforthatveryfactabouthowthedecisionwasmade.

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5.Conclusions

Ihaveexaminedafamilyofviewsonresponsibilitythatwereoriginallyproposedinresponseto

Frankfurt’sargument,butthatcouldalsobemotivatedbygeneralconsiderationsofmoralluck.

Coulditbethat,astheseviewssuggest,theultimatelocusofourresponsibilityisnotmaking

decisionsbutmakingthemonourown?Ifso,thiswouldhelpprotectthesphereofour

responsibilityfromcertainformsofluckthatsomemayfindobjectionable(inadditionto

protectingtheclassicalmodeloffreedomfromFrankfurt’sobjection).Ihavearguedthatthose

viewsfailinthat,totheextentthatwecanmakesenseoftheconceptofbeingresponsiblefor

makingdecisionsonourown,itisnotsomethingthatcanconstitutethe“ultimatelocus”ofour

responsibility.

Still,Ihopetohavealsoshownthatthinkingabouttheseviewscanbeinstructiveinthat

itcanhelpshedsomelightonthestructurethatagoodtheoryofresponsibilitymusthave.One

thingthatcameupinourdiscussionistheimportanceofdrawingacleardistinctionbetween

twowaysinwhichresponsibilityfactscanbe“rootedin”otherfacts:oneiswhathappenswhen

ourresponsibilityisderivedfromotherthingsthatwearemorebasicallyresponsiblefor,and

anotheriswhathappenswhenourresponsibility(inparticular,ourbasicresponsibility)is

groundedinotherthings.Althoughthisshouldbearelativelyuncontroversialdistinction,itis

onethatcaneasilybeoverlookedinsomecontextsandthus,payingcloseattentiontoitcan

helpkeepourtheorizingaboutresponsibilityontherighttrack.11

11InSartorioMs.Iarguethatfocusingontheroleplayedbythenotionofgroundinourtheoriesofresponsibilitycanhelpusavoidotherimportantconfusionsconcerningtheconceptofresponsibility.

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