necessary being and possible being: reflections on...
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Chapter 4
Necessary Being and Possible Being:
Reflections on Ibn Sina's
Emanationism
Introduction
Ibn Sina is probably the most significant philosopher in the Islamic tradition
and arguably the most influential philosopher of the pre-modem era. He is primarily a
metaphysical philosopher of being. He was concerned with understanding the selfs existence
in this world in relation to its contingency. Ibn Sina's philosophy is an attempt to construct a
coherent system ofthought that accords with the religious doctrines of Islam. He is generally
considered as one among major Islamic philosophers.
Ibn Sina's conception of God as the Necessary Being lays the foundation for
his systematic accounts for notions like soul, intellect and cosmos. In his attempt to establish a
relationship between Islam and philosophy, Ibn Sina invokes philosophical notions to explain
religious terms and vice versa. Ibn Sina emphasizes that God cannot be regarded as the central
subject matter of metaphysics.273 However, for him, metaphysics can only give proofs for the
existence of God.
Like Al-Farabi, ibn Sina can be located within the Neoplatonic Aristotelian
tradition. He embraces the emanationist cosmology of Plotinus, despite the challenging
appropriations from his side. However, he rejected Neoplatonic epistemology and the theory
of the pre-existent soul. Like Aristotle, Ibn Sina views that logic and metaphysics share a
concern with the study of secondary intelligible, abstract concepts such as existence and time.
Ibn Sina: Life and Works
Ibn Sina was born in around 980 in Afshana, a village near Bukhara in
Transoxiana. His father was a local Samanid governor. At an early age, his family moved to
Bukhara. There he happened to study Hanafi jurisprudence and medicine. Bukhara was far
quite far from Bagdad. But it remained a specific location of cross-cultural influences. 274
273 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989) op. cit, p.lSO. 274 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p. 87
104
He worked at the Samanid court of Nuh ibn Mansur (r. 976-997) as a
physician. The Amir allowed him to use the Saminid's library. 275 The excellent library of the
physicians at the Samanid court helped him to develop a philosophical and scientific outlook.
He kept himself away from the court politics. Ibn Sina wrote his two earliest works in
Bukhara under the influence of al-Farabi. The first, Compendium on the Soul (Maqala fi '1-
nafs), is a short treatise dedicated to the Samanid ruler. The book upholds the incorporeality of
the rational soul without resorting to Neoplatonic insistence upon its pre-existence. The
second is his first major work on metaphysics, Philosophy for the Prosodist (al-Hilana al
'Arudiya) penned for a local scholar. It can be considered as his first systematic attempt at
Aristotelian philosophy.
Later on, ibn Sina fled to Gurganj in Khwarazm, after the Qarakhanid's take
over ofBukhara in 999.276. Later, he moved further to Jurjan in Khurasan. He met his disciple
and scribe al-Juzjani at Jmjan.277 He worked as a physician under Majd al-Dawla in Rayy.
Later, he became vizier of Shams al-Dawla. After the death of Shams al-Dawla in 1021, he
became the vizier of the Kaykuyid 'Ala' al-Dawla. He found a reliable patron in Ala al
dawla. He lived in Isfahan under the patronage of Ala al-dawla for thirteen years.
Ibn Sina wrote many books in Arabic. He wrote three encyclopedias of
philosophy. The first of these is Kitab al-Shifa' (The Cure). Following Aristotelian model, he
deals with the natural sciences, logic, mathematics, metaphysics and theology. This work
shows his close allegiance to Aristotle. He completed the other two encyclopedias in Isfahan
itself. The first one is entitled Danishnama-yi 'Ala 'i (The Book of Knowledge for 'Ala' al
Dawla). This philosophical work is aimed at common man. It was written in Persian. It is a
short encyclopedic work of essential philosophic knowledge. 278• The Book of Knowledge
was the basis of al-Ghazali's criticism on the philosophic tradition. The second is Kitab al
Isharat wa '1-Tanbihat (Pointers and Reminders), a work that reflects his mature thinking on a
275 Ibid, p. 88 276 Ibid 277 Ibid 278 Ibid, p.89
105
variety of logical and metaphysical issues. For a scholar, Kitab al-Isharat wa 'I- tanbihat is his
masterpiece. 279
His work entitled al-Insaf (The Judgement) seeks to represent a separate
philosophical position. This work transcends Aristotle's Neoplatonism. This is not extant
now. One further work that had inspired much debate is The Easterners (al-Mashriqiyun) or
The Eastern Philosophy (al-Hikma al-Mashriqiya) which he wrote at the end of the 1020s.
This is also almost lost. He wrote Kitab al-qanum fi al-tibb to defend philosophers from the
intrusion of physicians. 280 Ibn Sina's Kitab al-hudud (Book of Defmitions) is the second
known philosophical book on defmitions. 281
Ibn Sma inherited the Neoplatonic emanationist scheme of existence from al
Farabi. He rejected creation ex nihilo. According to him, cosmos has no begirming. Cosmos is
a natural logical product of the divine One. The cosmos succeeds God merely in logical order
and in existence. It is impossible to have infinite series of causes and contingent beings.
Hence, God is the necessary being.
Ibn Sina is not distancing himself from the fundamentals of theology. He uses
philosopher's intellect for a theological purpose. The argument runs as follows: There is
existence; or rather our phenomenal experience of the world confirms that things exist, and
that their existence is non-necessary because we n·,tice that things come into existence and
pass out of it. Contingent existence cannot arise unless it is made necessary by a cause. A
causal chain in reality must culminate in one un-caused cause because one cannot posit an
actual infinite regress of causes (a basic axiom of Aristotelian science). Therefore, the chain of
contingent existents must culminate in and fmd its causal principle in a sole, self-subsistent
existent that is Necessary. This, of course, is the same as the God of religion.
279 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. (1976), op. cit. p. 23 28° Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.89. 281 ibid, p. 90
106
The roots oflbn Sina's doctrine are entrenched in classical Islamic theology or
kalam. Oneness of God is at the heart of ibn Sina's philosophy.282 His theory of essence
posits three modalities: essences can exist in the external world associated with qualities and
features particular to that reality; they can exist in the mind as concepts associated with
qualities in mental existence; and they can exist in themselves devoid of any mode of
existence. This fmal mode of essence is quite distinct from existence. Essences are thus
existentially neutral in themselves.
Existents in this world exist as something, whether human, animal or inanimate
object. They are 'dressed' in the form of some essence that is a bundle of properties that
describes them as composites. God on the other hand is absolutely silnple, and cannot be
divided into a bundle of distinct ontological properties that would violate his unity.
Contingents, as a mark of their contingency, are conceptual and ontological composites both
at th'.! first level of existence and essence and at the second level of properties. Contingent
things in this world are mentally distinct composites of existence and essence bestowed by the
Necessary. According to ibn Sina, every causal series ends in the being who necessarily
exists by virtue of Himself. 283
Despite his strong allegiance to Islamic theology, ibn Sina's metaphysics is
generally expressed in Aristotelian terms. For him, the quest to understand being qua being
subsumes the philosophical notion of God. The Necessary being is the foundation of his
metaphysics. Divine existence bestows existence and hence meaning and value upon all that
exists.
His theory of Existence addresses some of the basic debat{:S on causality. First,
theologians such as al-Ash 'ari was adamant in denying the possibility of secondary causality.
For them, God W:iS the sole agent and actor in all that unfolded. Ibn Sina's metaphysics,
although being highly deterministic because of his view of radical contingency, still insists the
importance of human and other secondary causality.
282 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op cit, p.l52. 283 Ibn Sina.(l957) Kitab al-Isharat wa i-Tanbihat (ed.) Sulayman Dunya, Dhakhair al-Ara.l, Cairo: Dar al-Ma' arif, pp.26-27
107
He also addresses the Problem of evil. Divine providence ensures that the
world is the best of all possible worlds. He distinguishes between universal evil and particular
evil. Some universal evil does not exist since evil is the absence of good. Good is synonymous
with the necessary being in Ibn Sina. Particular evils in this world are accidental
consequences of good. The problem of moral evils and particularly 'horrendous' evils
remains.
Ibn Sina' main contribution is to offer a philosophical system ingrained in the
theological Islam. His philosophy remained a bone of contention for the debaters in the east
and west. His metaphysics and theory of the soul had an insightful impact on scholastic
philosophy of the west. In the east, his conception brought in further enquiries in the direction
of theology and philosophy. Al-Ghazali considered Ibn Sina as the principal representative of
philosophy in Islam
The Book of Definitions
AI-Kindi did not differentiate between definition and description in his treatise
On the Defentions and Descriptions of Things. According to ibn Sina, definition is a statement
indicating the essence of a thing. 284 It does .'lot relate to an individual, but to a class.
Description "is a statement composed of a genu:> of a thing and the accidents concomitant to
it, so the description becomes equivalent to the thing In absolute terms, description is a
statement which defines a thing in terms of ine1;sential knowledge-but which is particular to
it. .. 285
[n the Book of Defmitions, Ibn ~:ina considers the relationship of matter and
form as one of the basic philosophical problems. For him, both form and matter form the
essence of a thing. Like al-Kindi and al-Farabi, ibn Sina uses the word al-jawhar for
substance. Substance is the essence of every existent. Substance is self-subsisting in ibn Sina.
284 Kennedy-Day. Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l23 285 Ibn Sina. (200J), The Book of Definitions, translated Jy. Kennedy- Day Kiki., The Books of Definition in Islamic Philos:,phy: The Limitation of Words, p.l 02
108
Ibn Sina adds that it is subsisting in actuality. There is a primary distinction between actuality
and potentiality in ibn Sina.
According to ibn Sina, there must be some science which studies substance.
Substance has a being which is in some way separated from matter. According to ibn Sina,
existence of a substance does not depend up on matter. Every reality has a nature by which it
is what it is. For instance, a triangle has a nature whereby it is a triangle. He distinguishes that
nature from existence. He generally speaks of the nature of a thing in three different ways.
First of all, he considers essence as existing in the individual thing. Secondly, it is conceived
as existing in the individual soul. Thirdly, it is conceived absolutely. An essence taken
absolutely in itself, cannot exist without being realized either as actually existing in an
individual or in the mind. A thing's individual existence is also something happens to it. It is
something accidental to that thing's essence. The existence of the thing and its essence differs
as everything receives its existence from another. Thomas Aquinas also agrees with Ibn Sina
that essence and existence differ in created beings. But he refuses to see existence as a n
accident.
The term al-hayula refers to matter.286 Some times he uses the term madda.
Absolute matter is a substance which exists in actuality only when it receives a corporeal form
from the potentiality of matter to receive forms. Absolute matter does not have in itself any
form particularizing it, except in the sense of potentiality. The meaning of his statement that
'there is a substance belonging to matter' is that the existence which comes to matter belongs
to everything from the point of view that it receives certain perfection or something which it
did not have. Therefore it will be matter, in relation to what is not in it and it is a subject in
relation to what is in it.
Matter comes in to actuality when it receives form. Aristotle also denies
separate existence to form. Ibn Sina calls God the necessary being. 287 His approach to God is
very similar to mu 'tazilite position. He tried to prove that there is no tension between reason
and revelation.
286 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l33. 287 Ibid, p.l 02.
109
Both mu 'tazilites and ibn Sina deny that God has any accidents. For ibn Sina
God has no definition, no description, no genus. Similarly, Mu 'tazilites argued that God is not
connected with a body. He doesn't have a form or shape. By accidents, al-Kindi calls God the
first cause. Ibn Sina takes God as the necessary existence. He describes his ideas on God in al
Illahiyyat. He distinguishes between necessary being and possible being. Necessary being is
that brings possible beings in to existence. Possible things are not necessary in themselves.
Obviously, there is a difference in theological conception of accidents and
philosophical conception of accidents. Philosophy takes colour, shape, taste etc are accidents.
Ibn Sina distinguishes philosophy from religion through the use of specific vocabulary. Al
Farabi has used the term 'The necessary existence' to refer to God.288 Al-Farabi did not
explain what he meant by the necessary existence. Ibn Sina, on the other hand, deals with the
necessary existence of God in detail. He explains philosophical significance of the term. He
explains this on the basis of causal relation, A necessary being does not depend on any other
to cause it to exist. A contingent being or possible being depends on another to cause it to
exist. The necessary being exists without a cause. According to Ibn Sina, there can be only
one necessary being that can exits without a cause. 289
Secondly, for ibn Sina, the necessary existence is an ultimate and indivisible
entity. The essence of God is his existence. In other words, God has an essence of different
kind. Through the uniqueness of his essence, God is separated from the rest of creation. He
has both essence and existence. Ibn Sina calls this singulars situation aniyya290. His view
echoes the Mu'tazilites doctrine that there is nothing like God. God's existence is unique.
Ibn Sina defines cause on the basis of his rejection of infmite regress.291
Every being which exists has existence from another essence in actuality. This being has
existence in actuality and existence of this being in actuality is not from the existence of
that one in actuality. The caused is every being whose existence in actuality comes from
the existence of another being, but the existence of that other being is not from its
m Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.126 289 Ibid, p.l27 290 Ibid 291 Ibid, 136
110
existence. In his metaphysics, ibn Sina recogruzes four causes. They are formal,
elemental, efficient and final causes. 292 In the Book of Definitions, Ibn Sina prefers ilia
over sabad. Illa is the word for cause used by al-Kindi. Sabab is the word used by al
farabi.
The issue of cause is foregrounded in the distinction between actuality
and potentiality. His first premise is that nothing comes in to being by itself. In Aristotle,
final cause is regarded as the most important. But both in Islamic philosophy and in
scholastic philosophy the efficient cause is stressed this emphasis exists in ibn Sina also.
Ibn Sina follows Aristotle in asserting that knowledge of things comes from knowledge
of causes.
Ibn Sina logically argues that there is only one necessary existence. If there
were two necessary existences, an infmite regress would again exist. Things come in to being
when necessary existence wills something. The possible beings constitute a different order
from that of necessary existence. He strongly denies the preexistence of possible beings. God
indicates perfection. God is pure actuality.
Mu'tazilites were interested in atomists of pre-socratic era. Ibn Sina's notion of
physical world also reflects pre-Socratic ~Jomist views. 293 Mu' tazilites believed that bodies
were composed of atoms. Accidents were attached to these atoms. According to Abu al
Hudhyal, smallest body requires six minimum atoms to constitute it.294 Another theologian
Muammar feels that a body requires minimum six atoms. Democritus th0ught that atoms have
different size. 295
One major point of atomists is that accidents adhere in 1 he individual atoms.
Sum of accidents form a substance. Substance is not just an underlying ;tratum of accidents.
Ibn Sina put forward his views in tandem with these basic points. Islamil~ theology considers
creation as continuous act of God. God is continuously creating the world. This recreation
292 Ibid 293Ibid, p. I 38 294 Fakhry, Majid. (1958), op. cit., p. 23 295 Kirk, G.S and J.E. Raven. (I 962),The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, p. 409
111
moves from one instant to another.296 The created world cannot sustain itself. It requires the
continued will of God.
Emanation Theory of Ibn Sin a
Ibn Sinha's scheme of emanation replaces the Qur'anic doctrine of creation.
He conceives a cosmology which is very similar to al-Farabi. 297 The universe is an emanation
from the The One. The world is not directly intended by The One. The unity of The One is in
no way affected by the production of many from the one. The First intellect emanates from
The One. The prime motor of creation is the First intellect. It is the product of the
contemplation of the one. The plurality of the world is derived from the First Intellect. God
cannot produce multiplicity. However, first Intellect can do it.
According to ibn Sina, all things that emanate from Necessary Being would
desire to return to that Being. S.H Nasr opined that there is no much differences between
emanasionism and Islamic doctrine of creation According to Nasir, "it is neither in his unified
vision of the cosmos nor in the doctrine of divine intellection that Ibn Sina differs from the
Islamic perspective. It is more in limiting the power of God to a predetermined logical
structure and in diminishing the sense of awe o;~ the fmite before the infmite that he came to
be criticized by certain authorities of Islamic tradition."298 Morewedge feels that Nasir's
argument is not in tandem with the facts. According to him, there is a difference in producing
something from out of nothing and producing sC'mething by emanation from one's thought. In
the latter case there is a resemblance between the agent and the product: this resemblance is
not to be found in the fist case.
Ibn Sina explicitly asserts that Necessary existent does not produce the world
in terms of Islamic creation. Islamic God produces the world ex nihili. Here, the view that Ibn
Sina's Emanationism upholds Islamic Theology is open to serious objection. According to
Ibn Sina, the Necessary being produces a single intellect. The First intellect is produced out of
296 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l40 297Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op cit, p.l63 298 S.H Nasr. (1976), op.cit, p.214.
112
Necessary being's contemplation on its own essence.299 The necessary being is not contingent.
However, first intellect is contingent. It can produce multiplicity. The multiplicity has a triadic
structure as the first intellect focuses both on the God and on itself in the process. Some
commentators term First Intellect a necessary bridge between the necessary one and the rest of
the universe. 300
Ibn Sina employs the theory of emanation to account for the multiplicity of the
universe. First intellect is a link between transcendent God and the rest of the universe. The
hierarchy of emanations is emanated eternally. The emanation process takes place by
intellection. The world of being is eternally emanated from God. They are co-eternal with the
God. Here lies a logical problem. The world of beings is not wholly transcendent like God.
There are some striking similarities between Ibn Sina's emanasionism and
Plotinus's cosmology. Ibn Sina elaborates the triad of Plotinus. According to Plotinus, "the
first remains the same even if other things come in to being from it."301 For Plotinus, good
transcends all things. Good let all things exist by themselves. But. good remains above all of
them.302 Similarly, the necessary being remains intact. However, some commentators feel that
the whole theory of emanation is designed to bring God with in the cosmos. Emanation tries
to connect God organically to the whole. It is not about the transcendence of God. According
to Armstrong, the relation between the absolute and the derived beings remains a mystery.
One cannot form a general concept on this relation. 303
The First intellect is the link between God and the rest of the universe.
Similarly, tenth intellect is the next major link between the celestial and sublunary world.304 It
is an active intellect in the sense that it send out an undifferentiated range of forms and
thoughts. The Tenth Intellect, by its own activity, reduces the dependence on God. Ibn Sina is
299 Ibn Sina. (1960), "Al-Shifa: al-llahiyyat", in Moussa, M.Y., S. Dunya, and S. Zayed (eds.), Cairo: OrganizaTion Generate des Imprimeries Gouvernementales, vol.2, pp. 402-03. 300 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op. cit, p.l67. 301 Plotinus·. (I 966), Enneads, voi.S, trans. Armstrong, Cambridge, Loeb Classical library, p. 169 302 Ibid 303 Armstrong, A.H. (1940) ,The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy ofPlotinus, p.ll9 304 Netton, Ian Richard. (I 989), op. cit, p.169
113
of the opinion that it is Active intellect that directs our souls. 305 The Active intellect assumes
the function of a creator. It is rather a necessary implication of active intellect's essence.
According to Davidson, in its operation, the active intellect is, as it were, an eternal cosmic
transmitter, sending out an undifferentiated range of forms and thoughts, as well as the
substratum that can receive them.
According to Ibn Sina, every existent is either a necessary being or a possible
being. A possible being receives actual existence from something outside itself. In that
process the possible being becomes a necessary being. A possible being is actually given
existence by some other being. In other words a possible being is necessitated in its existence.
A possible existent may be rendered a necessary existent either eternally or only at some point
in time. Eternally produced intelligences are not composed of matter and form. Only one
being- God- is free from all potentiality and possibility. According to Ibn Sina,, the only effect
that immediately produced by God is the highest separate intelligence. It is called the first
intelligence. It is eternally and necessarily produced by God. It is a possible ceing in and for
itself It is a necessary being by reason of God.
According to ibn Sina, the first produced intelligence knows three objects. It
understands its source, which is God. Se ::ondly, it understands itself as a possible being in
itself. Thirdly, it understands itself as a necessary being by reason of God. The first
intelligence necessarily and eternally produces a second intelligence. It happen•; on account of
first intelligence's thinking in God. It also produces the soul of the first heavenly sphere in so
far it thinks of itself as a necessary being. It produces the body of the outer most heavenly
sphere in so far as it thinks itself as a possible being.
The second intelligence thin::s of three objects. It thinks ofthe first intelligence
that produced it. It thinks of itself as a possible being in itself It thinks of itself as a necessary
being by reason of the first intelligence, which eternally produced it. Consequently it
produces three effects. It produces a third intelligence, and the body and the soul of the second
heavenly sphere. The same process is being continued till one reaches the tenth intelligence.
305 Ibn Sina, (1985), Kitab al-Najat, ed. Majid Fakhry, Beirut, p.278
114
The tenth Intelligence is the separated agent intellect. Separate agent intellect enables us to
think. It is the producer of the forms of material things on earth. It plays an important role in
flourishing of life on earth. The agent intellect does not produce another lower intelligence.
The creative power of the necessary being cannot be communicated indefmitely to ever less
perfect beings. 306
Ibn Sina is strongly influenced by the Neoplatonic view that from one only one
effect can proceed immediately. He says the God directly or immediately produces only one
effect, the first intelligence. Ibn Sina doesn't compromise on divine simplicity of God. He is
strictly against introducing some multiplicity in to God. But he is of the view that the
emanation is eternal. The first effect and all other effects are necessarily produced. The
universe, according to ibn Sina, is necessarily eternal in its existence. 307 Thomas Aquinas, in
his treatise on separate substances, rejects ibn Sina's view that created things necessarily
proceed from God. Thomas Aquinas asserts that God produces effects external to himself on
account of the decision of the divine will. He rejects ibn Sina's theory of mediate creation.
God is the immediate creative cause ofwhatever is created.308
According to Aquinas, many effects can be directly produced by God. He
rejects the view that only one effect can be produced from God. Aquinas argues that this
position has nothing to do with divine simplicity of God. In contrast to Ibn Sina, Thomas
Aquinas rejects the notion of a universe that existed from eternity. Aquinas links revelation
with the eternity. 309
Ibn Sina explains his position in Metaphysics IX. For him, every effect, when
taken in relationship to its cause, is necessary. The effect necessarily follows given a
sufficient cause for that effect. God is the sufficient cause for the existence of the universe.
God always existed since God always existed. For Thomas Aquinas, the God is the cause of
the universe by the necessity of his nature. God is the cause of this universe by reason of his
will. He argues that God produces things in the world freely through his will. God acts in so
306Wippel, John F. (2007) The Latin Avicenna as a source for Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics, p. 75 307 ibid, p.76 308 Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, pp.46-47 309 Wippel, John F. (2007), p.79
115
far as he is good. Goodness results in production by means of the divine will. Will is not
constrained to choose things which are only means to its end.
Proofs for the Existence of God
Ibn sina classifies beings in two- necessary and contingent beings. He defines
contingent being as that whose non-existence does not produce impossibility. A necessary
being is that whose hypothetical nonexistence would result in impossibility. A contingent
being depends up on the necessary being310• God himself is the necessary being.
Ibn Sina sees that there exists an infinite incorporeal power. He is the origin of
the first movement. The necessary being is an uncaused Being.311 The world owes its
existence to this uncaused being. Ibn Sina writes about this uncaused being: "Every totality
formed successively of causes and effects in which there is a cause, which is not an effect
must have that cause as its outermost point: because if it were in the middle, it would be
caused. Every chain which comprises causes and effects is fmite or infmite. It is clear that, if
it only comprised what is caused, it would need a cause external to it, to which it would be
attached, without any doubt, by an outermost point. So every series culminates in the Being
necessary by His essence. "312
There is a mystical dimension to Ibn Sina's conception of God. Here, he is
very much closer to Sufi paradigm of God. The necessary being is the beloved of the various
intellects and sublunar beings. God is the sublime object of love. Love is the essence of good.
It is the being of the good. In Ibn Sina, God is synonymous with good. It shows his C·Jnceptual
similarity with Plotinus.
His work The Easterners has some striking similarity with intuitive philosophy
expounded by Suhrawardi. His work Pointers expounds the terminology of mysticism and
Sufism. Some con,mentators locate ibn Sina only in the rationalism of the Aristotelian
tradition. His conception of intuition does not entail mystical disclosure at all. It is just a
310 Netton, Ian Richard. (1989), op. cit, p. I 72 311 Ibid. p.l73 312 Ibn sina. (I 957), op.cit, pp. 26-27
116
mental act of conjunction with the active intellect. Some of the mystical commentators of Ibn
Sina have relied upon Pointers to demonstrate their points. They argue that Ibn Sina accepted
some key epistemological possibilities that are present in mystical knowledge
For ibn Sina, it is not the act of creation which is the main event which proves
God's existence. Rather, the existence of the world demonstrates that it must have a first
cause. 313 The first cause stands as a first impulse which brought about existence. Ibn Sina was
strongly influenced by Greek philosophy. But his vestiges of Islamic influence can be traced
in his metaphysics emphatically. It is evident in his works such as al-Shifa and al-Najat314• It
is evident in his Treatise on love. Ibn Sina perceives God as absolute transcendent; God is the
source of existence, love and knowledge. In some parts of his works, he depicts God as the
necessary existent. In some other parts, God is portrayed as the source of knowledge, beauty,
goodness and love.
Plato believed in the existence of transcendental world which contains
universal ides and concepts. God is one of these ideas which stand above all of them. He
believed in the real existence of these ideas as a kind of divine intellect. In contrast, Aristotle
believed that ideas exist in the mind. Rational concept does not have existence in reality.
Aristotle, however, offered a defmition for God in terms of genus and species. Aristotle
explains that genus and species do not exist in reality. They are only rational descriptions ..
They do not violate the unity of God. One can describe the unity of God in terms of genus and
differentia by identifying His genus and differentiating him from others.
Philo tried to assimilate Greek thought in to Jewish philosophy. He stresses the
unknowability of God. God is unnamed and incomparable. For Philo, God is the creator of all
ideas. God created the world through logs. 315 One can describe God in negative terms, for he
transcends all descriptions. Plotinus also believed that it is not possible to perceive the essence
of God. One can only know the existence of God through the things proceeded from him. One
313 Elkaisy- Friemuch, Maha. (2006), Relationship with God through Knowledge and Love, 'Ishq, in the Philosiphy of Ibn Sina, Routledge, p. 79 314 ibid 315 Ibid, p.81
117
can speak of God in different ways. But all these things show the unlikeness of God to all
things.
Ibn Sina, like Philo and Plotinus, upholds the unity of God. His essence is
simple and indivisible. Any attempt to describe it may violate his unity. The essence of God is
indivisible in to matter and form or in to soul and body.316 Ibn Sina considers attributes of
God as his properties. 317 Properties can describe, but it cannot defme essence. Ibn Sina
attributes qualities to God without violating His absolute unity and simplicity Ibn sina writes
in al-najat:
"The first attribute of God is that He exists and all other attributes manifest this
existence either by addition or with negation and none of them imply
multiplicity or anything contradictory in His essence. The ones (attributes)
which express negation are such as when some one said about the first (God
forbid) that He is a substance; he did not mean other than that his Existence
was not in a subject. And if some one said that He is one, he did not mean other
tyhan abstracting from this existence numeral or logical division or association.
And if it is said that (He is) Intellect and knowable and knower, it does not
truly mean other than abstracting from this Existence the possibility of its
being mixed with matter or its relations, in considering a certain addition."318
The attributes describe the nature of existence of God. The descriptions are of
three kinds. Firstly, there is description through negation. It means abstracting from him what
cannot be applied to his existence. Second description involves adding what can be applied to
his existence. Third way is describing through adding and abstracting.
According to ibn S ina, God is the only being whose essence is identical with
his existence. 319 His existence comes from within his essence. The existence of all other
beings is added to their essence. This also means that existence of all other beings is
316 Ibid 317 ibid 318 Ibn Sina. (1985), op.cit, p. 126 319 Elkaisy-Freimuch, Maha. ( 2006), op.cit, p. 82
118
dependent on another. The existence of God comes from within Himself. 320 In his treatise on
love, Ibn Sina attributes to God pure love. In Risala fi al-Ishq, he explains that love is
implanted in all things. Love emanates from God. It is the cause ofthe existence of all things.
Love emanates from God first to the Intellects and indirectly to all other things. 321 Love is the
manifestation ofEssence and Existence. He explains that love is the essence of God.
According to ibn Sina, the same can be said about goodness also. Goodness
flows from God to all existence and nurses the world to be well ordered. According to ibn
Sina, knowledge has its origin in God. Ibn Sina writes in Kitabal-Insaf (Thelogica Aristotelis)
that all intellects receive an overflowing of knowledge. This knowledge makes them know
themselves and know God. Love, goodness and knowledge flow from God to all humanity.
Ibn Sina's conception of God is very close to Qur'anic verses. God, in the view oflbn Sina, is
pure intellect, pure goodness and pure love. At the same time, he is absolutely one.
Epistemology and Theory of soul
Ibn Sina's theory of knowledge has an Aristotelan starting point and a highly
neoplatonized superstructure. According to ibn Sina, the human intellect is a tabula rasa. It is
a pure potentiality that is actualized. Knowledge is the result of empirical familiarity with
objects in this world. Abstract universal concepts develop from empirical understanding. It is
further supplemented by a syllogistic method of reasoning.
Ibn Sina explores the validity of knowledge. Transcendental intellect
guarantees knowledge. Knowledge comes about by abstraction. All the essences ofthings and
all knowledge reside in the transcendental intellect. It is otherwise known as Active Intellect.
It illuminates the human intellect through c Jnjunction and bestows upon the human intellect
true knowledge of things. Conjunction only occurs to human intellects that have become
adequately trained and thereby actualized. Ibn Sina expbiins both inference and intuition. A
syllogistic inference draws a conclusion from two prepositional premises the middle term.
Inference is felicitated through intuition inspired by the active intellect
320 Ibid, p.83 321 Ibid
119
Ibn Sina's epistemology deals with God's knowledge. The divine is pure and
immaterial. It cannot have a direct epistemic relation with the particular thing to be known. He
opinions that God knows things only in a universal manner. It occurs through the universal
qualities of things. God only knows kinds of existents and not individuals. Al-Ghazali
discards Ibn Sina's epistemology as a heretical denial of God's knowledge.
Ibn Sina's epistemology is premised upon his theory of soul. According to him,
soul is independent of the body and capable of abstraction. His notion of soul is Neoplatonic
and Aristotelian. This notion of rational self begins with Aristotle and develops through
Neoplatonism. He affirms the independence of the soul from the body. He is an advocate of
dualism. He upholds self-awareness of the soul and its substantiality. Following Aristotle, Ibn
Sina gives the definition of the soul as the perfection of the body. Soul is non-corporeal
substance. 322
He is of the opinion that a soul is particular to each individual.323 He locates
intellect in the soul only. There are three sorts of soul -vegetal, animal and a rational.
Reproduction, growth and nutrition are the function of vegetative souls. Motion and
perception belong to animal soul. Reason is the function of rational soul. In higher creatures,
lower functions co-exist with higher functions. However, ibn Sina locates the operation of
rational soul in humans only. 324 According to ibn Sina, a unique individual is constituted by
soul's attraction for the body.325 Both soul and body act as a unit.
Ibn Sina answers the question whether souls pre-exist bodies. He asserts that
unembodied souls by their very nature cannot have an individual identity. Souls are separate
non-corporeal substance. They cannot pre-exist the bodies326• Ibn Sina did not believe in
reincarnation. But he states that soul is resurrected.
322 Ibn Sina. (2003), op. cit, p.l 04 323 Ibid p. I 04 324 Kennedy-Day, Kiki. (2003), op. cit, p.l28 325 Ibid, p.129 326 Ibid, p. 130
120
Ibn Sina considers intellect as the locus of thought occurring in the soul. Like
Aristotle, he says that ideas come to the intellect. Knowledge is not innate. The Arabic term
aql is referred to intellect. Islamic philosophy recognizes both intuitive and scientific
(acquired) knowledge. Ibn Sina places intellect as an intrinsic nature of human being. He fmds
eight different senses ofintellect.327 Theoretical intellect is a faculty ofthe soul to understand
the essence vfuniversal things. The practical intellect actualizes or moves the soul by desire.
The materia~ intellect reveals essence of the material aspects. The habitual intellect enables the
soul to gain knowledge. The actual intellect is the faculty of thinking. The acquired intellect
receives aEd processes the data from the external world. The active intellect brings things
from potentiality to actuality. Ibn Sina makes a distinction between universal intellect and the
intellect of the cosmos. The universal intellect is the some total of expressions of the intellect
of all people. It does not have a real separate existence.328 Its existence is manifest in all
individueJs.
Existence and Theory of Predication
In advancing his theory of predication, ibn sina departed from al-Farabi. Al
farabi's theory of predication accords with Aristotle's theory of predication. Aristotle believes
that copula is predicated in addition. Accordin.~ to al-Farabi, copula is not itself predicated.
Copula is not principally intended to be predicated. It is predicated only for the sake of
something else. 329
Ibn sina asserted that Arabic does not have an explicit copula. In S is P, ibn
Sina claims that copula is not itself predicated. Copula just indicates the relation of
predication between S and P. Here, the copula is predicated incidentally, not additionally. Ibn
Sina presents tables of opposites for simple categorical propositions. Ibn Sina follows al
Farabi in giving true conditions for each proposition in those tables. It is premised on the
notion that grammatical subject remains constant for each table. The predicate may be
rositive, metaethic, or privative. It may be affirmed or denied. Ibn Sina gives more truth
327 Ibid, p. 131 328 Ibid, p.132 329 Kutsch. W. & S.Morrow. (1960) eds. A I-F arabi's Commentary c,n Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, Beirut, p. 105
121
conditions in those tables. According to Allan Back, "each horizontal pair are contradictories,
and any item in the column is opposed (at least contrary) to any item in the other, except in
the tables for indefinite and particular propositions. In the column of the left, propositions
below follow from propositions above, but not vice versa; in the column on the right,
propositions above follow from propositions below, but not vice versa."330
Ibn Sina is ofthe opinion that every subject ofproposition is existent either in
individuals or in the intellect. This view is close to al-Farabi's implicit position. 331 The only
truth condition for S is P is that S exists somehow. He says that quiddity may exist either in
the individuals or in the mind. For ibn Sina, 'Homer is a poet' is true. However, 'Homer
exists' is false. Ibn Sina holds the view that Sis P entails claiming that Sexists somehow. Ibn
Sina adds this existence condition to the truth conditions of tables of opposites given by Al
Farabi. He distinguishes the forms "S is not P (ie, S is not existent asP) and the metathetic S
is not P (Sis existent as not-P).
The truth conditions that ibn Sina gives for singular categorical affirmative
propositions are singularly uninformative. Zayd is just is true only when Zayd is just, and is
false otherwise. Ibn Sina analyses indefinite and qnantified simple categorical propositions in
the same fashion. 332 He also recognizes true stcttements about things that are not real at
present. He recognizes two kinds of existence -the real and existence in the intellect. 333
The task of ontology is to find being qua being. This cannot be reduced to
being in one of its special categories. According to Ibn Sina, the common ground of being is
naturaUy tied to the theory of predication. This explains how essence becomes instantiated.334
The Quran offers many specific illustrations of the theory of creation. One
cannot trace striking correspondence between the Qura'nic and the Biblical accounts of the
creation of the world. The relationship between God and man is also characterized in
33'' Allan Back. (1987) "A vicenna on Existence", Journal of th9 History of Philosophy 25:3, p.356
311 Ibid 3J2 Ibid, p. 358
m Ibid, p.360 334 Ibid, p. 366
122
numerous passages in the Quran and Bible. The doctrine of creation has also been upheld by
many philosophers. Philosophers have expressed some reservations about it. These
reservations have given rise to their peculiar versions of the creation theory.
Some of the essential features of the creation theory are (i) the ultimate being is
the God of monotheistic religions. (ii) God has created the world ex nihilo; nothing is co
eternal with Him. (iii) God is logically independent of the world; hence, it is possible for the
world not to exist while God exists. (iv) In one sense or another God is conscious by being
aware of the thoughts of persons. (v) God can intervene in man's life (vi) There is nothing in
God's nature that is also an essential constituent of man's nature.
According to S. H. Nasr, there is a marked affmity between the creation theory
and ibn Sina's emanationism. 335 In ibn Sina's philosophy, creation itself takes place as result
of God's inte:lection of His own essence. Intellection, in conjunction with the knowledge of
His own esserce, brings about the existence of all things. The act of intellection is eternal. The
manifestation of the Universe is God's eternal knowledge ofHimself. Creation is the giving of
Being by God as well as the radiation o:f intelligence. Each being is, therefore, related to God
by its being as well as by its intelligence
Ibn Sina has even identified God with the source of overflowing light in some
of his less well-known works. The being and light are ultimately the same. To give existence
is to illuminate them with the Divine Light which is the same as His Being."336 Nasr opines
that Ibn Sina, who upheld the emanation theory, actually adhered to the religious doctrine of
creation. Accordingly, he argues that ibn Sina offered his views as a rejection of the
Aristotelian co-eternity theory in support of the Islamic doctrine of creation.
Creation, according to Nasr, is like emanation. In his opinion, Ibn Sina does
not step out of the Islamic perspective in his vision of the cosmos or in the doctrine of divine
intellection. He diverges somewhat from orthodox Islamic doctrines in viewing the power of
335 Seyyed Hossein, Nasr. (1964) An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrine, Cambridge: Mass, pp. 212-13 336 Ibid, p. 213
123
God as existing in a predetermined logical structure. ·In the Islamic doctrine God is absolute
determination as well as absolute freedom. He is the source of all qualities. Hence His will
cannot be limited to finite systems. The God produces the world ex nihilo. In Ibn Sina's
philosophy there is an explicit assertion that the Necessary Existent does not produce the
world in such a manner. On the other hand, it emanates the first intelligence.
Ibn Sina affirms that the will of the Necessary Existent cannot in any sense be
changed by consciousness, choice, or deliberation337 (DAI chap. 33). This will is equated with
His knowledge of the good universal world order, or of the general laws that best regulate the
order of the universe (DAI chap. 33). According to ibn Sina, the Necessary Existent is
governed by the physical and moral laws of the universe. The Necessary Existent cannot act
in an arbitrary manner .It remain at the same time necessarily good.
The structure of the laws governing the universe is independent of the will of
the Necessary Existent. Ibn Sina's view of the Necessary Existent resembles Leibniz's view of
God's righteousness. 338 .Here arises a controversy between the Islamic theory of creation and
the Ibn Sinian view. It is not only in terms of the interpretation of intellection. It is extended
over the issue of determinism. It results from different views on whether or not this
intellection is determined. Within Ibn Sina's metaphysical system, the intellection itself is
determined by the quality of the absolute perfection attributed to the Necessary Existent. Ibn
Sinian determinism includes intellection. It can be argued that this determinism undermines
the notion of the Necessary Existent that created the world.
In this sense, Ibn Sina's Necessary Existent does not satisfy the criteria for the
creation theory. It questions both God's logical independence of the world and God's
constitution which differs totally from that of man. For Ibn Sina, Necessary Existent is not
directly related to persons and the world. It acts only through intermediaries. This questions
God's ability to intervene in the order of the world. The discrepancy between the Necessary
337 Ibn Sina.(1952), Danashanamah-I Ala'I Ilahiyat, in Muhammad Muin (ed.), Tehran, chapter 33 338 Parviz Morewedge. (1972), "The Logic ofEmanationism and Sufism in the Philosophy oflbn Sina", Journal of American Oriental society, vo1.92, (Jan-March, 1972), p.3
124
Existent and the God of creation is evident in Ibn Sina's views on non-resurrection of the
body and the lack of punishment and reward after death.339
Emanation theory also challenges idea of co-eternity. Doctrine of co-eternity
states that the ultimate being and the world are co-eternal. The major difference between this
theory and the emanation theory lies not in any temporal dimension of emanation. Emanation,
as explained by ibn Sina, need not take place at a specified time.
According to the co-eternity theory, matter exists and has always existed
indeper.dently of the ultimate being.340 In ibn Sina's emanation scheme, the Necessary
Existen,: can act only through the supra-lunary mediators. It does not have the ability to
intervene in particular events. Ibn Sina's Necessary Existent differs from the Islamic God in
lacking knowledge of particulars. Particulars are capable of generation and corruption.341
Similarly, ibn Sina's view ofthe relation of man to the Necessary Existent conflicts with the
relatic;n of harmony formulated within a religious frame.
Ibn Sina's Emanationism is more or less a mystical system. The ultimate being,
in mystical system, is related to persons by the emanation of the contingent realm. Secondly,
it is possible for persons to relate to the ultimate being by means of a mystical union. The
ultimate being in the ibn Sinian system is the Necessary Existent from which the world has
emanated. But in the very process of mystical union entails a return to the Necessary Existent.
Here, the Necessary Existence is not portrayed as a substance. However, it is not separated
from the realm of contingent. It constitutes the ground for their actualization. Ibn Sina also
upholds that there is a multiplicity of substances in the contingent world342. For Ibn Sina, "it
was (analytically) discovered that in the first realm of the realization of existents only one
existent can come from the Necessary Existent. Here in this world, however, we observe
many existents."343 Ibn Sina consigns to each kind a special science which corresponds to it.
339 Ibid 340 Ibid 341 Ibid, p. 6 342 Ibn Sina. {1952), op.cit, p.ll2 343 ibid
125
Moreover, ibn Sina arranges these substances and the Necessary Existent
according to a ranking system where rank is determined by criteria of value. 344The basis of the
ranking is the amount of actuality that entities possess. Their type of motion or lack of motion
constitutes an important criterion for Ibn Sina. He assigns a higher rank to a being that
possesses a greater amount of actuality. Similarly, whatever is composed of elements which
move in r straight line is accorded a lower rank than that which moves in a circular motion. 345
He classifies entities into supremely perfect entities, sufficient entities deficient
entities and absolutely deficient entities. Supremely perfect entities are those which are both
self-sufficient and constitute a source of other entities. The supremely perfect entity is
conceived as the Necessary Existent. Sufficient entities are those who persist being self
sufficient. Deficient entities are those. lacking a feature that has yet to be realized. Absolutely
deficient entities are those in need of an external entity in order to persist.
According to ibn Sina, evil is a by-product of this actual world and a
consequence ofemanation. He undertakes another classification on the basis of the goodness
or the evil of entities. "Absolutely good is that entity from which only good can come.
Predominantly good is that from which more good comes than evil; and predominantly evil is
that from which more evil comes than good."346
The flow of emanation effuses from the Necessary Existent towards the world.
In this flow, the first intelligence emanates from the Necessary Existent. Considered from the
aspect of contingency, a body emanate·; from the intelligence, whereas intelligence emanates
from the aspect of the necessity of th1s intelligence. The initial emanations are followed by
similar series of.emanations in which intelligences and heavenly bodies are generated.347
In some texts, ibn Sina asserts th1t the emanation of the heavenly sub-stances
terminates wher: that heavenly intelligence is generated from which no heavenly body can
344 Parviz Morewedg~. (1972), op. cit, p. 9 345 Ibn sina. (1952), op.cit, p. I 64 346 Parviz Morewedg<'. (I 972), op.cit, p. 9 347 Ibn Sina. (1952), c•p.cit, pp. I I 2- I 3
126
emanate348. On some occasions he refers to this last heavenly intelligence specifically as the
active intelligence349. More-over, he identifies the heavens with the stars and the 73
The doctrine that exactly one entity can be emanated from the Necessary
Existent appears in several passages350. There are some other important aspects to this
doctrine. Being simple, the Necessary Existent cannot concurrently contain two causes for
two distinct effects. The simplicity of the Necessary Existent implies having only one effect.
As the most perfect being, the Necessary Existent must be the source of some other entity.
Consequently, its emanation is determined. The doctrine of the generation of intelligences is
found in many works oflbn Sina.
According to the Emanationism, elements are receptive to both generation and
corruption. 351 Since it is not able to generate a heavenly body, the active intelligence emanates
the substratum-matter. From these differences four kinds of primary, simple bodies are
derived which are capable of composition: fire, air, water, and earth. The active intelligence
emanates three different kinds of souls, the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the rational
soul. No other kind of entity can be emanated after the emanation of the rational soul. 352
Ibn Sina emphasizes an ascent towards a mystical union.353 Every entity,
according to Ibn Sina, has a desire to reach its perfection. This desire is expressed in the form
of love for this perfection. In the Risala ft 1-'isq, for instance, this desire is expressed in terms
of 'isq', or love. Discussions of the nature and function of love appear in many other writings
oflbn Sina. Ibn Sina explains this ascent on the basis ofthe pleasure principle.354
Ibn Sina explains this desire in his descriptions of the activities of the
intelligence of persons. There is an aspect of the soul which he calls 'aql. The desire of the
348 Ibn Sina. {I 957), p. 214 349 Parviz Morewedge. (1972), op .cit, p. I 2 350 Ibn Sina. (1952), p.l I 1-12 351 Ibn Sina. Sifa II, pp.393-94 352 Ibn Sina. (I 957), pp.23 I -40 353 Parviz Morewedge. (I 972 ) op. cit, p. I 2 354 Ibn Sina. (1952), op.cit, pp. 102-106
127
intelligence towards a higher realm represents a longing to return to its source.355The
intelligence finds its highest pleasure in the act of receiving the greatest of intelligibles,
namely the Necessary Existent. For ibn Sina, the Necessary Existent is the common beloved
of the intelligences. In this context he explains that the intelligences are in voluntary motion
for the sake of imitating the Necessary Existent. Similar views of love as a force explaining
motion are expressed.356 He mentions that man's soul has reached its highest stage when it is
in love with the greatest beloved, namely the Necessary Existent. 357
In contrast to Plato, Ibn Sina holds the view that the soul does not exist prior to
the body as an individual. 358 Ibn Sina distinguishes between sensible and intelligeligible
pleasures. 359 In the first case the degree of pleasure that can be experienced is limited. But
intelligences can receive unlimited pleasure since intelligence is not destroyed by the
intelligible. 360
It is observed that many powers of the soul, as explained by Ibn Sina, are
related to bodily functions and disappear, therefore, with these functions. The intelligence
('aql) persists after its separation from the soul. It is that aspect which can be separated from
the soul. It seems to participate in the mystical union. Ibn Sina describes the soul as a
substance. He states that subsequent to its realization, the soul remains a substance and
continues to be the fundamental source of the person's substantiality. And when the body, the
soul's instrument, is destroyed, the soul is not destroyed. As its instrument is destroyed, its
instrumental [physical] powers, such as sensation, memory-imagination, lust, anger, and
whatever resembles these, are also destroyed and separated from it. 361 For ibn Sina, the
greatest pleasure and the highest happiness and fortune are found in union with the Necessary
Existent.
355 Parviz Morewedge. ( 1972), op. cit, p.l3 356 Ibn Sina. (1957), op.cit, p.195 357 Ibn Sina. (1952), op.cit, p.l 06 35
R fbi d, pp.l 02-106 359 Parviz Morewedge. ( 1972), op cit., p. 13 360 Ibn Sina. (1952), op.cit, pp.102-106. 361 Parviz Morewedge. (1972), op cit, p. 13.
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