an enqumy into
TRANSCRIPT
. ,
AN ENQUmy INTO
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
IN THE BRITISH BOOT
AND SHOE INDUSTRY •
Dissertation submitted to Loughborough University
of.Technology in part fulfilment of ' the
requirements for the degree'of Master of Science
in the Department of Industrial Engineering &
Management.
!
J.H. WARNOCK. B.Sc.(HQns), M.Eng,
hsoo. I.Mi~.E,
A .M.Inst.F.
CONTENTS
Synopsis
Preliminary Review
Introduction
Review of Industrial Relations in Great Britain.
The development to their present decade.
The Donovan Commission Report.
"In Place of Strife".
Ob3ectives and Method of Investlgatlon~
The validity of claims to industrial peace.
Ob3ectives of the invest1gation.
Method of investigation.
The Indirect Investigation.
An Outline of the Process of Shoe Manufacture.
Clicking.
Closing.
Making.
The Development and Structure of the Industry.
Technological developments and their
repercussions.
Cost structure in manufacture.
Location and size of firms.
Production and the market trend.
Distribution of.footwear.
The Development of Collective Bargaining.
On the nature of trust.
"The Union .is born".
Early days.
The 1880's and 1890's period • . .
The f1rs.t Rational Conference.
"Procedures to Prevent Strikes" •
. Prelude .to the 189, Unrer:t. '-..
The 189, Conflict and its results •.
The Terms .ot Settlement.
Post-8ettlement period.
The development of piece-work for
machine operatives •.
. Progression to national negotiation. . ,
The 1914 National Agreement. ,
The Immediate post-war period.
The inter-war period.
The General Strike; The Minority
Movement.
The 1934'Union Conference.
The World War 11 period.
The post-war period.
The Agreements.
General Working Conditions.
General Provisions as to Day-work
and Piecework~
Incentives based on Time-Study.
Holidays with Pay.
Provisions affecting Local Boards.
Guaranteed Wages.
Disputes and Grievances.
\
The Direct Investigation.
Introduction.
The role of. the shop-president.
Attitudes to th~ shop-president.
Comp.arison with shop steward r.ole.
The role of the full-time union official
at branch level.
The full-time official.
Attitudes and comments on the full
time official.
The Union officer viewed against the
national baRground.
The National Union.
An industrial. union.
The Executive.
C,omments by members. .'
The Structure of Ma~gement.
Size of firms.
Management attitude and attitudes to
management.
Managements contribution to the
maintenance of stable. equilibrium.
The Association and Federation.
The Association Secretary.
The national background.
The Nature of the Agreements.and Procedure.
Comments from the.industry.
National comparison.
Conclusion.
Contributory factors.
Major factors.
Appendices.
References.
Bibl1ograpby.
A c knowledgemen ts.,
-,
-,
,. .
SYNOPSIS
The boot and shoe industry has been remarkably
successful in maintaining a stable equilibrium in
its collective bargaining. This dissertation
records an enquiry to determine those particular
and relevant features which have contributed to
that equilibrium.
The broad backcloth of industr1al relations in
contemporary Britain is painted; the footwear
industry is reviewed - production, labour and
markets; the historical development of collective
bargaining in the industry is dealt with in greater
detail; and the present negotiating procedures
and Agreements examined.
In a more detailed analysis of selected topics,
the opinions and comments of operatives, shop
presidents, full-time Union and Federation officers
and managers are recorded and placed in tha national
industrial context.
Finally, tentative conclusions are drawn,
particularly with regard to the contribution made
by shop-presidents,. Union and Federation secretaries
and, most important, the management.
Introduction
. ',"
PRELIMINARY REVIEW
"There are necessarilT conflicts
of' interest in industry. The
objective of our industrial relations
system should be to direct the forces
producttng conflict towards construct-
ive ends".
"In Place of· Strife",
Government White Paper.
January 1969.'
" •••••••• in all these cases
there are always, whether well founded
or not, complaints. on both sides ••••• "
Spencer Percival, Attorney
General, replying to a
group of boot and shoe
employers who requested
pros~cution of a comination,
1804. ,
"Such subtle covenants shall be .made,
.Till peace itself is w:ar in masquerade" •
. D17den •
Peace is not accidental, it is deliberately
coiltrived,~~1tIl1n~ny.-liO.c,itiY_~there are cont1nual_~nd • • '. • '. .""', I I •
inevitable conflicts ot interest between 'individuals, . . . .....
groups, sections and communities,' and it is the , '
determined recognition ot these conflicts and, b.v a
multitude ot means, their ultimate 'res~iution that' the , "
very positive character ot peace is established. It
is not quiescent, and those who maintain it must be '0 " • .
vigilant. There are alwa7s two sides - and complaints
on both. The objective can never be to satisf7 or be
satistied completely but rather to accept the partial, . . . . . -, '.
satistaction tha~'negotiated agreement ma7 br~.
Peaee, then, is the ,maintenan~e ot ,a, stable
~quilibrium between conflict ot interests, J stable . ' .: . • , , I I ,'",' • " ,
equilibrium being _detined as that equilibrium which, '
wben once disturbed, is so structured that the
disturbance amplitude will progressively redmce and'
equilibrium be restored. This continual restoration -
the reduction ot disturbance amplitude - is 'the very
nature ot positive peace. ,To ignore" the, conflict, ot,' . ' . , " .. interests is to, endanger the, equillbrii:lm. Peace - '"
even it it be war in some masquerade - is rightly
coveted ,and must be earned.
sooiet7.
. :, And so It Is 1ii ,industrial
In industry, as Blacitburn points out, "the labour
contract is not an exchang~ ot equivalents; it Is ( 1)
, ' structurally asymmetricaln • The single emplo7er
--_.------------------------------------------
bas a reasonably wide control of the type of labour • he employs, the single employee has a restricted,
, . control over those to whom he may offer his labour.
The history of the development of trade unionism in " ...
Great Britain has, in essence, been the development • . , , _ t' ,
of an exchange between employer and employee whicb is
less asymmetrical. D1rect eq111va1ency uiaynot be
possible, or even destrab1e, but the essential
disparity in the exchange has been diminished primarily
by the collectivisation of emploYees, their combination
allowing of a protection of individual interest within
the interest of the group. Employer and emp'loyee
have many common objectives, but is is idle • and . ,
perhaps dangerous .'to leave unrec~gnisedtbose'maQY . , .
areas where there may be a fundamental conflict of
interest. The recognition and resolution ot these
conflicts and the maintenance of a basically stable
equilibrium is tho primary aim of collective bargaining"
procedures and an industrial relations system.
When, in 1969, the area-preside~t of a union
stands betore an audienc~ an~ claims, albeit ~odestly,
tbat bis industry hasuaintained tbls.baslcally stable . . ...
eq11111brium in· the sphere of industr1s1 relations -
"we have ,not had a major stoppage of work through
industrial dispute since 1897" - it is understandable
that.tbe audle~ce may" at first, be sceptical, but, '
as the· prE!side!ltprogresslvely outlines tbe aChievements
of bis union and pays tribute to employers, sceptiscism . ' . '., "
gives way to interest and, tor one in that audience, a
I .
'--determination to enquire how this apparently remarkable
feat had been accomplished.. This thesis is the result ,
of that enqu1rtl an enquiry into the Boot and Shoe
industry •
. : .HOwever, betore embarking on the investigation
propel', it is necessal'7 to paint the broad, rather dark,
national baokcloth, against which. t~ls UDionpresident' s
comments appeared t~ be high11g~t~d •..
Rey1ew of Industrial Relations in Great Britflin.
The development to.
the present decade.
The . ul timEi te
~an()tlon that an
emploree possesses . :' -. . ': .
in dealings w1th his . .". ' .. , .
employer lsthe r1ght to withdraw his labour. Wlthholding
labour by collective actions,' iegaiised by the.'
Combination Laws Repeal'Act Amendi:ilerit Act 1825', saw' ,
the rapld development of einplOyee collectlvlsation wlth
lts attendant strikes and vlolence untl1, in 1867, t~e.
Royal Commisslon, under Slr Wll11am.Erle, provlded the . .
ba sls for the Trade Unlon Act, .1~7l, and . the su1;lsequent
Conspiraoy and Protection of Propel'ty Act., 1875' •.
Legislation reflected the growing urgency for the .
regularlsatlon and control of the employer/employee
relatlonshlp, accentuated by the rapid concentration
of the means of production in loc.~l centres.. Individual
firms were becoming larger allowing.of greater
specialisation wlthin the production process and,
inevltably, the direct physlcal contact betWeen employer ,'"
..•.
and craftsman was becoming less frequent, tbe link
between the two more tenuo~.
The growth of union membership was accompanied
from the ~880's by a rapid decrease in tbe number of
unions, the result of progressive amalgamation and
absorbt,ion.
Year
1896 1906 1914 1919 1920 1930 1938 191+1 1943 194, 1946 1947 1948 1949
. 195'0 195'1 195'2 195'3 195'1+ 19" 19,6 195'7 1958 19,9
TABLE 1
Deveiopment of Trade Union Membership 1696 - 1959
Number of Trade Unions at the end
of tlie year.
1;358 1;282 1,260 1,360 1;384 1,121 1,024
999 987 781
'7~r' 73 7'50 71f.3 732 730 714 712 699 689 669 669 660 65'1
Membership at end'of
year. Thousands.
Sources Industrial ' Rela~i8ns H~ndbook. H.R.S •• 19b'1.
In general, there has been a centralisation of , . . . . .' .
control, within the unions, developing towards national . .. ," - ...'. . '\ . ",
agreements negotiated with employers federations for a . . , . single iridustry or a particular section of a group of
. ; '. . '. ',' '.. . '. '.
industries'. This centralisation has tended to produce ., ' " . .~ ~ .
major problems of communication between an elected, . - .. . . . '.' ; I
union hierarchy and ~he "grass-root~" members at shop-
floor level. Collective bargaining-'the arrangement
by which the terms and conditions of employment are """, . .. , .
regulated by voluntary agreement between employers or
associations of-employers and workers organisations -
places great responsibilities on ,the negotiating
parUes inasmuch that, once agreement has been reached,
they must possess the authority to imPlement 'those,
agreements in 'the organisation that they represent., In
a 'democracy;' slichauthol'ity Is not statutorily conferred,
his'voluntarlly subscribed by members.' Tile so-called
Shop Stewards" Movement 'during the First 'World War,
highlighted this. problem"when the, ,recognised authority
of the unions was questioned by s,tiop-floor represent.. .,
atives, perhaps politica'lly motivated" TiTho, were able 'to
inspire the rank-and-fUe membe~s with' a philosophy .
that accepted unorthodox' acUon, par,ticularl1 in terms, '
of unorficia1strikes', as the means of obtaining a'
greater worker-contro1 at factory level. 'Consequent',
on the industrial unrest of this'pe:r'1od,'the Whitley'
recommendations' (2) emerged'in 1917/189nd maybe
summarised as'fo11ows',-
\ ,,' (i)" 'the setting uP. of joint
industrial councils having, as th~ir
• ,,'. ',1
ob3ect1ve, "the regular
consideration of matters affect10g
the progress and well-being of the , '
trade from the point of view of all
those engaged 10 1t, so far as th1s
1s cons1stent with the general,
10terests of, the comm1lll1ty".
(11) the appointment of works
comm1ttees 1n 1nd1v1dual establishments.
(111) the extens10n of
statutory regulat10n,of wages in ,badly
organ1sed 1ndustr1es.
(1v) the format10n of a
permanent court for 1ndustr1alarb1tration
and that (v) the M101ster of Labour
be authorised to hold enquiries, regarding
disputes.
Integral in the Wh1t,ley Committee recomme~dat1ons
was the acceptance that,as, far as was possible,
voluntary agreements ,ente~~d into bet~en employers and
employed with1n an indufJtrf should have a minim\1lD of , ' , ,
government 1oterference. : ,.~ ord~r tl1ats~l1~greements
could be made and, more 1lilportant, 1mple~ent~d~ "it was
emphaslsedtbat "adequate organ1sation on the ,pa~t of
both" was imperative. The Committee was,ecboing the
themEl of the 189'+ Royal Commiss1on on Labour (3) that,
powerful trade un10ns and powerful associa,t1onsof
employers, recognising and appreciating the position
of the other, could best enter into agreements and
settle disputes arising within their industries. '!'hus,
the works comm1~tees recommended by Whitley were to
consider "many questions closely affecting the daily
life and comfort ~, and,the success of, the business"
but were ,eXpressly precluded from wage negotiation and
conditions of,service w~lch would be settled by district
and national agreements.
The,inter-war period saw the spasmodic development
of a more rational relationship between employer and
employed but externa~ pressures, both economic and
pOlitical, caused overloading of bargaining machinery
and consequent breakdown, resulting in strikes and
industrial unrest. Post-war BrItain faced the problem
,of reduced if not impoverished resources, the need for
large capital investment to modernise the established
industries, many having their origin in the Industrial
Revolution, and to develop the new technologies; and --'"
the urgent proble~ of the maximisation, of human resources , "
in a period of controlled unemp~o1Ment, tb~.res~t of
the positive application,of KeJQs~an philos~pbY. The
growth of the larger industrial un~t had prqduced greater
economic inter-dependen~e and acco~panied by, a ,similar
growth of the "management class",. persons employed by
corporations, Which had a ,separate, and independent
e~istenoe, whose business It was to conduct the affairs
of tne qorporatlon, including negotlatiQns with other
employees, on behalf of the o'orporatlon.
The record of industrial relations in post-war . "., . .. -', ". .
Britain,es e~idenced by its 1n~apac1ty to deal with
disputes leading to stoppages and s~ikes, wl3s per.haPI:!
no better or worse than many othercoUntr1es. , ' :.. .
., .' TABiE,ll "
, , '
lPlTERBATIONAL COMPARISONS OF 'STATISTICS'" , RELATING TO STOPPAGES DUE TO INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES III MINING~ MANUFACTURING, : " ", , ' ,qONSTRUCTION AND TRANSPORT.
.' "t
Average annual, figures based on latest available infOrmation supplied by International
Labour Office.
Columns (1),(2) and (3)-period 19~1966 , ,
• Column (4) - period 1963 - 196'1 , . , '~ , .
,,(1)" ,(2): (3), (4), . "." '\
, ',:' "No. of ,Name of, '''', ~1;opp-" 'Country ,ages
'~ , . per 100,000
" ~mp10l'ees.
Uni ted K1ilgdcim 16'~8 ' AUstralia' , 63~8 BelgIum 7~O' Canada 1,.8 Denmark ' "~6 ' Finland, , , " ,,10. France ' 21.8' Feder,al Republic, ", ot Germany RepubUc of Ireland 2,~6 Italy 32.9 " Japan 7~6 Netherlands ' 2 ~2 New Zealand 26.8 Norway 0.6 Sweden 0., Uri.1ted'States13.2
'; ,
Average Average No. of 'duration persons of each involved stoppage
per ': in stoppage worldng
,days. , '
340' 3~4' " ,3,0 1.8
" , 680 ," "9;2 '" " 430 ,1~.O' '370' 7~3" 360 2.1
'1,090 "0,8 ,"
No. of work1ng
days lost per
1,000' employees
184 362 166 898
" lOlf. 414 347
,', 3'6 ", " " 34 1,210 1,04,
200 16
184
4,0 "720 '
, 1.040 370 ' 2,0 , 100'
~g
, . 15'.2 ,~3 2~9 2.4 2.1
26.0 15'.4
, 14.2 ~
934 , '
Source. , 11 In· Place of Strife" Go.vernment WhitEi Paper
',' , 1969.
However, apart £rom the fact that Britain is less ,
able to afford such stoppages if It is . to maintain and
then accelerate its ~conom1c growth, the most Significant
factor revealed in a closer analysis was the 'growth of
unofficial strikes. The total number of stoppages due
to industrial disputes remained' fairly constant, but
since there had been a remarkable decline in disputes in
coal-mining, there had been an equally J,'emarkab1e inlrease
in stoppages in the rest of the econo~.
TABLE 111
UNITED KnmnOM: NUMBER OF STOPPAGES DUE TO INDUSTRI4L DISPUTES, 1~57 - 1968
" Number of sioppa'gesl . . ,
Coal-mining , ' ;In the r.est Altogether Year of the
economy .. ,.
"
19~ 2;224 ,~i~ 2879 19 1,963 2~629
..•.• 19;9 . 1,~O7 '786· 2;093 ' .. ' , 1960 1, 66 1,166 2,~2 .
1961 '1;4;8 1,228 2, 6 1962 1,203 1,246 2,~~
.196~ '~ , 1,081 . 2,06
. 196 1,0 . 1,466 2,5'24 .196, ' 0 1,61lt 235'lt .1966 5'~ 1,384 1:93l .... ···t~~~ .' .3 1,722 2,11
219 2,131 ~,3,0 ( Provisional
figs.)
Source I ,"In Place .of.Strife". , Gov:ernment .~1hl te Paper
.' 1969.. .
Of these stoppages 9~% were not.sanctloned by the unlon·
or unions concerned, i.e. unofficlal.
TABLE lV
OFFICIAL UNOFFICIAL AND OTHER STOPPAGE~ OF WORK DUE TO 1NDUSTRIAL
DISPUTES Average Annual Figure for Stoppages
. in the Perlod 1964 - 67.
Type of Stoppage No. of . No. of No. of Stoppages Workers Working
Involved· Days Lost
Officlal Strlkes 82 84,700 643,000
Partly Official 2 600 6,000
Unofficial 2,12~ 663,300 1,857,000
Others. 1.e. lock-outs or strlkes by unorganised workers uncla ss1f1ed 24 3,200 24,000
All 2,233 7n,800 2,~30,000
Source. "In Place of Strife" Government White Paper
1969.
It was against thls background that the Donovan (4)
Commission commenced its investigatlons in ~prll 196~
and publlshed lts recommendatlons in June 1968.
The Donovan ,
COmmission
Report.
The comprehensive
review of the relation
ship of trade unions
and emplOTers'
associations taken by the
Donovan CommiSSion placed great emphasis on the disparity
between the formal system of'industrial relations, embodied -. . ,', , , '
in the official, clearly defined avenues of negotiation,
and the informal system Which in practice.operated, wherein'
bargaining took place at factory level, outside the sphere
of the union or employers federation, often in a very piece
meal fashion and sub3ect to local pressure.s and aberrations
resul tingin a plethora of unwritten agreements and chao,tic
pay structures. . The Commission was dis't1nguishing :between
IIwha t a pp.ea.red to. be so" and "wha t actua lly wa Sll • While
previolls Government enquiries had continually recommended
negotiation between powerful unions and feFlerations, the.ir
power derived from the evolvement from small, local groups . . . to large, national. centra'l1sed associatio'ns,
, . Donovan
suggested that because ot "the pressures of full employment",
an informal de-centralisation of collective bargaining had
occurred. This had resulted In the fragmentation of real
power and authority, a fragmentation taCitly accepted by
unions and managements alike since the "arrangements are. . .. .
cOmfortable and flexible and provide a very: higb ,degree of
" selt-government. The de-centralisation is,.however, . .. . condemned for its diaadvantages, degeneration "into
indecision and anarchy, a propensity to breed inefficiency,
and the reluctance to change".'
However,'the conflict between the two systems -
formal and Wormsl - cannot be resolved by compelling the
informal to,'comply. "Reality ••• " Donovan' comments,'
" ••••••• cannot be forced to comply with pretences". The
Commission recommended thata-
, , ,
, ,
. , '"
" . (1) . indllStry-wlde agrestm,'nts be l1m1ted
. . . to those matters whlcb tbey can effectively
. ',' , . , , regulate, setting out guide-lines for company
I ' • '.
and factory agreements. •
companles sbould review industrial
reiattons witbin their undertakings with six . " ,
ob3ectives in mind - ua) to develop
"
"
"
comprehensive and authoratitlve . . . , • • I '. •
collective bargaining macbinery; , I' • . ,
to dev~lop joint
procedures for tbe rapid and '" ", ;'
equitable settlement of , \ .. grievances in. a manner consistent
wltb relevant collective , . agr~ements,
c) to conclude , ,
'., '
agreements regulating the position . . . , i . , . ..
of shop-stewards;. . , .' . I • , .'
d) to conolude agreements . " .' .'
covering tbe bandling of redwidancy, . '."1 , ,
e) to adopt.effectlve . , "'. . , .
rllles and procedures governing
disclpl1nary matters, and
f) to ensure regular
( i11)
joint discussion of measures
to promote safety at work.
an Industrial Relations Act should be
passed requ1ring.-
( 1) the registration of company
agreements, thereby placing clear
respons1bil1ty upon management for the
conduct of industrisl relat1ons,
(i1) the setting up of a Commlsslon
to investigate and report on these
agreements,
(lv) the extens10n of collect1ve bargaining
be encouraged by several methods,
(v) the case for making collective agreements
into legally binding contracts be rejected,
(v·l) legtiLation be implemented to establish
statutory machinery to safeguard employees against
unfa1r dismissal,
(vU) the development of "labour tribunals",
extending the existing industrial tr1bunals terms
of reference to cover dispute ar1slng from contracts
of employment,
(vlU) the possib11lty of prohib1ting the closed
shop be rejected,
( ix) The means of reducing multi-unionism be
examined and the union government reorganised (i)
to accommodate shop stewards and work groups, (ii)
by increasing the number of1hll-time officials and
ensuring their capability by adequate training,
(x) employers' associations be encouraged ~
develop orderly and efficient systems of industrial
relations within the firms they represent. . . . . . (xi) a revision of certain sections of the
law relating to trade unions and employers'
federations, but, in particular, the l1mitation
of the protection given by section 3 of the Trades
Disputes Act, 1906, and by the Trades Disputes
Act, 196" in relation to inducement of breach of
contract of employment to registered Trade Unions
and union officials. (This majority decision of
the Commission would~ in effect, withdraw protection
given to non-union strike leaders,.the hope being
to limit unofficial strike action).
"In Place
of Strife".
The Government
published its White
Paper in January 1969
in which it argued
for an increase in State intervention in industrial
relations, rejecting the basic premise that had been
accepted for over 100 years - that collective bargaining,
voluntarily entered into, was the prerogative of both
s1des 1n industry, employers and employed. The
Government argument was that the State had, in fact,
been involved and that, "while often still voicing
the doctrine of non-intervention, managements and unions
have entered into a positive and mutually beneficial
partnership with the State to secure common object1ves".
It further argued that "the disparity in Jl)Ter between
employee and employer, though much reduced, still
persists", - "the asymmetrical relationship" - and that
new disparities of power have grown up between one
group of employees and another". Where these
d1sparities eXist, the Government took the view that
the State might - indeed, should intervene, there
developing a tripartite process for industrial relations.
The White Paper accepted that in a period of
rapid technological change it was imperative to securel-
(i) the reform of collective
bargaining,
(11) the extension of the role and
rights of trade unions,
(iii). new aids to those involved in
collective bargaining, and
(iv) new safeguards for the community
and individuals.
The major recommendations of the Donovan Commission
were accepted, it being underllnedthat ~ the sphere
of collective bargaining.reform the.major responsibility
musf lie with management. However, the Government
rejected the proposa1'regarding the withdrawal of
protection afforded by the Trade Disputes Acts and, in
its place, inserted a controversial' discretionary
reserve power to secure a "conciliation pause" of
twenty-eight days when unconstitutional strike or lock
outS occurred during which i'every 'opportunity for
negotiation would be explored". Also the Government
could - "where it believes that the proposed strike
would involve a serious threat to the economy or' public
interest of there is doubt whether it commands the . . support of those concerned" - require a ballot of
members to be taken' •.
The reaction to the White Paper was predictably
vociferous, partiCUlarly' with. regard . t~ the methods of
implementing the 28-day pause~ Also, it was pointed
out that those industries which were more directly
concerned with "the national interest", which really
meant those with direct effect on the import-export
balance, would be under ~uchc10ser scrutiny and pressure
than others. The T.U.C. rejected the intervention 9f
the State into collective bargaining and, eventually,
at the Croydon conference, took on 1tself tne
responsibility for controlling and disciplining
its membersh1p, the Government temporar1ly withdrawing
the offending clauses.
Here, then, l1es the dilemma, can employee and
employer so regulate the1rrelationsh1p that, while
recognising fundamental conflicts of interest'between
each and an extension of that conflict to include a
third party, the State, representing the community, a
basically stable equilibrium can be maintained, one
in which the amplitude of any disturbance will be
progressively reduced and equ1l1brium restored?
Thus, the union pres1dent's remarks, claiming that
his industry had solved th1s d1lemma understandably
created a large interest, part1cula~ly when viewed in
the context of the nat10nal problem. Were bis claims
justif1ed? And, if so, how had tb1s equ1librium been
achieved?
Objectives and Method of the Investigation
The validity of'
the claims to
industrial peace.
A brief' enquiry
into the 1abotu'
relations in the
boot-and-shoe
industry revealed
that the union president's remarks were substantially
correct. The industry had a long history in which
it had been contina1ly under presstu'e from trade cycles.
1ntense activity and growth,fo11owed by per10ds of'
depression; and since the latter part of' the 19th
century, it had undergone something ota,techno1ogica1
revolution in which productiVity per-operative-employed . : .
, 'had 'steadily risen but with a fairly uniform market
" ,-' '''outlet, ·the numbers einp10yedwithin the industry had
progressively declined. It was, not, therefore, a
growth industry,in which weak management had been able
, to tolerate or acquiesce to the demands of organised
, labour. Indeed, the industry had ,faced harsh economic
, times and been able, to, maintain. a, verY large meastu'e
of industrial peace.' :
The last major, clash between the two sides"
employee and employer, had, indeed,occurredin 189"
,< , and from this apparent catharthis had emerged an
agreement providing a basis for'a11 tuttu'e agreements
to the present day.
In the context o~ contemporary, nat1ona1 collective
bargaining procedures, the industry is remarkably free , '
from unoffioial strikes and stoppages. As will be
revealed, the organisation and olimate of opinion
wi thin the industry does not tolera te them. And the
working days lost each year through all stoppages is
below the national average; and signifioantly below
that of other mantlfacturing industries.
All industries and. services
Mannfaoturing indus~ries. ,
Footwear . industry ... ' •••
1,_,
; .
. . '.
-
~. e'
. ~ ~ ,,' - ,
•• 0 ••
. \
Average working days lost per employee per
annum •.
••• 0.107·
.. , 0~171
••• 0.067
All indust.ries and services.
Manufact.uring industries
Footwear industry
TABLE V
Working d~S lost. eaoh'¥,.ear thrO~ all stopp ~s in progress (thous~s) Average Average
Number of . working 1963 1964 196) 1966 1967 Average employees : days lost
( thous.ands) per elDP,loyee
. p.e~ annum.
1.7)) 2~277 2.92) 2.398 2.787 2,428 22,700 0.107
1,205 1,681 2.228 1.000 1.)61 1.53) 9.000 0.171
1.755 13.896 10.001 0.163 11.207 7.404 110 0.067
Comparison of working days lost. through aJ.1 st.oppages in progress for years 1963-61.
SOuroes; Department of' Employment andProduotivity and NationaJ. Union of' Boot and Shoe Operatives.
Ob3ectives of
the Investigation~
Accepting that
there were grounds
to merit an enq1l1ry,
the general ob3ect
ives of unch an investigation were as followsl-
(i) to examine.the history,
development and structure of the
employer-employee relationship
within the boot-and-sboe industry,
and
(11) to extract, from such an
examination, tbose more particular
and relevant features by wbich
industrial peace bad been worked
for and gained; and, bY a study
of such features, perhaps draw
such lessons as might be appropriate
in a wider industrial context.
The character of the investigation would be
indicative rather than conclusive.. Witbin limited time
and facil1ties available, preclt1ding examination in
depth on every topic, it would be arrogant and, perhaps,
impertinent, to suggest t~at compre~ensive conclusions
could be drawn.. However, such conclusions as could
be made might indicate those areas where further, more
detailed investigat.ion and analysis might reap large
dividends.
Method ot
Investigation. n Industrial'
relations depends on '
people" - a ciiche but"
no~theless true. -Agreements, methods ot'negotiation,
avenues of communication, det~itions and all the
organisat1onal paraphernalia are important 1nasmuch
that they provide the framework within'whicb people
operate; but wlthout thei'will to operate, which is
often a function of mutual trust, there can be little I ' • I •
hope of continued industrial peace.
Emphasising trust, a personnel officer in a woollen , (6)
firm ,said: "It is tllat the men on the _ shop floor
and the supervisors trust the management. Now that's
it - shortly and simply. It you get this' sItuation
it implies ~lso that the management trust tbe people •
on the shop tloor, of course. I don't think you can
have one without the other. It you get this trust,
then yon will get good industrial relations".
More particularly, the president ot an employers' _ . (7)
association in the boot-and-shoe industry, stated;
"Good industrlai relations are good ,
human relations and although effective
dispute procedures are important in
settling problems and grievances, tbey
are much less important than the
building of , mutual trust, confidence
and respect.
If these do not exist - and it Is
people not organisations who create
them - you might avoid serious
trouble by a good arbitration
system; but you will still be far
from making the partnership it should
be - rather than the contest it' so
often is".
In examining the development of trust in an ':-<.'
'of· -
industry, one is examining something organic, which
has developed and is developing. One is not dissecting
an inanimate object, and therefore 'the method of
investigation owes much to the sociologioal approach.
Certainly the hard frame~lork within which industrial
relations operate must be considered and, ,in particular,
to what extent that framework is a reflection of the
individuals operating within it. But most important,
it is necessary to get out into the industry and talk
to people, to examine their attitudes towards the
employer-employee relationship and to determine, if
possible, what oardinal features within their industry
do they consider to be important, and, finally, to
attempt to qualify a multitude of such impressions and
to discipline them into a coherent set of conolusions.
To this end, then, the investigation was divided
into two parts -
(a) the indirect investigatlon,in ~lch
the following were researchedl-
(i) the method of shoe manufacture,
. t, •.
(ii) the history and present state
of the boot.and-shoe industry,
,(iii) the historical development of
collective bargaining procedures .' .
in the industry, .. in, particular,
the growth,of th~ operative union . . . and the federation of. employers,
,\' t " ",' • '. " , ' •
(iv) the nature of the agreements . . ,
~eveloped' between, the ~o ,sides.. and
(b) the direct investigation, occupying the
majority of the time available, when operatives, ., "
foremen, shop-stewards, full-1:ime union
officials, federation secretaries, per~onnel , • • t
officer~ ~nd. managers were interviewed. , '. . . ". ;....
A total ~f eight factories were visited, the
factories being ohosen to offer as wide's
variety ~n oharaoter - size, type.of"shoes
manufactured, geographio location, etc.,
as was possible. Faoto~ visits normally
lasted for four to six hours, . dependent on
the availabili~y of personnel •.
The interview teohnique was ,adopted
beoause, although extremely demanding in
time, the standard questionnaire method, we
·were 1Ilformed, would meet wi th great
resistance and, in the time available, a
direot approach would eluoidate a more
genuine ,response. Interviews varied considerably
I
in length, f'l'om a short "chat" on the shop
floor with an operative at his work-bench,
to a three hour deta1led discussion' :witb
the National President 'of 'the Union of
Boot and Shoe Operatives. ' " '
Ta'pe recording of interviews was'.
attempted but quickly discarded since the
presence' of 'the microphone,' almost without
exception, inhibited the, interviewee. '
,Thus, certain key comments and answers
were ta ken down verba tim and, at the end
of 'the interView, ,'confirmed with the person
being interview~d. • i' \ '.', . • l '/ .
, ,The torma't::o£: the interview was. as far
as possible, regularised inasmuch' that, : " .
standard 'questions were 'posed, the phrasing
of the 'questions being kept fairly constant
to avoidprejudiclng the replies in any way.
(See Appendix 1). ' , The questions ,to : the
operatives were ,more particular in '
character .. dealing with' direct relationships
within the'factory" However, .the person
being interviewed was encouraged,- albeit
occasionally'in a rather baphazardfasbion -
to air his views on the relevant topics,
in the manner ,that he found most appropriate.
ImmediatelY,after theinterview,B complete
record wBstaken to ensUre 'that impressions
arid nuances were .documented~·
"
Below 1s given a l1st of persons interv1ewed.-
> "
Full-time Union officials , , • I •
,Shop Prefjidents •••••• ..~. '
Opera tiv!3 s ... - ...•.. ~ ... .. .
Number Interviel,ed
20
Empla,ver Federation Oftici~ls 2
Personnel Officers
f.fanagers ••• •• e" ••• •••
1
10
The list,is obviously no~ oomprehensively
representative., and yet. within the confines of time
and opportunity available. it yielded some interesting
results.
THE INDIRECT INVESTIGATION
An Outline of the Process of Shoe Manufacture • . ,
From the simple wrap-around of leather held
.together on·the foot by rawhide lacings there ,devloped
the moccasin and the sandal, the latter consisting of . • • I
a simple sole held on the foot by a leather thong. . . , ,t • ~ • • ...
Until the 18th century, footwear remained,largely , .• ! , . - \!,. \ ••
home-made except for the wealthy for whom a skilled
class of artisans produced custom-built and designed
footwear, the artisan being re'spon's'ible for the complete
manufacture. " , ", , , "' ....
As with other crafts' that' were chang1ri~,the1r
character andasswn1hg the essentials of an industry,
'specialisation within the process occurred and, with
,the graaual rise of a wealthy middle-class gathered ,,' :,... . ' , " . in the expanding city areas, the markets for foot~ar
, ' ,
.... " -
became large 'enough, towards the end of the 18th cen~ury, . '.'
tor a Simple diVision of labour to be an economic
proposition. The productive process had been divided
into "clicking", "closing" and "making".
, CHOking. , Clicking consists
. ot cutting out the ,
various leather sections
trom the bidewhicb together' make the upper of the boot
or sboe. "This cutting process demanded a very bigh
degree of skill in order' to obtain, from a given hide,
. "
the maximum number of pieces having matching
characteristics in terms of appearance, texture,
degree of stretch, etc. The "clickers" have historically
remained those nearest to the' "masters", originally
a class apart and, on the' whole,' considered by
themselves and' othera as superior to' the other process
workers. The" clicker maintained the "bowler-hat"
tradition, remnants of which can still be seen in the
modern industry where, although other processes are
now perhaps comparable in skill, the "clIcking room"
has a particular and clearly defined identity.
Originally the process consisted of hand..;.cutting around
templates and, this remains in' many small factories
with short production runs on relat1vely "special
lines" • However, upper material is now more normally
cut b1 dies that have been designed especially for a
particular shoe, hydraulic'presses being employed after
the operative has arranged the die in that position on
the material which will give minimum wastage with
maximum matching.
"Rough stuff cutting", normally included in the
clicking stage, consist~ of the cutting out and
,preparation of the inner and bottom soles and beels,
together ~'1t~, any "st1ffeners" that may be required to
. strengthen partIc~ar parts of the shoe.
Closing.' . The cut-out parts
of the shoe are then
passed to 'the '''closing
room" -'tradit1onally the province of female labour -
wbere tbe parts 'of tbe upper are fitted togetber, , "
usually by' s~itcb1n8, a1tbougb aome cementing is now . ,. . ',: . '. , '
being done., Qrigina1l1, tbe c1~sing ~as ,all hdn4~Olle . . . ' .. '" .. '. . . . - . .' . but E1iss Hove's invention of tbe sewing machine in
. . - . - • .' .. .!" _. : '.' \'" . -
,1846 great11 speeded up the process. The eari, machines . . . .'. ".' . . ...
had manr nteething? problems but eventually the . . " , . . .,::, ':' . '. " , ,:
un1£ormitr,in stitch which was possible with the mach1De . ..' '.. , 'I •• •
not only speeded the closing process but materia111 \' . . " :
, improved the qual1 t1 of the fina1pr~uc,t.
Making. Making 'may be considered
as'a series' of inter
connected processes whereb1
tbe "closed-upper", tbe' sole and the otber parts of the
shoe are fina111 assembled. ,The assembled upper, with
the heel and toe' st1ffeners'lnserted, is read1'to be
fitted over a wooden last 'for llhich the patterns have
been' precisely designed~ ,'Tbe upper is then "drafted" '
over the la at by a series of pulls by pincers in' ,
different directions according to the shapeof'the last,
it requiring a'l'oasonab1e skill to a,rrange the tensions
of the skins , variable in quality and tbickness, such
,that the final' shoeshape',is, both colnrortable' to vear
and acceptable in appearance. The tensioned upper,is
then tacked to t~e,last~· '
After lasting, a numb~r of operations,are required
to prepare the shoe for "bottomingn - attaching the . . . -. . , .
upper to sole - the operations varying to, some degree , ' .
on tbe type of sh~e construction b~ing employed. There
are four basic construction methods ~ attaching the
sole to the upper in such a way a s to create a
sufflclently durable bondl-
(1) Sewing, whlch includes (a) the
Goodyear welt process, in whlch the
sole ls sewn to a welt strlp prevlous1y
sewn to the insole and upperJ and (b)
the stltch-down, in whlch the upper
ls t~ned out and stitched d~ to the
sole.
(11) Cementing - ln whlch adhesives
are employed to aohieve the bond,
(lli) Vulcanising - in whloh the sole
ls moulded to the upper, and
(iv) the use of fasteners, as in
nal1ed or stapled shoes.
In the case of the welt-sewn shoes, a hollow space
ls left over most of the lnsole and it is this space
which is "bottom-filled" with material to provlde a
flat surface for the sole. The heel ls normally
attached by nai11ng or by means of a screw.
The final process in the making of the shoe ls
the ''finlshing'', a long series of. sub-processes - heel "'
and sook 11ning, lnsertlng laces, buokling Bnd strapping,
"paring" or knifing the edges of the soles and heels
to remove exoess, inking and burnishing - the ob3eot
being to improve the general appearance of the completed
shoe.
The Development and Structure of the Industry
Technological
Developments and'
their repercussions.
Specia lisation
in the shoe
manufacturing process
occurred in the late 18th century and developed during: ,
the 19th century,- producing the particular and reievarit: "
character of the present-day industry. The early'
manufacturer, often shop-keeper and shoe-maker, kept
the clickers on'his premises in order to supervise the
cutting-out process where, with an expensive raw material,
large losses through wastage could occur'. The other
processes - closing and making - were "put out" to .. . \
out-workers',working in their own homes. The advent
of machinery,particularly the sewing machine for the . ,
closing process; saw the gradual decline of out-work,
a. decl:i.ri.e'acce1erated by tile new methods ,of sole-. .. , . ' , .
attacllment in'the 1870's, and, in particular, by tile. . . . . .' .
coming of the Blake Sole-Bewing Machine from America. '. ,
The skill content in tile work, compared with the old
hand-methods, ~as considerably reduced. The transition
for established out-workers, independent in outlook and , ., .' . 1 rI' '., - -. . - - -
I '. accustomed to working dQ their own homes as and when it
" - \' 'I •• ", " • ..' .' '. • •
best suited theai, to the discipline of regular factory , " ,. - . ,
, "t
hours was aceompllshed witll some difficulty.. Employers , .
bemoaned the inadequacies of tile working man. "Many
of tile workmen ••••••• are too fond of displaying a .
spirit of independence. A large batcll will throw down
their tools and go out for 'fresh air' •••• ~~ Nor
does the mischief end there, for they will march
bodily to a neighbouring factory and induce the men !, ' (B)" ' ,
there to ,follow the,ir pernicious example".
During the 1880' s and after, machinery wss being , ., . .
more widely adopted in rough-stuff-cutting, in sole
attachment, finishing, heeling, but not;' as yet, in
"last1ng"', the drawing' over of the leather and tacking
down. During this period furthersub-div1s1on in
product1on process ocourred. "Team-working" emerged
where~ the work, formerly completed by a sk1lled or
semi-skilled operat1ve, could now be accompl1shed by
a group of relatively unskilled individuals. The (9)
Shoe and Leather Record, an independent publication,
in February 1888 clearly saw the implication of
machinery - "Our iron automatons require no food, are
never weary and do never c~mplain, but the displaced
workers live and must live. It would be folly , to
resist the speedy progress of labour-saving machinery,
but 'it is worse than madness '~o ignore the tact that
other changes must 'fohow also, and that speedily".
However, by '1890, 'the process of lasting, considered'
sacrosant by the e.ver-depletitig sk1lled artisans, '
became mechanised~ the 'early experimental macbinesbe1ng
the harbingers of an increased pace cif technological'
development.
During the 1890"9 a rather curiolis d1v1sion
occurred betWeen'those manufacturers 'situated 'in the
larger towns ,and cities, pay1tig agreed wages to indoor
workers (i.e. wi th1ri a factory)', and those country
manufacturers who were investing less in the newer
machine-methods and relying on a high proportion of
poorly paid out-workers to undercut their larger,
more sophisticated competitors; The pressure of
the city manufacturers for common l1nion acceptance
and therefore comparable wage rates was not 'entirely
altruistic, but it certainly aided the development
of the Union. The advent of the new machine methods
and the industries 1nabil1tr to deal with human
problems involved were the primary causes for the ma30r
stoppage of work in 189~.
By 1900 the threat of American imports was
catalysing the domestic manufacturer into a w1der
app11cation of machine methods. The' improved Goodyear . . ,
welting ,machines were becoming increasingly o~mmon.
Gradually the,very small concern was being squeezed out ,
of the market. Realising. tha't the industry consisted
of small to medium-s1zed firms', unable to raise the
capital, necessary for outright purchas~of machinery,
the British United Shoe Machinery. Company instituted
a, system of machine leaSing, a systemwh1ch bas I 1 " •
continued to the present d~y·and has, in no,small way,
contr1buted to the character of the . industry. '. In
particular it has allowed the entry of new compan1es'
w1th relatively little capital who 'were prepared to
pay for equipment, out, of current rece1pts.·'
At the turn, of the century the number of persons
employed ,in factoriE!ls, ,i.e., excluding· work-shops. and,"
out.work,were approx1matelylOO,000 to 120,000., the .,' . I • •
ratl0 of men, '1;0 ~omen be1.Dg approximately 211. , ,
An, InsP90'tor of Factorles ,Report in ,1900 gave' the .1\,.. ..'~ . '
number of, fa,otodes ln the boot ... and-shoe industry as
1,195'.
The 'great perlod of technologlcal:innov's'tion, ~ • • . F'
. • " r' ••.
1~90to 1910, ~asfollowedby the continuous development . ; . .
of more ~ophbtlcated ,application of established', '
techniques. '.Productl~'1ty ls difficult to'ascertain
accurateiy inasmuch·tha~'a palr of b?ots'or 'shoes ls
not a standard, ,article.: varying considerably, ,in' value
~nd, t:T0rk-content. '" Howe~er, a rough correction for
these' differences, can be made by evaluating broad
categories of. sho,es in ,terms of, some pair, which ls , ,( 10)
taken ,as ·unitary., 'OneEConom1~t, L. Rostas, calculated
th~, increase, in .productlvltyin output ,per man .hour
between 192~ ,and ,193~ to have been 28 per, cent., , Thls
increase 1n productivlty, was maintained during the, .", . , . .
perlod up to'19~5', as indlcate4 in ~he following datal-
,,' .
Year
1930 1933 1934 1935' 1942 19~3 1941+
, ,1945
"
\
TABLE Vl , ' ,
, I' I "'0. ',I '.
r' ,I .r' , :.,
five,rage Prod~ct1on:., " ,Average P~oductlon per Person Employed 'per Person Employed per Annum. ,(Pairs '., . per, Annum., ','
',. of Footwear' of 'all: (Equlvalent Pairs). k1n\1's.) '",
'1~020 " ,." ' ,
~72 ,1'°64 ~ ",; "
1 1 8 ' 1:1~6 893 1,2 3 1,027 1;379 1,071' , , '
1,390 1,062 ',1,35'1, ' ,1,030 : ;
, . " :' '. . .: . , . 'I:;
Source. Working Party Reports. Boots'and Shoes. H.M.S.O. 1946.
The British United Shoe Manufacturing Company, ( 11)
as the 1945 Working Party Report comments.,
exercised "a virtual monopoly over the industry",
supplying between 80 and 90 per cent of the machines
used in making shoes, exclusive. of the closing room
where Singer sewing machines are employed. The
most modern machinery could not be purchased outright
and could. only be leased. This system had clear
advantages to the industry inasmuch that (1) it
was relatively easy. for the small man to commence
manufacture, (11) new machinery could be continually
introduced and, (i11) ,B.U.S.M •. Co., maintained
a very effective service. Howeve~, the equal
disadvantage was the tied-lease system whereby
~ B.U.S.M. Co. machines could be installed
throughout a factory, virtually protecting the monopoly
position and it was not until 1946/47 ,that this
system was broken, allowing the subsequent influx
of competitors, particularly from Germany.
The degree of speCialisation intensified during
the "thirties", attempts being made to introduce
"6onveyor systems", first successfully employed by ".I ; .,- •
P.~ta in Czechoslovak1a~ The conveyor systems did
not prosper, perbaps because of the verY,long runs
neoessary to allow of production savings.
The technical developments since the Second
World War have been in four main areaSI-
(i) the increased use of
adheSives, particularly for the
----------
attachment of soles in women's
and men~ eight-weight shoes,
, ~11), ~he low-cost production of
, short-life shoes, part1,cular1y"
for, summer wear, bY, a process , .' . ,
of "slip-lasting" whereby the . " -. . " ", .'
, upper is st,itched to a soft , "
sock, the wooden 1as~ forced into
it and the sole cemented to the
.~ot~om,
(iii) ,the "vulcanisation" process , "
in which 8 rubber sole is moulded 1 • . ,.. . 1
to ~ leather upper, one process
replacing .the screwing, stitching
and shaping ofthe,co~ventia1 shoe"
(i~) ~he in~reasing use of
synthetic materials to. replace
leather. The obvious advan~age
"of the synthetio is its homogeneity I, '" ,
oompared with,the variability of .,. ' , -. " "
leather. A material having , ,
oonstant properties would lend ! ., .-' •
itself mo~e readily to automatic '. . , .' , ,
processes. However, as yet, there .' : " ',' ,_ " , " .,"
remain difficulties in the " . ' " "" ~ " . . \ .
application of synthet1cs, the . . .,'. ,;.' . . : .. \ .
oharacteristics of whiob do not . ,,' , \ ' ., .
,c,ompareideal1y with lea tber. '\ : ' .. ,. ,I
. 1
, .
In addition there has been further "
sophistication in already developed machines,
particularly the wider use of clicking presses
, " 'and last1ilg machines~ Also, there has been
, extension of the "track systems" t owing something , , .
to the conveyor system, in which the lasting and
many of the ma,king processes are tied to a hand
'or machine operated conveyor system. However,
in many small companies' there remains a disparity
, 'in output in the included processes, machines of
,various output capacities being included, and a
closecontinulty of output throughout "the track"
is difficult to achieve. The very wide range
'and variety' of shoes manufactured, even by a
relatively small 'firm, 'precludes'long run track;
" and 'versa~ility,' in the manufacturing process ls
, '
essent1al~ , , ",..'
, ,
Cost 'Structure
in Manufacture. . ,
, .,' .
",' ., ~ ,
"
It ls difficult
to obtain a
reasonable estimate
of contemporary cost
structure in manufacture. . The figures quoted by , I, ,
the 1946 ~orking Party 1n~icate the very high
proport1or:1 tha,t materials, 'cost in producing boots
,and ,shoes •. , ,
" .
"
TABLE V11
Costs expressed 8S a proportion of net ex-ractory selling.prlce . (excluding any dlscount allowed) ~
Me~'s boots Men~s Women's Shoes shoes
Materlals ~ ~ ~. ~ ! ~
Wages ••• ••• ••• ;., ..
Pr1me costs
Overheads ••• •••
73!4
16.6
-90!0
10.0'
100.0
Source.
60~S 5:0!0
19.7S ,27~0
-80~2S 77.0
19~7S 23~0
. 100.0 100~0
Working Party Reports~ Boots and Shoes. 1946~
The Working Party commented. "The share
of the value or output absorbed by overheads and
~rorlts Is thus relatively low in the boot and ~hoe
trade". -'A statement open to debate t· perhaps' •..
The boot and
shoe Indllstry is
fairly widespread
bllt output lsheavil.y concentrated in the East
Location and Slze
of· FIrms.,
Midland area~·
No. of Gross Net Persons Net Estab- Ontpnt Output Emplo,yed Output
l1sbments (Oper- per Area .. at1ves Person
and Employed .. Clerical
Workers)
£000 £000 £ London ••• n4 3,763 1,982 10,924 181
Lancashire,etc ... 60 3;~3l l,ltSl. 11,1;9 133 .. "
East Midlar,.~s .: ... ~,3 24;Q6l 10,966.'6,,716,. 167
Eastern ' Counties· 42 3,203 1,690. 11,738, 146
Remainder .139 ;,;22 2,718, 17,230 1;8
808 40,180 18,837.116,,67 162
Source. :Working'Party Reports~ Boots and Shoes. 1946.'
It 1s significant that, as the. 1946 Working Party
reports, new factories have often been located
conven1ently near to established B.U.S.M. Co. service
depots.
Many firms have grown up in village areas,
developments from the out-working days, and because of
the trad1t10ns and ava1lability of local labour, .
particularly female labour, have chosen to remain. , '. .
( 12)
The average shoe manufacturing unit remains small. . . , .
In an analysis for 19'}4, K. Marsden compared several (13)' .'
factors related to size.
TABLE lX
.Boot and Sboe Indnst~' Ana1vsis by slze 1924
A more detailed analYSis of t~e size of
estab1is~ment for 19,8 and 1963 is given in Table X.
~us t~ere ~as been cidecline in t~e number of
establis~ments from over 1,000 i~ 19~ to 610 in
1963, t~ere being a fall in the number "of small
firms and an increase in the number of large Qnits,
partlcu1ar1y in those firms employing 1,,00.2,,00 .. operatives. The average number of ope'ratives
empioyed'tn a conc~rn has ~isen trom.ioo/establi~hment In a Report
to the International Labour Office by the National .. " . .."., (14) " Union of Boot and Shoe operatives in 1964, the,
opinion Is expressed t~at "there were more closures
between 1963 and 1968 than for the comparable period
1958 to 1963, particularly affecting the smaller and
TABLE X
Average ' ',Number -" of ' ,Average ' % employed number Establishments Number 1n each employed b~, the
Employed group
enterprise in the toot- , wear inciustry 1978, 1963 1978 ,1963 1978 1963
2; ... 49 90 68 ,3,21t8 2,,61 3.1 2.6
;0-99 l.5'1 109 10,007 7,229 9~7 7~4
100-199 130 111 1;,3;1 12,830 14,9 13.2 .. '
200-299 54' 60 9,370 8,670 9.0 8.9
300-399 ;0 42 9;142 8,183 8.8 8~4
400-499 22 , 37 ',6,171 7,166 6~0 7.4
,;00-749 47 37 9,654 8,13; 9~3 8.4
7;0-999 24 14 7,712 3,603 7.7 3.8
1,000-1,499 27 14 6,773 4,26; 6~7 4.3
1,;00 .. 2,499 17 66 ;,438 l;,,aO 5'.4 16~0
2 ,;00 and over 62 5'2 20,444 19,138 20.4 19.6
Totals 674 610 103,310 97,360
Source. Report on the Census 'of Production, 1978
and 1963.
' ..
medium-sized enterprises" •
. There rema ins a bigb degree of fragments tion
witbin tbe industry witb a diffusion of p'ower wbicb
is relatively rare in industries witb a long estab1isbed
product. Tbe dominance by a few.1arge firms bas, U" in general, been resisted. Marsden sugg~sted tbree
reasons tor tbisl-
,
(1) . tew apparent economies ot scale.
because of (a) low level of capital . . . investment, (b) multiplicity ~t sty1~s
and.slzes of product, and (c) , labour
intensive character of industr~;
( 11) most manufacturers strongly
. influenced by craft origin of tbe industry, , . . .. concentrating on design and ma~utact~e.
Few firms are "sa1es-orlented" and little
"brand" loyalty amongst consum~rs.due.to
the lack of a marketing programme. (Thls
is now gradually cbanging and tbe larger
firms are becoming increaSingly market
sales conscious, advertising to promote
a brand-image),
(111) ''1itb one exoeptlon in tbe retail
outlet area, very few mergers bave taken
place, tbere baving been a fairly stable
domestic market since tbe Second World
War. "The powerful coalescing effect of
a slump in dr~ving outtbe inetficle~t
and st'imulatingmergers' bas thus been absent".
An independent enquiry whioh attempted to compare
eoonomies of scale in various British industries and
suggest the optimum size of concern was carried out (16)
by Pratten, Dean and Silbertson. The major
conclusions with regard to the footwear industry
weres-
(i) economies of scale not of
major importance,
(ii) the small man competes because -
(a) . leasing of machinery,
(iii)
(b) the piece-rate structure,
(c) provision of research
faoilities by the
employers' federation to
all its members.
the small firm can sell direct to
multiples and mail-order companies.
without incurring expense on advert1sing. 1 .
Production and
The Market Trend. The decade
following the Second
World War saw a
fa1r1y static domestic
consumpt1on, 167 million pairs in 1949 and 175 million
pairs in 1957, representing 2.04% and 1.67% respectively
of total consumer expenditure. The total footwear
consumption in pairs per head was 3.7 pairs in 1959
and 3.9 in 1960. This figure has not greatly altered
for 30 years, the figures for 193~ giving some notion
of the "per capita" consumption in various countries. ,. ,
" .
TABLE lUll
Estimated Consumntion (Pairs per Head)
United ',Kingdom • • • .' .. ~.~ 3~6
Germany ••• • •• ~.~ ••• 1.8
Sweden ••• • •• ••• .. ' . '2.8
Denmark ••• ••• ... ' ••• , 2.4-
United States ' .. ' ~ ... " ••• 4i3
Source. Working Party Report. 1946. ' ,
Thus it can be said that Br itam is relatively
"heavy on shoes".
Production figures for the years 19,." 1962 and
1967 reveal (i) a continued increase in'total '
production, and (11) an increase in the non-leather
footwear produ~tion at the expense of the leather.
(See TABLE Xl).
I '"
1 ' A closer analysis of the sales of footwear ", , , '
reveals (i) 'a steady increase in the percentage o~
uppers produced from synthetic or plastic materials.
(See TABLE Xll) • . , "
TABLE Xl
Production of' footwear, - leather" rubber and plastic for the years
19,7, 1962 and 1967.
. :! .
" '
Total
Footwear (other than slippers, house 'shoes' , , and ballet shoes) with uppers wholly or mainly" of leatherl
(million pairs) , "~, .. ,~ l22Z
171.~" ,179.'+ 190.1
; ... "
Total 109.0
Men's, youths' and, boys 40!7
Women's, maids' and' girls ,9.7
, 117.0 109,6
.49.4 38!8
. M.7 58.8
Infants'
, Sports, shoes
,Footwear. (other than slippers, hoUae shoes and ballet shoes) with uppers, wholly or mainly of materials other than
,leatherl· , , " ,
,,~
Slippers, ' house .. shoes, and ballet'shoes
Rubber protective footwear
Plastics protective footwear
Safety footwear
8.6
'- .
9.4
1.6
~" , I ..
9.9
2.1
28.0 , 21.1 3if.~2
"
39.7 , ,
6.9 ,.4
- 0.8
- -.. ~ . '
Source a Census of Production Board of Trade.
and (ii) an increase in the proport10n of
footwear with non-leather soles.
1962
~963
1964
1965
1966
1967
TABLE Xll
, '
Percentage increase in Plastic or'Synthetic Uppers.
( 1) ( 2) , ,
a:ot~J. Salea ' ' TomJ. P1asli1ga COi~ 2 m:. gg 0 " ' . , Smlibetig Colnmn 1 •
.. ~terid!\l 1000 prs. . 000 p,rs.
'172,365 , 9,189 5.3%
180,842 11,601 6.4%
194,542 14,139 7.3%
' 190,235 12,079 "6.3%
183,65"0 14,188 7'~7%
'180,447 • 22,295" 12~3%
Sources Census of Production. Board of Trade.
TABLE X111 ',,' ", " ,~,
, 'Peroentage increase"in non-leather soles • . ,.' , "
. "
Total " , ,
1961 ••• ••• ••• ~~~ 78% 1962 ~.~ · . ~ ~ !"! ~!~ 82% 196~ ~.~ ~.!' ~I!l!' ~,~ 86% 196 ~.~ · . ~ ~~. ~~~ g~~ 1965" 4!'~. ~ .. ~., <!'!'. 1966 ••• · .. ' .' ... ..~ '90~4:C 1967 ••• ••• ••• • e' • 91.1%
" . Souroel Census of Reduot10n.
Board of Trade.
,
The value of exports has, since 1960, '
shown a fairly steady increase ~ut this has been
overshadowed by a large increase in the value
of imports.
" . TABLE XlV
, "
, General trend of Imports and Exports' .
1958 .
19;9
1960
1961
1962 , . ,
1963 ' ,
1964
196;
1966"
(£m) Exports Imports Balanoe
12.5 ,
9., + 3.0 ~
,
13.0 ,
12.0 + h() f " ,
14.0 .' 18.0'·, - 4.0 ~ , ,
14.0 19.; - 5.5 " ...
13.0 ,19.0 ,~ 6.0
13.5 l 19.0 - ;~;
14.5 24.0 - 9~;
16.0 20.0 .. 4.0
17.0 23.0 - ;.0
Sour'oe,' ' Extracted from article "Where the
:. ..
Shoe, Pinches" by . George Smith, Footwear Manufaoturers' Journal. ,Nov. 1967.
. , . ' The. ma~~r sOUr~es ~~ :1mp~rt.s are Hong Kong
<31% of tot~l :lmports 1~ ;1966).~ :malnly cheap
oanvasand plastic 'footwear, arid Italy(20% of I • • • • • • • • , • .
total Imports in 1966),:the main suppliers of,
women's fashion wear •. ,
(17) With regard to exports, an O.E.C.D. report
on the years 1967 - 1968 commentedl-
"The trend established in 1966
continues, 'i.e., 'exports of footwear
with leather uppers have continued to
increase even more markedly in 1967.
Italy is still the leading exporter
with ,2 milllon pairs (an increase of
38~ on 1966), followed by France with
8.6 million pairs (an increase of 23~),
the United Kingdom with' 6.4 million
pairs (an increase of 4%) and Spain wi~h
5.4 million pairs (an increase of 68~).
Most of these go to the United States,
and more particularly those from Italy
(43 mllllon pairs representing 83%
-of its exports), and Spa in (4.7 milllon
pairs representing 87%)".
Distribution In general, the
manufacturing industry
has suffered from an
of Footwear.
. excess of productive
capacity. Since the Second World War there has
been a rationalisation in retail outlets which,
together with the increase in imports and the
seasonal nature of domestic demand, has resulted in
the distributors. being placed 1ft a dominant economic
position. ( 18)
MBrsden estimated the rela tlve lmportance of
dlstrlbutlon outlets in 1960asfollowsl-
Dist~lbution of Footwear 19601 Sales by sector
£In ~2 Multiple shoe shops 118 Independent shoe shops 69 21t Women's and Men's Wear
and Drapers' shops 22 8 Co-operatlve Societies 20 ., MSil Order Houses 20 ~ Department Stores 17 Credit Traders lit ; Others It 1
TOTAL £2B;m. ~
The growth of multlple outlets and Ma 11 Orde~
Houses is slgnlficant, there being a correspqnding
decllne in the sales through Co-operatives Dnd
the other smaller outlets.
In 1969, the Natlonal Unlon of Boot and Shoe
Operatlves estimated that Romethlng llke 70% of
footwear ls.sold.through Rpeclallst shoe shops and
mail order distrlbutlon has risen to l6%·of total
footwear sold.
'N.U.B.S~O~ estimation (1969)1-
Multiples ••• • •• ltl%
Independent retailers 24~
Co-operatives ••• ,% Mail Order ••• 16~
, ,
Others .. ~ ••• 14%
, , The, largest of the multiple shoe groups is the
British Shoe Corporation which handles between 2,%
and 30% of all' footwear sales, the Corporation having
some , manufacturing interests but getting the bulk of
its supplies from independent sources,
There has:be'en a tendency during recent years for
manufacturer~branded footwear to develop following , ,
the spectacular ISllccess of G.B., Br1ttOIl with its "Tuf" ~ ;' . . ' '
and "Gluv" brands. ' The creation of customer-demand
for particular advertised brands will encourage . ': ," "'
retailers to hoid stocks,to regulariSe, the demand on
the manufacturer and allow him to make longer production
runs.
It has been difficult to obtain details of the
margins that whoiesaiers' and' retailers have bEien
working to'. However, 'it has' been estimated that the
gross margins vary from 22t%for the cheaper brands to
40% for the "high:"style" trade.
The development of collectIve bargaining
On the
Natur~ of
Trust.
The organic nature
of industrial relations
has already been
indicatech the present
can never be dIvorced from the past. To understand
the formal systems of collectIve bargaining - agreements,
scales, condItIons, incentIves - is relatively sImple;
but to comprehend the subtletIes of the informal
relationshIps on which the functioning of the system
depends, one must review the development of those
relationshIps. All agreements, however well phrased,
ultimately depend on trust I and trust requires time
to flourish. The following chapter, based prImarily
on Alan Fox's "HIstory of the National Union of Boot
and Shoe OperatIves", attempts ~o trace the development
of those "subtle relationships".
"The Union
is Born".
The National
Union of Boot and Shoe
OperatIves was born
of healthy, if not uncommon, parents, a chIld mothered
by the social and economic clImate of Victorian England
and fathered by the rapid technical changes wIthin the
boot and shoe industry. That such an offspring was
leg1timate remained initIally open to question both by
the manufacturers, to whom It offered somethIng of a
challenge, and the operatives, whose interests it
cla1Jned to champion, but withlD a remarkably short
time, respectability and - whicb was more important -
the recognition that respectabillty confers was the
Union's by right.
The 18th and early 19tb centurY' a manufactur1Dg
concerns ware cUcking olld rougb-stuff cutting w1thlD
fectory walls, closing and making remaining tbe
province of the out-workers. The factor1es bad little ,
machinery and no power.
The market flourished lD the period 1840 to 1860
with the increase 1n population and the growing wealth
of the country. Catalysed by technical innovation,
the character ·of the industry mutated, gradually at
firat but accelerating in pace after a few years.
Factoriea became more numerous and, consequently, the
numbers empioyed in out-work. The manufactur1Dg
process was becoming ,more speciallsed and the skill
content W8S being reduced so that, 1n many areas, a
rural worklDg torce was atwacted by comparatively
good wages 'to take on boot and shoe outwork for which
a month-or-so's praotise and eXperience would tit them.
Just 8S 8 new class of semi-skilled operative was
rislDg, d1stlDct from the old-style crattslllBll, so the
employer class was changing. It was clearly the
period tor the entrepreneur, the lDdlvidualist with ,
some little capital but plenty of courage and foresight.
An upper middle class appeared withlD the industry,
employers who no longer lived "on the prem1ses". A (19)
trade journal moaned in 1888, nWorkmen know not
the.ir. employers nor their employers them.- .and neither
care".
The Amalgamated Cordwainer.s. Association had . . . .
represented the shoe workers. Its officials had
honestly and conscientiously attempted to unity the
Association during this period of rapid technical
innovation; but the old'band-sewnn workers reacted
strongly against the influx of machinery and the lesser. (20)
skilled manpower it demanded. As Fox states, the
reaction had a passion "compounded of jealo~sy, fear
and contempt - jealousy of a rival,· fear of technical
displacement by the new processes, contempt for the
skills which they regarded as vastly inferior to their
own".
So it was that in December 1873, twentr-flve
workers met. in Sheffield and' seceded from the old
Association. The secession was based on the causes
of the rlvetters and finishers - the new class of
operative.
Early days. The initial Union'
structure had a General
CounCil, comprising
the General Secretary, the General PreSident, the
Treasurer and four committee men,all - except the
General Secretary - subject to re-election every two
years by the full membership. The new Union empla,yed
the "seat of government" device in which one area or
or sect10n of the membership. often the largest.
would be regarded as the "seat of government. and
offic'ials for the national body could only be elected
from within that area or section of membership. In
this fabion. the d1fficulties and heavy expenditure
in transport o~ lay members were avoided. Strictly,
in the new Uni~n. the seat of government could be
changed every two years but there were clear
advantages in having a continuity ot representation.
Leicester became the initital "sea~ of government"
and remained so, causing. at different periods.
understandable antagonism in other developing and
power-conscious areas.
At branch level, the branch president, or some
respected nominee from the branch committee, acted as
"Branch Invest~gator", his ~ask being to ,carry out,
any initial enquiry into a dispute within the area. , ,
If there was no majo~ principle at stake and if there
was no threat of a stoppage of work, the Investigator
had authority to negotiate a settlement. . . ~. . It he was
unable to reach a settlement or if a stoppage was
likely, then the matter had to be referred to the
General Council. Thus at the outset of Union history,
no "workshop representative" ,had negotiating powers • ..
A dispute referred to the General Council by the , ,
Branch Investigator would require immediate and thorough
analysis by a Council Investigator, whose recommendation
would largely determine whether the Council would
recognise the strike as "official", qualifying members
to strike pay. Thus, strict and direct control was
maintained by the Council.
This strict control was also evident in the
indirect methOds employed by the CoUncil to harness and
channel the energy; initiative and occasional'
irresponsibility of the branch. Tbe constitution
allowed a referendum to be invoked at aily time, a
simple majority of those members voting deciding the
issue. Clearly, branches with part1cu1ar "axes to'
grind" could have exploited this situation but the
CounCil, in its 'Montb1y Report, had a platform 'on which
to put for\'mrd ar'guments on 'issues'; and this was
norma'i1y a sufficient 'counter;';balance. In one
specific area .. that 'of a branch wishing '''an advance
movement", a '~uphe~ism f~r pressing sw.age improvement ;.;
the Council, i;respective of tbe Union vote as revealed
'by a ,referendUm, couid de1ay'their sa~ction'to the· , ,
mot10n on the.! g~oundS that the total monies available
within the Uni9n could not suppor~ the strikes'which
might be a natural concomitant of such branch pressure.
This remained an effective veto.,.
The Union,conference, in~tlaliy'every four' years
and then biennial; was also a platform for branch " '
inltlatlv,e although, in th~ early ~ays, c~ndltions'
between the branch areas were so 'dissimilar on grounds . ,.' , . \' ','., •• 'I'" _' . '.
of funds; membership and prosperity that wage demands . . . , ~ . , ....
were rarely discussed~ The' General ,Council' could c'a11' " , ,.
a Delegate conference when part1cular and urgent l(!,sues , . ,
were to be resolved. The conferences remained an
avenue for the moulding of opinion by the Council and, . ,
equally important, a sounding-board of the pressures,
movements and attitudes within the Union membership.
In addition to the direct and indirect methods
of control exercised by the Council, it had within its
constitution rules many areas of discretionary control, , ,
particulerly with regard to the expulsion of members.
In an industry with"so diverse a range 'Of products
and with a history of piece-work payment, the early
attempts at obtaining some uniformity of wage rate per
job faced great difficulties. Piece-rate lists .. . . "
or nstatements" .. varied widely between areas and even
within areas. They might cover a town, a district or,
in some cases, a single employer,(a Shop Statement).
However,' all such Statements having been negotiated " .. . ,
had to be registered and approved by the Council. This
approval was necessary inasmuch that 'the CounCil, ,
representing the national interest of the operatives,
might 'be called on to defend the Statement, f1tiancial
support being required for the branoh.
The development of the Union followed the characteristic pattern - difficulties in developing
membership; general apathy amongst the rank-and-filel . .., '.' ..
the inadequacy of branch leadership and administration
whlcb' could be readily explOited by a minorlty.
" !
conscious of the power they could exercise,
increasingly art1cu1ate, parochial in attitude, and ,
determined, on occasion, to win local beneflts at
the expense of natlona1 interest, the reluctance
of many branches to surrender their reglona1 autonomy,
and the continual strain on national leaders to maintain
the outward oomposure and oa1m that an external world_
demanded of a confidant, developing and unifled Union.
The attitude of the employers towards tbe
beginnings of collective bargaining varied considerably.
There remained the hard-line opponents, sturdy
individualists who resented the questioning of wbat they
considered their patriacha1 privileges and responsibilities.
There remained also, the opportunists whose attitudes i ,
wer~ consis~ent only in' their inconsistency, recognising
the Union at some time on some issue,rejectlng the
Union at others. However, by 188~, many Employer
Assoclations had been formed, some loosely bound and
some, like the Lelcester ASSOCiation formed ln 1871,
more formally and recognisably coherent as a negotiating
body. In some centres, notably Leicester, Stafford,
Leeds and Birmingham, employers recognised that regular
joint dlscussion, particularly with regard to the
c1assificatlon of piece-work rates, would, in the long
run, be beneficial to the individual firm and to the
industry in general. Boards of Conciliation and
Arbitration were set up with procedures for dealing
with-disputes, the Board being made up of equal numbers
of employers and Union officla1s. A small sub-committee
from the Board would enquire into the dispute, and if'
agreement could not be reached, it would be referred to
the f'ull Board. Finally, with no agreement at Board
level,. the dispute would go bef'ore an independent
arbitrator. The existence of these Boards, developed
on patterns similar to those employed in hosiery and
coal-mining, signalled the willingness on behalf of' many
employers to accept and to regularise the methods of
collective bargaining.
Union leaders in the 1870's and 1880's fully grasped
that their position vis-a-vis the employers was
essentially defensive. The finances were such that a
major strike would cripple the Union in a matter of' days.
A Council statement in 1878 declared the sbike as an
outdated weapon •••••••• "the days for appeals to man's
worst passions ••••• are happily gone, and now it should
be considered a crime to seek a fight when peace could
be maintained with Just as much honour and more profit
by the use of' conciliatory measures ••••• ". The Union
leaders perhaps were not echoing Samuel Butler's edict,
"Better an unjust peace than a Just war" , but,
certainly, tactical necessity forced a policy of
moderation on the Union. (20)
Fox sums up their attitudel "Thus the times
had produced the appropriate men and the appropriate
measures, the Union, being deprived through weakness
of the weapons of militancy, turned to the softer but
nevertheless more potent weapons of' persuasion, rational
argument and the app~al to "fair play" and public
opinion. In doing so it had to educate its members in
those gentle and more subtle arts and to do this
effectively found itself creating a philosophy of
industrial relations, inculcating new values to lend·
weight to tactical recommendations". Thus was virtue
made of necessity - and the foundation of negotiated
industrial peace laid.
The 1880' sand
the 1890 period.
During the
1880's there was a
general, long-term
world trend of falling prices, pressuring employers into
smaller profit margins and, in turn, creating greater
difficulties for' the operatives~ The hiring of labour
by the day or week had been continually resisted by the
Union who, perhaps correctly, argued that an employer
could press a day-wage operative to produce an output
commensurate with that obtained on piece~work. However
such was the economic climate that when-the Union
categorically resisted "day_work" in an area, membership
of the Union in that area declined rapidly. Some
manufacturers introduced' "team-work" in which a particular
process was sub-divided in order that less skilled labour
might be employed. Although having a sound economic
basis it is understandable that the Union would resist
this dilution of skilled labour, for exactly the same
reasons that the old Cordwainers' As~ociation had resisted
the entry of rivetters and finishers.
By 1888, th~ nseat.ot governmentn method ot Council
representation was under attack on many grounds, placing,
as i t ~id, much reliance on th~ Leicester bra~ch. for
provid~g the. quality t)f. l~adership re9uired •.. Devised
as, a method of re~ucing expenses~ it wa~ decided,at the
Conference that the method should now be abandoped •.
In 1889, the Shoe and Leather Record was stating;
"Every manufacturer to-day feels that he has an interest
in the settlement of wages paid by his competitors and,
although the workmen were the first to point it,out,
yet n~w t!te principle has been acceded, the employers
are eager to carry it to its ,logical conclusion •••••
The irritation that, formerly existed,be~een unionis~,
and ,employer is rapidly dying out ••••••• n. , ,
Such. statements of conf~dence seem always to be
the ,harbingers o.r strife; and certainly a, decade of
industrial fire fol~owed, a fire in which. many
authorities aver· the negotiating patterns of the 10dustry
were tempered. ,
The Employers' Associations had rema10edseparate
entities. Tentative moves towards Federation had been ,
suggested 10 1889 and in December 1890, at the Bell Hotel . .'. '. ' ..
10 Leicester, representatives of Associations from all.
over the country agreed to Federation. The ~itial
years of the Federation would follow much the same pattern
of development as the Union, reflecting the basic
conflicts between individual interest, Association
autonomy and national Federation requirements.
,
The period of trade boom in 1890 saw the Union
significantly widening its approach to the employers,
confident in its growing strength. ' The impact of
machinery was beginning to be more widely felt ~ the
sewing machine', heeling and paring, finishing machines
and, what had be.en considered an impossibility, the'
lasting machine.. Day wages had· had to be accepted
in connection :with machinery, it be,ing impossible to
negotla te pIece-work ra tes. However, as the machinery
was being introduced there was a dec11ne in out-door
working, the area in which the UnIon' had had dIffIculty
in gaining membership and therefore to control. The
Union campaIgned for the e11mination, of outdoor "lorking
and for the limitation of' boy-labour.
The Firs:t
National ,
Conference. , .' .. .
, " The Employers'
Associations
had formed a
National'
Federation and t~e Union now had natIonal strength,
the logic of the ~Ituatioll d,em~nded dis~u,ssion between
employer, and e~p1oyee at national level. The f1rst , ,
conference took place ,in Leicester in 'August 1892 with . ,'." .
riiri~ represeritat1vesfromeach 'Sid~, the major issue
of boy-labour beIng eventually put to 'arbItratIon, the " . . '. " . -,
result being tbatthe principle of r~strIct1on in the " '. . , .
ratio of boys/men wss to be accElpted.
Procedure to
Prevent Strikes'.
" •..•....• all
and every'questIon,
or aspect' of a '
question, affe'ct1ng the relation of employers and
workmen individually' or collectively' should, In the
case of disagreement be'submitte'd to the local board'
So ran the "Rules for tb'e Prevention of Strikes, and
Loek~outs" drawn up by the Union and Federation, both
a • •• •
parties unequlvocally accepting that ani sub3ect could
be regarded as a' sub3ect for arbitration. The Union'
and the Federation were accepting responsibility for
negotiating for their members and, implicitly, in
disciplining thelli. Enlightened employers accepted'
that only a strong Union l~adership could maintain
authority over its members. Higher -capital investment
and higher overheads in factories forced employers to
recognise that unofficial strikes and stoppages, on the
increase during ,this period of unrest, could no longer
be tolerated if the industry was to prosper.
Union leaders recognised the unofficial strikes as
symptomatic of a growing unrest, stemming partly' from
the development of athe new Socialism" and partly from
the reluctance of local organisations, Federation and
Union, to submit to the National agreements. The unrest
manifested itself into an nanti .. arbitrationist'~ ,factiQn
whose protagonists ,claimed that arbitration machinery ,
was slow and clumsy. This grass~root m1l1tBI).cy was to
offer a severe challenge to ,the Union directly .. and to
the principle of arbitration.
pre~to ~he 1895' Unrest.
The arguments
of the rebellious
vociferous.
group became more
The moderate Union executives were losing
ground. The Federation were acutely aware that the
support given to the Union leadership by the "Rule:s for
Prevention of Strikes and Lock-outs" had eroded the
employe~s position; and the employer had not reaped
the ma30r benefits envisaged in the national negotiation, . ,
primarily a disciplining of employees by the 'Union.
Restriction of outputs had becom~ a commonplace.
Operatives on machines were normally on day-wage, piece
work statements for machine-made goods not having been
negotiated, and it had been.loca1 Union policy in many
areas for operatives on machines to restrict output to
that which would have been produced under the old hand
methods and commensurate with the day-wage being paid.
The employers therefore were losing the benefits of
introducing machinery and the greater outputs that went
with it.
Matters came to a head when the Leicester No. 1
Branch put forward a piece-work statement which,
essentially, provided the operative with a wage based
on the old hand-worked methods. The benefits of
mechanisation were 'being claimed for the operative.
The operatives understandab1r sUPllorted the vi.gorous,
if ingenuous, policy, particularly. since it emanated
from Branch level. They were, also understandably,
uncertain as to the possib1e.future effects on their
security of employment. The Union Council,
considerably embarrassed by the development, could not
denounce the piece-work statement outright.
The moderates,.within the Union and Federation, " .
were losing the day. The Union faced a clear and direct . .
threat to its authority by the "ant-arbitrationist"
lobby I and many Federation members ~lere openly critical,
claiming that the National Conference and arbitration
had denuded them of many of their prerogatives without
strengthening the forces of order and moderation which,
it wasc14med, were the long term ob3ectives of the
industry.
As with many disputes, the underlying reasons were
complicated - .a fusion of distrust, misunderstanding,
uncertainty, a seeking after power, rapidly changing . .
circumstance and difficulty in resd3ustment, and, as . '
with many disputes, all that remained to happen was that
a tangible situation be revesled in which underlying .. dispute became naked conflict.
The 189, Confli~t
and its Results.
• ". L
In September
1894, a trivial
dispute provdded the
confrontation. An
apparently non-Federated firm had an 'officlal strike.
Immediately the firm claimed Federation membership and
invoked the "Rules for Dispute" which required the men
to return to work. The Union claimed the firm was
non-Federated and not entitled to the protection the Rules
afforded. The Federation, invited to a National ,
Conference by the Union, replied in writing, " •••••
For some time the operation of our National: Conference
and local Arbitration boards, as you must be aware, . ,
have not been satisfactory .'..... The policy the
Union has adopted in attempting 'to 'find work for the . .' .
unemployed by restricting the output and p1ae1ngevery
obstacle in the way of satisfactory operation'of
machinery, thus increasing the cost of production, is,
in the opinion of the manufacturer, suicidal, calculated
to materially reduce demand and to drive trade into
other countries where no such restrictions exist ••••• "
The reply also contained seven proposalsl-
, •.
(i) That there shall be no advance
or reduction of the present rate of
wages or piece-work statements or
alteration of the hours of labour for
two years.
(U) That every employer is entitled ,
(a) to control ma~agement, (b) to
pay recognised wage rates and '(c) to
'introduce ' machinery.,
(iU) That the present'lsnot'the time
for negotiation of piece-work 'rate for
machinery operations.
(iv) That there be no restriction of
output.
Cv) That every employer can have his
. work done in any town or place if he
pays current recognised rates.
(vi) That an emp1Q¥er has the sole
right to determ1ne whom he shall emp1Q¥.
(vii) That statements by Secretaries
of AssoCiations or Unions be accepted
~s proof of membership.
The ~ederation decl1ned the Conference on grounds
of ultimate futility but perhaps also 1n order to
avoid extensive press coverage. (Previous Conferences
had been carried out 1n the glare of publicity).
At the Special Delegate Conference called by the
Union, .the "anti-arbitrat10nists" called for a w1thdrawa1
from local boards and a return to the old str1ke
methods. Put to referendum, the "anti-arb1trationists"
were defeated, the Union Council being supported by
,,046 to 1,930, a total response.of 6,976 from a
membership of 33,379. The Union now reiterated
modified counter-proposals which were rejected by the
Federation. A confrontation on "The Seven Principles"
was being forced on the Union by the Federation,
1nitia1ly.at Leicester and.Northampton but rapidly
spread1ng. B.Y March 189" 46,OOO.workers were involved
in the stoppage, all federation centres being 1nvo1ved
in what has been called "a strike" or a "lock-out", ,
dependent on the in~ividUB~'S point of view.
The impasse c::ont1nued.As the weeks passed much
hardship occurred. The Union f~~s were dra1ning away.
Public opinion favoured. arbitration butthe Federation
withstood this pressure. Eventually the Board of Trade . .
semi-offic1ally ordered a conference, the Union still
making defiant speeches but actually "whistling in a
rather penniless dark" t the Union being financially
'on its knees. The terms'of settlement were agreed
on the 19th April, 189,.
The Terms
of Settlement.
The Terms of
Settlement reached .
in 189, have tended
to be considered
epoch-making, certainly within the in~ustry. (Appendix 11).
Re-read1Dg the Terms at this distance of time, they " ,
appear moderately ambiguous and inconclusive, and yet
it' is true that these Terms have formed the basis on " '
which all future agreements have been made. ",
The Terms agreed that statements on piece,;,work , .
"were desirable; such sta'teuients to be based on the • , , ,
act~al'~apacity of an average workman". " '
Both sides
recognised - as perhaps no outsider could recognise , .
from the wording,- that these words meant the defeat of
the Leicester No. 1 agitation on maChinery. Modern
methods of production were to be accepted. 'Also any
manufacturer could employ day-wage or piece-work, but
he must employ t~e same system throughout tbe enterprise.
A jOint' committee was, to be formed for formulating
piece-work statements.
Local boards were to be 're-constituted but there
was to be restriction in the subject matter to be
considered by .. them, the restrictions to apply tOI-
(i) the employers right to
emploY wnom he chose,
(i1) the terms of employment
outside the board area,
(iii), the regulations with regard
to time-keeping of employees",
,e~c., and
(iv) the introductlon of ,machinerYI
and whetner day-wage or "
piece-work should be employed.
Resolution, defined the function of tnelocal
boards, it being' emphaslsed tnat no dispute exlsted
unless-indlvidual employees made representation for
a change. Thus disputes - within the Terms of Settlement -
", h,ad to originate at the factory floor and would only • i come ~o the board rhen ~it was impossible to se~t1e
" in the first -place' betwe~n employer and employed, or,
secondly, through ,their representative " •••••••• Thls
section of the Settlement was to place greater demands
on the local Union organisation. ,-
Henceforth, all agreements were to run for a
specifled perlod of time. Also, should any provision
of the Settlement be broken, either by a manufacturer
or the Union, then failure to compLv within ten days
would constitute a breaking of the agreement.
Resolution 6 provided financial guarantees for carrying
out the agreements. Thus, these are essentially
"penalty clauses" and originally required £1,000 to be
contributed by the Union and Federation to a Guarantee
Fund so that, if an Umpire considered that a default
of the agreement had occurred, the offending side
would forfeit all or part of that Guarantee amount.
Tbis clause was inserted to act as a deterrent to , ,
irresponsible action, primarily to the Union, to whom
the financial loss 'might have been -important. A
deterrent it certainly proved but it might be over
emphasising its effect to conclude that it woald have
deterred the Union. executive from industrial action .
on an issue of major importance if they considered,
(a) , they had sufficient finano1al backing to maintain
the actio~ and (b) they'had a good chance of winning.
The "penal clauses", however, gave individuals "pause ' ..
to think", 'preventing rash action~
The' essence of the Settlement isa restriction
on those 'subjects which could come before arbitration,
primarily considered by employers to all~l of too wide
an interpretation. The Settlement had broken the
reactionaries within the Union, particularly on the
acceptance of new, more sophisticated machinery.
However, the Union.remained as a viable entity, and
. that it did. remain when. many obs!'lrvers •. particularly
the hot-heads within the Federation, considered that
continuance of the dispute could have crippled the
Union completely, is perhaps 'some tribute to the
farsightedness of those responsible Federation officials
who recognised that collective bargaining within the
industry offered,the best opportunity for continued
industrial peace. It would be idle to pretend that
, employers were motivated b,y an enlightened social
conscience, although this was not rare, but rather
they had made a capable, rational assessment of the
present situation and extrapolated into the future.
Post-Settlement
Period.
The decade after
Settlement saw Unio~
fortunes in decline.
Membership fell.from 44,000 in l89~ to 24,000 in 1906.
The militancy ~ the Union had been checked. Inevitably, , I
often the Settl~ment, there were the cases of . I
~ vict1misation by' employers; but also there were ma~ f employers - and.~Associations, \-Tho recognised that the
wounds of the dispute had determinedly to be healed and ~ .
therefore adopted a reasonable and conciliatory attitude.
Trade fluctuated but there was a general trend .01' decline.
Levies amongst Union membership to restore depleted
resources were unpopular. Older men within the industry
found the new machinery, now being widely.intrcduced,
presented difficultiesl employers were quick to
encourage younger and less skilled operatives. Imports,
particularly from America, had trebled in a fev years,
producing a most potent agent for change. A technical
revolution was being accomplished in the industry.
The Development
of' Piece-\-Tork for
Machine Operatives.
The Settlement
provided for a
piece-work system
"ba sed on the
actual capacity of the workman". However, with such a
wide diversity of product, great difficulty was
experienced· in obtaining any piece-work basis.
Machinery and day-wage were the order of the day.
The Leicester Area, at the forefront of technical
change and with a history of piece-work, provided a
basis, exemplified in the Finishing Statement of
September 1904. The so-called "Quantities principle"
was devised ~ereby each operation carried a certain
price/pair so that, by dividing price/pair into the
recognised weekly wage, ~ "standard perforlll;8nce" was
determined. This "standard performance" or. "Quantity"
could provide the bas.is for a normal weekly wage or,
alternatively, could permit the operative to increase
output on condition that his wage increasmpro-rata
with increased output •. WIjS
The Quantities principle/resisted by many employers,.
particularly in areas of higb unemployment where day
wage men could be pressured to large outputsJ and
resisted, also, by some Union sections who recognised ,
that greater production by ~ewer men would inevitably.
lead to higher unemployment.
Progression to
National
Negotiation.
The Settlement
had retained !egiona1
autonomy, the local
boards determining
the wage rates to apply within the area. There were
wide differences in wage ·scales and employment conditions.
The Union Conference in 1902 resolved that one of its
major objectives shouid be a national mtnimmn.weekly
wage. This resolution was t'o accieleratethe move
towards national negotiation on wage rates, direct
between Union 'and 'Federation. " By' 1908, the' Union
President was able to report that "the thirty shilling
minimum weekly' wage was now established,in those places
where most of oill' members are employed"'.
It wssbecoming increasingly clear to lea'ders of
Union and Federation allke that there' were matters
arising' on' t-Thich no local board, i.e. Union and employer
ASSOCiations, was really competent to pronounce.
On the Union slde, the question of the minimum wage and
'the length of the worklng week, on the Federatlon
side, the unauthorised strikes which were causing grave
losses of output prompted the employers to seek a
reduction' in the "perlod of grace" from the orlg ina 1
ten days of the Settlement to five days, or 'even less.
The first national ~egotiatlon since 189, took
place, in private, in October 1907, butl1ttle 'on these
lmportant aspects was decided, nor again in 1908,
with each side progressiv~ly introducing fresh items
in the bargaining process. The 1909 Conference,
however,brought out the "Supplementary Terms of
Settlement" "' (Appendix 111), in which the Union accepted
a reduction in the "period of grace" from ten days to
three days, gaining, in return, a ,2+ hour working
week, a speeding up of the 100al boar4' procedures and an
improvement in the "boy-labour award". The agreement
was to run for three years and be subject to six months
notice by either side. This whole agreement was ' "
ratified'by the Union, membership by a' small majority,
4,000 for ,and 3,000 odd against out of a total membership
of 30,,000.
By the outbreak of the First World War, the industry
was coming to be recognised as one of the best organised
in the country, both from Union and Federation strength
and effectiveness. 'By 1914, Union membership,had risen
to ,0,000 and total funds amounted to £170,000.
Organisation within the Union had been considarably
improved with the appointment of more salaried officials
at national level, a move made necessary by the advent
of the 1911 National Insurance Act ~lhich made greater
demands on administrative efficiency.
The original 1902 Union objective of a national
minimum weekly wage had formalised by 1913 and, at the
Union conference of that year, the Union executive were
iristructed to press, at national level, for the
introduction of a national minimum of thirty-five
shillings 'for all adult employees.
T~e 1914
National
Agreement.
The major
items from the 1914
National Agreement
were as follows.-
(i) a uniform system of piece-work be
introduced nationally,
(11) that restriction of output be
awarded and that an operatlve's
( 11i)
"skill· and ability be employed
to best advantage and fullest
capacity",·
a rather ambiguous statement,
similar in style to. that of the
original Lelcester.Quantitles
Statement, imp1led that a day
or waek1y wage could be pald
but that extra output would
qualify for extra payment and
that, where an employer fal1ed
to provide work while the
operative was available in the
factory, a minimum wage would
nevertheless be paid. This was
later interpreted, in some areas,
as a guaranteed minimum wage
under both the day-wage and piece-
work systems,
(iv) If, at tbe· end· of a period of ,
agreement, it could be demonstrated
that tbe Union bad been imab·le.
to enforce new wage minima upon
non-federated· firms~ tben tbe
Federation or local Associatlon
c·ou1d refuse to consider further
increases.· (This ensured that the
Un10n would exert pressure on those
f1rms who were un~ercutt1ng on
wages and pr1ces).
(v) .Loca1 arb1trat10n boards could not
negot1ate any agreement or award
wh1cb was less favourable to.
operat1ves than that. agreed
nat10nally.
(v1) A general wldening of those matters
wblch were open to, lnvestigatlon by
local representat1ves compared wltb . , . .
the restr1ct10ns of tbe 189, ,
Settlement, and·final1y,
(v11) A statement by tbe employers that
they accepted the desirability of
all operatives becoming members of
the Union.
In retrospect, the basis of the 1914 Agreement,
amb1guous though lt be ln certain areas, was perhaps
as important a development as the 189; Settlement.
Two major factors contr1buted to lts success - the . . . ..'
growth of the Un1on, 1 ts strength and potent1al for
, diSciplin1ng its members, and the general confidence
of the employers that they now had the measure of . . . ,
the1r overseas competlt10n.
The 1914~
1918 W~r.
, During the War,
much of the industry
came under d1rect or
1ndirect Government control and, to save tlme and effort,
the Government preferred to deal with single natlonal
authoratltlve bodles~ The power and prestige. of the
F.eder.ation flourished.
The. female membership in the· Union increased and
by 1917, 20,000 of the Union's 69,000 members, were
women. Piece-work statements for "closing", the
traditional female province, began to appear.
There was a resurgence of local wage agreements,
increasing the diversity of tmges in different regions.
In an attempt to obtain greater unlformlty with regard
to Government contract work, a Natlonal Joint Standing
Committee was formed to determlne basic rates of pay
for each of the operatlves in the industry.. The first
"National Red Book Agreement" issued by this committee
appeared about the time of the?Whltley COmmittee, and
the Agreement was hailed in som~ quarters as the
precursor of t-lhlt1ey recommendations aimed at complete
unlformity througbout the industry. However, more
realistic and wiser heads were less enthUSiastic,
accepting that national uniformity was debatably
desirable but impossible.
Perhaps the most remarkable change during this
period was totally unconnected with the War.. This was
the acceptance by the lay. delegates to the ~onference
that, in future, all full-time officials of the Union
should attend the Biennial Conference. by virtue of their
offlce, over.and above·the maximum representation from
each section. Perhaps Britlsh trade unionism bas a
noted antipathy towards the so-called "professional"
,
within its ranks. Certainly many Unions still
preclude, its paid-officials from'their conference's.
And yet, as the Leicester delegate said in',19l8, .
"It is they who have to administer the Rules of the
Un1on. It doesn' tseem fair if they cannot attend".
After Whitley, a Joint Industrial Council for
the Boot and Shoe Industry was set up in 1918; The
end of the War produced its euphoric optimism, a
release from the conflict. ,Union membership had,
grown to 83,000. The employers were aonfident
that colleotivism ~ a "true partnership between'
employer and employed" - offered industrial salvation~
Tbe'Immediate' The 1919
Post-War Period~" ' , National 'Agreement
saw the Union
executive endeavouring
to reassert its authority, an authority part1Blly
eroded at area level. The Agreement's'major clauses
stipulated ...
anational'm1nimum wage for'
male and female operatives,
(b) that piece-workers, who,
during the tIar had been earning
well above the min,imum wage, should
earn at least 2,~ above the appropriate
minimum,wage agreed for day-wage
workers,
(c) , the working week be reduced
to 48 hours and new statements by the local
boards be provided,
(d) overtime would be paid at time
and a quarter week-days, time and a
half on Saturdays, or 2,% and ,0% respectively on piece-work rates.
This represented a consolidation of Union claims,
but by 1920 the cost of living was rising at such an
alarming rate that, on Union request, the Federation
agreed to re-open negotiations "having regard to the
fact that the cost of living has increased to a figure
not contemplated ,·Then the Agreement was reached". An
Interim Agreement saw a .10% increase for all operatives.
The post-war boom. quickly declined and short-time
returned to many areas. The old confl1ctof the'
abolition of piece-work and a return to day-wage with
restriction of output was revealed~ Northampton had
always been area area where the Leicester-based piece
work statement had not· been completely welcome and it
was Northampton who pressed the National Executive
to put the abolition of piece-work to the Federation.
It was; of course, unrealistic, and the 1921 Agreem~nt
saw a reduction in both day-wage and piece-work rates • . However, the concession won by the Union was that such
changes in rates should be related to the "cost-of-living"
index. This relating of rates to the index has remained
an integral part of all agreements to the preseni day.
The Inter-War
Period.
The inter-war
period was·governed
by the economic climate,
both nationally and abroad. 1 The further introduction of
machinery gave a potentially, greater product1ve capac1ty
but this was not matched by greater. demand. The
domestic market remained static, the export market
contracted. (Exports dropped from 17.; million pairs
in 1913 to ~.; million pairs in 193;); Cheaper products
did not increase demand, the market remaining relatively
inelastiC. Productivity increased and was matched
by a declining work force and short-time working. The
fickle women's fashion market develo~ed, particular~
with the cement-process of sole attachment, an~ other
centres besides Norwich, a traditional producer, branched
out into this market sector.
Many employers were not slow to exploit the essentially
weak position of the operative. Piece-work rates were
being undermined by placing men on minimum day-wage and
obtaining outputs comparable with piece-work.
Northampton firms, in partioular, adopted this 1 ,
attitude and were able to undercut competitors in other
areas who were honouring the Agreement. The Union fought
the issue in Northampton in 1932 and, under Union
pressure, a Manufacturers' Association was formed to
regulate the area. However, the pressure of deflated
world trade saw Union and Federation unable to maintain
complete diSCipline of its members.
Both sides of industry had a vested interest in the
universal applicstion of the National Agreements, the
Union for the common protection of its members and
the development of its strength, the Federation for
the limiting of what was considered to be the unfair , ,
competition of wage-cutting~ At the 1922 Joint ., . '.' .
National COnference~ Union and Federation'unanimously
resolved to persuade the Government that National , "
, . Agreements~ freely entered into, should be legally
enforceable~ i.e~~ tbat statutory powers be invested , ' ,
in tbe industry to impose the Agreements. Tbe
Whitley Committee had tentatively suggested tbat Joint
Industrial Council agre~mentsmight~,eventuallY, have , ,
legal, sanction. Numerous Bills were promoted in . " . . , , '
Parliament in the period 1922-1932, ,supported by a
number of industries, but all eventually foundering,
on the hostile attitude of the Trades Union Council.
(It is interesting to note tbat wben a group of firms
left the Federation, primarily to be outside tbe
negotiated wage agreements, tbe Federation financially
supported Union members in their tbree-montb strike
to force erring e~ploYers back "into the fold").
Tbeboot and Tbe General Strike,' ,
Tbe Minority Movement. sboe operatives
were not called
out during the 1926 General Strike but were generous'
in their donation to the'miners' cause, subscribing
£39,000 by levy and other means and lending. the Yorkshire
miners £;O,OOO~
The Trade'Disputes and the Trade Union Act 'of
1927 met vigorous opposition from many union off1cia1s"
particularly the 'section dealing with "the contracting
in" on political levies. In the Union of Boot and
Shoe operatiVes,' however, the reaction was 'miliii.'
Perhaps the most interesting outcome of the .1926 Strike
we s the development of the "Minority Movement" in'
certain industries, Communist inspired, the Movement
professing to' unify the ~lorking classes while' following
plainly disruptive' policies and declaring an open challenge to exiSting Union officials at branch, and '
. , ,.
national level~ Within the footwear industry. the , ,
Movement's platform rested on,
'~ .
(i) • minimum wage of '. '. .
'£3.l0s.0d~ with'equal
pay for women,
( 11) a ~hOur working
week, '
(11i) shop-committees
'to be formed at every
firm, with power to call
a strike,
(iv) the abolition of, , . . .
local arbitration 'boards;
(v) Union salaries to
be based on average
• member'.s wage," " '
(vi) nationalisation 01'
industry.
The underlying paradox for the Un10n off1c1a1s
lay in the1r acceptance of the fact that co-operat1on
w1th employers was essent1al, 1ndeed such co-operat1on
had shown visible dividends to their operative members;'
and yet, ~some fashion, co-operat1on conflicted w1th the
black and wh1te .princ1ples of trade un1onism, historically
developed, which vietoTed employers and employees" a1ms . { "., ' .' '. ' ,
and object1ves as always mutually exclusive. The
Minority Movement capitalised on this basic paradox. . .
In particular, the 'esta~lishment of shopecommittees -
a throw-back to the shop-steward movement of the war -
was viewed as a positive threat to be resisted since
it was here that the key to the exerc1se of power lay;
liithout sucb pOlier tbe break-up of the carefully
constructed, albeit pragmat1c~ employer-employee
re1at1onsh1p was not feas1b1e.
The Union execut1ve moved quickly, asking for and
rece1ving powers to take disc1p1inary action against
"d1sruptive members" over the heads' of the local branch
execut1ve. Later in 1928 a circular was sent out to
all branches stating that no member of the Minority
Movement or the Communist Party, or members associat1ng
with them, liere.to be allowed to hold office at national
or branch level. All officials bolding office were
requ1red to Sign a declaration that they were'not'member~
of the Minority Movement or the Communist Party~
The Minor1ty Movement faded due to the general
lack of adequate, 1eadersh1p and the decis1ve act10n of . , the Union executive, but also due' to the fact that
rank-and-file membership never reall~ took the
movement serious~.
The 1928 circular remains in operation to the
present da~ and, although it has treated misgivings
in ma~ liberal and democraticall~ minded union members
on the score of basic principle, the Biennial Conference
has regularl~ reiterated its support for the circular.
The 1934 )1~ion Since its inception,
the Union had faced a
conflict between national
needs and local branches wishing to maintain their
Conference.
autono~, and at no time had the National Union been able
to cont~ol, or even influence, all branches on all
matters. In pa~ticular; the election of branch officers
had, apart from ~he 1928 circular, ,remained a sole~
branch prerogative and; occasional~; the· executive had
to stand aside and watch men whom the~ recognised as
totall~ unsuited for the task be elected. This was the
essence of grass-roots democrac~, but a weak official
so elected was open to ma~ branch pressures; particularl~
from an active branch minorit~ nearing re-election time.
The finances of the branches had never been centralised
and there were wide variations in financial administration
and affluence between branch and branch. These
variations were furth~r exaggerated b~,the gradual change
in the geographic dist~ibution of factories, new growth
areas,.- requiring to develop membership, were denied a
full-time official because it hadn't the membership
and the funds. These problems were tackled by an
executi~e having, in Fox's estimation, nsome of the
keenest intelligences that British trade unionism has
ever called into its servicen• They realised that the
branch official must not only have the confidence of
his members but must also have a technical competence
in dealing with the more sophisticated problems ot an
industry becoming more technologically-orientated.
After an epoch-making debate at the 1934 Conference,
the executive Council were given some powers, (a) to
intervene in branch organisation, (b) to move towards
centralisation of funds, and, most importantly, (c) to
interview all nominees for office and only those
considered to have the necessarY,competence to be
submitted to a ballot by members. Thus, the executive
had a much closer control over the whole of the Union.
The decade prior to the Second I-Torld War saw
relative calm and general developmant in Union and
Federation, this despite the general tardiness of markets.
The total work force had declined but Union membership
had risen from about 80,000 in 1930 to 87,000 in 1938.
The Federation had increased its strength and in a joint
Union-Federation survey of over 600 firms in 1939,
32~ were federated (54%) but these firms represented
78% of the total operatives in the 600 firms. ,
The World War 11 , The transferences
Period. ". o~ labour under the
Ministry of !.Bbolll' Emergency Powers saw a depletion
from 10;,000 in 1939 to 64,000 'in 1944, with a rising
proportion"of 'women and a rapidly increasing 'average
age. The Union concentrated on the development of'
the new price-index sliding, sca1e,with ten-point
intervals to be adjusted mon'th1Y r'eplac!rig the previous
twenty-point scale with yearly adjustment to the' '
September cost-of-living index. The new sliding
'scale allowed the changes in ~dex to be more rapidly
trans1ated'into the wage-rates. The longer holll's
worked on more standardised products allowed piece
workers to earn very high wages. (Originally
the concept was that they shoWl obtain 2;% above day
wage). The 1943 Union Conference agreed to press for
14% and 24% increase in male' and female day-wage
respectively, together with a modest ~. for piece
workers. In fact, the Agreement gave 6%, 9% and
3.7;% respectively.
An increasing interest had been awakened in plans
for the post~war industry, it being considered 'that a
retlll'n to the free~for-all of the inter~war period
could be avoided by a' measure of overall "planning and
control" • The 1943 Union Conference 'saw "a'plan"
proposed - full employment, security, conditions of
service, worker participation in management, control
of profits, reduction in distribution margins, and
the plan accepted as basic premises that (i) the
interests of operatives was coincident with that,of
the general pub1i~ ,and, (ii) int~usion int? dir~ct
management deCision areas ,could be achieved without
consequent financial responslbll1ty for loss. o' ••
Workshop committees were proposed but "would not usurp . ,
the posltlon of the full-time Un10n off1clal".
The reactlon of the Federat10n was predlctablel
they dld not lntend to enter Into debate on thls Issue
whlch they consIdered polItIcal rather than industrIal.
The varlous Post"W~r
Per1od. ' econom1c'crises and
appeals' by Governments
for wage restraint have' created· problems for'Un10n
leader's,· already pressed b1 their members who have
clalme~ that averageaarn1Qgs In footwear are lower
than those . in' comparable craft industrIes~ ',The 1946
Agreement, saw, increases for the lower pilld; the' increase , ,
for the hlgher pald tapering off .. a 'determined effort , , ,
to reduce the "wage~gap" between the lowest'and hlghest
pald workers.' Important in thI.sAgreementWas· the
"Guaranteed Wage",equal to 7,% of average earnings~
~ThIch brought wIth Itthe posSibillty that,in perlOds
of slack trade, an employer w~uld lay people' off' rather
than continue to pay the wage. The FederatIonwlshed
to 'retain the rIght to "suspend" a worker for a period;
and many,operatives were in agreement. However,
strong Union leadershIp was adamant that they would
rather ensure continulty of employment for a.reduclng
labour force and face up to the problems of redundancy
and re-deployment. A UnIon Presldent 'summed up the
attitude; "Let us not weaken, but whatever the casualtles
so design our conscious acts that the industry will
••••• employ no more labour than it can offer a high
wage, first class cond1t10ns, and steady and regular
employment".
The industry had, over its history, regarded
collective bargaining as a domestic issue to be
settled between employer and employed. Government
intervention had been indirect and mostly per1pheral.
Prior to the 1947 negot1at1ons, the Minister of
Labour wrote off1c1ally to the Union, a copy being
seut to the Federat1on, pointing out that the national
interest demanded some restrict10n in wage advances.
It is interesting to note that the Federat1on, armed
with apparent Government sUpport, nevertheless d1d
not refer to the letter directly, recognising, perhaps,
that Government intervent1on, once employed, could be
used to their detriment on a future occasion. The
1947 Agreement saw one week's holiday w1th pay
introduced.and 1n 1949, the Un10n were press1ng for an
extra week. On being refused in 1949 and again in
1951, the.Union referred the d1spute to the Minister
of Labour. The National Conference chairman had
pleaded "not to resort to an outs1de body" but to
·maintain their reputation for settling matters 1nternally •
. The National Arb1tration Tribunal awarded the extra
week's ho11day with paYI the Un10n had won.
In the late 40' s and early 50' s, "work-study"
methods were beginning to enter the industry meeting
resistance from many operatives and branch officials who
saw it as a threat to security and also as a threat
to the functioning of the local boards. The Union
executive, however, welcomed the raising of eff1ciency
th(Jtwork-study could, in some areas', bringJ but it
was only' slowly that they persuaded their conservative
members tbst, with the correct sateguards, the
industry'and they'would benefit. (Standard Minute ,. Values are applied to the various operations under
review). 'BY the 60' s, the Nationa 1 Conference wa s
agreeing to the 'set-up of wages determined by Standard
Minute Values and, at the present t'1me, the piece-work
method of payment is a'ccompanied by a system bBsed on
the Time-Study Agreement"the employer deciding which
system will be introduced.
There was a change in the 1963 Agreement which
allowed wage-rates to be changed' b1-annual'lyin
relation to the Index of Retail PricesJ thus operatives
wages are a'utomati'cally kept in step with fluctuations
in the cost of living.
Summary~' In looking back
over the development
of collective bargaining in the industry, the salient
feature's tha't command themselves for further invest:..
igation are as iollowsi~
(i) The qua,l1tyand foresightedness .. of . .. ... , "
,the national Union a,nd Fede,ration officials.
(11) Their ab,il1ty to recognise the factsl,
and to base their actions and arg1,lDl9nts .
on a pragmatic pbi~osopby rather than
political doctrine.
(1ii) The exercise of pOwer b,yfull
time Union officials and the determined .' , .
policy of the Union executive to reject . ,
tbe concept of the 11 shop-stewardn •
(1v) Tbe high ratio of fnll-time . " . '.
Union officials to members,. and tbe
"screening process" in their election.
(v) 'The deliberate rejection of , .'
subversive - or wbat the ~nion consider , .
to be subversive - grouPSt denying " , the righ
certain minorities/to hold,office.
(vi) The general acceptance by the .,
union, post 189;, that technical Ohange
demanded cbanges in outlook; and a
willingness on the part of·Union leaders
to persaal!e their members to follow
tbem, when it took courage to lead and
to be led.
(vi!) Tbe development of a single
Emplo,yers' Federation whose officials
are not only sources of technical
information but also the main negotiating
personnel.
(viii) ·The recognition that trouble
nearly·always starts at the shop-floor;
and that it is 'there that immediate
....--- a'ction'must be ~keilas rapidly as',
possible~ The procedures'for ·
dealing ,with disputes are primarily , . , . factorY-l!ased, but they a're in the
hands of full-time Union officials
and, in' many are~s, full-time
Federation secretaries, together with
the management~' ,
(ix),' The development of agreements
which keep ~ step with the cost'of
living index~
The Agreements;
The current Agreements were negotiated 'in 1967
to be operative for the following two-year period.
The following chapter is a summary of the major provisions
in the Agreementsl-
Ge~eralWo~king
Condltions~ .. . . '" ~~ -
(i) Both Union and
Federation are
commi tted to the
national observance ,of the Agreement "by all employers
and employees whether,members of their respective
organisstions or not". "
(11) The Union must
not negotiate prices lower than the Agreement, or lower
than the prices prevsiling in the district without
consultation with the Federation ..
(i11) The working
week of ~O hours, five days, Monday to Friday, is
specified.
(iv) Conditions with
~egard to attendance at factories during both full
time and short-time working • . ' .
( v) The proportion
of boys to men shall not exceed ll~ in aggregate I and in
no one department shall the rat~o exceed l13!
means a male employee under 19 years of age).
(A boy
Females employed
on operations customarily performed by males shall receive
the wage rate appropriate to ~les.
(vii) Employers shall
give notice when overtime will be required. The
overtime "rates are specified and shall be paid to an
employee who has worked the full period of a normal week
of ~O hours, unless there has been an interruption which
is the employer's responsibil1ty or the emPloyee has
been sick.
General Provisions
as to Daywork and
Piecework.
(1) The employer must
pay the full rate of
wages; and, reciprocally,
the employees should use
their trade skill and productive capacity and with no
restriction of output following a change of organisation
or machinery.
( 11) ,The, basis of
payment s~all be either (a) Daywork - related to
statement prices· negotiated and
app~oved by the Local Xrbitration'
'Board, or '
,I
,:
1
(b) Piecework '- governed'by
, Local Arbitration' Boards. • 1.
(a) 'General Daywork provisions~,
The minimum Day' Wage' rates for"
'males and, females' as' agreed at the Biennia 1
Conference are set out·, relating the rates
to the Index of Retail Priees, provision'
'being made for the rates to be changed at
six monthly intervals on the first day in
March and September, ba~edon, the index,
figur:es PUbliSher in January or JIlly ~
(b) General Piecework provisions.
Local Boards of Arbitration
shall, at the request of employers or
employees, prepare Piecework statements
so as to' give the average' employee' an
earning capacity of not less'than 2; per'
cent over the Minimum 1I1ii'ge Ra tes' for
ordinary operations, and not less than
, 37i-per cent for operations where ,exceptional
skill or length of training is required.
Boards shall have regard to the prinCiple
that it is desirable as far as possible
that a uniform system of prices should
obtain over a very broad basis, so
that the essential conditions and
prices can be applied and adapted to'
the same cta'ss, of ,labour and materials
in all areas producing similar classes
of goods. S1milar provi,Sions for
relating piecework tO~he Index of
Retail Prices are made.
Incentives
based on
T1me-Study.
An employer
wishing to introduce
this, system will
inform his ASSOCiation
and the Union.
(11) Full discussion ,between operatives,
Union ,and Work, Study experts must tak~
place.
(iii) Facilities must be granted by the
employer to allow the training of
employee representatives competent to
check. values where such are in dispute.
(iv) An introduction, a trial period Qf
at least twelve weeks must be allowed.
After acceptance, it may then be regarded
as the established method of payment.
(v) Values shall be based on the measurement
of work in Standard Minutes, values being
assessed such that an average employee
working at '''piecework rate" of' output can
prodllCe' 80 S.Ms~ in one hour and maintain
this over the day. This rate of output
is called "80 performance"., Thus for a·
job carrying's value' of 20S.Ms. the
hourly 'output at 80' performance would be
80 = '+ units of work per hour. ' 20
(vi) A job specification shall be
ava1lable for inspection by employees or
their representat1ves.
(vii) Safeguards are stipulated for the
maintenance of values once determined
particularly with regard to condit10n and
type of material, maohinery, equipment
at workplace lay-out.
(vUi) Operations shall be graded "A",
"B" and "C" for adults dependent on the
degree of,sk111 and experience required
and the responsibil1ty for the correct use
of' materials. A fourth grade "J" shall
apply to juveniles.
(ix) The basis of payment is set out
in detail in terms of rates per Standard
Minute, the rates being negotiated at
the National Conference and also related
to the Index of Retail Prioes.
(x) All lost time in excess of five
minutes where the cause is outside the
employeel~ control sball be paid at a
rate equal to 60 performance.
(xi) ,
IJ "fully applied" . employee is
basically one wbo can maintain a 60
performance •. An employee who, . having been
trained, can maintain 60 performance for
FOUR weeks will be regarded' as an "applied
worker" in which case he will qualify
for a guaranteed minimum weekly earnings.
Failure to main~in 60 performance
for FOUR weeks will result in the 'employee
reverting to' his trainee status.
Guaranteed This provides
that every employee
under contract of
service shall, for each week when this employee is
t4ages.
available and willing to work, be guaranteed a wage
(a) equivalent to '7,% of ·the contract weekly wage , '.l. •
rates for the day~worker and (b) 7,% of the Basic
Weekly Wage for pieceworkers, the "Basic" being the
average earnings over a period of four full weeks
work. This 4-week period must lie within a specified
13-week period and the employer must inform the worker
of the assessment.
Holidays
with Pay.
Every employer shall
allow an annual holiday
of three working weeks
to every employee who is employed by him at the
beginning of the holiday, the holiday to be taken
(i) in two working weeks, exclusive
of paid statutory holidays,between
1,th May and 1,th September. (In
the case of productive workers,
these weeks to be consecutive), and
( 11) one other working week (or 1Q
not more than two parts of a week).
Payment for the holiday shall be made on the basis,
for each week of employment up to a maximum of 48 weeks
in each year, of three forty-eigths (3/48ths) ofl
(a) the agreed average weekly earnings
for pieceworkers, and
(b) the Qontract rate for day-workers.
Provisions affecting
Local Boards ot
Arbitration.
( 1) In no case
may a local agreement
be generally less
favourable to the
employees. than that negotiated and set out in the National
Agreement.
(2) Local Boards
must bear in mind the importance of maint~ining national
uniformity in regard to all matters covered by the
Agreement.
D1sputes and , ,
Grievances.
( i) No strike 01'
lock-out shall be ent,ered
1nto on the part of any
body of workmen" member
of the Natio~al Un10n or any manufacturer.
(11) Where disputes
or grievances exist they, sball be investigated
immed1ately by representat1ves of the local Assoc1at10n
and the local Un1on; and 1n the event of failure to
adjust them they shall be dealt w1th 1n accordance w1th ... , . . . .'. the Rules of the local Board of Arb1trat10n.
(111) Wbere any str1ke
or lock-out Is continued beyond a per10d of three days,
the r1ght of the Un10n or Federatlon,. a,s the case may
be, may be exerc1sed to claim upon the monetary guarantee.
THE DIRECT INVESTIGATION
Introduotion
The maintenanoe of a stable equilibrium between
recognisable oonfliots of interest in industry is
the essence of suooessful industrial relations.
The investigation undertaken in the footwear. industry
revealed partioular oharacteristios whioh both
management and employee argued were necessary for
the maintenance of that equilibrium. It is
convenient to oonsider these partioular chsraoter
istios separately although it must be remembered
that they are, in faot, interdependent.
The attitudes of those within the industry are
revealed by extraots from the interviews oarried
out, and the validity'of these attitudes related
to a national oontext by referenoe to and comparison
with prooedures and attitudes in other industries.
The role of the shop-president ----~~~--~~~~~~~~.
Attitudes to
the shop-president.
"One thing you
must understand:
shop-presidents ,are
not,shop~stewards
in the normal sense".
(Full-time Union
Secretary. )
Shop-presidents are elected from the operatives
at the factory, very often there being a president
for several sections of the factory- the closing-room
president, the clickers' president and so on. There
would appear t'o be no precedence given 'to one president
rather than another since, in all but the largest ' ..
factories, the presidents will not normally act in
unison but remain responsible for and to their
particular section.
In only one factory visited were the shop
presidents called collectively to a meeting with
management at regular intervals, primarily to deal
with disciplinary action for latecomers. (At this
particular factory the management were proud of their
"relationship with the workers" and had developed
an "intricate organisation" for regularising
consultation. This factory management was viewed
with some distrust by the Area Union officials and
almost universal contempt by operatives and shop-
presidents alike. It remained the only factory
where no· one was happy at shop-floor level, a
typical comment by a shop-president, "Yes, there's
always trouble here. It lives here. Always
has done. There's always some undercurrent or it .
I don't know what/is~.· ••••
The function of the shop·president remains a
little ambiguous since, as with.most Unions, it is
not defined 1n the formal sense. However, in the
informal sense the function is well-understood, as
the National President of the Union outl1ned, "The
shop-presiden~ has a most important function. He
or she - will collect (the dues) •••..•. but will also
be a sounding board both ways, .. from the members
upwards to the full-time official and the other way
for getting 1nformation f.rom us to the member". But
the exercise of real power,. particularly the
negotiations direct with the management, is denied
them. The shop-president may be referred to wben
a'new styling of shoe is to be produced and the
"prices" negotiated by the management and operative.
Many areas have their own piece-work statements in
which are set out in a detailed fashion, the agreed
"prices" for each operation. However detailed the
statement,there is almost always some slight
variation, and it is this variation which allows
of negotiation at shop-floor level. There is no
major pri~ciple at stake and it is merely a matter of
the very small adjustments to already agreed
statements. The small firm manager may negotiate
direct Wit~ the operative or wit~ the shop-, ' /
president, int~elarger firms the supervisor
and the s~op-president may negotiate. It must be
underlined, however, that where disagreement occurs
or where'the president considers that 'some basic' "
principle is infrlnged. the full-time Union official
may be called in. It is this "sounding board"
function of the president that allows the full-time
official to maintain control within his area. ,
During interviews in the industry, time and , , ,
again the role of the shop-president was quoted as
a cardinal factor in the maintenance of industrial
peace.
A shop-president - "We'li have an argument
about a price - and 'we will argue, but when officials
settle with management, we abide by it
they abide by it".
••••••• 'and
Again, "The trouble with other Unions is the
"big-headed" stewards Oilt' to make a name for themselves".
A Federation Secr~tary - lIThe shop-president
has no power. ' Its part of my job to get on wit~
people, , . . .
but I, just don't mow 'them. I work with
management and ~..... (the name of the local full-time
Union official).
The saine secretary made the point that the .. , , '
employers do not officially recognise the" role of the
ahop-presidents; tDdeed, when a proposal by the
Union was made at the negotiating conference that
shop-presidents be recognised" the employers quickly
rejected the proposal; It was felt that b.Y giving
official. recognition one would tacitly be raising
the status and importance of the shop-president;
and the Federation was eager that control be retained
in the hands of full-time officials of the Union.
A number of employers suggested that, in fact, the
Union executive were not "too distressed" that
their proposal had been so. firmly rejected.
One particularly interesting attitude was
revealed by a full-time Union Secretary who bad only
recently been elected, having been a shop-president
at a firm with something of a reputation for poor
industrial relations. "Tbe big difference" he said,
" ••••••• is that now (as Union Secretary) I can go
to them and give them my honest opinion and come
"away. For a shop-president, it may be very difficult
to tell members at shop-floor level tbat they are
.wrong •••••• and they often are wrong as I've quickly
come to learn in this job. The pressures on the
shop-president are great ••••••• he's living with
them, (the other.operatives) and its near impossible
to be objective".
A managing director considered "the shop~presidents
as important as foremen and supervisors to management".
He had taken over the factory management a few years
ago and had followed a policy of discreet encouragement
to operatives to join the Union •.
Another manager clearly stated that the "most
significant single factor in our history of good
industrial relations is the function of the shop-
president.,......... Small troubles can easily' be
dealt with in the factory if the management is
competent, particularly on the matter ,of job-pricing.
In such job-pricing, we can settle' with 'the
operative direct, 99 cases out,of a lOO~ We might
consult the shop-president but rarely; Of' 'course,
we have to make sure that we are giving a "fair
deal" - both for the operative and the company; and
that it complies with the spirit and the letter of
the National Agreement •••• ~ •••• MBnagemen~s
responsibility is to ,sense when therets something
wrong; trouble can arise ,in five minutes and it
can be dealt with speedily •••••••••• professional
advisers (full-time Union and Federation officials)
can come in in a very short space 'of time. The
shop-president would not really enter into it".
Perhaps this manager really meant the non-function
of the shop-president; but the fact remains that
the firm was considered efficient and go-ahead
and the management was trusted and'respected by
Union and Federation alike.
Another firm, comparatively large in size, had
had a history of 'minor disputes, particularly in
one section of the factory. The management
considered this almost wholly ~ttributable to a
"bloody-minded shop-:preside[lt". This' president
according to the management,'had ambitions to become
a full-time Union official and was employing every
pretext to deatroythe confidence of the members
in their eleoted full-time Union officials. It
was true, perhaps, that there was some slight apathy
on the part of one of the full-time officials,
a 'loss of'the'driving energy seen in 'most other
offioials. When interviewed,' the nrebeiliousn
shop-president declaimed any suoh motives. "I've
no real ambition to be a full-time Union official.
But they're not doing their 30b, you know, they're
too remote trom us and our problems. They don't
know what's going on - ~nd there's a lot going on
here, loan teil you ••••••• (Oh the pressure of
working with the people he represents). They
think you oan get everything and you can't, "and
its difficult to tell them that". He agreed,
however, that the role of the president should not
be altered generally, but for the Union to function
oorrectly great stress was placed on full-time
officials "getting round and seeing what was going
on". When faoed with these oomments, the full-time
Union offioials in the area - albeit in a tangential
fashion - agreed that there may have been some small
basis for his complaints but that they had sinoe
been reotified. The shop-president, nontheless,
was attempting to oall a meeting of the other
presidents in the faotory, perhaps to provide him with
something of a platform to meet management and to
follow his sinoerely-held views with regard to the
"incompetenoe of the local Union officersn•
A lady shop-president viewed these activities
with a oertain amount of detaohment. "He had a
good case but he's playing it too big. Mind you,
the mariagemerit' 11 argue over' a few shillings, and
if they listened, they could save thousands ...... .
I just collect the dues •••• '. (about non-members) ,
I've tried to persuade them to join but they w~t
have it. I've given up' trying" ~ ~
The management were not' interested, so they'
stated, 'in the degree of unicinisationwithin their'
factory and were 'strongly opposed to the "c10sed
shop". "Thereware"-they said, "a few militants
in industry - on both.sides. We happen to have
one or two on the Union side here". The overall
impression was one of a technically orientated
management paying good wagea with continuity of
employment - "We don't lose time dua to seasonal
fluctuations" - and only vaguely aware that this
might not be sufficient. The atmosphere 'of the firm
could be summed up by the comments of 'the operatives.
"It's O. K~ (the firm), the money" s good and
regu1ar~ But that's about alli'. "They talk 111
shillings and pence and sometimes I wisb' one ot them
would talk just tOm2".
When asked what had prompted them to become,
shop-presidents, answers varied considerably. "I've
been shop-president for twenty-two years. It's an
impor'tant job - at least, I like to think it's
important". " "Nobody else WOuld, do it and I've
always be1ieved'1ft trade unions". "Somebody's got
to do it but in this firm, ft's not a • bed of roses"'.
Comparison with
shop~steward
role.'
W.E.J.McCartby
summarised the general
view of the shop
.steward 10 British
industry from various
studies as that of "essentially a shop-floor
bargainer using every opportunity available to him
to try to satisfy ~embers' demands. If. necessary
he is ready to circumvent established procedures and
union rules in pursuit of this objective. His
activities, from the management viewpoint, appear
to offer a constant challenge to the prerogatives
and authority. To meet such a challenge they must
adopt a more systematic and planned response to shop-
floor demands. Unions too are challenged by the
growth in shop-steward influence and power. They
need active and loyal shop-stewards to give meaning
to union membership at shop-floor level, but they must
remain alive to the potential dangers of relying on
semi-dependent lay officials who create personal and
multi-union loyalties among their rank-and-file. .. . . . . (22)
W.E.J. McCarthy and R.S. Parker, estimated that
over half of the shop-stewards in Britain regularly
deal with managers over some aspect of pay and a
third of them handle disciplinary issues on behalf
of their members, also they deal with the
distribution of work, (particularly overtime allocation),
the pace of work, machine-manning, transfers from
• one job to another, new machinery and new jobs,
and redundancies. In 1959, Clegg, K1ll1ck and (23) ,
Adams calculated that there' were 90,000 shop..
stewards while the T .U.C. in 1960 "guessed" at
The Donovan Commiss1,on hazarded that the
number was around 17"OOO,Wbich, when compared
with perhaps 3,000 full-t1me trade un10n off1c1als,
suggested "that shop-stewards must be handling many
times the volume of business conducted by their
full-time officers". Thus, the shop-steward has
occupied an increasingly 1mportant role 1n Br1tish
industry, part1cularly in an env~ronment of
relatively full employment and where sometimes
unorganised and unaware management has continued to
accept the 1nformal system of collective bargaining
which has, in many cases, been parallel to but some
distance ,away from the formal, nat10nal agreed
patterns.
The Union executive's attitude towarda shop
stewards has necessar1ly been ambivalent, dependent
as they are on. shop-floor' representat10n and conscious
that where representation and negotiating power are
eauatable, iocal pressures may militate aga1nst
national interest. The 1920's attitude that shop-
stewards might be outwitted by a "~mooth-tongued
employer" no longer holds credence. The Donovan (24)
Commission places clear responsibility for much
industrial unrest on management in that they have , ,
chosen to deal with shop-stewards rather than more
.' through the formal channels with full-time
'."
llIlion officials. Donovan r~3ects tt,.e .des~ription
of shop-stewards a s "trC?ub1e-~kers". ,
"Trouble" -.. .
it says - "is t~ust uponth~m", and thSt the
steward is. viewed by others, and views himself,
"as an accepted, rea.sonab1e ,and even moderating
1nf1uencef more of a. lubricant than an irritant".
Against this nationa~ baokgrolllldof the.shop-. ..'
steward, the, role of shop-president in, the Union of
Boot and Shoe Operat1ves appears stgu1arly restr1cted.
The po11cy of.the Union,as was re~eal~d in the
outline of itsh1story, has always been to vest
au1;hor1ty forne.got1a,t1on in its full-time officials.
This po11cy has been supported by the Employers'
Federation who have consistently ~e3ected any
semblance 'of a move towards "shop-floor committees"
or . the, reoognition at shop-floor level of any
negotiat~ng au~hority other than the full-time
off1cia1. Thus the ma30rity of McCarthy's
summarised characteristics are not ev1denoed in the
footwear industry in that the shop-pres1dentl-
Botb management and Un10n oonsider that the
rather negat1ve role of the shop-pres1dent 1s,
none"tbeless, a very important faotor in the
maintenanoe of industr1al peaoe, and tha't a
oompensatory demand 1s, made on full-time ~10n
offioials to provide positive and energetiO
leadership.
:
The role of the full-time union official. at branch level.
The full-time official. The essence of
the negotiation
procedure at area
level is the. speed with which agreement is sought
at the factory with employer and employee by the
full-time. union representative, and the relative
speed with which a disagreement. can be dealt with
by the local arbitration boards. Thus the full-
time union official must be willing, competent and
available to carry out these dutiea within his area.
To be nominat~d, one must have been a financial
member of the Union for not less, than five years so
that the empbasis is on industry-orientated officials
rather than, as in the American pattern, the so-called
"professional union representative" • Technical
competence is demanded by Union and by the employer
with whom he is to negotlate.
Once nominated, the Executive Council of the
Union "examine and interview" the candldates and
"arrange to submit those who prove cOD!petency to a
ballot vote of the members of the Branch". Thus,
the Executive maintain a tight control over the
calibre of the full-tlme official. Once elected,
the Union officer holds office for seven years.
The function of the .full-time branch official
ls a compendlum - helping and seeing.1ndiv1dual
members, deallng .'ith benefit claims, recruiting,
negotiating, making sure that the branch finances
are healthy, and attending meetings or all
description.
The personal relationships that he develops
with employers and, in particular, the local
Association secretary, are important. As one
Union secretary described it, .. n~here are many
factors which have helped us ••••• (maintain . . . .. .
industrial peace) .•••••• but the largest B~e the
written agreements, and above all, . the . wll~. to
succeed, and this depends on people •••••••• on
the trust between people, 'specially between
••• ••• (the Association secretary) and me".
•••••
Attitudes and
comments on the
The National
President of the
Union considered full-time official.
that the ratio of
rul1-time officials
to members, the quality of leadership and judgement
they displayed, and the speed and clarity of
agreements reached at local level were major factors
in their success. Also, that all ofUce.rs came from
the membership and their election was partially
controlled by the Executive.
A summary of the Union officials' comments on
their function is given belotofa-Ijre
"Union representatives/not really democratically
elected •••••••• 1 had to be persuaded to take t~e
job ••••••• I don't think there's a future for me -
a career, if you like; I'm not like the others.
I don't belC?ng to the Labour party and all that,
I just want to see things done right. Yes, I
suppose I would li~e "to get to the top", whatever
that ,is; ,but it'is ~ery d1fficult~rom a small
branch office".
"We're successful - if we ~ successful -
because the Union,officers are recruited from
industry.. They understand all tile jobs and they'll
have done many of them (the jobs) themseives,i ~
"If a man is attracted by the money ~ this
job (Union official) then he',~ not the right kind
of man for, the Union anyhow ••••••••• We've always
got them in the past but, looking round, I'~,not
sure where they'll,come from in the future ••••••• but
they'll cOme ••••••• at 'least, I hope so •••••••••• The
working man is the worst employer there Is, , and then
we have to sit in judgement on our own wages. But
by far the majority of us are not l~,it for money;
or for power, ,it it comes to that
all worth it". "
••••••• but it's
"I'm the n~,,!,style Union man. ,I d0z:!' t,wa1k in
with. greasy trousers ,and a <qoth cap •.•••••• I'd no
option but,~o be,a SocIalist, coming from my
background •••• ~ •• and I always: was interested in
Unionism •••••••• The Union is basica lly democratic; ,
but we have to be partially benevolent dictators •••• o. • • • . • • • ••. , ..
the f!1~l~t~~e official bas got to be ••••••• never get
anything done otherwise.
exceeding slow".
The Union grinds
"I'm 'paid to .represent my members. I.hope
they think the sun ',shines out of me, but I'm "
also paid to lead Diy members -and sometimes that
can be very difficult, particularly if they don't
want to go.
"We have the agreements and they're pretty
cut-and-dried; but round the edges 'there's always
some vaguenes~. and'. some sharp operator looking to
exploit it ••••••••••• (about a particular firm) I
can put them out of. business. with trouble every
other day; and what good is that to my members? • .~ , •• .- I • • , •
The agreement~ are there and.then it's all.a matter ~ .'
of trust. .Some firms you don't have to bother with ••• . .. ,. .
and
one or two firms •••••• well,one of them ~as not
paying according.to.the.National Agreement. They
hadn't a leg ~o ~tand on. . We fight them and •••••
••••• (Federation,Secretary) and I persuade them I
that they're wrong. They. event~ l~y agree, and swear
it will never happen again. (Ind~gnantly) I Within
weeks, cases come to my notice and, trying to be
fair, I point· this out to' the mana,gement. There
might have been a slip up tn administration. But
again they'refuse. to pay - and. they take it to the
Arbitration' Board~ Of course, they lose but from
then on I'm never go~ to trust· their word. It's,·
not that they ( the management) are really bad, they're
just stupid~"
/
The Union officials at branch level were not
certain ttiat ~ny single factor contr-ibuted to
their success. They _ seemed -immersed 1Ii a
difficult and demand1Dg task, relatively unaware
of condit1ons1Q other -indus-tries. - The Donovan
Commission Report meant little-or nothing-to them.
"In Place of Strife" _wa_s re3eoted -but only on the
score that the Government might discriminate between
"export" and "none-export" industries; the
general terms of the ~Jhite Paper seemed reasonable
to them. When taxed on the issue of the precluding
of Communists from holding office, the majority
commented that "this is what our members want" and
that "it is . given overwhelming s~pport at the Union
conference". t'lhen asked if he personally agreed . . ., " .
with the poliCY, a Union Secret~ry'explained tha-t
t~ey were "not a political Union and never had-_ been"; . . . . and he then added his impression that "some other , '- . . .
Unions could learn from us".
The Association secretaries _interv~ewedregarded
the Union officials with almost universal respect. .' '.'.
They cons1~ered they had a diffioult, poorly-paid_
and often thankless task.- They welcomed the opportunity
to negotiate with an organised body, i.e. the Union.
Ho~ever, thecC?mpet~nc~.~f.the branch offiCials in
certain areas was questioned. "If I were in their
shoes I'd be quoting from balance sheets. The new
Companies Act can make it very difficult for a ......... ,.. ,. .
managing director " • • • • • • •• • Certainly, a knowledge
of economics and accountancy,. together with aspects
of other "management-decision-area" subjects, was
considered necessary by some of the Union officials,
but the common predicament was "too little time".
As one official said, "I came into the job from the
factory floor and I've had a lot of help, but I'd
hoped to study economics and book-keeping. And
I've never the time ••••••••• that 'phone will ring
and we're just too busy". One Association secretary
predicted the decline in the qualIty of Union
official, a decline he had already detected. His
argument was that the majority of Union officials
had been "socially motivated - a genuine desire to
improve man's lot", they bad.been intelligent men
from working-olass backgrounds, denied tbe advantages
of "grammar-school e4ucation". "But now an intelligent
boy will get to university, and university men
will not look at the salaries and opportunities of
the Union official - even if the Union would have
tbem ••••••••• wbicb they won't'." And again •••••
"Certainly tbe job will be a great deal barder witb
less able officials on their side, and we're getting
one or two now •••••• " (less able offioials).
The employers viewed the Union offiCials from
a different standpOint. Common was the attitude -
"They have their job to do and, on the '~bole, they
do it fairly and well. They come from the factory
floor and they know what they're talking about ••••
. the jobs and the difficulties".. One manager who
had that week instituted a new system of payment
on tr1al said, "Yes, there are the~reements, but
it 1s people that matter •••••••• they, (the
operat1ves) trust me to keep my word and I know
that ••••••••••• (Un10n official) will keep his".
The Union off1cer , • , I •••• ,
v1ewed against the "
National background.
A continually
recurring theme in
discussions both
w1th employers and ,
Un10n off1cials was
the stress placed on the number of full-time offic1als
1n relation, to the total membership. There has been
a tradition 1n Great Br1tain to rely on the services
of voluntary local officers; and a general , ,
reluctance to empla,y full-time so-called professional
representa tives.
Comparison of the member/full-time , ,
. " Union officer in several countries.
Great Britain
United States
Germany
113800
1.1400
1. 800
Italy),""·". . )approximately 112000
France) ,
Source: Donovan Commission Report.
/ (25)
Clegg, Killick and Adams determined the
member/full-time officer ratio in a·large number
of unionsl'- ........
. TABLE XV
er office
195'9 ' Total
·1927 1939 1947 . Df'ficer-Force
" 19591
" (3) T.& G.W.U. - 2,303 2,304 . 2,222, 551
A .E.U. 5,286 11,887 6,633 .. 6,345 140
N.U.G.M.W~ 2,430 . 3,480 ' ,',847 5,236 148·
N.U.M. - - 6,108 7,248 93 , .
N.U.R. 22,796 19,298 22,637 16',1,2 . ·22 ( 2)
U.S.D.A.W~ 862 ·1,,00 1,85'5 2,407 147
N.A.L.G.O. - ' .~ 2,705 3,680 . 67
(4) E.T~U. - 2,904 5,061 4,897 47
N .U.A .W. - 1,806 3,475 3,002 50
A.W.A. - - 1,705 1.690 39
N~U.B.S.O. i,614 1,474 1,477 1,679 46 ( 4)
N.U.P.E~ - 2,518 3,430 4;004 46
I.S.T.C. 2,382 4,497 5,836 5.813 . 22 • • • t , • . .
74 A.U.B.T.\V'.- - - . 1,5'57 1,11,
O.S.C.A. . - 9.342 10.25'8 '10.627 13
T.S.S.A. 3914 •• .5.810 6,21tO. ,,6,717 13
N.U.P.B.P.W. ' - .' . 6,488 6,~6 .10.109. 15
(2) Tllere is pr'obablysome ··error .in the pre-war figures of ,the'-Union of Shop,' Distributive and ... Allied Workers. This is; due to uncertainty about the exact number of officers. (3) 1943. (It) In 1959 both the Electrical Trades' Union and the National Union of Public Employees were planning' substant~al. " increases in their officer-forces of about 16 and 10 officers respectively. '
The authors commented on the "almost incredible
stability" displayed in the ranking of the thirteen
.' Unions for which they had ratios both in 1939 and
19;9&-
·TABLE XVI
FULL-TIME OFFICERSa RANKING OF MEMBER! OFFICER RATIOS.
'Union Ranking of 14ember/ Officer ratios from 'lowe~t to highest.
1939 i95'9 •
N~U~B~~~O, 1 1
.U.S~D.A,W. 2 .3 N.U.A.W. 3 4 ~. ..
T. & G.W.U. 4 2·-
N.U.P,E. ; , E.T.U. 6 6
N,U.G,M.W. 7 .7
-I.S,T,C. 8 8
. T.S.S~A~ 9 +0
N~U.P~B·,P~W-. 10 11-. C.S.C~. II l2.
A .E.U._ 12 9
N~U .• R. 13 ~3
The union of Boot and Shoe Operatives has,
then~ a demonstrably large number of full-time
officials to inembership comp'ared with otlier Unions
in Britain; but the ratio only approximates to
that common in France or Italy and is higher than
that in the U.S.A. and Germany. Without a detailed,
study of the, function of the ,officers, it is not
possible to draw any firm conclusions as to the
connection between this ,ratio and the stability
in industrial relations. . However", that suoh' a state
of affairs exists is no accident;, it has been the
deliberate policy of successive ~nion executives
to maintain negotiating power at shop-floor level
in the hands, of rull-time officials rather than their
voluntary local of,ficers, the shop-presIdents.
The election procedure for the full-time officers
appears s bealthy compromise betWeen the prescribed
examination~' originallysuggasted and pioneered by
the Webbs,' and· the "totally democratic" election.
A Union executive has someresponStbil1ty 'to ensure
that its officers are competent arid yet, ina pure
democracy" it may well be that the electorate, subject
to local pressures and the persuasion of an agile
tongue, will choose the indifferent candidate.
Some would, argue that this is ona6f the privileges
of a democracy; but the indifferent Union officer,
onre elected, can do immeasurable harm and hence the
safeguards placed on the election by the,exoutive's
assessment of the candidate's competence., It has
also to be pointed out that an unscrupulous executive
once 1ft pOlIer, has the mesns vith1ft the constitution,
to perpetuate :11;9 p01ler. Portanate~ this has not
bsppened, but it l'ema1fts a danger.
The restriction Oft Communists bolding of rice
rema1fts a hot~ debated issue in other Unionsl but
in the footwear industry there io no sacb debate
where they ere considered a minority and therefore
notrepresentat1ve of the operative class. One gets
the impression 1ft talking to employer a and Union
officers that tbere are two issues - method ot
election and the debarrment of Communists from office -which
may not be completely defensible 1ft terms ot
academio argument. Again and sga1ft, on this and
many other issues, tbe sole criterion applied - "It
worksl you see, it works".
the National YDiQD
An Industrial
Unlon.
Tbe most
obvioua fact about
the Unlon Is tbat
It Is the sole negotiating bocly (apart from the small
Rossendele Union of Boot, Sboe and Slipper Operatives,
a small local Union in tbe Rossendale valley). Thus
tbe Union of Boot and Sboe Operatives approximates
more than most Brltish ~nl~s to the concept of an
"industrlal union" in that tbe Unlon seaks toorganlse
all workers, of whatever grade, in a specific industry.
The advantages clalmed for industrial unions - and,
on the whole, confirmed in the footwear industry -
are as followsl-
(i) Sectional claims within the factory
can, be more. -eas11y harmonised,
(li) ease and speed of negotlation, , . . . ,
(iii) demarcatlon problems are reduced,
(lv) less opportunity for personal
antagonlsm between shop-floor represent-1 . .
atlves and the subsequent polarisatlon
of these.antagonims into inter-union
disputes.
The operatives and emp~oyers.were.universal
in their preferrment of 'tI s~gle· unlo~". A manager
commented, "t.[lth one ·Unlon attitude presented to
me, both locally and natlonally, I know where I am.
Slnce, on the whole, they are fair and competent, , we can. solve any of tho dlfflcult199 that come
along" • The Uulon Itself is less concerned wlth
the Brldlington Principles than most other Unions;
but thel'e are rumour·s of the forlilBtion. of a separate
Union for supervisors and foremen. Another
experience~ manager underlined the "one-industry
based-union" character when he remarked that he had
seen many of the.Union men develop, both locally and
nationally. _"Some of them were green but they
learnt quickly". And he had had operatives working
for him whom he recognised as Union. potential and
had·recommended them to the existing.Union officials.
He continued, "A m~nager has.~ot to understand
what makes a person 'tick' ••••• that's his most
important timotion, understanding people, and I've
got'to have Union me~ that loan trust ••••• and
I hope they trust me. It's easy with only one . '
(authority) for the employees".
TheExecutive~ The exeoutive
oounen consistS of
thirteen members
together with the General President, General Seoretary
and Assistant General Officer. The thirteen elected
members, one from ea oh of the thirteen distriots,of , , '
the Union, may be the full-time officers of the, Union.
Thus, the Exeoutive may ~ indeed, has in recent years -
been made up of full-time bran~h offioers who are,
however, subject to re-electi~nto the Executive.
This is unlike some other Unions who preclude their
"paid-officials" or maintain,a' certain ratio between
the full-time, and the lay 'representation. The
signif1oanoe ~f the ,ExeouUve ,repr~sentat1on is
difficult to qualify. One, Union official suggested . '
that w1 thout B:t;'eB sona ble number of ful~,:,t1meoff~,c j.a ls,
Union procedures would be slower and less efficient.
However, he thought that a "leavening" of lsy member,S
was necessary.
The full-time branch officials interviewed
oonsidered that the pro,cess of execu.tive decisio~
making might be improved but were not certain in what
fashion.
Comments
by Members.
There must always
be some areas open to
critical comment.
However, the operative
members viewed their Union with relative indifference.
Characteristic comments werel- '"Yes, I'm in the Union.
I pay my dues. After thet, I couldn't care less".
"I'm sure they do their best, (union officials) but
I'm not really interested". It was part1clllarly
noticeable in the factories where management was
clearly alive to the development of good 1ndustrial
relations, the apathy amongst the operatives was most
apparent. In the few factories where there was obvious
discontent, (a discontent rarely with rates of pay,
more often because of attitudes and the manner in which
the operatlv~,was handled), sharp critioism oame from
the operatIve with regard to the apparent 1nadequacy
of the shop-president and the 1nfrequen~y of the full
time officials' meetings with operatives and management.
On being pressed,however, the operatives agreed that
"they were blowing off some steam" about their own
officials when really there' were a large number of
small, apperently pettygrievanaes, all directly
attributable to the manegement, in their extremIties.,
However, both operatives and full-time 'branch
officials were aware of the gap thet must necessarily
lie between the branch office and the shop-floor,
and it is this gap that must be filled by a conscientious
shop:"president.
The structure of Management.
Size ot firms. "The typical
business' enterprise in
~he boot-ilnd~shoe' "
industr~ remains re1ative1~ small. ,'The, reasons for
this have alread~ beenmenti~ned, i.e.,thediversit~
of product range in the domestic market, the re1ative1~
loweapita1' investment required, the machiner~ leasing
s~stem and the fairl~ stable market over the last decade
which has not forced amalgamations., ManY of the
firms were developed b~ enterprising operatives who,
with some courage and skill, set up s~ll workshops
and determined~ established a thriving nfaml1~ business".
The one-man' business, the partnerShip and the small
compa~ allowed the "owner" or, "emp1~er" to play the , (26)
leading part in the management. As Crawford points
out'when writing about,the,development of management
sc ience, genara 11~1 ' " ••••••• ~ • • • • •• there were no
professional managers at all, because there was no
recognised profession of management, little conception
of an art or science of management requiring specialist
training or skills; little deve1Qpment of the stud~
of the special branches of management '- production
management, cost accountanc~, marketing or personnel,
management .- and little attention or thought directed
to the elucidation of the purposes and ends of management,
other than pro~it-mak1ng.
To say this is not to de~ that, in those now far-
off days, there were ma~ good managers. But they
were born, not made. _ "Their.,management skills vere
innate, t,heir training - if any - was not specifically
designed to develop them, and the decisions they took
were purely empirical, uninformed by any body of , -
principle or knowledge, save such as they had knocked
together themselves out of their own experience. ThiS,
in short, vas the era of "rule of thumb" mansgement".
"Rule of thumb" management rama'in's' in many of the
small companies but there is a growing awareness that , , ,
management science techniques may be successfully
applied to advantage, particularly where a group of
firms join together to provide a common information'
source. In the firms visited during the investigation,
the management, both in the small and large f1rms, were
part1cularly product1on conscious. The majority were
men who had a good knowledge and experience of the
processes under the1r control, and were not averse, -, '
in certain Circumstances, to ta'king oft. their coats and , ,
helping out in a section of the factory. , ,
The advantages
of the small concern _
were underlined again
, and aga 1n by
employers. Typical
were the comments of a ,long experienced and. successful .
Management' att1tudes
and attitudes to
Management~
manager of a firm employing under 1,0 operatives. "vIe
are aware that it 1sthrough personal relationships
that management functiona. I know the majority of
workers by their Christian names and they all call
me - (Christian name).' There's a family atmospbere
bere - and you'd never get tbat,in sOl!le large
factory.
village,
Of course; we get ourlabour from t~e
and everybody knows everybody else" ~ Tbese
views Were ge~em1.ly, sub~tantlat'ed on a tour rolind tbe
factory. , '
Anotber manager commented. "MY father developed
tbe ' busineEis ,around 1910, and we bave a local labour
force, many of tbem bave been witb us ,thirty-odd years.
Tbey came to us from school~ Redundancy. has been
little problem altbough our work force has decreased . . .. , ." . - ..
by 40% In tbe last ten years •••••• ~'.~Thel~' (tbe
operatives) pr'lde, in tbe job has gone , •••••••• ' probably ,
due t~ ful~ empla.yment and a reduction in the skill-
content •••••• But with small units ,(factory size) we
can have close control, supervision and encouragement~
Another firm, emplOYing about 100 operatives,
seemed to be completely dominated by th~ character
of the employer - a rumbustious, loud, competent and
sincere man, whose attitude was belligerently patriarchal.
"Nobody sees, tbe, bos~ In those big Jactories; ,here
they see me every day~. , , CElrtainly, in, speaking wj,th
some of the operatives, ~hey gave me the1mpressio~
that there wa~ mutual respect tinged with a little, , ' ,
amused tolerance •.
In contrast, at another. firm, colllpar,ablein size,
the managemen1;: had set ,up weekly "consultation committees"
with shop~presidents and operatives,primarlly fo~
disciplining late-comers and absentees. Procedura lly
the sohemes sounded admirablel in praotise, the
atmosphere ,in the workshops,was directly hostile.
Typical of the operatives' comments was that of a
&1rl in the ~inishing room who, well asked if she was , .
going to stay, replied, "Not ;ikely. , There's always
something wrong. ' Something going on., I 3ust think
they (the management) a~e "crackers"". The management
had a good, record in implementing nffi~ techniques,
r~is1ng its productivity from 4,000 pairs/week w1th a
labour force,of 130 employees to 6,000 pairs/week with
12, emp1~ed. , They gave the impression t~at they
had, in compar1son with other f1rms, developed the
mechanics of a good system without being able to
establish the 'mutual trust and conf1dence that seemed
apparent in so many of the other faotories visited.
Perhaps it was sympto~tio that the manager, when
~terv1~wed, repeatedly used the phrase "We work by the
book". It i~,not surprising that the Un10n officials
regarded the f1rm with a good deal of distrust.
An interesting interview took place with a manager
of a factory which had bee~ set up in a "development
area" aroW\d 19,2, with a predominant1y"green" labour
force recruited, from,the area. The manager commented
that the major disadvantage lay in educ~t1ng the
recru1ts "into the methods and traditions of the boot-
and-Shoe industry, particularly in labour re1at10ns".
The company had followed ~ deliberate policy ot
encouraging Union membership and, atter an initial
period of heSitancy, few difficulties had been experienced~
. He commented, also, that the ma30r advantage in
moving to the area was that there was much less
resistance to technical innovation compared with the
older, established firms in the traditional footwear
manufacturing areas •.
Another relatively young manager made the following
pOintsl-
(i) Wage Pricea developed 'by Standard
Minute Values can cause trouble; Time
Study personnel are universally disliked
and distrusted.
(i1)- The size of the establishment
is important; n I know them all - the
good one and the not so good".
( 11i) High level of employment in the
area precludes se1ection'of laboUr~
(iv) His attitude to the operatives
was summed up as follows - "I need these
people to work for me; a satisfied
worker is worth bis weight in gold".
Going round the factory.a woman operative was:asked
whether she enjoyed the work. "Yes", she replied,
!lA good firm - a good boss. ,I like it, I always
have here",; . . .
The manager 'of a relatively large :fi1tlm. part of a . - .
larger. group,. was.interviewed. "It's a good team,
the Union and tbe Association, with a good deal of
tolerance on both sides. We hav,e to pay good wages
and, being fairly large, we don't need to lay-off due
to seasonal f1uctuationn• When asked ebout hIs
relationships with his foremen, shop-presidents and
operatives, he very honestly- revealed a nUlllber of
doubtsl nWith 400 people in the plaoe I can't know
them all ••• , •• I don't really- know many- of them
any-way-. (A long pause). I'm not a popular manager.
I've few personal restionships with the operatives ••••
I'm sure they think I'm something of a bastard ••••
I just have difficulty in talking to people, but
that's how I am ••••• But they- think - or I hope they
think - this is a sensible firm to deal with. We
want tolerance on both sides ••••••• Size presents its
problems but there are great benefits, particularly
commercialn•
Tbe Union viewed the management at thIs firm as
honest but essentially- weak.
One Union official quoted the manager as demanding
to be told the price for a particular job in dispute.
nYoU,tell me and I'll pay- itn, he is alleged to have
said. The Union official regarded this as weakness
inasmuch that he considered a just case had always to
be made out in difficul~ pricings other~rise eventual
trouble could be causad. "If I'd told him to pay,
double he would have done, and then he, I and ••••••
(the Association,secretary) would have had trouble
in three months". However, the manager wa s clearly
under heavy pressure to maintain outputs, particularly
since there had been some reorganisation in factory
lay--out and further capital investment.
Two of the firms visited had Personnel Officers.
Closer examination revealed that they were both firmly-
I I I It.
excluded trom dealing in the negotiations with operatives
and Union officials, this being the prerogative of
the manager.
Finally, at another large firm situated in a
village some distance trom a large town or city, the
managing director peinted out that the Union had not a
monopoly in "looking after the operatives", but that
employers also had the operatives' good interests at
beart" • The firm, according to the Union secretary,
had a long history of paying below nationally agreed ,
prices. The ma~ager continueda "If an operative
earns £2; in •••••••••• (the name of the village), then
he's on a very good wage; and if his wife is working,
then it is very good indeed". On producti~n, he
remarke~, "We are very production conscious. We keep
trying to improve our output. And I'm here at my
desk every day at·'7.30 a.m.". '.
, In the. light!Of criticism made wfth regard to the
"tightness" of the firm on wages, the'manager was asked ~ what percentage wages constituted of total production ij
costs. He.made,~ guess at around ~ but, on verifying
this from records, the figure was 22%.
It was not possible to talk to the operatives,
but the Union officials and the Federation secretary,
(a little guardedly) viewed the management as a little
misguided. "They bring open-and-shut cases to the
Arbitration board and'consistently lose" commanted the
Federation secr~tary. ".If they'had to pay the costs ...
of Arbitration, : they' d maybe think twice". This was
the only case met within the investigation where a firm
ignored the advice of the local Federation secretary
and apparently tOt?k relat,ively trivial cases to the
Arbitration Board.
The Union official displayedl1ttle respect for
. the management's ability.' "They've no idea how to
get the best out of people. ' It's 'not that they
(the managelilent)'are really bad as individllBlsl it's
only that when they get'in'their office they become
stupid"'.' The same Union official suggested a visit
to two other firms wIthin his area where relatIons
between UnIons, management and operatives were -
dia'metrically opposIte. 'Certainly thIs' contempt for
the leadership qualities in management was unusual;
generally, there was·a measured ,- and often generous -
,respect for managers by both operatives and Union
officials.
Management's
contribution' to
the maintenance of
stable equilibrIum~'
,
The management
of firms in the boot-
and-shoe Industry
have clearly made a
very large contrib
utIon to the maintenance
of equilibrIum in industrial relatIons. They have been
willing, on the' whole, to support a Federation in its
negotia tions I and, Which is more important; to maintain
the negotiated .pric,e-structure as a fJ.1/n' basis for the
" very wide variation of, ,processes involved in, the manufacture
of so diverse a range of products~ .
The Donovan Commission Report, commenting on . ""
'British industry generally, stated,''', '"In the nineteenth , , ,
century, ~mpla,yers associations and trade unions tried
where they c,ould to regulate ,pieceW:ork .by drawing
up "lists" Of. piecework prices, to ,apply ~hroughout
the areas of their 3urisdiction. The success of these . . . . . . . : , '
lists depended, ,however, on standard methods of . '. .' . . ,
production and standard machinery. Otherwise standard , .. . .' . .' . . .
pric~s would,have brought very d,1ffering levels of . , ,
earnings in different factories. When piecework was , . .. ,
introduced i~to engineering follOwing, the development
of mass production, standard lists could not be used, ". '. .
for machines were not standardised and methods of . " .
pro,duction changed again, and, agaill.. The prices were
therefore fixed senaratelx for each. job in each factory.
This left scope for wide variations in earnings, both'
within and between factories and the scope grew with
the spread of piecework from ~ per cent of the male
labour force in engineering in 1886 to abqut 46 per cent
in 1961. Meanwhile most of the old price-lists dropped
out of use".
The history of the industry reveals that it faced
much the same common problems as other industri~s; but "
that management with unions developed the regional price
lists to which the firms adhered, the regional lists
eventually forming the basis for the National Agreements.
The Donovan Commission Report continlled. "More,over . '.' - . .' .
in many factories work stlldy is not in use even to-day , . . , . . .
and prices are fixed by bargaining methods often . ... . . .' . . .'
described as those of a "Persian markei;" •••••• Where
jobs change freqnently, new prices have to be fixed,
with new,opportnnities to bargain". The national
a,nd, regiollal price lists remain the basis in the ,
footwear lndnstry;, " with freqnently changing jobs.
, ne,w prices are negotiated at factory-level by
management, with, fnlI-time Union officials. Management
has supported,the growth of a vigorons and well-
:organised Union, and both have accepted that work-
study can become an integral part of price-fixing.
The managers that, were met in thI~ investigation
,were technically-orientated and very prodnction-
conscious. HOvlever, by far the ma jori ty bad a very
'clear concept of the rol,e that hwnan relation ships
played indeveloplng the mutual trust that is an
essential for industrial peace.- The majority also
consi~ered' that the, size of the nnderta king was a
oritical factor, allowing them, to maintain a close
personal contact with individual employees.
Also expressed was the responsibility that
different employers and managers felt to each other, ,. '.
even in ,a competitive market; ,a responsib1lity to
"abide by the rules".
Above all management accepted the prime
responsIbilIty, for ,indnstrial relations as theirs.
The Assgciation and the Federation.
The' Association " '
Secretary.
The development
, ,of the Federation, as
,seen in the historical
review, has been largely dependent 'on the degree to
which Associations have foregone their' local
autonomies in order that national, agreements could be
negotiated to regul@te, 'the, basis for wages andworktng
conditions in: the industry. The lOC,81 Associations
vary greatly ,in size of output and the number of firms
represented; but perhaps one of the critical factors
lies in tile employment of the local Associat1on secretary.
In some cases the secretary is a full-time ,official;
in other Associations he may be an employee of a firm
in the area doing the 30b part-time or, alternatively,
a solicitor or accountant employed by the Association
part-time, whose main function is to record the minutes
of meetings but would not be involved in the day-to-day
negot1ations with Union officials and employers.
In one area where there was no full-time secretary,
the Union officials were certain that they, the
operat1ves they represented,and the employers were at
a grave disadvantage in that the speed of negotiation
was often too slow. Tile Union secretary, suggested
tllat, witll a full-time Associat10n secretary, the
interpretation of the basiC Statement(they had not
developed their own local Statement but were employing
the Statement trom another area) would be so much . . . .
easier since employers "would listen to their own man
when they don't listen to me". The Union secretary
cited the case, of a three-day stoppage 1n wh1ch
management eventually agreed to ,the Un10n and operative
claims and which might have been averted had a local
Association secretary been able to present the National
Federation arguments.
The two full-time Association secretaries who were
interviewed were equally impressive if totally
dissimilar in attitude and method. One secretary
regarded their successful record in industrial relations
as having a compendium of causes - "We have a
unique history in industrial relations of which the
industry, as a whole, is justifiably proud, but the
individual,members may not be aware that we are
successful. Perhaps they take it for granted ••••••••••
Perhaps the question that must be asked in any industry
is how much are good relations worth?~ •••••••••• It is
better to have an organised body with which to
negotiate • • • • • • • • • • • • • • On the Union side, the critical
factors are the high ratio of full-time officials to
members and the role of the shop-presidents •••••••••••
We have consistently rejected th~ recognition of shop
presidents as a negotiating body. Whenever there are
the possible signs of,a disagreement, the employer may
contact me.pr......... (the local Union secretary) ,may
and the matter will be resolved quickly.
In other words, the moment,there is a puff of smoke,
the fire-engine is called". This view was confirmed
by a local manager who regarded the Association secretary
"as a professional encyclopedia giving access to
information, technical and legal, but mainly - when
some small trouble arises - I can call in the
professionals, Union and Federation, who will advise on
the issue".
The second Assoclatlon secretary confirmed the
importance of the Union structure. A younger man,
extremely articulate, with a clear 'aceial motivation -
"I suppose I believe in the clvllised approach •••••••
a deslre to settle things in a non-barbarlc fashlon •••
.. . .... lt may be old-fashloned and a 11ttle pompous
but I suppose I belleve in the perfeotabll1ty of man,
soola1 democracy ls not 3ust a plpe deam". On hls
functlon, he commented, "The essencels getting a1o~
wlth people - getting their tru.st and trusting them.
It never pays to score off people in a,comm1ttee •••••
We have to avoid 1ega11stlc attltUdes ••••••••• lt ls
mainly the applicatlon of common-sense".
Both secretaries agreed that they exerted a
measure of control over their members, the one secretary
,"suggestlng that in matters of negotiatlon over a dlspute
he would dlrect the employer on the course of actlon
to'be followed.
The National
Background.
. , .• i
(27) V.G. Munns
h~gh11ghted the varying
effectiveness of
emp~oyers' assoclations
as regulating lnstruments for the control of wages and
condltions of employment. The essentla1 national
problem lies in the dlfference between the "formal" and
"informal" industrial relatlons systems where Assoclatlon
and Federatlon negotlate scales of pay whlch, although
they would not publlcly admlt It, are only a consldered
minima; andtbere is a wide practise of "bidding-upU
for labour by paying' over tbe negotiated rates.
Munns considered" the. tatk of controlling'maxima as" .. I. .
"formidable"."' " He·also pointed' out tbat employer .. "
organisations are voluntary bodies and "any control, ..
OVer, members is a' form of self-diFcipline". "
In the direct area of strike·prevention, employers'
association·efforts have'beell directed to, the provis10n
of machi~ery for the orderly settlement of disputes;
but the existence of the machinery has not prevented
many significant strikes. Munns states " ••••••••. their
. (the associat10n's) claim that they reduce the. extent
of strike act10n seems to be justified.. Moreover,
they are also trying to improve the fa1lings of their
own members in management techniquesand.t~e handling
. of industrial relations problems ••• ~ ••••• ". . . (28)
W.E.J~ McCarthy stated that Association or
Federation officialsl-
(i) negotiated wage rates and conditions
for manUlll workers but rarely for staff , ",
workers,
(11) negotiated basic rates and
attempted to enforce them by "persUIlsion",
( i11) conSidered there had been an
increase in the use of disputes procedures, . .. ,
(iv) dealt with less than five Unions
in. their organisation,
(v) considered that there was competition
for members between Unions,
(vi) considered that the influence of the
shop-steward had not declined. (30%
considered it had increased).
McCarthy discovered that 2,'£".'of the organisation
had no full-time employees at allt'and 'virtually
none of the o~ficials 'he interviewed had had anT'
training for'their job other than 'experlenc'e. , ,
Both MWUlS and McCarthY sugg'ested that most
employers' aSSOCiations do not seek to el~1nate or
control wage competition.
The British Footwear Manufacturers' Federation'
is like other organisations in that it is a reflection
of its membership~ As such it made a major
contribution 'to the construction of the collective , ,
bargaining machinery 1n the industry, I but - and this
applies part1.cularlY at Association level ~ having
constructed the machinery they have 'displayed the will
to negotiate and, as,one of its secretaries stated,
"to settle'things in a non-barbaric fa'shion". It has,
of course, had certain advantages,'as a comparison with
the findings of Munns and McCarthy will reveal.
The Nature ,of the Agreements and Procedures.
,I
Comments from
the industry ••
In, considering the
nature of ,agreements
, in the footwear
industry, there seems
relatively,little that is remarkable or outstanding in ,J'
comparison with agreements in many ,other indllstries~'
However, it is, perhaps, the long period in which
agreements, based on the 189, Agreement, have been in
, operation that has, 1li a sense,' educated 'employers and
employees alike in their use.. ,It was claimed by
every Union official and, ~mployer that the agreements
were, in fact, implemented and were not merely used
as a convenient minima on which large differentials
between factory and faotoriwere based. However,
, it was not possible to 'confirm the existence or
otherwise of a large disparity between the nationally
negotiated rates and the actual rates empla,ved. The
impression was gained that some disparity existed,
.partioularly in the large oity centres where competition
for labour w~s intense~
The "three-day,period of grace" vas regarded by
most as a deterrent to irresP9nsible action and,as a
positive means of acoelerating a return to'work.
However, neither Union officials or employers considered
that, where a major issue was at stake, would the
financial loss of the "guarantee fund" be considered
as relevant. They agreed that the threat, of financial
loss perhaps prevented small disturbances from assuming
greater proportions, the disputes procedures being very
rapidly implemented.
Many employers and a few employees expressed concern
over the Guaranteed Wage Agreement, ,suggesting that there
would be a tendency to lay-off labour. In the
factories situated in larger conurbations where labour
was difficult, to recrult, , the management would not be
inclined to allow trained labour to leave d1ll'ing
periods of slackness in trade.
Some larger firms welcomed the Time-St~
Agreement and claimed 'that it gave higber productivity.
There vas the normal reaction of the operative in
such firms to: the "wbite-coated wizards" of tbe time
study department.
The universal opinion of persons interviewed
with regard to the Agreements wa's the' speed with whicb
grievances could be dealt with. There was, as in
any system, a hierarcby tbrough which grievances could
be passed until agreement was reached or an impartial
Umpire's decision accepted. But the majority of
grievances are dealt with at local level by full-time
repres'entatives' and at or very near to the place of
work. There is an immediacy and urgency in the
fashion of obtaining agreement, the basis of which is
the National Agreement and the regional Statements.
The operatives can - and often do - contact tbe Union
secretary directly and would expect - and normally
obtain - an, immediate response of an authoratitive
nature. The Union offioial has an intimate knowledge
of condit10ns in the area and can, with 11tt1e difficulty
set the particular grievance against the regional
background. He will then negotiate on the grievance,
assuming that he considers the operative has a case,
and negotiations will be rapid and not ,divorced by
distance from' the place of origin., An employer ha s
Similar facilities and'wil1 use them, particularly where
he is contemplating changes in methods of production
and so on.
. (29) National A.I. Marsh,
comparison. c()mlllenting on procedures . ., .,
for dealing with disputes,
states: "Conclusions concerning tbe relative effect-. , '" . . ."' ..
iveness of different procedures ar~ diffu~t.to draw,
but there are tllree factors. that ha.ve to be borne in
mind wbicb appear to be fairly well establ~sbed. First,
it is easiest to operate and observe proced~es where
tbe process of manufacture is orderly. Secondly,
procedures function most smoothly where technical
cbange is least, wbere markets are relatively steady
and vThere, as a result, predictabllity is greatest.
Tbirdly, tbe orderliness and consistency of management is .
behaviour/itself of considerable importance, particularly
at ~orksbop level".
Considering tbese factors in relation to the
footwear industrYI-
( i) tbe process of manufacture of
footwear may ~ subdivided int9 three, ' .. 'to' . • •
fO~.9r fiv~ successiv~.sub-processes
but, ""i th.~ e.ach sub-process, there 1s
sucb a wide diversity, dependent on
tbe type of sboe to be produced, that
tbe total process could hardly be
considered orderly,
(11) teohn1ca1 change has certa1nly
been 1mp1emented bd; the improvements, .
apart from vulcan1sat10n,' have been
more in the techn1ques app11ed than tn tile fundamental shoe~mak1ng proc·ess.
Nevertheless, product1v1ty Ilas r1sen
and tile market has remained relatively
stable 1n the long term resulting in a
cont1nual1y declining labour force;
a s1tuat1on aggravated by the four
year trade-cycle that can cause local
depressions and the lay1ng-off of
operatives.
( 111) the order11ness and consistenoy
of the management bellaviour is a major
contributing factor~ As a group the
managers seem to have estab11shed norms . . .
of behaviour wllich are clearly recogn1sed,
llav1ng heen developed by a fairly long
tradition. Dur1ng 1nterv1ews it was
clear tllat managers were aware that
tlleir relat10nsllips w1th operat1ves and
Unions was someth1ng special and, as such,
to be protected. The humbug and the
sincerely incompetent were the exception.
(30) Marsh quotes the reasoning of Professor Dun10p
who considere1 industrial relat10ns as analysable 1nto
(a) "substantive" rules - those whicll
establish norms or intentions 1n tbe forms
of spec1f1c cond1t1ons of, work, and
(b) procedural rules - those that
, ex1st to ad3ust,d1fferences in the
. making. of substantive rules and
relat10nships b~tween the partles.
Tbus procedural rules are those wbich govern
tbe bebavlour of tbeparties and the fashlon 1n Which
the "hard fact"· of the substantive rules are· applied •
. Marsh continues the Dunlop argument " •••••••••••
tbat a crucial element in tbe situation is always
the nature of the "shared understand1ngs" which exist
between tbe parties • In the last analysis these
, \.
. "understandings" are, by thelr very character,
1nscrutable, but they g1vean industrial relations
system its stab1lity, or, if. lacking, Its instabil1ty".
Tbe boot-and-shoe industry has bullt a ser1es
of "shared understandings" that are only partlally
revealed in the Agreementa, but it Is these
"understandlngs" that are critlcal.
, . ,
CONCLUSION
Conclusions must, in the nature of things,
remain tentative, governed: as they are by the limited
scope of the enquiry and the organic character of
the sub3ect matter. That the investigation had , "
prescribed limits imposed on it by time and opportunity
has to be accepted. It could not be comprehensive
and ,therefore must 'be selective; and tile degree of
selection limits the universality ,of the conclusions. , I
That the sub3ect matter 'was clearly divided .~ -
between that 'which was'acceptable fact, open to
precise identification, and that which was in the
nature of "shared understandings" - subtle relation
ships dependent on men and women, devious and opaque -•
further reduced the confidence with which firm
conolusions could be made.
However,' accepting these qualifications, certain , , .
conolusions, albeit limited, may be drawn with regard
to those "more particular and relevant features by
which industrial peace Ilas been worked for and gained"
in the boot and shoe industry.
Anciliary Faotors.
Certain factors have had a tangential influence.
(i) The relatively small size of the average
firm has allowed of a close interohange between
management and operative and the development of a
personal relationship whioh,on the evidence of this
enquiry, dimished in the larger compalJl". In the
small concern there was no detailed hierarchy of
decision making but r,atheran immediacy of action
and responseto-and-fro between employer and
employee •. The continued·existence of the "small
concern" may be in doubt, supported as it is at the
moment, by the· leasing system for machinery, the
diversity of the product mix and the relative
stabil1ty of the domestic marke.t.
(11) A minor contributory factor has been
the geographic distribution of the firms, many o~
them centred in villag~s surrounding large towns
and cities. Originally the· work fo~ce was drawn
by the higher earnings, compared. with agriculture;
but over the years a close-knit community has ~ '."
developed with loyalties to the village and the firm.
(It is significant that when a firm developed a
subsidiary in a development area, it chose the site
for the new factory·in a mining village some distance
from a ma jor town)
(iii) The high proportion of women employed
in the industry (now approaching 5'3%) is considered
by many to be aca lming influence in that, collectively,
they are non-militant in outlook.
(iv) The cost-structure in shoe manufacture
reveals that, if the primary cost of· materials is
omitted, wages represent th~ major item. There has
thus been a fierce concentration on relating earnings
to output as evidence by the piece-work and time
study agJ."eements.
(v) Manufacturers have, collectively,
wished to maintain a uniform national wage structure
in order that "undercutting of prices by sweated " ,
labour" should be avoided.
Competition for labour in the city
areas has presented difficulties in the last decade
of relatively full employment."
(vi) The total domestic market has been
remarka'bly static although subject to four-year cycles
of trade. The general history reveals,consistent
over-production and this remains to-day.
The stability in the markat since the
Second World War 'has allowed of a degree of predict
ability and confidence with1ti the industry and these,
in turn, have eased collective bargaining procedures.
Ma.1or fact,ors.
( i) A ma jor factor in the continuance of
good industrial relations in the footwear industry
is,that tradition has imposed on'the participants
a set of behavioural norms so that, consciously or
sub-consciously t their methods' and 'manner s are
governed and, toalarge extent, pre-determined by
those methods and manners that preceded them.
The' tradition was born out of the necessity of
the 189'.pe~iod;. but that it developed and
eventually flourished is a tribute to the quality >
and determination'of those early representatives
of both employer' and employee who initially .,.
imposed their concepts of moderation and determination
to negotiate until example and persuasion oonverted
the dubious, the weak arid the awkward. Pari' of
that tradition has been the general avoldanoe of
political 'oontroversy ;'''an ability to recognise
and to base their aotion and arguments
on a pragmatl0 philosPhy rather than political
doctrine". A clear . indication of the awareness
of tradition is that "green labour", introduced into
the 'faotory, 'is "educated in the ways of the boot
and shoe industryll.·
"(11) The low ratio of members to full-time
union o~fioers and the role of the shop-presidents
are inter-conneoted. The Union, indirectly supported
by the employers, has throughout its history retained
the exercise of negotiating power in its full-time
staff.· The shop~president has remained a "sounding
boardll and a collector of Union subscriptions.
As suoh he has made no'small contribution to the
sucoess of industrial relationsl but when compared
,.,ith the emergence of the shop-steward on the
national soene .. and the "informal" negotiating
prooedures that have been acoepted by management -
it would seem that this res~ction of power and
status in the footwear industry to non-lay members
has been highly significant. Certainly, the
industry, on the evidence of this enquiry, considers
it a crucial element.
If the system is to operate speedily and
efficiently, it follows that a commensurably heavier
responsibility is placed on the fnll-time official . .
to maintain a close contact with the membership he
represents and to deal with their problems. Some
mild criticism of officials was discovered but the
overriding impression is that the Union has been
singularly fortunate in being able to recruit from
its operative ranks a quality of official able and
willing to discharge these responsibilities. The ,
process by which prospective officers are, in fact,
"soreened" by the Executive before being eligible
to enter the branch election is also a safeguard,
although there are also potential dangers where an
Executive has such direct and discretionary control • . (Some doubts were raised as to whether the Union
will be able to recruit and train officials of
sufficient calibre in the future). The case for
debarring Communists from Union office is not proven,
but, without exception, those members of the industry
interviewed consider that, whatever the theoretical
argument may be, this course.of action is correct and
has been justified by events.
(Ui) That there are solely two parties to
negotiation, Union and Federation, has clearly
simplified the reiationship. allowing of -a maximum
of discipline, authority and responsib1lity and
preclud1Dg the internecine conflicts evidence in
other multi-union and employer industries.
(iv) The Agreements reflect the attitudes -,
of those negotiating, a compromise between absolute
national uniformity and regional diversification.
The Agreements are partially the result of the wide
diversity of products manufactured and the long
tradition of piece-work in the industry. Thus it
has been necessary that basic national Agreements
should be capable of interpretation at regional
or branch level within controlled limits, 'the
procedures for settlement being speedy and orientated
around the place of work. The speed of negotiation
and the close physical relationship between dispute
snd solution maintain the cohesiveness of the
bargaining _ procedures that are structured by the
Agreements.
The relating -of agreed wage rates to the Inde~ __
of Retail Prices has obvious advantages, maintaining
a correspondence between real income and the cost
of l1ving.
(v) ~he relationships between Union and
Federation secretaries appear to be based on mutual
respect and trust, coupled with a shrewd knowledge
and acceptance of their mutual positions and, as
important, . tbeir positions vis~-vis their
respective members •.
(vi) The consistency of attitude displayed
by mansgement in the footwear industry has been
,Invalua ble. Management has, on the whole, accepted
that ~t carries the major responsibility for
developing and maintaining an effective bargainIng
system • This attitude has been apparent at
. national, ,regional and factory level. Continually, "
in this investigation, one was 1mpressed by an
awareness that" whatever the technological content
of the industry - and this is not negligible,
,management, if it was to function efficIently,
"employed the whole man and not a pair of hands".
The management's attitude towards the National
Union has been generally one of encouragement,
regarding a strong Union organisation as necessary
to the regularisation and control of collective
bargaining. At the local level, management may
gently encourage operatives to take Union membership,
and consistently supports the Union attitude towards
the shop-president.
(vU) The "guarantee fund" by which Union or
Federation may lose a depOsited cash amount If,
In the judgement of the Umpire, the Agreement has been
broken is not regarded as vitally important to-day.
However, it remains to accelerate the process ot
negotiation and, as' a Union President' remarked,
"to prevent precipi ta te action" ..
(xiii) Finally, far the most important
factor'bas been the determination to negotiate. (3l)
Marsh comments: "The main objects of' machinery
,f'or reconciling differences are 'to make, apply and
interpret collective agreements, and to deal with
grievances. Expressed in the broadest possible
terms procedures are treaties of peace and devices
f'or avoiding war. It 1s implicit 1n their effective
operation that at each level at which an issue is
discussed a genu1rie attempt ,sliC?ill:d', 'be made to settle , ,
the d1spute. No'procedure can last w1thout the will
to settle and a sense of common interest 1n doing
so" •
Thus, if one were forced to isolate a single
factor without ,.h1ch ,all others are 1mpotent,' it is
the ~llll to o.egotiate". "" .
Industrial peace may be regarded as, the ,
ma1ntenance of a stable equ1libr1um be,tween a
recognised conf11ct of' interests. Such peace 1s not
acc1dental. it 1s deliberately contrived. And
the boot and shoe 1ndustry has so contr1~ed i~ for
nearly seventy years. Long may they contin,ue to do so.
,.
, I!'
,
APPENDIX 1
General format of interviews.
(i) An introduction of the investigator and
a resume of the objects of the enquiry.
(ii) "Do you consider that you have good
industrial relations in your industry?".
(111) "What single factor has contributed most
to industrial relations in the boot and shoe
industry?".
(iv) "What are your views on the Union? The
Union off1cers i the1r function and effic1ency?
The number of Unlon officers? ,l
(v) "How sign1ficant do you consider the ~ole
of the shop-president?".
(vi) "Is management interested in industUal
(vii)
relations? Are you happy with the present
situation in this factory?".
"What importance has the Association
secretary?".
(v1ii) "How signif1cant has it been that many
factor1es are fa1rly small and situated in
v1llages?".
(ix) "If there 1s a grievance, how 1s it
tackled? Is the "guarantee fund" important?".
(x) "In the light of our d1scussion, may I
· . ask you again about the most important
single factor?". . .
APPENDIX 11
TEBfo OF SETTLEMENT OF THE OOT AND SHOE DISPUTE
TERMS OF SETTLEMENT arranged between the
Federated AssOciations of Boot and Shoe
Manufacturers and the National Union of
Boot and Shoe Operatives, 'at a Conference
of Representatives of the Federation and
the National Union, held at the Offices
of the Board of Trade on 19th April, 189,.
We, the undersigned representatives of the
Federated Associations of Boot and Shoe
Manufacturers and of the National Union of
Boot and Shoe Operatives, agree to the following
terms of settlement of the dispute in the boot
and shoe trade on behalf of those whom we
represents
pmCEWORK STATEMENTS
RESOLUTION 1. - This Conference is of
opinion that a piecework statement or statements,
for lasting and finishing machine workers, and
those working in connection therewith, are
desirable, such statements to be based on the
actual capacity of an average workman. Any
manufacturer to have the option of adopting
piecework or continuing dayworkl it being
Understood that the whole of the employees
working on any one process shall be put on one
or the other system, which shall not be changed
RE~OLUTIOR 2. - This Conference is of
opinion that a piecework statement for welted
work at Northampton should be prepared on the
principle laid down in the above'resolution,
viz.,' I~The statement Ehall be based on the.
actual capacity of an averag~ workman",
employers having the option· as la-id down in
that resolution with regard ·topaymentby
time or piece •.
RESOLUTION 3. - That, for the purpose
of carrying into effect the last two
Resolutions, joint committees be appointed
as followsr (a) A joint committee of
representatives of the employers and workmen,
four of each, to determine the prinCiples
and methods of arrangement and classification
on which piecework statements for machine.
workers shall be based, such committee. to hold
its first meeting on 5th May, 1895, at
Northampton, for preliminary business.
(b) Joint committees composed of represent-• j • -. , •
atives of. employers and employed, four of ..
each,' to prepare such statements for, their
respective localities in accordance w1ththe
principles la id down by the above joint·
committee. Such committees to hold .their
first meetings with the least possible delay
after the completion of the work of the above
30int committee. ' (c) A joint committee
to prepare a statement for welted work for
Northampton, composed of representatives
of employers and employed, four of each,
such 'committee to hold its first meeting on
5th May, 189~, for preliminary business.
Such committees shall take such evidence
and obtain such information as they may think fit for 'the pnrpose~ and each shall .
appoint an umpire ,to deter~ine pOints on gnich
they fail to-agree. Failing agreement on the
part ofariy ,of the committees as to the , .
appointment of umpires the appointment shall ,
be made _by the President of, the Federation
and the General Secretary of' the Union, or,
if they fail to agree, by Sir Henry James •
. BOARDS OF ARBITRATION
.. , RESOLUTION 4., ... That the 'various Local
, '-
Boards of. Arbitration and9onciliation,
consisting of equal numbers of representatives . ., ").
of e~loyers,and workmen in the district
be immediately re ... constituted, and their.
rules -be revised, so far as nec,essary,witb
a view to,grea.ter uniformity by a joint
committee of representatives of employers and
employed,.fonr'of-each" to be appointed
forthwith. The revised rules to be submitted
to be submitted to and adopted by the Local
Boards with or without amendment in matters
of detail; pending the completion of this
revision the former rules to be in force,
but only questions of classification, and
other minor local quest10ns not involving
matters, of principle to be entertained in
the meantime, with the exception of the
question of the minimum wage for clickers
and pressmen in centres where notices have
already been given to Local Boards. •
RESOLUTION ;. - That such Boards when
re-constituted shall have full power to
settle all questions submitted to them
concerning wages, hours of labour, and the
conditions of employment of all classes
of work-people represented thereon w1thin
their districts which it is found impossible
to settle in the first place between
employers and employed, or, secondly, ,
between their representatives, subject
to the following conditionsl (a) I
No Board
shall require an employer to employ any
particuiar workman, or a workman to work for
any particular employer, or shall entertain
any question relating to such matters except
for the purpose of enabling a, workman to
clear his character. (b) No Board shall . " .
claim jurisdiction over "the c,onditions and
terms of employment of workpeople outside
its district, provided that no actual work
·shall be- sent· out .of .a·district which has
been .t~e subject of. anaward in that district.
(c) . ·.No Board shall interfere with the
right of an.employer .to make ,reasonable
. regulations for timekeeping and the
preservation·. of order in his factory or
worksbop.- (d) No Board shall put
restrictions on the introdu.ction of machinery
or tbe output tber~from, or on tbe adoption
of day or piecework wages by an employer
in cases in ,wbich both systems have been
sanctioned, :sub3ect· to the conditions
prescribed in Resolutions 2 and 3. No
q~stion referred to in subsections a, b, c
and d sball 'be made a ma tter of dispute by the
Union.
RESOLUTION 6. - That it is desirable
and necessary to provide financial guarantees
for duly carrying out the p~ovisions of this . . .
agreement and existing .and future awards,
agreements and decisions of boards, arbitrators
or umpires So long as tbey do not contravene
the provisions of this 'agreement, and. tbat
.scbeme.be at onbe prepared for depositing
certain sums in.the hands of trustees for that
purpose.
RESOLUTION 7. - That theCommittee
entrusted with the revision of the rules of
Local Arbitration Boards be instructed to
insert provisions I - (a) To carry the last
resolution into effect forthwith. If not
agreed upon by both sides, the conditions
and terms of the trust to be referred to
and finally settled by Sir Henry James.
(b) That in future all. awards and decisions
shall specify a date, before which neither
side shall ~e competent to re-open the
question. (e) That where a minimum wage
has been fixed and is in operation, and a
proposal is made to ohange it, the Board or
umpire in giving a decision or award shall
take into' account the length of time which
has elapsed since the question was last
determined, and the conditions existing at
the two dates respectively. The notices
already given by the Union for an advance on
the minimum wage to clickers and pressmen
shall be be1d to be good notices to the
Arbitration Boards for the districts to which
they refer, and shall be dealt with forthwith.
RESOLUTION 8 •. - No strike or lock-out
shall be,entered into on the part of any body
of workmen members of the National Union, or . . ,
any manufacturer represented on any. Local
Board of Arbitration •.
RESOLUTION 9. - That if any provision
of this agreement, or of an award agreement
or decision be broken by any manufacturer,
or body of workmen belong1og to the Federation
or National Union, and the Federation or
the National Union fail ~Tith1o ten days either
to induce such members to comply with the
agreement, decision or award, or to expel them
from their organisation, the Federation or
the National Union shall be deemed to have
broken the agreement, award or decision.
RESOLUTION lO~ - That any question as to
the 1oterpretatlon of these terms of settlement
be referred to Sir Courtenay Boyle, whose
deciSion thereon.shall be f10al and binding
on both parties; that Sir Henry James be
requested to ,act as umpire to determine any
other disputed points between the Federation
and the National Union arising out of this
agreement.
SIGNED on behalf of the Federated
Associations of Boot and Shoe Manufacturers.
J. GRIFFIN WARD; President. WILLIAM HICKSON. SAMUEL LENNARD. mos ", LILLEY.
SIGNED on behalf of the National Union
of Boot and Shoe
19th April 189;.
Operatives W.B. HORNIDGE, President. DANIEL STANTON WILLIAM VOTIER \of.; INSKIP, General Secretary,; ". COURTENAY BOnE, Chairman of
, Conference. H.LLEWELtIN SMITH. Secretary
'l'HOMA R RMT'I'H_ of Conference.
APPENDIX 111
The following amendment of Resolution 9
.was made on 31st March, 1910.
"Provided that if Resolution 8 of this
Agreement shall be broken by any manufacturer . .
belonging to the Federation, or by any body . . \
of workmen belonging to the National Union,
the Federation or National Union shall be
deemed to have broken the Agreement if work is
not resumed on the morning of the fourth working
day from the date on which the strike or lock
out is notified to the GenerafSecreU;ry of
the National Union and the Branch .Secretary
where the strike.takes place, or to the Secretary
of the Federation and the Secretary of the
Local Association where the lock-out takes place,
as the case may be. Such notification may be
given by telephone. or telegram, and the day
of notification shall count as one.day if the
notice is given before 1 o'clock p.m. If work
is not resumed on the morning of the fourth
working day from the day on which the strike
or lock-out is so notified, the Federation or the
National Union. as the case may be, shall have
a right of claim upon the guarantee fund under
the Trust Deed, giving effect to Resolution 6
of this Agreement, for loss sustained, commencing
trom and including the fo~th working day
from such notification (the,daY,of notification
being counted ,as one day) and continuing ,
until work ia resumed, and such right of claim
shall not be barred, pre3udicedor affected
by the expulsion of members from either
organisation" •
, ,
, .
REFERENCES
(1) Blackburn Robin.· '"The Unequal _~~}etl'" The
Incompatiblesl. Trade Union 'Militancy
and the Consensus. Ed. Robin Blackburn·
and Alexander Cockburn. Penguin Spee1al 1967.
(2)· Comnl1ttee on Relations between Employers a~d
Employed. Chairman, ~ • .r.S. Whitley •.. '
1916-1918. H.M.S.O.
(3) Royal Commission on Labour~ H.M.S.O. 1894.
(4) Royai Commission ~n Trade Unions and ,Employers
As·sociation. Chairman, Lord .Donovan.
1965'-1968. H.M~S.O. June 1968.
(,) In Place of Strife - A polioy for' industrial
, relations., Government White Paper.
H.M.S.O. January 1969.
(6) Attitudes in British Management. A P .E.P ~ Report.
Ed. Co1in Mclver. Pelican Books. 1966.
p.104.
(7) The Annual Report. Leicester. County FC?otwear
Manufaoturers Association. 1968.· . "
(8) Alan Fox. "The History of the National tTnion of
Boot and Shoe Operatives. ·1874-19n~
E!asllBlaokwelle 195'8; quoting from "Shoe.
and Lea.ther Record" .• · Novembel:· 22nd, 1890.
ibid. "Shoe and Leather Record". February 11th
1888.
( 10) Working Party Report 0*. the Boot and Shoe
Industry. 19'+6. , '
( 11) ibid.
( 12) ibid. . . ,
" .. , ,
( 13) K. Marsden. The Structure of tbe Footl0/9ar ,
Industrx. Journal of ,the British' -u
Boot and Shoe In~t1tut1on~ ~01. 9.
No. 12. June 1961. . , ' " ,
(14) Report on the Footwear Industr~ ~u~m1tted to
the International Labour Office by the
. National Union of , Boot' and'Stioe '
O~eratives. ,1969.
" ' (1,) K. Marsden; op.cit.
(16) Pratten, Dean and Si1bertson~ "The Economics , ,
(17)
of Large.Scale Production in British
Industrx. An Introductory Studt~
Cambridge University Press~ 1967.
"The Hides, Skins and Footwear Industry'in , .
o.E,ci.D. countri~s 1967':'1968" ~
Published by the Or~anisation for
Economic C~-oeration and Development,
Paris, 1969.
(18) K •. Marsden, op.,cit.
(19) Shoe and Leather Reeord. ·op.cit.
, . , .
(20) A1an Fox, op.cit.
(21) Research Paper No! 1, The Donovan Commission
Report, W.E.J.McCartby, The Role of
Shop Stewards in Industrial Relations.
H~M.S.O. 1966.
(22) Research Paper No. 10, The Donovan Commission
Report, W.E.J.McCartby and R.S. Parker,
"Shop Stewards and Workshop Relations."
H.M.S.O. 1968.
(23) H.A. C1egg, A,.J. Klll1ck and Rex Adams.
"Trade Union Officers". Blackwell. 1961.
(24) The Royal Commission on Trad~ Unions and
Emplo,rers Associations. op.cit.
(2,) H.A. C1egg, A.S. Kll11ck and Rex Mams. op.cit.
(26) James Crawford. "Management and Men".. Journal
of the 'British Boot and Shoe Institution,
April 1962.
(2?) V.G. Munns. "The Functions and Organisation
of Employers Association in'Selected
. Industries". The Royal Commission 'on:
Trade Unions and,Emp~oyers Association.
ResearcllPaper 7.. H •• I.S .0. 1967.
(28) W.E.J.McCarthy. "A.Survex of Employers
Association Officials". T~e Royal
Commission on Trade Unions and,Emp1oyers
Association. Research Paper 7.
H.M.S.O. 1967.
"
(29) A.I. Marsh. "Disputes Procedure in·British
Industry".T~e Royal Commission on . ~ . ....
Trade Unions and.Emp10yersAssociation.
Research Paper 2. H.M.S.O. 1966. ,'''. "
(30) ibid •.
(31) ibid.
. ,
BIBLIOGRAPHY
-H.A. C1egg, A.l. Killiek and Rex Adams. "Trade
Union Officers". B1ackwell.1961.
B.C. Roberts. "Trade Unions -in a Free Society".
Hutchinson. 19,9.
H.A. C1egg and Rex Mams. "The Employers Challenge".
B1ackwell.19?7 •
Henry Pelling. "A HistorY of British Trade Unionism".
Penguin. 1963.
W. McCarthy. "The Reasons given for Striking".
Bulletin of the Oxford Inst1tute of Statistics.
(XU). 19,9.
J. Goldstein.' "Goyernment of British Trade Unions".
Heinemann. 19,2.
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and E~p101ers
Associations 1967' - 1968~ Chairman: Lord Donovan.
H.M.S.O. 1968.
Research Papers.
No. 1. "The Role of Shop Stewards
in British Industrial Relations"
W.E.J. McCarthy.
No. 2.{Part 1) "Disputes Procedures in
British IndustrY"~,
, A~I. Marsh. ,
No.2. (Part 2) "D1sputes Procedures in Br1tain".
A.I. Marsh and W.E.J.McCarth~.
No. 3. "Industr1al Soc101ogy and
Industr1al Relat1ons.
Alan Fox.
1. "Product1vity Bargaining.
2. "Restrictive Labour Practices".
No. 5.(Part 1) "Trade Un10n Structure and
Government".
No; 6.
NOi 7.
No. 8.
John Hughes.
"Trade Union Growth and
Recogn1tion".
George Sa~ers Bain.
"The Funct10ns and Organisation
of Employers' Associat1ons in
Selected Industries.
V.G. Munns.
"A Survey of Employers' Associat1on
Officials".
W.E.J. McCarth~.
"Three Stud1es in Collect1ve
Bargaining" •
Jack Stieber, W.E.J. McCarth~,
A.I. Marsh and J.W. Staples.
"Overtime (<lorking 1n Britain" •.
E.G. W~bre1rl.
The Working P8r~ Report on Boots and SIloes.
H.M.S.O. 1946.
Alan Fox. "A HistorY of the 'National Union'of
Boot and Shoe Operatives. 1874-1957".
Blackwell~ 1958.
Industrial Relations Handbook. . H.M.S.O. 1961. ,
B.C. Roberts. "Trade Union Government Bnd
Administration". . .
Bell and Sons •
19;6.
A llan Flanders. "Industrial Relationsl . What is
Wrong witb the Syst~. Faber & Faber. 196;.
"In Place of Strife". Government Wh~ te Paper. .:'
H.M.S.O. 1969.
"Attitudes in British Management". A P.E.P • .Report.
Ed. C91~ Mclv~r.
Penguin 1966.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
An investigation of this nature is necessarily
dependent on the help of a large number. of people.
Mr. T. Cheesmond, President of the Leicester Branch
of the Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives,.gave
the initial impEltus and the important introductions.
Mess~L. Toft and E. Durie, secretary of their
respective Associations, arra.nged ·many of the \>lorks
visits. Mr. Robinson, National President of the
Union gave a lot of his valuable time.
Grateful thanks are expressed to them all, and
all those in the industry who were generous in their
time and interest.
On the staff at Loughborough University, thanks
are due to Mr. R. Condie, for his urbanity and
tolerance, and to Mr. S. Pitteway, for his energy,
competence and, above all, his enthusiasm.
And finally, without the forbearance of rrq
wife and family, nothing would have been achieved.
ACKNO~n8DGEMENTS
An investigation of this nature is necessarily
dependent on the help 'of 'a large number of people.
Thanks are due to my Principal and the Board
of Governors for granting leave of absence.
Mr. T. Cheesmond, President of the Leicester
Branch of the Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives,
gave the initial impetus and the important introductions.
Messrs. L. Toft and E. Durie, secretary of their
respective Associations, arranged many of the works
visits. Mr.S.A. Robinson, National President of
the' Union gave a lot of his' valuable time".
Grateful thanks are expressed to them all, and
all those in the industry who were generous in their . ,. . .' " ,
time and interest.
On the staff at Loughborough University, thanks
are due to Mr. R. Condie, for his urbanity and
tolerance, and to Mr. ,L. Pitteway, for his energy;
competence and, above all, his enthusiasm.
And finally; to 'mY family for their forbearance.
