armies & enemies of the crusades 1096-1291

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Armies

and

Enemies

of

the Crusades

96·

9

a t i o n tK tics. dress n weapons. 96 iIIustrltions.

Heath

,...,kS, HOSP

t

, lIl 11. TempI•••

,

.Syrians,

Se lju kl . F

hm

ldl .

yv u

bodl , MMnl ukl. A h l

ln

8y,.nlll . Georg

. .

. Mongol

an d

llk - idl .

W RG MES RESE RCH GROUP PU LI C TION



Armies and

Enemies

of the Crusades

1 96 1291

Organisati

on

tact ics dr ess and wea pons 9 illust ra t ions

bylan

Heath

r nk s lI ospitallers Templars Arm en ians Sy rians Selju ks

Fat im ids Ayyubids Mamluks Assassins Byzant mes Georgians

Mongols and IIkhanids

W RG MES RESE RCH GROUPPU LI C T O



INTRODUCTION

Although man y bo oks have bee n written on th e Crusad es ove r th e years they mostly ap proach the

subject from a pol it ical or socia l viewp oint, and with the excep tion of R. C. Smau s workmanlike

C rusadi ng War fare 1097·1 193 few o r no ne have ventured to describe in any detai l the warri ors and

armies with which Moslem and Ch ristian vied for co nt ro l o f th e Holy Land. Th e aim of this book,

ther

ef

ore, is to fill th is gap and add a litt le flesh to th e bo nes o f crusading history , by no t only describ ing

bu t

alse illustrating th e myriad wa rrior-types of Outrerner and

th e

lan ds o f Islam and Byzuntium so th at

toge th er

with

t he notes on organisat ion and tactics an entire pic ture can be built up o f warfa re in th e

Middle East in th e

tw o

centu ries

between

th e fat

ef

ul Bat t le of Manztker t in 1071 and the fa ll o f the

city of Acre to th e Mamluks 22 0 years late r.

A few n

ot e

s on terminology. I have used th e word Frank throughout to describe crusaders of

Eu ropean origin or extract ion, though the Byzanti nes tended to refer to

them more

o ft en as Latins . Where

the ir ethn ic origins are mixed or uncerta in Moslems I have usually called by that

name

, t hough where

applicab le I have sometimes substitu ted Turks r Arabs and on occasion have even lapsed int o using

th e popular term Saracen (a co rruption of Sharkeein , meaning Easterner o r Levanti ne]. Fo llow ing

convention, na tives of th e East ern Emp ire arc referred to as Byzant ines, o r sometimes as

Greeks

, which

term they were beginn ing to apply to themselves during th e course of this era, alt hough they more o ften

persisted in calling th emselves Romans even in th e 12t h and 13t h centu ries. T he Holy Land , although

it ref ers specifically to th e Kingdom of Jeru salem, l have generally used (inte rchangeab ly with Palest ine,

Frankish Syria and Outrerner ] as a collective te rm for th e mainland crusade r

stat

es

of

Jeru salem,

Tripoli, Annoch and Edessa; no mod e rn geographical boundar ies are inten de d by an y of these te rms,

and if this should at t imes cau se confusion I crave your indulgence.

European Crusades o f thi s same era , such as were fough t in Spai n, S

outhern

France and Prussia , are not

covered he re, th e part icipating armies o f t hese campaigns having already been desc r ibed in A rmies o f

Feudal 1066·1 300 .

The th ird and fina l part o f what was o nce envisaged as a single book, I th ink I can safely say that this is

th e par t which I have most enjoyed prepa ring. I ho pe you will f ind it equa lly enjoyable to read , an d that it

will encou rage further interest in on e o f the most neglected , an d yet at th e same time most fascinating,

th eatr es o f mediaeva l war fare .

lan Heat h

Febr uary 1978

Copyright lan Heath 1978

1



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ORGANISAT ION

THE CRUS ADER STATES

European feudalism was int rod uced int o Sy ria by th e crusaders, who founded the Principality of

An tioch ( 10< 8· 263) , th e Coun ties of Edessa ( 1098-1 144) and

Tr i

poli ( 1109-1289 , in

corpo

rating

Antioch afte r 11 19 ), th e Kingdom of Cypru s (11 91 -1489, thereafter a v cncuan co lony un til 1571 ) and

th e Kingdom of J

er u

salem

1100-

1187, thereafter in reality the Kingdom of Acre rather than Jerusalem

un t il the final extinct ion

of

th e state in 1291 ).

Feudal

co n

t ingents

Since the re was a co nstant sho rtage o f manpower , and the su rvival of Frank ish Syria depended entirely

on its military capabili t ies, general kn ight service was subject to far fewe r restri ctions th an in Europe. Fo r

instance, there seems to have been no time-lim it on t he length of service tha t might be req uired even up

to a full yea r, th ough it is not clear whether thi s was at t he expense of th e vassal or th e ten an t-in-chief';

e ither way it was not at t he king's expe nse unless it too k place out side o f th e kingd om.

Each vassal was a vassal of the king, irres pective o f whose lands he was enfeoffed upon (wi th th e exce p

tion o f th e lands o f th e chu rch and th e Milita ry Orders) , and so lo ng as he was under 60 years o f age he

was expec ted to serve mounte d an d fully -a rme d anywhere w

it h

in th e realm and within 15 days whenever

the king summoned him. In addi t ion the vassal

would

be accom panied by what ever kn ight s , se rgeants.

esquires or mercenaries his

terms

o f enfeo ffment might demand (i t

should

be noted, however c tha t a

vassal was no t allowed to subinfeuda te more of his

fief

than he hims

el f

held, wh ich ef fec tivel y resmctcd

th e size o f per sonal rerinucs ' ).

The principal limita t ion o n service to t he crown was that Edessa, T ripo li and Ant ioch were not

considered

part

of t he realm , and m ilita ry assistance from th ese principalities was only to be expected

whe n th e king was strong

en o

ugh to en fo rce it. When the crowns of Jerusalem and Cyp rus were u

nite

d

in 1268 th is problem became mor

e complicate d, Cypnote knights insist ing tha t th ey owed no mi

lih

ry

service to th e king save on the island o f Cyprus itself:

bu t

in 1273 agreement was rea

ched

that Cyprio tc

knights owed service in Jerusalem too - or

wher

ever else the king migh t have need o f

th e

m - fo r

4 mon th s every year. However, even prio r to th is dat e, as early as th e reign o f Amalric

( 1194·1 205

Cypriote feudal t ro

op

s had ap pea red in ma inland armies

on

a number of occasions; 100 Cy p riote

knights to ok pa rt in the Fifth Crusade under the Constable o f Cy p rus, and in an a ttac k on lI amah in

1233 , while perhaps

30 0

C

ypri

otes were killed at La Forblc in 1244 and at least :WOFyp

no t

c knigh ts

and 500 infantry look pa rt in the fin al defence of Acre in 129 1. (Th e Estoi re d' Eraclcs infor ms us tha t

whe n feudal tenu re was esta b lished on

Cypru

s by Guy de Lusignun, 1192-1194 , vassals 'c ame fro m the

Kingdom of Jerusalem, from Tripoli, from Anti och , and from Armenia u e Cilicia ), And

there

were

established fiefs worth 40 0 white bezants for a knight an d wort h 300 for a Turcopole with two horses

and a co at-o f-mai In all 30 0 knight 's fees were parcelled

ou

t and W Turco pole s fee s, leaving Guy

wit h scarcely enoug h land or revenue to maintain a familia of 20 - one source says 70 - kn ights.)

Because of th e shortage of land many vassals received mone y-fiefs in ex change fo r service (especially in

th e Principality of Antioch ), usually f rom th e revenues of spcctf'ic town s and ci ties: Frankish mer cenari es

were also pa id with money-fiefs (see below ), Som e of the knight s owed by the t

owns

t see Append ix 11

and

pe r

haps the ch urch as well were prob ably also supplied in e xchange for money-fiefs

Though often complicated by

th e

presence of crusading

Eu r

op e

an kings and magn ate s overall

co

mmand

was usually in the hands of th e king himself or his baill i [ regen t I, th ough in realit y a counci l of the

chief men of th c

army

decided st rategy and po licy :IS Heha ed-Din puts it ' it is their custom, when it is

a ques ti on of W:lT, to take co unsel together on horseback ], In the absence o f king or bailli th e Constable

of th e Kingdom led the army assisted by his lieutenant c th c Marshal. Su pplies and justice were

respo nsib iliti es o f the Con stable, as was th e em p loyment an d fai r paymen t of mercen aries, both the

king's an d those hired independe nt ly by the feu da l lor ds, from whom he co llec ted th e appr

op

riate

• By the mid·13th century there was considerable dispute ;u to ..hether this meant that the vassal must fa) hold at

least 51 of the fief himselF or Ib) that he need only hold more than

\Io 'lU

subinfeudated to hb ,:reatest vassa l,

5



paym en ts; but t he Ma rshal act ually co mma nde d th e mercenaries in the field, In ba

ttle t he Cons ta b

le

co m ma nded a do uble-stre ngth

troo

p h e had

th e

first choice o f men af te r t he king s own tr o

op

ha d bee n

mad e up ) and ma rched in the vangua rd , immediat ely beh ind t he

Turcop

c les see page 39 ), wit h t he

xta rshal s troo p, then t he king s, be hind him , Anti och , Ed essa and T ripoli had th e ir own

cons

t ables a nd

mars hals two marshals cou ld hol d offi ce simulta neously in Antioch ) , as did

th e

great baro ns of Ja ffa ,

Si

do n

, Ga hlee an d poss ibly Oult rejo urdain an d Ceesa rea . T he Senesc hal wa s se nio r t o t he Co nstable but

he was a co urt officia l rath e r t han a mili

tary

co mmander, In

th e

Pri ncipality of An tioe h t

he r

e we re

add itional office rs i n Antioch , Jah ala and Lat ta kieh] ca lled d uces or Dukes.

Fra nki sh mercenaries

Mercen:lril s, called Sodee rs or sold iers, we re o f great import an ce fro m th e very beginnin g o f t he

cru sade r state s exi sten ce, a t leas t par tially co mpensating

fo r

t he cri tica l s

ho r

tage of feuda l

manpowe

r.

They

became eve n mo re

impor

t ant over th e yea rs as t he stea dy re conquest o f land by th e Sara cens

f

ur t

her red uc ed th e numbers of fe udal troo ps available . Some were provided o n a fe ud al basi s by

vassals who

owed

service de compaignons w hich req uire d th a t t he vassal sho uld raise

an d

pay a

specified n

umber

o f

me r

cenaries}, o t hers bei ng provided by Fr ankish knights and serge a nt s wh o stayed

o n in th e Fast af te r visi ting t he ho ly places.

Th ey were co ntracte d mo nt h by mon t h

fr o

m t he 1st of t he mon th), breac h of such a co nt rac t being

regarded as very se rious offen ce ; in t he case o f a kn ight it was pu nishab le by co nfisca t io n of his fief if

he had on e presumably la nd or mon ey ) o r his ar mour and equ ipment if he did no t, while an o rdina ry

sold ier might have his ha nd s mu t ilate d with a hot iron . On

th e

o

th e

r ha nd mercena ries were paid a t a

ve ry high rate th o ug h probably no t at 100 times the rat e of a Mosle m warrior as is sugges te d in o ne of

Usamah ib n Munqld h s anecdotes ; evide nce suggests, in fact, that Fr ank s we re pa id 2-5 t im es a s much

as t hei r Moslem co unte r parts).

- knights , se rgeants a nd infan t ry -

tended

to be hire d out ri ght ,

but me rcen ar y kn ights we re of ten paid for with mo ney-flcfs, usually fro m th e revenues

of

so me town,

city or t je de speci fied in

their

con t racts. T he revenues var ied from 3

00

bezan fs

pe r

an

nu m

to 60 0 o r

even 1

,000

dep end ing o n how secur e t he revenues wen and how ma ny men were n eed ed -

th e

mo re

me n needed ,

th e

l

ower

t he revenue. However, be cause o f a lmost co nsta nt warfare

an d

th e frequ ent loss

o f

town

s and lan ds it was

no t

uncommo n fo r merce naries pay to be we ll o verdue, an d under such

cir cu mstances th e y co uld sell t heir eq uipmen t and live of f th e proceeds, owing no service unt il t he

o uts ta nding debt had bee n paid off. O n o ther occasions th ey we re paid for by special t ax es as in 1183 ),

o r by gift s of money from European rulers in lieu of act ual tr

oo p

s; t he

ll i

st ori a Regni lI ierosoly mitani

reco rd s t hat many as 1, 20 0 me rcenary kni gh ts a nd 7,00 0 me rcenary infant ry were hired pr io r to t he

Ba tt le o f Ila tt in in 118 7, e xplaining th at th ey were paid for by a m

oney

gift from lI enry

of England

in at

onement

fo r t he mu r der o f T homa s it Bec ket), but t hese figu re s arc s om ewha t on t he high side ,

wh ile in his will of 122 2 1hilip

o f Fra nce left 150 ,000 silver marks 10

th e

king of Jerusalem a nd

th e

Orde r of t he Tem ple for

th e

ma intenance of 100 merce nary knights each Ior a pe riod o f 3 yea rs.

Likewise mon e y sent ou t to Outre mer by t he Po pe see ms t o have been largely used t o hi re me rcena ries

th roughou t th e 13t h ce ntury.

Examples of Frankish knights staying o n in Out reme r in ex change fo r pay are provided by t he 40

knight s left with a yea r s pay by Wail e r d Avesnes on his retu rn t o Eu rope in 12 18,

an d th e

F renc h

regiment o f 100 kn ight s established in Acre by Loui s IX [St Lo uis) prio r to his

o wn d ep

a rt ure in 1254

and co nt inuo usly maint a ined by gift s o f money un til th e fa ll of th e ci t y in 1291 . Alt hough no t st ric t ly

mercenary, th e un its o f Fr e nch and Ge rma n knight s ma intained by t he ba illis of Ch arles of Anjo u and

F rede rtck

sho u ld proba bly also he mentioned he re.

Na tive soldie rs and mercenaries: Syrians, Maro nit es, T urcu poles and Arm enians

Far from all mercenaries wen of F rank ish o rigin. As

me n

tioned

ab o

ve, crusaders fro m Europ e oft e n dill

stay on for pay , but th e majo rity of me rcen

an e

s were probably hired fro m

amon

gst the na tive Ch risua ns,

t he Sy rians , Arm en ians and Maronucs. T hese woul d be hired o ut righ t

rathe

r

than

being grante d money-fiefs

It has bee n suggested t ha t S yria ns may have sup plied t he bulk of t he king

dom s

inf an

try.

and t hough

th e

re is little eviden ce to support t his rather swee ping stateme nt it is un den iable

that

Sy rians are

to

be

occ asiona lly fou nd in Franki sh armies ; so me, for inst ance , he lped Raymond de Sa int-GilIes in t he

co nque st of T ripoli . Undoubtedl y o t he rs wo ul d take u p arm s in an e me rgency, as did so me in 1124,

and passages in w illiam of Tyre and F ulch e r of Cha rtres ind ica te that t hey migh t sometimes pe rfor m

6



garrison duties. However, WilIiam also points out that in general

the

y were o f a timorous na ture, 'a race

which is regarded by us

JS

weak and effemina

te

, in wh ich he is bac ked up by Jacques de Vitry, Bisho p

of Acre, who wro te in the 13th centur y that t hey are altogether unwarlike and in ba tt le are as helpless

as wom en, save fo r some of them who use bows and arrows bu t are una rmoured and ready for runn ing

away. T hese men are known as Syr ians , For the most pa rt they are untrustwor thy, two-faced

cunning foxes just like the Greeks (Byzantines), liars and turncoat s, lovers of success, traitors, easily won

over wit h bribes, men who say one th ing and mean another, and thi nk no thing of t heft and robbery.

For a small sum of money they beco me spies and tell the Christians' secrets to the Saracens.' Hardly

reliable allies

The pr incipal nati ve Christian element in the County of T ripoli prov ided by th e Maronit cs of

Lebanon, sett led principally in Gibbat Bsarr i, Kisrawan and round Jebail. They appear to have

numbered about 304 0,000. WiIliam of Tyre praised t he militar y skill of the Maronites, 'a sta lwart race,

valiant fighters, and of grea t service to the Christian s in the difficult engagements which t hey so

freq uently had , to which de Vitry adds ' they are numerous, use bows and arrows, and are swift and

skilful in battle.' They served in most Tripolitanian armies, fighting under their own ch ieftains (called

by the Ara bic title Muqaddam) , some of whom even received fief s (which would indicate th a t a few

were actually knights; other na tive Ch rist ian knights are also to be fo und in the sou rces, with surn ames

such as Arrabi, Qelbe Arab, Elteffaha, etc. while in Ant ioch many knight s bore Greek names). Between

1192 and 1194 Gu y de Lusignan is reported to have even introduced a large numbe r of Marom tes int o

Cy p

rus th e figu re of 30, 000 is given ), these subsequently serving as a sor t of militia. Some may have

later

acco

mpan ied

the

Hospitallers to

Rh o

des, and la ter sti ll to Malta.

The most numerous, reliable and efficient Syrian element in Frankish arm ies, however, was pr ovided by

the Turcopole s, The te rm Turcopole itself, meaning literally 'son o f the Turks', had been bo rrowed from

the Byzantines, who used the name Turcopouloi fo r their ow n merce nary Tur k ish regulars (see page 28 ;

Raymond d'Aguilers sta tes th at Turcopoles were so named because they were eit her reared with Turks

or were the

offs

pring of a Christian mother and a

Tur

kish father' ), The Franks applied the te rm rat her

more loosely

to

Syr ians, nati ves of mixe d parentage (Tu rk ish fathers and Greek mo thers according to

Albert of Aix) , and co nverted Turks serv ing in their own armies. By the mid-12th cen tury, however,

judging from t he evidence of names reco rded for Turcopoles in writte n sources it would seem possible that

at leas t some, and possibly a great many, may have actually been Sy rian Franks ( Pou lains) or even European

Franks, probably equipped to fight in Turkish fashion. (I n sup por t of this last theory it is

inte

resti ng to

not e that Tu rcopouloi employed by

th e

Cat alans in Greece in th e early- 14t h cen tury include d native

Greeks who had shaved t heir heads Turkish-fashion in order to be employed in this capaci ty Although

it has been suggeste d that some

Tu r

copoles were foot-soldiers the sources seem to indica te that they

fou ght principa lly if not exclusively as light cavalry (see also no te 14 in th e dress and eq uipmen t section ).

They had their own officers called Turcop oliers (pr obab ly Fran ks) but like all other mercenaries came

unde r the overa ll command of th e Marshal o f the Kingdom.

There were 1,500 Turcopoles in the army which campaigned in the Jezreel valley in 1183 and the army

at Hatt in may have included as many as 4 ,000; Usamah records a single nobleman (William-Jo rdan, regent

of Tripoli) having as many as 200 'Turkubuli' (f rom Latin 'Turco poli' ) in his employ in 1107. Turcopolcs

served in addit ion in Tunisia (during Louis IX's Eighth Crusade ) and Cyprus and were employed in

considerab le num bers by the Military Orders - the Hospitallers supplied 5 0 0 in 1168 while the

Hospitallers and Templars together lo st over 5 00 at La Forbie in 1244.

The o

th e

r most imp

or t

ant group o f native Christia ns were the warlike Armenians of Cilicia ( Lesser

Armenia). These were numerous in th e Principality of Ant ioch and comprised most of the po pulat ion

of the Coun ty o f Edessa, and they are to he found serving variously as subjects, mercenaries and allies

under their ow n chieftai ns, supplying

both

cavalry and infan try, particulary under C

oun

t Joscelyn

11 3 1-1150 ). 1nl 108 th e Armenian prince of Kesoun, Kogh Vasil (Vasil the Robbe r), supplied Baldwin

of Edessa wit h an army of as many as 1-2,000 cavalry and 2,000 infa ntry , including a number of Selju k

renegades, while the c

hr o

nicle r Matt hew o f Edessa records that there were 50 0 Armen ian cavalry in

Roger of

An t

ioch's army at Ager Sanguin us in 1119 and a similar numbe r at 'Azaz in 1125 . When

Edessa fell in 1144 many of its mercenary defenders were Armenians, and some Armenians were even

present at the siege

of

Acre in 119 1.

shou ld be noted, however, that the Armenians (and very occasionally the Maronites) cou ld also be

7



foun d figh ting against t he Fra nks. Arm en ians see m to have played a pa rti cular ly im portan t ro le in som e

Seljuk a rm ies o f t he la te- Ll t h cen t u ry , nota bly that o f T u t ush o f Damasc us 0 079-1095) , and t hey we re

to be fo u nd t oo in th e various T urkish ar mies which o ppos ed th e First Crusa de. In add it io n t he F atirnids

employ ed A rmen ian ar c her s in t h e 1

2t h

ce n

tury.

So me t imes t o o

op e

n wa rfare co uld flar e up be twee n

Ctltcta a nd neigh bo uring Ant ioch .

The flee t: t he It al ian c o mm unes

Th o ugh A nt ioch an d Tr ipo li bo t h d eveloped sm all fleet s th e Kingdom o f J eru s alem itsel f had no

per manen t flee t

of

its o wn

th o

ugh it mainta in ed arsenals at T yr e and Acre, raisi ng 33 ships fr o m th ese

at sho rt n o tice in 1 182 , prob ab ly incl ud ing It alian me rcha n t vessels in po r t a t t he t ime, while in 12 32

mo ney -fief swere pa id ou t to Po u la ins of th e co astal ci tie s for fitti ng

ou t

arm ed shi ps), Inst ead th e kings

o f Je rusalem d epe nd ed pri ncipa lly on th e Ita lian co mmune s and t he Milit ar y Ord ers for naval su pp or t

t

he Ord ers maintaining bo th t ranspo rt s a nd galleys; in a naval e ngageme nt d uring t he siege of T yre in

118 7 we find as many as 17 galleys man ned b y Hosp iralle rs a nd Te m plars). 13t h cen tu ry Cyprus

simila rly relied on It alian sh ips, usually Genoese.

The It a lia n co mmu nes seco nd in impor ta nce on ly t o th e Milita ry Ord ers in 1

3t h

ce n t ury Ou t remer ) ha d

mos tly bee n establishe d in t he earl y years of th e 1

2t h

ce nt u ry in ex cha nge fo r t he se rvices re ndered by

Ita lia n flee ts in t he ca p tu re o f t he co as ta l ci t ies whic h, wit h th e e xception o f T y re a nd Ascalon, all fell

bet wee n 1100 a nd 1 1 1 1. Fo r e xa mple 4 0 Oenoe sc ships ha d a tt ende d th e siege o f I e bail in 1 10 3, 70 were

at Acre in 1 104 , 60 at T r ipo li in 1 10 9 , 4 0 Gcnocse a nd Pisa n sh ips at Beiru t in 1 110 , a nd lat

er

as many

as 100- 1

30

Ven eti an sh ips a t th e siege o f T yr e in 1124. Such flee ts ha d bee n sup plied p rinci pally by

th e

city -st ates o f Gen oa , Pisa a nd a t fi rst to a lesse r ex ten t) Ve nice , ge nerally in ex c hang e fo r pay, t rading

co ncessio ns o r loo t, o r of te n 113; usually th ey were promised pa rt o f t h e besieged city to o , of t en a

thi rd . Th e e nd prod uct was th e establishmen t o f self-governi ng It alian co mmu nes in a ll th e co ast al c ities,

eac h

under

a co ns ul o r visco u n t v ic om te) ap p oin ted by its pa rent cit y in It aly . Ge no a possesse d suc h

co mmunes in Acre, A n t ioc h, Arso uf , Be irut , Caesa re a. Ja ffa , J eb ail, L

att

ak ieh , Sain t Sy meon , Tyre and

Tripo li, an d Ven ice had its o wn co mmu nes in t he larger o f t hese ci ties, bo th having qu a r ters in

Je rusalem to o. Pisa h ad co mmu nes in Acre, An tioch, Botrun, l attakieh, T ri poli and T yre. In ad diti o n

the re wer e A malfi t a n co m mu nes in Acre and La tt ak ie h and Marseillais co mmunes in Acre, J a ffa, J eb ail

and T y re, there even be ing a Barcelonese co mmu ne in t he la tt er. Exce pt fo r Acr e few o f these co u ld

have mustered more t ha n abou t 5 00 men ,

T hough t h e co mmu nes were un de r no o bliga ti o n

10

se rve in th e king s army t hey co uld be ca lled upo n to

help defen d

th e

cit ies in which th ey had the ir

quar

te rs a nd to le nd naval su p po rt usua lly in ex cha nge

for e x t ra p rivileges) in d e fe nce of t he co astal to wns. Italian co n t inge n ts also o ft e n wen t alo ng as all ies

in many offe nsive campaigns, an d as mer ce naries in o t he rs,

Unfor

tuna

tely for t he kingd om , however , th e Venet ian , Plsa n, G cn oese a nd o ther It alian co n t inge nts we re

mu t ua ll y hos ti le, and Jucq u es de Vit ry re mar ks

dryly

t ha t t hey would be very te rrible t o th e Sar ace ns if

t hey wo uld cease fro m t heir j ea lousy and avaric e and wo u ld no t co n t in ually fight a nd q uarre l with each

o ther. But , . , t he y mo re o ft e n jo in ba t t le agains t o ne a nothe r th a n against th e t rea

chero

us

in f

idel.

On e o f the wo rs t o f th ese bl oo dy ci vil wa rs was th e w ar o f Sa in t Sabas in Acre in 125 9, in which

allegedly hu t impr oba b ly ) 20 ,0 00 v en e t ians. C e noese and o t hers d ied.

Oth e r so urces o f t roop s

Chu rc h land s and th e to wns o f th e kingdo m were ob liged t o supply co nti nge n ts o f se rgea nt s. T ho se

co n t ingents o n record listed b y J ean d Jbelin - see A ppendi x I) va ried be tw een 25 and 50 0 each , t he

lists ap pare ntly reco rdi ng th e state o f affairs as

it

ex isted in th e reign o f Bald wi n IV 1174- 1185).

D fbcttn gives a to ta l of 5,02 5 sergeants be ing available from the se so u rces, th o ugh his figures a re p

robab

ly

incomple te a nd refle ct the se rvice o f th e k ingdo m o r J e rusale m o nly , exclusive of An tioch a nd T ripoli

Edessa had fallen in 1144 ). T hese se rgeants were no t a milit ia , se rving ra th er e xchange for se rgea nts

fees, T hey were p rob ably infa n t ry, T hou gh th er e w

er

e also mo u n ted se rgea nts Isee page 7 1) th ese we re

mo re usu ally in th e re tin ues o f k nights.

O n o ccasio n th e A rricrl:-Ban . th e levy o f all able-b odied free men , might be sum mo ned to su p ple me nt

t he feudal a nd me rce nar y co n t ingents, eit her lo cally as. fo r e xa mple, at la ffa in 1 122 a nd Acre in 121 8 ,

o r to re lieve th e siege o f B

a r

in in 113 7 ; or o n a na tio nal sca le as a t t he siege of Acr e in 1 104 , fo r a war

8



against Damascus in 11 26 , at Ascalon in 115 3 w here in addi tion so me pilgrims we re hire d

temp

orarily),

at Mont gisa rd in 1177 , o r for t he lIa lli n campaign o f I 187, Pilgrims also appe a red in exchange for pay

on ot her occasio ns, as at Ram la in 110 2, Senn abr a in I I 13, a nd in t he Ain Jalut ca mpa ig n of 118 3, but

it is clea r that suc h se rvice was no t always perfor med willingly , Crusa ding knig hts c onsta ntl y arriving

from Europe also supplement ed the kingdom s army for th e durat ion of thei r stay, often staying on as

mercenarie s as men tioned a bo ve ).

Mosle ms and Mo ngols

In t he first half of t he 12t h ce ntury

Turki

sh e mtrs. fearful

of

losi ng

the

ir

indepe

nde nce t o

more

pow erful neighbo urs or eve n

to

t he Sultan, co uld be found allied to th e c rusader states a nd supplying

troops, suc h as the 600 Alcp pene cavalry a nd more than 1,00 0 T urks and Bcdoui ns who fo ugh t fo r

Tancre d of Ant io ch and Baldwin of Edessa respec t ive ly at Tell Bash ir in 1108 , a nd t he 5, 00 0 f rom

Aleppo, Mardi n a nd Damascus who serve d du ring the I l l S campaign. T he Fra nkish ar my besieg ing

Ale pp o in 1124 is reco rded to have inclu de d as man y as l OO Moslem t ents Be do uins unde r th e a mir

Dubays), c om prising one-third of th e tot al fo rce, Bedo uin spies a nd scouts being re

corded

in ad dition on

o

ther

occasions. Assassins were also to be fo und allied

to

the F ran ks o n occasion there wer e so me in

Ra ym ond of An tioch s a rmy defea ted at Fo ns Murat us) , wh ile Egypt ian troops t oo appeared in Frankish

armies, not ab ly

dur

ing the s t ruggle with Nu r ed-Din for co nt ro l of Egy pt in I 167, but they we re

regarded as poor soldiers of l it tle military significance. Th e re were also so me Sara cen arche rs introd uced

from Sicily in 1113 ; mo re accompanied Frederick d u ring t he Si xt h Crusa de of 1228- 1229 , an d

probab ly th e 300 Turco poles re po rte d in the flee t despatched by William II of Sicily in 118 7 were also

Saracens.

Even t he Mongols in t his case the Nestortan o r Christ ian-influe nced lfkhanids of Pe rsia ) so me times

foug ht for t he F rankish cause, an d in t his c ontext a ppea r so me of t he most unlikely armie s

of

t his e ra,

such as t he mi xed bag of Mo ngols, T urks , F ran ks under Bo he mon d VI

of

Antioch l, Armenian s an d

Georgia ns which campaigned in Sy ria in 1259 a nd 126 0

und

er t he Ilkha n Hulagu. In 128 1, un der his

suc cesso r Abuqa an arm y

of

similar composit io n, chiefly Mongols, Georgians a nd Ar menians but

including Hospitullc rs from t he garrison of a l-Marqab, fought the Mamluks at Ho rns. 10 years e arlier, in

127 1, Abaq a had alleged ly de spatched as many as 10,000 Mongols again st t he Mamluk s in Syria in

response to an appeal from t he English prin ce Edwa rd later Edward t hen invo lved in wha t transp ired

to be a ve ry minor crusading en te rprise.

Tot al st reng t h

In

the

Aut umn of 1099

Godftey

de Bou illon co uld muste r 3

,000

me n in Jerusalem ,

but

Albert o f Aix

recor ds that by t he Sp ring of 1100 t his ha d declined to on ly 200 k night s and 1,000 infant ry , T he ne xt

yea r Fulche r of Cha rt res record s

tha

t King Baldwin I had barely 300 c avalry a nd 30 0 infantry with which

to garri so n Je rusa lem, Ra mla, J affa and Huifa, and even at the Firs t Bat t le o f Ram la t here were as few as

260 cavalry a nd 90 0 infantry present. Baldw in found it necessary , in fact , t o establish a mercena ry

for ce to gar rison bot h Jeru salem and J a ffa a t least as early as 110 I , and in 1108 we hear of a force of as

many as OO me rcena ry k night s a nd 500 me rc en ar y inf a nt ry from t he garri so n of Jerusalem.

70 0 knights and 4,000 infantry gathered by Ba ldwi n in 111 I probably rep resented the to tal feudal

st rength of th e ki ngd om at t ha t t ime t hough here as elsewh ere to the t ota l numb er o f knights should

probably be adde d an unkn ow n num ber of mou nt ed sergeants); th e co ntingents o f Be rtrand

of

T ripoli,

Ta ncred of Ant ioeh , Bald win of Edessa 200 knigh ts an d 100 infa ntry), Josc clyn of T urbcssel 100

knigh ts a nd 50 infan t ry ), Ric hard o f Marash 60 kn ight s a nd 100 infa nt ry) and ot he rs, plus Arm enian

co nt ingents,

bro

ugh t t his fo rce up to a total strength of some 16 ,000 men.

Fo r a campaign in 11 15 Baldwi n supp lied 1,000 infan t ry and 500 knigh ts, Antioc h mustering 2,00 0

cavalry a nd infa

ntry

a nd Tr ipoli 2,000 infant ry and 200 knig ht s. To t hese were added 5

,000

Seljuk

aux ilia ry cavalry. A

noth

er Antio chene fo rce , recor ded a t Ager Sangui nus in 11 19 , co nsisted of 700

knights an d 3-4,0 00 infa nt ry and t his possibly represent s the principa lity s t ota l stre ngt h in kn ights and

serge

ants

respec t ively, t he

latte

r incl udi ng a numbe r of Sy rians and Armenians. T he tot al num be r of

knights actually availab le to An tioc h or T ri poli was probably a bout t he sa me as in th e king

dom of

Jerusale m. T he num be r of kn ights in Edessa was probably so mewha t less but a ppea rs to have been a t

least 500 . In 1138 a for ce recorded march ing fro m Samosa ta to th e relief of Edessa itself is reco rded as

numbe ring 300 kn ights a nd about 4 ,00 0 infan t ry.

9



In 1183 a n army of o ver 15 ,000 t rul y e xce llent arm ed foot-soldiers and 1,300 knights is rec ord e d by

William o f T yre, while mad ad -Din gives 15-20

,000

infan tr y and 1,50 0 kn ights plu s in additio n 1,5 00

Turccpolcs. Eit her way, a t t hat t ime it was t he la rge st army t o have been mu st e re d in Frankish Syr ia,

thou gh it incl ude d so me Eu ropean crusa ders. But t he largest arm y eve r mu stered by th e king

do m

was

the force of 2Q.63,O rec orded in th e lI alt in c

ampa

ign of 118 7, Th e o n ly detailed se t of figures for th is

army gives us a breakdown of 1,000 kn ights, 1,200 mercenary knigh ts, 4

,000 Tu r

copoles, 25,000

infantry, a nd 7, 00 0 mercena ry infantry, to talling 48,

20 0

men. Ho wever, on th e evidence o f th e

It inerarium Regis Ricar d i, which recko ns mo re t han 1

,000

knights a nd 20

,000

infa nt ry ; t he Libellus de

E

xpugnat

m, which gives 1,2 00 kn ight s, many

Tu r

c opcle s a nd over 18

,000

infantry ; t he Brevis Hist orja,

which gives 25, 000 ; a nd th e Mo slem au th o r Abu Shamah, wh o reckons at least 23, 000 men , it seems a

reaso na ble assumption

that

th e a rmy was

ab o

ut 20-25,000 st ro ng, probably includi n g 1,200 kn ights of

who m abou t 200 were mercenaries, An o lh er so urce, t he I lospltallers le t t er, recor d s th e arm y t o have

been 30,

000

st rong including some 1

,2 0

0 kn ights, T he lo west figur e give n in t h e sou rces is 5 ,000, wh ich

is as im

prob

able as th e 63,

000

given in o ne Moslem so urce.

It is fro m list s o f just a few years earlier t ha n t h is dat e tha t J ean d lb elin com piled his reco rd

of

fe udal

service o wed t o th e Kingd om of J erusalem, full de tails of whic h are given in Appendix Con tinge nts

ranged in size fro m t he 100 knights eac h du e from t he 3 great baronies o f Sidon, Galil ee a nd Ja ffa and

Ascalon, right dow n to t he se rvice o f single knight s. D lb elin adds up his figures to a tota l of 57 7 knig hts,

bu t his arithm etic ap pears 10 he at fault , t he actual to ta l be ing a t the most 749 and a t th e least 636 if

cert ain d iscrepancies are tak en int o account. No r are d l helin s figures co mp lete, h is list omitt ing the

service du e to t he kin

gd o

m from

Trip

o li from wh ich he elsewhe re reco rd s t he se rvice of 100 knight s

bei ng pot ent ially availab le) and Antioch, as well as cer tain kn own fief s for wh ich he probab ly had no

info rma t ion. seems rea sonabl e to a ssum e th a t if these unk now n con t ingents were ad ded a total

st rengt h in th e region of 1,000 kn ights would probab ly be arr ived a t. Even t hen me rcenaries and th e

Milit ary Orders are not inclu ded . During t he 13 th ce ntury Cyp rus to o co u ld raise 1,000 knights.

The las t la i ; e army ra ised by t he c rusader sla tes was t hat whic h fo u gh t, and was des t roye d, at La Pcr bie

in 1244 . Figur es va ry and are not a

lt o

gethe r reliable, bu t it wo uld app ea r t hat t his totalled 6, 00 0 men

incl uding, accordi ng to th e Est oire d E racles, 600 kn ight s fro m Acre , Ja ffa, Antioch-Tripcli, Cyprus, and

the Military O rde rs o f Temple, Hospital, Teut o nic Knight s and St Laza rus, On e ch ro nicler, Sali mbene,

says that Cy p rus and An tio ch-Tripoli lost as many as 30 0 knight s eac h, which is almost cer tai nly an

exagge ration. Ho wever, t he cas ualties suffe red by th e Military Orders would ten d t o suggest th at th e

Eraclcs 600, if it is an acc urate figure, refers on ly to lay knights. Th e Patriarch of Jer usale m wrot e a

le t t er re port ing t he loss of 3 12 Templar bre th ren and 3 24 T urco pole s in th ei r

em p

loy, 32 5 Ilospita

l

er

bret hre n and 200 T urco polcs, 29 7 ou t of an

im p

robable 300 Teu tonic Knights, and th e to tal de struction

of t he l a zar co ntinge nt. Frederick

received re

po r

ts Ihat th e Hos pitatlers lost

20 0

bret hren an d the

Te mpl ars 3

00 ,

pe rhaps th eir whole Con v

ent,

wh ile Matt hew Paris record s t ha t th ese 2 Orde rs together

muste red 500 bre t hren for th e

batt

le. In all th ese figures no diff

erenti

a t ion is ma de bet ween

br o th e

r

kn ights and br other se rgeanrs.) All in all th e infe rence is t ha t th ere were abou t 1,0 00- 1,20 0 knigh ts in

tota l, poss ibly mo re, wit h prob ab ly about hal f sup plied by t he Military Ord ers.

TH E MILITARY OR D ER S

Th ese were with o u t do ubt th e most impor tant so urce of tro ops in th e c rusa der states, co ntingents o f

Te mpla rs and for lIospitallers appeari ng in every arm y mu stered by t he king o f Jerusale m from th e mid

12th ce ntury o nwards, Their military services, however, were not ob lig

atory,

the great Or der s o f Te mple,

Hospit al an d T eu tonic Knights be ing answerable direct ly - a nd only - to th e Pop e the y even dre w up

the ir own treat ies and alliances independently of th e cr o wn, o ften mo tivated by fi nancia l considerations) ,

and th e king o fte n fe lt o bliged to en courage th eir military assistance by pr o mising ext ra-large sha res of

the spoils, o r other allure me nt s; in 12 20 , fo r e xample, John de Brienn e prom ised th e T eu tonic Knight s

ha lf t he plun de r of Damict t a. R. Sm all, ho wever, rem arks in his C rusading Wa rfare t h at th e presence

of Military Ord er con tingents cost th e feuda l ru lers full military com mand o f th eir fo rces in t he field .

T he heavy reliance wh ich th e ki ng was obl iged to place o n th ese tr oo ps effec tively increased t he powe r

and independence of th e Orders, which t he granting of f

or t

resses for t heir defence against Moslem

incursions st a rt in g with Gibeli n or Bethgeblin nea r Ascalo n, granted t o t he Ifospit alle rs in 1136) did

much t o

enco

urage; at on e st a ge th e T empl ars held som e 18 fort resses in t he crusader sta tes, while

Dr. Jo nat ha n Riley-

Smith

esti mates tha t t he Hospitalle rs probably hel d 25 fo rt resses in 118 0 a nd 29

0



in 1244 . It sho uld be noted , however , that none of

the

smalle r Ord er s hel d fortresse s, with

the

po ssible

exce

p

tion of

o ne to wer hel d by t he Lazars at B

etha

ny.) large f ro n t ier es tates were also p u rchased

from

lords no lo nger ab le to mai nlai n o r de fen d th em , and eve n so me to wns, su ch as Safed, To rtosa and

Ascalon, c ame in to th eir possess io n. Th e Orders wer e als o en trusted with t he defence

of some

roy al

for t resses a nd assis ted in

the

defen ce

of

o thers,

In add ition t o th eir t errit orial possession s in th e Eas t

they

also recei ved es ta tes f ro m large numbers o f

ben

efactors

th ro ugh o u t

Euro

pe , in England , Ireland, Sco tla nd , Fran ce, S pain, ortugal It aly , Sicily,

Ge rmany , Scandinavia, Hu ngar y and la te r G reece a nd

Cypru

s, Matthe w Paris estimating t he p ro

perty

o f

the Ho spital in t he mid-f J t h ce ntury at 19 ,0 0 0 man

ors

, a nd o f th e Te mp le at 9, 0 0 0 manors. was from

t heir Eur opean

commanderies tha

t t h e Co nven ts

of

O

ut r

em e r d re w their reinforcements in ti mes

of

great

need , suc h as aft er th e disaster o f lI att in in 1 187 and th e fall o f

the

key Hospit alle r fo rt ress o f A rsouf

in 126 5. Th e co mmand e ry was c o m mo n to th e

org

an isa

ti o

n o f all th e O rders, comp rising a u nit

of

brother

k nigh ts and b rot

her

se rgeants u sually 12 o r mor e b rethren) un de r an o fficer call ed a commander

I £leger

or

lI ausko mt u r in t he case o f th e Teu to n ic Knight s, Co mendudore in th e case o f Montj o le

and

the Spanish Orde rs). The Tem ple and Hospital h ad 14 a nd 12 co mma nde ries respect ivel y in Sy ria , plus

o thers in Cilid a a nd Cypru s, in add iti on t o fort ress garris

ons

.

The Ho sptt alle rs

T he Ilospitalle rs were so named be

cau

se o f th eir origi nal fo undati on c. 10 70 as a nursing b r

ethr

en f

or

pilgrim s in t he mo na

stery

ho sp ital of St Mary

of

t he l al in in J eru salem . T hey wer e gran ted Papal

protec ti o n in 1 1 13 as t he O

rder

o f th e Hospit al o f St J ohn. T h e nu rsing role o f th e Ord

er

predomi nated

at firs t a nd r

ema

in ed im po r t a nt thr oughout thi s e ra t he

750

woun ded fro m

the

Bai l ie

of

Mo n t gisar d in

1177 , f

or

ins ta nce, wer e t reat ed a t t he Hospit al in J erusalem).

Th ou gh th ey we re fai rly ce rt ain ly in exis tence earli

er

possibly as ear ly as 1I 26 , when a Con stable is

reco rded , or 1 136, whe n t he Ord er was gran t ed th e fo rtress o f G ibehn) a b r

other

k night d oes n

ot

occu r

in an y Hos pit alle r d oc ument un til 1 148 , and p rior to the mid- 12th cen t u ry it is probab le t ha t t he majo rit y

of wh atever a rmed fo r ces it mai nta ined w

er

e sup p lied by mercenaries - possib ly even including Te mpla rs.

Thereafter th ei r mili tary res ponsibilities stea d ily increase d, a nd statutes

of

120 4- 1206 ind icate that the

Ord er s

org

a nisa t ion wa s by then based o n its milit ary b reth ren , bo th kn ights a nd se rgeants.

Their mili tary hierarchy, p ro b

ably

base d on t ha t o f the mo re mili

tari

stic Tcmpla rs, was he ade d b y th e

Marshal, though t he Master had su preme co m ma n d, T he Marshal on ly first

appears

in t he I 160s though

as alre

ady

me

ntione

d a

Consta

ble is r

ecor

de d as early as 1126 an d last ed

until

at least 116 9 , p r

obabl

y

as th e Marsha l s lie ute na nt . Imme d ia tely

bene

a th the Marshal ca me t he Gonfanon ier {t he O rd er s

s

tan

dard -bearer) , th e Com mander

of the

K night s, and th e Master Esq uire o f th e Conv ent. Of th ese the

Comman d er , first rec

or

de d in 12 20 , was an

offic

e r ap poi nt ed by the Mars hal to lead a for ce in his

absence, wh ile t he Master E

squ

ire was a b ro ther se rgea nt resp

onsib

le f

or

a ll t he esqui res an d gr

oom

s.

Thr

ee

other

kno wn o fficers we re mercen a ries - th e T u rcop o lie r, th e Mast er Crossbcw man a nd th e

Master Sergea nt, T h e T u rcopolier, a b ro th er se rgea nt by 1248 and a b ro ther k ni gh t a fte r 130 3 , was

co mmander

of

th e T u r cop o le light ca valr y employed b y

the

O rder, Tu rc

opole

s are regu larly ref

er r

ed 10

in th e se rvice o f the Hospitallers , as in t he invasion o f Egyp t in 1168 , at th e Bailie o f Arsou f in 119 1,

and at La For bie in

1244

; by 1206 they we re even being assigned to t he ret

inue

s

of

t he se nio r

Hospit aller

offi

cers.

Th e brethren-a t-arms of the O rde r co nsist ed o f knight s an d se rgean ts th e la tte r o u t n umbe red by t he

former

), th ough

this

dis tin

ction

o nly firs t ap pears in do cumen ts in 120 6 , At th is d at e eac h

brot

he r

knig h t was accompanied by 4 ho rses and

probably

2 esq uires, while eac h bro th er se rgea n t ha d on ly 2

ho r se s and a single esqui re in all t he Military O rde rs t he esquires were d raw n fro m amo ngst t he se rving

brethren ), At t he end o f Ihe 13th ce nt u ry th e kn

ight

s com plem en t o f ho rses was redu ced to 3.

Broth er se rgeants

of

bo th Hospita l an d Te mpl e i

nclude

d

converte

d Arab s.

As well as th e T urco poles men t io ned

abo

ve additio nal t ro o ps o f t he O rder we re su p plied by co nfratre

o r co mr erc kni ght s and Do nat s non-breth ren affiliat ed 10 o r pe rm

itted

to join

the

Order fo r a limite d

perio d o f ti me und er special co ndit io ns, suc h as a do n at i on o f p roper

ty )

; feudal vassals fr om the O rder s

estates ; allie d co ntinge nts

som

etimes in cluding Moslems) ; a nd mer ce nar y k nigh ts, sergeants a nd

in fantry. Unfor t u

nately

co n te m po rary c h ro niclers tended no t t o distinguish be tween the a

ctua

l



bre thren-at-arms and these various types of auxil jary , so

it

is ha rd to j udge with any accuracy

exact

ly

wha t the fu ll-st reng th of t he Or der in

Outreme

r mig ht have bee n. But the re are figures avai lable in the

sou rces which at least give an idea of the Order s potenti al.

The earliest large force reco rded , in 1168 . cons is ted o f 500 knights and

50 0

Turcopoles promised to

King Amalrie I fo r his invasion

of

Egyp t and probably comprised chiefly

of

merc

ena

ries

or

so we can

assume h orn th e Iact tha t the Master . Gilbe rt d·Assailly . raised huge loan s to fina nce th is fo rce).

th o ugh 4 years earlier. in 1163 . a visit or to Jerusalem wrote that the Hospita l was c

apabl

e of ho using

400 kn ights in

ad d

ition

to

pilgrims and

th e

sick . Du ring

th e

F

ifth Cru

sade of 1217· 1221 the

Order

appears to have pr ovided

70 0

kn ights (or. more probab ly. horsemen . ther

efor

e including T urcopoles,

sergea n ts and mercena ries) and 1.000 'p ersons , presumably other soldiers, wh ile for an at tack on Harnah

in 1233 a force of 100 knigh ts. 30 0 mounted sergeants and 500

o

r 1.500) infantry sergeants was

mustered. an d thi s ap pears to have rep resent ed almost th e fu ll st rength

of

the Convent of An tioch at

th is ti me. In 1244 20Q.325 Hospitallc r brethren were killed at the Battle of La Forbie , wh ile 5. 15 or

26 escaped and

o thers were

tak en captive. suggesting an overa ll t

ot

al well in excess

of

350 ;

20 0

lIospita ller Tu rcopoles were also killed , while in add ition the to tal of 350 may have includ ed o ther

auxilia rics such as

merce

nar ies. Mo sl o f the Con ven t's brethren-at-arms ap pear to have

been

los t whe n

Arsouf fell in 1265

,8 0 ·

< 0 eing killed and 180 cap tured

o

f a garrison t

ot a

lling about 1.000 m

en)

, and

a fur t her 4 5 bre

thre

n wer e killed at Caroublier th e following year . In 128 1 we hea r o f 50 knights and

50 Turco polc s being sent int o Cihcla.

Ga rrison strengths where reco rded arc

of t

en co nsi

de r

ab ly larger, t

houg

h th ese were c

ertain

ly largely

merce nary. In 1203 the Hospitaller garr isons of Krak de s Chevaliers and al-Marqah toge

ther

mustered an

army of 4·500 ca valry and 1.1OQ I ,400 infantry. plus Turcopoles, whil e in 12 12 th e same tw o fortresses

arc rec

or

ded to have bee n garrisoned by 2.0 00 and 1,0 00 men respec tively even in pea cetime. By 1271

Krak des Ch evaliers was held by 10 0 bre thren , b

ot h

knights and sergeants, under

th e

Marshal, and

al.Mar

qa b

in 1180 by 600 ho rsemen (obviously not all brethr en) , presum abl y supplemente d by infantry

in bo th ins ta nces . Bar lIebraeus reco rds mo re Ihan 100 cavalry and

50 0

infantry at al-Marqa b a t the

same da te. wh ile in 1181 : OOcavalry and 200 i

nfantry

arc reco rded in a sortie against th e Mamluks: but

in a ll th ese figu res onl y about 15-60 w

ould

have een br othe r knight s.

Perha ps the most reliab le piece of evidence for the total stre ngth o f th e Hospitallers in Octremer is a

e t te r wr it t en in 1268 by the Master Hugh Revel, in which it is sp ecifica lly slated t hat by that date the

Order could muste r only 300 br

other

knights in th e whole of Syria (Le. incl uding the Co nvents of Ant i

oc h

and

Tri

poli). Even more interesting is

an o

ther sta temen t in th e same lett er where it is cla imed th at in

th e

the O rder had been able

to

muster 10,000 men . which including vassals. Tur eop oles, mercenari es,

serving bre th ren. et c. , is not altogether impossible .

Following th e fall

of Acre in 129 1 the Hospitallc rs removed th eir h

eadq

uart ers to C

ypru

s.

an d

in 130 1

the stre ngth o f th eir Convent o n the island to talled 70 bro ther knights and 10 br o ther sergeants, thou gh

the proport ion changed slightly in 1302 to 65 knights and 15 sergeants; in add ition the y were st ill

augmented by Turcopolcs and o the r auxiliaries.

Once est ablished in Cy p rus it became obvious t hat to ma intain th eir st ruggle against the Moslems th e

On.k r was going 10 have 10 henc

ef

ort h

conce

ntrate on naval ope rations, and it was as a mar it ime powe r

th a t the Hospualle rs were to earn th

ei r

fame in th e late r Middle Ages. The y had ships even in the 12th

cent ury bu t th ese were chie fly

tran

spor ts. and it was not un ti l tow ards the cnd of th e 13th ce ntury

that

they fi rst began to co ncentrate

on

building up their

Fle

et

o f war -galleys. As early as 1

30 0

th eir small

flee t lau nched a naval a

tt a

ck o n th e Nile de lta.

In 13 10 th e Order again shi fted its hea

dq u

arters. th is t ime to the island o f Rhodes (c aptured from th e

Byzan tincs in a series

of

cam paigns which had commenced in 1306). wher e in 13 11 it was declared tb ar

the Order needed to mai ntain 1,000 infant ry and

50

0 cavalry f

or

th e island s future

de f

ence.

• Some indication ( prop

e

rnon

s

may

be

given by

the Tempjar garrison of Safed, recorded e. 124 )

10 have con sisted of SObr

ot h

er knights. 30 brothel serg

eants,

Turc

cpole

s, 300 r e o men. 820 esquires.

...-orkmen and olhe rs t larllely na tives) and 400 staves.

1,



The Templars

Unlike th e Hospitallers, o r for that matte r t he T eut o nic Knights t he Templars were fro m th e o utset a

purel y milita ry Or d er, In fact t he l tospi talle rs military o rga nisa t ion was t o a grea t ex tent based upon

the milita ry instit utio ns o f th e T emple, and it is even posslhle tha t in th e first half of t he 12t h cen t ury

the Hospit al act ually employe d T

emp

lar knight s to fulfil ce rtain military functions.

T he aggressiveness, belli gere nce and milit ar y im

port

a nce o f t he Tcmplurs , t he ne w Maccabees , is well

d

ocum

en ted by co nte mporaries suc h as Jacq ues de Vit ry, who w

ro t

e c. 122 5 th a t When t he Tem pters

were called to arm s th ey did no t ask ho w many th e enem y were, o nly where t he y were . On

king of

Jer usalem e ve n wrote to

Europ

e of t he Te mpl a rs t hat in t hem ind eed , a fte r God , is place d th e e nlire

re lia nce of all in t he East, and even th e Byzan tin e c hronicler Cinnam us belie ve d th at t he ma n in

co m mand o f all) t he knights in Pa lest ine was he wh o m the Lat ins ca ll t he Master of the Te mple .

The Ord er s o rigi ns, how ever, were humble. It was init ially founded in Pale st ine in abo ut 11 18 by t wo

Fre nch knights, Hugh de Payen s and Godf rcy de St Ome r, fo r th e pro tectio n of pilgrims o n IIl

l

road

fro m Jaffa to Jerusale m. At first its handful of knigh ts, 9 in num be r, rel ied on gift s a nd cast-o ffs fo r

the ir clo t hes and keep , be ing called t he Poo r Knigh ts o f Christ as a result. bu t King Baldwin 11 , suitab ly

impressed by th eir devotio n, ve ry so on granted t he m lodging in a section of th e roy al palace o f

Je rusalem whi ch was suppose d to have hee n t he site o f t he Temple o f Solomon : hence th e Order s

full t itle, t he Poo r Kn ight s o f Christ a nd th e T e m ple of Solomon. Th ey we re gra nted Pap al pr o te ction

as a Military Order in 1128.

Military co m ma nd was basically as per tha t described above fo r t he Hos

pn

allc rs, o fficers including th e

Marshal, Commande r of th e Kn ight s,

Gon

fa no nier, Mast e r Esq uire , T urco po lie r and o t he rs t here was

appa re nt ly a Turco polier in each co mma ndery). l kewise in addition t o bre th ren t he ir forces inclu ded

Tu rco poles, vassals, me rcena ries an d allies sometimes Sa race ns) - t he Te mpt er garriso n of Safe d has

alrea dy been cited as a possible ind ication o f pr o por tions. T he proportio n of T urcopolcs wo uld appea r

to have bee n simila r t o t hose of t he Hos pit alle rs, basica lly o n a level wit h th e number of bret hren ; fo r

example ut La Forbie in 1244 , whe re the T em plars may have [ 11 as ma ny as 3 12 bre t hren ,

they

also lost

324 T urcopole s. Foo t-sold iers in

the

Ord er s e mp loy were a pp aren tly o rganised in co mpan ies of 50

men - Mosle m so urces reco rd 15 suc h infant ry co mpa nies in th e garr ison

of

Le Chastc uc t.

Bre t hre n again co nsisted of kn ights a nd sergea nts the lat t er exi sti ng at least as ea rly as 114 7). T he

distinct io n be t wee n them was almost inevitab ly mo re not iceab le t han amongst t he less militar istic

Hosplt alle rs, a nd by 125 an init iate seeking e ntry into th e O rde r as a bro

ther

knigh t ha d first 10

prove t hat he was th e so n o r descen dant of a kni ght , a qua lificat io n like wise requeste d by th e

lIospil alle rs a nd t he Spanish O rde rs within t he ne xt tw o deca des.

Again, lh e full st rengt h of th e O rde r in D ut rem e r is unknown and ca n on ly be surmised fro m

the

vario us

references which are t o be found sca tt e red a mongst co nte m po rary so urces.

In 115 2 a let te r records t hat th e Ord er co uld onlygathe r 120 kn ights and 1,0 00 se rving bret h ren and

hired sold te rs t c fight in Antioc h, whi le in the kingdo m of Je rusalem as early as 115 7 85-88 Te mplars

were ca pt u red a nd allegedly 300 killed in an e ngagement with Nur e d-Din, t hese figur es possibl y

inclu ding vario us auxiliaries. Conve rsely at Mo nt glsard in 1177 t here we re as fe w as 80 bret hren prese nt .

despite th e Co nvent having summo ne d all its available knight s for th is ca m paign; the figu re wou ld

seem t o indica te th at t he T em plars full st reng t h had no t asse mbled be for e t he a rmy mar ch ed,

part icula rly since a t abou t t he same dal e WiIliam of T yre recor ds that

th

ere are in t he O rde r about 300

kn ights . . . and a n alm ost cou ntless numbe r o f lesser breth ren. In th e disast ro us ye ar of 1187 we hea r

of 90 Te m pte rs being killed in t he skir mish at Cressc n a nd a furth er 26 0 p erhaps including some

Hospit alle rs) at Huttin, fro m which a number o f o th ers escape d, which wo uld im ply that t he ir to tal

strengt h t the latt e r ba il ie was in th e region of 300, as o ppose d to pe rhap s abo ut 25 0 Hospitallers.

Duri ng t he T em plar occu pat ion o f Cy prus a fe w yea rs la te r, in 1 191 . 119 2, we hear o f abou t 12

Templar cavalry. plus infan t ry, being shipped to th e islan d ; of t he horseme n 15 were knights, 74 were

sergea nts an d 29 were pro bably T urco poles.

In th e ea rly- 13 th ce ntury Jacq ues de Vitr y reco rds tha t th e ma inland Co nve nt still co mprised abo ut

300 brother knigh ts su pplement ed by t he usual auxiliaries). Ano t her source o f similar date reco rds

13



the ir sta bles in J erusale m ho ldin g up to 2,000 h o rses wh ich, all

owing

fo r th ose o f

mer

ce naries and

au xiliaries as well as spa re mo unts , et c. Tern pla r kni ght s be ing accom panied b y 2

hor

ses, as well as 2

esq uire s) , see ms t o su p port d e V it ry s figure, T he ga rriso ns o f fro n tie r fo rtr esses we re as lar ge o r even

larger; when Cas tle J aco b

l

Chaste llet fell in 1179 its Tem plar garriso n appears to have co mpr ised

8 0 kni gh ts a nd sergean ts?) an d 750 infan t ry plu s ser vants and c raf ts

men,

wh ile in I 230 t he garrison o f

To rt osa , toget her wit h t he lI ospitallers o f Krak d es Chevaliers, ra ised as many as 500 ca valry and 2,700

infant ry , o f who m a t least 20 0 c ava lr y and abou t 1,0 00 in fa ntry wer e probably sup plied b y t he Te mplars.

An anonymous 13th cen t ury so urc e reco rds t he garr iso n o f Safed as 1,70 0 men in pea cet ime and 2,200

in ti me o f war .

As wit h t he Hospit alle rs, th e Te mple too appears to have su p plied 700 knigh ts a nd 2,000 o t hers d uring

t he Fift h Cr usad e, p ro bab ly ch iefl y mer cena ry , wh ile at Darbsaq in 12 37 100 breth ren and 3 0 0

crossbowmen - appa re n tly in th e em p lo y o f th e Orde r - a re rep

or t

ed t o have b een kill ed at t his d at e

t her e may have been in a ll about 2 00 b re

th r

en in t h e Pr inci p alit y o f An ti och) . As already men ti oned , 3 I 2

bre t hren were k illed a t l a Porbie in 1244 and 4-36 mo re e sc aped, t h

ough

Matt hew Paris reco rd s th at the

who le Co nven t the figure o f 300 b rot her

knights

again ap pears) was lost ; 6 ye ars la ter in 125 0 mo re

th an 280 T

empl

ars , proba bl y incl ud ing a fair num ber o f me rce naries , wer e killed in t he ma in ba it le a t El

Mansurah, o t hers being killed o r cap t u red in e arlie r an d su bseq uen t engage ment s. Fi nall y th er e wer e

perhaps 240 a t th e fall of Ac re in 12 9 1, com pared t o possibly 140 Hosp it alle rs, on ly I S T eu to nic Knights,

a nd 25 b reth ren and 9 bret hren respect ively fro m th e O rders o f t he Hospit als o f S t Laz

aru

s a nd

St

Th

o mas Aeo n.

Aft e r th e lo ss o f t he ki ngdo m th e Tem plars co n tinue d t o hold a single of fshore st ro nghold at Ruad, o ff

To rt osa , u n til

130

3 whe n t he Maml uks finally ca p tu red t h e fo rtress a nd e xecuted its garriso n. Bef

or

e

t hen t he Ord er had wit hd raw n its head q ua rte rs first to Cy p rus, th en to F rance. Withi n a few yea rs

of

th is t he O rd

er

came to an igno minious e nd, It s great wea lt h had rou sed th e jea lo usy

of

th e avaricious

king o f Fran ce. P l p t he Fai r, who wit h Papal su ppo rt, trum pin g-up charges

of

he resy and wo rse.

inst igat ed th e arr es t o f t h e O rder s members o n a n in te rnational sca le in 130 7-1308. F oll

owin

g a se ries

o f p re

ju

diced tri als bac ke d u p b y confessions ex t rac ted und e r tor tu re th e Ord er was o fficiall y

su pp ressed in 13 12 , t he last G rand Master , Jacq ues de Mo lay , bei ng b urnt a t t h e sta ke as a heret ic in

1314.

Th e Teutonic KnillhlS

Th e Teu t o n ic Knight s, th ird o f t he great Military O rders, o wed its grea tne ss no t to its act iviti es in

Out

re me r bu t rat her to its no torio us, eve n infamous, ca mpa igns against Prussla, Lit hu an ia an d Poland ,

th e ea rly st ages

of

whic h have b ee n b riefly o u tlined in Armies o f Fe uda l Eu ro pe .

The Ord er was fou nded in 1 19 0 d u ring t he T h ird Crusa de w hen mercha nt s o f Bremen and Liib ec k

esta blished a ho sp ital fo r t he ca re o f German p ilgrims at th e siege o f Ac re, It t u rned milit ary in I 19 8

whe n some Ge rman k night s j oined fo llo wing t he a bortive Ge rman cr usad e

of

119 7. T he O rder, un d

er

the full ti tle o f th e Te u ton ic Knight s o f th e Ho sp it al o f St Mary o f J er usale m, was alway s excl usively

Ge rman a nd , e

xcep

t fo r Roman ia, t he Balt ic lan ds a nd brie fly) Hu ngary, ou tside o f O u tr e me r held

es ta tes o nly in Germa ny it self.

Officially t he O rde r s head q uart e rs was always at Acre, d es pite t he fac t t ha t t he T emplars

drov

e th e m

o u t o f th e ci t y o n o ne o ccasio n, bu t th ei r c hief st ro ngho ld fro m 12 29 un t il 12 71 was act ually Mon cr t

whic h t hey renamed Sta rken berg). Ho wever, th e

Ord

e r was always o vershado wed in Sy ria by th e

Te m ple and Hospit al a nd it inst ead co nce n tr a ted most o f its att en tio ns in t he Levan t on e n te rpr ises in

Cilicia , w here th e main fo rtresses a mo ngst it s many possessio ns were Amo uda and Har un iy e. Even so,

Te ut o nic co n t ingents we re p rese n t at most majo r e ngage men ts

of

th e 13t h ce nt u ry including Ba hr

Ash mun 1n La Fo rbi e ]24 4 ) a nd El Mansur ah 125

0

. I S b re t hren were presen t at t he fa ll o f

Acre i n 1291 , o f who m o nly t he Hoc hmeiste r t he Gran d Maste r) escaped alive. T he Order t here after

transf

er r

ed its headqua rte rs t o Ven ice, moving on t o Marie nburg in Prussia in 1308 .

l

ke t he Te mp lars a nd Ho spit alle rs, th e Teu to n ic Knigh ts e mp loy ed la rge nu mb e rs o f T u rcop ole s

p ro babl y sup plying t he b ulk o f t he alleged ly 3 00-st ro ng Te ut o n ic co nti ngent at La Fcrbie a nd c ert ainly

co mprising th e great est part

of

Star kenberg s ga rrison a t it s fall in 127 1) and also h ad b ro ther sergeants,

co nfrere b rethre n called Halbb ru de rs ], mercen ar ies , a nd t h e vassals o f its es ta tes t he Order h eld, fo r

instance, t he Seigno ry of Co u nt J o scely n afte r 1220).

14



St Lazarus

After t he Temple an d t he Hos pital t h e Orde r

of

St Laza rus was the thi rd Military Order to be

establishe d in O utremer . Like t h e t wo mai n O rders it had co m ma nd eries in Europ e e.g. Burt o n Lazars

in Leices tershire) as well as Syria.

Th is was ba sically a Hosp it al

Ord

er co nce n tra ting o n th e t re

atmen

t o f le prosy and was p robably

es

tabl

ished as an o ffshoo t by the Hospi t alle rs the mselves in t he earfy

f

th ce n tu ry, tu rn ing m ilitary

c. 112 3. Templar bre th ren who co n t rac ted leprosy were tra nsferred to th e Lazars, as pro bab ly wer e

ll os pitallers. As well as th ese unclea n bre t h re n t here were als o no n-l

epers

, bu t t he

numbe

r o f military

brethre n was never particulary high an d J ea n Sire d e J o inville s statemen t ab o ut t he Master

of

St La za rus

wh o h eld no rank in t he ar my bes t su ms up th eir milita ry importan ce. Never the less a co nt ingen t o f

Lazar b re t h ren was pr esen t , an d wip ed o ut , at La For b ie, while in 125 3 t h ey fo rme d part o f the arm y

u nde r St Lou is wh ich e ncamped before J affa, a n im petuous a tt ack led b y th e La za r Master see ing all b u t

4 o f th e bret hren kille d. In 129 1 25 bre thren wer e pr esen t at Acre, all of who m were killed .

Th e

Ord

er basically ceased to in volve itself in m il it ar y ac tivities from t he ea rly - La th ce ntury .

St Thomas Aeon

Th e Hos pitallers

of

St T ho mas o f Can te rbury at Acre, usu ally ca lle d t he Knight s

of

St T ho mas Aeon ,

were established in Acr e as a nu rsin g Ord er after the cap ture o f th e

city

b y Richard 1 o f Engl and and

Philip

of F ran ce in 1191 . Membersh ip was restr icted to Engli shmen . It was al way s a small Order and

proba bly di d no t tu rn mil

itary

unt

il

t he F i

fth

Crusade o f 1217 -12 2 1.

Th e 9 b r

et

h ren p rese nt and killed a t Acr e in 129 1 are an indi ca t ion o f th ei r military po te n tial. Even w

ith

merce naries an d T urco poles

it

is imp r ob able t ha t they eve r mustered even 40 men in Ou trem er. Aft er

the fall o f Acre th e O rd er establish ed a pre

cep

tory in Cyprus and th ereafte r und erw ent a grad u al milit ar y

decline; no b ro t he r kn ights ar e reco rded aft er

1357

.

M

onl

joie

Named aft

er

a castl e ou ts ide J e rusale m t his Spanish Or d er, es tablished b y an ex-Sa nt iagan kn ight

c. 11

80

, did no t p ros per in O utr e mer,

withdraw

ing t o its co mmanderies in Aragon afte r th e de feat a t

Hatti n in 118 7 , wh ere a small co n t inge nt of

breth

ren was p rese nt . In Spa in they b eca me kn

own

as t he

Ord er o f

ruf

ac

ROMAN IA ; TH E

LATI

N

EMPI RE

Afte r th e fall o f Co nsta nti no ple in 120 4 th e Franks d ivided up th e Byzanti ne Emp ire a mongs t the m

selves, t he Lat in Emperor yet a not her Baldw in ) receiving

one

-quarter and the Ve n et i an and

Fran

kish

crusa ders th e re main in g t hree

-qu

art ers, probab ly th ree-eight hs each.

Th

es e lands wer e then divided u p

and parcelled ou t in gro u ps o f 200 .

l OO,

70 , 6 0 , 4 0, 20, 10 , 7 o r 6 k ni gh ts fees ea ch ,

10

be d ist ribu ted

by th e vassals amo ngst th eir retainers. T he greater vassals eac h rece ived th ei r Ile fs in 2 parts - one

with in t he Emperor s o wn lan ds near C

onstant

in

ople

, and t he o t he r in the p rovin ces.

Th e basis o f military se rvice, d rawn up in 1205, was tha t when th e Empe ror and his senior Vene tia n a nd

Frankish vassals d ecided tha t a c am paign was necessary all k night s - v en enans as well as F ranks - wer e

au toma t ically o bliged to se rve for a pe riod o f 4 mo n th s, fr om J un e I to Septem ber 29 . In t he case o f

inva sio n this service cou ld be requ ired fo r as long as t he Empe ro r and no bility d eemed necessary .

Bu t o f all

the

Fra nkis h

conq

uest s wh ich resu lte d fro m th e Fou rt h Crusa de, precise details o f

o rga nisat io n ar e know n f or o nly o ne o f the s

tates

th er eb y esta blished within t he o ld Byza n tin e

te rrit

or

ies - th e Pri nci pality

of

A

cha

ia, also kn own as xto rea.

As with a ll o t her Fr ankish co nq uests in th e Ea st , o rganisa tion involved the ap plication to th e co nq uere d

ter rit ories of curre nt feu dal pra ct ices. T he Pr inci pality o f Achaia was no exception . be ing divid ed u p

in to 12 Baronies with esta tes varying fro m 4 kn igh ts fees right u p to 24 ch iefl y in m ultiples o f 4 ),

with many lesser est a tes of o ne fee o r a half-fee eac h , so me held b y G reeks. T he re were also 7

ecclesias t ical Baronies. 6

.o f

4 fees held b y Bisho ps and o ne, Ach a ia its elf , o f 8 fees held by an Archbishop,

as well as 3 es tates be longing to t he Milit ary

Ord

ers

with

Temp lars, Hos pitalle rs an d Teu to nic Knight s

ho lding 4 fees ea ch .

15



The service from the larger esta tes was based on the holding

of

4 fees, which was ob liged to supp ly 14

horsemen consist ing of the vassal [i. e. the Banneret ). a second kn ight , and 12 sergeants. Estates over

4 fees had to supply an extra knight or 2 sergeants for each addit ional fee. In the case o f a single fee or

half- fee the vassal kn ight or sergeant respect ively) served alone and in person. As in the kingdom o f

Jerusalem all vassals were expec ted to serve in person up to the age of 60, aft er which a so n or tenant

migh t suhsnt ute.

In addit ion to the standa rd 4 months service garrison du ty was requi red fo r a further 4 mont hs a year

(t hough the Church and Military Orders were exempt from the la t ter]. Even in the remaining 4 month s

of the year th ere might he a fur ther summons from the Prince if th e need sho uld arise. This service

could also be demanded overseas; Prince William was ce rta inly accompanied by 400 Achaian knight s in

C

ypru

s in 1249 and in Italy in 1268.

This permill ed the ma intenan ce of an a

lmo

st pe rmanent feudal army, and the number of troop s that

could be thus summoned was q uite co nside rable: at Bodon itsa in 1250 William was accompanied by

800 kn ights, and up to 1,000 are reco rded on o ther occasions, these probably represent ing the full

feudal muste r. As many as 8,000 Achaians arc recorde d in a campaign of 1246 , while at Pelagonia

there were allegedly 12,000 infan t ry in addition to an Improb able 8,000 horsemen o f whom in any

case very few would have actually been knigh ts).

Throughou t the Empire aux iliary t roo ps were supplied by the indigenous po pulat ion , bo th Greeks and

Slavs: in Acha ia the lat ter were principally from the Peloponnesian Melingi tr ibe, st ill favoured by

the

Cat alans in the 1

4th

century. An army raised in the Duchy of Athens in 1304 contained as many as

6 000 Th essalian and Bulgar cavalry · under 18 Gree k noh les (possibly organised in A

aghia - see

Byzantine o rganisa tion ), plus some 30,000 mixed infan try , chiefly Greeks and Slavs; up to 24 ,000 Greek

infantry are reco rded in the Athenian army at Keph issos in 13 11, The Slavs usu ally supplied archers and

spearmen. and t hese are certainly the types specif ically mentioned in an Achaian a

rmy

o f 1296.

Many such troo ps were supplied to the Frankish army by Byzantine Archontes (noblemen) who the

Franks had co nfirmed in their possessions, probab ly Pronolai (see Byzan tine organisatio n). The

contingents they provided were prob ably the same as they had heen obliged to supply to the Byzant ine

arm y in pre-Conq ucst days so mu st have varied co nsiderably in numbers. but in one instance in 1205

a cert ain Theodore Branas agreed to supp ly as many as 500 men. In fact the case with which many

Byzumines and Byzant ine subjects shit ted their loyalty from Byzantine 10 Frankish rule is no tewort hy,

for wit

hout

such obvious disaffection o n their par t it is unlikely that these Frankish co nquests would

have lasted fo r as long as they did o r even . perhaps. have succeeded ut all. But the d isco nten t was there

and tr proved a very real ally o f the Franks; the inco rporation int o his arm y in 121 1 of Nicaean

prisoners-of-war under their own o fficers hy the second Latin Empero r, Henry of Flanders, is without

doubt far from bein g an isola ted Incid nt, and suc h troops clearly helped to compensate fo r Ihe consta nt

and often crit ical sho rtage of man power in Frankish Greece and Rom ania. (However, it was not long

befo re the greed and general cruelly of the Franks tu rned the native popu lat ion against them.)

Othe r au xiliari es included Turks and Cumans , the latter to be foun d in allia nce with the Empire from

[239 ; th ere were ap pa rent ly Cumans present in the Achaian army defeat ed at Pelagonia in 1259. Some

Turks set tled in Achaia after 1262 and some were even knight ed and granted Iiefs Aft er the ascent o f

Charles of Anjou 10 the Achaian throne in 1278 there was a mark ed increase in the use o f Turk ish and

Bulgar auxiliari es, and in addition Saruce n archers were imported fro m his Sicilian kingd om to serve

principally as 6arriso n troops.

Frankish merce naries werealso employed qui te o fte n. an army of allegedly 60,000 recorde d under

Emperor Baldwi n II in 1239 containing Frenchmen, v enettans and Franks o f various othe r nat ion alit ies

in addi t ion to Gree ks. Moslems and Cum ans. If this army really was 60,000 st rong th en it is hardly

surprising to find tha t consisted almost ent irely of foreign mercen aries and auxiliaries. Roman ian

armies were in general ridiculously small; Henry had o nly 2,000 men at I hilippo polis in 1208 (o f whom

one-sixth were Greeks). and as few as 260 knights (p lus sergeants

and

infantry , pr esumahly) at Lake

• mercenaries :lho frequently appeared in duringme 14th century.

16



Apo o nia in 1211 , t ho ugh in 1206 he ha d raised a so mew hat larger fe ud al a rmy o f 600 kn ight s in

addition t o 10,000 inf ant ry .

Alt ho ugh Fra nk ish Greece lasted until long afte r th e clos e o f th is period th e Lat in Em pir e o f Ro mania

itsel f survived o nly un til 126 1, whe n Co nstan tino p le fell

to

th e Nicacan Byza ntin es it would appe ar

that th e est ablishment in 1260 of a full-t ime , regularly-paid garriso n o f 1,000 men for th e cit y co uld

have met wit h litt le succ ess . T here aft er ti tu lar Latin Empero rs drifted ab o ut Europ e in seach o f military

aid for th e reco nq uest of

t

he ir Empire. In 126 7, for insta nce, Char les of Anjo u pro mised to pr o vide

th e ti t ular Emp e ror Baldwin

wit h 2,00 0 knight s fo r a y ear s service to wa rds th e recovery

of

Constanti

no p

le, while by a treat y o f 1281 he and th e t it ular

Em p

er or Charles de Courtenay wer e t o

provide 8,0 00

kni ght s for a no t he r e xpedi t ion planned for 1283 , to wh ich Ve nice prom ised t o co nt rib ute

40 o r mo re galleys. Gradually, how ever , t he co nce pt of eve n a t it ula r Lat in Emperor falte red and d ied.

SYRIA AND ANATO LlA : T HE SE LJUK T URK S

Und er Sul ta n Alp Arslan an d his so n and successor Mallk Sha h t he Selju ks rule d a vast te rritory st re tc hing

from An at olia as far east as Khwari zm ia and Afghani sta n,

no r

th t o t he Caucasus an d t he Aral Sea, a nd

sout h t o Syria, t he Red Sea a nd th e Persia n Gul f, and alth o ugh thi s great Em pire began t o bre ak up int o

a plet ho ra of lesse r sta t es towa rds th e end of t he I I th cent ury th e East ern Selju k Sulta ns ret ained

supremacy - albe it in many instances o nly nominal - un til th e deat h in 1157 of Sanjar, t he last great

Sulta n,

af t

er whic h t he re mna nts of th e once great Su ltana te co llapsed e ntirely.

Eve n pr ior t o t ha t date th e Sultan s influe n ce in Sy ria had declined co nside rably : T ransoxlana ,

co nquered in 10 73 , had fallen in 114 1 to t he Qarak hit ai; and t he Sul ta

na t

e o f Me rv had begun t o

colla pse int o to ta l a narchy as a result of a se ries of revolts by Ghuzz Turco man) t ribes aft er 115 3.

In 119 4 t he Su lta nat e o f Hamada n fell to t he Khw arizmian s, leaving t he Sulta nate of Rum in Anatolia

conquered in t he yea rs aft er Ma nzi kert ] as the o nly rem aining majo r Seljuk state, since th e Syrian

Seljuk prov inces, lo ng-since a u

ton

omous, had by

th a

t tim e passed to t he Ay yubid Sultana te of Egypt.

It is th ese west ern Scljuk states, of Rum and Syri a, which a re

ou r

co nce rn here, since th e int erests of

th e ot he r major Seljuk pow ers were alwa ys in t he East a nd so techn ically lie bey ond t he sco pe of t his

bo ok.

The st rengt h of a ll T urkish armies lay in th ei r bow-arme d cavalry , back ed by sma ller numbers of hea vy

but o t herw ise similarly arm ed horseme n. Infa ntr y were provided chiefly by volunteer to wn m ilitias,

called Ahdat h - lite rally Young men - in Sy ria often based o n th e F ut uwwa h, q uasi-poli tic al fac tions,

and co mparab le to t he Ayyarun a nd Fit ya n of Iraq ), plus for eign auxiliari es no tably Daylarnis] and

tribal irregula rs, tho ugh some times be tt e r-t rain ed foot-soldiers who may be professionals a ppea r in

contemporar y so urces; cert ai nly it see ms

pr o

bable th at t he na pt ha-t hro wers a nd crossbo wrnen recorded

in t he 12t h and 13th ce nt uries must have been regu lars. T he milit ias served mos t frequent ly in the

vici nity o f t heir ci ties, oft e n being used for siege and cam p d ut ies.

As in co nte mporary Fa timid arm ies, ac tual o rganisa t ion was ba sically decimal whe re it e xisted, based

on units and multiples of I D, 100 a nd 1,000.

Iqta at

Lack ing gre at wealt h and th e refo re un able to

pay thei r men in cash , the Seljuk s ad op ted a nd pe rfected

a quasi-feu da l syst e m o f milit ary land

tenu

re previously uti lised hy their

Ghaz

nuvid an d Buyid

pre decessors. Thi s was t he iqt a plural I

qta a

t } esta blishe d init ially by th e Buyi d s in t he mid

O

th

cent ur y when it was a grant of co nfisca te d or un cultivated lan d. However, iqta a t had rem aine d rare

unti l th e Se ljuk co nquests o f th e mld- Ll th cen tury , a nd were o nly fully regularised unde r Nizam

al ul j t he cele brat ed vizier of Alp Arslan and Ma lik Shah , so t hat his claim tha t previous rule rs had

neve r dis t ribute d gran ts of l

and

but pai d th e ir soldie rs only in money is prob abl y a reaso nably accurate

sta tement. Ho wever, th e iq ta could be a pay m e n t in cas h an d th e Gh aznavids were still pay ing their

iqt

a at

e xclus ively in mo ney eve n in Nlzam s ti me , so t hat the payme nt o f troo ps only in mo ney by t he

Selj u

ks

predecesso rs pr obably indicates no mo re than tha t iqt a a t were paid in cash rat he r than land .

There were 1 t ypes o f iqt a - t he qati a and th e tu rna , t he he reditary benefice and t he lifet im e bene fice

7



respec tively. Either was transferable from di

st r

ict to district , since unlike the Frankish fief the milita ry

jqta represented not a persona l esta te but a payment in land revenues fo r services rend ered : and since

as a soldie r the hold er, the lqta d ar o r muq ta , might need to he posted from one area to anothe r then

his iq ta could likewise ll t ransferred with him. T he ot h er main difference fro m Frankish feudalism

was that the iq ta dar was permitt ed to levy only a specific sum (i n cash and /o r kind) from the po pu lace

of his iq ta - his act ual pay - and ot he r than thi s usually had no fu rther au th orit y over them (an

exception being the jqr

a at

gran ted by th e Zengids). The fact tha t the iqta dar had to co llect h is pay

personally at th e du e t ime was probably cont ribu to ry to the inab ility of Moslem armies to remain in

the field for long pe riods.

The gran ting o f an lqta involved in return the mili tary service of the lqt a d ur, who was usually an

anur , with a specific num ber of

so

ldiers - usually mamluk slave-sold iers (see Egyp tian nrganisaunn]

depending on the size o f the lq ra (la ter , under the Ayyubids, lq tn a t appeared in Syr ia which were

spcci ficatly called iqtu ut of 10 , iq ta ut of 20, e tc., the figures referr ing to the number of t roo ps to be

sup p lied ). Part s o f th e Iqta might even be gran ted to lowe r-ranking amirs by the lq ta dar by a process

compa rable to subinfeuda tio n, Under the Mamluks as much as two-thirds o f each amir s iq ta ha d to be

divided amongst his own rnamlu ks as pay , though under th e Ayyubids eac h am ir received 2 land grants,

one tthc khassa l for his perso nal needs, th e othe r ( the actual iqta or kh ubz ) for the maintenance o f his

troops. Certai nly by the mid-1 2th cen tury Selju k mamluk s were being gran ted their own lan ds under a

simila r system.

Askaris and auxntartes

Early Scljuk armies consisted of 2 majo r elements - the askar of th e Sulta n, a full-time force paid in

cash or lq ta ut and comprised ch iefly of mamluk slave-soldiers: and the provincial contingents o f the

amirs. who had uskars of their own, togeth er with auxiliar ies supplied by Turcomans, Bedouins,

Kurds and o ther rrtbcsmcn. The provincial aska rs numbered from a few hu

nd r

ed to several tho usand

depl nden t on the sil t of the city or distr ict - Damascus had an askur of 1,00 0 , Antio ch apparently

2,000 and so on. As mentioned above, the us karis were largely mamluks bUI

co u

ld also include freemen,

Usamah him self

serving as a paid freemen in the askars o f Zengi, Damascus, Eg

ypt

and Nur ed -Din

tt hc askar is included Kurds. Armen ians and Arabs as well as Tu rks). Organisati on was clearly o n a

decimal hasis.

In his famous writte n wo rk the Siy aset-Nameh. the Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk records the Sultan s

standing army to he as large as 400 ,000 men in th e reign o f Malik Shah ( I0 :: ·1OQ: ), all paid wit h

iqta at: a cour ticr is reputed to have advised tha t this to tal should be cui back to 70,00 0 since peace

theo reigned . though Niaam advocated an inc rease in st rength to a tot al o f 700,000 men. These figures,

if credible. prob ably represent the total strength of all th e askars, both royal and provincial, ove r the

whole , vast Sultana te, especially since ano ther sou rce reco rds the rcyal taskar un der Malik Shah o n one

oc

asion as consisting o f

46

,000 cavalry . Befor e the accession o f his successo r garkjyar uq ( 109:: -1105 )

this had dec line d to o nly 2V,OOO.

Niaam himsel f advised the mainten ance o f an elite unit of 1,000 Hasham (Guards) from amongst the

mamluks o f the Sult an, which should be increased in st rengt h to 5-10,

00 0

in wartime: these part icular

maml uks were to be tr ained fro m Daylamis. Khor asania ns. Georgians and young Tu rcomans. Much later ,

towards the end of the 13th centu ry. Ibn Bibi-Duda records mamluks in Rum (Anat olia) as chie fly

of Byzant ine, Cilic ian, Geo rgian and Cnrn ean ex tract io n, the largest number being Byzantine Greeks o r

Cilician Armenians

th

e mamluk who cap tu red the Byzant ine Empero r Romanus IV at Manzike rt was,

by a twist of fate, a Byzant jnelI . T hese were obtained by war, purchase or gift , or recruited by levy

with in the Seljuk slate itself.

After the deat h of Shah in 10Q : and the subseq uent disintegration o f centralised Seljuk po wer,

the seco nd of the afo re-mentioned elements

th

e provincial a skars and various auxi liaries) assumed the

leading role as th e provinces became practically and then 10l a y independent. On ly in the mid-I

::

th

cen tury un der Nur ed-Din. following in the foo tsteps of his father Zengi, were the Syrian provinces

forcibl y reunit ed , Nur ed-Din adding Egypt to his do mains in 1169 and thereby setting the stage for

Satadin s rise to power hy mak ing him governor, from which position it proved to be bu t a short step

10 the Sult anate , thereby succeedi ng 10 the Syrian provinces and mor e besides,

\ 8



Prior t o th ese eve nts command of t he Sy rian provincial armies was usuall y entrusted to the more

powerfu l ami rs, freq uently th e am ir of Mosuj. But unf

or t

unately the emirs did no t like tak ing ordcrs

from each other an d frequently thi s led 10 dissentio n and a lack of u nity in Sy rian armies: delibe rate

dese r t ion was often ca rried ou t by jealous ami rs in th e face o f th e enemy so as to brin g

about

the

downfall o f particularly powe rful rivals. Such disse nt; all too common, togeth er with the somewhat

tribal composi

tio

n o f Turk ish armies, mea nt th at the combined forces of a dis trict or province coul d take

mont hs 10 muste r and even then the am irs o ften required liberal br ibes to guarantee th eir co ntinued

presence and s

uppo

rt.

Both Rumi and Sy rian Sel

juks

relied hea vily on Tu rcoman auxiliaries, and th ese Turcoman tr ibesrnen

who were fie rce though un reliable sold iers - were the nucle us of Seljuk mili tary strength

th r

oughout the

whole of this period . They did not readily accept any form of authority or discipli ne and served main ly

in the ho pe of plunder coming th ei r way ; if none was fo

rthcomi

ng th ey were mor e th an likely 10

abandon

th e army. Othe rwise th eir pay o fte n took the form of ransom money taken in ex change for high-ranking

prisoners hy their employe r; sometimes when the Turcomans indiscriminately massacred their prisoners

they th er

ef

o re deprived t hemse lves o f th eir own pay Some chieftains were paid wit h ext remely large

lqtu ut which seem to have been int en ded as a sub sti tute for th e grazing land s essen t ial to such nomad ic

herdsme n. The y fo ught in triba l u nits und

er

their ow n standa rds an d chieftains. Modern estimates

haw

reck oned Turcoman strength in Anatolia a t some 30 ,000 men in the lat e t h century, but th is figure is

clear ly far too low. Frankish chroniclers, though

undou

b

tedly

going

to

the opposite ext reme , claim Ihat

du ring the Firsl Crusade t he Sultan of Rum , Kilij Arslan I,

mustere

d som e

200·360,000

ca valry, and by

far

the

major ity o f such a fo rce would have

been

Tu r

comans. Certa in ly in Ihe early-

12th

centu ry it

was poss ib le to raise 20-50 ,000 Tu rcomans from the Jazira alone,

Oth er auxiliaries were principa lly supplied by Bcdoui ns and Kurd s. Th e Kurds were a hill-pe uple from Ihe

moun

tainou

s dist ricts o f

nor

th-west Iran , accord ing to Marco 1010 lusty fijlhters and lawless men, very

fo nd of ro bbi ng m

er

cha nts ; they ofte n fea tured in Seljuk arm ies

th

er e were as many as 10 ,000 at

Manztkert} bu t , like th e Turcomans, lacked organisation and fo ught pri ncipa lly for 1001 so werc

disheartened by long or unsuccessful campaigns, Kurds were par ticu larl y prom inent in the armies of

Nur ed-Din , Salad in an d o the r Zengid , Or toq id an d Ayyubid princes, serving bo th us auxi liar ies

and paid askaris. In Rum o

ther

auxil iaries were of Persian, Arab and even Russian origin by the 1

3th

cen tury, Frankish advent urers also appeared on occasion in Syri an and Anatollan armies (see below].

The Syria n army present at Harran in 1104 may help to

giv

e some idea o f the pro port ion of au xiliaries

in th eir forces; o f 10,000 men

7,000

were Turcomans, while th e remaining 3,000 includ ed Hednuins

an d Kurds as well as Seljuks.

Rum in th e 13th century

Under Sulta ns Kai Kobad I ( 1220-1237) and Kai Khcsrou ( 1237-1246) a brief revival of Sclj uk power

took place in Anat olia , bo th Cilician Armenia an d the Byzumine Empire o f Trebi zc nd bec

oming

vassal

states of th e Su lta nate of Rum . Simon de St Quenti n, a Fr ankish visi tor 10 Rum in t he 1240s, reco rded

that Kai Khosrou was owed the service o f 1,400 lances by the Ctltcian Armeni ans for 4 months a year,

1,000 lan ces by the Sultan o f Aleppo, 40 0 lances by the Empe ror o f Nicaea, and 200 lan ces by the Emperor

o f Trebtzo nd : these may have all served for pay since Bar lIebraeus reco rds Kai Khosrou laking Aleppcnc

and Byzantine cavalry as well as Bedouins int o his

army f

or gold in 1243. Whet her th e figur es of lances

arc to he take n as the t

ota

l number o f men involved is unknown , bUI

it

seems improbable: th e

numb

ers are o

ther

wise insignificant ly low when compared to the Su ltanat e s regu lar mamluk units,

whic h perhaps totalled 60

,000

men at thi s time.

In add ition Fr ankish mercenaries were employed , par ticularly under Kai Kaus I, Kai Kobad I an d Kai

Khosrou Il , though even as early as 1148

appar

en tly 3,00 0 Fr anks captured at Atta leia dur ing the Secon d

Crusa de had taken service with Sult an Masud

I

Kai Kaus even fo rmed

I

b

odyguard

un it from Franks

he had liberated by vict or ies over rival Moslem chie ftains. Ther e wcre a t least 1,0 00 Frankish cavalry

in Kai Khosrou H s army at the commencement o f h is reign and il was principa lly tha nks to

300

of

them tha t a serious Turcoman revo lt was pUI down in 1241 ; in 124 3 he employed 2,000

mor

e and th ese

were present in his a rmy at Kuzadugh. The la tter co ntingent co nsisted chiefly o f

Cypnot

es. C

ypru

s

ulso owing service to the Su ltana te a t ab out th is date, bu t oth erwise such mercenaries were ma inly

French, German and Itulia n. Their commander held t he rank of Kondlstabl (Constab le) but he was no t

19



always a Frank (for instance a Georgian named Zahiru ddaula held this office al one point in the 13t h

cen tury, and the future Byzantine Emperor Micha el VIII was Kondistabl under Sulta n Kat Kaus ).

In fact Fra nkish or

Fh enkt

t roo ps

ap p

ea r to have often included Greek elements, bot h mercenaries

employed from the Archontes and Akrita i of the Emp ire and troops levied from the Sult an s ow n Greek

subjec ts (see not e 51 in the dr ess and equipmen t secti on).

During Kai Kobad s reign the threat o f the Mongols first became a reality, when over

10,000

fleei ng

Khwarizmian troops ente red the Sultanate, Kai Kobad took them into his service, grant ing them a

number of extensive iqta ut , hut th ey abando ned these duri ng the civil strife which followed his dea th

in 1D 7 and fled across the Euphrates to take service wit h t he Ayyubids; a lready the Mongols were

raiding eastern Rum, and this was th e reason fo r the Khwarizmians ea rlier nigh t fro m certain fro ntier

iqta a t. The ab rupt departu re of suc h a large

nu m

be r of auxilia ries must have been a blow 10 the Seljuks,

who knew that

it

was o nly a matt er o f lime before a show-down with th e Mongols shou ld

pr o

ve

unavoid ab le.

Following the

almo

st inevitable defeat o f Kai Khcsrc u

at the Batt le of Kuzadagh in 1243 t he

Sult ana te of Rum becumc a vassal stat e of the Mongols, and the Seljuk army

an d

administ rati on

und erwent a rap id decline. Constant financial depression led to a grow ing need to grant ever-larger

iqtu ut to soldiers in lieu of payment , which led o nly to a fu rther loss of revenue 10 th e state

an d

enco uraged the independence o f provincial amlrs . Nor did the Sultan any longer have Ihe money 10

employ fore ign mercena ries, even if his Mongol overlords had been willing to permit it , which seems

unlike ly, and he was therefore obliged to d

epend

on the provincial armie s and th e und isciplined

Turcomans.

There was, however, a Mongol garriso n force stat ioned in the Sul tanate aft er 1256 which steadily grew

in numbe rs, its me

mbers

se ttling pr incipally in the easte rn provinces where they were nearer 10 their own

seat of power (t he Persian Ilkhanate) and to the f rontiers o f thei r enemies. The presence o f thcse

Mong

o lt

roo ps W:lS another reason for the abrupt decfinc of the Seljuk army since th ey satisfied most of

the Sultanate s remaining military requireme nts. They were mainta ined by payments of tribute (o ne of

the reasons why the Selju ks were in financial straits] and granIs o f grazing lands. some of which

ult imalely became Ihe independe nt property of Mongol chieftains.

By the cnd of the 131h ce nt ury , and particula rly af ter the capture o f Ico nium by Karama nli Turcornans

in 117 6, the power o f the Sultanate of Rum had colla psed entirely as Mongol administr

atio

n gradually

repla ced Seljuk ; by th is t ime the Mongols had a fairly firm hol d on easter n Anatolia, but in the

wes tern provinccs u number o f autonomous Turcoman amtrates arose, o f which the Karamanli was the

mos t powerful and the Osmanli (O t toman] the mos t Impo rta nt to the course of subsequ ent histo ry.

Though they relied heavily on

their

t ribesmen all of these successor amirat es em pl

oyed

mamlu ks of

th ir own.

TIlE EGYPTlA

ro

S: AM AYYllBIDS

The Fal imids

From the mid-v th cent ury Arab armies had grad ually become dependen t for regular troo p s on Iheir

conti ngen ts of slave-sold iers, the ghu lams. Of these th e white slaves, largely Turks, were properly called

mamluks (deriving from the Arahic word for

o

wned ). th e name unde r which they rose to their greatest

power. Such troops were pu rl-hascd as slaves and trained and kep i at th e ir master s personal expense,

which thcoretically ensur ed their undivided loyalt y 10 him. When they became compete nt so ldiers they

wetc Icgally freed

an d

, by the ta tc-

Faurntc

era , euch given an «u a on which 10 su

pp o

rt themselves: these

iqtu ut usually reve rted t

he mamluks master

on

the ir death ( though in the mid- I ce ntury Nur

cd-Din made th ose of his personal rnarnluks hereditary and Ih is became the norm under th e later

Zeng ids and the Ayyuhhls},

The s

nior maml uks

h l th e

rank of amir and were ex pected to supply a num her o f tr oops from the ir

iqta a

t. u

hcsc too bein g usually - though no t necessarily - slave-soldie rs, maintai ned by a process

compa rable to feuda l subinfeuda tion, The occasio nal descrmnon of larger iqtu a t as iqt a o f

10,

iq ta o f

iq ta o f 100 and thc like reflect s this practicec th e figures indicating the strength o f the iq ta da r s

[d da , his co ntingent o f hor sem n. However, prio r to t he era iqt

a d

ars were no t requ ired to

0



maintain specific num bers o f men , t heir charte rs o nly dernunding tha t each sup po rt as

many

as possible .

More ofte n tha n not the more powerful iqt a dars commanded even larger numbers in t he field because

the co ntingents o f lesser amirs would he added to their own.

T he cen tral

co r

ps o f bot h Fatimid and later armies wer e the Roya l Mamlu ks. Under the late Fatimids

these numbered ab out 5,000, toge the r with an el it e Young Guard , th e Siby an al-Khass, o f abou t

500. The Royal Mamluks and o the r regula r regiments were hacked up in war time by the persona l

mam luks o f the amlrs. These pcrson al mamlu ks o f eac h successive Caliph. sultan or ami r were nol

disbanded after his death , but retained his

name

and conti nued to exi st as pa rt of th e regular a rmy

until th eir

membe

rs found employment elsewhere or died out; Shir kuh s regiment. th e Asadtyyah

(originally

500

str ong according to Ahu Shamah) were st ill figh ti ng in the Eg

yp t

ian army in

119 ::

des pite the fact tha t Shirkuh himself had died over

20

years earlier, in

1169.

Usually such uni ts were

absor bed into th e standi ng regiment s of the Caliph, sulta n or ami rs, though under the Ayyuhids

they were sometimes a

ttac

hed to the al-lIa lqa (see Mamluk o rganisa t ion ],

Arahs and Egyptian s were no l permit ted 10 become maml uks. Under the Fatimid Caliphate

909-

117 1)

slave-soldie rs wen: most ly Suda nese , Bcrbcrs and Turks. The Sudanese uni ts, know n co llec t ively as the

Ahid al-Shira or Purc hased Slaves . co nsisted principa lly of th e Rayhaniyyah , Juyushiyyah,

Farahiyyah and Alcxandr ian regiment s hy the mi

d·12

th centu ry, the Juyushiyyah alon e posxihly

numbering 10,000 men ; th ey gene rally served as infantry. bot h spea rmen and archers bu t prin cipally

thela t ter , So metim es Negro cavalry are to he found in co ntem po rary sources - Saladin s Qarughula ms

may have included some such - but t hese we re rare. )

In addition Tu rcoman and even Seljuk auxiliaries were sometimes to be found in Fatimid armies. as

mor e o ften were Bedouin and Berber tr ibesmen, while addi t ional infantr y might he supplied by volunt eer

irregulars. T urcomans were first employed b) the Fatimids in 107 2. Even prior to th eir unificat ion with

Egyp t under the Zengids and Ayyubids. Syrian units somet imes appeared in Egyp tia n armies - ther

were, for examplc, 1,000·1 ,300 Damascenes at the Third B

attl

e of Ramla in 1105 and an un re

co r

ded

number of Seljuks at the Battle of Ascalon in

1099.

As an ind ica tion of Fat imid field-a rmy strength, at Ascalon there were

probab

ly

20.000

cavalry and

infantry alt ogether

thela tt

r includin g volun teers and mi litia levies). while at th e f irst and Second

Battl es of Ramla in

110 1

and

110 2

t he Egypt ian forces are re

corde

d as

11,000

cavalry ami

2 1,000

Suda nesc infantry, and

20 .000

cavalry and

10.000

Sudanese infantry rcspec

tiv el y ,

bo t h armi es

co nsist ing largely o f ghulams. At least

7,000

men are reco rded by Ibn al-Athir in a raid of I

ll

(o ther sources claiming 15,000 cavalry and 20 ,000 infantry) , and

there

were 16,

00 0

Faurn tds at Yihneh

in 1123 . We also frequent ly hear of the fron tier garrison of Ascalon (500 cavalry and 1.000 inf antry)

launching its own raids int o Frankish Syria .

Du ring th is period comrnand o f the Fat imid army was generally in th e hands of the Vizier who , like th e

Cali ph , maintained a larg body o f personal mamluks: for instan ce, th e Vizier Bahram ( 1134·1 137 ) had

at leas t 2,000 Armen ian soldie rs in his service , and his successor Ahbas 3,000 Armenians in 11 54 .

( Armenian infant ry . principally archers , still constituted an important element of the Fat imid army

as lat e as 1169.)

Saladi n s ar mies, 1J69·1193

By 1169 , when Salad in succ eeded Nur ed -Din s appointee A

Sil

d ad-Din Shirkuh as governor of Egypt

unde r the last Fartm td Caliph . th e Egyptian arm y consisted of 40 ,000 cavalry and 30-50 ,000 Sudanese

infantry , th e cavalry pro bably inclu ding Qaraghulams (l iterally Black Slaves . probably Negro and Berb r

slave cavalry) and Bedouin and Tu rcoman auxi liarics as well as mamluks.

Al-Maqr iai, reco rd ing an ear lier writer s notes on a review

of

Salad in s cavalry in 1171 th e yea r wh ich

53W the final demise of th e Fat imid Calip hate] no tes tha t th e stan dard un it at this da te was t he Tulh,

apparently a Kurdish or poss ibly a Gh uzz inst itutio n. T he Tulb is the o nly u nit commonly mentioned

• No

w

as earlier each regfmentwas namedafter its o

w

n

r, for example (Vizier Amir al-Iuyush),

Haf

z

iyyah (Caliph

al-Hafszj, A Iildiyyah

(A

....

d ad-DinShtrkuh), Nuriyyah (Sultan Nur ed-Din), Salahiyyah (Saladin

Adiliyyah (Sultan al-Adi

1 .

Kamilin ah (Sultan

et-x amm.

etc.

21



in thi s era , u nder ho th Ayyu hids and Mamluks, but it

W:l S

of a very loose cha r

acter

and varied

considerably in numbers, those recorded in the review comprising either 70 ,100 or 200 men ; basically

an y company led by an amir in wartime was a Tu lb, as too was th e entire

body

o f Royal Mamtuks.

Th e ami r was perha ps assisted by an NCO ca lled a Jawish. 174 Tulbs we re present a t the review o f

1171 and a fur th er 20 were absent. Those present are recorded to have num bered some 14 ,0 00 men

excluding Bedo uin auxil iaries. William of Tyre repeats the ear lier figure

of 40 ,000

, and the

differen

ce

o f 26

,000

possihly acco un ts for absent T ulbs

1, 4

00

- 4

,0 00 men ), the Bedou ins (of whom al-Maqrizi

records

7,000 including I ,300 regu lars ) , th e

Tur

comans and t he remnants o f the Fat imid mamlu k

unit s suc h as the Ascaton (Asaqila) regiments.

The Fat imid Sudanese infantr y , meanwhile, had revolt ed agains t Salad in; they were cru shed in The

Batt le of thc Blacks in Cairo in 1169 , the survivo rs being disbanded and dr iven out of Egypt, The

Sudanese present in Salad in s army at Arsouf in 1191 were und oubt edl y Irom new regiment s raised

after that dat e, and Suda nese infantry were sti ll an important element of th e Ayyu bid army in 122 1

when they harassed King John s with drawal from Dam ietta du ring the Fifth Crusade. However, their

numbers were much smaller than before and co ntin ued to dwindle so that by the time the Bahriyyah

Mamluk

dyna

sty came to power in 1250 they had

appa

ren tly disappeared alt oge ther.

By 1177 18

,000

Quraghulams and 8 ,000 Toassin o r Tawashis Ielit e, fully-armed cavalry), including t he

1,000 Roya l Mamlu ks, could he ra ised for a raid on Ascalo n and Gaza according to William

of

Tyre,

who rcscr tbes them all as light-armed ( they were de feate d at Montgisard). Moslem sources record

maximum figures o f 8

,000

Toassm and o nly 7,00 0 Qaraghu lams d uring the pe riod 1171 ·

l

l , though

in addit io n there were th e usual Kurd ish, Bedouin and Turcoman auxiliaries, as well as Muttawwi a

(Ghazis, and volu nteers paid less tha n the regulars and o nly for th e du ration of a campaign) and Arab

and Sudanese infan try . Saladin,:I Kurd himself, em p loyed a conside rable number o f Kurds, tho ugh he

disbanded many o f the m afte r his defeat at Montgisard , for which disaster he held them responsible

Iw illiam of Tyre s 18

,000

Qaraghulams

ther

efore pro bably incl udes auxiliaries since he does no t

men tion Kurds ind ividually ).

The Egypt ia n askar as reorganised by Salad in in 1181 co nsisted of I I I emirs, 6

,976

Toassin, and 1,553

Qaragh ulams, giving a total o f 8,640 men bu t not including unheneficed troops, auxil iaries, or th e

remaining Fat imid mamluks

th

e ex-Fatimid clement was by th is time very small , receiving

perhap

s

less than 2 of the

army

s to tal

pay)

.

will

he no ticed that these figure s make no provision fo r regul ar

infantry, though th ese arc know n to have existed, wh ich has led to th e suggest ion that perhaps the

Qaraghulams should he assumed to represent such tr

oops

. However Ihis seems improbable.

The army reviewed prior to the Bat t le of Ilatlin in I 187 consisted o f I 2,00 0 Eg

ypti

an and Syrian

regular cavalry and perha ps a similar num ber of volunteers and auxilia ries. H. A. R. Gibb in his article

The Armies of Salad in c alcula tes tha t th e regulars were probably,

1.000 Roya l

1,000 from the Damascc ne askar

1,000 from nor thern Syr ia and the Aleppenc askar

4,000 fro m the Egyp tian askar

5,000 fro m the Ja zira (Mesop otamia) and

th e

askars of Mosul and Diya r Bekr

The estim ated st rength o f the askars of Damascus and Aleppo at 1

,000

men eac h is based o n sound

evidence. Gibb similarly estimates the askars o f Horns and Il amah at

50 0

and 1,000 or somewhat less

resp cuvel y: certainly Shir k

uh s

Asadiyyah regimen t of 500

me n

had on ce co nstitu ted the askar o f

lIoms. The figure for th.. Jaziru, Mosul and Diyar Bekr is based on a sta temen t by Ibn al-At hir,

wh o

records some 6,500 cavalry Ior Mc sul, Dtyar Bckr and the Jaztra in 1176 , specifica lly refu ting Imad

ad-Din s sta tement that t he y n um bered 20 ,000 . G ibb calcula tes that of the 6 ,500 approx imat ely 2,000

would have been supplied by Mosut . At the same time it seems likely tha l Diyar Bekr, Mardi n and

Harran would have maintained a ska rs of 1,000 men each - Harran cer tainly had an askar o f 1,000

(o

ffk

ially) in 1242 . II must he remembered, however , that these forces only rep resent regular cavalry,

no t total available st rcngth : as examp les of th

tatt er it is o nly necessary to q uot e the co mbined force

of 6. 000 cavalry from Damascus and Aleppo rec

orded

in 114Q, whic h could undo u btedly be

sup plemented by a liberal numbe r of infan tr y .



Alt hough no accurate breakdow n is available for Saladin s arm y as it a

ppeared

at the Battl e

of

Arso uf

in 119 1, Ambrc lse and th e It inerarium Regis Ricard i (app arent ly Old French and Lat in ed i tio ns of

the same ey e w tn ss acco unt ) give a good id ea o f th e heterogenous natu re of Egypt ian arm ies a t this

da te, rec

or

ding Bedouin s

an d

Sudanese inf ant ry, Syria n and T urco man ligh t cavalry (at leas t 2,000

and possibly 10 ,000 , a rmed with bows and javelins), and perhaps 20,000 Ambroise records 30,000 )

heavy cavalry, bo th Sal

adin

s and th o se o f his provincial 'askars, 'clo thed and eq uipped sp lendid

ly ;

th e figure

of

20 ,000, thou gh high, does ta lly wit h th e alleged stre ngth

of

Saladin 's fo rces a t Belvoi r in

1182 and pro babl y incl udes Oaraghu lams. At Jaffa in 1192 ther e appea r to have bee n 7,

00

0 cavalry

prese nt.

The lat er Ayyuhids

Kipcha k

Tu

rk s ( i.c. Cumans) forme d th e bulk o f th e mamluk t roops unde r Salad i

n s

desce ndan ts. There

was an influx o f

Kjpc

ha k mam luk s under Sultan

us-Salih 12

40- 1249 ) in p

artic

ular, as a resu lt

of

t he

stead ily

gro

wing pressure of th e Mo ngols o n their east ern fro ntier , and fr

om

amo ngst th em the elite

bodyguard unit

of

the Bahr iyyah as-Saliyyah was fo r med, some 800· 1,00 0 men, usually inco rrect ly

r

ef

erred to as the ' River' regiment.

It

was this regiment whi ch laid

th e

founda t ions of the Mam luk

sta le in 1250 when some of its office rs, led by Aybek and the future Mamlu k sultan Baiba rs .

assassinat ed Sultan Turan-Shuh. The Roya l .Mamluks appea r to have to talled M000 under al-Aziz

(] 193-1198) and 10,

00

0 unde r b

ot h

as-Sahh and his fat her Sultan al-Kam il ( 12 1

1238),

Bedo

u n and

T

ur

coman

light cavalry

co

ntin ued to suppleme nt th e mamluk reg imen ts

of

the

a s

kars.

Kurds also co nt inued to fea ture in man y a rmies, the Kurd ish Oaimariyya h reg

ime

nt bei ng a pa rt icular ly

powerfu l e lement a t th e

dose

o f the Ayyub id era, In 1258 un-Nasir of Damascus emp

loye

d as man y

as 3,

00

0 Shahrazuriyyah Kur ds.

Ot h

er auxiliaries employ ed und er a l-Kami l and as-Salih we re the Khwarizmians who had Fled from Rum.

As many as 10

,0 0

0 (o ne source says more th an 12,000) under a ce r tain Barbch Kha n wer e tak en i

nt o

service in 124 4, receiving in exchange th e lands

of

Diyar Mudar as an iqta , and these fea tu red

promine ntly in the capt ure

of

Jerusalem and th e Bat t le

of

La Forbic the same year. They we re at firs t

a powerful

eleme

nt amidst th e politica l chaos wh ic h prevai led in Egypt and Syria at tha t t i

me ,

but thei r

semi-inde pendent existence was ended ab ru ptly by a devastat ing de feat at Ho ms in 1246 at Ihe hands

of Sultan as-Salih , after which so me

of

th e survi vors again to

ok

service in th e ro yal and vari

ou

s

provincialtaskars,

thou gh in

co

nsiderably smaller numbe rs Ihan

before

. A few hund red (3 00

or

more )

wer e presen t a t the Batt le o f El

Mansu rah

in 1250, while t

heir

final appearance was in 1260 in the

Mamluk arm y which d

ef

eated

the

Mongols a t

A

in

Jatut .

Frankish mercenaries

Frank ish mercen ar ies sometimes appeared in Egypt ian armies in th e 12th and 13th cen turies, hut

alth

ough

th e

re are ma ny allu sio ns th ere is very

little conc

re te evidence. One clearly recorde d insta nce

of

Franks in Fa tim id employ, where in 11 11 Shams al-K hila fah, the gove rnor of Ascalo n, emp loyed 30 0

knights as his bodyg uard , is more appa ren t th an rea l since Sha ms was planning to han d the cit y over

to King Baldwin .

A somew

ha t

la ter indica t ion of t he appare nt desi rab ility

of

Fran kish mercenaries da tes to

I I 9 I

when ,

duri ng ne got i

ations

w

it h

King Richard

I of

England,

Saladin

is a lleged to have proposed th a t in exchange

for

co

nsiderable terri to rial concessio ns he

sh o

uld receive the se rvices fo r one year of as man y as 2,

00

0

knight s and 5,000 infa ntry fo r use agai nst the

Zcngids of

Mosul; bear ing in mind the milit ar y po tential

of the kingd

om

of

Jeru salem at this dat e th ese are very high figures indeed.

La te r in th e Ayyubid per iod we have one

of

the few certai n references to th e employ me nt

of

su ch

Fra nk ish mercenaries, several knight s bei ng

reco

rded in Damascus in 1227. La t er sti ll al-Maqrizi

reco

rds

even th e Mamluk s

ulta

n Baibars employing Fran kish knights af ter the fall o f Caesarea and lIaifa in

1265, even gra nti ng

them

feuda lesta tes

TH E MA M lUKS

Under th e Mamluk Sultans

th e

regu la r arm y co nsisted o f 3 major elements - the Royal Mam luks, the

mamluk tr oo ps o f th e emirs. and the al-Halq a.

23



T he Royal Mamluks consisted o f

th e

reigning sultan s ow n guard s th e Khassa kiy ya h ), who wer e

selec ted f rom th e Ju lba n I fmp o rt ed , T u rkish mam luks

purch

ased fro m th e st ep pes, Ca ucasus o r

else w

here

), plus t he mamlu k u nit s o f fo rme r

sultans

the Sulta niyy ah) and t he u nits o f de ceased am irs

It he Saif iy ya h). Under Bai har s 1160

-1

2 7 7 ) t he R

oy a

l Mamlu ks wer e 12- 16 ,00 0 stro ng. O ne so urce

cla ims t he un likely to tal

of

40 ,00 0, Ihou gh elsewhere giving t he figu re

of

4 ,000 : al-Maq r izi re co rd s

12,00 0 , 4 ,00 0 each be ing post ed in

Cairo

, Dam ascus and Al

ep p

o. Qa la u n 1279 -129 0 ) had at t he m os t

7-12,0 0 0 and ap pa r

en t

ly on ly 6 ,00 0 by th e

cl o

se

of

h is reign : if, as Moslem so urces clai m, his mamluks

ex c

eeded in number t ho se o f any precedi ng su lt an then Baibars must have had co nsiderab ly less th a n

11,00 0 , let al

on e

16-40,000. In ad d it io n Q al

au n

jus t ifi

ably

dis t rus ted t he Bahriyyah regim

en t

a nd

raised instead a new elite un it

of

3,70 0 men wh ich ca me to be k no w n as t h e Burjiyyah

T

ower )

regi ment : these were Circassia ns and Mo ngols as o ppo sed to Kipc haks, an d th ey even tually dis placed

th e Ba hriyyah sulta ns fro m th e th r on e in 13 90 . Under Qalaun s successors Khalil 1 290-1293) and

Mo ha mm e d 1193-134 1, w

it h

intcr ru p tion s) a l-Maq riz i records th at t he Ro yal Mamluk s numbe red

11,0 00

t

hou g h els ewher e he implies tha t Khalil actually had less th an 10 ,000 . Ano ther so u rce suggests

tha t Mo hammed had 10 ,0 00 in 1299 an d it seems t hat in realit y he p robab ly had eve n less, per ha p s as

fe w as 1.000 by 13 19. In peacetime mo st o f th e Ro yal Mamluks Were sta tio ned in Cairo itsel f.

T he amirs were mo stl y, if not e xclusively , draw n fr

om

a mo ng t he Ro yal Marnluk s. They were graded

acc o rding to t he ac tu al n umbe r o f hor semen and /o r mamluks t he y em p loye d, giving rise to th e tit les

am ir o f 5, amir o f 10, amir o f 40 usually called a m ir al-tablkhanah, amir w

it h

han d ) and a mir o f 10 0 ,

and to ra n k as an m r a t a ll on e had to co mma nd 5 o r mor e maml uks or ho rsem en . T his was basically

t he sa me sy

stem

as had been employed b y

t he Ayyuhi ds

ex ce p t th a t u nde r t he Mam luk s th e prev ious ly

h ighly variable n umbe rs o f horse men had bee n st ra tif icd in lo jus t th e 4 o r 5 forma l ranks as listed

a bove and

below

. Th e ti t les th emselves are a l itt le misleading, ho wever, since co n te mporary sources

stat e t ha t

th e

ami r of 10 co uld command up to 20 ma rntuks t he t itle a mtr o f 20 also appears),

th e

a mir

o f 4 0 up t o 70-80

mamluk

s. a nd th e a m ir o f lOO u p to 110- 120. Even t hese o fficia l figures were o ft e n

sur passed, to tals of up 10 5-

70 0

, 1,500 a nd in o ne case even 3,0 00 hors

em e

n someti mes be ing recorded

in th e e m p lo y o f a single ami r, lhough suc h insta n ces we re

excep

t io nal. Vet t hey indi

cate th a

t th e

o fficia l qu o tas were or te n ex ceed ed.

Amir s o f 100 a lso th eo retically co mmande d a regiment o f 1,0 00 al-lI a lq a in wart ime , giving r ise to th e

alte rnative and

equally

inaccu

rate

ran k amir o f 1,000 ; th e inaccuracy o f t h is t itle is best

witn

essed by

the fact th at a lthough in 13 15 o nly 8 ,93 2 men a nd 204 o ffice rs o f th e al-lI alq a arc recorded in Egy pt ,

me re wer e u nder the first Mam lu k su ltans a s many as 24 a mirs

o f

1,000 in Egy pt , so that t he average

al-Halqa co mmand

of

ea c

h

amir

co uld no t have much exceeded ap proximat ely 380 men . Po ssibly t he

nu mbers wer e mad e u p wit h auxiliaries

By 13 15 th e re W l U

20 0

am irs o f 40 and

20 0

a mirs

of

l O in addition to t he 24 am irs o f lOO. A later

au t hor it y, Za hi ri, qu ot i ng a source of unknow n d at e, gives t he low er fig ures o f 14 a mi rs of 10 0

0

amlr

s o f 4 0 . 2 0 am irs

of

10 . SO amirs o f l a and 30 a mirs o f 5 in Egyp t , whil e Da mascus had 11

amir

s

o f 100 , 10 anurs o f 4 0 and 60 am irs

of

10 , a nd Alep po 6-

emir

s

of

100 . la a mu s

of

40 a nd : am irs

of

10 . T he smalles t Ma mlu k pr ovince, Gala , had o n ly 1 am irs

of

40 .

T h e al- lIa lqa it self f irst ap pe ared in 1 174 and co nsisted o f a n ehrc

of

no n-

mamluk

cavalry, mainly

Ara bs. na ti ve Fgypt ia ns a nd mamluk s so ns ho rn in Egypt. T he latter , the Awl a d al-nas , were rega rde d

as seco nd-crass be

ca u

se t hey had no t been bo rn o n t he s te pp es as true T urk s, wh ile Arahs and Egyprians

were not r m l l t o becom e mamlu ks. When Jo inville de scri bes the al-Halqa as th e Su ltan s bo dygu ard ,

an d ma mluk s to bo o t , he is

there

f

or e

und o u bte dl y

co

nf used in his te rminolo gy

t h ou gh t he

ir na me

al-lI a lq a, meaning Ring , do es te nd to im pl y a bod yguard fu nc tio n). Ho wever , th e al-Halqa o ft e n, if no t

a lways. o utnumbe

red t he Royal Mamluks. but th ey were generally po st ed in t he provinces as o p po sed

to Cairo. It has alr ead y bee n men t ion ed t hat there wer e o ver ,000 al-Hulq a in Egyp t in 13 15. Zahiri,

wh o

a

ppea

rs to he spea king o f t he 14 th o r

th e

heginn ing o f th e I 51h cen t ury. recor d s th at th er e wer e

as many as 2

4,00

0 ul-Hulqa in Egy pt which tallie s wit h 24

amir

s

of

100j , 12,0 0 0 in Damascus, 6 ,00 0

in Alep po , an d 9- 1 1,000 spread o ver 5 o u t o f t he remai ning 6 pro vinces, and t his is despit e

th e

al-Halqa

having unde rgo ne a decline in im portance si nce Ihc ea rty- f a th ce n tury; ho wever , since th ese figu res

wer e recorde d in res ponse t o a Mongol t h rea t o ne sho uld allo w fo r e xaggera

tion

an d la ke t he m all wit h

a pinch o f sal t, even th ough al-Maqrili a lso implies the imp rob able fig ure

of

14 .00 0 Egyptia n al-Halqa

at o ne po in t. A n alt erna tive acco u nt says th e al-Ha lqa nu mb er ed on ly 11 ,000 , th is figure la ter being

24



red uced. 4.

00 0

31H31qa are r

ecor

ded to have been presen t in the arm y which fou ght at Horns in

128 1, in compariso n to o nly 800 Royal Mamluks. In ad dition

some

o f th e al-Halqa th emselves

employed 1-4 personal mamluk s.

Every 40 al-Halqa were commanded by an offic er with the ti tle Muqaddam al-Halqa literally

Commande r o f al-Halqa , equiva lent in rank to an ami f 10 ), every lOO by a Bash , assisted by a

Naq ib , and every 1,000 by an Ami r mi a Muqaddam alf. Unlik e the ami rs the al-Halq a o fficers held

th eir ran k o nly during wart ime . The organisation o f the ac tu al mamluks was probably hkewrse easeu on

a

40

or 50-man un it , with

comp

anies

of

100 (or possibly 200) and regiments of 1,000 . Amirs and

office rs were not incl uded in these t

ot a

ls. However , a much lat er author, Ibn Iyas , states that the Royal

Mamlu ks at least were not organised into regu lar un its an d sub-units un t il they se t out on campaign ,

and even then i t was th e sultan

wh o decided the sizes of the unit s.

T he overa ll stre ngth of these regular Mamlu k troo ps is no t easy to reso lve, but cer tainly 40 ,000 are

recor ded o n campaign against th e Sudan in 1289 and 10-19 ,00 0 a t the siege o f Tripoli in the same year,

while 60,000. th ough including some auxilia ry cavalry , were present at th e siege of Acre in 129 1. Gihhon,

in his Decline an d j all of the Roman Empire .

recor

ds on ly 25,000 Mamluk

u v

lry hough he does

no t ci te a so urce , o r dat e, for th e info rmatio n. Wheth er any of these figures inclu de al-lIa lqa

unit s is unk now n .

ll i iaries and infantry

In add ition to the mamlu ks and al-lIa lqa la rge numbers o f auxiliary t roops co uld be raised fro m amongst

the T urco man , Kurd, Bedouin , Syro-Palest inian and Lebanese tribesmen . Such aux iliaries were

sometimes called Khassek (er. Russian Kaza ks , meani ng freebo o ters or nomad vagabonds ].

T he l u rcomans and Kurds were settled on gran ts o f land as mili tary colonists by th e Mamtuk s. chieftains

be ing given t he t itles amir of 10, amir o f 20 or amir of 40 depending on their importance. However,

th ese chieftains remained inferior in ran k to Mamluk amirs o f t he same grade .

Th e Bcdouins we re under no obligations whatsoever and supp lied au xilia ry cavalry in emergencies o nly ;

no r were they co nsistent ly reliable. The ir chie f tai ns wer e therefore graded lower thu n th ose o f the

Turcomans a nd Kurds , be ing ranked 3S amirs o nly if th ey were powerful, o therwise being classi fied as

al-Halqa .

The semi-nomadic al- Ashair, the Syro- I a lesti nian and Lebanese t ribesmen, ap pear to have been hired

principa lly as bow and sling armed mer cenary infantry du ring this period, though th ey sometimes

supplied cavalry. Af ter 1289 mos t offici a lly became regu lar soldiers of so rts when the t ribal ch ieftains

came to ho ld the ir lands as di rec t grants from the sultan. T heir infan try

prob

ably resem bled figure 15

in the dress and eq uipment sect ion.

Zahiri records tha t the auxiliary co ntingents availa ble from these so urces numbered 180 ,000 Turcomans.

20,000 Kurds (h e says

f

ormerly 20,000 ),

93,0

00 Bedouins(

29 ,

000 from Syria and Palesline, 33,000

from Egypt. and 3 1.000

from

the lI ijaz and Mesopotamia , co ntingents ran ging from 100 to 2,000 men) ,

and 35

,000

Sy ro-Palestlnians and Lebanese. In add it io n l ah iri reco rds that every village in th e Mamluk

state was req uired to supply 2 horsemen. and he gives the Iiguee of 33,000 villages: th ese possibly

represe nt the Awl ad al-nas. These auxiliaries were all cavalry , no infantry figures being given.

However, Gib bon men tions au xiliary troop s co nsisting o f a provincia l milit ia of 10 7,000 infantry ,

almost cer tainly incl uding the

Syro

-Pales

tmian

s an d Leban ese, in addit ion to

66 ,

000 Bedou in cavalry ,

while Frankish sources record 100 ,000 and Moslem sources 100-160,00 0 irregular infa nt ry at the sieges

of Tripoli {I 289}an d Acre ( I 29 1) respectively .

Thoug h th e infan tr y were nearly always irregulars (pla ying on ly a mi no r ro le in Mamluk warfare) a

de scriptio n o f the siege of at-xtarqa b in 1285 mentions a regiment of 1,000 infa ntry called the Aqjiyyah

for ming part of th e garrison installed by the Mamluks af ter its captu re ; the regimen t is o therwise

u nkn ow n , hut they were qu ite clea rly no n-mamluk regu lars o f so me kind. perhaps Lebanese. Somew hat

earlier , in [279 , an arm y com p rised of 4 ,000 infantr y and 9,000 cavalry at tacked Qa at Rho ma ita

on th e Euphrates, and certai nly so far from home such infantry co uld hard ly have been sup plied by

irregula r mili tia. In addit io n th e axe

-arme

d Tabardariyyah regim

en t

was clea rly regular.



Ano th er hand of infantry irreg ula rs in the Mamluk army were th e Hadj is, light -armed religiou s fanatics

comparable 10 the layla rs o f the la ter

Ot t

omans. At the siege of Acre

they

are recorded thr owing

t hemselves

into

the ditch before the walls so

that

their own infantry co uld advance, across t heir

bo dies

Engineers wer e also irr egulars, though naptha tr

oo p

s may have bee n employed full-time since naptha,

sipho ns and o

ther

incendiary equ i

pm e

nt was kep t exclusively in royal arsen als.

Th e Wafidi ya

In addit i

on

to the usual auxiliaries so me Mongols wer e to he found serving in Mamluk armies afte r

I as man y as 3, 000 tak ing service during Balhar s re ign. T hese were gene rally called by t he names

Waridiya o r Musta mina, meaning immigrants

or

t hos e who see k asylum respec t ively. ke the

Tur comans, Bedouins and Kurd s they retained their status as free men but , unl ike o ther aux iliaries,

so me act ually se rved

with

in regular Mamlu k un its, usua lly th ose of th e am irs though some even

served alongside the Roy a l Mamlu ks and even in the Khassakiyyah, the Sult

an s

perso nal bodyguard,

itself. Most, however , were enro lled in th e al-Halqa and nea rly all ran ked lower than the Mamluks

th emselves, th e ir chief ta ins being given on l y ver y low ranks, usuall y Muqaddam al-Halq a and r

ar

ely

highe r than an amir o f 40 dur ing this e ra

th

is rank was even given to

th e

Ilkha n Hulagu s son-in -law,

Turghay. who en t ered Marnluk se rvice in 129 7 wit h as many as 10, 000 or 18 ,000 Kulmuks Later ,

however , in Mo hammed s reign when the day s of such mass immigrations were past , higher ranks

were

somet imes assigned to Waridiya chieftains,)

T

il E

ASSASS INS

Th e

Assassins were fo unded in the

late l

th century by a Persian, lIasan as-Sab

ah , wh o

in

1090

se t up

his headq uarters at Alamut in the Dayl am m

oun

tains. They were an ex

tremi

st

group of

a

Shi i

te Moslem

sect , the lsma Hi tes , th eir name o f Assassins (Arabic lIashishiyun) deriving from a co rruptio n o f the

Lati n for hashish, to wh ich

they

were allegedly (hut highly improbab ly) add icted . Th e Moslems

more

of ten called them Barinis or Nazaris.

Their existence as an ind ep ende nt polit ical e

ntity

und er th e ir Grand Maste r was main ly a resu lt of the

inaccessibility o f the ir mounta in f

ortre

sses - Alamu t itself means Eagl e s Ne

st

- o f wh ich there were

perhaps

60 or more

in th e region

of

Alarnut alone by th e mid -13th century. In add it io n from the ea r ly

I ce n tury

there

was a large Sy rian o ffshoot

of

10 for tre sses, with its head

quart

er s at Masyaf aft er

1141 , most fam

ou

s leade r of whom was Rash id ad-Din Sinan ( 1169- 1

193)

know n as Sheikh al-Djabel,

The Old Man

of

the Mounta in . a ti tle

ther

eafter

born e by his successo rs.

Th eir most not a hie co nt rib ution to this era - and all e ras since - was the gentle ar t o f poli t ica l

assassin at ion , to which they gave their name. The sectaries were lin ly obedient to

th e

Grand Maste r

or the OM Man of the Mounta in and w re even

prep

ared to k

illth

emselves if orde red to do

so ,

so

they

did not fear ca p tu re or dea th in the

co

urse of executing the ir duty , whic h was a g

oo d

j ob since more

often

than no t they d id n

ot

re

turn

fr

om their

ass ignmen ts: as Bar Hcbraeus graphically

pu t

s it, killing

the y were ki lled. I Fho se o f th eir bre

thren

a

ctua

lly responsible fo r th e majo rity

of

assassina

tion

s were

the Fida is

or

Fid awis, m

aning those r

eady

to offer th eir Hves fo r a ca

use. )

Celeb rit ies removed fro m

th e course

of

hist

or y

hy ,

\s

sassin ac tivit y included Nizam al-Mulk (

1092)

, th e Fat imid vizier at-Are a

1 ~ ~

il-Bursuq i o f Mosul ( 1126), Con rad o f Montfer rat (1 192 ), and

Geng

his Kh an s s

ec o

nd so n

Jagata i

I

to nam e bu t a

k w

. Even Saladin curne

d o

se to havi ng his career abbrevia ted o n more

than o ne

occ

asion, wh ile Princ e Edwurd , la ter Ed ward I of England , narrow ly esca ped

death

whe n he

was w

ound

ed by a poisoned Assassin dagger in 1271 . There are even sto

ne s

tha t Assassins were ac tually

sen t as fa r afield as Eur

op e

, and tha t some tr ied 10 murder Lo uis IX of Fran ce pr i

or

to his

departu

re

o n the Seventh Crusa de.

Quite

of

ten such assassinations w

er e

mo tivated b) out side rs - the murder

of

th e Pa triarch of Jeru salem

in I : 14, fo r xample , was inst igat ed by the Ho spu ajlers of all people - bu t equally , if not

more

, often

rhey were aimed at con tr o lling th e bal ance o f power amongst th e Assassins enemies. For the sam e

reaso n Assassins might be fo und allied to ei t he r Franks or Moslems as the need s o f th e moment dictat ed .

Duri ng t he 13 th century th e Syria n Assassins were almos t per manently subjec t to th e Hospitallers.

TI

l1

strength

of

th e sect was ef fec tively brok en when its headqua rters at Alamut was des troy ed by th e



Mongo ls in I

256,

t he nucleus o f th e Persian sec ranes being all but ext ermi nated by I 257. The Syrian

Assassins las ted a litt le longer , though the Mamluk Sulta n Baibar s achieved their fina l de

structi

o n by

1273 , ending their po litical

powe

r

for

ever. Nevertheless, Assassins st ill occasionally appear thereafter,

in 1275 even recapturing an d hol ding Alamut for a few mo nt hs, and

though

the rema ining sect artes

were grad ually absorbed by o ther Isma ilite groups they co ntinued to be employed as political

assass ins under the Mamluks, Ibn Bat tuta recordi ng how during the 14th cen tury th ey were normally

paid at a fixed ra te per murder.

Sca

tt e

red as the communit ies o f

the

sect were it is impossible to establish th eir milita ry po te nti a l,

hut

William o f Tyr e sta tes that the Syrian Assassi ns numbe red 60 ,000 and Burchard of Mount Sion that

t hey num bered 40,000 ; the Syrian Assassins are recorded to have fielded per hap s as many as 10 ,000

men against the Franks as early as 1128,

They

relied o n volunteer civic militias f

or

bo th infantr y and

cava lry ; these were

of

a high

stan

dard and received pay fo r the du ration o f their service, usually in the

form

of

booty, hor semen be ing pa id tw ice as muc h as foot-soldiers.

TH E BYZANTI NE EMPIRE

The traditiona l army as described in Armies

of

the Dar k Ages was defeated and all but des troyed by

the Seljuk Turks at the disastrous Battl e o f Man zike rt in 1071, and the succeed ing cen turies saw the

final de mise

of

classical milit ary organisation. The subsequent changes in Byza ntine orga nis

ation

ca n be

fairly accura tely summarised as a decline in the impo rta nce o f the provincial fo rces

of

th e Thema ta

accompanied by an inc reased reliance o n mercenaries and the co ntin gents of the landowning arist ocra cy.

Mercenaries and the Regular arm y

Though they had always been an outstanding feature of Byzantine armie s, from the practical point

of

view, and certainly as a successful solution to the Empire s imm

ediat

e needs, the principa l result of

Manzike rt was a conside rable and ever- increasing rel ianc e o n mercenaries. It was undoubt

edly

thi s

which led to

the

final disappearance amongst many of the na tive Grccke pop ulation o r any kind o f

mili tar y potential, steadily o n the decl ine since the 10 th cen tury. It was inevitahle, therefore, tha t the

Comnen i Em perors and the ir successors should show a marked prefe rence for mercenary t roo ps.

Anna Com nena describes the mercena ries in the arm y of her father Alexius I as horsemen and foo tmen

from all lands ; by th e end

of

the 11th centu ry they incl uded Colbingians tK olbingoi = Kol hyagy?

Germanic inhabi tan ts o f the sout hern Baltic coast line), Curnans, Selj uks, Pat zinaks (Pechencgsj,

Uzes

Tor

ks), Alans, Macedonians (Sla vs and Bulgars, employed ex tcnsivcly under t he early

Conmcnij.

Scrbs, Geo rgians , Armenians, Nemi tz oi o r Alamanoi (Germans and possibly Flcmings;

just

to co nfuse

th e issue F renchmen are sometimes referred to as Germans in Byzan tine so urces ), Lati ns (a blanket

te rm fo r Frenchmen, N

or

mans an d Italians ), Englishmen, Saracens, Ru ssians and Varangians, and on

the who le these elemen ts co ntinued to serve

throughou t

the I th and 13th centuries. (Some, how ever,

se rved as allied auxiliaries o r vassals rather than as mercenaries: the Serb s, fo r instance, supplied 500

caval ry for campa igns in Asia and 2,00 0 for campaigns in Europe during Manuel l s r eign. ) Niketa s

Choniates, writing in the early-13th ce nt ury, says th at each differe nt tribe or race formed a di fferen t

regiment, which must have helped to mi nimi se what would have othe rwise undou btedly been a

disas trou s

com

mun icati on

pro

blem

Alongside these irre gular unit s of mercenari es and auxiliaries there were a

num

ber of full-time

mercena ry un its which , throu ghout most of th is e ra, co nsti tu ted th e hulk o f th e regular army , the ol d

elite regiments

of

th e Tagmata havi ng been prac tica lly des troyed at xtanztkert. Tho ugh the Excubitae

arc re

cor

ded at Dur azzo in 1081 , the Ile taeria and Ikanato i elsewhere, and though

the

Schcla e

appa rently survived at least as an insti tution , these units were merely shadows

of

their forme r selves

and as elite army units fad e int o obli vion befo re the close of th e 11th ce ntury. For a brief period

du ring the reign o f Alcxi us I ( 1081-1118 ) the

resto

re d arm y nucleu s was based o n th e following un its:

- the Vardar io ts, a cavalry unit o f Christianised

Turk

s, pro babl y Uzes. from Macedonia.

- Frankish me rcenaries, lat er called th e Lat iniko n, at th is da te mainly

of

N

orman

or Fr ench extractio n,

• Although even after 1204 the Byzamines continued to j enerally call them

ve

s R homaioi

Le

Romans)

seem

10

have gradually adopted a preference for the term lIellene or Greek so as

10

avoid any confusion between

themseIves and the hated h anks.

27



commanded by an office r with the feudal Eur

op

ean ti tle of Kc nostablos or consta ble . (The Maniak etes

regimen t, wh ich features in latc- I lth century sources, a lso appears to have consisted of Franks,

descendants of the mercen ar ies employed by the general Maniakes in the I030s and 1040s.)

- the Sky thiko n, at the hegmning of this era cons isting mainly o f Pechencgs, for who m the Byzantines

genera lly reserved Ihe archaic term Scyth .

-

th e

Tu rcopou loi, , Sons o f T urks , co

mp r

ised o f the sons of Christianised Turks and Seliu k and

Turcoman mercenaries.

- a number o f native Greek regiments which all vanished aft er only shor t caree rs. These comprised t he

Immortals, a large un it ( 10

,000

men acco rding 10 B

rycnniu

s) formed by Nicephoros III in 10 78 from

rem nant s of the Eastern Th c rnata sup plemented with new rec ruit s; the Choma te nc l , a cavalry regimen t

ra ised in Choma in Phrygla, also by Nicephoros, apparently num bering as few as 300 men in 1081 but

probably abou t \ ,000 when at full strengt h ; the Archontopouloi

Sons

o f l eaders ), a un it of 2,000

cavalry raised hy Alex ius from o fficers or phan s in Ihe I0 80 s; and the vesnarttee. household troops

who perhaps included in additicn

th

fam ous Varangian

Guar

d , fo unded in

thc

tate- t

nr h

ce

ntur

y by Basil

11

from Scandinavian and

Russian mercenaries. There were in add ition ot her Varangian regiments, which by

th e

end of the 11th

century also inclu ded English mercenaries.

Fr anks (o the rwise referred to in Byzantine sources as Latin s or K elt

s j

were em ploy ed in large numbers

1 0) th e

end o f the I I th cent ury, and it may have been a req uest made to the West by Alexius for

mercenaries in 10 11 o r IOQ5 that inadver

te n

t ly res ulted in

th e

Firsl Crusade AI the beginni ng of th is

era, in 107 1, when thcy were commanded by th e unscrupulou s adve nt urer Rou ssel de Oa

iJI

eul, their

strength is recorded as 3 ,000. A few years later there ap pear to have been as many as 8 ,0 00 . Their

numhers were increased co nsiderably by the

ti

no p

hile Emp eror Manucl I

11 4

3- 11

80 )

under

whom Fra nks. part icu larly Frenchmen , Germans and Italians, became the predomi

nant

mercenary

clement of Ihe army arre r the Turks.

Most of the nat ive, and some o f the mercenary, regiments me

ntioned

above had disappeared by as early

as the end of the 11th century, apparently being disbanded by Alex ius: the disappearance of ot hers was

possibly

th e

resu lt of having suffered heavy casualtie s throughout the 12th century , pa rticularly at

th e

Battle of Myriokeph alon in 1176 , whic h left the army in an even worse state compa ratively than

had Munzikert a century earlier. However, the Archon topouloi arc still recorded in Ihe Nicaean per iod

in

co u

rt circles : in 1261 there were o nly 5 2 of them, which would seem to indicate tha t they had

earlier become some rype of inner bodyguard and had declined co nsiderab ly in strength and

importance . O the rs of the old regimen ts may . like the Schotae and Archon topouloi, have gone th rou gh

a similar process of grad ual de terior ation .

The regu lar mercenary regiment s, however, thrived . Only the Turcop ouloi, a nume which appears

regula rly in Byzantine sources from the la te

- l l th

century through to the 141h cen

tury

, seem to have

undergo ne any kind of decline and th is appears 10 have been in status ra ther than strength. Alexius I

seems to have relied heavily on the Tu rcopouloi : Ihey f

eatu

re prominent ly in the events of th e Crusade

of 1101 , and he had as many as 7,0 00 Selju k Turks in his employ as early as 1083 . It is also wo rth

remarking nere tha t

under

the C

omnen

i a large number of senior Byzantine officers wer e either

Byzanun ised Turks or o f Turkish descen t.

T he other 4 regiment s - Varangians, v ardariots. Skyt h ikon and Latinikon - con tinued to fo rm the

nucleus of the regular army , changing only in their ethnic composition. Th e Sky thikon , for instance,

which had since 11 : 2 recruited its members principally from am ongst Pecheneg prisoners-of-war

settled in the European provin ces after th e decisive defea t of Eski Zagru, had begun 10 incl

ud e

Cumans

lIuring the reign o r Joh n

(1 118-1143 ) ut the latest ,

an d

though the Pecheneg

colo

nies co nt inued to

n ou r ish un t

ilthe

Lat in Conquest of 1 : 04 the Cumans seem 10 have become predomi nant hy the end

of the l I th ce ntu ry ; militarily, in fact , th e Pechencg elemen t was probably o n the de cline by the mid-

I : th cen tury and

it

seems likely that inter-marr iage and th e i

nt r

od ucti on o f reinforcements from other

T urkish peo ples brought abo ut t he gradual change or composition from Pecheneg to

Cuman.

Uaes also

appea r in large numbe rs dur ing th is century, and some at least found their way into the Skyth ikon ;

Byzantine sou rces even seem to imply that they formed the largest percen tage of Turk ish mercena ries

a t

th e

time of



Likewise th e compos it io n of th e v arangian s, still principally Scandinavian at the beginni ng of this

per iod, graduall y cha nged , acquiring a larger and larger percentage of Englis

hmen

. In the lat e- 0 70s the

St rategicon of Cccaumenus mak es th e first men tion o f Englishm en in an apparently mili tary co ntext,

but the y ar e o nly first men tio ned in o fficial Byzantine so urces in 1080 and 1088, whe re they are

never thel ess specifically mentio ned separa tely from the Varangians. Ordericu s Vitalis, writ ing c, I 130 ,

d early records Englishm en serving th e Emperor , and there wer e certai nly English t roops presen t at

Myr iokephalon in 1176 (t hey arc men tio ned in a let te r from Manuel to King Henry ), T hough

importan t (apparently the most trusted element of the Guard und er Alexius the ir numbers were

o bviously st ill small in the

e

arly-12 th cen tury, Sax o Gr

ammat

icu s (wr iti ng c. 1101) stati ng tha t the

Emp

eror s gua rd was composed o f men o f Danish

tongue

, an d Snor ri St urlu sson reco rding a grea t

m

any

Northmen

aking service with Atextus in 1112, Th e English element , however, steadily

inc reased

unt

il by

1180 the Byzantine c

hro

nicler Ctnnamus could state qu ite specifically t ha t th e

Varangians were

o

f Brit ish race , Even so , Svemr s Saga records tha t as la te as 1195 en voys were

sen t to

the

Scandinavian kings to req uest 1

,200

men for the Guard, while Villehardouin reco rds Danis h

as well as English gua rdsm en in 1204 . alongside o ther un it s co mposed o f men o f

many

nati on alities,

After the fall o f Constantinople to th e Franks in tha t yea r the Empire devolved into 3 pr inci pal sta tes,

Nicaea, Epirus and Tr ebizo nd , of which Nicat a ap pears to have inherited th e ma in rem nant s o f the

Imperial a rmy, Theodore 1I(1 254-1258) reo rganised the a

rmy

nucle us, now called the AlIaghio n or

T axis and at least 27 Allaghi;l strong by 1259 , unde r an officer called t he Archon , later t it led the

Megas Archo n. The Varangian s and Va

rdar

iots were the mainstay o f the Tax is while th e Lali niko n

and

Skyt

hikon were loose ly associated wit h it. Pseudo-Codin us reco rds th at af

te r

126 1 the full strength

o f the Taxis pro per was 6 ,000 men , co nsisti ng of 12 Allagh ia o f 500 men each, which woul d seem to

suggest that th e Vardar iots and Varangians probably numbered about 3,000 men each, By th is time the

Sc

andi

navian elemen t o f the la tt er had practically disappeared , an d in a doc umen t of 1272 Michael VIII

refers to the Varangians as Engfinvarrhangoi which , if it needs tran slatio n, is English Varangians ,

In o ther sources th e name is ab breviated to Englinoi , Englis

hme

n ,

One o f Theodor e s o ther r

ef

orms was a reduct ion of th e wages ami privileges gra nte d to Frankish

mercen aries, since he thought that the large-scale rel iance

on

foreigners was a princip al weak ness o f the

Byzanti ne army and had a prefe rence for native Gree k soldiers , Nevert heless, the Lat iniko n seems to

have bee n as strong a t th e end of his reign as it had been at the beginn ing, so his measures p

rob

ably had

lit t le o r no

ef

fec t. T he Fr an kish mercenar ies cons titu ting the Latinikon were chiefly drawn from the

Syrian crusader sta tes and Romania by this time and proba bly had been since the mid- l t century ),

though they also include d Sicilians, Italians, Venctians and Achaia n Fra nks. T heir co mmande r s t it le

had changed to Megas Konostahlos, Grand Constab le . und er Theodore though, like the earlier

Konostabl os, he was no t alwa ys himself a Fr an k - t he fu ture Emperor Michael VIII, fo r instance , held

the rank of Megas Konc stablos under Theodore.

The Sky

thiko

n now co nsisted chi efly of Cumans, recruited af ter 1241 from some 10 ,00 0 who had been

sett led on land-gran ts in Anatolia and Thrace .

of the m, toge the r wit h

other

regular mercenaries,

were detached to serve as garrison tro ops a t strategic poi nts or under provincial commanders, this

being particularly tr ue of the Cumans, and , earlier, t he Pech enegs, th ese o ften serving as a kind o f

pro vincial police, These de tac hed units were called Megalon Allaghia or St ra to peda and

the

ir o llicers

Stra topedarchs. Even th e Varangians appear to have some times bee n used in th is way , for de tachmen ts

are found at Kalaura in Thracc, Ctbe to t o n the Ana tolian coastlin e, and possibly even at Cherson in the

Crimea.

Th e irreg ular mercenary unit s

who

backed up the regula r field a

rmy

also contained large nu mbe rs of

Franks, T heodore t s a

rmy

of 2,000 men at Anlioch -in-Pisidia in 121 1, fo r ex

ample

, contained 800

Frankish merce naries, principally Italians. 3 years la te r, in 1214 , his a

rmy

is descr ibed as consist ing o f

Germans, Romanians , Armen ians and Turks , and his successor John III Vatatzes ( 1222-125 4) is recorded

to have em ployed particularly large numbers of Frankish mercenaries. T he Nicaean army at Pelagonia in

1259 included 300 German cavalry, 1,500 Hungarian cavalry, 600 , 1,000 or 5 ,000 Serbian cavalry

ap

par

ently

includin g horse-archers, probably Turks or Cum ans), 500-1,500 Turkish hor se-archers,

4,000 Cuman s an d Alans and an

unk

now n

numb

er o f Bulgarian horse-archer s,

One ear ly O

tt o

man source even reco rds Mongol au xiliaries in a Ntca can army defeated by Kai Khosrou



o f Rum in the INOs. The Mongols somet imes supplied troops

dur

ing Michae l VIIl s reign as well, for

example in 128 1 when 4 ,000 were sen t to his assistance by the Golden Horde, while And ron ikos 11 was

promised 40,000 hy the Ilkhan Dljeitu in 1305. Pachymeres records that 20,000 of these actually

advanced as far as c onium, while in 1308 he records another 30 ,000 being sent into Bit hynia by the

IIkha n to reca ptu re certa in places recently seized from th e Byaan tines by the Turks. Even as late as 140 2

5,000 are reco rded figh ting for the Byzuntines agains t the Ottoman s,

Unde r Michael VIII

( 1259-1282 ) there was an increased intake of Turkish mercenaries, Michae l having

a minimum of 5,000 regula rs in his employ by 1262 , and Turks and Turco po uloi , bo th infantry and

cavalry, co ntinued to ll a major cleme nt in the army o f his so n

and

successor Andr on tkos

However,

the

most mcmorahle mercenaries o f Andro nikos reign were undoubtedly the Catatans and Almughavari

of Rogcr de Flor s Catalan Grand Company, whose caree r is desc ribed in detail in Appendix 2, In

addttion to thc T urks and Catalans the o ther principal mercenary elem ent s of his arm y an reco rded

hy Puchymcres as Gazmouloi. Cre tans and Alans, IQ.16,OOOof the la tte r being em ployed as lat e as 1302,

By the ea rly yea rs

of

t he 14 th c

entu

ry, however, continu

d financial di fficulties had necessi tated a

severe

cutb

ac k in military expendit ure, to th

point where , in

abo

ut 1 120, on ly by utilising increased

taxation revenue co uld Andru nikos env isage maintaining a stan ding army o f 3,000 cavalry , and even this

plan may never have been exe

cuted

. Of these 2,000 were 10 have been sta tio ned in Macedon ia and

Thracc and 1,000 in Buhynia. Possibly these re presen ted no more than elite or purely Gree k units, hut

all in all it is not surprising to find the 14 th cent ury historian Gregoras lamen ting t he sad sta te o f the

army, cal ling it the laughi ng stock o f the worl d

Prm incial

troop

s: Themata and Strarlotes

In additjon to the regular cen tra l army based in Consrantmople there were subsid iary armies scattere d

throughou

t the Emp ire s various provin ces.

Thc

s

semi-regular provincial troo ps, however, were usua lly

rclatively f

w

in numbe r and tu Iacc any larg

scale incursion it was necessary for the armies of several

provmces to be gathered into O 1l large force, of ten reinforced in add it io n by the ce ntral army and

laced with hbcral quanti t ies of mercenaries. However, it sho u ld he noted tha t mos t provincial t roo ps

contmucd to of native stoc k i cer tainly, despite the prcpondc rence of mercenaries , native

troops con tinued to serve in Byzant ine fo rces in large numbe rs, nota bly under Alexius I, Manuell

and lsaac

Even when the Asiatic provincial re

guncms

underwent a decline in the 1190s ;lI1<1 were

r

placed with en

nre

ty new and rigorously trained regimen ts

they

were recru ited aga in from tlre native

peasa nt-far mers. In me course

of

the

lJ th

cen tury many such provincial troops were drafted into the

regular army, not ably in the reign of Theodorc

11

Lascans . though by this t ime the distin ction between

central and provincial armies was hecoming sorn

what blurred, As early as Manucl

reign we even

find the ccnrral army itsel f being billeted t hroughout the provinces in winte r so as to ease the st rain on

the

l mperjal treusury, amI this pract ice appears to have persisted t

hro

ug

hout the

remainder o f this era.

Anothe r large pa rt o f

thc

Lmpire s provincial tr

oop

s was com prised of the con tin gents o f th e Dynatoi

and Archontcs.

t he

lando wning magnates, Even before Manzikert (and at the bau e itself) such noblemen

are to he found leading thcir personal re tinues in huttle, and after 1071 th is elemen t beca me prevalent ,

till old provincial levies

of

th e Themat a at

the same

t imc unde rgoing a dramatic decline in most pa rts

of till Empire. Thelast muster o f

the

Eastern Themuta was in 1073 , and the ease with which

thl ) were defea ted hy some 3,00 0 rebel Norman mercenartcs would indicate that they were inadequa te

in qualfty and few in number. Even so, evidenc suggests tha t the mili tary ohligarions of the Themata

confinued

to su rvive; certain ly when Andronikos I marched o n Constant inople in 1181 the hulk o f his

army composed o f the Thema tic forc es of Thracesion . Paphlagoniu and x tca a, while the militar)

Theme struc ture o f Chaldia.x-omplc te with its Banda o f semi-regu lar cavalry, survived right up to 146 1.

Aft er 1071, however. many native troops were being raised in ret urn fo r an alterna tive type of land-grunt

to mat

held

hy the Thematic farmers, This was the Pronoia ( lite rally Provisio n }, which may possibly

have or iginillly evolved from the Moslem iqta (see page 17) . Though it was then chiefly a civilia n

rhere is som evid nee of military service occasio nally being per formed in exchange for Pronoiai as

earl y as the mid -lOth ce

ntury.

and ce rtainly in the immedia te post-Manzikert era VII made

incrcaxing us. o f such grants to pay his troops, The main difference o f the Pronoia from the old

Thcmauc gran t

WJ S

that the

own

er of the latt er was a self-s

upp

orting farmer who rec ived his land

1



as payment for pe rfo rmed milita ry service, while t fo rmer was an estate held by a q uasi-feu dal tenant

who performed mili tary service in exchange for the grant , wh ich was usually supplemented by paymen ts

in cash and/o r kind . But , unlike th e Th emat ic gra nt, th e Pronoia was not hereditable unt il the reign of

Michael VIII ( 1259-1282 ), usually being made only for a specific

numb

er

of

years (most co mmonly the

holder s life t ime). During that t ime the tax es and revenues o f the estate were payable to the hol der

ra ther than th e Imperial t reasury, while th e ho lder himself - know n eithe r as a Pro nc iarios or

Pronoet es or, more usually, a St ra tio tes ( S oldier ) · - paid no tax at all. Instead he was ob liged to

perform mou nted military service, almost certainly though this is a mu ch de bat ed po int) wit h a

pre

de t

ermi ned number of men in th e case o f the larger es tates - in the mid- 1

3t

h cent ury a Lomba rd

receiv ed the islan d of Euboea in exchange for th e service of himself and 200 knight s, bu t whether such

troops were ever obligato ry or merely rep resent the personal at tendan ts of the great er Stra tiotai is

unknown , Most Stratiotai, ho wever, ob viously would have held only small estates and served alo ne an d

in perso n,

Alt ho ugh some members o f such co ntingents as did follow the Strat io tai were pro bab ly simi larly

armou red an d equipped as heavy cavalry o thers were equally probably lighter-armed or served as

infantry ; cer ta inly as earl y as Alexius

l s

re ign church and mona ster y lands were o bliged 10 raise levies

of light infantry , and some lesser landown ers also appear to have served as infantry, tho ugh under wha t

o bligat io n is unclear (possib ly t hey were local T hematic tr oops), Cka rly, however , Pro noiai were

regarded principally as a source of heavy cavalry, and mo re and more Pronoiai were gra nted to this end

in the co urse o f th e 12t h cent ury, th e Su a

uota

t rapidly evo lving into a qua si-feu dal military aristocracy

as their numbers grew, In fact th e general resem blance

of

this sys te m to E

urope

an feudalism is striking

and becomes even more so when we learn th at by the beg inning o f the 13th ce nt ury at th e lat es t some

such land -gran ts were ac tually called Fters, and when the Fran ks con quered vast tract s of Byza nti ne

territory aft er 1204 they fou nd the exis ting co nditions of land-tenu re so similar to those of feudal

Eur ope th a tlit tle administ rative change ( in some cases

none

whatsoever] was necessa ry.

Unde r Man uel l Prono iai were first gran ted to half-barbarians , probab ly Curnan s or Turks in Byzantine

employ , tho ugh they had been used as pay ment fo r o ther mercenar ies, chiefly Franks such as the

Norman men tioned ab ove, even in th e 11th ce n tury and dur ing the 12th ce ntury had become the

generally acce pted mea ns of main tai ning th e regular army as well as provincial un its. In this form

Pronoia i survived right down to the fall of Constantinop le in 1453, alt hough - in total contradictio n

to the pu rpose for which they had been esta blished -

some

were rece iving exemp tion from the

ob ligati on of mil itary service by the middle to late-13 th century.

Likewise many o f t he remaining Themat ic soldiers cus tomari ly exempted themselves from service by

cas h paymen ts by th c end of the I I th century. However , as no ted above, such Thematic troo ps still

served in th e 13th ce

ntury,

some perf orm ing garrison

du t

ies in local fr

on t

ier for tresses unde r office rs

called T zaousioi and Kastro phy lakcs. These garrison

troo

ps incl uded foreign mercenari es as well as native

farmers, a ll bein g gran ted Pronoia i in the vicinity

of

whichever fortress they defended, These garrisons,

of

vital imp

or

ta nce in Anato lia, dec lined considerab ly

unde

r Andronikcs

at the very end

of

this era.

Unit Si ll

Although the old Byza ntine un it organisation described in Armies of the Dark Ages survived, by the

12t h ce nt u ry at the latest , and probably as early as th e late I l rh-century , the standard unit of the

Byzantine army consisted of some 300-500

men,

comparable to th e old Bandon or

l

agma but by thi s

later date generally called by th e name Allaghio n

this

term having clearly derived a new mean ing since

the days of Leo VI s Tucfica , when it hall referred

10

a unit

of

only 50 men ).

It

is logical to assume tha t

th e unit s strength was tec hnic ally 400 bUI, like the ear lier Bandon, this cou ld vary depending o n

wheth er th e uni t was und er or over th e o fficia l strengt h. ,\ t the siege of Constantinople in 1204, for

exam

ple, the French ch ronicle r Ro bcrt de Clari speaks of th e Byzar uines muste ring 17 b

aule

s fo r an

engagement hcfore the Palace of Blachemac ; of \) of these he says there was no on e o f these 9

Bat t les in wh ich t here were n

ot

3, 000 knights, o r 4 or 5 in some , and allowing for de Clan s tendency

This term, somewhat corrupted.up peurs in theWest in the 15th and 16th cen tunes as St radiot , the name under

which Albanians andGreeks served inVenetian employ after the fall of Const mtin ple in 1453 and subsequent

conquest of Albania by the Ottomans.

31



tow ards exaggeration th ese b att les probably repr esent such units of

300

,

400

o r 500 cavalry.

Th e term Mo ira (a un it co nsisting of a number of Banda in the old system) is also s t ill used

occasio nally in t he sou rces (as are Bando n and Tagma) , bu t in general the Allaghion appears to have

now been th e largest unit ; for instance , a for ce o f 6,000 cavalry reco rded in 1263 includ ing a minimum

o f 1,500 Turk s was organised as 18 Ajlaghia. Smalle r un its of 40·6 0 and 100 men also ap pear to have

existed, pr

obab

ly indicating th at the AlIaghion was subdivided into 4 un its o f 100 (official stre ngth),

each o f .2 un it s o f 50 men. Th e smallest cavalry un it was st ill of 10 men . Infantry may st ill have been

org anised in 16-m3n sub-units .

It should also he no ted that un its of a ra the r mor e feudal characte r a re to be sometimes f

oun

d in th e

so urces. Cinnamus, for instance , records a reg iment under the

Emper

or Manuel

co

nsisting o f th ose

nearest him in blood ,

among

whom were many of his most int imate associates and those who had

wedde

d his sister s ; und ou btedl y th e Si

ll

o f such a un it wou ld, like its Frankish coun terpart, adhere to

no regula t ion standard what soever.

Servallb

Paid servants accompanied Hyzantinc soldiers now as in th e earlier pe riod . By th e 13t h century th ey are

generally refer red to as the T zoutoukon ae. Like thei r earlier co unte rparts th ey were on occasion expected

to righ t , as at Serr hac in 124(1, but they were ligh tly, if no t poorly, a rmed and probab ly served chiefly

as stingers and arc her s.

The Navy

As in the crus ader states of Palestine, Byzantine naval powe r throu gh

out

mo st o f this era depended

heavily o n the contingen ts of the Ita lian marit ime repu blics, particularly Venice and Genoa but also on

occasion Pisa , which served in exchange for pay and favourab le trading concessions with in the Emp ire,

v cncuan co lonists were presen t in Constan tinople from 1084, though t he Pisan and Genoese colonies

were onl y established in I1 II and 1155 respectively and on an inferi or scale. By 1171 there wcre some

20,000 v cneua ns settled wit hin t he Emp ire , 10 ,000 of them in Co nsta ntinople itsel f, whi le Bar Hcbraeus

reco rd s as many as .l O,OOO Frankish merchants ( probah ly chiefly Pisans and Genoese] in Constantino ple

o y 1204.

An agrccmcn t mad e wit h th e v enertans in 1187 is fair ly typical o f the arrangements by wh ich such

auxiliancs saved . By th e co nd it ions of this t reaty the republic o f Venice agreed to supply 40-100

galtey s equ ipped at the Emperor s expense, o n which 3

out

of every 4 Venetia n co lonists were to serve.

Th

e)

had thei r own officers, though these had to follow t he orders of the Byzan tine admiral. In

emergencies suc h as a sudden

at t

ack b) 40 or more

enemy

ships , in wh ich sit

ua t

ion no time would have

been available to await the ar rival of th e galley s from v cnic e. Yhc co lonists were o bliged to serve instead

on Byzan

tmc

ship s. O n ti ll co nclus ion of peace auxiliary galleys could re

turn

to Ven ice

bu t

had to be

k

ep i

ready for further service. By a lat er agreement

t he

Oenocsc. in exchange for th eir re-establis

hmen

t

in Galata in I

:: 6 (fo

llowing the recouqucst of Constantinople ) agreed to sup p ly 100 galleys

for

defe nsive

warf ar 50 of th cm man n and fully armed ,t hc o th r

SO

unmanned. In ad dition furt her galleys wer e

often hired

on

a purely mercenary basis.

Th e Byzantine navy proper co ntinued a steady d ...chne, The Themat ic flee ts and Imperial fleet were

combined

under

th e co mmand of a Mcgas n ux d uring the reign of Alext us I, but although the fleet

underwent a bri ef revival at this t ime even Alcxius found it ex pedient to emp loy Venenan ships and t heir

numbe rs stea dily increased un til th e mid- I cen tu ry , when Manuc11 temporarily rec tified th e balance

by co ns: ruct ing a fleet of considerable propor t ions: as many as 200 ships, including galleys and horse

transpor ts. are recor ded in 1109 , Qu itc what reso urce s Manue

employ

ed to mainla in th is fleet , however ,

is no t c1ca r, since it was dur ing his reign tha t many o f the coastal distr ic ts and island s exempted

the mselves from naval service by pay ments in rash. No t sur prisingly, the refore, the fleet declined again

under his successors so th at by 1196 only

30

galley s remained. w hen the flee t of the

Four

th Crusade

appeared before Constantinople in I 03 no t a single large ship remain

d serviceable in th e whole

Byzurnin e flee t, which by that time consisted o f o nly 20 wo rm-eaten hu lks, and the Dux -

when he did ap pear - was in command of a de tachment o f cavalry

l.vcn so. afl l r

Constanti

nop le fell the Nicacan Despot Thcodore I Lascaris is recorded to have possessed

32



a fleet of 30 galleys as early as 1205 , In th e same year Leo Gaba las, the Despot of Rhodes, co uld

muster 20-30 galleys,

33

shi ps are recorded under the Nicaea n Megas Dux in [230 , an d 10 yea rs later

John

va

tatzes had

30

galleys .

The flee t had increased to some 80 galley s by 1283

whe

n, sho rt ly a

fter

his succession, And ron ikos

disband ed it al tog

eth

er, instead placi ng to tal reliance o n Genoese aux iliary vessels, 50-60 of t hese being

employed by 1291 . Thi s was principally a finan cial cutback which increased tax at ion reven ue was

int ended to recti fy c. 13 20 by th e establishm

en t

o f a Byz

antin

e fleet o f 20 galley s; however, thi s plan

may never have been carried out.

The Gazmouloi

These were ha lf-caste Franko-Greek s (o f Fra nk ish

fath

ers an d Greek m

oth

ers), regarded by th e

Byzuntines as part icu larly good soldiers because th e ir mixed blood gave them, acco rding to Pachymeres,

bot h the wild , reckless co urage of th e Franks and th e calculating cautio n of th e Byzant ines. Tog

eth

er

wit h th c Tzako nes (Pclo ponnesia ns - Pach vmeres plau sibly iden tifies th em wit h th e descend an ts of

the cla ssica l Laco nians, the Spar tuns) they supplied a large part of the Byzan tines naval man power.

Andronikos d isbanded th em when he ab olished the flee t, which was a mista ke since th ereaft er a

number of them took serv ice wit h the Emp ire s Fr ankish enemies, o thers even going over to the

Turks

In th e 13th cen tur y a large num ber o f pirates - par ticularly Genoese pira tes - also o perated under t he

Byzantine flag agains t t he Franks an d 2 succ essive Byzant ine Mcgas Duces of the last quarter of th e

cen tury ( Licario and John de 10 Cav

e)

were themselves co rsairs. (Som e Syrian and Romanian Franks

also employed pir ate ships, such as th e 15 in the pay of Gerard o f Sidon at the siege of Ascalon in

1153.)

G EORGIA

The sta te of Georgia, f

ound

ed th rough the union o f Abasgia and Ibe ria in 10 08

th

e name de rives not

f

rom

any special association with St George but rathe r from thei r Arab ic/P ersian name, Gurj o r Kurj ),

underwent mixed fortune s du ring this peri

od ,

growing to co nside rable dimension s b

efo

re being d

ef

eat ed

in 1221, and red uced to vassalage in 1239, by the Mongols. Tho ugh Chri st ians the Georgia ns had no

special liking for

the

Fran ks of O

ut r

emer,

bu t

th eir co un try was strategically situated on the flan k of the

Moslem world an d at leas t o ne Fr ankish writer, Anseau, observed that

t

he land and kingdom (of

Geo rgia) a re for us like a rampart against th e Medes and Persians.

A feu dal system, called Pat ro nqmoba, prevailed in Georgia from the 11th cen tury o nwards and mos t

Georgian armies were composed chie fly o f the feudal co ntingents o f the nobility. The ru ling class were

the Pa tro ni, comprised of Eristavt-Eristavni, who led th e provincia l co ntingen ts in wart ime under the ir

own ban ners : Eristavni, commanders of armie s , equivalent to the Byzan tine St rategoi; Dide bulni,

literally the Grea t , subj ec t to th e local Enstavt-Eristavi (n ot to the Ersitavi) ; Spasa lari (er. th e Arabic

Sipahsala r) ; Atassistavni, commanders of 1,000 (organisati on in Georgia was decimal) ; and Aznauri ,

the basic knightly class. Many az naur had thei r own fortresses (somet imes no more tha n a fort ified

house) , an d many install ed castellans, called Tsikistavni or heads of fortresses . Th ir f euda l

co nti ngents co nsisted of th e Qma ni, cl ien ts resident on th eir estate s,

num

ber s de pend ing on th

size of

the esta t e; those Qmani who served well were given their ow n lands an d improved st

atus

in retu rn. T he

elite troops we re those from the region of Kurutli, and

was from amon gst th ese that the king

maintained a per so nal cavalry r

etinu

e, a sort o f Familia, ap paren tly 200-s

trong

under King Dimitr i in

th e la te-13th century.

No regular

army

was formall y es tah lished unt il th e reign o f David 1I Aghmashenbeli ( 1089· 1125) who

recruited a stan ding arm y o f mercen aries from amongst the Kipchaks (Cumans) and Ossenans (Alans ).

The Kipchaks, settled in large numbers in de pop ulated parts of the kingdom, co uld muster 40 ,000

men on

deman

d, as well as an elite guard unit o f 5

,000

. In fact it was a new wave of these Kipchak

mercen aries who were largely respo nsible fo r Georgia s rapid, bu t sho rt-lived , growth to milit ary greatness

in the

lat e- Lj

th centu ry unde r Giorgi I11 ( 1156-1184 ) and the celebrated Queen Thamar ( 1184 -1213),

when they were led hy a cer lain Qubasar, In addition to these troo ps a la rge force o f regular , pa id

garrison troops was mainta ined in Tlffls, the capital, and in many provincial fortresses (David

maintain ed as many as 60,000 men in th is capacity , o f whom at least some if not the grea ter pr

opor

tion

33



are ce r tain to have been foreign mercena ries.)

In fact most Georgian kings appear to have ma

inta

ined such foreig n troops, Bagra t IV

of

Karat li

1027- 1072) even havi ng a

co n

ti ngent o f 3 ,000 Varangians in his e

mp

loy {chief ly Russians

bu

t

possibly including some Scan dinavian s) , as to o did Queen Thamar. In addit ion to Osse ttans and

Kipchaks, David was even em ployi ng seve ra l hundred Frank ish me rce nary knights as ea rly as 112 1,

an d Selj uks and Turcomans were em p loyed o n

othe

r occasions. All suc h tr

oo

ps were

respo

nsible fo r

su pplying their own

ar m

our an d equi

pm e

nt.

A goo d idea of the mixed nat ure o f Georgian armies can be taken from an a

rm y

of 40

,000

reco rded

in 1228 to have co nsisted of

Georgian

s, Armenians from Greate r Armenia, no t Cilicia), vario us

n omads S erifs, Lesghs, Suans and J ikils) an d as many as 20 ,000 Kipchaks. An earlier army , in the reign

o f David , included only l OO Frank ish knight s bu t compensated with 5,

00 0

Alans and 15,0

00

Kipch a ks.

TH E MONGOLS

Mongol armies were or gan ised on a decimal basis. Marco Polo records th e largest un it as be ing the Tuk o f

10 0,000 men , but this was pr obably only tru e o f the eno rm ous multi-racial armie s o f Mongol China .

The standard un it was the Touman o f 10 ,

00 0

m

en ,

consist ing o f 10 Minghans

of

1,000. Each Minghan

also cal led a Ilaraza or, in on e early instan ce, a Guran) was of 10 Jaguns o f 100 men , and ea ch Jagun

of 10 Arbans of 10 men.

Th

e Arba n, the basic unit ,

co n

sisted

of

a nu

mbe

r of Yurts, each o f 1-3 men

with a family relationship,

an d

was

co

mm

anded

by an unr e la te d o ffice r called a Baa

tut or

Baga

lu r

).

2 o r mor e Toumans, usually 3, const itu ted an arm y an d

on

e of Ihe commanders was de signated th e

senio r ; he was accompanied by a great drum see note 62 in th e

dr

ess and equipmen t section) which

could

on

ly be sou

nde

d a t his com mand , when

was the signal to a tt ack .

Oth er officers were dra n from am ong th e Dark hat , a speci al cla ss of freemen, an d the Baatuts,

Ncy a ns and Nuk uts. all noblemen by bir th ; when th e Minghan units were first formally es tablished by

Genghis Khan in the ea rly-13 th century each was co m

manded

by a Noyan, though similar Thousand

un its called Gu rans

Rings

)

recorded in 1193 wer e c

omma

n

ded

by officers called Gu

rkhans

. By

th e

1

4t

h cent ury

th e

comma

nders

of Minghans

an d

Toum ans were mos tly prin ces

of

the Imperial family.

In addit ion there was wh at ca n hest he de scribed as a cent ral

co

rps of 9 staff o ffice rs called th e Or lok,

of h om S ub ut ai a nd M

ukuf

are probahly th e bes t-know n.

Military service was

du e

from every ab le-bod ied

man

between Ihe ages

of

14 and 61 , th ough th e Great

Vasa laws

of Genghis Khan say 20 an d over . A column of reinfo rcemen ts recorded in 123 5 certain ly

co nta ined ho ys of I 3-14 years o f age , though these may o nly have been part icip at ing in esc

ort

du ty as

par t o f th e ir t rai ning. On campaign each man was accom panied by a min im um of 2 or 3 horses , or on

occasio n as

man

y as 6 or 7; o ne version of Marco 1010 recor ds each Mo ngol o

wning

on average 18

horses

an d

mares. 4 horses

p er r id er

are reco rded in th e invasion

of

Khwarizmia in 12 19 and 5 for

th e

Ilkhan id a t t

ac k

on Syria in 1299. F ria r John de Pian o Carpini, who wrot e c. 12

46

, re

cords thal

if

possible a horse ridd en one day was no t again ridden fo r th e ne xt 3 or 4.

Guard smen and auxi liaries

In addi t ion to the line Touma ns there were auxiliaries

an d

the Keshik . The latt e r was a gua rd un it

which

only to ok

th e

field when the Kha n went on campaign. is fir st m

enti

oned in 120 3 when it

co nsisted o f 70 day g

uards

I

th e

Turghaut ), 80 night guard s

th e

Kabtau

t] ,

400

e li te ar

cher

s I th e

Khorchin

). und th e Ba

atut

or Bagatur , an e lite

o f

1,000 Warriors wh o formed th e adva nce guard in

bat tle . In 1206 the Keshik was incre ased to Touman strength, wit h Turghaut of 1,000 , Kah ta u t o f firs t

800 an d the n 1,000, Khorchin of 1,000 and an ad d iti onal 6 ,000 Baa tut . wh o remained junior to th e

original Baat ut Each o f

th e

se Keshik rode horses of unif

or

m colour ; th e B

aatut

horses were black

p

oss ib ly fo r all 7 Minghans). Kesh ik warr io rs were high er in

rank

tha n co mmanders

of

line Minghans, and n

on

-co

mbatant

s

atta

ched to the Keshik higher in rank than commanders

of

Jagu ns.

Auxiliary troops th e Cherig) included Russians, Baskirs, Vol ga Bulgars, Alans, Georgians, Armenians,

Kur ds, Turcorn ans, Cum ans, Ulgurs, Qa rluqs, Ju rchids, Qa

rakhi

ta i, Kalmuks Otra ts) ,

Tangut

s, Turks ,

Khwarizmians, Bedouin Arabs, Ind ians an d Chi nese; Ch inese tro

op

s firs t d efect ed to t he Mo ngo ls in

34



12 14 and w

er

e mainly inf antr y - t h e fir st ti me the Mo ngols had used large n um be rs c f fo ot -soldiers.

Office rs of

t hese variou s natio nalit ies co u ld even be fo und as gene rals in Mo ngol armies - a Tan gut ,

for insta nce, co mma nded t he Mo ngo l fo rces wh ich cr ushed t he Ala ns in 1239 - bu t mo re of te n Mo ngol

o ffi cers co mmanded a uxiliar y t ro o ps a nd o rga nised the m in Mongo l fashio n.

Ho weve r, suc h auxilia ry co n ti nge nts, co nsist ing as t he y did o f peoples the Mongols had co nq uered ,

wer e no t t otally rel iable. Even Car pini reco rd s th is d isside nce , say ing th a t if a n op po rt un ity sho u ld

ever a rise a nd th ey co uld

be

sure t hat Iheir ene m ies would not k ill t hem, th e au xiliarie s would turn

on t he Mo ngo ls t hemselves a nd att ac k th e m mo re fierce ly t ha n even t he e nemy wou ld.

is no su r prise,

ther

ef

o re, that we so me t imes find t he Mo ngo ls disba nd ing o r d ist rib ut ing t hei r au xilia ry t roop s.

Some idea o f th e scale o n whic h au xiliaries wer e e mployed ma y be tak en

from

ar mies o pera ti ng in China

12 17

a nd

1225 ;

th e fo rm er co mp rised

10 ,000

O ngut s,

20-30 ,000

Qar a kh it ai, l u rchid s a nd Ch ine se,

a nd

50 ,000

Tangu ts, bu t o nly

13,000

Mo n go ls, w hile t he la tt er alt ho ugh co n ta ining a h igher pro po rti o n

of Mo ngo ls 80 ,000 in fact, t ho ugh so me o f t hese were pro ba bly T ur ks) also con ta ined 20.00 0

Ind ians, 30, 00 0 J et es and Cum ans, and 50,000 Kh war iz mian s. Bat

u s

arm y whic h in vaded Russia

in 123 6 was simi lar in pro po rt io ns, wit h 70- 100 ,00 0 T urks and o the r au xilia ries an d 50,000 Mongols.

Engineers

Mong o l engineers were lar gely d rawn fro m Arab, Kh warizmi a n o r Chinese au xilia ries an d p riso ne rs.

Ch inese e ngin eers wer e first emp lo yed in

12 11

and ap pear ed in la rge n u mbers by la te

1213,

wh ile as

many as

10,

00 0

are re pu te d to have acco mpa nied t he a rm y wbich invad ed Khwar izmia in

12 19.

Th ey were e m ploye d t o b uild siege equ ipme nt as an d w he n req uired ; a t t he siege of Nishap ur in I 22 1

t he Mo ngols engineers a re re puted to have cons truc ted as many as 3,000 Ballistae, 300 ca ta p ults, 7

00

na

ptha

-thrc wing e ngines an d 4 ,000 siege-ladde rs. In add itio n ligh t en gines might be d isma n t le d and

carr ied b y ca mels, ya ks a nd o xe n o n a ca mpa ign.

1,000 eng ineers fro m Asia Mino r e mployed by If ulagu in 1253 a re reco rd ed to have bee n me n sp ecially

t raine d in the use of napt ha a nd gren ade s. T here is t he possibilit y too th at th e Mo ngols ma y have even

used gu n po wde r, so me so urces sugges ti ng t he use of wha t may have bee n a crude mo rtar in 123 2, used

to d ischarge a t hu nd er bo mb , an iron vessel fi lled wit h gu npow d er , w hile Frankish chronicle rs spea k of

th e Mo ngo l ar tiller y barrage at t he Batt le o f Moh i in 1241 as b eing acco mpan ied by t

hunder

ou s noise

a nd flashes o f fire . Late r, in

th e

in vasions o f Ja pan in 1274 a nd 1281 , Fi re-barrels are reco rd ed , and in

o ne

of

t-re pro d uced illust rat io n fro m th e fam o us Mo ngo l Invasio n Scro ll o f

1293

what ca n on ly be

desc ribed as so me kind of explo din g bo mb is q uit e clea rly d ep ic ted. Per ha ps th e Fire-barrels were

pri mitive ca n no n, pe rha ps not , bu t it is wor t h no t ing t ha t Ch ine se so urces ce rtainly recor d t he inventio n

in 1259 of F ire-la nces , wh ich were bam boo t u b es fr om wh ich clu sters of pellets co uld be fire d by

gun po wde r 10 a range of so me

250

ya rds.

Tot al s tre ngth

When t hey werl: first crea ted in t he early -l J t h cen t ury th e re were 95 Mingha ns, t heo retically giving

95 ,000 me n, th o u gh o f th e co mma nde rs on ly 90 na mes ar e listed, a nd on e of t h ese is k no wn to have

bee n dea d at t his date so t hat t her e may have act ually bee n less t ha n 90 Minghans a t full st rengt h.

Th e IIkh a nid vizier an d histo ria n Rasch id ai-Din, who wro t e c. 1306, records t hat o n th e dea th o f

Gengh is Kha n in

122 7

t he a rm y co mprised

129,000

men ; t his co nsisted o f t he J u ngha r A rmy o f t he

Left Wing, or Ea st ) o f

62 ,00 0,

th e B

araun

g ha r Army

of

t he Righ t Win g, o r w es t} o f

38 ,000 ,

th e Kho l

Ar my o f t h e Ce n

tre,

th e Imper ial

Ordu

s ) o f 1,000 picke d men , 4 ,

00

0 gua rd s eac h for p rinc e s l uch i,

J agat ai , and Ogoda i

to

serve as t he nuclei o f t he ir o wn mult i-racia l armies) , a nd 16,00 0 guard s for

o t her m

embe

rs of th e Imper ial famrly. A varian t co py o f t h e same so urce gives a to t a l o f 230 ,000 , with

J unghar of 52

,000

, Baraunghar o f 4 7,000 , Khot o f 10 1,000 , Im perial Gu a rd o f 1.000,4 ,000 ea ch fo r

the 3 pr in ces, an d 17,000 guar ds for t he remainder o f th e fa mily . Bot h se ts o f figu res ar e sligh t ly

suspect - w her e, for insta nce, is t he Keshik, u nless o ne is to ta ke t he Kho l in th e form er an d th e Imperial

Gu ard in t he la tt e r as b eing mista kes fo r IO,O ?

Even so, o nly th e Mo ngo ls t h em selves are acco un ted for by t h ese figures. Raschid al-Din also records

t hat in t ime of war th e co u ld mu st er as ma ny as 1,400 ,000 men , whi le Khan O godai 1229 -1241)

35



is claimed

10

have mainta ined 5 armies tot alling 1,500 ,000 me n, and if

they

are to be take n seriously

such figu res must represent levies of vast

number

s of subject peo ples an d aux ilia ries, in which case

contemporary remarks about th e legions o f th e Mongols, who exceeded locusts and ant s in numbe r

wou ld seem to be justified

ILKHANID PERSIA

The Mongol armies of the Ilkhanate of Persia (which was established in 1256) were a t first main tained

by trea sures looted from the preced ing adm inistra t ion ; by nom adi c grazi ng on

th e

available pas tu re

lan ds; an d by fo rced levies in cash and sometimes men from the exist ing populace. However , under

Ilkhan Gha zan ( 1296-1304 ) and the vizier Raschid al-D in it became ap parent

that

it was imprac tic al , if

no t impossible, to mai ntai n the army in this way any longer. Th erefore a system comparable to

th e

earlier

iq ta

was established, often even retaining t he

name iqta

but technically now called Suyurghal

o r T uyul de pendi ng on whe ther the gran t was hereditary or for the holder s lifet ime o nly; the so ldiers

had to support themselves from these grants. has been plausibly suggeste d that the term lqt a survived

in use for th e smaller bene fices held by the ind igenous Turkish and Persian peoples, whi le th e Mongol

terms were app lied to those lands held by Mongol soldiers.

However, except for an inc rease in the nu

mber

of Mon gol troops presen t, military organisat ion d id not

change d rastically from tha t which th e Seljuks had originally imposed , and Persians, Turks an d

Tu rcornans continued to play an importan t military role . Add it ional elements of the army were supplied

by Kurds, Geo rgians and Armenians am ongst o thers. Cilicia n Armen ia and the Frank ish pri ncipality of

Ant ioch bo th paid t

ribute

to , and were ers twhile allies of,

th e

Mongols from 1246.

On e

intere sting co ntinuat ion of Selju k pract ice which deserves men tion was the emp loyment of Frankish

mer ce naries. The mid- 13th century t raveller Simon de Saint-Que nti n records th at th e Mongo ls were so

impressed by the figh ting spirit of those Franks they encounte red du ring their co nquests

that

they

for bade the pri nces and kings of vassal states to employ th em th ereaft er, though they employed small

numbers th emselves - for example Ilkhan Arghun had at lea st 900 in his em p loy in 1290, and a

co mpany of Frankish crossbowrnen was presen t a t th e

khanid siege of Hera t in 130 7.

As with othe r Mongo l sta tes, huge arm ies arc claimed fo r the llkhanate. In 1299 Ghazan is supposed to

have mustered 100,000 men for a campaign aga inst Mamluk Sy ria, and th is represe nted only half his

avai labl e forces , while xtarco Polo report s th at in 126 1 Hulagu was ab le to raise 30

0 0

00 .

T he Ilkha nate itself lasted only unt il 1354 , though its power de clined drastically aft er the

deat

h of the

last legitima te Ilkhan in 133 5.

TACTICAL METHODS

FRANKS AND MOSLEMS

Strate gy

For the Fra nks, stra tegy largely involved defend ing their conq uests, by the building and hold ing o f

for tresses and, in t ime o f war, th e posi tioning of f ield armies where th ey co uld pro tect th e largest

amount of agr icultural land and th e mos t towns, for t resses and roads, their primary fu nction be ing to

interfe re with any Moslem att em pt to tak e a Frankish fort ress. But at the same time these armies were

usually only create d by draw ing from th e garr iso ns o f the local fort resses (usually near ly th eir tot al

strength - ju st 2 sick men were lef t in Faba when its

Templar

garri so n rod e to des tructio n at Cresson

in 1187), so th e defeat of a field army could mean th e almos t inevitab le loss of several cast les.

It was therefore preferable to de fea t the enemy by stra tegy ra ther than bail ie , as in Count Roger of

Ant ioch s ca mpaign of 1115, Baldwin IV s ca mpaign of 1 182, an d th e bailli Guy de Lusignan s Jezreel

campaign of 1183 ; Guy , now king, was a ttempting to pursue this same pol icy in 1187 b

ef

ore he

succumbed to the ill-advice of Ger ard de Rid

ef

or l and led his army to des tructio n at Ha

lt

in . ( Hatlin

is in fac t a classic example of th e dangers of drawing on for tress garri sons to make up a field

army

.

Most of the kingd

om

s castles and wa lled t

owns

had been denuded of th eir

de f

en ders fo r th e campaign,

and the destruct ion o f th e Frank ish army resulted in most of th e king

do m

fa lling into Moslem hands

with in th e next 2 m

on t

hs.)

36



Saracen str a tegy was

there

fore ob vious - 10 defea t the Fra n kish field a

rmy

, the n red uce the ir thinly

de

fended

cas tles and f

ort

ified to wns. T he disadv

antag

es, ho wever, wer e t hat b ringing

the

F ranks 10

battl

e a nd red ucing their fo r ls cou ld be l ime-consumi ng, and if Mosle m ar mies had o ne major short

co mi ng tr was t h eir inab ili ty t o remain in the field fo r pro lo nged periods. Th ey tended to dis perse o f

Ih eir o w n a cco rd if d isaffect ed as wa s o fte n the ca se ) o r u na bl e to ac hieve milita ry success, pa rticular ly

at t he o nse t o f wint er, the a pp roach o f cold , wet weather usually re su lt ing in t he dispersal o f Mosle m

ar mies. T he F ra nks, th eref or e, had to tr y a nd o utlast t he Mo slem s in t he field , th us forestalling a ny

cha nce o f military success an d by their ve ry p resen ce hast en ing t he d ispersal o f th e Mosle m

army

.

Ta

ct i

cs

Though t he t act ics of the Fra nks in a set-p iece b

attle

in O ut remer were similar to t ho se e mployed in

Europe a nd described in A rmies of F eud a l Europe , c hma xing in the delivery of t he knights decis ive

dose-order c harge, th e ir famous char ge t ha t co uld make a ho le t h rough the wa lls o f Ha hylon , such

tactics co uld only he emp lo yed successfu lly against an enemy w ho wo uld stand and t ak e its full imp ac t.

And a las, in t h is the majo rit y o f Mo slem ar mies o f this era , being largely o f T ur k ish c o m posit ion, did

not o blige. Neverthel ess

unde

r favo u rable ci rcums tan ces F ran kish kn igh ts co u ld ma noe u vre the ene my

into a sit uat ion in wh ich it was

impo

ssib le tp evad e t he cha rge as a t Ars

ou f

in I l l) I I, and o n

occ

as io n

eve n th e T ur ks mig h t

decide

o f t heir own a c

cord

to st and u p to it,

desp

it e t he fac t th a t man for ma n

t hey were no ma tch fo r th e F ran ks in d ose co mba t.

Usuall y , ho wever , t he

Tu

r ks preferred to ma ke t he best possible use o f t hei r principal

advantages

o ver

t he Fra nks - t h ei r a rchery and t he ir mo bilit y. Ho rse-a rchers, o f c o urse, were t he backbone o f all T ur kish

a rmies. in Syria just as mu ch as in Cen tral Asia. an d t he F ra n kish c h ronicles of t his e ra are full o f

refere nces to the effect s of t hei r llrche rY

t

heir sho wer s o f a rrow s wh ich fe ll J

S

t hou gh ra in was Ialfin g

f ro m t he sky.' When t he first ra nk had q u it e em p t ied th ei r q uivers a nd

sho

t all their arro ws, wri tes

Willia m of T yre o f till. Ba t t fe of Dor ylae u m 1097 ). the second , in whi c h t her e we re stil l mo re ho rsemen .

ca me on an d began to sho o t

mO

H densely t han

one

co uld belie ve. T he T ur k ish sq uad ro ns a t o nce fl u ng

the mselves up o n o ur a rmy, and loos cd such a q ua n ti ty o f arrows Iha t yo u wo uld have

though

t ha il

was fall ing from

t he air ; hard ly ha d t he firs t cloud o f the m fallen , de scri bing an ar c, th an it was

fo llo wed b y a second, no less de nse. Suc h a h igh ra te o f fire co uld he mai n tained , in fa ct, t hat Amb ro ise

repo rt ed o f King Ric hard s advance to Arso uf in II I I t hat t here was no t as mu ch as 4 feet o f groun d

t o be found t ha t was entirely Ircc o f spen t arr ow

s,

On e of th e Fra n kish deau a t Ager Sang uinu s in

1 1 19 had as many J S

4 0

arro ws in him, lh n al-Qalanisi reporting o f t he sam e ba tt le t ha t t he re wer e

'd e

ad ho rse s b rist ling like hedge hogs w ith

the

arr ow s st ic king o u t o f t he m, an d more t ha n a ce n tu ry

late r a t El Ma nsu rah J o inville t ho ugh t himself an d his hor se fo rtun a te t o have been wo unded by

arro ws only 5 an d 15 l imes res pectively.

At t he sam e tim e, howeve r, t he effect iveness o f Tur kish arc hery should no t ll o veresti mate d: duri ng

t he w hole 4

\ :z

mo n th siege o f T yre in I

II

1 th e Fr a nks lo st o nly 1 .0

00

men acc o rd ing 10 l bn al-Qalanisi,

despite the fact tha t he repo r ts the Mos le m garrison which was. ad mitt ed ly , far fr o m e xclusively

T ur kish in co mpo sition ) t o have disc harg ed

20.000

arro ws in o ne day s fighti ng alone A nd it s hould

also he bo rne in mind t hat T urkish a rro ws were relatively ligh t a nd co u ld stri ke - a nd perhaps penetra te

ar

rnnu

rv even sim ple q uilted arm o ur , with o ut ac t ually wound ing the wea rer: at Arsouf, fo r e xa mple,

F rank ish infa n t ry a re re

corde

d

Be ha cd- Din mar c hing along

uncon

cernedly w ith up to 10 arr o ws

st uck in th e ir

armo

ur, th ou gh

the

ca use fo r t his was of t e n tha t t he

arro

ws wer e to o ligh t and

sho

t a t

too gr

ea t

a ra nge several sou rces ref er to t he asto nishi ng range fro m wh ich T u rks so met imes o pened

fire and lat er test s rep

orted

hy Sir Ralp h Pay ne-Ge uwey reco rd T ur kish bo ws bein g able to fir e up 10

4 0 ya rd s - t ho ugh a t anything mu ch o ver 10 0 yar d s it s penetrative valu e was mu ch red uced ). T he

so urces im ply th a t a t closer r an ge th eir a rro ws became fa r more e ffective, A nna Co mnen a for instance

rec o rd i ng th a l th ey co uld pass d ea n th rough I n u narmou red ma n.

• To mainlain such

ithen njl: rates or fire il was obviously to ensure lhat sufficient ammunition Won

available, Each man carried at Ieasl one and often 2 013qu ivers, each capable or containing up 1060 arrowsf othcr

arrows could

he

carried in the

how

case, sluffed into

bou

ts 01 hell, and 5<1 on.

l i

tlle information i available

replenishingempty quivers on the ball lelidd . but al ll alt in Saladm 3ppalent had 70 camels b den

ith arrows,

as wellas 400 loadsof spare ammunitton for them.

J7



lnevitahly such arc hery was particular ly effective against unarm

ou r

ed horses. and th e Turks were well

aware o f th e im

porta

nt ro le o f ho rses in Fr ankish tacti cs (writing of Hattin , Abu Shamah obse rved

ho w

th e Frank ish knig ht s o lon g as his ho rse is safe and so und, cannot he felled but as soo n as

th e

horse is killed the knig ht is throw n down and captured ). Imad ad-Din reco rds the heavy toll th e Turkish

arrows too k o f the Pranks horse s that da y , hardly any of the thousands tha t were presen t being left

alive.

was for th is reason. jo prot ect the knights horses un t il the momen t of th e charge, that Frankish

infan t ry usually preceded the cavalry, defending the knight s like a watt as Beha puts it ; lmad

to o

USl S

a similar expression , de scr ibing Fra nkish infan try as a wall of arms . At Jaff a in 1191 Richard formed

up his infa ntry with spearrnen in th e first rank, shields to the fronl and spear-bu

tt s

braced agains t the

ground , wi th : crossbow-armed men behind eac h of th em (on e loading,

on e

firing ), a veri table wall o f

arms indeed. o ne wit h which o n that occasion th e

Turk

s re fused to

dose

. Louis IX s infa ntr y

em p loyed much the same forma tion whi lst holding the beac hhead at Dami

ella

in 1249 , hut in hot h

sit uations Ihe Franks wen: unden iably on the defensive. More usually they seem 10 have formed up in

line in rela tively d ose or de r probably several ranks deep , those armed with bows and crossbows

(const ituting a large percentage o f Frankish infan try) usually to the fore so

tha t

they co uld r

et u

rn

the fire

of

th e Turks, who soon learnt a hea lth y respect for th e crossbow in particular ; indeed , the

presence of crossbow-armed infan t ry in Fran kish armies may have been t he pr incipal reason why Turkish

ho rse-archer s often opened fire at such long range that th eir ar row s hall litt le rea l hope of penetr at ing

arm our.

William

of

Tyre, in his account of th e Bat tle of Mar; es-Safar in 1126, in fac t c redi t s Frankish infantr y,

presumably archers , with the same tactic as the Tu rk s in that they turned their

attentio

n to wounding

the horses of their adve rsaries and th us rendered t he riders easy victims to the Ch rist ians (Le . th e

knights) who were following: In the same accou nt he also gives a good descr ipt ion of th e rol e of

infant ry in close co mbat , relating how they ins tantly des patched wit h the swo rd any wou nded o r

fallen infidel who m they chanced to find and thu s prevented all possibility of esca pe. They lift ed up

those (o f th eir own cavalry) wh o had been thrown down and restored the m to the fray . They sen t

the wounded back to th e baggage train to receive care. (At th e same ba il i e we also have

on e

of th e few

refe ren ces to Tu rk ish infant ry in action , Fulcher of Chartres describing Damascen e inf

an t

ry tr ained

to spring up armed hehind the ho rsemen, who when the enem y dr ew nea r descended and fough t on

foo t ; fo r so th ey hoped to d isorder the Fra nks hy attacking them with infantry o n the o ne side and

cavalry on th e o ther. )

But in addi tion to th eir a rchery th Turk s had a seco nd major tactical advant age over th e Fr anks in th eir

mobi lity . which enable d them to evade the Frankish charge and successfu lly employ hit-and-ru n

skirmishing tactics. Bu t above all it enabled them to att ack th e Fran ks on the march, showering their

co lumns with arrows, suddenly closing an d as suddenly falling bac k, and harassing in every way th e

a rmy s advance . Attack ed thus the Fr anks had no real o ptio n but to press resol utely o n, relying on t heir

solid ity of arm y to deter the Turks, kee ping together so closely that if an ap p le had bee n th row n amongst

th em, it wou ld no t have fallen to the gr

ound

with

ou t l t

o uching a man or a hor

se.

The infantry

marched on

th e

outside of the co lumn o r o n the Ilank nearest to the enemy, those in th e rear (aga inst

which most a ttacks wer e d irected ) of te n having to march backwards in order to bea t o ff

th e

re peated

T urkish at tack s, the cavalry conforming their ow n pace to th at of th e infan tr y tha t the ranks might

not be broken and th e enemy given a chance to break in upon the formation . Often , in fact , the infantry

even carried

th e

ir own dead on camels and pack-horses as th ey ma rched , so as to conce

a lt

he number

o f casualt ies from the enemy.

As ment ioned the Turk s co ncentrated o n the rea rguard whe n atta ck ing a Frankish co lumn, in the hope

that it would lie slowed down sufficiently to cause a gap be tween it and the main body , which could

then he ex ploi ted (as happened at Mount Cadmos in 1148 and near ly happened at Halt in in 1187).

Heavy att acks were also oft en made on the vanguard in th e h

op e

that the whole co lumn might thu s be

hatr ed. Often they would also make short , co ntrolled charges in th e ho pe tha t, in th e wo rds of Abu

Shamah. jhe Franks wou ld he ca rr ied away b) blind fury and would attac k us and in this way would

give us the o pportunity to d ivide and break their mass. Con centrate d ar chery co uld likewise goad

Frankish knights into an impe

tuous

counteratt ac k, as it did at Arsou f in Il q I. The Franks , however,

learnt in turn to tr y and co ntro l the ir coun tera ttacks, the kn ights charging ou t onl y to dr ive the enemy

38



away to a safe d i

stan

ce if he came too clos e, b

ef

or e rallying an d faUing bac k to

the

main co lumn Lth

...

author of the It inera rium like ns th is to bea ting off a ny which, though yo u may drive it off, will re tur n

dir ect ly you cease your ef for ts ). 0

1

0 o f Deuil, a par ticipant in Lou is VII s c rusade , gives a good

de scri ption of the organ isation of a Fr an kish co lumn o n th e march which includes all these poi nt s:

Becau se the Turks were quick to flee o ur men were commanded to endure. un ti l

they

received an orde r,

th e a t tacks of t heir ene mies; and to wit hdraw for thwit h when recalled

• .

. When th ey had learned th is,

they were also taught the order of march so th a t a person in fro nt wou ld not ru sh to the rea r and th e

guards o n the Ilan ks would not fall into disorde r. Mo reover those whom nature o r fo r tu ne had made

foot-so ld iers

were dra wn up at th e rear in order to o ppose with their bows

the

ene my s

ar r

ows.

In fact severe penalties awaite d any man who broke ranks. Exa mples of

battl

es fo ugh t on th

mu ch

incl ude Il ab ( I I 19) , Mo unt C

adm

os ( 114

8)

, Il att in (1 18 7) and Arsouf

I

191).

Because of th eir military prowess th e co nti ngents of the Milita ry Orders usually held the dangerou s

stat ions of vanguard and rearguard o n the march , being the best disc iplined troops available to th e Fran ks;

Iacq ues de Vitr y relates how they fought no t rashly or disorderly but wisely and wit h all cau

no

n , be ing

th e first to a t tac k and the last to ret reat . They were no t a llowed to turn their backs and nee , nor to

re tr eat wit h

out

orders. One car tula ry o f the 13t h cent u ry ac tu ally sta tes that it was customary fo r the

Ord ers to ho ld th e vanguard an d rearguar d positio ns, and certain ly th e pract ice was common enough

for the Mamluk Sultan Haiha rs to march out o n on e occasion with ca ptured Hospitalle r and Templar

banners in th e van in orde r to foo l the Fr anks. Examples of the practice to be found in co ntemporary

sources include Templars holding the van a t Mou nt Cadmos a nd, with the Hospitallers, th e rear at

lIa t t in ; Hospitallers the fear and Templars th e van at Arsouf and in Galilee in 1204 ; and Ilospita llers

the van a t Carou bher in 1266 . This custom may also be imp lied in de Vit ry s wo rds about the bre thre n

be

ing the first to attack and the last to ret reat .

Th e other principal use to which the T urks put the ir mobility was in feigning fl ight , still a chara

cte

ristic

Turkish tactic. The feigned n ight co uld assume one o f 3 differ

en t

forms , e ithe r a steady re treat lasting

several days, desig ned to weary th e enemy an d dr aw him away fro m his bases; as bai t for a pre-arranged

ambush : or as deliberate provocation in the hope that the enemy wou ld throw cautio n to the wind and

charge in pursuit , thus disrupting his forma tion. Examples of th e feigned flight in pract ice includ ...

lIarr an 1104), Sennabra 1113), Harim (1 164 ), al-Babein J 167) and Gal a 1239 ). The Franks too

seem to have occasionally employed th is ruse, Tancred apparently feigning nigh t at Ar tah in I 105, while

W

i Ii

am o f Tyre describes in de tail how Baldwin

11

successfully employed th is tact ic agains t the Fat imids

at Ascalon in 1125 in conjunction wit h a concealed

amb

ush, de spatching a decoy

body

o f tight-

armed horsemen to lure the Moslems in to his trap.

These light-armed horsemen may have bee n

Tur

copoles, sometimes used in a light cavalry role by t he

Fra nks. At least, th ey seem to have o ften preceded the knights; at

Sar

min in I

S, for example, and at

Ager Sanguinus in 1119, we find them in advance of th e knight s, on the former occasion at leas t

fighting as horse-archers, b

UI

in bo th instances the y app ear to have been pushed o nto the knights beh ind

th em . Even th e Livre au Ro i seems to imply that they were c

usto

marily placed in fro nt o f th e knight s,

sta ting tha t the Const able s t roo p held th e firs t place in

batt

le af ter th e Tur copoles. Another occ asion

on which they are rec

orded

being em ployed as horse-arche rs in a skirmishing role takes place during the

Th ird Crusade, when King Richard se nt his archers forward in th e van wi th th e Turco po les and

crossbowme n, to sk irmi sh with the Turks and str ive to press them till he co u ld arrive. Undoubtedly

the re arc o ther unrecorded occasions too o n whic h th e Turco poles fought as horse-archers, bu t this

aspect sh

oul

d not be overemphasised ; the infreq uency with which it does occ ur in the sources tends to

suggest tha t th ey were no t par t icular ly effective in this role

th

ough he does not record how

they

fought , WiJliam of Tyre wri tes of the Tu rcopolc s at al-Babein in 1167 th at they were fo r the most

part , useless - probably as a result of Fran kish misuse rath er than mili ta ry incompetence ). is quite

proba ble th at instead they of ten fought alongside the Frankish knight s and sergeants. They are also

occ asio nally recor ded in a reco nnaissa nce role (as, fo r ex amp le, in th e Rule of the Order of t he Temple).

• In fact in reality kni

j:h

ts of the . ilitary Orders could be just as

ilful and headstrong as their secular counterparts,

if nol moreso:

.....

Itness, for example, the actions of the Templars at Marj Ayyun (1179), Cresscn (1187) and El

(1250), and of the ltospitaJlers at Arscur. But, it should be noted, in all but the last of these instances the)

ere foUo

.....

in/l lhe orders of theirGrand Masters,

.....

hile the Hospitallers at Anouf

.....

ere following the example of

their Marshal.

J9



Though so far only Turkish tac tics

have:

been de scribed , it should nol be assu med tha t all Moslem armies

fo ughl in the same way , h

cr

se-arcbers. skirmishing tactics and the fe igned flight . The Arabs o f

Faumi

d Egyp l employed none of these, though small numbers of all ied or mercenary Turkish ho rse

archers Vtry oc casio nally appear in thei r armies (as at Ramla in II OS). Instead th ey fo ught with sword.

mace and couched la nce ver y much like the Franks. Usamah (him Cl( a Syrian rather Ihan Egypt ian

Arabl descrihing in detail how the lance should be held to best ef fect in th e ch arge, held by the rider

as tightly as possible with his

hand

and under his arm, close 10 his side. and (h e] should let his horse

run an d d fect the required

thru

st : Their a r

chers

were infanlry ra the r than horsemen , su pp lied ma inly

by Suda nese ghulams; like the archers o f

the

Franks these usu ally preceded

the

cava

hy

in

batt

le.

Earlier sou rces record that th ey were expert marksmen .

Ibn Khaldun slales Ihal the Faurruds employed principal formations in bat t le , th ese be ing the Persian

la ct ic o f aJv ancing in line in organised divisions, and the Bedouln or Berber ta ct ic o f altackini l in sma ll,

d iso

rp

nised gro ups . and he observes t

ha t

rhe Persian

method

was

the

more sur e o f victory in be ing

welt-organised an d a s impregnab le as a co ntinuous stone wall o r a strongly

cons

t ruc ted f

ort

: As

already men tioned , archers formed the firs t rank, with spearme n in th e second and cavalry in th e th ird,

el

ue

units usuall) f

orm

ing th e cen

tr e

, where th e arm y s main standards flew ; th e density of th e

formation de pended on th e strength of th e ene my . S

ometim

es numerical superiority p

ermut

ed an out

flanking moveme

nt,

and Bedo ums are o ften encoun tered in

this

role .

For a set-piece bat tle the Ayy uhid s and

m

used

iI

very sim ilar formation, bUI usuall y with

out

the

inf

antr

y, Th ey drew up in

J

div isi

ons

, co nsisting of centre, left

and

rig

ht,

still with the elite

units and

standards in the cen t r e (usually th e al-H abqa and ror Royal \lamluks, with the amirs co ntingents on the

flank s). The in add ition placed

aux

iliaries o n th e

extr

eme wings, usually Bedouins o n

one

wing and Turcomans on the o ther, tn ba

ute

it was n

ot

unc

omm

on fo r one wing or bo th to give way.

victors and vanqu ished dashing from the fiel d in pur su it o r rou t an d leaving th e ce n tre to resolve th e

batt le (lhis occ urred at Acre in I 1IN and at 1I0ms in I for exa mple},

Skirmish

C

rs usually preced

l1

Ihe ma in

e )

o f ca valry.

either

Turcomans or th e hes t mark

smen

. Imad

dC

S4:Tl

h

inl -

how at Hat tin Saladin p icked o ut the adva nce guar d o f archers from each c

omp

any. while a t

Arso uf th e Frankish sou rces record Iighl cavalr y coming down at us in fu ll charge and hur ling da rts and

arrows as fast JS co uld whil e th e well-ordered phalanxes of the Turks with ensigns fixed on th eir

lances were d rawn up

beyon

d Ihem. Infantry si ill somet imes preceded

the

cava lry , bu t und er

the

m

th ey wer e ext remc ly

unc

ommon except in s ieges and the themselves rarely . if ever.

Iough t o n foo l. (As early as

1 1 1 ~

Ihe t

nn

era

nu

m re

co r

ds the following alleged deb

ate

be tween some of

SalaJi n s mamluks and Kurd ish soldiers: T he Kurds said. You mamluks will have to go on root to

sieze

the

king and his peopl e, while we keep wat ch o n horsebac k 10 cut off th eir nigh t towar d s Ihe

ca

mp.

BUI the mamluks answered . It is

rathe

r yo u r business to go o n foot. fo r we are noble r

than

you.

We arc co nte nt

w t

Ihat kind o f warfa re ..... hich rightl y be longs 10 U5. Th is foo t service is your co ncern. )

E BYZANTINES

When Emperor

, u e l

over the Imperial of fice , he became co ncerned as 10 how the Romans Le

th Byu nlines) mighl improve their armament for th e fut ure , It had previously bee n customary for

th em to be a

rml d with rou nd shields and fo r the most part 10 carry qu ivers and de cide ba ttles by

bows. Such are lhe words of the chronicle r Ctnnamus in the 12t h century. Indeed

the

bow had always

hcc n, a

ndev

en af h r Manud s reforms wou ld co ntinue to be, a principal rect or in Byzantine tac tics ,

bo th in the hands o f native tro

op

s and - mor e especially - in (he hands of thei r Asiat ic mercenari es.

Byz

ant

ine

app

r cia tion o f th e bow as a major weapon .l

Olle

d hack many cen tu ries, even as far back as

rh days o f the Roman Emp ire , and co nstant co nfl ict with armies comprised chiefly o f swa rms of light

horse-archer s over th e following cen turies had repe a tedly served to confirm its Impor tance in warfare .

Horse-a rche rs in particular there fo re played an imp ortanl role in Byzant ine tact ics now as earlier. and

t hrou ghou t the co urse o f the CrusaJ C era large co ntmgent s o f horse -archers appear in every Byzant ine

army that is recor ded, pr incipally supplied by auxiliaries o f T urkish extracuon (Uzes. Sel

juks

•

• p r i s i such Turkish ilu\ ilurirs were usuaUy t \ uemely relbble - lM Pechc: nep al Manziktrl. (or eum ple,

remainedloyal tven in

~ u

and e often enroenter ( uman, in Byzanline

SL rvK e

f i P 1 l aJainu barbarian

( uma n\. S

ndle

u 10 say, however,

dC wn

ion lare somelimes recorded.

0



Pec he negs, Bulgars, Hungarians, Cumuns, even Mongols, also Alans and Georgi:ms) but also , unul the

thir d

quart

er o f th e 12th ce ntury. incl uding nat ives.

Their ma in ro le o n the ba ttle ficld was as skirmishcrs, in which ca pacity we o fte n find Ihem utilising

Iheir t radit i

on

al Turkish tact ics o f harassme nt , feigned fligh t and ambush as de sc ribed o n page 38. And

like t he Turks, the Byzanti nes too soo n came to ap preciate the import ance of the horse in Fr

anki

sh

tactics, co ncen l rat ing their fi re on the knights' m

ou

nt s; the Alexiad o f Anna Com ncna rec ords how in

1083 Alex tus I ordered his tr

oo

ps {apparently cavalry , hUI possibly foo l-so ldiers ) ' to dr ive hard on the

heels o f ( the Fra nk s) . • , but nOI to figh t at

clo

se-quar ter s; they were to sh

oo

t grea l num bers o f a rrows

from a di stan ce and at the horses rathe r than the riders. Catc hing up with th e Kd ts (i .e

lh

e Fr an ks) ,

therefore, they rained down arrows on their mounts and thus co mpletely upset the ride rs.' Even in the

1

3th

century, a t Pelagonia, the Byzanti nes' Tu rk ish aux iliaries were ordered to s

hoo

t do wn the Frank ish

h

or

ses, a

co

ntempo ra ry record ing how they 'slaughtered thei r steeds and won the batt le'

Again st Turkish armies suc h tact ics inevit ably met wit h less success, the

Tur

ks in turn freque ntly

co ncent ra t ing th eir own fire on the horses o f th eir Byz

an t

ine adversa ries; Nicc

phor

os Breyen nius, in his

Commen tarii, d escrib es how at Manzike rt in 10 71 o ne of Alp Arslan' s commanders

o

rde red his men

10

surr ound the Byzan t ines

and

discha rge a ra in o f a rro ws agains t th em from all sides. The Byzan t ines,

see ing their horses struc k by arro ws, were forced to

pur

sue th e Turks .

bu t th ey suffered heavily

when they fe ll in lo ambu shes and Iraps.' And of an earlier

camp

aign All a liates reco rds how Pechc neg

hor se-archer s 'pa nic ked th e ho rses o f th eir adv ersaries by th e w

ou

nd s tha t they inflic ted and

fo rced th e Byzan t ines 10 flee ignominious

ly.

It

was in t he ho pe of red ucing th e effect s of suc h tactics

tha t Alc xius evolved a new format ion, whic h is u nsuccessfu lly desc ribed in th e Alexiad as having ' th e

ranks so orga nised that th e Turks wo uld have to s

hoo

t f rom th eir right a t the R

om

an lef t , wh ich was

pr

ot

ec ted by t he shie ld;

the

Romans, on th e

co

nt ra ry w

ou l

d s

hoo

t left -handed at the Turkish evposed

righ t ; perhaps a line angled away from the Tu rkish formation is i

nte

nded, bu t it is unfo r

tunately

impossible to be sure.

Another form ation adopted in th e face of a Tur kish arm y was

the

close-order

co

lumn alread y desc ribed

as used by th e Franks, and in fac t it was pro bably th e Emperor Alex ius who f irst taught the Fra nks

of th is tac tic, as ea rly as 1096 (a t least , Anna tells us tha t he told them 'h ow to draw up a ba ttle-line,

how 10 lay ambushes' and ' no t to pursue far when the enemy ra n away in flighl' ). The Atextad has

left us with a good descripti on of such a co lumn as em ployed in the Philomelio n

camp

aign of 1116,

de scribing how

the

Byzantincs 'ma rched in a d isciplined way, keeping in ste p 10 the sound of the

flut e In fact th e scrricd ranks

of

close-locked shields and ma rching men gave the imp ression o f

immovable mo unt ains; an d when th ey changed di rec tio n th e whole body moved like o ne huge beas t,

anima ted and direct ed by o ne single mind

The return jo urney was made slowly

and at

an ant' s

pace, so to speak, with the capt ives, women and childre n, an d all the

boo

ty in th e

cen

tre of the

column.

(11 is also interesting to no te th at the T ur ks' reac tio n to this fo rmat ion was Ihe same as if it had been a

Frankish co lumn, co ncent rati ng their a tt acks o n the reargua rd and vang uard and skirmishing along the

flan ks.]

However, the typ ical Byzant ine ba

ttle

array remained a series of successive lines, some times as many as

4 bu t m

ore

usually 2 or perhaps 3. Th e first line was frequent ly comp rised of the weaker or least reliable

co nt ingents, presumably in the ho pe th at th ey w

ould

successfully disorgan ise the

ene

my whi le at the

same

time

absorbing the impact o f his initia l charge (partic ularly important when fighting Frank s,

whose first charge was recognised by th e Byzanti ncs as po tent ially 'i rresistible' ). T he second line had

the

task of reinforcing the firs t if necessary and of fru st ra ting enemy att emp ts a t outflanking, t hereby

pro tec t ing the first line's rear . Skirrnishcrs

Le

ho rse-archers usually preceded the a rm y and /or were

pos

itioned o n the flank s (de tachments some times being concealed far o ut o n o ne or e th e r fla nk, as

at Kalau ra in 1078 ), but they ca n also be fou nd fo rm ing the seco nd, th ird or even the four th line ; at

Durazzo in 108 1, fo r instan ce. we f ind the v ardarlo ts ta regiment

of

Turksl forming the second line,

be hind th e Varangians, th e commande r o f the latt er being inst ructed ' to o pen his ranks q uic kly fo r

th em ( by moving to

left

and right) whenever they wan ted to charge out againsl th e Keus: an d to clos e

ran ks again and ma rch in close

ord

e r whe n they had with drawn .' Skirmishe-s ope ratin g in advance

of

the

main arm y generally wit hdr ew thu s when thr eatened

th

ough usually th ey took refuge beh ind lance-armed

cavalry

rath

er th an infantry; al ternatively they sometimes scatt ered to lef t and right in tb e fa ce of an

enemy charge , e nci rcling his fla nks in the process. The lancers themselves advanced in close o rder,

4 1



appa ren fly charging wit h the lance couched ( th ough it was see mingly on ly un de r the

Em p

er o r Nan uet

th at Byzanti ne cavalry fir st 'excelled the meu te of Fren chmen

an d

Italians' in this fo rm o f co mbat -

not

that this

s

topped

a

13th

ce nt ury Fr

an k

describing a single Fr

anki

sh kn ig

hl

as wor th

Byzant ines ).

O th

er w

ise fo rma

ti o

ns and tact ics appear to have d iffered litt le fro m those described in

A rm

ies o f

the (l ar k Ages' . l he role

of

th e infa

ntry

having c

ha n

ged

on

ly in

beco

ming per

haps

even

more

seco

nda ry.

THE MO

l

GOLS

T he tactics o f

th e

Mo ngols or

T

ar t

a rs' as mediaeval Fr ankish

authors

ca lled

th e

m)

wen

sim ila r

to

those

o f the l urLs, havi ng Ihe ir

orig

in in

th e same steppe

tr adit ions. Like

th e

Turks th ey relied

primarily

o n

Ihe ir m

ohiht)

·

and th e

use o f

th e bo w

,

many

so urces tesl ifying 10

their

sk ill in a

rchery

- Frede

nck 11

des..ri bed th em ;u 'mcomparable

archers

' , whi le Marco Polo 5.1ys Iha l th ey wer e '

th e

best

th a

t ar e kn

ow n

10

th e

world.

,h with

Ihe Turks, their m

obility de m

on

strated

itself bes t in the feigned flight . 'Whe n they

a re p ursu ed

a nd t ak e

to night say s Polo , ' they fight as well

an d

as effectively.u when

they

are face 10

face

wi th the

en

emy

, When

they

are fleeing at top

speed

,

they

tw i

st ro und

w it h t he ir b ow s

and sh

oo t

their

.

UTO

W so

ef f

ectiv<ly

t ha t th ey

kill the enemy' s ho rses

an d

their

riders to o

, (

And)

When

t he e ne my

th

inks

th at he

has routed ..nd

cr u

shed

them ,

th

en he is los l ,

f

o r) as so on as the T

ar t

a rs de

cide

t ha t t he y

have killed

en

ough

of

th e pu

r

suing horses and

ho

rsemen th

ey

wheel round an d

a t ta ck .' The Armenian histor ian

Hair ho n,

wh o

wr

ot e

c ,

13 0

7, likewise cautions tha t

i t

is v

er y dangerous

to

give chase. fo r as they flee

they

sh oo t

back

over their

h ea ds a nd

do much executio n u

po n their pursuer

l. The fligh t WOlS

also

used

as bait for an ambush .

T ht )·

drew

up o n

the hattlefield

wi

th units o f

100

t.e. Ja

gu ns )

separat d

from each o t her by i

nt e

rvals .

Each

Unit drew up in S r

an k

s in d ose o rder, Ha

ithon

reco rd ing how

they

kept

very close

ran ks. so that

yo u wou ld

no t take them

for half

their

real

numbers

: In theory the

front

1 ranks wo re ar

mour

(a nd

wer e pr('sumably m

ou n te d on ar m ou

red ho rses

when

ava ilable ) wh ile the laner 3

wore

no armour.

Th e

ligh l cava lr)- of

th e

rear 3 ran ks ad vanced th r

ough th e inte

rvals o ne ra nk at a

time

and po

ured

a hail of

a

IT

OWS

an d

javelins in to the en

my

while at

th e

same t ime ei ther

on e

or

bo th

Mongol

flan

ks

would

commence

an env

el o

ping

manoeu

vre. If the light cava

lr y

wer e repu lsed then

th e

y would fa ll back

tfiringallthe

while}

an d th e f

ourth

ra nk ,

then th e

fiflh,

would

co me fo rwa rd in turn

an d

carry

on where

the o thers

ha d

le ft off ; bUI if

th

ey wer e successful in disorganising th e

...

nemy

then

t hey w

ould

wuhd

raw th rough th e in tervals and m e heavy cavalr)'

of

th

e first 2 ranks would lead a fr

ont

al a -1ult

B)'

t tu n

e , wh

et h

er the sk irmishing tacti cs had

been

suc

cessf

ul or no

tv

th e en

velop

ment of

th

e enemy

flanks was u\;uall)' comp lete too . and a feigned fligh t migh t be used to d raw an incautious en emy

de e

p...r wi

thin

t he

en c

ircli ng wings tCarpini pro ba bly ha d

th i

s in mind when he wrote

that

t he ligh t

cavalry fi red only 3 or 4 rou nds, an d th en feigned fl ight if

their

ar ch ery was ineffective. Polo. however .

spea ks o f

th e

ar

ch e

rs e

mp t

)'ing t hei r

qu i

vers). Vic to ry was alw

ay s

foll owed up by a tireless pursui t.

The ...nvelopment movement was

often

co ncea led fr om th e enem y by hills, du s

tcloud

s, da rkness, e tc.

Ca rpini reco rds t

ha l

t h enveloping tro ops

us u

ally comprised th e Mongols them selves, auxiliary t ro

op

s

gene rally Io rming a sc r n in advance of Ihe ce

nt r

... of their ma in line o f ba ttle . Mall hew Paris simi larly

rec

or

ds

th e

au ,

i1ia

ti

...

s' ro le in b

attl

e, r

elatin

g how the Mongols co mpelled them, ' reduced to the lowest

co

ndition o f slav

l

rY. lo figh t in the fore most ranks again s their own ne ig

hbours. Howeve r.T he

more

reliable of th

...

m

pr

inci pally the Geo rgians and Cilician Arm

...

nians] are o ft en to

be

fo und fo rm ing

on e

o r

bo th fla nks of t he main

bo dy

alo ngside th e Mongo ls, As well as th e scree n o f a

ux i

liaries the ma in b

ody

was also preceded by Mo ngol skir mishe rs. ca lled m e Mangudai or 'God -be loning' (w hich s

ay s

so me thing

for thei r ch

an c

es of surviva l ).

Very

O :C as

ionally so me Mo ngo ls

might

be fou nd fi

ghti

ng on foot . usually if

thei

r horses we re in poor

co ndi

ti o

n or if they felt tha t circ umsr

an c

...s or the na

tu r

e of the around were un suitable for mo

un t

ed

comba t . At Wadi al-Khaaindar [Salamiye t} in 1299 so me 10,

00 0

Mo nguls s

to o

d behind

their

horses

an d

• The c;arnailew,ouJt 'hen 2 \Io

rijli

ol armies fought

ilh each o ther u, inil these tae, in can be imagtned. · S OIa.

you can 'I(' (' an.... .-, nymF like peltinFrain, for the sky •

...

as fuUof them,'

riles Polo, 'and you could IC e hor ICmen

and hor

SCI

tumblinFdead upon the Jl

Ollnd

:



poured volle ys of arr ows into the charging Mamlu ks, so tha t whe n those who had remained moun ted

counte r-charged th e Mamluk line o f bat tle was in co nsiderab le diso rde r. lIait hon slates t hat t he Mongols

were slow when on fool .

In add ition to their standard Asiat ic ta

ct i

cs

the

Mongols also had a formidable ar senal of asso rt ed tric ks

and de ceptions which could best be classif ied as psychological war fare. These incl uded tying branches

to th e tails of their horses an d raising grea t clouds o f dust in their wake 1 decei ve the enemy into

Ihinking th at Mongol reinforcemen ts were arri ving, an d even m

ou

nting their wom en - in addit ion 1

stuffed dumm ies - o n spa re horses 1 give the impression of a huge reserve force, as Ihey di d in Khwarizmia

in 122 1 ( the Mongols customarily

maintaining a

rese rve whenever possible). Anothe r such st ratagem was

1 put sto ries around which deli bera tely infla ted th e actual Sill o f th eir a rmy ; fo r example Mongke Khan,

invad ing part o f the Sung Emp ire in 1258 , spread

rum

ours tha t he led an army o f 100,000 men, when in

ract

he had o nly 40 ,000 . Leaving moun tain s o f skulls heaped here and

the re

in th e course

of

th eir

co nquests, as a warning to others, also falls into th e psychological warfare catego ry

Frank

s against Mongols

Th

is is based on the advice of a shrewd o bserver, Fr iar J

ohn

de PIan o Carpin i, to the rulers of the West ,

co ntained in a repo r t wrilten aft er a long sojourn amongst th e Mongols in the m id-13th cen tury

To start with he stresses th e importance

of

good

qual ity

arm s and equ ipm

en t

, pa r

ticu

larly recommending

good sl rong bows and cross bows, which he says the Mongols

part icularly

fea r, Ihe arrows for these to be

manufact ured Mongo l-fashio n so that t hey are sharp enough to pie rce their stronges t armou r. Il l a lso

especia lly recommends long-handled axes, plus lances with a ho

ok

below t hc head for dragging the

Mongols from their saddles, fo r the y fall o ff very eas ily bUI he cautio ns against ignor ing dismounted

Mongols since th ey shoot as acc ura tely and rapidly o n foot as

on

horseback (wit ness Vochan in 1272

and Salamiyet in 12( 9).

Armour should co nsist of double-mail, which arr ows from Mongol bows co uld not casi ly pierce , plus a

helmet an d an y o ther available armour. Where possible hor ses to o should be pro tec ted against the Mongol

arro ws. Una rmoured o r less-heavily equipped men are adv ised

1

fo llow the Mongo l practice o f fo rming

th e hind ran ks and should shoot overhead. But

nowhere

is Piano Car pin i s respect of Mongo l military

sk ill more

appa

rent than in his recomm

end

ation s for organisation , what fo llows

being

no more th an

imi tat ion w t uni ls of 1 000 , 100 and 10 o rgan ised in th e same mann er as the Tar tar army.

The battlefield needed to be carefully chose n, pre ferably a level plain whe re eve rything was clear ly

visible on all sides; if a site co uld be fo und whe re flanks or rea r co uld be protec ted by a forest or s imila r

all the bet te r, The ta ctics the n given are again emu la tion of the Mongols. li e adv ises tha t the army should

draw up in several lines, positioned not too far apar t, on ly th e firs t of which should be sent for ward

to

meet

the ap proaching Mongo ls. the Mongols feigned night th ey were on ly 10 be pursued with

cautio n since an ambush would und

oub

t

edly

have been prepared he forehand. An

oth

er reason fo r

cautio n was the need to avoid ti r ing th e horses, since Frank ish arm ies did not main ta in th e large

numbers of remounts available to the Mongols. The seco nd line shou ld meanw hile stand by to help the

first if needed .

Following advice on co nstant vigilance ,

mainte

nance o f the army over a p rolonged period, a nd the

advantages o f a scorched ear th p olicy (since Mongol arm ies ex isted by foraging),

Car

pini s last

recommenda tio n is tha t th e infid elity of th e Mongo ls au xilia ry a llies

sho

uld be exploited, since if

the

opp

ortun ity should arise and they could co unt o n our men no t to kill them , they would figh t

against the Tartars . and wou ld do them greater harm even th an would those who are the ir enemie s.

MA

JOR

BATILES OF THE PERIOD

MANZIKERT 1071

Taking advan tage o f a Seijuk attack against Fat rrnid-held Damascus and Egyp t , th e Byzan tine Emp

ero

r

Rornanus IV prepa red an o ffe nsive against recen tly lost Byzan tine territories in th eir rear. He assernbled a

huge bu t ill-t rained an d ill-discipli ned a

rmy

of 200-600,000 men inclu ding most of the Western and all of

the Eastern Themata , Varangian Guards and the Tagmata, as well as Russians, Uzcs. Khazars, Alans,

4 3



Cumans. I·cchcncgs, Bufgars. Crirnea n Goth s, Armenians and Franks (mainly No

rman

s and

Germans}.Of the total, however , the largest percent age were englnccrs, servants and attendan ts for the

vast

Alp Arslan , the SdJuk Sultan, learning

of

the Byzant ine advan ce into Armen ia as he was encamped

heron. Aleppa , orde red an immedia te with drawa l from Syria . On reaching Mosul he received news from

Scljuk refugees that a de tac hmen t of Romanus army, a large force of Franki sh and Tu rkish mercenaries

under Rou ssel de Bailleul, was lay ing waste the region

round

Manzikert and Akh lat , and he now set o ut

northwards to interce pt them, sendi ng So

undaq

th e

Tur

k ahead with a fo rce

of abo

u t 5,000 cavalry

to reinforce Akhlat. Alp Arslan himself was at firs t accompanied by o nly his 4

,000

perso nal marnluks

since his sca ttered arm y had no t reasscrnbtcd, bu t he issued o rders fo r tr

oops

10 joi n him on the march

and in additio n hired some 10,000 local Kurdish tribesmen.

Romanus. hy now fore

arned of the Sult

an

s ap

pro

ach, despat ched 20 ,000 Cuman or Russian heavy

cavalry und er Josc ph Turchunio tes to assist Rou ssel s Franks and Turks

app

roaching Akhlat, while the

rest of the army took Manziker t, Soo n after, o n August 16 , Soundaq arrived o n the scene and a fierce

ski rmish ensued between the Sefjuks and 2 bodies o f Byzant ine troops und er Nlccphoros Bry

cnn

ius

and Basila kes: weigh t of

numb

ers eventually forced the Sel

juk

s back but

the

Byzantmcs, incau tiou sly

pursuing them, suffered heavy losses when they rallied, Basilakes being captured and Bryennius

w

ounded

. At abou t the same time Ro ussel and Tarchanio tes, also having suf fered heavy losses, and

receiving news that Alp Arslan himself was now close by, wit hd rew to Mehtene.

On hearing of the de feat o f his foremost units Rom anus marshalled the main army and marched out

for bat tle, bu t by th is t ime the Sejjuks had melted away and were nowhere to be seen. The arm y

therefore returned to camp and an an xious night was spent unde r the watchful eyes o f th e Seliuk s. who

had se t up their own camp 3 milt s away,

Romanus must have been aware by now that Alp Arslan himself had arrived with the main Selju k army ,

ut he was probab ly equally aware tha t this army was numerica lly inferior to his own - th e lowest

to ta l gsven in the is 12,000 ; lbn al-Athir says 15,000, UI the higher figures o f 30-40,000 seem

more probable. However, Romanus own army was not as large as it had been at the outset o f the

campaign, and probably now num bered o nly abou t I00 ,000 men of whom many were

non -om batants.

J exI mo rning Alp Arslan made an offer of peace, which was co ntemptuously rejected - since

wou ld

be financially

impo

ssible for the Empire to raise a similar army again for some time to come Romanus

had little choice hut to force a decisive sol u tion t here and then . In addi t ion it was likely

that

Alp

Arstan s proposa l was onl y in ten ded as a delay ing tactic while more t roops co uld be gathered. Therefore,

ignoring

the

advice o f his ncrats, Romanus decided 10 commit the army to bail ie on August 19.

On the day of bat t te the Byzanunes formed up in their customary 2 lines, with Tugmara in the cen tre

and Them atic t roops and Turkish auxiliaries on bo t h flank s of the first line, The reserve line, comprised

of Archontes. the Hetacna and Ge rman and

Norman

mercenaries, was put under the command of a

cert a in Andr oniko s Ducas, a nephew o f the previous Emperor and therefor e no friend o f Roma nus: thi s

factor was go ing to prove decisive. Rcussel and Tarchaniotes. meanwhile, had no t re turned.

The Byzantine advance across the pla in o f Manztkcn towar ds Alp Arslan s

camp

met with litt le

resi

stan

ce except fo r skirmishes on the ext reme flanks, which lacked an) kind o f security in the o pen.

The hul k o f the Sdju k arm) , however, stead ily withd rew before them , drawing them on un tilla te in the

da r they reached the Su lta n s camp-site , on ly to find it abandoned. Romanus, possibly fearin g an

am bush, therefor e resolved to re tur n to his own u

ndef

ended camp and gave the order to retire, tu rning

the Imperial standard to wards the rear.

The

order, however , was misunderstood and gaps

appe

ared

between ce

ntre

and flank s as un its turned thi s way and that in c

onfu

sion . Simu ltaneou sly , Andronikos

Ducas treacherously pu t a

bout

a rumour that Roma nus had bee n kill ed and, as chaos reigned in the

Byzantine ranks, Alp Arslan charged do wn on them with 10 ,000 fres h Seljuk cavalry,

A rout ensued, the Byzunfines believing

the

mselves be t rayed by eithe r their Armenian or Turkish

auxiliaries thou gh the latt er in fact rema ined lo yal to the end). The Byzantine right and lef t wings



were swe pt away , while And ronikos, who migh t have st

saved

the

day , ca lmly ma rc hed fro m the field

with

the

desperately needed reserve line. On ly

the

ce nt re unde r Rom a nus s

too

d and foug ht o n, unt il

the Empero r wa s recognised a mid st his Vara ngian Guard s a nd cap tured by a Se l

juk

ma mluk. Af ter

suffering a ppa lling losses th e remainder of t he army t hen bro ke, pursu it of its sca tt ered units

co ntin uing th ro ugh th e ni

ght

Th e subsequent Se lj uk co nq uest o f t he Anatolian hear tland o f t he Empire had two imp

or tan t

result s:

it led ultima tel y to the found

ation

of a new Seljuk state , aptly ca lled t he Sultana te o f Rum - litera lly

t he Sulta nate o f Ro man Lands; and , even more impo rt an tly , it was respo nsib le fo r t he Cru sade mo vemen t,

fo r in Weste rn Eu ropean eyes the Byzantin es had , in Sir Stev en Runcim a n s wo rds, forfe it e d o n t he

ba ttlefield the ir tit le as protectors of Chri stendom . Man zikert j ustifi ed the interventio n o f th e West.

L UR 1078

In co m mand of an Imperial army , th e fu

ture

Byzantine Emperor Alexiu s I Comne nu s faced t he rebel

Dux o f Dyrrac hium, Niceph

oro

s Bryen nius, at Ka la u ra in T hrace.

Whe n Bryenn ius dr ew up his army he plac e d a de tachme nt o f Pecheneg light cavalry ab

ou t

a

qua

rter

of a mile awa y o n his le ft fla nk with o rders t o a

ttac

k Alexius forces in

the

rea r and gene rally harrass

th em while the

main a rmy advanced sh ie ld to shie ld. Alexius likewise t hrew

ou t

a de tached flank unit,

concealing it in ravines on his le ft with o rders to fall on the rebel rear as

soo

n as Bryenniu s had

adva nced pa st

th ei r po sitio n. Th e bulk o f his ar my , which was inferior to t ha t

of

Brye nniu s, co nsisted

o f t he newly-raise d Immor t als a nd Chom at

cno

i and a few Frankish and Seljuk mercena ries.

His attack on th e re bel rear a nd righ t flank met with on ly initial success and was soo n repulsed , while

in th e cen tre the Frankish mercenarie s dese rt ed to Bryennius a nd the Immortals bega n to give way .

Almost sim ultaneously the Seljuks and Choma teno i on Alexius righ t flank were rou t ed by the Pec he neg

detachment. Fortuna t ely, however, Ale xius himse lf ma naged to capture Bry ennius spare ho rse,

ma naging t o ra lly ma ny o f his tro op s by spreading a rumo ur t h at Bryennius himself had bee n taken.

Even

so,

the bat t le was still very much in Bryenni us favour - despite th e fact that the Peche negs,

having sa tisfied t hem selves with loot in part a t least from Bryennius o wn cam p, had no w lost interest

in th e fight ing and were headi ng for h

ome

.

At this poin t Alexius was joined by a fresh body of Seljuk rein fo rc

eme

nts, and wit h a detachm ent of

t hese an d a ra llied po rti o n o f his o wn arm y he co unt er-attack

ed,

t he n feigned fligh t a nd drew

the

overconfide nt re bels bac k t o where two o t her bodies o f Seljuks had bee n placed in a mbu sh. Disorganised

in pursu it and a tta ck ed fro m bo th sides the re bel ar my was routed , Bryen nius himse lf being captured

by the Selju ks.

D

UR ZZO

1081

A Byza ntine army of 70 000 men und er t he Em pero r Alex ius I

att

e mp ted 10 relieve t he co asta l city of

Oyrra chium Our

azzo , un der siege by a n l talo -No rman army of 15 18 000 men , includ ing Italians,

Saracens, Greeks and Balka n Slavs, unde r Rober t Guiscard an d his so n Bohemo nd of Taran to. Th e

Byzant

ine force incl ude d household troo ps, som e

Franki

sh me rcenaries, T hessalia n cavalry , Serbs

und er King Co nsta ntine Bodin, Macedon ian Slavs, Vardari ot s and Vara ngians. Alexius di vided his army

in tw o, half t o stan d before th e No rm an

c

amp

and half 10 tak e a rout e th ro ugh

the

co astal marshes

and attack th em from th e rear.

Th e No rmans, seeing o nly t he half to t heir fron t , abandoned Ihe ir ca m p a nd formed u p fo r battle, thei r

right flank pro tec ted by

the

sea and th eir left by high gro und . Atextus then arra nge d his forces in 3 lines,

with the Varangia n Gu ard a nd o the r Varang ian unit s som e of the m Engl ish) f

orm

in g the vanguard, t he

Vardario t ho rse-arc he rs be hind th em , and t hen t he main bod y under Alexiu s.

T he first No rma n a

ttack

was launched by Italian cavalry unde r

Amaury

of Bad . T hese were re pu lsed by

the Varangia ns, wh o in their e nthusiasm t he n marc hed to o far from the main bo d y and wer e cut o ff by

Bo he mo nd s left wing wh eeling against them. His crossbo wme n a nd knig ht s, the l at te r

800

strong, all

but wiped t he m ou t , man y of the survivors being burnt in the small churc h of St Michael wh ere t hey had

taken refuge.

45



The mai n Norm an b

ody

th en charged and smashed the Byzantin e line. In the cen tre the Vardario ts

broke and fled and the Serbs deser ted without jo ining battle. The remainder of the Byzantines were

then pu t to flight and

the

ir camp cap tured. Wounded and alone, Alexius only just escaped the close

Norman pu rsuit. A sortie from the cit y was also repulsed.

As f w as 30 of the 1.300 Norman knights were killed , though Amau ry s Italian division suffered

co nsidera ble losses. The Byzant ines lost 5-6.000 , most ly vara ngians. Dyrrachium surre ndered to Robert

4 months later , in February 1082 , aft er a 3-day st ree t fight following the adm ission o f the Nor mans into

the city by a Venetian t raitor.

LEVUNIUM 1091

A combined fo rce of Byzan tines under Alexius I and 40,000 Cumans under Tugor khan and Bonyak

faced a superior Pecheneg army .

Despite distrust be tween the allies, the Pechencgs were routed by th e Cuman and Byza ntine cavalry

and forced back agains t their own wagon laager which effec tively blocked their line o f ret reat . Unable

to escape, many were massacred toge th er with their wom en and children wit hin the laager. Large

numbers of prisoners were ta ken, but these were slaughte red almost to a man during the night by

the ir Byzant ine guards through fear th at ei the r they might break loose or that the Cuman s might

release t hem. The Cumans, likewise distru sting the Byzantin es, took to

the

ir heel s under cover o f

darkncss.

DORYLAEUM 1097

After the ca pture o f Nicaea durin g the First Crusade the Franks divided their forces into 2 columns,

the firs t o f which was att acked soo n aft er by a supe rior Seljuk force allegedly 150-350,000 strong under

Sultan Kith Arslan includ ing Caooadoc lan and Danishmanid conti ngents under their em irs.

The Frankish co mmander, Prince Bohemond o f Taranto, at first

orde

red his knight s to di smo un t and

assist the foo t-soldiers and non-combatants in pitching camp, bu t before the task was completed it

proved necessary for the knigh ts to remou nt and ride out against the Turk s, leaving the infan try to

comp lete the prepara tion of the camp-site. However , the arche ry and mobility of the Turks, atta cking

from all sides,

soo

n force d the Frankish cavalry to fall bac k ben

eath

a hail of arrows. u nti l knigh ts.

cam p, foot -soldiers and pilgrims became one confused, tangled mass in which some knights were killed

by the spears of th eir own infa ntry . But in fact

cro

wding together thus actually saved them , for in such

a tight ly packed fo rmation the Seljuk s found it impossible to destro y them and co uld o nly att ack

ind

cislvcly.

Eventually, af ter abou t 3 hou rs o f fight ing, as Bohemond was beginning to despair o f his situation, the

seco nd crusader col umn unde r Cou nt Raymond de Saint-Gilles began to arrive on the field, surprising

Kihj Au lan who had been under the imp ression that he had surro unded the en tire Frankish army. As

the Seljuks hesitated and faltered in the ir a tta ck a further detach ment fro m the relief division, under

the Papal Legate Adhemar le Puy, appeared in their rear, and at this they panicked and fled , abandoning

their own cam p to the Franks.

The crusaders had suffered abou t 4 ,000 casualties. and the Turks allegedly as many as

30

000 The

losses of the f

orm

er wen somewhat highe r in horses tha n in men, mo st of whom were amongst the foo t

so ldiers and non-comba tants.

ANTlOCH 1098

The crusaders under Prince Bohemond , having just ca ptured Antioch but being numerically unable to

defe nd the walls, decide d to marc h o ut into the o pen to face 12-28,000 or according to som e sources

150-400.000 ) Seljuks and Ara bs, including 28 senior Turkish ami rs. unde r Kerbogha o f Mosul, who had

arr ived

too

late 10 relieve the Selju k garrison 10,

000

of whom had bee n massacred by the crusaders

after

the

fall o f the ci

ty

.

The Franks left the city by a single gate in a co lum n of 4 divisions, each of infantry and cava lry the

lat ter pe rhaps tot alling only 1,050 men I, the fou rt h co mprised mostly of dismoun te d knigh ts acting as

a reserve under Bohernond himsel f; ot her sources record the Franks to have been organised in to be tween

6 and 13 divisions. Their plan was to secu re their lef t flank on high ground abou t 2 miles fro m the city

46



wa lls before ad vanci ng a gainst the T urks, who were masse d o n t heir right fla nk. Ker bogha, watching

them

depl

oy , see ms to have de liber a tely allowed the ir whole army to eme rge fro m Ant ioch rat her than

laun ch a pre ma tu re a

ttac k, presumably to e nsure t ha t his victory over t he m wo uld be as co mp lete as

possible. How ever, he did des

pat

ch one body o f 1,500 or 15,000

Tur

ks to c ut ac ross the hea d of th e

Frank ish co lumn and get be hind t heir line o f batt le bef or e t he lead ing di visio n succe eded in secu ring

t he a r my s flan k; th ese did co nside ra ble da mage before, see ing t he withdrawal o f the main Seljuk ar my

in t he face o f an attack in eche lon by t he Frankish divisions, a nd suffering a t t he hand s of a det a ch men t

from th e F rankish reserve, t hey bro ke a nd fled .

A shar p melee fo llo wed t he adva nce of th e Frankish d ivisio ns, with heavy losse s being sust a ine d by bo t h

sides, unt il the T urks, suffe ri ng as t he y wer e fro m disse nsio n a mo ngst th eir co mman de rs who rese nt ed

Ker bogha ), d isillusio ned by t he dese rt io n of a la rge co ntingent of T urc oman au xiliaries, a nd find ing

th em selves un a ble to o u t flank their adversa ries, bega n a re treat wh ich s teadily de teriora ted into a ro ut.

T he Franki sh pur suit wa s o nly slight ly hindered whe n the Se ljuks fired th e dr y grass to co ver t heir

with dra wal, t he crusad er horse s a ppa rent ly sta mping out t he flames as th ey adva nced. Th ey pursue d

th e rou ted T urks as far as t he Iro n Bridge acro ss t he River O ro n t es . slayi ng grea t numbers o f

them

a nd

in ad dit io n ma ny more T urks were later killed

of f

by loc al Arme nia ns a nd Syrian Christi a ns. Kerbogha

himself esca ped t o Mosul, his po wer and repu t at ion rui ne d.

A so rt ie by t he re mnants of t he Selju k garriso n of Antioc h, still hol ed u p in t he cit ad el, wa s co ntai ned

by an infantr y holding forc e of 20 0 me n un de r Count Ray mo nd de Saint- GiIles. Seeing th e defe a t of

Ker bogha, the co m ma nder of the garriso n surre nder ed t he cit ade l to Bohemond a fter t he ba ttle.

ASCALON 1099

A Fa timid co unteratt ac k by 20 , infan try and cava lry un der t he vizier al-A fdal, incl udi ng Syrian

T ur kish auxiliaries, was defea te d by I ,20 ).S,000 Fran kish cavalry a nd 9· 15, 000 infant ry

und

er

God frey de Bo uillo n. T he Fr an ks 9 divisions appear to have bee n fo rmed up in line, with Raymon d de

Sai nt-Gilles o n th e right flank , Ro bc r of Fla nders, Ro ber t of Nor ma nd y a nd Tancred in th e cent re a nd

God fre y o n th e left ; t heir infa ntry a rchers were sta t ioned in t he fro nt rank wher e t hey e ngaged the

Fat imids cont ingent o f 3,0 00 Sud an es e arc hers.

The

ba tt le was of ver y brief dura tio n,

the

Egyp t ia ns having bee n cau ght com plet ely unprepa red. An

att empt by Bedouin cava lry to enc ircle t he Franks left fla nk was bea te n bac k an d t he Franks

launc hed thei r charge int o the bulk of t he Egyp t ian army, closi ng wit h t hem so fast tha t t he Sud anese

arche rs succeeded in gett ing off o nly one volle y before bei ng d rive n back o nto t he ir cavalr y, who

fled a lmost immediate ly.

A fai r num ber of Egyptians ma nage d to reach t he safet y of Ascalon, o t hers run ning int o t he sea a nd

swimming

ou t

to t heir flee t mo ore d offshore. In fact th e reg ular cava lry esca ped virtu ally in tact ,

tho ugh th e infa ntry a nd th e mili ti a levies a nd o ther irregulars lost some 10,0 00 men killed,

dro

wne d or

crushed in the ro ut.

T he Franks captu red the Fa timid c am p, including the sta nd ard and perso nal te nt o f al-Af-tal, T he y

ga t hered all t he

boo

ty t he y co uld man age and bu rn t what t hey co uld no t carry.

FIR

ST BATTLE OF RAMLA 110 1

A Fati mid ar my of allegedly 11,000 cava lry and 2 1 infan try under Sa ad ad-Daulah , ma rching on

J eru salem from Ascalon, was intercepted at Raml a by a F rankish fo rce o f 260 knigh ts and 90 0 infan try

under King Baldwi n . The Fra nks d rew up in 5 o r 6 divisio ns, possibl y in ech elo n, wit h Baldw in

co mma nding a reserve. T he Fatimid line out fla nked th e m o n bo t h wings.

T he e nsui ng batt le was a co nfused affa ir. T he first 2 Fra nkish cavalry divisions to ma ke co ntac t against

the Fat im id left ) were re pulsed and alm ost a nnihilated by the Mosle ms, but Baldw tn s reserve th en

cha rged in and restor ed t he line, Bald win himsel f possibly killing Sa ad ad-Da ul ah a t t his po int. T he

Fa t im id ce n tre bro ke soon af ter. A bo d y of 500 cavalry o n t hei r lef t wing, ho wever, had ou t flanked

Baldw in s line and fallen o n t he Frankish infa nt ry asse mbled to t he rear, bad ly mau ling th em befo re

mo ving o n against Jaffa. T hese were de fea ted by Bald win the ne xt

day

as they retu rned fro m t heir sor tie]

47



Despite th e co nfusion it was the Fatimid ar my whic h fled the field a fte r on ly an ho ur s co mbat and a

prom ising F rankish pursuit was on ly en ded by nigh tfa ll. Th e Moslems lost allegedly 5,00 0 men , the

Fr anks 70-80 kn ight s

probab

ly t he 2 rou ted divi sion s) and a much larger num ber of foot -soldie rs.

RAML A AN D J AFFA 110 2

Whe n new s of a relat ively sma ll Fatimid raid ing force of 70 0- 1,000 men a pproaching Ram la was received

by Baldwin in Jerusalem he ga t hered 200 knight s an d se t o ut t o a

tt a

ck t hem, his fo rce including a

number of t he leaders of th e Crusade of 110 1 suc h as Stephen of Blois, Ste phen o f Burgundy a nd Con rad ,

th e C on stab le o f t he

Emp

ero r li e m y IV. Ho wever, Baldwin ha d bee n misinformed of th e st re ngth o f

th e Fat imid ar my wh ich , tho ugh is im pro bab le t hat it comprised t he 20 000 Ara b cava lry a nd 10,00 0

Sudanese infant ry th at co nt em po raries cla im , wa s vastly superior to his o wn for ce . Even when he lea rnt

of th is Baldwin pers isted in his

atta

ck , an d in th e batt le which fo llo wed his small army , with no

inf

an t

ry s

uppo

rt , was surro unded a nd virtually wiped o ut. Baldwin himself and 5 co mpan io ns, keeping

clo se toget her, a t temp ted to hac k t he ir wa y ou t

but

o nly o ne ma n actually e sc aped with t he king, A

few others so ught ref uge in Ramla but wer e smoked

ou t

afte r 2 day s an d in a fierce figh t mo st of t hese

were killed , including Ste phen o f Blots an d Stephen o f Burgundy. Coma d was amongst t hose tak en

ca ptive.

Escap ing to J affa , Baldw in was joi ned by re info rceme nts of 170 kn ight s a nd mo unt ed sergeants from

Jerusalem and Ga lilee plus a large for ce of Eng lish an d Ge rma n pilgrims. S

hor

tly af terwards he mar c hed

o ut agai nst

the

Fa timid s for a seco nd t ime ,

but

no w with a considera bly la rger arm y. T he Falimid s

agai n e nci rcled t he Fr

ank

s, falli ng on th e in fa n tr y each tim e the kn ights c harged and th e re by ob liging th e

cavalry to fall bac k to de fend th em . Ho wever, th e infa nt ry held tog

eth

er a nd th eir sho wers of arrows

cou

pled with t he knights rep eated c harges e vent ually brok e

the

Moslem s.

Th e Fran ks were to o few in nu m ber to mou nt a pursuit , but they ca pt u red t he Fatimids cam p and t he ir

herd s of asses and camels. Th e Moslem s los t about 3, 000 me n.

HAR RAN 1104

To dis tract a T urkish attack against Edes sa by Suq man ihn-Ortoq of Mardin and Ja karmish

of

Mosul, t he

ar mi es of Ede ssa

and

Anrioc h, un de r Cou nt Bald win of Le Bourg and Prince Bohem

ond

, in veste d t he

Moslem ci t y of lI arra n. Ho wever, before t hey could occ upy th e town t he T urkish a r my having

aba nd

oned

its brier siege of Edessa ] arrived on t he sce ne , di viding in to two bodies o f which one

revic tualled th e c it y while the o t her advan ced t o

OC

CUp) th e bes ieging a rmy , d rawing

away from the

cit y by a feigned flight.

T he Franks, 3,0 00 cavalry and more tha n 7,000 infan try including many Arme nians, drew u p with

Baldwin on th e le ft and Bo he mo nd co ncea led behind a hill about a mile distant o n th e fight , t he plan

being fo r th e Edessans to ti n: th e Tu r ks, a nd pOSl ibly even to feign fligh t an d d raw th em in to an ambush.

Unfor tunat ely t he Tu rks had a very sim ilar plan an d when t he y fe igned an a

ttac

k a gainst the F rankish

left an d turn e d in flight th e Ede ssans t hr e w cau tion and th eir plan to th e win d a nd cha rged of f in

pursuit.

Once t hey were ac ross t he River Balikh t he ma in T urkish a rmy some 10.000 fresh cavalry) e merged

from a mbush, t he Ede ssa ns breaki ng in r

ou t

at t he first onse t. Meanwhile Bohe mond

and

the Antl och e nes

had advanced from hiding and

repulsed t he Tu rks o pposing t he m, but they were too la te to save t he

Edcssa ns, inst ead qu i

tting

t he fiel d in pani c a nd bei ng overtaken an d ro uted in

turn

,

F ran kish casua ltie s were very heavy , po ssibly as man y as th e 10· 12,000 men claime d by Ibn al· Athir

and ot her Moslem sources these figures probably includi ng no n-comba tan ts) . Man) Fra nks drowned

a tt empting t o recross th e Balikh , a large nu m ber o f horses were also lost , and cer tainly very few of th e

F ranks ac tu ally escaped t o Edessa. In a ddition Co unt Baldwin was take n cap tive

by Jak arm ish s men ,

and o

ther

Christian leade rs were ca ptu re d by Suq man .

THI RD BAT TL E O F RAMLA 110 S

A Fa timid army , making yet an o th er at tempt to reconquer Palest ine, t his tim e und er al-Afda l s so n

Se na al-Mulk, again found itself

opposed

at Ram la by King Baldwi n wit h an army of 500 kni ghts, an

unkn ow n nu m be r o r mo unted sergeant s, a nd no more than 2 000 infantry . T he Fat imids num bered

48



5-15,000 Arab cavalry and Sudanese infantry, plu s a contingent of 1,000-1 ,30 0 bow-armed Turk ish

cavalry from Damascus.

The bat t le took place near th e Pat imid camp about 4 miles from Ramta. The Damascene ho rse-archers

led the Fatimid at tack , showering the Frank s 5 d ivision s with arrows before wheeling and falling on

their flank , But Baldwin, commanding the reserve, successfully re pulsed th e Tu rks then advanced

to the support of the o ther divisions.

Though they put up a stiff resistance for some time the Fat imid army, weakened by the de part ure of

its left wing o n a raid agains t Haifa, at length brok e and fled , the sources record ing how the Sudanese

infant ry, una ble to

outru

n

th e

Frankish pursuit, w ere slaughtered in the field s . They lost 1,200-4,000

men, b

ot h

cavalry and infa

ntry

, and their camp was captured. Th e Franks cla imed 10 have lost o nly

60 men. though Moslem sources say losses on bo th sides were abou t equal.

SENNA BRA I l l ]

Drawn in pursuit of a fo raging party o f 500 Turk s, a Fran kish a

rm y

of 2,000 infan t ry and an unknown

number

of

cavalry und er King Baldwin was ambushed by 2-7.000 mo re Turks under Toghtek in and

Mawdud , a tabe g of Mosul, and severely defea ted. The ba ttle was spo ntaneous, neith er sid e having

time to draw up in any for mal array, and hand-to-hand combat began without any prelimina ry

skirmishing. The Franks were bro ken in th e Ihird Moslem cha rge.

The Franks losl 30 knights and 1,200 infan try Ibn al-Qalan isi says 2,000 men ) and th ough Baldwin

himself escaped he lost his standard in the rout . The Frankish camp and baggage were also capt ured.

was o nly the arriv al of the troops of Antioch and T ripoli tha t enabled the king 10 ex tricate the

remnant s of his army. Th e Turks appear to have losl abou t 400 men.

SARMIN (TELL DANITII) 111 5

A Seljuk army und er Sultan Bursuq o f Hamadan was surprised by a Frankish army unde r Roger o f

Antioch whilst making camp in hilly wooded count ry. A large pari of Bursu

q s

fo rce was awa y

foraging, While others were scatte red in preparing Ihe camp site.

Th e Frank s emerged from ambush and all acked in echelon in 3 divisions, lhe lef t flank leading. This

division routed Ihe main body o f Seljuks, which had withdrawn to a hill behind their camp, while the

centre seized Ihe camp itse lf. The Frankish right was att acked by a single bod y of 300

Tu r

ks unde r

th e amir of Sinjar who drove the screen of Tu rcopole light cavalry back o nto the kn ights and caused

some confusion hefore be ing su rrounde d by the Frankish reserve and all bUI wiped oUI.

Bursuq managed 10 rally

ju s

t a few hundred men. but af ter a desperat e fight he fled the field .

AGER SANGUINUS (THE FIELD OF BLOOD) 1119

Roger of Anlioch , with

ou t

awaiting the re info rcemen ts he had requested from Baldwin and Count

Po ns o f Tripoli. set out again st llghazi of Mardin with a for ce of 70 0 knight s and 3-4,000 infantry ,

which included Tu rcc poles. Armenian s and native Syrian infant ry Hbn al-Qalanisi report s that the

Ant iochenes totalled 20 ,000 men ). Encamp ing wit hout due cautio n he was t rapped in a valley wit h

s

te e

p. Thic

kl y

wooded sides by Ilghazi s numerically superior army, which descend ed by hidd en pat hs

and had surrou nded the Frankish camp by dawn. The Turks, includi ng many Kurds but largely

comprised

of

Turcomans, numbered at leas t 7,000 men . some sou rces claiming 40 -60 ,000 .

Roger told off o ne division 10 guard his rear

th e

n drew up his rema ining forces in 4 or 5 divisions,

each of cavalry and infan lry . On the right 2 or 3 o f these had some success before the Frank ish line

was disorganised by the division of Robert de St , on th e left, breaking in rout and carrying away

par t of Roger s own d ivision with it. In the ensuing confusion, made wor se by a dust sto rm blowing

into the faces of the Fra nks, the Turks successfu lly closed in ro u nd the Frankish flank s and rear

cutting

of f

all esc

ap e

, and a massacre ensued. The bail ie was over inside an hour.

100 knigh ts managed to escape before the encircle men t was complete , and a few of the reargua rd under

Renaud Mazoir also go t awa y (Ihough the latt er - except for Renaud - were captured and execu ted

49



on

ly a fe w ho urs later ), bu t o f the re mainder

on

ly 70 knights and 5

inf an try wer e taken alive. Mo st

were tor tured to

deat

h in t he s tree ts an d gardens of Alepp o t hou gh 40 o f t he r icher kn igh ts a pp ea r t o

hav e bee n spared fo r ranso m. Usarnah records tha t less th an 20 men ever returned safely to Ant ic c h . T he

sa me figure o f 20 is also reported in an

ot

h er so u rce as the to ta l n u mber o f Turk ish casu a lties.

HAB 11 19

A

Frankish co lumn o f 70 0 k nigh ts and some 2·3 ,00 0 in fa n try u nder King Bald win a nd Co un t Po ns

o f T r ipo li was att acke d o n t he ma rc h by a llegedly 20. 00 0 T urks und er Ilghaz i o f Mard in a nd

Toght

e kin

o f Damascus, who succeeded in sep arati ng a nd ro u ting t he 3 cavalry di visio ns o f t he vangua rd and t hen

atta cki ng t he infantry in t he mai n co lu m n, inflic ting heavy losses.

On the left flan k the Ant ioc hcn e kn ights

unde

r Ro bert o f Zerdana succ ee de d in r

ou t

in g t he Damascenes

and pu rs ued them from the fiel d , failing to retu rn , bu t on th e rig ht t he Tripolitanians wer e d r iven

bac k o n to t he main body . Ba ldw i n manage d to rally h is reserve a nd by rein for ci ng th e weake st points

in th e column a nd de livering a seri es of co nt ro lled charg es with his fresh t roo ps he force d so me o f t h e

Tur

ks to flee a nd t he rest to w ithdraw in

good

o rder.

The engagement was ind ecisive, bot h sides cla imin g a vic to ry . Th e F ran ks had lo st 100 kn ight s a nd

7

infan try o n the field of ba ttl e p lus a n add itiona l

unkn

ow n nu m ber o f Antioch ene knights, these bei ng

def ea te d as t hey returned tJy t he re tiring T u rks; Ilghazi ex ecu te d 30 knight s he had ca p t ured, includ ing

Ro bert

o f

Zerdana.

and these wen fa irl y ce rtain ly all

Anrio chenc s.

T he T u rks, o n Ihe o t h er hand , are sai d

by Fra nkish

author

itie s 10 have lo st 1-4,000 d ead, plu s add itional lo ss es in wo u nde d an d prisoners.

ES KI

ZAGRA

1121

Aft er th eir de f

ea t

at Levun u in

1 <

I the Peche negs re mained qu iet un ti l 1 121 , w hen they again

crosse d th e Danube int o Byzan tine te rritory , T he Emp eror J o hn

Co m nenus manage d to hold the

passes

against t hem t hrough the w in ter and in the spring of 111 2 he inv ited a large

num

ber of

Pec he n eg

ch ief ta ins to various cutes as gues ts. When t he se a rrived t he y were arrested , a nd a By za nt ine a rm y

u nd er J o h n himsel f, containing large

number

s o f Flemish and Fre nch mer

cen

ar y knigh ts and 54 0

Varangian Gua rdsm en . immedia te ly mar ch ed agains t th e remainder o f t he m, encampe d in a vas t

wagon

laa ger

into wh ich th ey withdrew af te r in itial Byzantine successes.

The Pec he negs co uld st ill m uster a co nsiderable farce, o utnu mbering the V ar an gian con tingent by

perhaps 6 to I , T hey for med up befo re their laage r a nd repulsed fir st t he Byzantine u nit s a n d t hen

lhe F l

emi

sh and

French mercenaries.

Aft er t his

the

Vara ngians a tta

cked

.

t

seems t hat th is tim e , when

the Pe

che

negs tried to

part

the ir wagon s - pre

suma

b ly to let t he ca valry o u t se e sec t io n o n Asiatic

tactics in Armieso f th e Dar k Ages ) - t hey co uld not b e moved . and becaus e o f t his o r for so me o ther

rea so n t he Peche negs see m to have pan icked a nd fled,

many

being killed and th eir commande r being

ca p t ured in t he pur suit. [ Possibly Ih is was a feigned fligh t which go t

ou t

o f ha nd , since t he Pec heneg

co mman d er was

a

half-blin d o ld man who may have had d ifficulty co n t rolli ng

suc

h a man oeuvr e

t hrough his su bo rdinates, all bu t 6 o f

whom

had fle d when th e wagon s were found t o be s tuck.)

T he wagon laager was the n sto r med a n d brea

ched

b y t he Va rangians and the rallied mer

cenar

y a nd

Byzant ine uni ts. a nd t he Peche negs were slaught ered en masse. T h is bat tl e s ee ms to have virt ually

e x te r mina ted th e Pech e negs. t he sur vivors being sell led as military co lo nists in Byzantin e lands ;

t hereafter t he Cu ma ns a nne xed their territo ry. T he Byzantines hen

cef

orw a rd cele brated the vict

ory

a nnu ally as Peche neg Day u ntil at least the end of t he 121h century.

IBE l IN Y IBNE H) 11 23

Encouraged by th e captu re o f Kin g Baldwin

by Balak o f Khanzit , a n

army

of 16 ,0 00

Fatim

ids invade d

t he Ki ngd o m o f Jerusalem. T hey we re in te rcepted at Ibe lin by a F rank ish a rmy of 7· 8 .0 00 men und er

t h e Con stable, Eus tace Ga mie r , and - despite th e ir nu merical superiority - t hey broke and fled alm o st

before t he F rankish c har ge had eve n made co n tac t ,

aband

oning the ir ca m p to t he Franks.

6·7 , 0 Fatimid s were apparen tly k illed, p resumably mo stly d u ri ng t he Fra nkish pursuit , and the cam p

yielded up 40 0 camel s, 500 asses , 3 very ric h ban ners wh ich

Fu

lcher of Cha rtres d escri bes as S tandarz ,

and muc h o t her loo t besides.



AZAZ 1125

Invad ing t he Principa lit y o f An l io ch a t th e head o f a co nfederacy of no r t hern Syrian amirs, Il-Bursuq

of Mo sul laid siege t o th e Frankish fortress of Zer dan a. Hea ring, ho wever , of t he ap pro ac h of a re lief

force o f

1,100 cava lry a nd 2,000 infantry under King Ba td win he raised the siege an d re tired

no r t hward s t ow ard s Aza z whe re Baldwin s fo rce c

aught

up wit h him. T he F ra nk s d rew up in I

J

divisio ns, eac h of cava lry an d infan try.

Rely in g o n t heir su per ior nu mbe rs possibly tota lling 15,000 horsemen ) th e Sy rians seem to have

volu n ta r il y closed for han d-t o-ha nd co mbat ea rl y in t he ba ttl e. But t he sup e ri

or i

ty o f t he Fra n ks

a rm o ur and ph ysiq ue t o ld heav ily against th em and a fte r a pr o tr ac te d a nd blood y mele e t he T u rks

we re sca tt e red in r

ou l

, the F ra nks co llecting a n imm e nse a mo u nt o f booty from t he ba lll ef ie ld.

Frankish sou rces claim t ha t t he Tu rks los t

2,00 0

men includi ng 15 a mirs, but t hat t he ir

ow n

casualti es

a mo u n te d 10 o nly 20-24 men . In ad diti on bo t h sides lost lar ge n umbers of horses.

MARJ ES·SAFAR 1126

Marching again st Damas cu s a F rankis h ar m y u nde r Ba ldwin was co nfr o nte d by t he Damascen es

und er t he At abeg Toghtek in a bou t 20 mil es fro m the ci ty. T he Dumasc en e s incl ude d 2,000 T urcomans

and per hap s

1,000

askuris as we ll as

a n

imm e nse num be r of infan try . T he F r an ks d rew u p in

12

d ivisio ns o f cavalry an d in fan t ry .

At first t he T u rcom a ns p ut t he F ran ks to flight , th e horse-a rcher s tak ing a h eavy to ll and To gh tek in s

asker ts even p ushi ng t hro ugh t o th e ro yal camp. Bu t after bei ng p ursued fo r 4 miles th e Fran ks

ralli ed a nd as even ing dr ew in lau nc hed a co nce rted attack , t he F ra nk ish arc he rs sho o t ing d ow n ma ny

of t he Damascen e ho rses and Baldwin s k nigh ts rid ing do wn t he ir d isorganised c avalry, w ho pan icke d

w hen To ght e kin was u nh orsed . The victor iou s F ran ks wen t on to pu rsue t he rou ted Moslems to wit h in

sigh t o f D amascus, t he Dam asce ne in fa n t ry bein g c u t to pieces in t he pu rsuit. T h e Mosle ms lo st a t leas t

2

00 0

men.

Th e F ranks claime d to have lo st o nly 24 knight s an d 80 infa n try t he mselves, t ho ugh t hey also record

th at the in fa n t ry suffered badly in t he in iti a l rout . Certa inly the F rankish ca sua lt ies wer e heavy enough

to ob lige Bald win to a ba ndo n his projec ted a tta c k o n Damascus. Inst ead t he a rm y gat hered a

considerable a mo u nt of bo o t y from

th e

battlefie ld an d wit hdrew to J erusalem.

MOUNT CADMOS 1148

Ea rly in 1148 d urin g t he Sec

on d

Cru sade a F re nch arm y unde r King Lou is VII was am bushed on

Mo u nt C admos by th e Se lju ks. Th e vangu ard c

ompr

ise d largel y of royal merce naries and a c o ntingent

o f Templars], d isregar ding it s inst ructions to halt and e nca mp be fo re th e mounta in, o u ts tr ip ped th e

res t of th e ar my so t hat a wide gap o pe ned up bet wee n t he m. Th e main bo dy losi ng sight of th e

vanguard, p iled up in co n fusio n a t th e fo o t of the mountai n a s its fo remost u nits hesi ta ted , u pon wh ich

th e Seljuk s - w ho ha d been lyin g in a mbush a waiting just such a n o pport unit y - fell u pon t he infa ntry

and baggage in th e mid d le o f

their

co lu mn.

Lo uis a nd t he

40

kn ight s o f t he rear guard , heari ng t he

sounds

o f ba

ttle

advanced ra pid ly to t he sce ne

o f th e a mb us h, w h ile a messen ger was des pa tc hed t o ret rieve

t he

vangua rd. T he latt er, how ever , was

o bst ruc ted in try ing to re tu rn by large n um be rs of no n-co m ba tan ts in ro u t fro m t he ma in bo d y.

T he c harge of Lo uis an d the rearguard succeeded in dist racting th e Seljuks a t ten tion from t he remainder

o f t he n on-co mb atants, hu t in th e co nfused me lee wh ic h fo llo we d a ll 40 knig ht s were cu t dow n and

Loui s. him self un horsed, was fo rced 10 figh t his wa y to safe ty alo ne a nd on foo l.

lt was o nly

t he o nc om

ing o f night t hat

br o

ugh t an e nd to t he Scl

ju k

a ttac k, u po n whic h Lo uis a nd the

su rvivors ra llied o n th e baggage t rain. He was at las t re inforce d by th e un c

om m

itt ed va nguard, b

da r kn ess preven ted th e m

ou n

t ing o f a counter

-att

ack.

FONS MUR AT US

1 149

Lea rn ing of t he siege of t he fo rtress o f Inab by t he co mb ined ar mie s of Alcp po a nd Damascus, 6,000



stro ng und er Nur ed-Din and Asad ad-Din Shirkuh, Raymond of Antioch set ou t wit h a relief force. But

he had failed to await a full mus ter and although accompan ied by a few Assassin allies his to tal for ce

numbered on ly 4 000 cavalry and 1,000 infantry.

Misinformed of t he strengt h of the Frank ish fo rce, Nur

ed-Din

re tired on its approach. Raymond then

weakened his army by putt ing reinfor cement s into Inab, and Nur

ed-Din,

watching his movements

from a distance. now became awar e of the inf erior strength o f Ihe Franks. Therefore when Raymond

en

cam

ped in a hollow in o pen co untry near to the Spring of Murad the Tu rks surrounded his camp

overn ight.

Raym

o nd

realised his plight in the morn ing and led a cha rge against the enci rcling Turks,

but

this

was

def

ea ted by the incline

of

the slope and the wind blowing dust in their eyes fro m the summit. Th ey

were subsequently virt ually wiped c u t . Shi

rkuh

himself slew Ray m o nd , and Nur ed -Di n sent his silver

decorated sku ll as a trophy to th e Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad .·

HARIM UAREN C) 1164

On hea ring that Nur

ed- Din

had

layed

siege to th e Ant iochene fort ress o f

Hanm

a Frankish relief force

set o ut under Bohemond III of Ant ioch, Raymond III o f Tripoli and Joscelyn III ( titular Count of

Edessaj.

In addition it included Byzantine tr

oop

s und er Constantine

Colo man,

th e Byzantine Dux of

Cilicia , an Armenia n co ntingent under T horos

, a band of French crusaders unde r Hugh de Lusignan,

and a contingent of Templars and /or Hospitallers. Altogethe r the army totalled 13.000 cavalry and

infantry.

Bohemond s

own

contingent

including 600 kn igh ts.

Nur ed-Din , par ticularl y alarmed by the presence of Byzantine t roo ps in the ap proaching army,

decided to raise the siege ra ther than risk a bat t le. but prepared a contingency plan to des tro y the

Franks should they pursue him - which, ignoring the advice o f Th oros and o the rs, Bohe

mond was

foolish enough to do. As the Frankish ca valry chased

after

th e reti ring army Nur s [eft wing rallied and

turned back to fall o n the un pro tecte d infan try , so that when the disorganised cavalry were in turn

atta cked they no longe r had infantry support. u

r s

cavalry then trapp ed them in a confined and

swampy place and broke them in the first charge.

A la rge number o f Franks were killed Incl udin g all the milit ary bre thren) and most o f the remainder

were forced to surre nde r. uhe prisoners including all the leaders except Thoros, who had pursued with

more caution than his allies

and

succeeded in escaping with his own contingent.

THE DAY OF AL·BABEIN 11 6 7

During the Syrian invasion of Egypt the Franks under King Amalric

I .

fighting in this instance as allies

of t he Fatimid Egyptians, managed to cross the Nile despite

the

pro ximity of Syrian fo rces under

Asad ad-Din Shir kuh, and as a result the Syr ians. d iscovering the crossing too lat e to o ppose it, wit hdrew

into Uppe r Egypt. Amalric pursued them as far as al-Babein, The Two Gates on the edge of the desert

10 miles south of Minya , whe re Sh irkuh decided to give batt le.

S

ir

kuh s plan

was to co nvince the Franks t

hat

his main strengt h was in the centre, and to th is end he

placed his baggage in t he cen tre o f the line but covered it with on ly a small for ce of cavalry under

Salad in. Shirkuh himself commanded the right wing, comprised of elite cavalry, intending

10

fall on the

Frankish rear when they charged his cen tre. whe re

Saladin

was to feign

[light

to draw them away from

the field. His forces numbered 9 ,

000

heavy cavalry, 3,000 ho rse-archers and 10-1 1.000 Arabs who appear

to have bee n infantry. (Moslem s

ou r

ces recor d only 1-2,000 horsemen .)

To face them Amalric, whose forces had been de pleted by de tachmen ts

dur

ing the pursuit , co uld

muster

374 Frank ish knights,

an

unknown

numb

er o f sergeants and Tu rc

op

o les, and a la rge contingent

o f unreliable Egyptians ; Bar lIehraeus recor ds that his army tot alled 10,000 men . For the att ack he

placed his knights in

the vanguard and the Egyptian co ntingents in t he rear.

• Since none of their own fronticl5 bordered on those of the f rankish slates the Abbasjds were passive throughout

the Crusad es; though Caliph Muqlali ( 1135-1160 ) is alleged to have sent an army of 20.000 men to fl l t against

the Franks 1know of no evidence of its seeing action.

52



Th e ba t tle wen t en t irely according to plan. When Amalric charged Saladin tur ned in n ight , and as the

Franks follo wed in pu rsuit Shirkuh fell on the Egyptia ns. Whcn Ama lric managed to rally his sc

at t

ere d

kni ght s and re t urn to th e main part

of

th e fie ld he fo und tha t the majorit y o f the Tu rcopoles and

Fa limid s had been routed , but although th e Franks had to

aband

on the ir baggage tr ain th ey managed

to ra lly a co nsiderable number of men

and

, fo

rming

a

co

lumn, retired fr

om the

field in g

ood

order.

The y had , however, los t 100 knigh ts and an un

doubtedly

larger numbe r of Eg

ypt

ians

and

oth ers, and

st rat egically it was a Syrian vic

tory

even

tho

ugh the Sy rians themse lves are sa id to have los t 1,500 men.

The Moslems called the ba ttle T he Day o r The Event of a l-Babe in.

Soo n afte r, hearing of an

at tack

o n Fran kish Sy ria by Nur

ed -Din ,

the Fr:mk s with drew fro m Egypt

MYR IOKEPH ALON 1176

In an a

ttemp

t to c rush the Seljuks o f Rum, th e Byzan t ine Emperor Manuel I ga the red a huge but largely

mer

cenary army , co ntaining in pa rti cular co nsiderab le

number

s

of e

and Fran ks , and

mar

ched

on

th ei r

cap ital lconium, in tending to cap ture bo th th e ci ty and

the

sultan, Kilij An lan 11.

The ir march was orde rly but slow , th e la rge nu mber o f

no

n combatan ts

tt

ending the baggage t rain

dic

ta t ing the army s speed. In add ition th ey were dogged by bands o f 5- 10,000 Turcomans, who

Kilij Arslan had instruc te d to adopt a sco rched earth policy as th ey withdrew before

the

Byzam ines.

On reaching th e abandoned fo rt ress of Myriokephalon an embassy was received from the sultan

pr

op

osing

peace

which Manuel co ntemptuously refused - probab ly for th e same reasons as Ro manus

had refused Alp Arstan s offe r b

efore

Man

li k

er t a ce

ntu

ry ea rlier. Kilij Arslan

then

oc

cup

ied

the

Tzibr it ze Pass, a t the head of whi ch Myriokephalon stood.

Nex t day , ignoring

the

advice o f his officers, Manu el led his army in to the w

her

e the Se l

juk

s -

a t least

50 00

0 s trong - could ap parently be

dearly

see n in their positions o n the mountain slopes.

They gave way before th e Byzant ine vangua rd and allowed th e bulk of the army to en te r th e nar row

defile unmolested , where th e Byzan tines were packed so d ose that they cou ld scarcely move. As soon

as th e long co nvo y of Byzantine baggage carts was halfway into the pass th e Sefjuk s cha rged down

from bo th sides.

The wagons, ha rrassed hy Seljuk infan try (who had se t some o f th em o n Iire }, wer e unabit: to turn in

the narrow pass and co mpletely blocked the roa d, full y preventing any retrea t by the bu lk of the army,

and th e Tu rks ctos

d

in

on

the disorgamsed Byzanrincs. A co nfusing bat tl e ensued in which a fierce

sandstorm blinded th e comba tants so that both sides killed many o f th e ir own men , but as th e sto rm

subsided towards even ing it became appa rent th at

although

the Byzant ine vanguard had successfully

forced its wa y to th o th er en d o f the pass it was the Seljuk s who had the ad van tage .

On th

plain

bef

ore the pass Manucl managed to rally with

many

of his se nio r officers, and her e the

ma in par t of the surviving Byza

ntin

e a rmy e

ncampe

d for

the

night , in such a preca ri

ou

s situatio n

tha

t

Manuel even considered

ab

ando ning th e army and seerc t1y slip ping away. However. Seljuk cas ua lties had

been heavy to o, and desp it e the severe tosses of the Byzantines

Kilij

Arslan now sent

an

envo y o ffering

peace in exchange for an ugr ment by Manue

l

to dismant le the ron resses

of

Dorylaeum and

Sublaeum

and a payment to the sultan of ho rses, r ich cloth and 200 000 gold and silver picces, term s wh ich

Man uel now willingly accepted . t was only on the wit hdrawal of th e Byzantin vanguard from the far

end o f th e Txibritz Pass tha t it becam e ap parent to them just ho w heavy Turkish casualties must

have heen - the heads and genit al s of th e co rpses lit te rmg the pass hall cvcn been mut ila ted or removed

by the Scljuks overnigh t so tha

it

was

imp

ossible to disti nguish Moslem fro m Christ ian or

theref

ore

ca lculate

jlij

Arslan s losses.

Despit e the peace treaty the Hyzantincs were ha rrasscd as they wit hdrew by T urcoman

mbc

sm en, over

whom the sultan had littlc o r no control, and no t unt i hey reached Chonac did the pursu it end. Safe

within his own terr itory, Manue l refused to d isma nt le th e fort ifica t ions of Do rylacum. and Kilij Arslan

fel t obliged to re taliate by despat ching a rorce o f 24 ,000 cavalry to ra id the Maea nde r valley. These

did co nside rable dam age an d sac ked several towns before Manuel s for ces cau ght and des troy ed them

at the crossings of Hy

li

on

and L

eimmo

che ir.

T here wer e furthc r sp oradi c skirmishes and co unter-at tac ks against T urco man raid crs be tween Phrygia an d

Bith ymu which were et ther mo re o r less successful, bu t the campaign o f 1176 was really at an nd. It left

53



bo th Byzantine Ana to lia and the Em p ire s military resources seriously weakened .

MONTG ISA RD 1177

While invading

Franki

sh Syria an

Egypt ia n

army

under

Sala din was surp rised and

defea

ted by the Fran ks

under Baldwin IV.

Af ter blo

ckad

ing Baldw in in As

calon

th e Egypt ians, origina lly over 26,000 stro ng accor ding to WilJiam

of Tyr e

(8,

00 0 Toassin and

18,00 0 Qaraghu

lams, all cavalry, plus

in f

antry mo unted on camels and

mules), had sca tt e red to lo

ot

an d

pillage , co nfident th a t t

here

were no fur

ther

enemy for ce s be twee n

them

and J

er u

salem. But Baldwin succ eeded in gathering

375-500

knights (in cluding

80 Templars from

Gala and somewhat und er

3,000

infantry an d , evading the sma ll E

gypt

ian h

olding

for ce, surprised

Salad

in s

main arm y as it was n

eg o

tia t ing a ravine near th e fortre ss o f Montgisard .

Many o f th e Eg

yp t

ian un its were foraging, o the rs were encamped, and the Fra nkish at t ack caught the

main b

od y

almost complet

el y

by surprise.

Th e

y had time only to draw up a very loose ba t tle arra Y, their

un its milling about in to ta l disorder and even all emptin g to revise their formatio n in the face o f the

Frankish charge. Inevitably unde r such circu mstances some units bro ke and fled even be for e th e Franks

made contac t with them , and those units which s to od wer e pra

ct

ically annihilat ed. Saladin s own escape

was covered by his personal guard of 1,000 mamluks.

So comp le te was th e Frankish vict or y th at the Egypt ians abandoned their bo o ty , baggage an d priso ners .

In addi

ti o

n to th eir heavy

losses

in th e ba

ttle

the E

gypt

ians suffered further casualties as a result o f

Bedouin harra ssmen t du r ing their withd rawa l.

Frankish losses were also high, the Master of th e Hospital recording 1, 100 dead and at least 750 wounded.

MA

R J

AYYU 179

On

receiving news th at Salad in had invaded th e dis trict o f Banyas an d Sidon a Frankish arm y under King

Baldwin IV and Count Raym on d of Tr ipo li set o ut to in tercept him. Reaching high ground overlooking

the Mar; Ayyun th ey co uld see th e t ts of Saladin s main encampm ent a t Banyas in the distance an d

resolved to de scend to the plain wit h

ou t furthe

r delayc th ough such was th ei r has te th at many

of

their

infantry, already exhaus ted by the long ma rch , were unable to keep up as the army hu rried down th e

steep slope.

Once o n the plain there was a delay o f severa l ho u rs (in which m

os t

of

th e

infant ry were pre

su m

ab ly

able to catch up

befo

re Saladin s advance guard of skirmishers, retu rning from ra ids furthe r to the

west, were in t

ercep

ted and

de f

eated, losing many dead. Encouraged by

their

success many

of

the

Frankish cavalry charged o f f in pursui t under the Master of t he T

emple

and Cou nt Raymond,

only

to

be

co n

fron ted by

Sala

din and the ma in body o f the

Moslem

army, o n which the fle eing skirmishers

now rallied. Th e Fr anks had no time to r

ef o

rm in orde rly array before the Moslems wer e o n them,

but though disorganised th ey manage d to ho ld out for a while before Salad in s superior nu m bers

overwhelmed and bro ke them, driving t hem back in rout upon Baldw in s main body

where

th e

in f

an try were st ill co ll

ec t

ing boo ty an d resting af ter the init ia l

defe

at o f the skirmishers.

Many mo re Franks were kill ed or captured in the purs

u it, th ou gh

some incl ud ing the king himself

managed to esc ape to the f

or t

ress of Beaufort. Others, who hid overnigh t am ongst th e rocks an d caves,

were hunted d

ow n

an d taken prisoner the n

ex t

morning. The Maste r of th e Temple, who was blamed

for th e disas ter, was amongst those tak en captive.

CRESSON 1187

Foll

ow

ing a raid on a Mo slem caravan during a

period

o f truce by Rey nald de Chatillon, L

or d

o f Kerak ,

Salad in resolved to invade th e Kingdom of Jerusalem.

In prep

ar

at i

on

for th is Kukburi of lIarra n and 2 o ther amirs were despa tched to make a rec

onnai

ssance

in force (6-7,000 st rong) into Pale st ine . As a result o f open enm it y bet ween KingG uy and Coun t

Raymon d o f Tri poli, permission to cro ss his Ga lilean possession s was granted by the Count on co nditi on

that the Moslems would cro ss and ret urn in a single day and should not pillage.

54



Probab ly Kukbur i s reco nnaissa nce wo u ld have passe d w it ho ut inci den t bu t for t he fact tha t th e Masters

of t he Hospital an d T emple, se nt by King Gu y to pa t ch up a reco nc ilia t ion

with

Raymond, learn t o f it

e n route to Ti berias. T he Tem plar Master , Ger ard de Ridefort , immediately summoned his Marsha l and

80 mo re bre t hre n f rom t he Tem plar garr isons of Qaq un a nd Faba) and mu stered in total a fo rce o f 140

knights a nd 3-400 infantry with wh ich he a nd Roger des Moulins, Master of the Hospit al, se t out

to int ercept the Moslem s.

Th e y ca ught u p with Kuk b ur i a t t he Spr ing o f Cresso n the S pring of Saf

funy

a acco rdi ng to Moslem

so urces) as his me n were wat ering t he ir horses

du r

ing t he ret urn jo urney , a nd

th o

ugh numbe rs we re

utt erly against th em Gerard de Ridef o rt goaded th e knights into cha rging, wit ho ut eve n wa it in g fo r

th eirin fant ry

to

cat ch up. Inevit ab ly they were all but massac red . Roger des Mo ulins and t he

Marshal of t he Tem ple we re a mo ngst t hose killed , though Ge rard hi mself ma naged to escape

with

2

o ther bre th re n. Of the rest, 40 sec ular knights were ca pt ured a nd the ot her 97 Templurs a nd

Hospit alle rs all killed .

r HE HOR NS O F HAT Tl N 1187

As a result

of

t he disaster at Cresson Raymo nd of T ripo li fell obliged to put aside his qua rrel with King

G uy in t he fa ce of th e co mmo n enemy and pe ace was made be t ween th em . Th e Fra n kis h forces th en

mustered at Acre to d isput e Sa ladin s

forth

com ing inva sio n. Various so urces record this muster as

between 20, 000 a nd 60 ,000 me n see page 0 0), th e most co nvincing figure s, fo r t roop-type proportion s

rath er t han fo r quan tities, be ing th ose of t he Historia Regni Hierosoly mit anl, where th e fo llowi ng

bre

akdow

n is given : 1

,000

knights, 1

,200 me r

cenary kni ghts an d 7,000 mercenary inf ant ry, 4 ,000

Tu rco poles, and

25 ,

000 infantry. No mo unted sergean ts a re mentioned, t hough th ey are possibly

meant by t he mo

unte

d I oulai ns record ed in th e an onym ous Libellu s de Exp ugnation c Terra e Sen c tae :

th e sa me sourc e rec or ds innume rable T urco poles , but however

many

t her e may have been th e y

ap pear t o have had no e ffec t on t he subse qu e nt fighting. By co mpariso n Saladin s arm y contained

12,000 m

amluk

s from Egyp t , Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, Mardin and elsewh ere, in addition to a large

num ber of volunteers. J ud ging fro m

cont

emporary account s part isan t o bot h sides t he Mosle m arm y

was clea rly th e larger, o ne source recordi ng as man y as 8 0, 00 0 men , an o

ther

t he im possib le figu re of

700,0001 T he lo west tot a l reco rde d in Fra nkish sou rces is 25 ,000.

On Ju ly I Saladin enca mped at Ka fa r Seb t, 6 miles sout h-west o f Co un t Raymond s for tress of

T iberias, a position wh ch co m ma nded th e ma in road to bot h T iberias and Senn a bra. Half his

army

remained

there

while th e o ther half

attac

ked a nd sacked t he t ow n a nd environs

of

Ti bcrtas the ne xt day ;

th e fortress i tself , however, held out

under

t he

command

of Raymon

d s

wife, th e Co untess Esch iva,

who sen t an urgen t a ppea l for a id

10

King

Gu y

.

T he message probab ly reache d the king at Saffu riya, where his

army

had now encamped , the same

evening. Ra ymo nd, wh ose cas t le an d wife we re t ho se t hrea tened, wisely ad vised against going to t he

re lief o f Ti berias; he pointed ou t that th eir own p os it io n at Saf furiya was a goo d

o ne , a mp

ly provided

as was

with

water and pastu rage, an d sh o uld not be aban do ned a l a ny cost , particularly when their

presence alone co uld severe ly restrict Saladin s mo ve

ments

. But Guy foolishly took contrary advi ce

from the Master of t he Temple, Ge rard de Ridefort

wh o

probab ly st ill seethed

abou

t his defea t at Crcsson,

for wh ich he undoub tedly held Ra y mo n d solely responsible) , and on th e morning of Ju ly 3 t he Frank s

broke ca mp a t Saff

unya

and prepare d for thei r advance a

cr o

ss the waterless Plain of To ran. T he y

abandoned

t he Senna bra road in favo ur of a more no rtherly route, pro ba bly in part at least b ec ause

of the th rea t of the Moslem pos ui o ns on Kafar Se bt an d also because it wouldlead t he m to

th e

spri ngs of th e Wadi Hamrnan.

Salad in, probably forew arned of their c hanged route by deserte rs or by traitors wit hi n Raym ond s

con tingen t, now sh ifted his pos itio n fr om Kafar Sebt to the hills of Hut tin, which

comma

nded the

nor therly road the Franks were now ta king. T he re he was jo ined by t he majority of the troops who had

been besieging Tiberias, a sma ll forc e having been

detached

to co ntinue with Ihe siege, while skirrmshers

co mmenced 10 harrass t he Fr ankish colu mn.

All morning th e F ranks marched on , co ns

tantly

under at tack by th e Moslem skir mishers. Raymond s

vangua rd lost man y knigh ts, an d so hard-pressed wa s the rearguard of Temp lars, Ifospita llers and

T urc

opoles

th at it had b ee n dangerously slowed

down

and ran the serio us risk of being sep a

rated

55



entirely from t he cen tre of the column , commanded by King Guy . Being made aware of this danger by

messe ngers from Gerard de R iddor t and Balla n d I helin , Guy or dered the army to halt and encamp (or

the night , even though they had cove red barely 5 miles and it was s till early afternoon. Raymond, who

appea rs to have been the o nly sane

comm

a

nder

in the whole Frankish host, urged that it was imperative

they should push o n and reach a nearby spring, bu t with the rearguard de

mo r

alised and the in fan

tr y

exhaus ted his advice was poi ntless; he is alleged to have then prop hesied, T he war is over; we are dead

men; the kingdom is finished By now th e Moslems had also blocke d the pass to this spring, however,

and though there was clearly some heavy figh ting nea r th e village o f Marcscalha

att

empts to dis lodge

the Moslems seem to have been unsuccessfu l. Left with no ot her option, Ray

mond

advised the king to

encamp at Marcscallia itself , with o nly half the distance to Tibcrias covered and Saladi n still holding the

wells .

During the night Saladin s army close d in. When mor n ing came the Franks made one final at tempt to

reach the spring near lIa tt in but aga in found their way blocked by th e Moslems; ba ttl e was

jo

ined at

abou t o clock, the main Moslem army advancing towa rds them with the ce ntre held back an d the

wings thrown forward , preceding their charge with a clo ud of arrows.

The Frankish infantry, ex hausted and desp

erat

e for water , failed to hold fo

rmatio

n and refused to stand;

they made a disconce rted dr ive to wards th e Sea o f Gatilee, which they coul9 see below th em, but finding

the ir pa th blocked th ey herded onto a low hill , pr

obab

ly one o f the pair

kn o

wn as th e Horns of Hat t in,

and despi te ent reaties from King Guy wou ld no t jo in the batt le, pleading that their thirst preven ted

them. They

to o

k no fur the r pa rt in the

battle

until the Moslems fell on them and killed many, taking

the re st prisone r.

The rea r and ma in battles, unsupported by their infantr y, were no w hard-pressed, parti cular ly the

Military Orders and the Turcopole s. apparently st ill in the rearguard posi tion ; Ruymond and the

vangua rd o f

abou

t

200

knights, meanwhile, had bee n separa ted from th e bulk o f the army when called

upo n by Guy to de liver th e first charge at

about

noo n , when Taq i ad-Din had open ed his ra nks to avoid

the impa ct and so let them through, thou gh inflic ting heavy casua lties o n them as they passed [

Raymond

himself receiving 3 wound s and on e of his sons being captured). Seeing how hopeless the sit uation

was and tha t he could not get back to the army , Raymond rode from the field an d w

ithdre

w to Tyre.

t was pro bahl y at this stage tha t Prince Reynald o f Sido n and Balian d Jbetin escaped from the rear

gua rd , as Ji d a small number of Tem plar s.

was also at abou t this stage,

afte

r

th e

escape o f Raymond, tha t the Moslems took advan tage o f a wind

at their hacks to fire t he d ry scrub. The smoke, blown towards the exhausted Frankish knigh ts, must

have tortured throats tha t had not touched water for 24 hou rs or more, and poss ibly even choked some

to death. The remaining knights then fell back towards one o f the Horns of Hatt in, the Moslems

revolving ro

un d

them as a globe turns on its axis. But th e Moslem

attac

ks were repeatedly rep u lsed,

despite the death of th e Bisho p of Acre and the captur e o f the True Cross by Tuqi ad-Din himself,

and the knig hts rnude a number of count er-a t tacks wh ich came within an ace of success. Their

numbers

steadily dwindled , however , and the last 15 re tired to the summil of the hill, whe re King Guy s red

tent had bee n set up.

The Moslem attacks pe rsisted un til finally the king s ten t was

overth

row n, on which the ta st few knights,

exhausted, dismounted and th rew themselves on the ground . The Moslems immediate ly surrounded

them and too k them capt ive, toget her with the king, his brother the Constable Amalric, Reynald de

C

haullo

n,

Guard

de Rid

ef

orl

oscclyn de Courtenay , Hum phrey de Toron and many

others

.

The exte nt of the disaster is well pu t over hy Ion al-Athir, who wrot e When on e saw how many were

dead o ne cou ld not believe that ther e were any pr isoners; and when one saw the prisoners one could not

believe th3t there were any dead. Beha ed-Din claims that

30 ,000

were cap tured in all, and a furt her

30.000

killed . Another source record s t hat

1,000

kn ight s were killed or cap tu red; the pri sone rs were

probahly 3 secular knights, since the

200-260

Tem plars and Hospitallers taken alive ( Bar Hebracus

reco rds on ly 80 1were execu ted . Gerard was spared, bu t Rcynald de Chautlon was executed for his

crimes, possi bly by Saladin s own hand .

The nex t day Tiberi as surrendered , realising that no he lp would now be coming, Countess Eschiva

56



being allowed to depart wit h honour by Saladin.

THE G

REAT

BATT LE OF ACR E 189

Cram ped by Ihe

dose

proximit y of Saladin s field army whilst besieging Acre, King Guy was

encouraged by th e arr ival o f rei nfo rceme nts 10 launch an attack against th e Moslem camp. The Franks

drew up in 4 divisio ns, each of cavalry an d infa ntry with archers and crossbowmen to the fo re. IIis l

ef

t

Ilank rested o n the sea, his right on the River Bclus.

When

th e

Fr ankish cavalry cha rged both the Moslem Ilanks gave way, the right wing u nder Taq i ad-Din

possibly feigning night to draw the Templars of th e Frankish left from the field in pursuit. Salad in

rei nforced his ow n lef t fro m the centre which , thus weak ened , subsequently bro ke when the Fran kish

cen t re cha rged. Some Fran ks pushed on right up to the Moslem camp before Saladi n, reaching high

ground and successfully rallyi ng th e cen t re and left , launched a co unt er-att ack. The Franks, by now

dispersed in sea rch of plu nder, bro ke in panic and were dri ven back to their own camp with heavy losses.

Gu y lost 7-10,000 men, 4 10 0 of whom fell on th e right flank , incl uding many Templar bre thren :

Gera rd de Rldefort, Master o f the Temple, was again cap tured and th is t ime Saladi n had him execu ted.

Moslem losses to talled 1,500 includ ing 150 Royal Mamluks and 2 senior am irs. In addition the Diyar

Bekr

conting

ent, which had fo rme d part o f Taqi s righ t wing and Ile d du ring the initial

rout

, failed

to re tu rn after

th e

ba tt le,

only

next being heard from when they had reached Galile e

The magnitude of the Fran kish d

ef

eat might have been grea

te r

if Gu y had no t had the fo resigh t to

anti cipate a sort ie against his ow n camp by th e garrison of Acre and told oH a holding force to conta in it.

ACRE 1190

Hearing that Saladin s right ank , co mmanded by his neph ew Taqi ad-Din, had been weakened by the

despa tc h of several detac hments 10 watch the ap proach of t he remnants

of

Freder ick Barbarossa s

German cr usade , a large numbe r of Fr ankish so ldiers decided to march ou t from their entrenchments

round Acre and fall un

ex p

ected ly o n the Moslem army, against

th e

will o f their leaders.

T hey caught th e Moslcms complet ely unawares, and by the t ime the lat ter had armed

an d

mounted th e

Franks had already smashed throu gh the wea kened right wing and

penet

ra ted as far as the

camp

. They

then began to loot and pillage and became d iso rganised so that Taqi, rallying those of his troops that

were nearest , successfully la

unch

ed a counter-a tt ack. The Franks stoo d at first but were

ro u

te d when

a fresh division, the Mosul ask ar, followed by Saladi n with mo st o f the Moslem centre, jo ined t he

b

at t

le. As in th e grea t bat t le o f the previous year they were th en chased bac k to their own camp.

Th e

ba ttle lasted l it tle mor e than a co uple of hou rs, by the end of which the Franks had lost some

4,000 me n . Moslem so urces cla im that the Fr an ks lost 7-8 00 0, themselves losing only 10, bo th figures

obviou sly high ly impro bable. Few pr isoners were taken and

most

of thcm we re executed.

ARSOUf J 191

Marching along the coast road towa rds Arsouf dur ing the Third Crusade, an army of crusaders and

Sy rian Franks unde r King Richard I of England was

attacked

by a large Moslem fo rce unde r Saladin,

possibly ou tnumbe ring th e Franks by 3 : I .

Ant icipat ing the

attack

, Richard had taken me ticul ous care in arranging his line of ma rch that morning,

organising the army in 5 ba ttalions comprised in all of 12 divisions of knights, flan ked on the lan dward

side by a lightly-packe\1wall of infan try and on the seaward side by the baggage train and mo re

infant ry . The vanguard was held by Tcmplars an d the rearguard by Hcspitallers and c ho ice knight s

d ivided into squadrons, its

membe

rs so close together tha t an apple co uld no t be thrown to the

gro und wit hout touching the men or the ir horses.

Saladi n had been harr assing the Frankish column for several da ys bu t had fai led to disrupt its

for ma tio n or dr aw the knights away from the pro tectio n of the main co lumn . Now, at a po in t where

the Forest of Arsouf came down to wit h in 3 miles of the coast, he launched an al l-cut a

tt a

ck on the

Ifospitalle rs o f th e reargua rd.



For some t ime the Fra nk s struggled on

under

a co nstant ha il of arr ows, with pre ssure steadily increasing

o n the hard -pre ssed rearguard until th e Hospitall ers, twice having been refused per mission to co unter

attac k, finall y disobeyed and charged out against the Moslems, ju st before Ric hard gave a general orde r

to do so , th eir prematu re charge giving man y of the Moslems a chance to fall back and avoid the full

impa ct of th e Fr ankish charge wh ich might have o therwise smashed them. Fo r a few

minut

es the

reargua rd was thr own int o co nfusio n as the Moslems rall ied unt il Richard brought up reinfo rcement s

fro m the cen t re and d rove them back , Moslem co unte r-attacks on bo th the Hospit aller s and t he

Normans and English guarding th e roya l s tandard likewise bei ng repulsed . Th e knight s the n rallied on

the standard and ref ormed their

rank

s. and th e army co ntinued its mar ch to ArsouL

Moslem casua lties

amounte

d to 7,000 dead, including 32 emirs. while the

Frank

s losses were under

7

incl udin g only one nobl eman o f dist inc tion . However , th e apparent vict ory was indecisive;

the Moslems

atta

cked again la ter the same day as the Franks were pitc hing the ir tents

outs

ide Ars

ou f

,

hut they were agai n repu lsed

and

driven back to th e for est.

JAFFA 11

92

King Richard, commanding a small fo rce of o nly 2,0 00 infant ry , including 400 cro ssbowmen but for

the most part I isan an d Oenoese sailors (Beha ed -Din says that th e re were o nly 300-1

infantry in

all} , and 55-80 knights of whom only 9-17 (including th e king) were mo unted, drew up an infantry

phalan x in 2 line s, the first o f spearmen and the second of archers and crossbowmen. The spearmen

set th eir shie lds before them to fo rm a wall behind which the arch ers co uld she lte r, and fixed th eir

spear h

ul l

s in the grou nd so tha t the head s were levelled against the chests of any horse that dared to

app roach . Before the whole Force a rough barricade of tent -pegs had been set up to disorganise the

e

nemy

cha rge.

T he Moslem arm y under Salad in , comprised o f Kurds and mamluks, was relu c tan t to

dose

with th is

formatio n hut att empted to charge against it in 7 successive waves, th eir attacks lasting until mid

afternoon when after a single concerted volley by the crossbowmen, th ey were dri ven away by a general

advance of the spcarmen, led hy Richa rd himself with his few mounted knights, leaving 7 men and

1,500 horses l ad . Rich ard lost on ly 2 men in addit io n to a number of wounded .

An a

ttempt

by th e Moslems to seize Ja ffa in the rear of the Franks was foiled by Richa rd s tim ely

return with J small numher of kn ights. The town was then re-garriso ne d by him with th e Pisan and

Genc cse sailors who had abandon ed th e defences when the Moslems atta cked,

ADRIANOPLE 1205

Whilst besieging Adriano ple the Roma nian Franks under the Latin Emperor Baldwin I and Doge Dando lo

were at tac ked by a Bulgarian army unde r Joa

nmts

u. includ ing Greek s as well as 14,000 Cuman

auxiharies.

Having learn t f

rom

bitter e xperience

t ha t

it was inadvisable

10

pu rsue ret reating Cumans the Fra nks

deci de d to assum e a defensive fo rmation and [c t

the

Bulgarian s

attac

k rath er than th emselves take the

offensive. However, whe n the Curnans har -assed the ir cam p the m

orn

ing after they had made these

plans the Fr ank s fo rsook their caution and pu rsued the m piecemeal.

upon

which th e Cum ans t urned

and r

ou t

ed them . capturing Baldw in in the process.

The

rout

was halted by a H lid force tha t had been

left

to co ntinue Ihe siege of Ad rianople, and when

the Bulgarian pu rsuit saw thi s second arm y they halted. The two sides faced each o ther th us un t il

nightfal l, th e Cumans persiste ntl y harr assing th e Franks wit h arro w-ure all th at time. The Fr anks

finally withdrew und er cove r of da rkn ess, having

1051

120-300 knight s and a large num ber o f sergeants

und infan try. abandoning their camp to the Bulgarians. Baldw in died or was murdered in captivity.

AN

Tl

OCH· IN·PISIDIA 1211

Accompanied by Fra nk ish mercenaries supplied by the tin Emperor Henry as wen as Phrygjan t roops

under the eposed Byzantine Emp ero r Alex ius

and his nephew Manuel Mavrozom es. th e Seljuks

under Sulta n Kai Khosrou I

of

Rum ma rche d against Emperor Theodore I of Nrcaea. th e summer

they took Allaleia, then advanced towards x tcaea and la id siege to Ant ioch-in-Pisidia.

58



The 2 ,000-s tr o ng Nicaean army , also includi ng a co ntingen t o f Fr an kish merce nar ies 800 me n, c hiefly

It alian s ), co nfronted them near t he city. The who le Nicaean ar my ca rried

cro

sses o n t he ir shields in

imitati on o f th e ar my o f Co nstant ine t he Grea t a t th e Battl e

of

Milvian Bridge in 3 12.

In th e ensuing battl e the It alian s fo rming

the

Nica

ean

vanguard were overwhelmed by the Seljuks and

pra c ti cally wipe d o ut. Kai Kho

srou

then led a n a tt ac k against heo ore h imse lf and per s

onall

y

unhor

sed

him

the

Emper

or o n ly sa ving hi mse lf b y hack ing a t t he forelegs o f the Sultan s mar e. bringing do wn

both

ho rse and rider

upo

n whi ch Kai Khosr

ou

was insta n tly decapita ted by a Nicaean so ldie r. Yet th e

battle

appea

rs to have bee n inde cisive,

author

itie s variously claimi ng the r

out

o f the Nicaea ns a nd t he

Se ljuks , t ho ug h it see ms mo re p r

oba

ble th a t it was t he lea de rless T u r ks wh o broke and fled . Certainly

Alexius and Man ue l Mavro zom es were ca ptured d uri ng the pu rsuit. At the sa me time , however ,

Th

eod o re s losses ca n o nly be descri b ed as cri ppling.

DAMIETTA 121 9

As a result o f d issension in Ihe F rank ish ca m p du ring th e siege o f Du

mictta, t he leade rs o f the Fifth

Cr usad e acquiesced to th e de mand s of t heir army and marched o ut against the e ncampme nt o f th e

encircling Mo sle m field -army .

Th e Mosle ms, dra wing u p, feig ned ni gh t with their ce n tre and dre w th e inexperienced and foo lhardy

Frankish infantry in pursuit. At the same t ime Bed o uin auxilia ries fe ll o n th e Frank ish camp-followe rs,

o bliging t he King, J o hn de Brie n ne , to fall bac k to

their

d efen ce, and whe n the Ro ma n infan tr y o f Cardinal

Pelagius sa w t his t hey t hought t ha t t he kn igh ts wer e

runn

in g away a nd them selves tu rned a nd fled . T he

pa nic sp read a nd the

entire

a rmy br o ke in rout , o n ly a rear guard acti o n by King J oh n. t he Military Ord ers

and so me Fren ch and Englis h kn ight s p reven ti ng a ma

jo r

d isas ter .

The F ranks appear to ha ve lo st 20 0-400 knight s i ncl udi ng 3 3-50 Tempters. 3 2 Ho spit allers and 30

Teu to n ic Kn ight s)

and

1-2 ,00 0 , or pos sibly as man y as 5 000 , infantry ,

BAHR ASHMUN 122 1

Advancing from D amle

ua

towards Cairo un de r King J o hn a nd t he in famou s Card inal Pe lagius, a

Frankish ar my numbering 1,200-5,00 0 kn ight s, 4 000 archers {including 2,50 0 mer ce naries.

possi b ly all T urc o poles] , mo un ted sergea n ts and 20- 40 000 inf an t ry was pinne d d ow n by Egypua n and

Syria n for ces unde r Sulta n al-Kam il and al-Ash raf of t he Ja zira . Th e Mo slem ar m y included so me

7-40,000 c avalry.

After being

blockade

d wit hin t he ir fo r ti fied

enc

a m p me nt fo r a mon th, t heir lines of co mmu nica t io n

c u t by an Egyptia n flee t o n the Nile in th eir

rear

,

the

Fra nk s finall y resolved t o fall bac k o n

Darmcna

.

T he y set o u t at nigh t, hu t th e Teu t

oni

c Knigh ts were st upid en ou gh to adv

er t

ise the fac t by sett ing

fire to th e abando ned te n ts. To im ped e

thei

r withd rawa l, the Moslems o pened sluic e ga tes al o ng t he

bank s o f the Nile and b y m

or

ning , as t he Fr ank s flounde red t hro ugh t he wat e rlogged fie lds a nd d itc hes,

the Moslem s had in terce

pted

a nd su rro unded

the

m. T he Fra nk s ma naged to ho ld o u t for a da y,

repu lsing the mamluks an d Su danese in fan try se n t against t he m a nd inflictin g a bou t 1,0 0 0 casualties

on the la lt e r ), b u t fur t her ret rea t was imp ossib le. T he a rmy su rrendered o n mode rate te r ms 3 day s

late r.

AKH LAT ERZINJAN ) 1230

While e xpa nding in to the Selju k d omain s o f R um , Jal al ad-Din, Sha h o f Khwar izmia, besiege d and

ca p tu red Akhlat fr om a l-A

shraf

Musa

of

Damascus, bro th er o f th e A

yyub

id Su ltan o f Eg

ypt.

Th

is was

a polit ically un wise move since it pro mpted an alliance be t wee n th e previously implacable adversar ies

al-Ashraf

and Sultan

Kai Kobad o f Ru m against the Khwarizmians.

Ja lal ad-Din a dvance d 10 Khart p

er t

in t h e h op e o f catch ing a nd defea ting the allies individually, bu t

fa lling he was unable to p revent the junc ture of th eir fo rces at Sivas. AI-Ashraf led 5 000 elite

ca valry, and Kai Ko bad 20 ,000 incl uding nap tha-th ro wers and c rossbow-armed infa ntry.

In th e m

eanti

me Ja lal s fo rces had bee n re

duce

d by de tac hme nt s an d he was

conse

q uently

soun

dly

d

efeated

a t Erzin

jan

from wh er e he withdrew t o Akh Jat and th en

to

Azer baijan . T he Seliu k-Syrian

allies did no t

pur

sue. Instea d

they

mad e pea ce with J alal, ap pre cia t ing Khwarizmia s value as a b uffer

59



stale be tween them

and

the Mo ngols.

CASAl lMBERT t 232

Thi s b

attle

to ok plac e du r jng a civil war be tween th e Imperialis t fac tio n o f Frede

nc

k

, under the

Im per ia l Lega te Richard Ftlangicri, and th e Ihe lin party of Jean d Ibeltn , th e 'Old rd of Beir ut' ,

suppo rted hy King Henry I

of

Cyp rus.

Encam ped a t

Casa

r

nbcrt

with

on

ly a very small fo rce , King Henr y,

accom

panied by Anseau de Brie

and t he Old rd 's so ns Baldwin, Hugh and Guy and neph ew Jean (aut hor of the ' Assises ) , was defeate d

hy the Lombards (i.e. the Im perialists). When da rkness fell th e lom bards had se t sail from Tyre with

11 galkys an d surprised the lbeuns. Encamped badl y Jean d' lhe lin ' s sen tries, for exam ple, had been

posted o n th e

wro

ng side of the camp) the king's par ty were caugh t to ta lly un prepared ( the

c

hr o

nicler Philip

of

Novara speaks of 'so me

on

f

oo

t ,

ot her

s on horse witho ut saddles, so me armed

with ha uberks an d o th e rwise naked , ot hers wholl y unarmed' ), hut they managed to ho ld the ca mp

until daylight ; King lIenry himse lf was mo un te d ' almost ent ire ly nak ed '

on

a horse by his bo d yguard

an d

esc aped to Acre with a small re tinue .

AI dawn Lom bar d rein forcemen ts were landed fro m th e Tyrean galleys an d the Ibelin camp was finally

taken, th e Lom bards ca p turing 24 lbe lin knights, near ly every horse left in the cam p, an d most of the

arms and

equipme

nt stored there, The surviving Ibe lins ra llied o n a nea rby hi ll, where a re lief fo rce from

Acr e unde r the Old

rd

foun

d

them

soo n after. The

Lcm bards, seeing

the

relief

for ce appro

ac h

i

ng ,

trans

ferred

as much

loot

as possib le to the ships an d began a precipita te with drawa l to Tyre by lan d and

sea , archers an d crossbowmen holding off those lbc lins who tr ied to fall o n the rearguard of th e ir

lundboun fo rce as it withdrew through the Pass of oul in

AGRID I 1232

Following up his success a t Casal lmber t 6 wee ks earlier , Filangier i had invaded C

yp r

us with the

inlent ion

of

co

mp

lete ly r

ed u

c ing the island, which was already largely in the hands of the Imperialist

Iacuon.

In tendi ng to re lieve the besieged fort ress of Dieu d ' Amou r, besieged by Filangier i, the Old rd of

Beirut lef t 50-

60

dismou nted sergeants 10 hold th e village o f Agridi then proceeded alon g a nar row pass

towards the fort in 4 divisions, in the hope that the Lombards wou ld co me d

ow n

and jo in bait le.

His vanguar d was co mmanded by his sons Hugh an d Balian with Anseau de B

ne

; t he second division b)'

Haldwin ; the third \ly Jo hn of Caesa rea : and th e f

ou

rt h by King Ienry and

th e

Old

rd hims

el f

with

his o ther sons an d neph ew Jean. Th eir fo rce was sho rt of horses and probably in a ll tot alled only

abou

t

ho rsemen, as oppose d to aho ut Imper ial ist cavalryvt he la tt er including Cyp riote Tu rcopoles

a r

u T ripo lita nian and Ci

lk i

an mercenaries .

Th

e Lombards, seei ng thi s inferior force, descended fro m their st ro ng po sit ion higher up the pass and

atta cked in 3 divisions, with Filangieri commandi ng the rearguar d. Th e im pet us o f the Lc mbard

vanguard's charge ca rried it c lear beyo nd ' the lbeli ns, upon wh ich it fled the field . The seco nd

division , however, f

ou

ght a fier ce hat tle wit h the first 2 Ibe lin divisions

unti

l Co unt Berard, its

co mmande r, was unhorsed by Anseau de Brie an d killed hy the Ihe lin infantry who had come up from

Agridi, as were man)' o ther Lom bard horsemen. More than 60 o f th e ir knight s were killed , and 40

more captured, while of the lbelins

on

ly one kn ight was killed , and he in error by an Ihelin

infant ry man .

Pita nglcri. meanwhile, wit h

t he

bu lk o f the

1,000

Imperialist cavalry , had been prevent ed from co ming

to Co u nt Berard s aid hy Ba lian d ' lbe lin who, with a handful of kn ights (5 , o f who m o ne was th e

chro nicler I' h ilip of Novaru). had distr act ed and disorgan ised his division hy co nsta nt harassment in

the

co

nfined space o f th e pass un t il the Im perial l egat e was forced 10 0 ee.

T he Lom bards' vanguard d ivision, whic h had failed to re tu rn to th e bat lie , was la ter tr a pped in a fos se

before Gastn a and its

co

mmand er and abou t 100 mo re knights were captured there. Dieu d 'Amour

was me anwhile relieved .

60



DARB SAQ 1237

Whilsl bes ieging the Moslem fort ress of Durbsaq a Frankish

army

unde r William de Mont ferrat , the

Templar Prece pt or of An tioch , was

su r

prised and defeated by a Moslem relief force despa tched from

Aleppo . William had been warne d of the enemy s ap proach by Ch rislian pr is

on e

rs in Darbsaq bu t had

failed 10 act on the info rmatio n, as a result of which his

army

was cut to pieces and he him self killed .

More tha n 100 other Tem p la r br

ethr

en died as well as 300 cross bowmen in th eir emplo y and a

numbe r of secular kn ights. Th e Moslems th emselves allegedly but highly impro bably) lost 3, 000 men .

GA Z

A 1239

A det achmen t from King Tiba ld of Navar re s crusade set out to a t tac k an Egypti an force in the

vicinity of Gaza reported 10 number only ab out 1,000 men . The Fran kish force pro bably num bered

some thing be tween 1,500 and 2,000 men. including 500 cavalr y, under Co unt Henry of Bar.

Un

fo r

t

unat

ely, however, lhe Egypt ians were co nside rably superior in numbers and their slingcrs and

crossbowmen encircled the Frank ish army as it paused

fo r

a meal amongst the sandhills and du nes

nea r Gaza. At length realising th eir mistake several of the nat ive Syrian Franks withdrew , bu t Count

lI enr y refu sed to ab ando n his infantry in the face of the enemy.

The ensuing bat t le was shor t and bloody. The Fran kish crcssbowm en at first seemed like ly to succeed

in dr iving Ihe Egyp tian missile-men from the dunes but ra n

ou

t of crossbow bolt s. Th e kn igh ts th en

charge d into a na rrow valley between two du nes where they could she lter fro m the devastating barrage

the Egypt ians were layi ng do wn, scat tering the infan try who a tt empted to hold it against them.

Almost simultaneo usly, however, the Egypti an cavalry arr ived and , feigning n igh t, drew the knights

back into t he open where, unable to manoeuv re th ei r heavily laden mo un ts in the deep san d, they

were pick ed o ff by the Egyptian archers and cu t to pieces by the caval

ry .

Th e sources di ffer regard ing the number o f casualt ies, bu t it wo uld seem tha t 1,000- 1,800 men were

killed and at least 80 kn ights and 250 othe rs ca ptured; ano ther re po rt gives I co un t, I S knights and

500 o thers ta ken capt ive. Count Henr y was amongst the slain. Th e main body of King T ibald s army

subsequentl y withd rew to Acre.

KUZA DAG H 124 3

Invad ing th e Rumi province of Armen ia, a Mongol fo rce under Baichu, includingGeorgian and

Arme nian auxiliaries, a tt a

ck e

d Erzerum and razed it to th e grou nd aft er a b

rief

siege. They then

wit hd rew to win ter on the plain of Mugha n, but in response to belliger en t threats from the Selj uk

sul tan o f Rum, Kai Khosrou

, they march ed out again, th is time towards the Seljuk positio ns in th e

pass of Kuzadagh nea r Erzinjan.

Baichu , wary of the large numbers o f au xiliaries in his a rmy, disbanded a nu mber o f Geo rgian and

Armen ian units as unt rus two rt hy and dist ributed the res t amo ngst his Mongol

troo

ps to prevent

dese rti on or t reachery. On the day of battle his command is repo rted to have bee n 10-30 ,000 st rong,

prob

ably his own Touman o f 10,000 and 20,000 auxiliar ies. Kai Kbosro u s army was clearly la rger,

some

sources cla iming 100-160 ,000 men. include d Bcdouins, Georgians, Syrians from Aleppo , 2,000 or

more

Frank

ish mercenaries {chie fly Cypr iotes) and pro bab ly a co ntingen t of Trapez unt ine Byzan tines.

T he batt le itself was indecisive. Th e mai n part of Baic h

u s

Armenian and Geo rgian aux iliarie s de feated

the Seljuk s right flank, whe re a number o f amirs wer e killed , tho ugh the Seljuk lef t successf ully dr ove

back the Mongols. Nightfall ended hostilit ies and both sides encamped

on

the field , but du r ing the night

the Seljuk forces evapo

rate

d, and when Baichu launched a su

dden

a

ttac

k against the Seljuk camp at

first ligh t th e nex t mo rning it was found to be deserted. It seems tha t Kai Khosrou , dubio us of the

loy alty of man y of his amirs (who wished to surren der), had slipped away through fear

of

tre ache ry,

and his army seems to have fo llowed su

it ;

altern atively

it

may have been his a

rm y

wh ich slipp ed away

first

On disc

over

ing the Seljuks ni ght th e Mongols suspec ted that it was a ruse intended to d raw them into an

ambush. The ir pursuit was theref ore del ayed by a fu ll day , bu t even then many Seljuks we re over taken

and killed. Kai Khosrou himself esca ped to Ankara. Thereaft er the Sulta n of Rum became a vassal of

the Mongols, paying an annualtrib ute o f 12 million Hyperperes , 5,

00

0 sheep, 5

00

camels and 500

pieces o f silk.



l. A FO RBIE GA lA 124 4

Allied to al-Man

sur

of lIoms and an-Nasir of Kera k, a Frank ish arm y under Ph ilip de Montfor t and

Count Waiter de Brien ne o f Jaffa marched against as-Sat in Ayyub, Su ltan of Egypt. In add ition to 6, 000

Fra nks , incl udi ng infantry, Cypnote knights, co nt ingents from th e Military Orders (Hospital, Temple,

Teut onic Knights and St Lazarus) and Turco po te cavah y, th eir com bined army included 4-5,00 0 or more

Syrian an d edou in cavalry.

At

la

Forbie , near Gaza, an Egypt ian army und e r the ami r Baibars co nsistin g o f 5,000 elite troops and

10 ,000 me rcena ry Khwarizmian cavalry

opp

osed them.

l M

ansur

advised Ihat th e allied arm y should

fo rt ify th eir camp an d ac t

on

the defensive since the Khwarizmians were unhapp y

alla

ck ing st ro ng

positions and wou ld probably deser t , ther eby forcing the wit

hdr

awal of th e r

emai

nde r of the infer ior

Egyp tian fo rce. Co unt Waile r, how ever , insisted that they sho uld adv ance and engage the Egyptia ns

immediately , an d un f

ortun

ately his co unsel prevailed .

C

on

fron ted by t he

Khwarizmians,

most of th e Syrian s

of

th e allied cen tr e took to nigh t when

counter-a tt ac ked; on ly th e 2,O

OO s lro

ng oms

co

nt ingent did no t flee outrigh t, fight ing th e ir way off

the field in good orde r desp ite suffering perhaps as man y as 1,720 casualties, Th e d

epar

ture

of

the

Syrians, follow ed pos t-haste by the Bed ou ins posted on the lef t flan k, lef t th e ir Frankish allies on th e

righ t hopelessly outnumbered. These the Khwar izmians now at tacked in flan k while t he Egypt ian s

pressed in on the ir fr

on

t (alt emauvely the Egypt jans may have fled, leaving the Khwarizmians to encircle

the Franks).

After several hou rs of ha rd fighting Ihe Fr ank s were r

out

ed .

Em

oul say s

that

bare ly a quar ter o f the

arm

y esc

aped

, bu t they may have lost as ma ny as 5,00 0 dead . 325 Hospitaller s, 3 12 T

emp

la rs and perhaps

297 Teu tonic Knights were killed , only 12-65 (5 -26 0spitallers, 4-36 Ternplars and 3 Teu tonic Knights)

ma naging to escape, the Maste r of the Temple bei ng amongst the dead. The Lazar co nti ngent

(possibly about

40

men, ce

r

tainly no mo re ) and th e

Cvpnore

co ntingent o f 300 me n were wiped out.

In add iti

on

the Egypt ians t

oo

k 80 0 pr isoners, including Co unt Waiter and th e Master o f th e Hospital

(both of

whom died in captivit y) and perhaps 100 o the r

brethre n

o f the Military

Or

ders , Not with

out

reaso n has this ba t t le bee n descr i

bed

as 'a second Ha lt i n'

El . MANSURAH 1250

After capturing Da

mictta

during th e Seventh Crusade, an army o f 2

0, 000 crusaders unde r King

Lou is IX o f France marched o n Cairo . Althou gh la rgely French in composition, incl uding 1,80 0

-2 ,5

00

knights and 5,0

00

arch ers , the a r

my

also incl uded

400

Achaia n knights,

200

English knight s un der Earl

WiIliam of Salisbu ry, and about 700-1,000 Hospitalfe r , Templar, Cyp

no

te and Syrian Frankish knight s.

Their advance was held up for nea tl y 2 months by the Egypt ian s' defe nce of a canal j us t n

or t

h of El

MJnsurah , the Bahr as-Saghir , hut eve ntu ally a local Co pt revea led a fo rd to the m 4 miles 10 the east nea r

the village o f Salamun . T

wo day

s later the ca valry

of

the Frank ish a rmy crossed t he canal by th is fo rd ,

the plan being for them to th en ride bac k al

on

g the canal to cover the c ross ing o f the in fan t ry over a

make

shift woo den bridge. However the vanguard u nde r Louis' bro ther Rober t d 'Ar to is,

co

mprised o f some

some 1,500 knights inclu din g Q Tcm plars. fa iled 10 follow these instruc t ions and once acro ss ro de

st raigh t for the Egyptian camp. Th e Moslems were caugh t comple tely by surprise and driven from thei r

camp and in to El Mansurah with heav y losses, their commander Fakr ad-Din being killed in the

co nfusio n. Hut de spite thi s ini t ial succ ess when the Franks follow ed t he nee ing Egypt ians into th e

town they were rou ted hy 2 r namluk regiments commanded by th e emir Baibars, the Bahr iyyah an d

Jamdariyyah, and shot down by arch ers posit i

on

ed o n th e rooft

op

s, pe rhaps as many as 1,

00 0

-1,500

Frankish horsemen being killed inclu ding Robert , th e Earl of Salisbury , most of the 200 Englishmen

and 285 Temp ters.

The ma in body of F

rank

ish cavalry under jns Louis, wi th the elemen t

of

sur prise now lost, ma naged

to secure a brid gehead only af ter a ha rd Iighr, the Egy

pt

ians only being finally driven back whe n the

crossbow-ar

med

Fr

ank

ish in f

antr

y began to cross b)' their hast ily comple ted causeway towards

nightfa ll, By thi s time at least a third of the knights were dead and man y mo re were without horses, and

alth ough they succeeded in ho lding the bridgehea d against a fie rce night-a ttack the Franks no longer

had th e st rength 10 advance furt her. 3 days later another Egypt ian

at t

ack was repulsed afte r heavy

fighting in which me con tingen ts of the Military Orders were almost annihila te d,

62



Aft er ano

ther

8 weeks, with disease ram pant throu gh out th e Franki sh ca m p, the presence o f an

Egyp tia n flo tilla o n the ca nal in t hei r rear pre ve nt e d further supplies ge t t ing t hrough fro m Dami etta and

finally forced Loui s to with draw . Ra cked by disease and hunger th e Franks we re su rro unded a nd

d e st roye d as the y withd rew a

fter

a running ba tt le wit h t he Egyp tia ns. When t hey rinall y surrendered

th e sic k an d weak p erhaps to talli ng 7,00 0 ) wer e massac red by their ca ptors. Of t he o ther 2

0, 0

0 0 or so

survivors Louis event ually managed to negoti ate th e re lease o f 12,000 by t he surrender of Dami ett a

and the payment of a hu ge ranso m of o ne mill ion go ld be aa nts.

Although Lou is remain ed ac tive in Ou

tremer

for a fu

rthe

r 4 years his arm y ne ver again e xceeded a bout

1,400 men a nd the disaster o f El Ma nsurah ef fect ively ended the Se venth Crusade.

PELAGONIA 12 59

In 125 9 N lchacl

o f Epirus for me d an allia nce

with

Achaia and Sicily against the Nicae a n Empire,

prin cipall y to disp ute Nicaea s possessio ns in t he Balkans. Against t his array a Nicaea n

army

was mu stered

unde r t he

Emper

or s half-b

roth

e r J o hn Palaeologus, co mprised o f 1,500 Hungarians,

30 0

Germ a ns, 6

00,

1,000 o r 5,00 0 Se rbs, 500-1 ,500 T ur ks, 4

,000

Cumans and Ala ns an d an unknown number of Bulgars

all these co n tingents being cavalry), as well as Stavs a nd Anat olian Greeks, probably to talli ng in all

20-25,00 0 men . Jo hn s princi pal reliance was placed in t he va riou s co ntingen ts of horse-archers, who

pr ior to th e ba tt le persistently har rassed the Epirotes and th eir allie s and pe rm itted th em no rest day

o r night.

Th e Eplrote s t hemselves num bered so me 8, 000 cava lry and 18,00 0 infantry. Of the ir allies t he Ac haians,

unde r Prince William Villehardouin, mustere d a n equ al number of cavalry an d 12,00 0 inf an t ry , an d th e

Sicilians 400 first-class heavy cava lry, pro bably o n barded horses, an d perhaps 2,600 Sarace n archers

th is woul d

ex p

lain th e discrepancy in the figur es of 40 0 and

3, 0

00 Sicilian s qu o ted by Akrop olites and

Pac hyrneres res pec tively ]. T he

Ephot

es a lso included an unk nown nu m ber o f Vlachs under Michael s

son J ohn. T he to tal all ied force s th erefo re mu stered in e xcess of 50, 00 0 men .

Ito weve r, t heir advantage in nu mb ers was negat e d by dis

trus

t and dissension a m on gs t the various

co ntingents - William, fo r inst a nce, was almost certainly ac t ing entirely in his o wn int erests an d , with

his better q uality tr o o ps, proba bly intended to impose his will o n Michael a fter the de fea t of t he

Nicaeans. Mich ael cert ainly suspected the lo yalty of the Achaians and d uri ng t he night before t he

ba il ie larg e n umbers of Epiro tes slipped awa y. Th at sa me night a sq uabble with t he haug ht y Achaians

alie nated th e Vlachs, and th is led t o th eir le ad e r, Jo hn , secretl y se ndi ng messenge rs to the Nicacan

cam p as a result of which it was agreed that he and his troo ps wou ld withdraw from th e line a t th e

co mmencement of battle.

So o n th e morni ng of the bat t le the Achaians seem to have fou nd the mselves

t to face the x tcaeans

alon e , since d uring the nigh t Michaelll himself appea rs to have dese r te d, th e remainder of his fo rce

presu ma bly following su it at firs t light.

is possible that he did in fac t re main , but was inac tive during

th e battle beca use part of his

son s

agreement with t he

xicae

e ns was tha t Michael and the Ep i

rote

s

sho u ld not be a ttacked.I

Prince William at first co nside red e xecuti ng a hasty with d raw al , but failed to do so. Instead t he Fr ank s

drew up in fo rmation and charged. The Nicaea n co unter-attac k was spearheaded by t heir 300 German

merce naries, wh o

were delibe ratel y sac rificed to abso rb t he impact of t he initial Fra nkish charge.

Beco ming inex tricably mixe d with th e Achaian ca valry th ey began to s uff er heavy losses, desp ite a

simulta ne ous atta ck in William s rea r by the Vlachs.

John

Palaeologus t hen o rdered his T urkish, Cum an

and Hungaria n ho rse-arc hers t o fire int o th e whole e ntangled mass o f cavalry, with co mplete disregard

for the lives of the G erma n mercenaries th erein. T heir volleys were direc ted principally at th e Franks

unarmou

re d ho rses, so th at the Acha ian a nd German k night s fe ll in large

number

s beneath t his barrage

as t heir horses wer e mowed dow n. Th e remainder th e n bro k e and fled.

Few ac t ua ll y escaped. Th e batt lefield was lit te red wit h th e co rpses o f t housa nds o f Fr anks, and th ose

who lived we re most ly ca ptured by t he Nicaeans Tu rkish ligh t ca valry. T he

40 0

Sicilian cavalry who,

o ne suspects, p

robab

ly declined to get involved in the one -side d battle since they appear to ha ve

suffered no losses, surrendered to one of the Nicaean gene rals. Prin ce WilIia m himself was t aken captive

63



while hiding in a haystack, and 30 of his no bles were also captured . In fact the nob ility o f Achaia were

prac tically ann ihila ted in this on e batt le.

A IN JALUT 1260

An Ilkhanid army of 10.000 cavalry under Kitbugha, ch iefly Mongol-offlcere d Tu rks but including

Georgian and

Cilician Armenian tr oo ps, was defeat ed by a superior force of about 12

,000

Mamluks

which included Khwartzrnians and Bed

oum

auxilia ries supplied by the Ayyu bids of Kerak.

Th e Mam luks sent forward an advance guard o f Egyptian t roo ps specially chosen fo r t heir un reliability

and poor morale ; these were

comm

anded by the amir Baibars, now com

man

de r-i

n <

hief of the Mamluk

army. As anticipated, they broke and ran in the face o f the Mongols ar row sto rm and first cha rge,

drawing Kitbugha on int o a pre-planned ambush in the hills where the bulk

of

the Mamluk army under

Sultan QulUZawait ed them, filling

the

valley f

rom

side to sid e. These withstood the Mongol charge

and success fully enveloped their fla nks. The flee ing Egypt ians o f the first line now also rallied and

returned to the fray.

Despite their inferior it y in numbers the Mongols nea rly succeeded in brea king through, the batt le

rema ining in th e balance until midday when they were rout ed in a fina l counter-a ttac k. T hey rallied

once near Betsan, hut br

oke

aft er ano ther fierce figh t. Th ose that co uld fled , but th ey suffered severe

losses in the pursuit , which took the Mamluks 30 0 mi les to the very banks of the Euphrates. Kitbugha

himself was either killed in battle or cap tu red af ter his horse had been sho t unde r him and promp tly

executed, his head being used for an imp romptu game of polo

Not long after this victory Baibars had Qu tuz murdered and himself procl aimed Sultan,

JAULAN 1261

A large Templar force

under

the Marshal,

com

prising most of the kingdom s breth ren

th

e co ntingen t

of the main convent being joined by the garrisons of Safed , Beaufort and Chateau Pelerin], plus lay

knights under Jean

d

lbe lin and the Marshal of the Kingdom , mou nted a raid against a large

Tw

coman

encampmen t near Tiber ias. Th e Turcom ans, however, go t wind of their ad vance and soundly repulsed

them , presumably in an ambush. In addition to those killed 16 Templars were captured , plus Jean

d

Jbelin and several other counts and lay kni ghts. the Templars in addition losing all their ha rness ; the

prison ers were ransomed for 20,000 bezants. The Templar Marshal was blamed for the de feat and

t

emp

orarily lost his hahil and was removed fro m o ffice.

MAKRY PLAGI 1264

A Byzantine army, including

Tzak

o nes, Stavs and Turk ish cavalry, was defeated while campaigning against

the

Achalan

Franks.

Th e Byzant ines 6 ,000 Turk ish aux iliaries, disgruntled because the ir pay was 6 mo n ths in arrears, decided

to offer their ser vices to the Franks, who readily accepted. The Franks then advanced towards Kalamata,

but o n the rising crest of the pass

of

Makryplagi their vanguard was amb ushed by the Byzantine forces.

The Franks we re twice repulsed as fresh Byzantine uni ts successi vely eme rged from ambush, bu t o n their

third att empt they successfu lly sto rmed the ridge when the Tu rkish auxiliaries simultaneously appeared

in the rear of the Byzan tines and rou te d them. Seeing th is t s Byzantine units still concealed in hiding

panicked and abandoned their position s.

The Byzantine co mmanders, the Grand Domestic Phill s

and

Makre nos, we re cap

ture

d toge ther with 354

nobles and o fficers

and

5,030 o the r ranks. Philes died in cap tivi

ty ,

while Makrenos was blinded by the

Byzantines

afte r his release, fo llowi ng acc usations o f collabo

ration

with the Franks.

CAROU BLlER 1266

Following Mamluk raid s through Gali lee , King Hugh II1o f Cyprus ( regen t of Jerusalem) launched a

cou

nter-raid towards Tibenas, mustering the co ntingents of the Military Orders and the mercenary

French regimen t fro m Acre . However the vangua rd, including the Hospitallers, becom ing careless and

getting separa ted fro m Ihe main a rmy in search of loo t, was ambushed by the garrison o f Safed. 45

breth ren were killed in the batt le, while many of these who escaped were massac red in a nigh t attac k

on thei r cam p by local Bedouins.

64



ALBISTAN 127 7

To th wart a p

rojecte

d invasio n

of

Syr ia by

the

Ilkhanids, Baibars

ent

er e d t he Jilia n and in

terce

p ted th e

IIkhanid ar my , wh ich was co m prise d o f the Mon gol garr ison

of

R um , divisions un d er T u k uz each

of 1,0 0 0 or mo re men , includ ing 3,00 0 Georgia ns) a nd proba bly a similar nu mbe r o f Ru mi T ur ks u nd er

t he Per vana Kee per o f t he Seals ) Suleiman. T he IIkha n Abaqa had , in fact , been forewarne d of t he

Mam lu k a tt a ck by Kin g Leo III of Ciltcla , b u t th e Pervana -

who

was hatch ing an am bitious pl

ot

of

his own - de liber ately suppressed th e in form a t io n a nd lulled the Mo ngols into a false sense of sec uri ty

so th at when the Ma mlu k army ap pea red

it

ca ugh t the Mongols un prepared.

T he

2

ar mies met at Albist an. T he ad van tage was wit h Bai ba rs from t he ou

tset

since h is ar my n u mbered

in excess

of

3

0 0

0 0 me n,

but

t he Mongo ls gained

some

headway before the Mamluks p ut t hem t o

flight ;

prob

a bly th e terra in wa s no l su it a ble fo r t he Mongols mode o f warfa re , and J o h n Ba got Gl uhb

says t hat they in fac t fo ught o n foo l bec ause of t he mountainous ter rain. What ever t he reason , t he

Mongols wer e routed wit h ap palling losses; 6 ,77 0 Mo ngols and 2,0 00 Georgia ns we re killed, inc ludi ng

T u k uz, a nd th e Seljuks proba bly suffe red

about

t he sa me number of casualties. In addi tion

Baibars executed a ll t hose Mongols w ho we re taken pri soner,

though

he spa red the Se ljuks.

Soo

n a fte r, hearin g o f

the

ap

proa

c h, o f a mu ch la rger Mongol

a rmy

un d er

Abaqa

himself, Baibars

with dre w to Syria. Aba qa t he n had th e t reacherous Perva na Sulei man arrested a nd pu t on trial; he

was fou nd guilty no t o nly o f deserting t he army in t he face o f the enemy bu t a lso of actually arra nging

fo r t he Mamluk invasion, a nd was pro mptly e xec uted as a trai to r .

HO MS 128 1

2 Mongol arm ies invaded Syria u nde r Ilk han Abaqa and his bro t her Mangu Tim u r. While the

former

proceeded 1 subdue the Marnlu k frontier fort rcsscs al

on g

th e Eu phrates, Ma ngu was joined by Georgian

and

Cilici a n Arm e nia n t roo ps under

the

ir kings Dimil ri an d Leo I Ru mi Sd j u ks, and a

sma

ll n umber

of

Hospita ller s

from

a l-Marqab a nd proceeded dow n

the Orontes

valley wit h his army 3 0

80 0

0 0 strong,

the G eorgia ns and Armenians co nst ituting abou t o ne-

third

o f t he to ta l p erh aps 30,

00 0

me n) . O utside

Horns they encoun

tered

t he Mamluk arm y un der

Sultan

Qala un .

T he

Marn

lu

s

nu mbering 50 60 000, fo rmed up with a l-lIa lqa, Ro yal Mamlu ks and Egypt ians in the

cen tre, Bedouins and Ayyubids from Ha mah a nd Ker a k 011 the righ t a nd Sy rians and Turcomans on the

left, wh ile Mangu dr ew u p with the Mongols formi ng the centre and left an d the bu lk of the a llied

conti ngents - Cilicians, Georgians an d Hospitallers - consti t uti ng the right Flank.

Des

pite

hea vy losses t he Ch ris tia ns

of

t he Mo ngol right routed t heir

u rcornan

oppo nen ts

and

the

I

: OOO

men

of

t he Mamluk left fla nk ea rly in the ba ttl e a nd p ursued t he m from t he fie ld r igh t up to t heir ca mp

be fo re t h e ga tes

of

Ho rns , where t he y killed many more. Man y

of

th e su rvivors th en fle d on to wards

Egyp t, while the vic t

ors

loo ted the aba ndoned

camp.

T h e Mongol ce n t re wit h w hich

they

ha d now lost

to uc h meanwhile cont inued to press the Ma mlu ks, until a Mamlu k officer, pretendi ng 10 desert ,

succeeded in pe ne trating the Mo ngol ran ks an d wo unded a nd un horsed Mangu. Simu ltaneously a band

o f 300 Be do uin auxi liaries attacked th e Mongo l le ft flank and proceeded to plunder the baggage t rain.

Unnerv ed and fe

aring

encirclement Mangu orde red a with drawal, and the Marnlu ks la

unched

a fin al

ch arge t o cle a r the fiel d. Whe n t h e iso la

ted

Armen ians and Georgians learn t

of

th is th ey im

mediate

ly

turned bac k t o rejo in t he main ar my, passing so close

10

Qa laun s com mand

post

- where th e S ultan

had a guard o f o nly 1,000 men - Ihat he had to

conce

al his s

tandards

and silence h is dr u ms for fear

o f d isco very. But on ce t hey had passed he fe ll u po n t heir rear and h a rassed th eir withdrawa l so t hat

the y suffered heavy losses as they foug ht t heir way ou t , especially since t hey also bu m pe d in to th e

Mamlu k right fla n k as it re turned fr

om

it s successful p u rsuit of Mangu. In fac t Mon gol losses suffered

du ring the

pursuit

we re ap

parently

heavier t han durin g th e ba ttle , b ut Mamlu k losses had also been

heavy.

ACRE 1291

Encouraged by rio ts within the cit y, a Mamlu k ar my o f 6

0 000

ca va lrY 100·160,OOO infant ry and

92 siege-e ngines co mmenced t he siege of Acre on Ap ril 5. T he Frank is h garrison, un der the absent

King Henry Il s br

ot

her Amalr ic , consisted of o nly 7-900 knig h ts and 14-18,0 0 0 infan try co mp rised

o f the Military O rders, Syria n an d Cy prio te Fr an ks, th e me rce nar y Fr ench regime n t u nde r J e a n de Grailly,

65



an English contingent u n der a Swiss m

er

ce nary o ffice r named

Ot t

o d e G ran d iso n, Pisans, Venelians an d

t h e Co mmune

of

Acre . Rei nfo rcemen t s o f 200 k nights a nd 500 in

fantry

under King Henry him self arrive d

from Cy prus o n May 4 .

On Ma y I S, 6 week s a fte r t he

commencement

o f th e siege, th e cit y s

ou ter

wall fell,

undermi

ned and

breac hed in seve ral places by th e Moslem engines, an d t hou gh t he bre

thre

n o f the Military Ord er s we re

a t first successful in dr iving

out

the Mamluk s, by eve ning the F ranks had bee n for ced t o wit hdraw

behind th e in ner walls . J ust 3 days lat er th e inne r wall was also breached in t he vici nity o f the Accursed

T

ower

and the Mamluk s fought

the

ir way in to th e ci t y in the face

of

s tiff o p positio n fro m t he Military

Orders in particula r, t he Temp lar Gra nd Master and t he Marsha l o f the Hospit al bei ng a m

on

gst those

kille d in t he ch ao t ic s tr ee t-f igh t in g whi ch e nsued . Bu t the M

amlu

ks pe netra

tion

to t he in ner ci ty

mar ke d th e e nd

of

orga nised

resistance.

King Hen ry, Am alric and so me o t h er s, including J ea n de

Grai

lly an d O n o de Gra ndison , escaped by

shi p t o Cy prus ,

bu t

mo st of

t he def

enders and a huge numbe r of ci t izens died in th e s

treets

o r were

cap

tured an d so ld in to slavery Th e su rviving Tempta rs and o the r ref ugees

con

ti nued t o ho ld out from

their for t r ess by th e sea un d er t he c

ommand of

their Marshal, but on May 28, 10 days a fter the fa ll o f

the ci ty , th eir d

ef

ences wer e breach ed as a res ult

of

unde rmi ni ng and in cess an t bombard men l. 2,000

Mamluks the n storm ed t he b reach , on ly 10 bring the cru mb ling walls down on Moslem and C hr isti a n

alike .

T he Frank s abandoned T yr e the day afte r the fall o f Acre, and Beirut an d

Sidon

fell to the Mam lu k s in

J uly. With ju st 2

exce

ptions no ves tige o f the mai nla nd c rusader sta tes remained by th e end

of

t he

sum

mer, t he ex

cep

tions b ei ng t he lordship

of

Je bail, wh ic h su rvived u ntil 1298, a nd the

offs

hore T emplar

fo r tres s o f Ru ad at To rtosa. which fe ll in 1303,

WADI AL-KHAZINDAR SALAMIYET) 129 9

Th

e co nversion o f the Ilkh an id Mon gols to Islam in 1295 did lit tle

or

n

ot

hing 10 lesse n th e ir enmi ty

t owards th e M amlu ks, and in 1299 th e Ilkha n

Ghazan

Mahmu d launched ye t a no

ther

Mon gol invasio n

o f Syria. T h is

time

t hey we re intercep ted by the M

amlu

k ar my a t Wad i a l-Khaz

indar

. T he Mo ngol army ,

which in

clud

ed Geo rgians and 5,

000

Cilician s, is recorded as 100,000 st ro ng but was in Iac t much

smaller , possibly fe we r in number

tha

n th e Mamlu ks 20-40,000.

Ih

e Maml u ks we re led by Su ltan Mohammed , bu t si nce he was

only

a child a

senio

r

amir

, Sa lar, took

co mmand on th e ba rrlefietd, Il l fo rmed

the

Ma mlu k for ces up with 5,000 Bedouin a uxiliari es o n t heir

r ight Ilan k, t aking com mand o f t he ce n tre h imself while ano the r

senior amir

, Bektash, co m ma nde d

the

d t

T he Mongols deci ded to remain o n the

defe

nsive and wer e

or

de red 10 s tan d fast unti l Gh azan

himself led t he c harge.

F or so me reason t he Mamluk s decided t o rel y o n t heir swo rds an d maces and p u t t heir lances and

bow s?) aside. T heir adva nce was p re

ceded

by

mount

ed

eng

inee rs eq ui

pped

with naptha tubes , b u t

t hese see m to ha ve had no ef f ect and co nseq uen tly the cava lry cha rged. Bek t ash successfully br o ke the

Mo ngol right and pu rsue d it fr o m the fiel d ,

bu t

o n t he o pposi te flan k t he Mamlu ks me t fie rce

resist ance, the Mongols having d ismounted 10 ,000 o f

thei

r men who no w sto o d be hind th eir horse s a nd

pou red volley s o f arrows in to the c harging Mamluk s. T he Bedo uin s an d Syrian co n t inge nts see m t o have

su ffe re d par ticul arly severely , lo sin g large n

umbers of

ho rse s, a nd wer e fo rced to fall bac k.

Th ou gh st ill h ard-pressed by Sa lar , G haaa n chose t h is mo me n t to la un ch h is cc u n re r-a t tac k. T he elit e

Mam lu k Burjiyyah re gi me n t br

oke

in t he first c harge, and a fter a br ief e ngagement a sec o n d c harge

routed t he res t o f t h e Mamluks. Th e Mo ngol p urs uit took some as far as G aza a nd J erusale m, while in

ad di tion 12,000 Leb anese Dru zes se rio usly harassed the Mam lu ks as they withd rew . Mo ngol casualt ies

ap pea r 10 have to talled

some

14 ,000 me n.

Damascus fe ll 10 Gh a zan early in 1300 , and fo r a while t here seemed a possibility that

Chr

istendom

stoo d a c ha nc e o f rega ining Sy ria by an alfiun ce with the Ilk ha n w ho , Mo slem t hough he was ,

w

oul

d have welco med Ch rist ia n a llies. No thing was d o ne howeve r, a nd the o p por t u nity evap or ated

afte r th e Mo ngols de fea t by th e Mam lu ks a t Shaqhab in 1303. In 1308 his successo r O ljeitu act ually

rea ched J erusalem itsel f and r um o ur had it th at he wou ld have handed th e cit y o ver in e xch ange fo r

a Chr istian all iance . Bu t no such all ianc e was

offe

red , a nd th e death in 1304 of the p rn-C

hns

tian IIkh an

Gh azan reall y en ded for eve r th e c han ce o f a Mon gol-bac ked crusade r kingdom.

66



DRESS AND EQUIPMENT

2

3

1

2. PILGR IMS

Th e dis tinguishing fea tu re of all crusaders was the cross, worn on the shoulders of the ir mantles or

cassocks or tunics o nce the y had declared th eir inte nt ion to go o n a crusade.

Alt hough the sho ulde r or right breast seem to have been the most commo n places to wear the cross it is

also reco rded worn be tween the sho ulde rs (a ppa rently signi fying th e pilgrim to be return ing from

crusade). It normally co nsisted o f a cruci form piece of clo th sewn o nto every day clo thes. Traditiona lly

it was red in co lour hu t, although this was generally th e case , by th e Third Crusade of 1189 -119 2 cert ain

co lours had begun to ado p t nati ona l mean ing - red for th e French , green fo r the Flemish, whit e for

the English an d yellow for the Germans. To a cer tain extent these dist inctions lasted into the 13th

century when , for ex am ple, Simo n de Montfor

t

s a

rmy

at Lewes in 126 4 wore the whit e cross of the

crusader , while the Fr ench who fought against Manfred of Sicily in 1266 wore red crosses ( the

en terprise having been declar ed a crusade). By the very end of this period, however , the red cross had

become a national insignia of no t the F rench but the English, while co nversely the white cross (often

on a blue backgrou nd ) was nationally adopted by the French ra the r than the English Undoubtedly

cr osses of an y co lour could be found in any army at any time, depending on what material was to

hand at the moment of ta king the cross ; man y nobili ty, for instance , wore crosses of such subs ta nce

as woven gold.

These figures are ty pical of the non-comba tants who accompanied the early crusades in vast numbers.

Bot h da te to c. 1170 and wear everyday cloth es. T hey carry the character ist ic s taff an d wa llet or

scrip-hag, the latt er suspende d from a shou lder-stra p.

Although some carr ied a how or spe ar most were unarm ed or o nly poorly equipped with farm implements.

and it is a hear t-fel t plea from more th an one contempora ry chro nicle r that more such pilgrims of the

early crusade armies migh t have been equipped w it h th e swo rd ins tead of th e wallet and the ho w instead

of the sta

ff

3. FRANKISH KNIGHT c. 1097

Th e development of armo ur in the crusader states followed exa ctly Ihe same course as in Euro pe. Since

th is has already bee n discussed in Arm ies of Feudal Europe it is no t in tended to cover the subject in

de t

ail again and the following 6 figures sho uld be taken on ly as a represent ative sele ction.

67



6

a

is gene rally a

ccep ted,

qu ite r ight ly. that k nigh ts o f th e F irst Crusade a

nd,

10 a lesser ex tent th e

Second Crusa de wou ld have bee n lit t le differen t from th e Norman knights depic ted in the Bayeu x

Ta pestry and t his co nclusion is borne ou t by th is figur e who t hough he da te s 10 t he mid-12t h century

represents a knight o f the F irst Crusade. Il l. car ries a kite-shield wen

s

a co n ical helmet with or with o u t

nasal} and a kn ee-length - . sleeved haub rk and is a rm ed w it h lance and sword.

Il

l.

ca r ries t he c rusade r de vice o n helm

et

an d go nfalon an d co u ld also have had pai nt e d on his sh ield.

An E nglish knight of the Fi rst C rusade is described as having crosses o n his helmet shield. sa dd le a nd

horse

acco

utre ments and cert a i nly d uring th e earlier crusad es kn ights carr ied t he cross device c hiefly

o n shield and /o r hel me t. S hield s were o the rwise pa inted in br igh t co lo u rs and pa tt erns man y

probably rese mh li ng Baye ux Ta pest r y type s; Albe rt of A ix desc rib ing cr usad ers a t Antio c h in 109 7

spea ks of shie lds o f gold green red a nd ot her colours.

At what sta ge cr usade rs wh o stayed o n in the Hol y La nd gave u p wearing the cross is a n u nan swerable

qu estion . A ppar e nt ly so me never did th oug h seems probable t ha t t he majo rit y of se tt lers d id so so o n

a fter ful fi lling thei r pilgr im s vo ws.

4 . FRANK ISII KN IGHT

c.

1 150

Th is figure is very litt le

diffe

rent from t he last t ho ugh in ac

corda

nce with prevailing fash i

on

h is tu nic

as well as his haube rk is so mew ha t lo nger. T h e hauberk no w has wrist-le ngth sleeves which bec a me

standard in th e co urse of IIn

12

th cen tu ry. Th e cross is again in eviden ce o n his helme t.

Light er form s of ar mou r such as th is w

oul

d have remained in u se amo ngst se rgeants for much o f t his

era.

5. FRANKISlI KN IGHT c. 1 189

T his fig ure is based o n t he seal of t he most fam ou s c rusader o f the m all King Richard I o f England

know n 10 post

erit

y as Richard Coe

cr

de Lion - Richard t he Lion -Heart. The seal was probably ex ecuted

imm ediately prior to his depa rtu re fo r t he Third Cr usade.

68



T he sleeves of the ha ube rk no w have mail mill ens attached , and in ad di tio n separate mail d ef en ces

called hose n or c hausscs} arc worn to pr

ot

ect t he legs. Cha usses ha d bee n in use since the mid l th

centu ry bu t o nly ca me in to widespread use

abo

ut a

centu

ry la

ter

ce rta in ly the y we re standard

equipment

for wealthie r knights hy th is dat e, a nd the aut

hor

o f the lt inerarium Regis Ricar d] no tes

with ala rm how Richard wen t in to b attle at Ja ffa without his ch ausses.

Ilis helmet is he misp herical rather than co nical ; a flat- topped varie t y co u ld also be wo rn , an d Sa, from

Richa rd s sec ond seal o f a fe w yea rs later , sho ws a nother t y pe of hel me t with a face -guard, jus t

beginn ing to

appear

at about t his d ata; no te also the e arly c rest. Another earl y occ urre nce of a crest is

in a n inci de n t at t h e siege o f Tyre in 118 7, wh ere a knight is recorded wit h a pair o f stag santlers

to his helmet.

T h e shield displ ays Richard s heraldic de vice ,

two

ramp ant lio ns facing each o ther , which also appeared

on t he back of his sad d le. Herald r y evolved in abo ut the mid- 12th century and , in Outremer, may have

bee n e ncou raged by th e Sarace ns use of perso nal dev ices.

6. FR NK ISH Kl \IGHT c. 12 50

By 123 0 the h elmet t y pe de pic ted in Sa had evolved in t o th e barrel-helm the casq ue o r hca ume j

de p ic te d her e , padded o n th e inside and with ey e-slits and bre a t hi ng holes pier ced in t he mas k. A

q uilted head -defen ce, t he arming cap , was usually wo rn under the coif from c. 1200 onwards .

O th er di fferences from the las t figur e are the addition

of sur

coa t and cuisses. T he former was m os t

probably adop ted in im ita tio n of Sara cen dress, poss ib ly as ea rly as e. 1 127 whe n a knigh t is re corded

by Usarnah ibn-Mu nqi d h to have worn a lon g, sleeved green a nd yello w silk co at o ver h is a

rmo

ur. Its

use was pro b ably fa r mo re widespread in O ut remer t han in Eu rope , whe re it was not widely worn u n til

t he ea rly- 13th ce n tu ry. It was usually sleeveless and at f irst plai n in co lour, b ut afte r t he in troduct ion

69



11

of heraldry

it

oft en disp layed the wear

er s

heraldic device. In Ihis pa rti cula r instance tht su rcoar, as

well

:IS

the lance

penn

on , displays crosses. The upslanding cross at each shoulder may indic

at e

he is

weating s

om e

form of reinforced leather cuiri or iron breatpla te

under

the surcoat.

Cuisses weTe

qui ll ed t ube

s w

or n

over the thighs as add itional pr

ot e

ction . They first

appear

c. I 220 an d

arc common thereafter.

7. FRANKISH KNIGItT

c.

1275

Taken from th e w-alof Jo hn de Monlfort, lor d of Ty re and T

or o

n 270-1283 , this figure show s little

change from 6 ex cept th at he substitu tes a banner for the latter s pen non .

ke 6 he carries a fla t-topped

shid d ( th is type fiu t ap peared c. 114 0 and was the predominant shield-type by the 13th century. its

size de creasing som ewha t as tim e wen t by) .

More interest ing is the cl o

th

co vering for his horse, the housing. In Europe thi s only Iirst appeared c. 1185

bUI

it

may have ap peared in

Ou t

r

em e

r at a som ewhat earlier date under Moslem

influence

(see

93 ,

some

Frank

ish hOUlS possibly wearing

ho u

sings at Hatnn in 1187. Qu it e probably some consis ted o f several

layers or wer e quilted . in which case they wou ld have been quite capable o f

st o

pping Tu rk ish ni ght

arr ows

except

at close range. The housi ng was also

useful

(or displaying the rider s hera ldic device,

for which purpose it was already bei ng used

for

the en d of the 12th century.

8. FRANKISH KNIGHT

c.

1290

This figure, based o n mss. illustrated in Acre be tween 1280 and 1291, sho ws how knights we re equ ipped

du ring the kinlldom s closing yea rs. The barrel-helm has bee n replaced by a ty pe called a sugar-loa f

afte r ilS shape (t hough th e heaume also remained in use) and he carr ies a cross-emblazoned shield.

Colo urs of cross and field on crusader shields in the Acre mss. ind ica te that practically an y co lour

co mbinat ion was poss ible, irrespective of he raldic rules , including red on black , brown on red, red on

mauve. blue on ye llow, e tc. The cross itself also ap peared in diverse forms an d shapes.

An ached to his chausses are iron poleyns ( knee-guards), which could also

be

attached to the q uilted

cuisse. Ot her pieces of plate-armour in use by th is t ime bUI un

commo

n until the 141h cent ury were

70



co uters

elbo

w-guards which, like poleyns, probably first ap peared c. 1225) and sch

yn b

alds {greaves,

pr o

tect ing eithe r the front or both fro nl and back o f the lower leg). There were also shoulde r pieces

called aile ttes which first appeared c. 1270 , bu t these we re of lea ther ra ther than met al; the ir

defensive value remains questionab le.

9 . FRA NKISH MOUNTED SERGEANT

In addit ion to knigh ts the re were also ar

mo u

red horsemen of lesser statu s available to the Fr ank ish

host, re ferred to variously in the sources by the terms milites gregarii, milites plcbei, cq uites lcvis

arma turac , serjans

cheval and servte nres lor icati am ong

othe

rs; all refer to mo

unte

d men o f less than

knightly status including sergeants (servientes) , the no n-knight ly elements of nob lemen s re t inues and

pro bably the wealt hier burghe rs o f th e tow ns. They are no t alway s easy to find in th e so urces, which

often list only t he n um ber of knight s prese nt , excepting, as Fu lchcr of Chartres admits in o ne passage,

those who were not counted as knights although th e) were mounted.

T hey were less heavily equip ped than the knights he nce Ievis arma tu rae ) , wearing lighte r o r old

fash ioned armour hut carrying the same a

rmame

nt o f lance and swo rd. This mid- f

Jr h

century figure

fro m Matthew Paris dr awings o f crusade batt les is probab ly fair ly typ ical.

In stric t feudal terminology

th e

sergeant was, by t he late-

12th

cen tury, the holder of a grant of land

called a sergean ty ( in Europe usually half th e size of a knight s fee) , but co ntempo rary chroniclers

mo re often tended to use the word- sergean t and its variants as blanket

-ter

ms fo r all non-knigh tly

soldiers,

often

no t even distinguishing between mounted men and infant ry. Turco poles too are

sometimes described as sergea nts.

1

0,1

1

,1 2

13. FRA NKISfI INFANTRYMEN

Infan try in the crusader stat es ranged from pilgrims armed with no more

than

spear or bow (see I and 2),

th

ro u

gh to well-armed and a

rm o

ured mercenaries an d feuda l retainers, th e la

tt e

r e lements comprising th e

la rgest percentage o f foot-soldiers in

most

armies, arme d chiefly with spear, bow or crossbow though

some may have been eq uipped with both spe ar

an d

bow. The Anonymi Gesta Franc

orum

records

crossbows in use as early as the First Crusade, as does Ann a Comnena, and certa inly by th e middle 10

late- Lj th century the crosshow was th e weapon par excellen ce of th e Frankish infan tryman.

10 and I I are based on desc riptions o f th e 12t h century. Beha cd- Din, writing of Frankish infan try at

Arsouf in 119 1, desc ribes how they were clo thed in a kind of th ick fel t , and mail corselet s as

am p

le as

they

were s trong, wh ich protec ted them again st arr ows. I have see n men with up to 10

arro ws stuck in th eir bodies marching no less easily for tha t. Ambroise, de scrib ing t he same battle,

likewise records that the infantr y were a rmed qu ite well ac cording to the cu s

to m

of foo t-sold iers,

(w

it h

) head protected by an iro n cover, (and ) a hauberk and a linen tun ic padded man y times and

difficult to pene trate, ingeniously worked wit h a needle and consequently called in the vernacu lar a

Pourpo int. Such q uilted corselet s, t

ho u

gh known in Europ e for several cen tu ries, o nly came into

widespread use d uring the Crusades t

hrou

gh co ntac t with the Moslems, amongst whom quilted armou r

was a

stand

ard form of body -defen

c e I

see note 35 -38 ); the Moslems called it al-Qutun , li

te r

ally

c

ott

on , a te rm which the Fr an ks soon co rrupted to Aketon (see figures 26-28 in Armies of Feudal

Eu rop

e )

. G ambeson was an alte rna t ive term tha t first ap peare d c. 1160 , possibly d iffering

from th e ake to n in having sleeves. Basically all such arm our consisted of a leather , line n or woollen

tunic padde d wit h woo l, cott on and old rags and qu ilted eit her vertically or diagona lly.

12, based on illust rat ions in an Acre ms. of c. 1280, gives a general idea of the ap peara nce

of

such

armou

r,

in this instance

1

such cor selets being worn one over the o ther (possibly ake to n over gambeson). Figure

13, similarly dating to

th e

la te-13th century, subs ti tutes mail co rselet and surcoat. Both wear mail

chausses in addit io n.

Unlike spearmen, crossbcw men and arc hers appa rently car ried no shields. Although most shield s were

like

th o

se of 10 and 12 it should be no te d

that

some o f the mss. illum ina ted in Acre as late as

1290

· 129 1 show circular shields in use amongst Fra nkish infantry, on e ms. o f 128 7 even

depi

cting oval

shields such as 12a .

T he clo thes o f Franks in Out remer were o f co t to n. wool, line n an d silk. Colours were generally bright,



a

principally fed, H C O an d y el lo w, a nd a ls o

bl

ack, those

of

th e

UPrc'Tclasses

often being richly

cmhwido:rcd in r.olJ a nd c ol oured thread. Th

Fran ks W(' TC' generally cleanshaven by the

mid·

:: Ih

cent u ry . o n e co n temp or ary

pilgrim no

ling

t hat of all

th e p<'orlcs

of Outreme r t hC y 'ar e t he o nl y

one who sh llve rh beard

Fo r o

ther

infantrymen

of

thi' . era see 'Armies

of

Feudal Europe', In 3ddilion . in crusading armies

many

knlgh ls were Ir qu nl ly reduced to the roll'

of

in fan

tr y

tly

th e 10000s

o f their horses.

1-' . T URCOPO l E

Turcopnlcs 111

...

r Sy rian me rce naries em p loyed in considerable numbers b ' th e :Iol ilitary Orders

well a hy th e kinll and Frankish no bilit y.

Des

pite

111\' sra temc

ms

o f R. C Smai l in his '

Crusading

\l rfu c th at t here see ms litt le j us t ification

in

assuming,

on the ha§i§ o f

rhe s ca nt y i n fo

rma

ti o

n usually

quo

ted.Y ha t all Turcopoles were bo rn

ho

rse

me n

an d

c l ~ r s

and ,

of

hor se-archery, '

th a

t thenr is no reason 10 su p

po s

e Iha t many na

uvcs

o f

Sy ria wer e adept in us uve , it s

eems

fairly ce rtain that the Tu rcnp

nl c

s were a ll

hors

e

me n

and that

all hou gh nol a ll were oeco:ssari ly ar med with a bo w by far th e major ity we re. Th ose OIl Sarm in in 11 15

were ce rla inly arche rs, an d Usamah ibn-Munqid h act ua lly ca lls th e T urco polcs ' th e archers o f Ihe

Fra nks : in a

ddit

io n a ch

ronic

ler of me Third Crusade, describing an engagemen t w

it h

Hyzun

nn

c t roops

on Cyprus. wro te like a swift T

ut c

o polc d id the Emper

or

r i.Il , an d sho t 2

ar r

ows

l rhe

king.

Funh cr Ihat

they

wen' mounted ma y be infer red

Irom

Ill,' w

or d

ing

of

Mns

km

t rea t ies, suc h

as tho se o f I ( , 7 , I and I

all o f which eq ua te 'a knigh t for a kn ight , a Turco pole f

or

a Turcopole,

a

merchant

fo r a

me r

chant ,

fo o

t-soldier fo r a foot -soldier'. S

aladin.

dic ta ting terms for Ih,' s

urrende

r

o f Ja Ha in

1 1 < ~ , l i

~ eq uat ed knigh t fo r horseman, fool -sold ier fo r fo

ot

-soldie r and Turco p

cl e

for

ligh t-armed so l.lk r ; in all

these

tns tanc s rh very specific f oot-soldier fo r foo l-so ld ier' d e ar ly excl udes

the 1 UreOl'II1\ 5, by which \l e may

lake

it the y were mo unted. William of Tyre states q

uite

s pe,ifica lly

that they w... re ' lill.hl· r

me ,

1 horsemen',

Al firs l Ihe y we re prohahl)' ma inly ha lf-hr ds, Syr ian nanves

an d

Turk ish co nverts. hUI la te r they

included

a ,rea l ma ny Po ulain se rgeants who wer e pro bab ly eq uipped 10 figh l Sar u

ce n

-Ias

hi o

n,

Dr. J. Riley-Smilh s u g j ; ~ s

th a

t by the l J th

cent

u ry th e 100Tm Tu rco pol e

r d e

rred 10

th e

func tion

ra

ther

t ha n the race of the hol

de r

' .

In addition 10 111

0:

bow the Turco poles wo uld have carried J ligh t lance alllUor Javeli ns plus a swor d and



16

p ossib ly a mace. Whe ther t he y wen. ar

mo u

red or no l is a mo o t point. As alr eady s een. William of T y re

a nd Salad in bo t h desc ri bed the m as ligh t-ar med , but that is also th e st

andard

contemp orary descr

iption

of Saracens, ma ny o f who m wo re light o r not-so-ligh t armour. T he fact tha t T urc op oles were o fte n

must er ed alo ngside th e knigh ts wou ld te nd to sug gest that the y wo n: light ar mour o f so me desc r

iption,

even i o nly q uilte d al- Qut u ns, a nd it is in tere st ing 10 no te that when G uy de Lusignan first cs tabtished

fie s in Cy p rus in 1 192 th ose of T u rco p oles o wed th e service a man with mail ar

mo u

r as well as 2

h orses).

t see ms p ro bable Iha t t ho se em ployed by t he Militar y Or ders wo u ld have ear ne d so me kin d of recognition

device, pro b

ably

a cr oss

of

t he a

ppro

priate

co

lour ) o n shield a nd / o r tunic. tConrrere bret hren and

mercenaries of t he Or de rs p

robably

ca rried sim ilar devices: we hear , for instance. o f shie lds w it h ch ief

gulc s a cr oss argen t, indica ti ng allegia nce to the Hospitallcrs.)

15 . MA R O N IT E O R SY R IAN C tl R IST

IAN

T h is sh o ws the pro bab le a p pearance of Maro n

ue

s a nd the few Syrian soldiers in Fra nkish armies. T he

nati ve Christ ians wo re t he same basic d ress as Mo sle ms [ Burchard of Mo un t Sio n sa ys t hey we re

disti nguished b y a woollen girdle ) a nd were in fa ct fo rb idd en by legislat io n to wea r Fran kish-st yle

cl o thes. T hey also diffe red from the Fr ank s in growing lo ng bea rds o f whic h t hey we re e xt reme ly

prou d Jac q ues de Vit ry rela ti ng ho w th e y cherish the m w ith grea t cure, and speci all y glory in them ),

T he co mposi te bo w was th e princi pal wea po n o f t he a nd de Vil ry re c o rd s t ha t the fe w

wurhke Syrians also use bo ws and a rrows, hu t are un armourc d and ready fo r run n ing a

way

th ough

t his may be a r

ef

erence to T ur

co p

oles).

Som e Mar o nit e chieftains a tt east fou ght o n horse bac k and wore ar mo u r , and var i

ou

s sources a t test the

la king o f co nside rable am ounts o f ar ms and a rmo u r fro m the Mo slems, whic h

W;l S

undo ub ted ly reused

ar te r ca p t u re. Man y ar mo ured Maro nite s wo uld t herefore have bee n in d ist inguishab le fro m Sar ncens,

a nd

t

was fairly certai nl y fo r the p ur pose of recogni tion t ha t o ne Maron it e chieftai n is recorded as

having the sign o f t he cross o n h is ar

mo u

r. Som e Fra nk ish eq u ipm

en t

was un doubtedl y also in use.

16 , 17 18. CILl CI AN AR MEN I ANS

Th

e Arme ni an pr incipal ities relied c hiefly on ban ds o f paid r et ainer s largel y na tives b u t in

cludi

ng

T ur ks, Persians and Fra n ks ) and milit ia infa n try , In e qu ipm ent and o rganisa tio n F rank ish infl u

ence

73



8

soon came to pre dominate (part icu larly under Leo

11

, 1198-1221 ) an d feu dalism was introduce d from

neigh houring Anlim:h , lhc t itles Cunstab l and Baron being adopted in place o f th e old

Spar

apc t and

Nakha rar. In ad di

lio

n there were some Armenian kni ght s even in Edessa and Antioch, of whom 17

is pro hahl y fair ly represen ta tive.

16 and 17. based o n Cilic ian ms. illuminat io ns and one of the Acre mss. of c. 1280, are fair ly ty pical

of Crliclan Armenian borscmen, comprised of the nobility and their re tainers . Both wear mail

corselets, that o f 16 being of a distinct ively lJyzantine design. Frankish eq uipmen t probab ly

prcdom inatcd by the 13th century. some la te - l J th century and earfy -l

at

h century Cilician mss.

showing warriors indist inguishable

from

Fr ankish knights (

tho

ugh simple hel

mets

of

the types

worn here appear to haw bee n worn in prefe rence to t he Frankish heaume}, but it seems likel y that

a

mix

tu r

e

o f Byzantine, Moslem and Frankish gear was in widespread use througho ut most o f t his

era :

figure

ce

rtai

nly be trays evidence of all 3 sty les. Shields were either circular or kit e-shaped, the

lau

ap pa ren tly adopt

...d

pr ior to the Crusa des, probably un der Byzant ine influence.

18, like 17 based on Frankish mss o f c. 1280-1290 , wears typical orien tal garb . Th e cap is o f a type

worn by bo th Jews and Armenians in the so urces and was ap parently a co mmon form of headwear,

even am ongs t Franks. Many Armen ians wore tur ban s, and all wore bea rds. Commonest infantr y

weapons were low and spear.

19 20 21. BR

ETlIR

EN OF TH E MILITARY OR DERS IN lt ABITS

19 wears th e blac k hooded man tle, the cappa cla use, of the Hospital, with a wh ite cross sewn on ;

the

cross, a

dop

ted at some time

befor

e 1153, was p

robably

qu ite small in realit y, Rile y-

Smith

sta ting

it to be o nly

J

or 4 inches dee p. Th e cha racteristic g·po inted cross o f the Hospitallers, shown in 19a ,

seems to have been introduced du ring the first qua rter of th e 13th century bu t did not completely

replace the cross rorm ee and was apparently no t worn with milit ary dress . A blac k skull-cap officia lly

completed the habit , th ough white tur bans were of ten worn in Out remcr . A broad-brimmed hat (l ike

that

of

2) co uld also be worn.

20 wears the habit o f while woo llen tunic, mantle and skull-cap granted to the Poo r Knights of Ch s t-

t he Templars - in 1128 ; prior to thi s da re th y dressed like sec ular knights, wearing d

onate

d cast-offs.

T he red cross was w

or n

by all br

ethr

en fr

om

1147 onwards. Oth er items o f official issue dress included

linen shirts. tunic, breeches and sh

eeps

kin jer kin. In addi tio n, however,

some

breth ren o f bo th Temple

74



and Hospital wore more wordly garments such as brigh t silks and gold or silver embro idered clo thes and

tu rbans.

2 1 is based o n the tomb ef figy of Conrad o f Thunngja, lI oc hmeister of the Teutonic Knigh ts I 239 -124 J•

Like the Templa rs - and despite their

op

positi

on

- th ey wo re a while habit, their r igh t to wear this

being secured for them by

the

Holy Roman Emperor Frederick (King of Jeru salem 122S-1228).

The cross was black . Sergeants luter wore a grey habi t with a 3-armed Tau cross like a capita l I

(also called a cru x commissa), and it seems probab le Ihat this dress was also worn in 131h century

Ou tremer. Bea rds were obligatory in all 3 Orders.

Th e following gives br ief details of the othe r Milita ry Orders active in Outremer (see also pages 10-15) :

Order

Knights of the

Hospita l of St Lazarus.

Knights of St Thomas

of Canterb ury at Acre

(St Th

oma

s Aeon ).

Knights of Our l ady of

Mont joie (Knights o f

Tru fac aft er 1187).

Histor y

A leper Order. Established

early-12th ce n

tury

.

Probably turn ed military

c.

1123 .

An English Order.

Established I 191. Proba bly

turned military c. 1220.

A Spanish O rder. Papal

conf irmatio n 1180. Withdrew

from Ou tremer aft er Hattin

in 1187 and returned to

Spain. Absorhed by another

Spanish Order, the Knights

of Calat rava , in \ 12 \ .

Habit

Black ?

White.

White.

Device

Green cross

from 16t h

century.

Red cross wit h

whit e scallo p

she ll at centre.

Part t-c

olc

ured

red and white

cross.

Readers may also be int erested to know that in a crusading treat ise of 130 5 it was proposed that all th e

exi sting Milita ry Ord ers should be united ; had t his been done the new Order s habi t was to have been

black wit h a red cross.

75



22

23

:: :: .l 4. KNIGHTS

TEMPlA

R

An avid

admirer

o f th ... T

empter

s. SI Bcrnerd de Clairvaux, proud ly

wrote

in the 1

2th

century that Ihey

wen

:

ill k

empt and

unwa

shed, wi

th

their

beards

wild an d

their

hair c ropped sho

rt ,

r ee king of d ust , soiled

by

their

a r

mo

ur an d the heat : Ill.

vic torlan

adag.

abo

u t cleanliness be ing next 10 Godliness cle arly had

no plac

...

here

is

taken

fro m a map of Jerusale m da ting 10 c.

1170.

li e wears a long, wh ite su

rco

at an d ca rr ies a wh ile

shield

with

a red

cross

paint ed

on

it.

A

cros

s-emb

roide

red sur

coa

t.

apparent

ly ad

op t

ed by th e Templars

relat ively early in th eir hist o ry (som e authorities men

tion

cloaks ), replaced

the

cassoc k on active se rvice;

th is was

white

excep t for conrrcrc bre thren

and

sergean ts. the la tt er

of

whom wo re surcoats

of

black , or

brow n or so me o

the

r pla in

colo

ur. In fact a second figure in the same source wears a dark but o the rwise

ide ntical surcoa t to t hat w

orn

here and , despite

no

c ross being appar

ent

o n his shield, he may well

rep rese nt a sergeant. In all cases

the

cross was red.

co mes fro m fres

coes

o f a simila r da te in the French church

of

Cressac,

depicting

Templa rs fight ing

Sar ace ns. Il l appears 10 wear

eithe

r a lo ng-slecved su

rco

a r or so me form

of

cassock over his a rmour,

though o th crs wea r more typica l sleevele ss surco ats. he mix

tu r

e

of

dress

and the

absen ce

of

beards

wh ere c

hins

are visiblc, toge the r

with

the

person

al

her

aldry appn rcn t o n so me shields (as here),

tends

to suggest

tha

t th cse frescoes may depict a mi

xtu

re

of

kni ghts, sergean ts aOlI

con

frerc b

re t

hren.

However it

should

be

not

ed t

hat

it is not kn

own

for ce

rtain

how l a

dy

Tcmptar sh ields were de c

ora

ted ,

though it is

probable

(s ince some means of ide

nnfic

a

no

n

wou

ld have been necessary

from

the ver y

earliest

day

sl tha t they carried c rosses from the very beg

mnin

g. Howeve r, exta n t versio ns

of

t he O

rder

s

Rule

which

p

robably

pre

dat

e 114 7 sta te that no

decoration may

be a

dde

d to br

ethren s

sh ield s o r

lances, hu t p

robably th

is refer s o nly 10 pe rs

onal

he raldry, : 3a

depicts

a Tcmpla r shield as it

ap

pea rs in

the best -kn ow n

Tempter

sea ls,

th ough

proba bly sh ields such as th os e carr ied by 8 and were mo re

co mmon; the diagon al a

rms

are p

rob

a

bly

strengthening b

an

However

4 ,

who

is based on an illustra

tio

n of Templars in M

al l

hew Par is mid·13th centur y

Chr

on

ica

76



carries an alternative type of shie ld, painted black an d white like th e Orde r s b anner Bauccant

(sec 27a and b).

Regulation arms consisted of lance , swo rd, dagger, mace and shield. addit ion all arm ou r - comprising

hau berk, chau sscs, helmet and later foo t and shoulder pieces - was officia l issue . One interes ting point

regarding arm ou r is that amongst th e Military Orders mail mi tte ns with separate fingers were apparently

forbidden as being a luxury

25

26. KNIGHTS 1I0SP ITA

lLER

25 repres

en t

s the pr

obab

le appearance

of

a

12th

century Hospitaller knight. The v

oluminou

s, enveloping

mantle , worn over their arm our on act ive service, must have imped ed the wearer consi derably in battle,

and in 1248 a Papal Bull final ly au

thor

ised the ad optio n of a wide , cross-embroidered black surcoat

(as worn by 26) as a r

emedy

fo r the fact tha t when you are wea ring the ca ppa clausa over yo ur armou r,

which hampers both your hands and your ar ms, it makes it easier for your enemies to

at t

ack you and

harder fo r yo u to d

ef

end yo urselves , The surcoats of brot her knigh ts were changed to red in 1259, sti ll

with the Or d

er

s white cross sewn upon

them

, th e w

earin

g

of

red surcoats bein g extended to brother

sergeants

from

1278. Ho

spualle

r D

onat

s wo re the unif orm of bro ther kn ight s.

As with the

Templar

s, it is not known in what way early Hospitaller shields wer e de

corat

ed tho ugh

probab ly most car ried a cross. The Hospita ller s apparently only universally adop te d a red shield with a

white cross u

nder

the Grand Mast er Nicholas de Lorgne ( 1277- 1285). Unlike the Templars

there

is a lso

a fair chance that at least some la te-12th and 1

3t h

ce ntury Hospit allers, probably the senior office rs,

bore the ir ow n coats-of-arms on th eir shields

or

so on e must assum e fro m 13t h century Hospitaller

legislat ion rep

eated

ly - and apparently unsu ccessfu lly - fo rbidding the decorat ion of arm s an d

equipment ). By the middl e to

lat

e t

centu ry Gran d Masters of te n quar tered the ir personal arms

wit h the arm s

of th e

Orde r.



3

io

I

1

b

d

27

c

28

3

b

29

27 . STAN DARDS O f T HE MILITA RY ORDE R S

173 a nd b r

epre

sen t 2 variants of th e Te mp lars blac k and wh ile banner Bau cea nl a s it ap pea rs in

xta t t hc w Paris Chro nica Maj

or

a. Its n ame, usually co rrup ted 10 Beau

e

a nt o r Beaus

eant

de rives

fro m t he Low Lann fo r a pieba ld ho rse , and Jacq ues de Vilry describes how it signified t ha t t hey are

fair an d ki nd ly to ward s t heir Irle nds, b u t b lack and terrible to their e ne mies , In use a t least as

ear ly a s 11 28 though at t hat date pro ba bly a go nf alon rather th a n a ban ner), it was app ar e n tly not

act ually carried by the Ord er s sta ndard-bearer. the Gonfano nier ; o n th e march it was born e by o ne o f

h is esq uires, and in b attl e

it

was born e by a Turcop ole t h e Gonfanonier hi mse lf t aking co mmand o f t he

esquires). In bat t le it co uld ha ve a guard o f 1 k nigh ts, a nd its loss b y a b ro ther me ant ex pul sion fr om

t he Orde r. In ad ditio n t he

Tcmpla

rs had a seco nd ary ba nner o r go nfa lon o f a red cross o n a wh ite fie ld ,

and e31: 1I cnmma ndcry had its o wn ba nner plus 3 reser ve on e to be u nfur led if t he first wa s lost.

1 7c. t hl sta ndard o f th e Hospitallers , co nsisted o f a whit e cross o n a red field ; th is par t icu lar ex ampl e is

again taken from th e Chronica Majo ru, l hough Par is lI isto ria Anglorum sho ws a variant wit h a plain

cross. T his sta ndar d was in use by

1182

a t th e la test a nd p rob a bly earlier, a nd like th e Temp lars

Baucea n t was

t he

responsib ility

of

the Order s Go nfano n ie r

but

was ca rried by an esquire.

T he ba nne r or t he Teu to nic Knigh ts, 27d, was sim ply a blac k cross o n a while field. In the O rder s

ea rly d ays t he pa tt ern o r t he cross may have bee n Io r mee ra t her Ihan plain, bu t certa inly t he lat ter

fo r m soo n

came 10

predominate. Th e sh ields

or

bret h ren d isp layed t he sa me blac k cro ss o n a wh ite field.

18. TI lE ROYAL BANNE R

T his depicts th e ban ner o r t he Kingdo m o r J er usalem. Contra ry to the hera ldic rules o f tinc tu re wh ich

78



co nde m n th e use of m etal on metal it co nsists of yell ow o r gold cro sses a cross pot e nt be t wee n 4

Lati n cross lets) on a white o r silver field. Earlier 12t h cent ury exa m ples o ft en sho w t he large cross with

sma ll balls rat h er t han ba rs a t

th e

en ds of th e arms. Th is banner ma y have bee n ado pt ed as ea rly as

Baldw in t s reig n 1 100- 11 18), his o wn being described as wh ite in contemporary so urc es th o ugh no

device is me nt ioned. In battle th e royal b

anne r was ca rried by t he Marshal of t he Kingdom.

Th r

oughout

thi s e ra most Chri stia n ar mies in

Ou t

re mer carried in add itio n o ther cross-embroidered

n ags as well as t he no blemen s heraldic go nfa lons a nd ba nners.

29. Til E TR UE CRO SS

T his wa s a holy relic often used by t he Fra nks as a ba tt le standard afte r 109 9 , suc h as at t he Fir st a nd

T hird Battl

es of Ramla 11 01 and 110 5), th e B

attl

e of Sarmin J 115), Ha b

J

119 ), Yib neh

1123

),

Bosra 114 7), Asca lo n 1 153), Mon tgisard 1 1

77 )

, and Ha l t in I 18 7) wh er e it was fina lly lost to t he

Sar ace ns.

t

was a lways carr ied by a cleric , often the Patriarc h of Jerusale m himself but othe rwise

an arc hb ishop , bisho p or ab bot. It s bea rer a t lIa lt in, t he Bishop of Acre, wor e the ar mour of a knigh t.

29a is based o n an illustra t io n in t he Chro nica Majo ra depicting t he cap t ure of

th e

Cross at Ha t fin ;

Imad ad-Din , who wa s prese nt a t t he bat tle, describes it as cased in go ld a nd

ad o

rned wit h

pear

ls a nd

precio us sto nes, F ulcher of Cha rtres likewise reco rding it to have be en pa r tly cove red by gold a nd

silver . 29 b is an alterna ti ve re nde ring of the Cro ss, as it ap pears in a Histo ry of Ou tre mer ms. e xecuted

in Rom e in 129 5.

Ot her similar standards we re a lso in existence, Roge r of Ant ioch, for exa mp l e, having a large jewelled

cros s with him at Ager Sanguinus in 1119.

30 . FATIMID INFA NTRYMA N c . 1100

Moslem infan tr y were gen erally un arm ou red . T his figure, from an 11th or 12 t h cen tury Egypt ian ms.,

is ar me d with swo rd a nd thrust ing spear, t he la tt er

eithe

r a T ira d o r a Mitre d , a ppa rently the sta ndard

te rm s fo r infan try spears . O thers might substitute javelins, called Ha rba h in Arabic , while in his

memoirs Usama h me nti on s infan try severa l tim es as c arrying on ly shield, sword an d dagger t h e la

tter

called by var ious nam es suc h as Dasha n , Si kh, Nimga and Sikhin a j. Oth er infa n try, of co u rs e, would

have bee n arc hers,

th o ugh un der t he Ea timid s t hese were chi e fl y Ar menian an d Sud anese slave

soldiers se e 33 ; .

Th e shield is

take

n fro m reliefs on

th e

Bab al-Nasr the G

at e

of

Victo

ry )

in Cairo, execu ted in 1

087.

t

is o f a typ e called Tu rs by t he Arabs, desc ribed by Murda al-Ta

rt u

si in his 12t h cen t ury Ta bsira h a

mil itary ma nua l writ te n fo r Sa ladin) as a

ro u

nd shield which covers mos t of th e holder , capable of

pr o

tec ting him fro m mos t sides and th erefore clea rly c on ve x in sha pe. t co uld ap paren tly be of

considerable circ umference a nd is usually

de p

icted wit h a rei nfo rce d rim and a boss or se veral bosses

see 33 - wh ere t he shie ld is taken Irom t he g

at e

of Qal at al-Gind i in Syr ia of 1187 - 44 and 54).

AJ-Tart u si desc ri bes shie ld su rfaces of un tan ned, varnished or paint e d hide, polished or bare wood,

and ho rse, ass, ca me l or giraffe ski ns one wonders wh et her zeb ra was used t oo ?) . He records in a ddi tion

shi elds o f cane se wn toget her with co tt o n and says also tha t some choose shields of iro n . Th e Daraqa , a

circu lar shie ld sma ller tha n the T urs, was always of hide.

His sh o rt, tighl -sleeved coa l an d tunic are t he sta ndard cos tume of a Moslem war rio r , allowing far mo re

fr do m o f move me nt than t he wide-slceved, flowing dress wo rn by ci vilians. Rou nd t he up per arm are

t he usu al Tiraz ban ds wo rn by Moslem s, usuall y st rips of

broc

ade or clo t h of a co nt rasting

colo

ur

rich ly embroide red in gold an d coloured t hread, ofte n with qu o ta tio ns from the Ko ra n, but so me times

plai n. Ibn Kha ldu n late r reco rds that t hey migh t have th e Su lta n s o r a n amlr s na me embroidered on

them .

L

A. Ma yer, in his Mam luk Cost um e , ex p lai ns t hat real T iraz in th e sense of an honori fic

for mula were granted on ly to iq ta d ars, eithe r by the Sul ta n o r an amir ; all ot her T ira z were technically

decor at ive fa kes .

3 1. FATIMID INFA NT RYMAN c. 1150

T his figur e an d t he nex t com e from a ms. fragme nt from

fu

stat which depicts Moslems an d Ch ristians

in batt le before a for tress. t prob ably dat es to c. 1150 but may be so mewha t ea rlier, so the Mosle m

warriors de picted are fa irly certai nly Fatimids.

79



T his figur e is

baref

o o t,

arme

d o nly with sh ie ld and fr inged spear, an d wears an un usual pai r o f what a re

ap parently baggy bre eches , pe rha ps the skirt o f his tu n ic pull ed up thr ough a be lt. Th e kite-shi eld was

ca lled T ariq a by th e Moslems, a ter m which, it ha s bee n sugges ted curious ly ) , evolved from th e name o f

the small, ci rcular

Europ

e an sh ield . th e T urge th is seems

impro

bable. T he T ar iq a was possibly eve n

a d o pte d pr

io r

to t he Crusad es the re are kite-shields carved o n t he Bab al-Nasr ) but ce rtainly d u rin g the

Cr usades Tariq as w

ould

ha ve e ome ava ilable in fa r larger numbers, shield s - to get he r wit h o t he r

Frankish equip men t -

bemg recorded

to have bee n reu sed by t he Mosle ms

af t

er ca pt u re fr

om

th e Franks;

al-Qa lanisi, r

eferr

in g to the equ i

pment

of Nur cd- Din s HOOps in 1 157 , speci fica lly spea ks o f Frank ish

T ariqas. The T uriq a a ppears to have b

ec o

me p

op

ular as far east as Pe rsia see 50 and

87 )

bu t drop

ped

o u t o f use in Syria d uring th e Bahr i

yyah

Ma mluk era , th o ugh al-Maqrizi still records a u nit o f youn g

Mamlu ks equipped wit h Tariqas.

Io n al

-Athir

a

ctually

reco rds ar chers in Salad in s ar my with Ta riqas, and

al-Tartu si s T a bsirah de s

cnbes

the

Tari

q a in detail. He record s it as t he shield used

by

t he F rank s and By zan tines , wh ich is

shaped

lik e

an on ion an d pa in ted

in

all so rts of co lours , d esigns a nd ar tist ic pat terns. t is a lo ng shiel d

of

a shape

a cc

eptab

le to both th e ho rsema n and the fo ot -sold ier ; it begins rou nd at t he top ). bu t narr

ow

s do wn

litt le by

litt

le an d at t he bo t to m en ds in a sharp point like the ti p of a spea r . A var

iant

o f th e Tar iqa

was t he J anuwiya, des cri be d as like a T ar iq a

bu t

wit h a fla t te ned base so th at infa ntry in a

de f

ensive

formatio

n

co u

ld sta nd th eir shields

befor

e t he m.

A sec o nd Moslem infant ryma n in th e so urce ap pears to e ar t he same breeches but is ba reheaded and

wea rs shor t , bla ck a nkle-bo o ts. Neithe r wea r T iraz hands .

3 2. F ATIMID CA VALRYMAN c. I I

T he Sara cen co at-of-mai l see ms to have gon e und er a variet y of nam es, suc h as Dir , Zard , Yel ba , Lam at

al-Har b, Zardiyya t

Sa b

ila and Zardiyyat Musbala to menti on b u t a Ie hese refer ri ng vario usly to

sh orter o r longer cor selets. Some are d esc ribed as d ragging , whi le Sabila an d Musba la mea n

fountain-lik

e ,

bo th o f which te nd to suggest that t hey mi ght reach well below t he kne e, possib ly even

d own to t he ground . Th is wou ld be un usu al, how ever . since generally Mosle m armo ur re mained

con s ide rably light er than th at o f th e Franks; th e Itin erarium Regis Ricard i, fo r in

stan

ce, d escribing

arm ou red

<IS

welt as un arm ou red Mo sle ms at An ou f in

II

Q I , says t ha t t h ey wer e n o t weig hed d o wn wit h

h ca

y arm ou r lik e o u r kni ghlS . Th is is mor e tru e o f t he Turks than t he A rabs , ho wever , a nd eve n th en

80



the re were excep tions (see 58 ); from th e sources it is appar

en t

tha t na tive Arab cavalry, as o pposed 10

Bedouins or

Turk

s, were usua lly armoured, and Mayer concludes in his Mamlu k Co stume tha t mail was

the commonest fo rm of Moslem arm our.

Th is ma n appears to wear a tur ban rather than a helmet. It has been argued tha t the tu rbans worn her e

are in fact no more than caps or co verings concealing hel mets, but since 3 1 wear s an almos t iden t ical

turban this seems unlik ely ( though still no t impossible). Unden iably helmets were sometimes

co

ncealed

benea th tu rban s, but it should also be noted th at in the 13th century Jea n Sire de Joinville wrote o f

Moslem turbans that

they

were capable

of

warding the heavy blow o f a swor d . The original

ms.

de p

ic ts

this man s tur ban as du ll red wit h black markings. They were most

co

mm only white but co uld also be

blue, black, br own or any

othe

r colour.

Though the original depicts him wit h o nly a sword a lance wou ld normally be carr ied too, bu t it is

imp or tant to note that as he is an Arab he wo uld not carry a bow. Usamah, a Sy rian Arab, do es no t

record the bo w in use by horsemen anywhere and he

ce r

tainly never used one himself ; his ba ttle anecdo tes

are almos t exclusively o f swo rd an d lance th rusts, and the Ara bs clearly relied o n t heir proficiency w

it h

these weap

on

s ra ther than the bow, though some may also have

em p

loyed javelins.

Cavalry lan ces gene ra lly

went

un der the n mes Rumh, and lIa tt iyya, ap parently all very simi lar

weap

on

s

pro

y dirrering on ly in leng

th ,

weight an d blade shape ; th e heavy Rumh occu rs most often .

Another type, the Quntariya (cf. th e Byzantme Kon t aria }, was widely used by the Franks as well and

was u ndo ubtedly a lo ng wea pon , q uite probably 12 feet. The Berber Kabarbara, reco rded hy al-T artu si,

was also

of

conside rable len gth , w

it h

a shaft of some fee t and a (sock

et

ed j

j

blade o f anot her

feel . Usamah records that c. 1120 the Arabs of Ifamah adopted an even lo nger lan ce, lengthened

by at ta

ching

on e lance to another a nd reaching a length o f 18-20 dh ira -

7-30 feet This must

he

n exaggera tion , des

pite

the fac t th a t o rd inary lances co uld cer tainly reach I S fee t. However, il

is

inte

resting to n

ot

e his descript ion of such a compound lance in use, trai ling on

the

ground like a r

ope,

the warrior una ble to raise it , w hich certainly ind ica tes tha t it was of un usua l (n

ot

to say rid icu lous )

length ; on e imagines the exper iment was sho rt-lived, Lances were usua lly of cane or wood, Imad ad-Din

writ ing of brown lan ces a t lI

al l

in.

33. SUDANESE ARCHER

Sudanese in fantry, predominant ly archers, were an important element of Egyptia n armies during the

earlier pa rt o f thi s per iod , fea turing prom inen tly in th e Fali mid era (as many as 30 ,00 0 bei ng emplo yed

by 1169 ) and less prominently under Saladin and th e Ayyu tJids. Sudanese troops do not seem to have

bee n employed at all un der the Mamluks, and aft er the fall

of

the Ayyu bids it was to be several

centuries before Negroes again appeared in large numbers in an Egypt ian a

rm y

in any role other than

as grooms or horse-boys,

Surprisingly - since so few Euro peans co uld have ever seen a Negro at this da te - Sudanese so ldiers in

Moslem emplo y exci ted l it tle o r no

co

mmen t fro m most Crusade chro niclers, from which we may

surmise th a t they were la rgely, to all appearances, iden tical to the average Ara b in all bu t skin

colouring, though at least on e lat er source reco rds that the y scarred their faces .

The unifo rms of Sudanese gua rdsmen appear to have been of ric hly de co rated brocade or dam ask , but

it should be no ted t hat ,

co

nt rary to th e impressio n created by most modern-day historian s, far from all

such soldiers were guardsmen.

Fulcher

of

Chartres, who r

ef

ers to the Sudanese as Aet hio pes, notes thei r black skin and imp lies in a t

least one passage tha t they fo ught with bow or spear. Albert o f Aix add s that they carried maces

(undoub tedly th e fla ils o r sco urges of iron not ed by bo th Gibbon and Oman) and records that at the

ba tt le o f Ascalo n in 1099 th e Sudanese archers knelt o n one knee to fir e, accordi ng to their custo m .

The ltin erarium, writ ten by an eye-witness, also mentions th e Suda nese, referring to th ose a t Arso uf

(11 9 1) as t he Nigred uli, the Negro Pack, a race o f demons ver y black in co lour , The ensuing passage

is unclear , but Am broise (t he Old Fre nch, an d possibly mo re reliable, version) rende rs the same passage

as Following th ese came a black race - Noir

et

s is their common name, or Saracens o f the ber rule

un culti vated land) - loa thsome and as black as so o t in co lour, swif t an d agile footm en armed wit h bows

and with light shields ,

81



34

35

34 SUDANESE SPEARMAN

Though mos t Sudanese in Fa timid and Ayyubid em ploy were archers some were instead armed with a

spear . and il is as one such Ihal I have inte rpreted this figu re from the SI Dents wind ows (sec no te 35

belo

w

. Th e spear co uld be used as a thrusting

or

throw ing weapon, Baldwin I bein g badly wounded in

1103 by the thrown spear of a Sudanese infantryman.

is apparen t from his simp le dress that he is no l a

guar

dsman and he carries on ly a spear an d a circu lar

Tu rs. Th latt er has a reinfo rced rim and an acu tely spiked boss like that of 3 . A swo rd wou ld have

also been currie d, and Negro swordsmen

appea

r in a list

of

Fat jmid regiments recorded c. 1047-1054.

Usamah s a

necdo

tes include r

ef

erences 10 Negro horsemen

too,

and

some

mod

ern

au t

hor

it ies - such as

Lane-Po

ole

- have even in te rpre te d Salad in s Qaraghulam cavalry as Negroes (Qaraghu lam trans lating

liter ally as Black slave ) ; m

ore

p

robably

Quraghula m merely de noted no n-

Tu

rkish mamlu ks, no do ubt

including some Negroe s nevertheless.

35,36, 37

38.

SYRIAN CAVALRYMEN c.

1150

Th

ese figures are fro m a series

of

10 painted windows once in th e monastery ch urch

of

5t Dents in

Par is. These windows, o f mid-12th cen tury date, th e commissioning of which has b

een

accred

ited

to

Louis VII s c

hief

minister Abbot Sugee, were des troyed during the French Revolutio n bu t ar e known

from sketches executed by Montf auco n in 1729 (in L es Monuments de la Monarchie Fra nqo ise in which,

alas , the origina ls were no t copied altogether clearly.

T he equipment por trayed was pro bab ly based on the rep orts

of

eye-witnesses who had parti cipated

with Louis in the Second Crusade ,

tho

ugh th e episodes depic te d actually all took place d uring the First

Crusa de. The figures the mselves arc pro babl y Syrians, representi ng Turkish marnluks of the various

askars.

35,36

and 37 all appear to wear quilted al-Qu tuns (see no te 10 ), st rengthened with scales in the la tte r 2

instances, though possibly 36 may be a very poo r representation of a lamellar Djawshan (see 48); ce rtainly

the Char lemagne window o f c. 1210 in Cha

rtre

s Cathedral, wherein certa in de tails were inspire d by if no t

copied directly from the original St Den ts windows, shows Moslems wearing co rselets th at are undoubtedly

lamellar,

so

it is possible that some of the 5 t Denis figu res too themselves wore lamellar armour. Other

figures in Mon tfaucon s sketches qu ite d early wea r mai l corse lets, some times with colfs, whi le a few,

of

which 38 is the clearest, wear scale.

82



l

--<1

0»

3 6

3 8

Helm et s arc all eithe r conical - probably the typ e called Baida (egg) be

ca u

se o f its shape -

O f

hemi

spherical, o r of Spangenhe tm construc tion. some times ap parently wit h cloth, lea ther or ma il aven tails.

Shields are circular and come in variou s sizes, o ften with acutely spiked bo sses like that of 36. Arms

co nsist chie ly o f sword and lance , the latt e r of no outstandi ng length und oub tedly res t ricted by the

conf

ines of th e illust ration area involved) ;

alt

hough a few hor se-archers are also ap paren t bows arc ,

ra th er cur iously. heav ily outnumbered by lances and no ne of Mon t fau con s ske tc hes sho w bo wcases or

qu ivers.

These par t icular figur es are taken res pect ively from sce nes de picting the bat tles o f Nicaca ( 109 7 I,

Asca l

on

1099) , Dorylaeum

( J

09 7 ) and Anti och ( 1098 ).

39 , 4 0, 4 1 4 2. TURK ISH CAVALRYMEN

Contem

po r

ary Christ ian chr oniclers generally used the term

Tu

rk t o descri be Seljuks, Turcomans an d

Sy ria ns or armies comprised mainly thereof - Salad in s armies, fo r

examp

le , are descr ibed as T urkish

even though they also co ntained many Hed

ouin

s, Ara bs, Kurds, Negroes and o thers. Of these fou r figures

two are Sy rians (4 1, fro m the Jaziru , a region of Northe rn Syria roun d Mosul , Raqqa and Diyar Bekr, and

4 2, fr

om

Raqqa) an d two are Seljuks (3 9 , from a P

er

sian ceramic , and 40, from Azer baija n; th ese are

typical

of

Seljuk warrio rs in genera l, figure s identica l to 39 appearing on Seljuk pain ted bowls as early

as th e 11th cen tury).

All 4 wea r longish topcoats with a right-over left n ap ( the Muqallab) at the fron t, plus emb roidered

hems, cu ff s and co llar ; round the u pper arms are the usua l Tiraz band s. Tall oose b

oo t

s , baggy trousers

and , in the case o f 39 , a small cap wit h a tu rban wrapped rou nd it ,

co

mplete the co s tu

meiJ

va shows the

same ty pe of turban hut without the embroide red , tra iling head hand. T urbans proper such as th at of

40 (who da tes to 1200)wer e also being worn at least as early as th e ta re- t th century . 41 wea rs instead

a fur

-t r

imm ed ha t wh ich hears a s triking resemblance to the mit re-caps of 18th cent u ry gren adiers and

was characte rised by a me tal pla te abov e th e forehea d.

Th

is st iff , tr iangula r ty pe of hat, ca lled by the

nam e Sha rb ush, was of Turkish origi n an d seems to have bee n worn only by amirs and chiefta ins as an

indic at ion o f rank , even Salad in being recor ded to have worn on e (c

on

cealing a ma il cap benea th ). It

was wor n unde r

both

the Ayyubid and Bahriyyah dynas t ies hut was la ter aboli shed the Ct rcassian

Mamluks. It ap pear s in illust ra t ions o nly from th e late-12t h century but had prob a bly bee n in use

somewhat earlier, th e illu st rat ion s themselves being principally of Rumi, Ja ziran , Iraq i and

Azer baijuni origin .

83



a

As can he seen here and in

other

illus tra tions the Seljuk and Sy rian Turks generally

(t

hough by no

means ex clusively - sec 4 1 an d 50 ) W e their hair ver y long in 3 tai ls, one at each side of Ihe head

and one at the hac k. Mo ustaches were usual ly long (Alp Arslan coul d alleged ly l ie th e ends

of

his behind

his head ) while beard s co uld be full, sho rt or very wisp y, some times comp rising no more than a

shadow o n eit her side of

jaw and a small tuft under the bo t tom lip .

As for arms, the Itincrarium Regis Ri

car

di, descri bing Saladin s largely Syrian arm y at Arsou f in 1191 ,

records that he Turks aT • almos t w

eap

onless, ca rrying o nly a bow, a mace furnished with sharp

tee th, a sword, a lance o f reed with an iron t ip, and a lightly hung knife , Some Tu rks carried in addi t ion

a small axe suspended from the saddle, The sho rt but powe rful composite

bow

was th eir principal

weapon, The

arro

ws were light, limiti ng th eir penetra tio n somewhat so that although they could pier ce

armou r th ey of ten d id no t and when they did might inflic t

only

a shallow wound o r no wound at all

(see page 37 ). T he bow was

often

slung beh ind th e l

ef t

shoulder during close combat.

The bowcase, wh ich could doub le as a q uiver, hu ng on th e lef t, while the q uiver was suspended from the

belt at the right ; these are

occ

asionally de picted th e

oth

er way round . Quivers could co ntain up to 60

arrows. In add itio n spare bows and ext ra qu ivers were o fte n carr ied. some times as man y as J of each.

so it was quite feasible for well over l arro ws to be carried. The light lance co uld be used for thru sting

or

th r

owing. but javelins might also he Carried. Small shields held hy a single, cen t ral grip were in genera l

use, tha t of 40 being of a rather un usual design; th e rose painted at the centre may w ry well he an

heraldic device.

S

words

co uld he curved like that of 47, long like that of 40, or short and straight. From its length and

shape that of 42 is q uit e d

ef

initely an Indian weap on . Indian swords st ill being held in high estee m

th roughou t the Moslem worl d du ring th is e ra, j ust as they had been since as ea rly as the 7th century .

Whe ther this was because Ind ian swords wer e par t icularly goo d o r because Egypto-Sj-ria n sword s were

part

icu larly bad is not altoget her clear. Cert ain ly al-Tartu si reckoned Egypt ia n blades as inferio r not

o nly to Indian swords hut also to Andalusian, Maghribi and Ch inese swords too . Whatever the reason,

Indian blades, e ither o f the tradit iona l type

sho

wn here or of more mode

rn

design. wer e impor ted

in to the Moslem world in grea t numbers, o ften then being rchilred and decorated acco rding to local

taste and prevailing fashio n. Captu red Frank ish swo rds also feature and unde rwent similar ad aptati

on

.

Other eq uipment import ed from India included lances an d corsele ts

(type

unspec ified but pro bably

scale and /or lamella r),

Turk ish clothe s wer e of ten of brocade or silk and were very brigh t , usuall y involving geome tr ic pat terns

or Floral or arabesque moti fs on a bright base co lour.

84



I

c

~

d

41 42

4 3 . SYR IAN CAVA LRYMAN c. 12 20

T h is A y yu bid warr ior from Mosul we ar s q uilted hip -le ng th ar mou r w it h m ail slee ves, u nd o u b t ed ly a

Kuzaghand ,

and

a h elme t w

ith

nap e-guard . Ot h er figures in t he sa me

sour

ce wear l

ame

lla r a nd mail

corselets.

T he Ku zagh and Persian Kaz haghand . caucd in west

ern

so urces a G azeganz, fro m whi ch t he te r m

Jaaeran t almost certainly evolve d ) wa s basically an early ty pe

of

Brigan d ine , so me t imes

app

are ntl y

wo rn in

co

nj u n c tio n wi t h a ma il corsele t . Al-Tart usi im p lies th at It was inven t ed by ea sterne rs

Sy rians o r Iraq is ; he d escribes

it

as a ma il co rsele t co vered in clo th a nd silk , q uilt ed ,

and

with an

o uter su rf ace o f

emb

ro ide re d material o r

bro

cade.

rec

ord

s Fa timid Kuza gha nds co vered

with brocade

and silver st ars. probab ly rivet s. Usa mah has lef t us with a de tailed de scri pfion o f o ne

o wn e d b y hi s fath er, wh ich co nsisted o f 2 co a ls-of-ma il, a lo ng F ra nkish on e wit h a shorter one,

apparen tly wais t-len gth o ver it , line d on t he inside a n d co vered o n t he o u ts id e wit h fell , t he wh ole

being pa dd ed wit h fe lt ,

rabb

it ha ir and silk and , pre sumably qu ilte d . Fr o m Ib n al-A thir we a lso kno w

th

at

t he

K uzaghand

ha d

a

co llar ,

app

arently u psta nding, wh ile la

ter

so u rc es le nd to ind icate th a t it

co u ld ha ve sle eves - as here - t ho ug h mo re

of

ten it d id not . Kuzaghands reco rd ed in use by a co n t ingent

o f Sy rian A ra bs at Ho ms in 12 80 were cov ere d with red satin and brocade , Qalqa

shand

i record ing in th e

14 t h centu ry th at cove rings we re us ually

of

red o r yell ow

bro

ca de . By the 14t h ce n tu r y, however,

Saracen Brigadines wcre manufactured in th e Euro pea n s ty lc , t he a rmo ur ele me n t consisti ng o f iro n o r

steel la m in ae rivc tt ed together ; t he resulti ng Brigan dine was ca lle d by t he name Qar q al and wa s

the

mo st

co m mon Iyp e o f later Mam lu k bod y-armou r. -

Hel me ts wit h so lid iro n na pegua rd s a pp ea r to ha ve be e n fa irly co m

mo

n du ring t h is period , Q alq ash an d i

reco rd s 2 ty pes o f hel me t in add iti o n to the

Haida

mentioned under

3 5; bo t

h were calle d Migh fa r,

o ne

with a mail

a ventail

t he Mjghfar ai-l ard t he o the r ap par ently older type with a solid

neck guard ;

4 3

probahly depic

ts a

varian t

o f t he

ta

u

r

from a

mid L

th ce n t u ry edi t

ion

o f

Jcin vine s

Memoir s. Imad

ad -Din to o refe rs t o helm e ts w ith nec kguards. 4 3 b ,

a nd d sho w ahemative he lm e ts w

ith

na sal s as we ll

as napeguu rd s from 2 ve rsio ns

of

William o f Tyre s lI isto ry o f O u tre mer

execute

d in Acre c.

128

0 ; again

writi ng o f his

fat her s

a rmour as wor n in th e

12th

c

entur

y U

samah

me n t io ns a Mosle m helmet with

a nasa l. Visors are a lso occasiona lly ment ioned but probably aventails or cotrs - perhaps like tha t

of 58 - a re meant. Baidas at least were often painted and so m e he lmets wer e even gilded as, fo r

example was Saladin s).

4 4 . SYRIA N INFA NTRYMAN

In Sy ria, Iraq

and

the I aaira infa

ntr

y a lways to ok second p lace to

the

mo u nte d military e lite o f th e

ami

rs a nd askans . Th ey were pro vide d largely by

city

mi litias suc h as Ih e Ah d a t h

and

o the r irr egu lar

volu n te e rs, a nd a p pe ar mos t fr e

qu en tl y either in bat tles in t he i

mme

dia te vicinity o f th eir home to wn s



a

b

4 3

44

or in sieges. Ce rtainly the infant ry of

some

Syria n ci ties, pa rtic ularly Aleppo, were especially noted

for their abilities as siege-enginee rs: th ese came in 3 categories - the lI ajja rin (artillery crews). Naqqa bin

mine

rs) an d Khurasan i (crews for the ra ms an d pe nt ho uses ),

Thi s Iigure, from the same source as the last, is probably fairly Iyp ical o f Syri an milin a men , com prised

chie f'ly of po orly armed and armoured levies from the indige nous Arab po pulation. Though most wer e

Arabs the militias of so me cit ies in No

rt h er n

Sy ria and the Jaair a (such as Aleppo and Mosul) wou ld

also have included Kurds and Turk s as well as peo ples of older nat ive stoc k, while elsewhere Gr eek

speaking elements also survived.

Be ing largd y Ara bs most would have been armed with spea r or swo

rd ,

but javelins and bows, an d

sornc nmes even crossbows. also fea ture prominently in th e so urces.

4 5. SARACEN CROSSBOWMAN

During the Crusades the crossbow

soo n ear ned

a healt hy respect fr

om

the Moslems fo r its acc uracy and

de adliness and they q uic kly adopted th e weapon themselves (t hough it may have been in use in parts of

Persia as early as the r th ce ntury ].

In fact the Saraccn crossbow (of ten called th e Qaws Fa rungi o r Frankish Bow) wa s a su perior weapon to

th at of the Fra nks, using a composite bow as

opposed

to the simple self-bo w used by th e lat ter . Al-Tur tu si,

speak ing o f crossbo ws, desc ribes 4 diffe ren t ca tegories - th e Qaws al-Rigl or ' leg-bow , a nam e comparable

to the 'o ne-fo o t crossbow' o f Europe) wh ich was smalles t,

prob

ably wit h a stirru p: the somewhat larger

'Aqq ar, probab ly comparable tothe ' two-foot crossbow ; the Gar h, the largest , mo unted o n a s tand for

use in siege-wor k: and the lI usban o r ass-hoppe r , ap pare ntly a crossbow with a barre l for

shoo

ting

short , t hick bo lts. slings

toncs.

or small na ptha gre nades. He also descr ibes the met hod of load ing using

:I -elawed ho ok, :Il1a.:h<d to a toughened ox-hide belt, to pull back the string.

The Franks in turn adopted

th e

com posite crossbow fro m the Saracens, realising its superiority , and

for some time Levanri nc crossbows and their man ufact u rers were in high de mand in Europe; King

Jo hn o f Eng land 's cross bow-maker, for instance. was Pe ter ' the Sarac

en ,

and King Louis IX's was

John ' the Armeniun ,

This figure is based on an illustration in xt

a nh

cw Paris' I' bro nica Majora de picting th e Ayyu bid

garrison of Kera k in 1 4 1. wears mail and a helme t o f a ty pe which frequ en t ly ap pears in

86



con temporary illust rat ions of principally in Spanis h sou rces. In the original he is

sho

wn

wearing a n arming ca p

under the helmet. T he cross how itself has bee n substituted from a 13th cen tury

Egyp tian military manual. The st irr up is o f interest since it appears to he of leathe r or ro pe ra the r th an

iro n.

46.

AYYUBID HEAVY CAVALRYMAN ACCORD ING TO MATTHEWPARIS

Illust rations in Paris'

chro

nicles and some o ther 13th cen tury so urces tend

10

depic t Moslem warrior s

in equi

pment

that mak es th em almost if no t to t ally indistmguishuble from the Frankish knight s

they

fight, a nd

the tende

ncy in t he pas t has usually been to dismiss th ese as the prod

ucts

of ar tists ignorant of

the

appe

arance of ' re ar Sarucen

armour.

However, one need o nly loo k at a few of the co ntempo rary

chronicles

10

see that this is not an al toge the r j ust ifiable conclusion.

is a well-recorded fact tha t mud

Frank

ish eq ui

pment

was reused by xtosrems after cap ture, incl uding shields, lances , swords, helmets an d

corsele ts (see 31 , 4: and 43 ) - we read , for examp le , of Arab ho rsemen at Ramla in 1101 who 't oo k up

the shields, lances and shining helme ts o f the slain an d pro udly adorned themselves' , an d one Ayyubid

warr ior at Acre in Q I similarly put on the armou r o f a Frankish knight he had killed ; ce rtainly figure

J:: above needs only to substitute a helmet for his tu rban to become a

F r

ankish' knight. The St Dcms

windows too

sho

w some Moslems in

armour

which resembles very closely that of th e crusaders they

f ight.

At th e same time Ma

tthew

Paris' illus tra tio ns also depict Moslems in more dis tinctive f

orm

s of a rmou r,

of

which this particular figUH , hascd on his dr awings of th e battles of Ars

ouf

and Bahr Ashm un , is on e.

li e wear s a

stif

f, sleeveless scale corselet ( probably based on a lea

ther foundation)

over a short coat-of

mail with a co if, and ap parently also wear s qu ilted cuisses. Whether o r nOI such

equipmen t

was ever

actually w

orn

by Egyp tian or Syrian Moslems is open [0

deb

a te, but it cer tainly was wo rn by th e

Stostems o f Andulusian Spain as explained under figu res 75 and 76 in 'Armies of Feudal Europe '.

One po int that should

noted , however, is Ihat accordi ng to

L

A. Mayor the flat-top ped varie ty of

kite-shield de picted here was never act ually

ado

pted by

the

Sarucens

th

ough again captured shields

wou ld have almost certainly bee n thus uscd t. 46a and b

sho

w

1

more ty pical shield s o f

the

Turs

varie ty f

rom

o the r illust r

atio

ns by Paris.

87



48

a

GtlD 4 9

47 AY

YU ID

M MlUK c. 1240

Since he ca rries a Tu rk ish sab re rat he r tha n t he usual sword th is figure may ver y well represe nt o ne of t he

new wave of Khwa rizrnia n o r Kipchak mamluks t o he fo und in Ayyubid

emp

loy in t he 1230s and 1240s.

In additio n steppe-influence is a pparent in his ha t wit h upturned brim ; t his was the Saraq uj, ty pical o f

Mongol d rcss t see 84 ) an d a do pte d by th e Ayyu bids and earl y Mamluks via such mercenaries. Th e Saraq uj

was usuall y whil e. In t he so urce th e t unics an d coa ts t he la tt er called T arta r coa ls - see SS a nd 5 6) of

such figures are all of rich broca de. principally blue, green o r pin k in colo ur.

T he sab re came into mo re wide spread use in t he lat c -13t h o r ea rly- 14 t h centu ry under Mon gol

tnuucncc

tho

ugh cu rved swords ar e occasiona lly de pic ted o t

record

ed in US as early as

the

1 11h ce ntury,

probably introduced from Cen t ral Asia via slave-soldiers purchased in t he East.

Note

th e spu rs fixed t o his hoots. Usamaf me n t io ns K

huf

f hoo t s with spurs b p ictoria l sou rces

ten d 10 indicate tha t sp urs were uncommon am ongst Mosle ms du ring thi s era e xce pt in Andalusia an d

13 t h ce ntu ry Egyp t.

48. S ELJ UK II EAVY CAVA LRYMAN

Alt ho ugh t he maj or il y of T u rkish cavalry seem 10 have bee n una rmou red horse-arche rs. heavy cavalry

were a lso to he fo un d in their arm ies, t hese bei ng generally sup plied by t he retin ues and ma mluks of the

amns an d o t her chief tains. T he c hronicler Bar Ile braeus ma kes muc h of Alp Arslan, t he vic tor o f

Man l ike rl , putti ng on his armour bc rore

t

battle adding tha t all the Tu rk s did likewise .

T his la l. , 1 or ea rly· 13t h ce n tu ry Seljuk fro m Al l rhai; an wea rs armour th at is of t ypically Easte rn

des ign, comprising a ma il

hood

, Persian -st yle hel me t with neckguard an d a waist-lengt h Djawshu n th a t

reac hes

only

to t he ches t.

Djawshan seems 10 hav e described a lamella r corsele t of any length and al-Tart usi says

it

wa s of Persian

o rigin. Th e lame-llae were chiefly o f iron , horn or t rea te d lea

ther

and cou ld be gil de d, varnished o r

pain ted Suh a n Kha t Khosro u I is reco rd ed wearing red ar mour in I Sc ljuk a rmour was

ap paren tly o ften blackened. T hat wo rn here may ver y well h at tached to t he tu nic i ts elf in the same

way as is 48a {wit h a lt erna te ro ws o f lamellae pa inted d iff

erent

co lo u rs), f rom a store of arm s a nd

armour de pic t ..d in a n ea rly- f J t h ce n tu ry so urce. It is possibly an armou r of simi lar length th at is

reco rd ed being wor n by a n Abbasid am ir in one of Usa ma h s a nec do tes: describi ng the Bat tle o f

Qinna srin in 1137 he

mentio

ns how a Frank ish ho rsema n s lanee pie rced t his ami r thr ough th e chest

88



b

5 0

and came out a t his back , despi te his gil

de d

Dja wshun.

51

52

Th is

man s

equipment inclu des lance, shield. and sword as

well

as a bo

w,th

ough Bar Hebraeus stat es

th at Alp Arslan cast aside his bow and arrows and f

ought

with spear and shield whe n he do nned his

arm our. The length of the swo rd should be noted , such long weapons freq uently

appe

aring in Syria n

an d Persian so urces of the 12t h and 13 th centuries. The

helmet

could he plu med .

By the 131 -13th century and pro bably somewhat earlier most Sdjuk heavy cavalry would have closely

resembled 58 and 89 .

4 1

50. SE

LJU

K I

NF NTRYM

N

Despit e th e predominan ce

of

caval ry in th eir

armi

es Sefjuk

in f

ant ry were, seemingly, no t uncommon, fo r

example fea turing pro minen tly at Myr iokephalon in 1176 , while Anna Comnena reco rds as many as

80 ,000 f ully-a rme d infantr y' opposing th e

fi

rst Cru sade at Heraclea in 109 7. They wer e usua lly

unarmoured and most were eit her jave linmen o r ar

chers

, some carrying sho rt spears too. By the mid- I : th

century at the latest crossbows wer e also in use, bec oming an important

in f

an t ry arm by the 13th

ce n

tury ; Rumi crossbowmen recorded at the Bat tle o f Akhlat in I : 30 wer e pro tec ted by large co whide

shields, presumably wielded by shield-bearers.

49 is fro m an ea rly- 13th century Persian paint ed bow l which shows a number

of

similar figures as well

as ho rsemen like 39.

Clothe

s a re depic ted mainly dark blue, ligh t blue , turquoise . brown and ran :

anc ma uvc so urces depic t red , gr

ee n

, black and most o ther co lours also being w

or n

. On the bow l

some infantrymen have their t rousers

cr o

ss-garte red .

50, from Azerbaijan Ithe same so urce as 40 and 48), is inte res t ing in sho wing tha t th e Selju ks too used

the kite-shield (some infa ntry figures on the painted bowl men tioned above also substi tute kite-shields f

or

circular o nes), and also in its depic tion of the more 'c haracteristic ' Turkish hairstyle which du ring th is

e ra seems to appea r o n ly in Easte rn frontie r regio ns and amongst the 'uncivilised' Tureo man nomad s.

50a and b are alt e rna tives from a Pers ian source o f e. I : : 5.

5 1. RUMI FIR ENK' IIE,\ VY CAVALRYMAN

This 12th centu ry figure in sho rt lamella r corselet bears a remarkably

cl o

se resemblance to co ntemporary

Bvzan rines (see, for exam ple, 66 and 67 . T his is probably be

ca u

se he is himsel f a Byzantine, possibly a

mem ber

o f

o ne of the in

digeno

us Greek Christian un its , u

nifo

rmed and armed in Byzantine fashion and

89



with their o wn co mmanders, raised and mai ntained by the Selju k Sulta ns of Rum and late r known as

Kafir-Sipahi1t'r and Mar to tos by the

Ott

omans. So me were brigaded alo ngside Frankish merce na ries

and

the gene ral term Pirenk o r Franks was often applied to the m collectively (see page 20 . Fo r

lame llar armour in use am ongst Moslems s c note 48 abo ve.

T U R O MAN I E I ~

Turcomans (

wh o

still cxist even today, under the nam e Turkmens) supplied th e bulk of Scljuk armies.

as well as providi ng larg.. numbers of au xiliaries to the la te-Fati mids, Ay

yubid

s, Mamluks and Ott

oman

s.

Som e \·vcn served with the Almohades in Spain an d Nort h Africa, where th ey we re sti ll call..d by their

carli\·r name of Gh uaz. Though they used some in fan try ar med with spear, swo rd and how th ey rel ied

on th ir light ho rse-arche rs in baute.

This tigur is based on th e 14 th centu ry d rawings of Ustad M hmc d Siyah

Qalc

rn, 13th ce ntury

illustrations ind icating tha t th r had been no change of dre ss in the int eri m. lI is to pcoat sho ws th e

ancmauve upright-fastening rat he r than th e obliq ue Muqullab nap gene rally worn by Turks. Uslad

Mehn1l'u

sh o

ws tu nics chkny in shades o f hlue , black, brown and red. The black fu r or felt cap is fairly

stand ard. Ihn

Hibi,

however, desc rihi ng 13th cen tury Karam anli Turcomans in Anatolia, speuks of red

caps and black

coats

and boots.

Basic

equip men t ap pears to have co nsisted of now, sabr e anti 2-3 light javelins. In addition bags of 1001

wcre no rmally muc h in

videncc.

Tu rcoman womcn also re-gularly fou ght alon gside their me nfolk , Marvazi comparing the Amazo ns to such

temalc Turcoman war rio rs in th e 12th

centu

ry. Much later ( in Ihe 15th cen

tury)

one tr ibe is said to have

ratscd as many as fem ale warriors.

53

54. BEDOUlj\; T RIBESMEN

Th Bedawis or Bcdouins w

re pr incipa lly no ted as hrigands d uring th is e ra and were as likely to be fo und

robbing thcir

f

euow-Mos ms as they

w

er

to bc fight ing the Fr anks , ' it bein g well-known .' as I omville

re

cords.

' that

the

USl and c

ustom

of the lk douins is always to fall up on the weaker side.' Nevertheless

Bedouins app

ar

d as au xiliari

s in most Most

m armies (and also in S Ol o ... Frank ish ones ). se rving mainly

00



57

® @

@ @

® ®

f

as cavalry th o ugh infan try aTC also rec orde d o n o ccas ions. In F ra n kish e mpl oy they usually su p plied

sco uts and spies.

T hese 2 figur es da le res pec tively to c. 123 7 Ilar ir i s Maq amal) and c. 1306 Raschid at-D i

n s

Wo r ld

lI ist o ry ) and tall y clos ely wit h t he d escr ipt ion o f Bedo um d ress lef t to us by Jo invillc in his xtc mcirs

o f the Seve

nt h

Crusade. li e reco rds t h eir ch arac te ristic ca mel-wool

tu n

ic , t l

long

, wide-sleeve d G u b ha.

as cove ring the whole body do wn to t he ground , while th e tu r ban was wrappe d

aroun

d t he head in

suc h a way th at o ne stri p wen t bene a th th e c hin, as c an be see n in bo th these figu res . In t he so urces

cl o thes ar e de p ic ted o r des cribed as d yed c hief ly in b right co lo urs, p redo m inan t ly re ds and bl ues o f most

shades. St riped cl

ot

hing o f t he t ype wo rn by 54 , pop ularly associa ted wit h A rabs, only be ca me

co

mm o

np lace fro m th e l I t h ce nt u ry . Hair was black .

Jo inville also rec o rd s a Bedo uin belie f t ha t no -one c an die save o n t he d ay ap poi n ted, and f

or

th is

reaso n t hey will no t wear a rmo u r: and th at in ba il ie t hey ca rry no thing b u t swo rd an d la nce , which

bas ically repea ts Willia m o f T yre s co mme nt t hat acc or ding t o thei r custo m the y fo ught wit h lances

o nl

y.

Burchard

of

Mo u nt Sio n, who wro te c. I o, ad ds tha t t hey do no t use arro ws, sayi ng t ha t it is

base be yon d meas u re to stea l away a man s life with an a rrow. T he la nce was us ually of can e reed ).

T he swor d was gene ra lly susp e nded fro m a baldric across t he right sho u lder , t he Bedouin s ap pa re n t ly

ad her ing to t his t radit io nal Moslem custo m ra t her Ihan fo llo wing t he p revalen t hab it of gird ing o n th e

sword at t he wais t : o t he r t ha n th e Be do uins o nly Nur ed- Din s arm y ap pea rs to have regularl y used t he

bald ric.

T he By za n t ine gcylitzes ms.

of

c. 1200 de pic ts Mo slem horse men in d ress ide nt ical to th at wo r n by th ese

figure s, an d like wise ar med with lance , sword an d shie ld most o f the shields rese mble t ha t o f 30 , t hough

a few ap parently carr y crescen t devices ).

5 5 56. MAML UKS

T hese figu res arc based o n t he Bapt ist ere d e Sa int Lo uis

of

e. 13 00 . Bo t h we ar T a

rtar

co a ts I

Qab

a

al-Tar rany yah ) w hich, as is ob vio us from the na me, we re

of

orig in and follo wed t he Mo n gol

pract i ce o f having t he Muq a lla b flap cross the ches t from lef t to right as

oppo

sed to t he T urkish fashio n

o f righ t t o lef t. T he left o ve r r ight Mo ngo l-st y le Muqa ltab also fea t u res in Ru mi and Per sian so u rces in

t he 13t h r e n t ury. ) Su ch coa ts wer e o ft e n worn u nder a lon ger to pcoa t sec 5 7).

In 12 8 3 so me 1,50 0 Mamluk guards me n a re d escr ibed as wearing red sa ti n or silk coats, un do u btedly

unifo rms suc h as are so me times men

tioned

in o t her co n t em po rary so urces {Fntimhl Su danese guar dsmen

9 1



appea r to have been

unif

ormed , and cer tainly as early as 1177 Saladin s personal

mamluk

regiment is

recorded hy WiIliam o f Tyre wea ring ye llow uniform s). Red was the most common un iform

colou

r under

the Mamluks, though Ayyubid yellow was st ill some times worn . Red was also th e usua l colour fo r the

Kalaula h

cap

. usua lly worn wit h a kerchief wound r

ound

it as by figur e 55. Yellow Kalautahs were worn

under the Ayyubids an d also by the early Mamluks up 10 th e reign of Kh.. liI 1290-1293 ). They were

some times ernh r

cidered

.

Th

e Kalautah itself app ears

to

have been padded with co lt on, prob

ably

10

increase its defensive value.

Both w

ear

sashes o f c

olo

ured silk round the waist. sometimes yellow

bu t

probab ly more oft en red .

Amirs, and even a few ordinary mamluk troopers, instea d wore de cora ted Mintaqa bel ts , t hese

comp rising gold and silver links mounted with pr ecious stones ac

co

rdi ng 10 ran k. Usually a black

lea ther belt -pouch was suspended at the right.

Footwear

co nsists o f knee-length Khuff boots with covcnn gs called Saq al-Muza worn over them .

A slipper-li shoe cou ld also he worn over th e boo t . The boot s themselves had a clear seam dow n the

side (see 4 7 and 57 ) and were usually o f yellow or black leather in win ter , while leather in summer . Red

hoots an: also recorded.

Th

e dress o f amir s is recor ded as bei ng much richer th an that

of

ordinary mamlu ks. The cerem

onia

l

dress of Amirs of 1 for instance ,

con

sis ted a t on e lime

of

an

outer

coat of red satin emb roidere d in

gold and t rimmed with miniver, and a fr inged inner coat

p

rob ably a Qaba al-Tart a

ny

yah) of yellow

sat in.

TI\l Kul

aut

ah

was o f gol d brocade, wit h a muslin kerchief striped in whit e an d o

ther colours

wrap ped round it. Finally a beaver

clo

ak might be w

orn

.

Though 56 wears a helmet bo th ap pear to he o therwise unar

mour

ed, hut it sho uld be no ted that Moslems

of te n wor e b

ody-armo

ur beneath their oute r garm ents in the same way th a t th ey wore helmet s beneath

turbans an d caps (William o f Tyre, for instance, reco rds Saladi n s bodyguard wearing armour under th eir

ye llow silk un ifo rms at Montgisard) . In addit io n Usarnah, Ibn Hudayl and o the r au thor s recor d ho w

armou r was of ten carried o n pack mules and

on

ly do nned immediately pr ior 10 batt le .

57. l

UK

This figure , from a History of Outremer o f c. 128 is typical of th ose appearing in the mss. executed

in A CH in th e second half of the 1J lh cen tury . so a n be assumed 10 he a fairly relia ble re presen

tation

o f a Mamtuk warri or of tha t lime.

li e wea rs Khuff hoots. a small turban (big tur bans wer e bann ed at least in Syria in 1291 ) and a long

outer robe , th e Islami c coa

t

(Qaha al-Islamiyya). The Qaba co uld he wool . satin, silk or co

tto

n and

was appare-ntly most commonly ei t her whit e or striped in red and blue . By the 15th century o nly winter

to pcoa ts appear to have been colour ed and deco rat ed thu s, most Mamluks o ute r garments (as well as their

b

oo

ts) bei ng white in summer. Ano ther type of coat sometimes worn was th e Sallari. an outer garment

with elbow-length sleeves.

li e is armed with a mace, a favourite Mamluk wea pon, used princip ally to crus h helmets and. co nsequently.

heads. It was ca lled ei th er Dubbus or Amud (Persian Gun) de pending on whe the r

it

was enti rely of iron

or had a wooden handl... Some were Itanged or spiked. When not in use it was normally tu cked beneat h

th e knee and stirru p st r l l 10 the right of the saddle. mamluks being recorded carrying their maces from

th e st irru p in this way a t least as earl) as the mid-12th cen tury. Anot he r typical Mamluk wea pon related

to the mace hu t o nly recorded in later sources is th e Ghadd ara, a steel staf f kep t in a case l the sadd le

and capable o f cutting o ff a man s arm . One figure in the Baptistere de Saint Lo uis seems to be carrying

such a weapon. where it appears to be abou t 30 inches lo ng.

Alt hough the adopted the kite-shield (see 3 1) the Turs clearly remained far more popular. Like

thc main figure, 57a-f are all from the

Acre mss. so arc rairly typical of the hera ldic charges carried by

xtamt uks. Most no ticea ble are the large number of crescent device s. II has been claimed that the crescent

was no t widely ad

opted

amongst Moslems until the Ott omans ad opted it in the 15 th centu ry , hu t the

freq uency wit h which it

appea

rs in these mss. w

oul

d seem to dis pro ve

this

. the crescen t being, alongside

the rose tt e. the most

comm

on shie ld device

depi

cted. Sec also 64 .



a

58 . U IN F

ULL

ARMO UR

c.

1290

~ h in full arm ou r ap pear on ly rare ly in th e sources

of

th is e ra, (hough as menti oned ab ove man y

probably wo re similar body -armo ur to tha t depic ted here but concealed it beneat h thei r topcoa ts.

li e wears a helme t , wit h plume and solid neckguard, and a

long

lamellar

jawshan.

(Ay

the cnd

o f thi s era at the la test

the

t

erm

Djawshan could also be applied to a mail co rselet reinforced with small

tin plates called Teneke, as

depic

ted in 583 ; being of m

ore

expensive co nstruc tion Ihan eit her mail or

lamellar this ty pe was generally rest ricted to amirs.) The mail coi f covering all hut his is taken fro m

the Bapt islcr e de

Saint

Loui s: similar coi ls are 10 be

occ

asionally seen in o the r Moslem sources at least

as ea rly as c. I :WO. sometimes worn without a helmet.

His

arms consist of lance , bow , sword

{with

tasselled hilt - see also 6 and 40) and circul ar shield

charged with an he rald ic lio n.

59 MAMlUK T RD R

This figure probably rep resents one of the infant ry guardsmen called Tabardar iyyah. named after th ei r

d istinctive wea pon the Tabar (a xe). l ow hig th is un it actually was does not seem to be al together

clear - it may have comprised no more than the 10 Tabardariyyah who acc

omp

anied Ille Sul tan o n

parade. Their commander was the Amir-Tabar . The axe was also em ployed by other

troo

ps , Joinville

record ing 30 al-Halq a in 1250 with drawn swords in their hands and Danish axe s hangi ng at the ir

necks : the shape o f the axe blade was appa ren tly very simi lar to the t radit ional Scandinavian design .

AI-Tartusi describes th e shape of the Nagin , a smaller , cavalry version of the Tabar, as like a half-moon .

The haf t of the Tabar could he of wood o r metal. The blades o f ceremonial axes were usually deco rate d

with inlay an d perfo rated pa tt erns.

6 M MLUK ENG INEER wrr u MJOFA

A cer iain al-Hassan al-Rammah describes and illu stra tes Ihe Midfa in a work o f c. 1280-1190 . It was

clearly an early firearm, made o r wood with a barre l only as deep as its muzzle width , used to fire

8 unduk s ?bullels) or fea th ered bo lts . The charge filled a Ihird of the barre l and co nsis ted o f a m ixture



60

of 10 pa rts saltpetre IBuud ), 1 par ts charcoal, and l

Yi

parts sulphur .

The actual discovery of gu

npowder

is a d ubious dis tinction which has been variously cla imed for Chin ese ,

Ind ians, Byzanti nes, Ara bs , Germans and Englishmen, but the name o f the discoverer and da te of ac tual

discovery remain uncer tain. The date of th e ap plicat i

on

of gun powder 0 a proj ectile-firing weap

on

is even

more hazy , but

the da ting o f

this

Mamlu k rns. is co

rrect

then th is source is

cer

lainly amongst the

earliest pieces of evidence o utside of China.

Th

is weapon was probably no more Ih an an ex perime nta l

device

of

the Royal Arsena l an d may ncv r haw seen active service, though

the

late-13th cent ury

ch ronicler lbn •Abd al-Zahi r rema rks that for the siege o f al-Marqab in 1285 iron implements and flame

throwin g

tubes were issued by the roya l arsenals, and one wonders whet her any of the

Ma

m u

k

engi neers arme d wit h nap tha tubes at Salamiyet in 1299 apparentl y mounted ), or s torming th e

breaches of Acre in 1291 , might have actually carried such weapons.

t

has to be admitt ed that hand

siphons like th ose used earlier by the Byzantines seem mo re probable.

Midfa was also the name ap plied to th e ea rliest known Mamluk can nons, dat ing to 136 6 or possibly

1340

la te da tes con sidering the appa ren t ea rliness of the weapon described here .

6 1. ASSASSIN

The dress of the was. as is that of his mo

dem

-day co unte rpart , in no way unusual. Disguises

arc o ften

mentioned

, however; th e Assassins who killed Co nrad o f Mont ferrat , fo r instance, wer e dressed

as mo nks, and o the r incidents see the dress of merch ants, Fra nkish soldie rs and Sy rian Christians being

worn. In the ir own st ro ngho lds Assassin brethren wore white cloaks and red caps.

They normally o perated singly or in pairs, though

on

occasion con side rab ly larger gro ups appear, perhaps

to he do ubly cert ain o f success. -Bursuqi of Mosul was murdered by a hand o f 10 Assassins in 1126

and Caliph :l1Mu st:lrshid .by as many as 15 or 17 in 1135.

Their weapo n o f execution was exclusively the dagge r, some times pois

on

ed an d apparen tly sometimes

engraved wit h the name of the in tende d vict im, an ea rly inst ance o f if it s got you r name

on

it . . .

Usamah even records ba tt le ane cdot e s whe re Assassins appear to be arme d only with daggers, but

nor mally swo rd spear and shield wou ld have been added in combat, and fully -armed Assassins w

ou

ld

have been indist ingu ishable from ordinary Moslem warrio rs.

A cerem

onia

l da gger desc ribed by J

otn

vtne

cons

isted o f 3 daggers of wh ich the top 2 had their blades

sheathed in the handles

of

the lower 2. Thi s was ca rried by one of th e 3 envoy s sent to Louis IX at

94



Acre in I 2

52;

an

oth

er carried a funeral shroud wrap ped

round

his arm , to be presen ted to the king

for his own burial sho uld he reject the Assassin demands Another cer emoni al w

eapon

recorded by

Join ville

was a long-handled axe carried before the Old Man o f the Mountain , the haft of which was

covered in silver and had daggers fixed to it in some way.

62

63. MOSLEM MUSICIANS

Mou

nted

hands acc

omp

anied most Moslem arm ies in ba tt le during this era , the Moslems believing

that the more noise the y made the bolder their spirits became and the mo re fear they struck into the

heart s of their enemies

t

he Bedouins in part icu lar were sensi t ive to the noise of

ru

s :

the

It inerarium

Regis Rica rdi records of Arsouf tha t b e fore the arnir s there went men clanging away wit h trumpet s and

clarion s; ot hers had dru ms, othe rs pi pes and tim hrels (

tambou

rines), ra tt les, gongs, cymba ls, and other

instruments suited to mak ing a din . To raise these noises was the specia l d uty of certa in men ; and the

louder their din the fiercer their comrades fought.

Pro bably

mos

t important of all were

t he

nakers and ke tt le-drum s. The nakcrs were great drums which

accompanied the Sultan, or his commanders-in-chief , and could o nly he bea ten at his personal command,

to t ransmi t o rders o n the b

att

lefield. The Sultan s band, commanded by the Amir- Al am. co mprised 4

nakers, 40 ket tle-dr ums, 4 hautboys, and 20 trumpets; some mu st have also carried cy mbals and o ther

instruments.

The importa nce of the bands can be

judged

from the fact that an amir with d

rum

s ( Amir al-Tablkhanah )

was

one

of the highest ranks in the Mamluk

mi

litary

hierarchy. and tha t on ly an amir with

drum

s or an

amir o f 100 were permi tted bands at all. Those of amirs o f lOOseem 10 have consisted of 8 o r 10 kett le

d rums

trumpets, 2 hau tboys, 2 timbrals , plus other inst

rum

ent s. Amin of 40 (Le. a mirs wit h dr ums )

had 3 kettle-drums, later 2 kett le-d

rum

s and 2 Ilutes. In Saladin s day the amirs commandi ng Tu lhs

were each accompanied hy at leas t a single

trump

et er.

Th ough they are ofte n shown carr ied o n mules (but only ra rely on hor ses), it was camels that were most

commonly used for carry ing

drum

s, th e drums of the Mamluks besieging Acre in 129 1 being ca rried on

as many as 300 camels.

T he Mongols used naker s in an identic al capaci ty to the Mamluks, the roll of th e Khan s or arm y

com mander s nakers being the co mmand to

at t

ack, for the Ta rtars, reports Marco Polo. do no t

dare

to start a ba tt le till their lord s dr ums begin to beat. Those of the Mongols appear to have avera ged

abou t one metre across, and were likewise usually carried o n camels though Kublai Khan had some

which a

ppear

to have been considerab ly bigger and were carried o n elephants.

Though on the balllefield they normally transmitt ed orders by trumpe t calls, even the Franks appear

to have used drums in th is capa city undou bt edly under Moslem influen ce}, WiIliam of Tyr e rela ting how

at Ascalo n in 1125 the king ordered that his men be recalled by the sound o f trum pet and roll of d rum .

64. SARACEN HERALDRY

In the Moslem wor ld heraldry played on ly a seco ndary role amongst Ihe military elite. Only Su ltan s and

all

iin

could have heraldic devices, Qalqashandi recording Ihat

it

was custo mary fo r every amir to have a

special blazon according to his choice and pr

efer

ence:

Such

devices were heredit ary only to such

descendants as fo llowed military careers. They were probably originally gran ted by the Sul tan him self

and usually represented the orrice which the bearer had he ld at the t ime that he was made an am ir.

Abu l Flda , writing in Ihe early 14th century, records that the Secretary s

embl

em is the r en-bcx. tbe

Armour-bearer s the bow, the Superin ten

dent

o f

Sto

res the ewer, the Master of the Robes the napkin,

the Marshal s the horseshoe , and th e Jawish a golden saddle.

eae -m represent a var iety of Syrian and Eg

ypti

an devices as used by the Ay

yub

ids and ear ly Mamluks.

64a is the pen-box o r the Secretary, 64 b the napk in of the Master o f the Robes, and 64c and d the sword

of the Armour-bearer, the latt er also incl uding a napkin. As mentio ned by Abu J Fida, the Arm ou r

bearer s device could also be a bow (sometimes accompanied by arrows), or even a crossbow, though

no exa mples of the latter surv ive. 64e is a device usually describe d as a crescen t , though in his Saracenic

Heraldry L. A. Mayer plau sibly suggests that it is a Saracen horse-shoe . and therefore the device of the

9l



j

m



Marshal (see also n

ot

e 57 ),

There were also other officers device s not list ed by Abu l Plda, f

or

instance the table of th e Taster

(64 f) an d th e cup of the Cup-bearer (6 4g and h), on e

of

the mos t common dev ices in Saracen heraldr y,

O ther devices indica tive

of

the ir bearers

offi

ces were polo-sticks (P

olo

-master, 64i), standard ( Alamdar,

or

Standa rd -bearer), drums and drumst icks [Ta blda r, or Drummer) and ho rn , 64j , a device very common

amongs t th e 13th ce

ntu

ry Bahriyyah Mamluks, Mayer suggests as the dev ice of the Dispa tch-rider .

Anima l devices were un usua l, and the on ly

anima

ls to ap pear in Saracen heraldry are the li

on

, the eag le

and occasionally th e horse. The most famous during this period was the lion o f Sultan Baiba rs

6

4k) , and

one so urce speaks of Saladin s standard and that of his br

ot

her el-AfdaJas carry ing pa irs

of

lio ns a t

Acre in 1191 , However, Saladin s device may have been an eagle, a device wh ich appears to have been

pa rticularly

pop

ular amongst the Sel

juks

; it was sometimes 2-headed , possi bly

n

imitatio n of th e

2-headed eagle

ado

pted by the Byzantines some time during t his era . ngi and the Ortoqids appear to

have used this device . T he banner

of

the vizier Fakr ad-Din, the Moslem commander at El Mansurah,

also bore an eagle.

641and m

were

also popu lar du r ing th is era. 641, usually descr ibed as a rose tt e, was a common de vice

under both Ayyubids and ear ly Mamlu ks, usually 6-pointed as here but somet ime s wit h 5 or 8 poin ts.

Th e Ileur-dc-Iis (64m) was the de vice of Nur ed-Din and also fea tu res on a large number of Ayyubid

coins. The Sarace n Ileur-de-hs differs sligh tly from that used in Frankish heraldry in tha t th e 3 leaves

grow from a commo n stem; in

Frank

ish hera l

dry

the leaves ar e ind ividual and are joined toget her only

by a band in the middle,

Some o ther devices represen ted Tamghas, the tr ibal symbols used as brands by many Asiatic

people

s

an d introduced in to th e Near East by Turkish mam luks.

From the evide nce o f surviving ex amp les it wou ld appear that the co lours used in Saracen hera ldr y

consisted of whit e, yellow, red , blue, green , brown and black. The formal regulat ions of European

herald ry , forbidding the use

of

cer ta in co lours together , do no t appear to have ap plied.

6 5. SARACEN STANDARDS

Unde r t he Ayyub ids and early Mamluks the royal standard was o f gold -emhro id

ered

yellow silk or

damask . The ir Royal Mamluk units also carried yellow st andards, each one embr oidered wit h the

herald ic device o f its un it commander. Joinville rec

ords

the se devices to have

been

in crimson,

men tio ning roses, bends and bird s as examples. Th is practice may also be intended by a remar k in t he

It inerarium Regis Ricardi that at Arso uf Tuqi ad-Din commande d 700 o f Saladin s mamluks, each un it

of wh ich carried a yellow standard together wit h a pennon (device?)

of

a differen t colour , especially

since th is source also ref ers to th e use of emblems on standards. Taqi s own standard resem bled 65a;

the It inera rium descr ibes it as a pair

of

trouse rs ,

The It inera rium ment ions banne rs and pen no ns of countless shapes and sizes, o ther sources not ing

man y different colou rs in use. Imad ad-Din records red as well as l asmin standards in Saladin s army at

lIa tt in, wh ile green sta ndards are reco rded in the Seljuk army at Dorylaeum. The Abbasid Caliphs

continued to use blac k standards up un ti l the dest ruction o f the Calipha te by the Mongols in 1258,

tho ugh in 1

057

pu rp le ba nners de

cor

a ted with gold script are also reco rded , pro bably similar to 6 5g.

In 117 1 the Ahhasid Caliph sen t black ban ners to both Saladin and Nur ed-Din.

The standa rds given here are charac teristic of those dep icted in contempo rary sources. Most dat e to the

13th ce ntu ry. T he dev ices on 65b and c of c. I 250 . and on

65d

and e which da te to I 28 7 , a re heraldic.

65f is a horsetail banne r

of

Turkish design such as was probably carried by

many

maml uk units

of

ste ppe

origin, as well as by Seljuks and Turco rnans: see also JOb. The Fatimid vizie r al-Afdal s s

tandar

d a t

Ascalon in 1099 , de scr ibed as having a go lde n ball a top a sifver-p lated staff, was pro bably just such a

banner, as were the Khwarizmian lances reco rded by Joinvdle on which were fashio ned heads with hair ,

tha t seemed like the heads o f devil s. l oinville also spea ks

of

Khwarizmian standards which w

ere

red

and indented up towards the lan ce , presumably swallowtail pennons.

65g, ha nd dep ic t a type o f standard called a Tu , an ornamenta l metal blade atop a wooden shaft. It

was usually perforated

or

damascened, o fte n with inscript ions or heraldic devices. These par tic ular

97



6 5

..

f

b

-

exam ples a re from Han n s Maqumat of 123 7, while 6Sj sho ws an ac tua l Mam luk T u in detail. In th e

so urce t he rib bo ns o f 6 Si ar e blac k with go ld ba nd and fringe , wh ile th e n ag of g

is

blac k, blue. red

o r c rimson wit h blac k o r while let tering. T he T u was used in Rum, Persia. Syria and Egyp t.

= :

66. 67 68

69.

YZ

NTINE HEAVY INFANTRYMEN

In t he ir armo u r, as in many o t her respec ts, th e By

zanti

ne s o r Ro ma ns as they persist ed in calling

themselves] clung te nacio usly to their classical herit age throughout this era, the evolu tion of armour

basically sta gna ting af ter t he I lt h c en tu r y so Ihat mo st so ldie rs de pict ed in so urces of t he I 11h- 13t h

ce n tu ries di ffe r fro m o ne a no ther o n ly in de tail. Unfort un ately t her e are no military man uals o the r

t han t he so mew ha t Mach iavellian I I t h ce n t ury S tra tegi

co n

o f Cecau me nus, so we a re almo st en t irel y

dep e ndant o n suc h co ntempo rary illus tra tions

fo r

inform a tio n regarding arms a nd arm o u r.

Basic eq uipm

en t

.:k arl y co nsisted o f cor sele t. hel me t, shield . swo rd a nd sp ea r. T he co rsele t was most

Ircq uen t ly o f la mellar or sca le, le ss o fte n of mail, usua lly re ac hing o n ly to the hi ps and sho u lder s wi th

han gin g pt er uges st ill pro tec ting th e t h ighs and u pper arms. Hel me ts were o f 3 ma in ty pes - the most

co mmo n varie ty being po in ted , with th e neck pro tec te d by a scate or ma il aven tail o r h anging leather

tap pets 66-68): cc mca t with t he back e x te nded in10 a nape-guard 72 , 73 ) ; o r brimmed like a kettle

hel me t , also so me ti mes wit h a nec kguar d o f leather tap pet s o r ma il. Shie lds cou ld be ci rcular o r k

it e

shape d, th ou gh so me in fa n try st ill ca rried t he o ld ova l sh ield in t he lute- t h ce ntury. T h e k ite- shield

ap pea rs to have bee n in general use amo ngst hea vy infa nt r y a nd cava lry by the mid-12th ce n t u ry [b u t

see n

ot

e 75-7 8 ), l ho ugh Ihe ci rc ula r shield p revailed a mo ngst light infan t ry. F lat -top ped heat e r

shields like tho se o f t he Fran ks we re a lso in use b y th e 13t h ce n t ury , Ihou gh th e kite remained mo re

co mmo n; t hat ca rried by 6 9 , qu a rte red in red an d blac k. is fro m a lat e-I 3th c

en t

u ry wo o d -carvin g.

Th e infa nt ry man s spear was no w usua lly of a bou t 8-10 feel , t ho u gh t he o ld 12 fo ol Ko n t ar io n may

have rema ined in limite d use t hroug hout th is e ra. T he swo rd was mos t co m monly suspe nded from a

baldnc .

O the r it em s o f ar mou r 10 be fo u nd in use included w

oo

llen o r linen ho o ds suc h as th a t wor n by 69,

a pparentl y fairly c

ommo

n. as well as ma il co ils , the fo rme r p ro bably th e same a s t hat d escribed as

laced a t t he hac k of t he neck in Leo VI s Ta c tica ; th e o ld leath er harn es s o f breas tba nds and sho u lder

pieces 67 . 69 . 7 2 e tc .}; tu b u lar u p per-arm gua rd s : a nd greaves a nd vam bra ce s b o t h

of

t hese ment io ned

only very occasio nally d u ring th is er a).

Unifo rms . where wor n , were st ill mainly o f vario us shades o f red and blue, usua ll y wit h heav ily em broi dered

98



•

•

•

67

borders and hems, often brocade . Offi cers and nob lemen wore much more ela bo ratel y em broid ered

tunics and trousers o f brocade. Embroide ry was of t en gold. Boots, a standard part of Byzantine military

equ ipmen t, were chiefly red , black, white or ye llowish leather ;

th e

markings, consisting of 2 or 3 dark

ban ds, were fairly standa rd. Some men, however, appear to have worn shoe s supplemented with similarly

marked gaiters in place of the

bo o

ts (see figure 76 ).

Hair was gene rally long en

ou g

h to cover the ears, but was neatly trimmed , while shor t beard s were

charac terist ic of the Byzantines throughout th is era and are oft en recorded in anecdot es (such as when

Richard I of England ca ptured Cyprus in 119 1 and obliged the Greek po pulatio n to shave off their

beards ' in token o f their change of masters' ).

Of

th e

4 figures de picted here , 66 dates to the lat ter part of the 11th century white 67 and 68 are from

illustr a tio ns in the famous Scylitzes ms. which pro bably da tes to c. 1200 {no te the shield devices o f these

2 figures, which closely resemble Bayeux Tapestry types ). 69 dates to the 14th century and is pro bably

rep resentat ive of Byzant ine infant ry as they appeared at Ihe time o f the 'Catalan Vengeance' an d the early

Ott oma n wars.

70

1, 72 73. BYZANTINE LIGHT INFANTRYMEN

Light infantry continued to co nstitute a fair percent age of Byzantine foo l

so hfie rs ,

some con tinuing to

resemble th e t radi t ional types described under 6 , 7 and 8 in 'Armies of the Dark Ages' (Anna Com nena,

for instance, describes light infanlry armed only with bow and small shield ). Others were stingers and some

were cro ssbowmen (ca lled Tzangratoroi). After apparen tly falling ou t of favou r in the 10th cen tury the

cro ssbow (Tzangra was rein troduced unde r Frankish tnftuence

du r

ing the 12th century ; when Anna

wro te her Alcxiad c. I 140· 1150 she still described the crossbow as 'a weapon o f the barbarians (Franks),

absolutely unknown

10

th e Greeks' and felt it necessary to give a de tailed descri ptio n of it, which

would sugges t that its use was not widespread even then

t

hough she is describing Frankish crossbowmcn

of the First Crusade). However, it is men t ioned in use dur ing Manuel's reign (1 143

·118

0 ) and cert ainly

it was in general use hy the end of the century, lsaac of Cypr

us army

in 1191 ap parent ly including a

co

nsiderable num ber of crossbowmen.

frequent ly occurs in 13th century sources.

••



69 70

71

Most light infantry. howe ver, were archers or 10 a lesser extem.javebn rnen. 70 and 71 are both armed

with composite bows , though 70 (c. 1100) carries in add itio n a spear. 7 1, from the Scylitzes ms., carries

no shield : he is probably on e of the light-a rmed Anatolian provincial troo ps (Paphlagoni ans and

8 ithynians in part icular) held in high regard by the Byzant ine during th is per i

od

especia lly in Nicaean

armies of the 13 th century - there were Bithynian arche rs at i'elagon ia in I 259. for example, and at

rta tata in

12

60

,

while 800 elite Bithynian archers were the nucl eus of the army with which Alexius

Stratcgopoulos recapt ured Constantin ople in 126 1. His cap is characteristic o f both Bithynia ns and

Phrygians ( tha t of 70 is similar).

The

soeannc n

depic ted in

and 73 are pro bably fairly repres

en t

at ive of the light-armed ex-Thematic

provincial levies and the infantry contingen ts o f the Stra tiotes. T hese two date to the 12th and 13th

centuries respec tively, b

similar figures are to be found throu ghout this era. Both wear helmets o f

simila r design and carry circular shields a

bout

2 fee t in diame ter . 72 in addi t ion wears a leather corsele t

with reinforci ng hreastb

and

and pte ruges at the shoulde rs. Scyli tzes shows many such unar

mou

red

infant ry spearmen

w t

kite-shields in place of round ones.

74.

VARANGIAN GUARDSMAN

The axe remained the principal weapon of the v arangian s, l ohn VI Cantacuzenus wri ting of ' Varangians

with their axes' as late as 1329 . The usua l blade-shape can be clea rly seen in this figure, from Scylit zes ms.

A spear could also he carr ied. The illustration from which this figure is tak en ind icates that some at least

continued to carry the rou nd shield as la te as 1200 or per haps even later , though Niketas (who wrote in

the early- I3t h century) describes Varangia ns with axes and ' long' Ii.e. kite) shields at Eski Zagra in 11 22.

74a

dep

icts the head and shoulders of a Varangian Guardsma n in sta le dress from a

eo

rtratr rep resenting

Joh n VI in 1351; in thi s sou rce ha ts

an

' wh ite with gold trim and tun ics are blue . 'Sky-coloured' silk

tu nics are also recorded by l laroun ibn Yahva as being worn by guardsmen in the I Ilth ce n

tury.

pre

suma

bly Varangians since the y carried gil

ded

axes.

The ir armour was generally heavy - we hea r from Anna Com nena, for inst ance, Iha t the weight of their

arms' soo n broughl on fatigue at Durazzo in 1081. Quite wha t should be made o f an alte rnative so urce

for the same bail ie referring 10 a lack of mail co rselets amongst the English

i .e

. Varangians) I do not know .

The Guard probably ceased 10 exist towards the end o f the 14th century.

100



72

74

75,7

6, 77 78. BYZANTINE HEAVY CAVALRYMEN

Byzantine cavalry were g

enera

lly less heav ily ar moured t han thei r Fr ankish counterparts. an d F rankish

chronicle rs as a result a lmost invariably d escribe th e m as se rgean ts .

T he re was l

ittl

e u niformi ty o f arm

our

, pro bab l y o nly guar d un its now maintaining a ny degree o f un iform

ap pearance. or th ese 4 figur es , 2 wear mail co rselets wit h breast bands plus sho ulde r pieces in the case

o f 78 ), o ne a scale co rselet with pterugcs, and t he fou rt h an ap pa rentl y qu ilted corselet, pr o b ably over

mail o r lame llar. T he latt er figure from Scy lit zes) wea rs in add it io n sp lin t greaves. Mo st heavy cavalry

in S

cylit

zes in fact re sem ble 68 an d 76.

I 4 c r ry kite-sh ild s d eco rated in al mo st we st ern fashion. T he kite-shield a ppe ars to have bee n invented

by the By za n ti nes in th e first half o f t he 10 t h ce n t ury see Arm ies o f the Dark Ages ) a nd by the I I t h

ce n t u ry was in widesp read use, pa rt icularly am o ngst horsemen . Ci n namus, howeve r, co n ta ins a passage

w hic h seems to imply t ha t pr ior to th e beginning of Man uel s reign 1 143) mo st cavalry were

armed

with

ro u nd shie lds a nd that lo ng shields reac hing 10 t hei r feet were o nly in tr o d uced d uri ng army ref

orm

s of

c. 1150 . Q uit e ho w th is sta te me n t sho u ld be in te rp r et ed is o pen to deb ate , b u t is w

or t

h n

ot

in g t ha t

al-Tartu si refers to th e kite-shield q uite specifically as

the

sh ield used by t he Fran ks and Byzan t incs .

Never theless, so me la t e so urces st ill o ccasion ally s

how

ro u nd shields used by By zan ti ne cava lry.

At th e beginn ing

of

t his e ra so me heav y ca valry un its still included archer s as we ll as lance rs the

Immo rt als, fo r exa mple, inlcuded bo ws am on gs t t heir eq uipme n t) b ut t hese see m

10

have stea dily

disappeared in t he co urse o f th e 12th ce n t u ry. Man uel s refo rm s we re basica lly res ponsible for their

fina l d emise see page 4 0 ) t hou gh we st ill o ccasio nall y hea r

of

hea vy ca valry ho rse-arc hers eve n at the

en d o f th e 12t h ce n tu ry ; Isaac o f Cy prus arm y incl uded h eavy hor se-archers in 1 191 , in clu ding tsaac

himse lf. Most cavalry, ho weve r, wer e lan ce rs. T he 12 fo o l Ko n to s was sti ll in use durin g muc h o f t his

e ra the Mos lem Qunta r iya, an d pr o bab ly th e Rumh to o, we re de rived fro m it ) bu t F ra nk ish and It alian

la nces wer e also used. Of ficers still seem to have carried th e Bard ouk ion

or

mace.

79 . BYZANT INE LIGHT CAVA LRY MAN

T he S

cylitz

es ms. and var ious o t he r so u rces

of

te n sho w band s o f u narmou red ho rseme n similar to t his

figure , arm ed o n ly wit h sword, lance, shield and helme t, a pparen t ly represent ing nat ive ligh t o r medium

101



7

cavalry suc h as an, occ asio nally recorded in the written sources. may have been tr oops o f th is type

th at co nstituted at least a part o f th e co ntingent s o f th e quasi-feudal Stratiotes. It is probable that man y

of

the ex-Thematic cavalry as still served were also

of

th is ty pe.

They

wer e possibly uni fo rmed , and some

may h

aw

been

bow-arm ed.

However, most light cavalry of t his era were Asiatic mercenaries, particularly Pechenegs and Cumans

the Pigmalici or Pineenal i and Comans

of

Frank ish sources, b

oth

described under figures 115-117 in

Armies of Feudal Europe ; sec also figure 80 helow) and, in numbers which steadily increased during

this era, Turks, gene rally r

ef

erred to as

Tur

co p

ou

lo i.

On

e poi nt of in terest is that Pechenegs and Tor ks

r

ecor

ded fight iug fo r th e Byzantines in the Manzikert campaign were indist inguishabl e from th eir Seljuk

enemies, wh ich indicates a close af fi nit y in their dress).

80 CU

N

CAVALR Y

N

At vario us t imes du ring this per iod the Cu mans also called Kipchaks, o r Polovtsy by th e Russians) fo ught

eit he r as allie s or me rce naries for the Byzantines, Geo rgians, Mongol s and Roma nian Fran ks as well as the

Russians, Bulgarian s and Hungarians, and as stave-soldie rs in Ayy ubiJ , Marnluk and Khwarizrnian armies.

They ma y also, towards the end o f

the

11t h

centu

ry . have served with th e Khazars J uring the twilig ht

yea rs

of

th e Khaga natc.

They wore tr ousers, hoo ts, long Arab-style tunic and kafta n. Brocade, fu r, w

oo

l and line n predo mina ted,

hu t goa tskins were also worn and Ro bert de Clari, recording th e events of the Fourth Crusade, speaks of

the Cuman s wear ing a sheepskin garment wh ich may have bee n in tended to serve as light armour. Othe r

forms of armou r including scale and lamella r were also worn dep end ing

on

wealth and soci a l sta tus; fo r

suc h riche r warr ior types sec figures 115- 117 in Armies o f Feudal Euro pe .

Robcrt de Clan implies th at t he Cumans wer e armed only

with

th eir bows , but Byzantine an d Russian

10:



so u rces also record sa bres , lan ces, lassoes, maces a nd javelins in use , the Cu mans bei ng not ed fo r t heir

acc u racy wit h

the

latt er . Mos t shields we re small circular ones , bu t so me

uma

ns carried a small vers io n

o f t he ki te shield.

T he y a lso incl uded so me fo ot-soldiers o n oc casio n. T hese p ro bably r od e ca me ls o n t he march .

T he Curn ans Russian name Polo vtsy and Germa n name F alven bo th origi

na t

ed from wo rd s mean ing

yello w, w hic h is fa irly cer tai nly a r

ef

erence t o ski n c olour.

8 A N CAVALRYMAN

T he nom ad ic Ca ucas ian Alans al so called Osse tians) su rvived well beyon d th e dose o f t h is period , albe it

o nly in small co mm un it ies rou nd t he Black Sea co ast line aft er t he ir crushing d

ef

ea t by t he Mo ngo ls in

1239 . Alt ho ugh t hey co u ld incl ude a large nu

mber

of infan t ry t heir main arm was cavalr y and t he 14 t h

cen t ury Ca tala n c hro nicle r Munt aner rec or ds t ha t t he Alans were held t o be t he best ca valry t here is in

t he East , which cer tainl y e xp lains wh y in the By zant ine a rmy t hey received d o u ble t he pay o f th e best

native t roo ps.

Arch aeo lo gical finds p rove th at t hey wer e st ill pri nci pally bo w-armed ; t he Byza n tines, who co n tin ued to

h ire Alan s in lar ge n um bers in th e 12 th a nd 13 th ce n tur ies, usuall y br igaded the m alo ngside th eir T u rkish

tr o

o ps a nd used t he m as skirm ishers. Cin

namu

s reco rds o ne insta nce in 1 156 whe n t hey we re brigaded wit h

Geo rgian t roo ps, and cer ta in ly t his figure fro m Daghest a n co u ld equall y we ll be a Geo rgian .

O ther eq uip me nt wo uld ha ve incl uded sabre , dagger , shiel d pro bably o f wic ker an d/ o r lea t her ) an d a light

lan ce , t h ou gh f inds o f spea r-heads are co mp arat ively few in nu mbe r. Mo st wo re little if an y ar mo u r, bu t

t her e we re at le ast so me heavy cavalry ; 3 ,00 0 A gulani - A la ns o r possibly th e neigh bou r ing Albania ns

- record e d in t he Selju k ar my at nt io ch in 10 98 we re armo u red all o ver wit h pla tes of iro n probably

indica t ing la mellar ) as we re t he ir ho rses, while ma il-armou red Alans are a lso me n tio ned

durin

g th e

Mo ngo l co nq uests.

T he ir infa n tr y fo ugh t p rincipally wit h a he avy , lo ng-handl e d ba tt le-a xe.

103



As wit h most steppe peopl es they were accompan ied on the march by Iheir fam ilies and wago ns, forming

the latt er in to Ihe characteris tic

de f

ensive laager when they en camped and ptiching the ir tents withi n .

They were generally blo nde

w t

blue eyes.

82. G EORGIAN CAVALRYMAN

Jacqu es de Vilry te lls us tha t the Georgians were very warlike and valiant in bat tle, being strong in body

and powerfu l in

the

co untless numbe rs of thei r warr iors , ad ding that they were much dreaded by the

Saracc ns .

•

o n whose borde rs they dwell. Marco Polo simi lar ly rela tes that the Georgians are a handsome

race of do ughty warriors. good archers and good fight ers o n the bat t lefield.

Of th eir appearance d uring Ihis era we know little and th is figure is based largely on 14t h ce n

tu r

y sources.

Arms and equ ipment ap pear to have bee n principally of Persian design and the composi te bo w was o ne

o f their main weapons, though lance, mace and sword or sabre were also carried.

Dc Vitry reco rds tha t they wore their hair and bea rds a bout a cub it lo ng , while Po lo says the y wore

their hair sho

rt

so we are o bviously no t the o n ly o nes uncerta in o f t hei r appearance

83

84. MONGOL LIGHT CAVALRYMEN

Mongol costume and equipment is described fa irly th oroughly in contempo rary so urces. w luta m o f

Rubreck recor ds t hat in summer th e Mongols wore silks, rich broca des and co tto ns from Ch ina and Persia,

and Fria r Joh n de PIano Carpini probab ly intends the same ma te rials when he speaks of buckram , purp le

and baldequin . Marco Polo also speaks of clo th of go ld (brocade ) and silk, lined or decorated wit h sabl e,

ermine , sq uirr el and fox fu r. One ty pe of Chinese shir t, first rec

or

ded in 1219 , was of raw sil k worn as a

type of armour since arrows co uld not penetra te it , instead being driven inl o the skin so Iha t by tugging

on the shirt th e arrowhead co uld be ex tracted fro m the wound clean ly,

In winter fur coats and breeches were worn , usually 2 o f the former, the inner coal with the fur on the

inside and the outer with it outside. T he outer coa t was of wolf, fox , monkey , badger, dog or goat skin

depending o n the social sta tus o f the wearer. Sheepskin and stuffed silk were also worn, plus felt which

served as a type of light armour,

104



Carpini men tions white, red and blue-p ur ple tu nics as weU as ba jdequin . . H. lIowor th, desc ribi ng the

dress of mid- 19t h centu ry Mongols, says the usual colours for the outer summer coat (the Kalat ) were

blue or brown, over a bright blue or grey shirt ; tro user co lours appear to have been similar. The nap

o pening of the Kalat wen t from left to right, as o pposed to the right-over-left opening of the Turks

(see not e SS/ 56 ). An ornamen ta l bell , round fur or plush-tri mmed cap and leather boo ts with felt soles

completed

the

costume. Howor th adds that a t tha t lat e da te the cap ha d two 45 cm ribbons hanging

dow n at the back, and these appear to be mentioned in at least

one

contemporary source of our pe riod.

The alt erna tive hat worn by 84 is a Saraq uj.

1010 reco rds basic Mongol equ ipment as bow, mace and sword (other sources describe the latter mor e

accu rately as a curved, one-edged sabre). Apparently 2 or 3 bows were carr ied, or else o ne particularly

goo d on e, and 3 large q uivers o f arrows. Polo speaks o f only 60 arro ws being carried , 30 smaller o nes

for piercing and 30 larger with broa d heads for discha rging at close quarters ; armour-piercing arrows

were also in use. All had eagle-feather flights. Car pini s report ind ica tes that the arrows were 28-30 long;

ano ther so urce says they were lon ger than European arrows and had iron , bone or horn heads 3 broad.

The bow was bo th lo nger and capable of grea ter range than the type in use wit h the Turks and Mamluks.

Other arms were lasso. dagger. and lance, the latter o ft en with a small hoo k below the head to pull

en

emy

horsemen from t he saddle. Vincent de Beauvais, however, says few Mongols carried lances and

Carpini seem s to confirm this.

Polo records shields in one passage and Ea rpini says that wicker shields were carried, though he adds that

they were not used much because they in terfered wit h the use of the bow and th at he on ly saw them in

use in camp at nigh t by guardsmen such as the Keshik. Ml ng lIu ng (a Chinese general con te

mpor

ary to

Genghis Khan) seems to disagree since he lists 4 ty pes of Mongol shield : large, of hide or willow wood

(the

lat ter possibly meaning co uld be o f inte rwoven osiers ); a smaller type used by front r

ank

light

troo ps to de flec t arro ws; large to rto ise shields for use in sicge-workj and appa rent ly a type o f face-visor.

84a depicts how the Mongols wore thei r hair. The crown was shaved right round , leaving just a long lock

of ha ir on the very to p of th e head which hung do wn to the eyebrows. The hack o f the head was also

shaved. At the sides they grew thei r hair long like women , pla it ing it behind the ears. Rub reck indicat es

that there co uld also be a plait at the back of the head. Compare to the hair style of SO.

Moustaches could be grown to extt avagent length, th ough Carpini says only a few grew hair on their top

lips. All the sources agree that beards were scanty.

S



a

8 MONGOL HEAVY CAVALRYMAN

Co nt empora r ies of fer a fair numhe r o f desc riptio ns

of

Mongol arm

our

, a lbeit generally vague.

Carpini records iron or steel helmet s wit h leather colfs or aventuils, mail cc rescteu, and leather bod y

armo ur of overlapping strips; he also gives an accurate and detailed description of lamellar armour used

for bot h men and horses. Marco Po lo says they wore a vcry st ro ng arm ou r 'o f lea ther that has been boiled

i.c . cu ir bo ullh. Matt hew Paris also reco rds lea ther armour, of oxh ides streng thened wit h iro n plates,

addi ng th e improbable but amus ing det

ailtha

t on ly th eir ches ts were prote

ct

ed, their backs being left

unar

mou

red to d iscourage them from runn ing away Tho mas of Spalatro desc ribes 'armour of buffa lo

hid es with sca les fas ten ed on it' ( possibly lame llar) as well as iron or leather helme ts. T he Empero r

Frcderick

JI

rec

or

ds 'untanned hid es of oxe n. horses an d asses' reinforced with plate s of iron wh ich wer e

somehow st itched in. li e also menti ons that th ere were

man

y considerably be tter-equippe d Irom the spo ils

o f

the

ir de feated enemies (he ac tu ally says

Christ

ians'

the

r

efor

e Franks). Into th is category fa ll iro n

helmets and armour of i ron pla tes' of Persian origin and ma il haube rks of Alan or igin recorded in

add ition to hardened- leathe r armour by Rubrec k. Meta l a

rmo

u r was po lished to a high shine.

Q uill' clea rly lea the r was the

co

mmo nes t f

orm

of

body

-a

rmo

ur , cons truc te d from 'overlapping plia ble

s trips' according to Carpin i. li e records that th e hide str ips - abou t

inches wide - wer e tightl y

sewn together 3 layers th ick, th en so fte ned by boi ling and shaped to fit. li e add s tha t the hide was

st iffe ned with b

itu

men, wh ich wou ld also have served to protect

it

from humi

dity.

The whole arm

ou

r

consis ted o f fro nt, bac k, arm an d leg pieces, th e fron t and bac k bei ng joined 1 the s

houl

de r (and sides,

on

e assumes) by iron plate s and bu ckles: sec a lso 89.

The s tandard Mo ngol battle-f

or

mation required tha t 40 o f the army we re heavy cavalry, but William

o f Rubreck says only th e o ffice rs and picked men wore arm our and thi s is reitereated by Vincen t de

Beauvais, who adds thal no more th an 10 of the Mongols were armoured.

86 MON O INFANTRYMAN

Alth

ough earl y Mo ngol armi es wer e exclusively cavalry

they

gradua lly came to include a large pe rcentage

of

infan try recruited from the subject p

op

ulations o f co nquered ter rito ries, principally Chinese bUI also

Tu rks, Arabs, Khwarizmians, Russians and

ot hers

.

Main weapons appea r to have

been

a lon g thrust ing spear (principally as a

defence

agains t ho rsemen ),

javelins, bo w or crossbow, and a shield

co

uld be ca rrie d. Othe rs were engineers. Th is p

ar

ticu lar figure,

from the Mongol Invasion Scroll of 129 3 , is probably a Chinese auxiliary. He wears helmet and qu ilted

body-armou r, probably o f felt .

106



a b

c

90

87 88. K H ~ J L1

GnT

CAVAl RYMEr\

These 2 figures and the nex t all come fro m illustra t ion s 10 the Wo rld History o f Ras

chid

al-Din, executed

between J

306

and IJ I S.

It was und ou btedly the Ilkhanids 10 wh

om

Marco Polo was referring when he wrot e th at those (Mongols)

who

live in the Levant have ad

op t

ed th e man ners

of

the Saraccn s j though

it

is apparent fro m these

figure s th a t it was the tr ad itions of Persia rath er than Egypt or Moslem Sy ria 10 wh ich th ey had succ

umbe

d.

The dre ss of ho th these figure s particularly tha t o f 87 wit h his short-sleeved jacket and baggy trou sers)

be trays co nsiderahle Persian in fluen ce and is fairly characte rist ic of tha t worn by Persians and Moghuls

over the oc I several hu nd red years, the o nly ap parent concession to Mongol fashio n be ing the Saraq uj

wo rn by 88 . Tu rbans were also freq uentl y worn from Ilk han Ghazan s t ime ( 1295-1304 ) onwards, while

som e of Raschld s i1u

strat

ion s also show the Sharbu sh (sec al a-d I in use. Clot hing colours were bright,

with reds and blues pred omina t ing, often richly em broidered .

The ci rcu lar device on the chest of 87 may be a badge of office called a Paizah (see note 93 in Armies

and Enemies o f Ancient Ch ina ); those of the llkhanids wer e marked with 1·5 lions depen ding on

seniority, prob ably I lion for a commander of 100 men, 2 for 1,00 0, 3 for 10,000 for 100,000 and 5

for princes and commande rs-in-ch ief.

Judging from the illust rat ions bow and sabre were the principal arms, th e latter a lo ng, narr ow wea pon

with only a very slight curve. Pro bably a small shield like th at of 89 was also carri ed. 87a de pi

ct

s an

alterna tive type o f shield which was also in use, ulti mately derived from the Frankish kit e-shield ; one

illustra tio n shows such a shield slung at a warrior s back by guige-strap.

89 ILKHAN

I

HE VY CAVALRYMAN

The armo ur w

orn

he re is typical o f tha t dep icted in many tat e-t Jth cen tu ry sources and th rough out

Rasc hid at-Din s mss. , comprising a long, lamellar corselet (oft en comple te ly co vered by a heavily

embro idered surcoat j and a spiked helmet wit h aven tail. Buckles and laces are ver y clearly depicted

across th e shoulders and down the chests of some co rselets in Rase

hid s

illust ration s, indicat ing that

107



:

they were co ns truc ted of several diffe ren t pieces as described

unde

r S Th e arm-pieces a re

naps

ra ther

t han short sleeves. On ma ny co rsele ts alt e rna te rows o f lamellae are so

meti

mes shown pa in ted or

o th erw ise dec orat ed .

Th

e helm et , wit h its clo th

or

leather aventa il , is almost invariab ly de picted a blue

colour

p

robab ly ind icati ng iron) wit h th e spike colo ured gold.

Other items of armou r in use bef ore the end o f the 1J th cen tury included tubu lar vambraces, knee

guards, greaves and mirror a rmour

[i.e

. plates on chest and back secured by straps).

N

ote

the clever if somewhat impra ctical me th od o f

sto

wing away the lance wh en bo th hands are needed ,

sturring

it

thro ugh the waist-b

elt

and passing the foo t thro ugh a small loop near the b

ut t

. Lances seem to

have varie d in leng th be tween

abou

t 9 an d 12 fee l, o r sometimes more, and were he ld in a vari

et y

of ways

inclu ding th e unde rarm co uc h and the j -hand ove rarm th rus t. A bow was also carried, togethe r with a

sabre and frequen tly a mace .

Shie lds seem to have been mostly 12-20 in d iamete r, ap par en tly held by a single cent ral grip .

90

. MONGOL

STANDARD

S

There appear 10 be no co nlempo rary illustratio ns of Ihe Khan s 9- lailed Tuk

sta

nda rd

th

at depicted under

94a in Armies and Enemies o f Anci ent China appe ars to be a misinterpret ation o f Hulagu Khan s ro yal

umbrella ). All we know of it is that it cons isted of 9 white yak tails, Meng lI ung adding tha t

it

had a black

m

oon

in the middle, pr

obab

ly refe rri ng to the ball at

op

th e staf f. John Creer ha s suggested 10 me in

co rrespo ndence tha l in fact th ere was no set arra ngement for th e ta ils, bUI th at pro

bably

it was th e

number of tail s tha l indicated rank. The number 9 itself was sacred 10 the Mongols, and Howor th

thinks that t he 9 yak-tai l Tuk

of

the Khan probably resul ted fro m the origina l division o f the Mongols

proper

into

9

horde

s

hy

Genghis K

ahn

s lime represen t ed by the Or

lok)

.

90a

is my

ow

n interp retatio n

o f its appearance.

Most o the r standa rds were like 9

0b

. Thomas of

Spalatro

describes Mongol standards as sho r t , made o f

bla ck or white yaks tails wit h ba lls

of

wool at the t

op

, while o ther sour ces also refe r to standa rds made

from the black horse s tail ,

one of

4 black hor se-tails apparen t ly being a

nother

of

their

main ba ttle

sta ndards. The Mongol standard at the Battl e o f l eign itz in 124 1 desc ribed by Ge

rman

chronicle rs as a

demon with a gr ey head and a long black bear

d

was und oub

tedly of

th is type . The Mongols a t Ain

Jalu t

in I

260ap

pea

rto

ha ve had whi le standards, bu t o thers may have

been

dyed red or o th er co lours.

O

ther

standards might be

of

clo th as was Kublai s, described by Marco Polo as carry ing a sun and

moon

device. T hese may have resembled

90

c , from Raschid al-D tn s ms. o f 1306 .

9 1. FRAN KISH HORSE

Because the Fra nks

depended

so heavily

on

the charge of th eir mailed knights horses were

ex t

remely

108



valu a ble in O

utr

e mer, eve n mor e so t han in Eur ope beca use of the c onstant da nger o f inju ry o r loss in

b

att

te as a result o f T urk ish ar ch ery t actics. Rest or , t he cust o m o f repla cing a vassal s horse if killed or

inj ured in ba t tle see page 6 in Armi es o f Feu d al Eur op e ) , may have act ually evolved in Fr ank ish

Sy ria in t he early-

12th

ce n

tury

; Usa mah reco r d s in an ane cd ot e how Tan cred ,

to l

d by his men d uring a

batt le o f c. 11 10 t hat t hey feare d for their ho rses, pro mised to replace a ll t hose hur t in th e fighting

T he ho rses are my p rope rty. Whosoever o f yo u loses his ho rse shall have it repl ace d. ) and th is a ppears

10 be t h e ea rliest recorded insta nce o f Rest or.

Ho rses in Ou tre mer came c hiefly fr o m Syria an d Cypr us, Arab st eeds were p ar ticu lar ly highly prized ,

an d h igh prices we re also ra id fo r Kurdish and Persian horses, fine steed s o f gr eat value accord ing to

Marco 10 10. Tu rc

oman

T urquema n or T urquan ) horses wer e also used bu t t hese were clear ly

smaller.Tike t he hard y hor se s o f Cilician Armenia, bo t h t her

ef

or e bei ng r id den ma inl y by sergeants

th

ough

Templa

r sta tu tes ind icate tha t Co mmanders , as well as t he Grand Mast e r and o ther o fficers,

also had a T urqu eman eac h ).

Eur op ean ho rses also fou nd th eir way to th e Itol y La nd wit h th e var iou s crusading arm ies b ut if t he

so urces ar e to be belie ved mo st of the m did no t last lo ng, th e major it y o f th o se that ca me o verland

d yin g of ex hau stion, sta rvatio n o r wound s lo ng

befo

re t hey reached Sy ria. add ition th e Military

Orde rs fr

equ

en t ly had horses sen t

ou t

10 Ihe m by shi p from t heir Eu ropea n Con vent s: th eir regulatio ns

also specified th at no b ro th er was allo wed to take a ho rse fro m O ut re me r bac k to Europe if he sho uld

be po sted , Th e Moslems, incid

en t

ally, d id not t hi ng mu ch o f Eu ropean horse s, despising th e m as

overlargc in t he bod y and la ckin g spirit .

Mo st k night s were e xpe cted t o se rve with 2 or 3 sp are horses, and even se rgeants so me t imes h ad 10 have

o ne re mo unt.

10 9



96

93 MOSLEM HORSES

One of th e charact eristic fea tures of Moslem harness was the collar Mishadda) wor n at the throat.

usually with a plume of horse-hair suspen ded from it as in figure 9 2. It hJS even been suggested

that

this

may have been colo ured as a means of identification. A second plume was often suspended h orn

the breast-si rap together with o the r pendant s; 92 has in ad di tio n 3 pendants hanging from long straps

on

e ith er side of the saddle, apparen t in many illustrat i

on

s of Turkish horses throughou t th is era.

The saddle itse lf was of ten very ornate: Usamah describes one as black and quilted. and anot her as gold

wit h a black centre and the rider s name in black lett ering rou nd the edge. Th e saddle-cloth Zunnari), which

usually cove red about half

of

th e

horse s bac k, also t

en d

ed to

be

rich ly de co rated.

H a Seljuk mou n t dating 10 c. 1115 , is int eresting in tha t it wea rs a housing, called Kan bush by the

Moslems {

comp

are to tha t of figure 7). T hese wer e probab ly in use by the 121h century and were fair ly

commo n by the

en d

of

th e

Ayyu bid era .

Th e

Malllluk sultan Baibars had a horse wit h a black housing

at his coronano n in 1160 , and at Acre in 129 1 Ihe Templar of Ty re re por ts of th e Mamluks th at tt hey

had the ir mou nted men all armed , and their horses in housings. At 1I0ms too , in 1281, many of the

Mamluk ho rses ap pear to have wor n housings . Probably th e h

ou

sing sometimes co ncealed arm ou r.

Hor se-arm o ur was in use among st the Moslems even bef

or e

th e Crusades bu t owing to the predom inan ce

o f light cavalry in th eir armie s it appears only rarely in th e sources. There were a t lea st 3

,000

armoured

horses in the Seljuk army de fea ted at An t ioch in 10< 8, an d Sultan Kilij Arslan I rode an armoured horse

at the Bail ie of Khabar in 1107. In his Raymond III of Tr ipolis M. W. Baldwin even implies that there

were arm

ou

red ho rses in Sal

adin s

army at Ilal tin in 1187, appa rently ci ting Ibn al-Athir and Abu

Sham ah . Moslem terms fo r ho rse-armour were Barasim bard I, Baraki cha nfro n) and Tigfaff qui lte d

armo ur).

Th

e Franks ado pt ed horse-a

rm o

ur in th e late- 12th ce n tury , an d its use stead ily increased

throughout the 13t h cen tury: for Frank ish ho rse-armou r see figures 120 and 121 in Armies of Feu d al

Europe .

< 4. BYZAN

TINE

HORSE

Thi s is typicaI of Byzantine harness thr oughout the I l th. 1

2t h

and 13th ce nturies. It ap pears to have

mos t commonly been dyed red or black.

Horses we re mostl y from Analolia and

Sy r

ia - Ann a Comnena mentions Dama scene. Edessan and Arab

110



horses being bought fo r the army, an d the Byzant ine wor d for horse (Pharrhi} itself derives from th e

Ara bic. Anoth er type held in high regard fo r its speed was ca lled the Wild Horse by th e Byeantincs.

ap parentl y th e same as the Tu rcoman or Frank ish Turqu ernun horse. Th cssa tian ho rses were a lso of

goo d qualit y .

The Byzan tin es wore th eir st irru ps sho rte r th an th e Franks. Spurs arc absent fro m most contemporary

illustrations, bu t they

do

oc casiona lly occ ur as, for instance, in on e or two pictures in the Scylit zes

ms. Some Byzan tin es [ possibl y those of Tu rkish an cestr y or extractio n ) ap pear to have followed the

Turkish custom of cont rolling the horse by use of a small wh ip suspended at th e wrist .

I

know of no Byzantine sources of th e Crusade era which de pic t or ment ion the use o f horse-armo ur by

Byzant incs, thou gh this does no t prove that it had completely disappeared. It seems more prohahie tha t

its use simply became less widespread with th e gradual deterioration of the milita ry

es tablishment ,

and th a t

o nly those wealth y enough (or with access to Imperial armo uries) were ab le 10 o btain horse-armour af ter

th e cnd of th e I 1th ce ntury or meearly part o f the 12th cen tury.

9 MONGOL PONY

Mongol pon ies were sho rt-legged and stoc ky-and stood o nly 13-14 han ds high bUI th ey were, in the

Emperor Freder ick lI s words, swift and at need long-enduring: Each man had a t least 2 and possibly

as many as 18 horses, these apparently

being ridden

in ro tat ion fro m da y to day . They

were

mainly

geldings and mares.

The

har ness

de pict ed here is fairly typical,

most

horses having a plume suspended at throa t or chest.

The tail was normally t ied or short ened and the st irr ups were w

or n

shor l. The saddle was made of

woo d , rubbe d wu h

sheep s

fa t to

pro tect

it against the rain.

Some were armo ured or

half-armoured.

Car pini record s leat her horse-armour o f

2

or

3

layers pro tec t ing

the horse down to its knees, a lso des cribing horses w it h their shoulders and brea sts pro tec ted ,

apparen tly

with metal armour. In ad ditio n he records lamellar hor se-armour and iron head-pieces. Withou t ci ting a

so urce

. Lamb, in his Genghis Khan , s ays tha t the sh ock divisions had ho rses encased in lacquered

lea th er -

red o r black , by which he may

be

ref

er r

ing to

Keshik

units. For the pro bable appearance of

Mongol horse-armou r sec figure 122 in Armies and Enemies of Ancien t Ch ina .

Solid coloured horses were gene rally preferred since they co ncealed the blood o f ho t h their own and

their riders wounds, white horses be ing generally shunned f

or

the

same

reaso n (whi te ho rses we re in

fact sacred amon gst the Mongo ls). The Baat ut rode blac k horses. wh ile greys. chestnuts. bays, sorrels and

skewbalds are also record ed.

T he Ilk hanids appear to have main ly ridden large Ara b

s teeds.

Like all Asiat ic nomads, the Mongols directed the horse w

it h

:I

wh ip rat her than spurs. Such a whip can

be see n suspended h orn th e wrist of figure 84.

96 . CAMEL

Camels were the main mea ns o f huggage t ranspor t in the Middl e East and accom panied most armie s

Moslem , Mongol or Fran k ish - in large numbe rs ; Beha ed-Din records th e Fra nks ca pt uring as many as

3,000 came ls fro m o ne of Saladin s supply caravans in 119 2 the Itinerarium claims the even higher

figure o f 4 ,700 ) in addi t ion

10

mul es ami asses, a lso used in large numbers, and th is was o nly o ne o f 3

similar co nvoys. In addition to carr ying baggage the camels o ften doubl ed 3S infa nt ry mounts o n the

march , bu t th ey do no t seem to have bee n ridden in bat tle except by some Arabised Negro tribes o f th e

Su d

an , such as the Bega. Mamluks usually had at least one camel each, mor e oft en 2, wh ile non-mamfuks of

the al-Halqa received 3 per 2 men .

xtoslem caravan s generally had lheir own escorts , comprised o f cavalry, in ad dit ion to which the drivers

were usually arme d, Fu lcher of Chart res describ ing how the drivers of th e Fatimid supp ly column at

Ramla in 1102 carried staves and missiles in their hands for fight ing. Of the 3 caravans reported in I 192 ,

two were esco rt ed by Bedoui ns; in all th e 3 caravans seem 10 have had a combi ned escort strength of

2

,000

cavalry

in

clud ing 500 eli te mam luks ) plus nu

mero

us foo tmen , pro hably th e camel drivers.

I 11



PPENDI ES

APPENDIX I MILITARY SERVICE OWED TO THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM AS RECORDED BY

JEA N O IBELlN

Jea n d be lin wro te c. 1265 but ap pea rs to have re

cor

de d military ser vice as it probabl y exis ted in th e

re ign o f

aldw

IV, ther

ef

or e some lime be tween 1174 and 1185, The re are several vers ions of his lists

ex t

ant in which , inevitably, ce rtain discrepancies have been introduced; these are noted where they

app

ear . A la ter list by Marino Sanudo

sho

ws

certa

in o ther

differences-and

these to o are no ted . D l be lin s

Livre de s Assises de la

aute

Cou r .

from

which this da ta is taken, is q uot ed in fu ll in Volume I of

Recue tt des Histone ns des Cro isad es, Lois publis hed in 184 1 (a facsimile edition was publi shed in this

co untry in 1969 ).

KNIGHT SERVICE

The Barony of the Co unt of Jaff a and Ascalon , includ ing Ram la, Mirabel and Ibelin, owed 100 knigh ts

(

one

version .eves the improbable figu re of 500)

thu

s:

Ja ffa 25

Ascalon 25

Ram la and Mlrabcl 40

Iod in

I Q

The Bar

ony

of the Prince of Galilee owed 10 0 kn ights

t

he same one version again says

500)

thus:

The land s to the cast of the River Jordan 60 ( one version says 40 )

The lands to the west o f

the

River Jordan 40

The Baro ny of Sidon , including Beaufort , Caesarea and Beisan , owed 100 kn ights ( one version again

says 500 , while S

anudo

doe s no t list this Barony at all)

thu

s:

Sidon and Be

auf

or t 60

Caesare a 25

Beisan 15

T he Seigno ry of Kerak, Mo nt rea l

and

Hebro n owed 60 knights

thu

s:

Kera k an d Montr eal

Oultre

jourda in) 40

Hebron 20

T he Seignc ry of Coun t Joscely n owed 24 knight s (one version says 50 ) thus:

Chateau do u Rei (Mi iJiya) 4

Sain t George (Lydda ) 10

The lands of Ge

of

frey le Tor t 6

The lands of Ph.ilip le Ro us 2

The Chamberlain 2

d lbelin lists the knight service which the bishop s of the kingdom of Jerusalem owed (one version

includes th ese as pa rt o f the Seign

ory

of Count Josccly n : they are no t li

sted

at all by Sanudo) thus:

The Bishop of Saint George o f Lydda 10

The Archbishop of Nazareth 6 (one version says 10 )

(T he Scignory

of)

Toron and Maro n 18 (one version says I S) th us:

T

oron

15

Maron 3

D Ib

ehn

th en moves on to the knight service owed by the cit ies of

the

kingdom .

Of

these Jerusalem ,

Nab lus, Acre and Daro n comprised the roya l demesne at th is time.

Th e service which the 1I0 ly City o f Jerusalem owed was 41 knights (4 3 in 3 versions, but 4 1 in San

udo

)

th us:

Lore ns de Francleuc 4

Anscl Babin 5

112



The wife of Jean Comain 4

Raymond le Buffile 3 ( 5 in 3 versions)

Henr y des Mons

Nicho las d Art ois

Simon the son of Peter l Erm in 2

Andrew of the Temple 2

Pet er d An ti

Amalric the son of Arnold 3

Baldwin de

Saint-G itles 3

Simon o f Bet hlehem

Engeram de Pinquegni 2

Lady Gille, the wife of Jean de Valence

Peter le Noir 2

Fulk le No ir

Anse l le Borgne

Hugh le Petit

The children of Roben de Pinquegni 2

Eustace Pat ric I

The city of Nablus ( NeapoJis) owed 85 knights (on e ver sion says 80 , another

102,

but

85

in Sanudo )

thus:

The Viscou nt 10 (50 in one version)

Renier Rohart and his mother 8

Jean Belarnier 5

Eudes

dou Mer le

4

The wife of lI ugh de Mimars 4

The wife of Baldwin le Prince 3

The wife of

Raymon I

Jean de Saint Bertin

(3

in versions)

Constantine the bro ther o f Raymond

William le Queu

Henry the so n of Guy Rays I

Th e wife o f Baldwin o f Paris

Isaac de la Pessine I

Roger l Asne I

Aubrey de Roi 2

Ber nard Fouchier I

Richa rd o f Nazare th

Raymond Bahin I

Baldwin de Ro trtnes I

T he wife o f Robert Salibe I

The wife o f Michacl le Grant

Gerard Passerel I

Baldwin of Ibelin 4

The Lady o f Cacsarea 2

Henry the Crossbowrnan

uy

of Naples I

Arnold of Tripol i I

Rey nald de Soissons

Amalric de Landre I

Philip o f Nazaret h I

George l E scrivain 1

Balian of Ibe lin , fo r the land which he holds in Nablus 15

Simon de Darria n 2

The city (or seigno ry in one version ) of Acre owed 80 knights (3 versio ns say 72 , but Sanudo - who calls

the city by its classical name of Pto lomais - a lso says 80 ) t hus:

The Co nstable (Amalric de Lusigna n) 10

113



Balian o f l affa, the Chambe rlain 7 6 in one vers ion)

Pagan of lIaifa

7

Raymond o f Scandehon 7

Philip le Rou s I

The wife

of

Eudes 2

Gerard Espinal I

Lady Gille 3

William de

Molcmbcc 2

The wife

of

William

of

Ant ioch

Waiter de Saint

Denis 2

Robert Tah

or

I

Raou l of Nazareth

I

Simon de s M

ou l

ins I

Foun

t Joscety n I

Jordan de Terrcmonde

Michael of Mo unt Sinai I

Dreux the bo the r of Gilbert de Fia r I

wafter of Blunchegarde 9, of whom Am old de Br ie supplied

The wife of Adam Cost

e

I

wetter le

Bel I

Eudes de la Midi I

Gace the

son of

Robcr t

ille de Calavadn 4

The Seneschal 3 (4 in onc version)

Quast rin Benoit 2

Am old de ifoille I

The Vis

cou

nt (Williarr. Ill Flor)

Jordan Harenc

l ean de Rains

I

The ci ty or seignory j o f Tyre

owed

28 knights (25 in one version) thus:

The vcncnaus 3 ( I in on e version)

Simon lie 3 (I in

one

version)

The wife

of

WiIliam le Grant 2

The wife of

Gilhert

v em ter

I

Fu lk de la Fal aise

2

Ansel the so n o f Charles

Gera rd Ga zc 2

Henry de Machefin I

Adam of At souf

I

Dents

the son

of

Geoffrey

Raoul de Bou telfie r 2

Roger Sau veri 7

Sirnon des Moutms

Roger le Gast I

The

city

(or seignory l of Daron owed 2 knights thus:

Ocra rd de Do uai I

Reynald o f Mon tgisard I

The ci ty

o

r scignory l of Beirut owed 21 knights No deta ils given. Neither Daron nor Beirut appear in

Sanudo s list).

D I belin adds up his

ow

n figures to a t

ot

al of 577 knights:of the other vers ions one gives 56 7 2 give (,77 ,

an d 3 give 6 66 . while Sa

nudo

- who, as n

ot

ed above, omits several figures _ gives 5 18. However, his

arith metic is at f

ault

in severa l places (Nah lus add s up to o nly 8 1, Acre 10 76 ) and his sum total is

lik ewise wrong. Adding th e figures for you rself, yo u will a rrive in fac t at 675 . Small. in his Crusading

Warfare , say s th a t however the figures are a

dde

d,

the

ir to ta l ca nnot be less tha n 64 bu t in fact by

114



l aking eac h minimum t ot al 40 ins tead of 60 for Eastern Galileo, 15 instead o f 18 for l o ro n/ Ma ro n , 8 0

instead of 85 fo r Nablus,

n

instead o f 80 fo r Acre , and 25 instead of 28 for Tyre ) the Iota I ca n he

reduced a litt le furt her, to 636 . Conversely by taki ng th e highest figure in eac h case Iex cept for th e

impossible 50 0 o f t he 3 great Baronies: t herefo re 50 ins tea d of 24 for Co unt Josce ty n , 10 instea d o f

6 fo r Nazare t h, 43 instead of 41 for Jerusale m, and 12 7 ins tead of 8 5 fo r Nablus, incl udin g 50 instead of

10 fo r t he Viscou nt ) it is possible to increase th e to tal to as m uch as 74Q. How eve r. as no ted o n page 10

the figures arc clear ly inco mple te ; d lbel in him self admits his lack o f knight se rvice dat a for Banyas an d

Subei be bot h ca pt ure d by Nur ed-Din in 1164 ) a nd C ha tea u Ne uf , an d it is known t ha t o t he r fids suc h

as Arso uf, which o wed 6 knights and 21 se rgea nts -

Le.

16

1 r

knights - in 1261 ) have also been omi t ted.

S ERGEANT SE RVICE

This service appears to have bee n o wed o nly by church lan ds and th e burgesses of t he cities. like th e

list of knight service , is al mos t cer t ainly incom ple te we

kno

w , fo r inst ance , t ha t Magna Ma ho meria

pro vided 65 fight-armed yo ut hs - und o ub t edly a co nti ngent o f se rgeants - a t Gaza in I 170 ). D Ib clin

lists t he fo llowing :

T he Pat riarch of Jerusale m 500

T he Cha pte r of th e Holy Sepulchre 500 Sa nudo says just 5)

Th e Abbey of St . Mary of Je hosa phat 150

T he Ab bey o f Mo un t Sion 150

T he Abb ey of t he Mo unt o f Olives 50 150 in 3 versions. No t list ed by Sanudo)

T he T em plum Do mini 50 3 versio ns sa y 150, as do es San udo )

T he Lat ina 50

T he Bisho p o f Tt bcna s 100 500 in 2 ersions )

T he Ab be y o f Mo unt Ta ho r 100 500 in 2 versions )

T he City of J e rusale m 500

T he Cit y of Acre 50 0

The City of T yre 100

The Cit y of Nablus 300

Th e Cit y of Caesa rea 50

Th e Bisho p o f Bet hleh em 200

Ramla, Mira he1 an d Ibd in 150 Sanudo sa ys 100)

T he Bishop of Sa int Ge orge o f Lydda 200

Arso uf 50

T he Bisho p of Seb ast ea 100 500 in 2 versions, 150 in an ot he r)

T he Bisho p o f Acre 150 550 in o ne versio n )

T he Bisho p o f lI eb ro n 50 5 50 in o ne versio n)

T he Arch bisho p o f T yre 150

T he Archbisho p of Nazar et h 150 No t listed in 2 version s. Sa

nudo

says 50 )

T he Bisho p o f Sidon 50

The Arc h bishop of Caesarea SO No t listed in one version)

Ascalon I SO 100 in 3 ersion s, and in Sa nu do )

Ja ffa 100 N o t listed in 3 versio ns, no r in Sanudo

Le Lyo n 1 Leluo n in Sanudo} lOO

Le Ge rin

?

- Leyr im in Sanudo ) 25

lIaira SO

T tberias

200

T his lime d l he lin add s u p his figures co rrectly to a to ta l of 5, 02 5. t hou gh o ne

ersion miscou nts to

5, 175. T hose ersion s with varian t figures

add

up to 4,975, 5,075,

6,12

5 a nd 7,0 25 t ho ugh 3 version s

iU

ve

the ir o wn to ta ls inacc urately as 7

.075

. Sanud o s t ot a l of 4,2 80 is much lo wer t han an y of th ese.

APPE ND IX 2 ROGER DE FLOR AND THE CATALAN GRA ND CO MPANY 130 2-13 11

Cat alan mercenarie s arc first recorded in Byzant in e service in 1279 , d u ring t he cam pa ign lead ing up to

t he Bau lc of Negro ponte . Co rsairs of Cat a la n o rigin also appeared o n oc casion in the flee ts o f t he pirat e

Megas Duces Licarlo a nd Jo hn de

10

Cavo , bUI it was no t un til 130 2 tha t the Byzan tincs e mp lo yed

Cala lans in pa rti cular ly large numbers.

11s



The previous yea r the Sicilian wars which had commenced with the so-called ' Sicilian Vespers' of 1282

had finally been ended by the Peace o f Callabc'lIotta , and Frederick of Aragon, King of Sicily, could

finally dispense with the service of the mer

cenar

y Grand Company of Catalans under Roger de Flor -

not with out a sigh o f relief They I t his service some 18

.000

strong, in addition to t rue Cata lans incl

udin

g

al t hat time Italians, Fren chmen , Germ ans, and some Aragonese: when first ra ised by Pet er o f Atagon in

1281 the comp

any

had even included IO

OT

S.

Roger de Flor (whose real name. Rut ger vow Blum, was considerably less roman tic ) is described by a 1

4th

cen tury Ffore n

une

ch roni cler as 't he fat her of all

Condorneri

li e was an apostasized Templar sergeant

who had made his fame and fortune at the fall of Acre in 1291 , when he had commandeered a Femplar

galley and charged exorbitant pr ices for passage 10 the safety of Cyprus Atter a period o f piracy as

captain o f a Oenoese ship he had jo ined the mercenary troops of Fredenck III and become commander

o f the Cata lan Grand Company , and It was he who, an

tr

the Company had been made redundant by

Fredenc k, managed to extor t co nsiderable privileges from the Byzantine Empe ror Andro nikos in

eacha nge for the promise o f its service against the Tu rks of Asia linor . Byzantine sources re cord the

strength o f the

Compa

ny when it sailed from Sicily fo r Constanl

inop

le as 2-8 ,000 men, while the more

reliab le t unl aner, de F1or' s secretary, reco rds them as 36 ships and 6 ,500 men , comprised of 1,500

cavalry, 4.

00

0 Almughavari (Aragonese mou ntainee rs - see figure 64 in 'Armies of Feudal Europe') and

1

,000

o ther inb ntry. This t

ot

al

does

not include the seamen, who pr

obab

ly account for the diffe rence

between xtun taner s 6, 500 and Pechymeres' 8 ,000. (The latter, ho wever, reco rds the size o f de Flor's

fleet as o nly 18 , alleys and 4 'grea t shi ps': since Genoa supp lied a number o f his ships this figure may

represent only those which were his own.) Eith er way, by the Spring of 1303 the Cal alans numbered

about 6 ,000 men.

On his arr ival a t Constan tino ple de Flor was created kgas Du ll hy Adronikos ( this being one o f the

term s of their agreement and , following scurrles with Genoese colonists in the ci ty , the Cata lans were

prom ptly shipped over to Asia Minor for a campaign against the Turks, of whom they subse

que

ntly killed

more Ihan 50 ,000 in engagements at Cyzic us, Philadelphia and the Iron Gates. Unfor tunalely these

successes went to de H oe's head , so that he abused his au

thor

ity and gradually became openly hostile to

Andr

onik

os, seeing himself as ru ler of a suzerain Byzant ine state which he had plans to carve ou t in

Anal olia. Despite his elevation to the rank of Caesar, an official request 10 reduce the numbers of his

Iroops 10 3.000 was ignored, and inciden ts co ntinued unt il Michael IX, Andronikos' son and eo-Emperor,

resort ed

10

having de Flor assassinat ed in

130

5,

and

in the ensuing carnage some 2,300 or mor e o f the

Company were hunted do wn and killed : Muntaner records that th eir numbers were reduced to 3,307

men and 206 ho rses.

Leadertess and demoralised the majorit y of the survivors then disbanded. DUI 1,500 o f them, a mixture

of Almughavari and French men (the latte r, together with Catalan knighls. und

oubt

edly providing the

cavalry element) Iortrtied themselves in Gall ipoli, from which they succC'ssfully re pulsed two

Byzantine attacks. They were gradually reinforced by motley ban ds of adven turers plus some 3,800

Turcopotes and Turks (1 ,800 cavalry and 2,000 infa nt ry] who had dese r ted from thc Byzantines.

Ultimately internal d issensio n fo rced them to abandon Gallipoli and split up . The largest part , some

8-9,000 men includi ng 3,00 0 Turks, marched inland into Thessaly in 130 8, finall y heading towards the

Frankish Duchy of Athe ns, where Duke Waiter de Bne nne employed Ihem against the Byzantincs and

the

Duchy o f Nenpatras , from whom they seized over 30 for tresses for him within 6 mon ths. when peace

was co ncluded the Duke no longer desired to employ suc h a vast number o f unmanageable mercenary

troops : h.. instead granted land s to 500 o f the m

: OO

cavalry and 300 Inf antry) and dismissed the rest

with

out

pay

(wh

ich was 4 months beh ind). InevitablY

t

he Catala ns were not con tent

10

leave

it

at tha t.

and event s ultimately culmina ted in the decisive Battle of Almyra or Kephi ssos in 13 11, where Duke

Waiter's cavalry, be tween 2,000 and 6 ,40 0 strong and includ ing

atlca

st 700 knighls from all Franki sh

Greece, eft tricked by

the

Catata ns into charging headl ong inl o a can-fully concealed marshy plain

wher e thei r horses wer e down. The Catalans, wbo now include d 3, 500 cavalry and 4.000 infantry

( the latter largely Almughavari but including some Dyunl me prison ers-of-war pressed int o serv ice

because they were good archers), then all but e xterminated th

C

Frank ish army - so thoroughly Ihjt

only

4 or 5 noblemen are known to have escaped with their lives. Of the 4·24 .000 Frankish infant ry present

cla ims that 20 ,000 wer e killed .

Therea fter

the

Duchy of Albens became a Calala n state , ·hich lasted down to 1379 .

116



APPENDIX 3 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following is a list o f th ose h

oo

ks which I found to be th e most use ful during th e course o f my research .

is fair ly exte nsive bu t st ill a long way from being co

mp r

ehens ive, and th ose who wish to delve dee per

still are recommended

to consult the bibliographies and foll ow up th e references th at many o f th ese

include , as I did . T he bibliography in Armies of Feudal Eur ope shou ld also be consulted . Where it is not

clear from the ti tle o f a modern tra nslation which source it is tha t has bee n tr anslate d the name o f the

original au th

or

s) is given in brackets afte rwards. Translat ed passages in th e main text are base d largely on

th ese mo dem translati

on

s.

Ali

en

, w. E. D.

Histo ry

of the Georgian Peo ple 1932

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Archer, T. A. T he Crusade of Richard 1 1189-1 19 2 (ex t racts from various co ntempo rary sources) 1888

- an d Kingsford , Char les Lethbridge. The Cru sades: Th e Story of th e Lat in Kingdom of Jerusalem 1894

Ayal

on

,

David.

T he Wafi diya in the Mamluk Kingdom Islamic Culture XXV , 1951

- Stud ies on the Stru c tu re of the Mamluk Army Bulletin of th e British School o f Oriental and African

Studi es XV, 1953 and XVI, 1954

Baldwin , Marshall Whithed . Raym

on

d

of T ripolis and the Fall of Jerusalem (1 140-1 187) I

93 6

Bart hold, W. Turkestan do wn to the Mongol Invasion 1928

Beeler , Joh n . Warfare in Feudal Europe 73 0· 1200 1971

Benvenisti, Meron. The Crusaders in the Holy Land 1970

Berry, Virginia

G. {transj.

De

Profec tio ne Ludc vici

VII in

Ortcrucm (Od e

of

Dcuill

194 8

Blondel, S. Nabites th e v arangian Classica et

Mediaevalia

, 1939

Boase, T. S. R. K ingdoms and Stron gholds of th e Crusaders 197 1

Bradfo rd ,

Emle . T

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1

204

1 9 74

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- trans). Deeds of Joh n an d Manuel Comnenus ICinnamus] 1976

Bucht hal , lI ugo. Miniature Painting in the Lat in Kingdom of Jerusalem 1957

Buckler,

Georgina

G. Anna

Comnena:

A Stud y 1929

Budge, Em est A. Wallis ( trans ). The Chr onograp hy o f Gregory Abu J Faraj (Bar lIebraeus) 1932

Cahen, Ctaude. La Campagne de Mantziker t d apres les So urces Musulmanes B yzantic n IX, 1934

Un T rait e d Ar murerie Compose pou r Saladin (Murda al-Tnrt usi, in Fre nch ) Bulle t in

d Etu

des

Orientalcs XII ,

1948

Pre-Ortornan Turkey. A General Survey of the Mat erial and Spiritual Cultu re and History,

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The Cambridge Medieval Histor y (8 volumes ) 19 11-1936

C

am p

bell, G. A. The Knights Templars, Their Rise and Fall 193 7

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Ctrac Est op a han, Sebast ian . Sky llit zes Matnten sis, Tomo I Reproduci ones Y Minia turas 196 5

Conder, C. R. T he Kingdom of Jerusalem 1099-129 1 AD 189 7

Dawk ins, R. M. The Later History o f the Varangian Guard : Some Notes Journal of Roman Stu dies

XXXVII ,1 94 7

Donovan , 1. P. Pelagius and th e Fift h Crusade 1950

Encyclopaedia of Islam (4 volumes) 19 13· 1929 , sec ond edition 1

96 0

- (in progress )

Finlay, George. H istory of the Byzantine and Greek Emp ires

from

716 10 1453 (2 volumes) 1853-1854

F

olda

, Jaroslav. Crusader Manuscr ipl llluminat i

on

at Saint-Jean d Acre

1275-1291 1976

Gabrieli. Prancesco ( trans]. Arab Historians o f th e Crusades (extrac ts from var iou s con te mpo rary

sources) 1969

Gar dner , Alice. The Lascarids of Nicaea : The Story of an Empire in Ex ile 19 12

Geanakop los, D. Graeco- Laun Relat io ns on th e Eve of th e Byzant ine Restora tio n: The Bai l ie of

Pelagonia 1259 Dumbarton Oaks Papers VII, 1953

-

T h

e Em p

er

or Michael Palaeologus and th e West I

258-12

82

1959

Gibb , H. A. R. (t rans). Th e Damas

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s Ch ronicle of the Crusades (l bn al-Qala nisi) 1932

- The Arm ies o f Salad in in S tudies

on

the Civilization of Islam 1962

- The Life of Saladin , from the W

or k

s of Imad ad-Din and Baha ad-Din

1973

Glubb, John Bagot . Th e Course of Empire : The Arabs an d th eir Successo rs 1965

117



- ' The Lost Cen tu ries: From the Muslim Empires to the Renaissance of Europe 1145· 1

453

1967

- ' Soldiers of Fortu ne: The Story of

th e

Mamlu kes' 19 73

lI ill, G. 'A lIi story o f Cyp rus' (3 vol umes) 1940- 1948

lI ill, John

Hugh

and

lIi1l, Laurita

l t

r

an s). 'Raymond d A

guilcrs:

lI istoria Fra nco ru m Qui Ceperunt

Iherusalem' 1968

lI i l Rosalind ( tra ns). 'T he Deeds

of

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