article 3 secs. 6 7 8 9
TRANSCRIPT
SECTION 6
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN
FACTS:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with
Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October
25, 1918 beyond the women‘s consent and
knowledge.
Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc,
Manila.
Thereafter the women were shipped to
Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers.
The purpose of sending this women to davao is to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years.
That when the women, its relative and lawyers filed for
habeas corpus, the City of Manila Mayor and police
moved to dismiss the case saying that those women
were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should
be filed in the city of Davao instead.
ISSUE RELEVANT TO SECTION 1 ARTICLE II of the
Constitution
1. WHETHER OR NOT MAYOR LUKBAN WHO IS AN OFFICER
OF THE STATE, TO ERADICATE VICES IN ITS CITY HAVE
THE RIGHT TO DEPORT SAID WOMEN OF ILL-REPUTE?
OTHER ISSUE
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CITY OF MANILA DOES NOT
HAVE A JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS TO DAVAO CITY TO PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE
WOMEN SINCE IT IS OUT OF THEIR JURISDICTION AND
THUS, DISOBEYING THE WRIT ISSUED BY THE COURT TO
PRODUCE THE BODY OF THE WOMEN?
HELD:
· The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court for not following the order of the court to
produce the body of the women and shall pay into the office of the
clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100)
RATIO:
1. On the first issue, the court‘s decision is based on the
principle of Republicanism wherein ―Ours is a government of laws
and not of men‖
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that”No
freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his
freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or
any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.
No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts
are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual
liberty and to punish official transgressors
2. On the second issue, the court believed that the true
principle should be that, if the respondent (Mayor Lukban) is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey
the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of
the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose
principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
3. In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from
the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao
to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may
not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with
impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ
of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
NOTE:
HABEAS CORPUS as defined by the Black Law Dictionary
Literally means- “That you have the body”
- It is a writ employed to bring a person before a court,
most frequently to ensure that the party’s imprisonment or
detention is not illegal.
- In addition to being used to test the legality of the arrest
or commitment, the writ maybe used to obtain review of (1)
the regularity of the extradition process (2) the right to or
amount of bail or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has
imposed a criminal sentence.
- In other words, it is a writ which compel someone to
produce the body of the person under the name of the law.
MANOTOC v. CA
Facts:
Criminal complaints were filed by some clients of the Manotoc
Securities, Inc., to which petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. is a
principal stockholder, after the torrens title submitted to and
accepted by the same were suspected to be fake. The cases
were assigned to different trial courts. In all cases, petitioner has
been admitted to bail, with FGU Instance Corporation as Surety.
Petitioner then filed motion for permission to leave the country in
each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the
United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.". His motion was denied thus he elevated his
petition to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that having
been admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts which
granted him bail could not prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.The same was denied hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
released on bail, has an unrestricted right to travel?
Held:
Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to
prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail
as the security required and given for the release of a person who
is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in
which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not
an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
states that ―The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary
in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.‖
The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
such lawful order as contemplated by the said constitutional
provision
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail.
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution
opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and
Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to
travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and
the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear
him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter
of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the
Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction
over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his
constitutional right to travel.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been
violated.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of
the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed
upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond
the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for
his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business
transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his
behalf.
SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the
revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of
the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC
ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner‘s passport, based on the
finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was
evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out
the knowledge and the permission of the court.
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order
of the court.
Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and
warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to
appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right
to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself
available whenever the court requires his presence. A person
facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from
leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return
(Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it
is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested
without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from
the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the
case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]). Article III, Section 6 of
the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the
appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety,
or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive
phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263).
Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the
previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center,
which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of
an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel
Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the
Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in
any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their
course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an
accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders
and processes
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court praying that the Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio
vs. Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990,
as well as the Resolution of 29 June 1990 denying
reconsideration, be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of
Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No.
CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he
posted bail for his provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of
the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an
Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a
hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground
that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary
Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and
scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988,
issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to
cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor,
and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from
leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial
Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14
October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because
he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo
C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without
the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45).
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July
1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a
similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review
filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we
resolved to give due course and to decide the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April
and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently
erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be
held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the
Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired
upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the
"interest of national security, public safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been
omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the
filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several
arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to
Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was
set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by
the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is
the concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. The records will show that the information was filed on October
14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be
arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and
reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The
reason for accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been
because he is abroad in the United States of America;
2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio
had never appeared in person before the Court;
3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice
and warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the
same reason –– failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has
given accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit
had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No.
CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April
1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as
Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances,
the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several
settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by
reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate
Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to travel can be
impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other
than the "interest of national security, public safety or public
health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the
bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of
Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances,
of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of
Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the
conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail
is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the
law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearance before any court when so required by the Court or
the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule
114, Secs. 1 and 2).
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel
(Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May
1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad,
compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987
Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail
may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he
attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987
Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the
liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the
allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel
were treated under one provision. Article III, Section 1(4) thereof
reads:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired.
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including
the liberty of travel, thus:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV, Section
5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct
sentences and treats them differently, to wit:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts
can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national
security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted
to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even
without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
"national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be
provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the
1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First
Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso
& Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA
121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means
be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use
all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed
upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all
times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the
1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of
a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the
1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on
that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before
in People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has
violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the
Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued.
Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an
accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure,
outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused
in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best
interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 7
Legaspi v. CSC
Facts:
Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi‘s
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Issue:
whether or not Legaspi‘s request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed must be
granted on the basis of his right to information
Held:
Yes. Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
stations as may be provided by law.
These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply
the rules by means of which the right to information may be
enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to
afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental
right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of
the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared
State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right
and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and
enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter.
Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus
proceeding such as this one.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
right to information may be exercised by the public.
The authority to regulate the manner of examining public records
does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be
made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of
or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate
the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought,
which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987
Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency
charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to
regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage
to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference
with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more
importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by
other persons shall be assured.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be
subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of
such agencies.
The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all
information. Under the Constitution, access to official records,
papers, etc., are ―subject to limitations as may be provided by
law‖ (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a)
being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and,
(b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
Issue:
whether or not petitioner has legal personality to bring
the mandamus suit
Held:
Yes. The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,
which, by its very nature, is a public right. When the question is
one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
When a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere
fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general ―public‖ which possesses the right.
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right.
Issue:
whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern
Held:
The above question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information.
However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of
denial of access, the government agency has the burden of
showing that the information requested is not of public concern,
or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by
law from the operation of the guarantee. To safeguard the
constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of
the claim of certain government employees that they are civil
service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed.
The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:
Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and
except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily
confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art.
IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).
But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information
must not be among the species exempted by law from the
operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of
eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the
Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner‘s right to know
who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. The names of
those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions,
are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about
one‘s civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner‘s
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And
when, as in this case, the government employees concerned
claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen,
has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission.
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (May 29, 1987 )
Facts:
-Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspi‘s (petitioner)
request for information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people
employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas,
in the Health Department in Cebu.
-Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the
Constitution prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose
said information.
-the Solicitor General challenges the petitioner‘s standing to sue
upon the ground that the latter does not possess any legal right to
be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the government
employees concerned.
-SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part
of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he
seeks.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to
validate the civil service eligibilities of the Health Department
employees.
Held:
Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible
for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil
service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for
said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested
by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Ratio:
The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with
personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the
exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his
standing to bring the present suit.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973
Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of
the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data
used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.while the manner of examining public
records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies.
Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the
constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical
exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being
discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of
mandamus in a proper case.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of
public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any
and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official
records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security. It follows that, in every
case, the availability of access to a particular public record must
be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a)
being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and,
(b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee
VALMONTE VS BALMONTE
Facts:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June
1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of
theopposition members of (the) BatasangPambansa who were
able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of
Mrs.Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified
true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses
inconnection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due
to serious legal implications, President & General Manager
FelicianoBelmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General
Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his
opinion"that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS
and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the
GSIShas a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality;
and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach
thisconfidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June
1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of
the GovernmentService and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying
that for failure toreceive a reply "(W)e are now considering
ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the
premises to pursue our
desiredobjective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 198
6, Ricardo Valmonte,Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Roland
o Bartolome, LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun
"Ninoy" Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul
filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke theirright to information and pray that Belmonte
be directed: (a) to furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of
the BatasangPambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO
and PDP Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note
of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish
petitioners with certifiedtrue copies of the documents evidencing
their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the
public records for thesubject information.
Issue:Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by
the formerFirst Lady Imelda Marcos toBatasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban politicalparties
Held:The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government
and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programsfor the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume
a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD
1146, asamended (the Revised Government Service Insurance
Act of 1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions,premiums, interest and other amounts payable to
GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations
which theRepublic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to
pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to
manage itsresources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus,
one of the
reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as
amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuaria
lsolvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second
Whereas Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano
Belmontehimself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant
'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to
ensure thatthese funds are managed properly with the end in
view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the
insured governmentemployees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
who themselves appropriatedfunds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degreeof fidelity and
that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public
nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the publicoffice held
by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a
matter of public interest and concern. Still, Belmontemaintains
that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its
borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentialityrestricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has
failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilegeof
confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present
petition. His position is apparently based merely onconsiderations
of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court
can only declare what the law is, and not what thelaw should be.
Under our system of government, policy issues are within the
domain of the political branches of the government,and of the
people themselves as the repository of all State power
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO
Facts:
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade
agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another
country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of
origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement,
movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy,
mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.
Issues:
a. Whether or not the claim of the petitioners is covered by the
right to information.
b. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents
applies only at certain stages of
the negotiation process.
c. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim
of privilege.
d. Whether the Respondents‘ failed to claim executive privilege on
time.
Decision:
Supreme Court dismissed the petition, on the following reasons:
1.To be covered by the right to information, the information sought
must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public
concern.In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
‗Public concern‘ like ‗public interest‘ is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse
the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are
matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They
only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information
is covered by the right to information, a specific ―showing of need‖
for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only
whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however,
the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed covered by the same,
then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must
show that that the information is vital, not simply for the
satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and
reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-
making.
2.Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to information
includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
3.The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege and
can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need
determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis. "[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted
the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the
competing interests," taking into account factors such as "the
relevance of the evidence," "the availability of other evidence,"
"the seriousness of the litigation," "the role of the government,"
and the "possibility of future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the strong
and ―sufficient showing of need‖. The arguments they proffer to
establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of
this standard stated in the decided cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a
matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is
a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need
shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published, petitioners
have failed to convince this Court that they will not be able to
meaningfully exercise their right to participate in decision-making
unless the initial offers are also published.
4.When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first time
only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean that
the claim of privilege should not be credited.
Respondents‘ failure to claim the privilege during the House
Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver
thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents received from
the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman Aguja were
mere requests for information. The House Committee refrained
from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a subpoena duces
tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia‘s alleged
request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold
the same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to refrain
from issuing subpoenas to executive officials – out of respect for
their office – until resort to it becomes necessary, the fact remains
that such requests are not a compulsory process. Being mere
requests, they do not strictly call for an assertion of executive
privilege.
AKBAYAN vs. AQUINO
Facts:
· Petitioners, as non-government orgs, congresspersons,
citizens and taxpayers, filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition seeking to compel respondents, Department of Trade
Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino, et al., to furnish
petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
· The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade
agreement to be entered into by the Philippines with another
country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a
broad range of topics which includes trade in goods, rules of
origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services,
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement,
movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy,
mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business environment, and general and final
provisions.
· Petitioners emphasize that the refusal of the government to
disclose the said agreement violates their right to information on
matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-
disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to
effective and reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political and economic decision making.
· Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied
on the ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic
negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the
right to information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that
are of public concern like the JPEPA - that diplomatic
negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Substantive Issues:
1. Whether the claim of the petitioners is covered by the right to
information.
2. Are the documents and information being requested in relation
to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency
and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is
justified in denying access thereto (whether they are covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege).
3. Whether the executive privilege claimed by the respondents
applies only at certain stages of the negotiation process.
4. Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim
of privilege.
5. Whether the Respondents‘ failed to claim executive privilege on
time.
1. YES. To be covered by the right to information, the information
sought must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of
public concern. In determining whether or not a particular
information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be
applied. ‗Public concern‘ and ‗public interest‘ both embrace a
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because
such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by
case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade
agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese
offers submitted during the negotiations towards its
execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do
not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an
exception to the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure.
Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an
information is covered by the right to information, a specific
“showing of need” for such information is not a relevant
consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of
public concern. When, however, the government has claimed
executive privilege, and it has established that the information is
indeed covered by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to
overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is
vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability
to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and
economic decision-making.
Ruling:substantive
2. YES. The Supreme Court Ruled that Diplomatic negotiations,
therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the
JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v.
Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does
not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only
after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made
may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the
disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome
its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus,
wherein petitioners were seeking information from the President‘s
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
The Court held that ―applying the principles adopted in PMPF v.
Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be
‗ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved‘ –
the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is
reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives
submitted their offers with the understanding that ‗historic
confidentiality‘ would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with
Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.‖
The Court also stressed that ―secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of
freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine
offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during
negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty
negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where
negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of
greater national interest.
The Court also addressed the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno by saying: ―We are aware that behind the dissent of the
Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people’s right
to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a
zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour
to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be
careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point
that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise
thereof.‖
3. NO. Supreme Court stated that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. However,the information must
constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar
matters affecting national security and public order.
4. NO. The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege
and can be overcome by a sufficient showing of need. This need
determination is to be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis. ―[E]ach time [the deliberative process privilege] is asserted
the district court must undertake a fresh balancing of the
competing interests,‖ taking into account factors such as ―the
relevance of the evidence,‖ ―the availability of other evidence,‖
―the seriousness of the litigation,‖ ―the role of the government,‖
and the ―possibility of future timidity by government employees.
In the case at hand, Petitioners have failed to present the
strong and “sufficient showing of need”. The arguments they
proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject
documents fall short of this standard stated in the decided
cases.
There is no dispute that the information subject of this case is a
matter of public concern. The Court has earlier concluded that it is
a matter of public concern, not on the basis of any specific need
shown by petitioners, but from the very nature of the JPEPA as an
international trade agreement.
Further, the text of the JPEPA having been published,
petitioners have failed to convince this Court that they will
not be able to meaningfully exercise their right to participate
in decision-making unless the initial offers are also
published.
5. NO. When the respondents invoked the privilege for the first
time only in their Comment to the present petition does not mean
that the claim of privilege should not be credited.
Respondents’ failure to claim the privilege during the House
Committee hearings may not, however, be construed as a
waiver thereof by the Executive branch. What respondents
received from the House Committee and petitioner-Congressman
Aguja were mere requests for information. The House
Committee refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to issue a
subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de
Venecia‘s alleged request to Committee Chairperson
Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance.
While it is a salutary and noble practice for Congress to
refrain from issuing subpoenas to executive officials – out of
respect for their office – until resort to it becomes necessary,
the fact remains that such requests are not a compulsory
process. Being mere requests, they do not strictly call for an
assertion of executive privilege
SECTION 8
UNITED PEPSI-COLA VS. LAGUESMA
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears
that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification
election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-
arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union
membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
organization; right of supervisory employees. — Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order,
dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the
first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares
managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist or join
unions, contravenes Art. III, §8 of the Constitution which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public
and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees
from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, §8
of the Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top
management; (2) Middle Management; and (3) First-line
Management [also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an organization
at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is
called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers
direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other
managers. Examples of first-line managers are the ―foreman‖ or
production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical
supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor in
a large office. First-level managers are often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle management can refer
to more than one level in an organization. Middle managers direct
the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of
operating employees. Middle managers‘ principal responsibilities
are to direct the activities that implement their organizations‘
policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the
capacities of their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics
firm is an example of a middle manager.
TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively small group
of executives, top management is responsible for the overall
management of the organization. It establishes operating policies
and guides the organization‘s interactions with its environment.
Typical titles of top managers are ―chief executive officer,‖
―president,‖ and ―senior vice-president.‖ Actual titles vary from one
organization to another and are not always a reliable guide to
membership in the highest management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to
devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies
(top and middle managers) and those whose task is simply to
ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors).
What distinguishes them from the rank-and-file employees is that
they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such rank-
and-file employees.
―Managerial employees‖ may therefore be said to fall into two
distinct categories: the ―managers‖ per se, who compose the
former group described above, and the ―supervisors‖ who form
the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous
determinations by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in
accordance with which this case was decided by the med-arbiter.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear
showing of the exercise of managerial attributes under paragraph
(m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended. Designations or
titles of positions are not controlling. As to the route managers
and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are
managerial employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so
(Worker‘s Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In
Re: Petition for Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-
Route Managers/Supervisory Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products
Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary
administrative proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an expert‘s view that the employees
concerned are managerial employees within the purview of Art.
212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative
determination compels respect for the finding of the Secretary of
Labor that route managers are managerial employees as defined
by law in the absence of anything to show that such determination
is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the
Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by substantial evidence.
The nature of the job of route managers is given in a four-page
pamphlet, prepared by the company, called ―Route Manager
Position Description,‖ the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and
you achieve this objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF
YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager.
Within these functions — managing your job and managing your
people — you are accountable to your District Manager for the
execution and completion of various tasks and activities which will
make it possible for you to achieve your sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets
them apart from supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who
basically merely direct operating employees in line with set tasks
assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the
success of the company‘s main line of business through
management of their respective sales teams. Such management
necessarily involves the planning, direction, operation and
evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of
supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere
supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far
beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating
employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire
and fire people (the evidence shows that they only
―recommended‖ or ―endorsed‖ the taking of disciplinary action
against certain employees), this is because thisis a function of the
Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989
by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law.
Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the provisions of the Labor
Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate
definitions of the terms ―managerial‖ and ―supervisory
employees,‖ as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) ―managerial employee‖ is one who is vested with powers or
prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign
or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment. All employees not falling within any of the above
definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes
of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set
management policy, and front-line supervisors, who are merely
responsible for ensuring that such policies are carried out by the
rank and file, is articulated in the present definition. 30 When read
in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art.
245 faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional
Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of the fundamental law.
*Framer‘s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7,
page 2, line 19, which is to insert between the words ―people‖ and
―to‖ the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section will
now read as follows: ―The right of the people WHETHER
EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS
to form associations, unions, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.‖
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 infringed
by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The
right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the condition that its
exercise should be for purposes ―not contrary to law.‖ In the case
of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial
employees from forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED
SECTION 9
Visayan Refining v. Camus, G.R. No. L-15870
FACTS: Upon the direction of the Governor-General, the
Attorney-General filed a complaint with the CFI (Rizal) in the
name of the Government of the Philippines for the condemnation
of a certain tract of land in Paranaque for military and aviation
purposes. The petitioners herein are among the defendants
named. Likewise, it was prayed that the court will give the
Government the possession of the land to be expropriated after
the necessary deposit (provisional) of P600, 000.00 as the total
value of the property. Through the order of the public respondent,
Judge Camus, the prayer was granted.
During the pendency of the proceedings, the petitioners raised a
demurrer questioning the validity of the proceedings on the
ground that there is no law authorizing the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. Likewise, they moved for the revocation of the
order on the same ground stated and with additional allegation
that the deposit had been made without authority of law since the
money was taken from the unexpended balance of the funds
appropriated by previous statutes for the use of the Militia
Commission and the authority for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain could not be found in those statutes. The
demurrer and motion were overruled and denied respectively by
Camus. This prompted the petitioners to file this instant petition to
stop the proceedings in the CFI.
ISSUE: Can the Philippine Government initiate expropriation
proceedings in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise
of the power of eminent domain?
RULING: Yes, it can. The Philippine Government has the general
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain as expressly
conferred by Section 63 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902). It says that the Philippine Government is authorized
"to acquire, receive, hold, maintain, and convey title to real and
personal property, and may acquire real estate for public uses by
the exercise of the right to eminent domain." The same is subject
to the limitation of due process of law. In consonance with this,
Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands
(Act No. 2711) expressly confers on the Government General the
power "to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to
exercise the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government
of the Philippine Island; and to direct the Attorney-General, where
such at is deemed advisable, to cause the condemnation
proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction."
There is no question as to the Governor General's authority to
exercise this power.
However, this authority is not absolute. It is subject to two
limitations, namely, that the taking shall be for public purpose and
there must be just compensation.
Apparently, the reason behind the taking of the subject land was
for military and aviation purposes. This considered a public
purpose given the importance of the military and aviation in the
operation of the State.
As to the second requirement, it must be remembered that at that
time there was no law requiring that compensation shall actually
be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation. The deposit was
made, despite the absence of said law, to afford absolute
assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably
taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. This is
in conformity with the just compensation requirement.
Given these reasons, the proceedings were made in accordance
with law.
DISPOSITION
Petition is denied. Proceedings of the lower court were in all
respects regular and within the jurisdiction of the court.
NOTE
The Supreme Court did not elaborate the reason in upholding the
legality of the transfer funds used for the deposit. It only said that
"the Insular Auditor was acting within his authority when he let this
money out of the Insular Treasury
THE CITY OF MANILA,vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF
MANILA, ET AL.,
FACTS: The important question presented by this appeal is: In
expropriation proceedings by thecity of Manila, may the courts
inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of
theexpropriation?The City of Manila presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of said city, prayingthat certain lands,
therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of
constructinga public improvement. The petitioner alleged that for
the purpose of constructing an extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila,
it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership
of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo.
The defendants – the Chinese Community of Manila,Ildefonso
Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado – alleged in their
Answer
(a) that nonecessity existed for said expropriation and
(b) that the land in question was a cemetery, whichhad been used
as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, andthat the same should not be converted into a
street for public purposes. One of the defendants,Ildefonso
Tampbunting, offered to grant aright of way for the said extension
over other land,without cost to the plaintiff, in order that
the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors maynot be
disturbed.The Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there
was no necessity for theexpropriation of the particular strip of land
in question, and absolved each and all of thedefendants from all
liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. On
appeal, the plaintiff contended that the city of Manila has authority
to expropriate private lands for public purposes. Section 2429 of
Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the
city(Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private
property for public use
HELD No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act No. 2711, or
the Charter of the City of Manilastates that "the city (Manila) . . .
may condemn Private property for public use." But when
thestatute does not designate the property to be taken nor how it
may be taken, the necessity of taking particular property is a
question for the courts. When the application to condemn
or appropriate property is made directly to the court, the question
of necessity should be raised(Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo,
Ry, etc., Co.[72 Ohio St., 368]).The necessity for conferring the
authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain isadmittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising
the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
generalauthority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.The impossibility of measuring the damage and
inadequacy of a remedy at law is tooapparent to admit of
argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those endeared to us
in lifesometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in
cases of necessity , or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the
grave, the last resting place of our friends, should be
maintained,and the preventative aid of the courts should be
invoked for that object
Whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its
appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the
lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as
acemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully
established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In the
presentcase, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening
of the street in question, the recordcontains no proof of the
necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record
showsthat adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered by
Tambunting to the city free of charge,which will answer every
purpose of the plaintiff.The judgment of the lower court was
affirmed.
RATIO/DOCTRINE[1] The taking of private property for any use,
which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of
eminentdomain, and beyond the power of the legislature to
delegate
To justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain)
where thelegislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that
may be found to exist, in order toaccomplish the purpose of the
incorporation, … the party claiming the right to the exercise of the
power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of
necessity for its exercise
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must
not be confused withthe right to exercise it in aparticular caseThe
power of the legislature to confer, uponmunicipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the
rightof eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but
that general authority of municipalities or entities must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances.The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise
the authority conferred, itmust comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority.[3] The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon
it. When thecourts come to determine the question, they must
only find
(a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain, but
(b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed
uponthe authority conceded to the City of Manila:
First the land must be private; and, second , the purpose must be
public. If the court, upon trial , finds that neither of these
conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot
be contended that the right is being exercised inaccordance with
law.[4] The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether
directly by the State, or by itsauthorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is thatthe
authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held
by individuals withgreater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
constitution and laws more sedulously, than the rightto the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that
right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of
an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990]
First Division, Gancayco (J): 3 concur
Facts: On 20 February 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an
expropriation proceedings against the owners of the houses
standing along Fernando ReinDel Pan streets among them
Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and some
15 other defendants (Civil Case 7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de
Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction,
pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines,
prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous
valuation of the properties. On 29 March 1979 de Knecht filed an
ex parte urgent motion for the issuance by the trial court of a
restraining order to restrain the Republic from proceeding with the
taking of immediate possession and control of the property sought
to be condemned. In June 1979, the Republic filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be
expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of
compensation stated in the complaint. In an order dated 14 June
1979 the lower court issued a writ of possession authorizing the
Republic to enter into and take possession of the properties
sought to be condemned, and created a Committee of three to
determine the just compensation for the lands involved in the
proceedings. On 16 July 1979, de Knecht filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR No. L-51078) and
directed against the order of the lower court dated 14 June 1979
praying that the Republic be commanded to desist from further
proceeding in the expropriation action and from implementing said
order. On 30 October 1980, the Supreme Court rendered a
decision, granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition and
setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the Judge Bautista On 8
August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde,
Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the
expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of
the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court which had become
final and in order to avoid further damage to latter who were
denied possession of their properties. The Republic filed a
manifestation on 7 September 1981 stating, among others, that it
had no objection to the said motion to dismiss as it was in
accordance with the aforestated decision. However, on 2
September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss said case
due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa 340 expropriating
the same properties and for the same purpose. The lower court in
an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case by reason
of the enactment of the said law. The motion for reconsideration
thereof was denied in the order of the lower court dated 18
December 1986. De Knecht appealed from said order to the Court
of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on 28
December 1988, setting aside the order appealed from and
dismissing the expropriation proceedings. The Republic filed the
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined
by a final judgment of the Supreme Court may be the subject of a
subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme
Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between the
parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take
private properties for public use upon the payment of the just
compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws.
Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the
Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners
but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. When
on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP 340
expropriating the very properties subject of the present
proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was
based on supervening events that occurred after the decision of
the Supreme Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying
the expropriation through the Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets. The
social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this
extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the
area have been relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the
EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had been
completed. Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to
this project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control
problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area.
Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter making its own independent
assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the
propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in
question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation
as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and
necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of this
Court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
City of Baguio vs. National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority [GR L-12032, 31 August 1959]
Facts:
The City of Baguio filed on 25 April 1956, in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio, a complaint for declaratory relief against
the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), a
public corporationcreated by Republic Act 1383, contending that
said Act does not include within its purview the
BaguioWaterworks System; that assuming that it does, said Act is
unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving the City of
the ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system
without compensation andwithout due process of law, and that it
is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other
cities,municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated. On
22 May 1956, NAWASA filed a motion to dismiss.On 21 June
1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as well as on the
answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, denied the motion and
ordered NAWASA to file its answer to the complaint. On 6 July
1956, NAWASA filed its answer reiterating and amplifying the
grounds already advanced in its motion to dismiss. On14 August
1956, the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts and filed
written memoranda. And after allowing the City to file a
supplementary complaint, the Court on 5 November 1956,
rendered decision holdingthat the waterworks system of the City
of Baguio falls within the category of ³private property,´
ascontemplated by our Constitution and may not be expropriated
without just compensation. NAWASA filed amotion for
reconsideration, and upon its denial, it took the present appeal.
Issue:
Whether the Baguio Waterworks partakes of the nature of public
property or private/patrimonial propertyof the City.
Held:
The Baguio Waterworks System is not like any public road, park,
street or other public property held intrust by a municipal
corporation for the benefit of the public but it is rather a property
owned by the City in its proprietary character. While the cases
may differ as to the public or private character of waterworks, the
weightof authority as far as the legislature is concerned classes
them as private affairs. (sec. 239, Vol. I, Revised,McQuillin
Municipal Corporations, p. 239; Shrik vs. City of Lancaster, 313
Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557). And in this jurisdiction, this Court has
already expressed the view that a waterworks system is
patrimonial property of thecity that has established it. (Mendoza
vs. De Leon, 33 Phil. 509). And being owned by a municipal
corporationin a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be taken
away without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for
the protection of private property. The State may, in the interest of
National welfare, transfer to public ownership any private
enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time,
one has to bear in mind that no person can be deprived of his
property except for public use and upon payment of
justcompensation. Unless the City is given its due compensation,
the City cannot be deprived of its property even if NAWASA
desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit of the
law (Republic Act 1383). The law,insofar as it expropriates the
waterworks in question without providing for an effective payment
of justcompensation, violates our Constitution.
CITY OF BAGUIO V. NAWASA
Facts:
Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against
defendant a public corporation, created under Act.1383.It
contends that the said act does not include within its purview the
Baguio Water Works system, assuming that itdoes, is
unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership,
control and operation of said water workswithout just
compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss ion the ground that itis not a proper exercise of
police power and eminent domain. The court denied the motion
and ordered thedefendants to file an answer. The court holds that
the water works system of Baguio belongs to private propertyand
cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of
R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of theNAWASA assets for
the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional
for this is not justcompensation. Defendants motion for
reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not there is a valid exercise of police power of
eminent domain.
Held:
R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power.
The act does not confiscate, destroy orappropriate property
belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all
water works belonging to cities,municipalities and municipal
districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The
purpose is placingthem under the control and supervision of an
agency with a view to promoting their efficient management, but
inso doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they
be paid with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.The Baguio
water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other
public property held in trust by amunicipal corporation for the
benefit of the public. But it is a property of a municipal
corporation, water workscannot be taken away except for public
use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment affirmed
THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BALBINA
ESTRADA Y SARMIENTO, minor and only heiress of Concepcion
Sarmiento, deceased, and ARISTON ESTRADA, personally, and
as administrator, defendants-appellants.
After a careful examination of the entire record in this case and
the law applicable to the questions raised therein, we are of the
opinion that P10 per square meter is a just compensation for the
land taken. Without prejudice to filing a more extended opinion in
which our reasons will be set forth in full, judgment will be entered
accordingly, without costs. So ordered.
A short opinion was handed down in this case on February 18,
1913, and in accordance with the reservation made therein, the
court now proceeds to write an extended opinion setting forth the
reasons for its judgment in the case.
The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land
with its improvements for use in connection with a new market at
that time being erected in the district of Paco. A complaint was
filed setting forth the necessary allegations, answer joined, and
commissioners were appointed, who, after viewing the premises
and receiving evidence, and being unable to agree, submitted two
reports to the court. The court duly rendered its decision,
confirming the majority report as to the improvements, but
reducing the price of the land from P20 per square meter, as fixed
by the majority report, to P15 per square meter. Motions for a new
trial having been made by both parties and denied by the court,
both parties appealed from that part of the decision fixing the
value of the land at P15 per square meter. The record was
therefore elevated to this court for a review of the evidence and
assigned errors of the parties. This court held that P10 per square
meter was just compensation for the land, and rendered its
decision accordingly.
The court justifies such action, first, upon the ground that the
great preponderance of the evidence submitted to the
commissioners showed that P10 per square meter was just
compensation for the land taken, and, second, upon the power of
the court to revise the report of the commissioners when the
amount awarded is grossly inadequate or grossly excessive.
A brief resume of the evidence in regard to the value of the land
will first be made. The land was bounded by Calle Herran, the
Paco Estero, the market site, and Calle Looban.
The several sessions of the commissioners at which evidence
was heard took place between September 19 and October 3,
1911.
George C. Sellner, a real estate agent, testified that he was
familiar with real estate values in the city of Manila. He stated that
the land in question, fronting as it did on Calles Herran and
Looban and the Paco Estero, was worth 60 per cent more than
other land near by, and placed its value at P10 per square meter.
He stated that he had carried on negotiations with regard to a
parcel of land situated on the opposite side of the estero and
fronting Herran; that he was offering this land for sale at P5.50 per
square meter, but that the owner succeeded in obtaining P6 per
square meter, and that the sale had been consummated only
about thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. The witness
stated that this land was of about the same elevation as the
parcel sought to be expropriated, but that it had no improvements,
being used for the storage of coal.
Enrique Brias, another real estate man, testified that P10 was a
good price for the land. He stated that he was the owner of the
land on the opposite side of the estero which had been sold for
P6 per square meter about one month prior to the hearing, but
that this land was not in such a good commercial location.
Mr. Powell, of the Internal Revenue Bureau, testified that the
Estrada land was appraised for taxation at P6 per square meter;
that prior to 1911 it had been appraised at about P4 per square
meter.
The president of the Municipal Board of the city of Manila testified
that a parcel of land on the opposite side of Calle Herran but on
the same side of the Paco Estero, owned by one Clarke, had
been expropriated by the city in 1908. He stated that
commissioners were appointed who duly rendered their report to
the court, but as it was accepted by both parties, no further
litigation was necessary. In this case it seems that the land
desired by the city was part of a parcel fronting on Calle Herran,
whose other boundaries were the Paco Estero, some private
property, and a small callejon. The portion desired by the city
compromised the entire Herran frontage of the owner. The
commissioners appraised the total area, consisting of 1,399.03
square meters at P6.50 per square meter. The city desired only
353.21 square meters facing on Calle Herran, and the
commissioners therefore found consequential damages to the
remained, due to depriving it of its Herran frontage, to be P4.50
per square meter. These consequential damages were included
in the price paid by the city for the land taken, making the
apparent price of the 353.21 square meters P7,002.05, or P19.85
per square meter.
To the same effect was the testimony of Judge Camus of the
municipal court, who at the time of the Clarke transaction was city
attorney
Ariston Estrada, one of the defendants, testified as follows:
As to the market value of the land (the subject of the present
case), whatever may be its price on the market, in my opinion, by
comparing previous sales of land in the same or similar conditions
and circumstances, and having in mind the only sale which has
been made in twenty years of land equally or similarly situated to
this, I believe that it is all that can serve as a standard to ascertain
the value in the market of the land in question.
xxx xxx xxx
With reference to the land, I believe I am as well as informed as
the witnesses for the plaintiff who have testified, and I estimate
that the land in question should be worth on the market at this
time P25 per square meter for the reason that about P19.85 per
square was paid for Mr. Clarke's land and this was three years
ago; and, on the one hand, property values have increased in the
last three years, and, on other hand, with the opening of the
market, property values along Calles Herran and Looban have
increased.
From the record it appears that the improvements on the land
consisted of a camarin in fairly good condition, appraised at
P4,500; a dwelling house in very bad condition, appraised at
P1,500; the former being occupied by tenants and the latter by
the defendants Estrada and his family. The remaining
improvements consisted of a stone wall surrounding the lot,
appraised at P1,020, and some trees, appraised at P150.
The majority report of the committee, fixing the value of the land
at P20 per square meter, states:
And lastly, with respect to the value of the land, the evidence is
very contradictory. While the evidence of the plaintiff tends to
show that the value of the land does not exceed P10 per square
meter, that of the defendants, on the contrary, maintains that the
value of the land is more than P19.85 per square meter, and it is
contended by the defendants that the true market value of the
land in question is P25 per square meter.
The lower court, in arriving at its decision to reduce the price of
the land to P15, discussed the Clarke transaction at some length
and concluded as follows:
The court therefore understands that the price which the plaintiff
accepted three years ago for a piece of land less suited for
commercial purposes than that in question, without proof that
since then the price of land in the place where the tract here
considered is situated has fallen, ought to serve as criterion for
fixing the value of the land that is the subject matter of the present
expropriation.
xxx xxx xxx
So, the court holds it just and equitable to take as a compromise
between the two conflicting majority and minority opinions of the
three commissioners the average of the two prices they have
fixed per square meter for the land in question, P20 and P10,
respectively, fixing upon P15 per square meter.
From this review of the evidence it appears that two disinterested
witnesses for the plaintiff corporation testified that the land was
worth P10 per square meter, their statements being based upon
the prices obtained for land in the open market in the vicinity. The
defendant Estrada testified that it was worth P25 per square
meter, basing his statement on the price obtained three years
previously by the owner of the parcel on the opposite side of Calle
Herran of P19.85 per square meter. It also clearly appears that
the price fixed in the majority report of the commissioners was
based principally upon this same transaction, and that the
compromise price fixed by the court was based upon the
evidence of this sale and the testimony of the two witnesses for
the plaintiff who fixed the price of P10 per square meter.
Attorney for the plaintiff corporation objected to the introduction of
all evidence with reference to the Clarke transaction, and so much
depending upon it, it is proper to inquire as to its competency and
relevancy.
The general rule that the market value of the land taken is the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is
entitled under the law meets with our unqualified approval. Such
was our holding in Manila R. Co. vs. Fabie (17 Phil. Rep., 206).
But as stated in Packard vs. Bergen Neck Ry. Co. (54 N. J. L.,
553; 25 A., 506):
The difficulty is not with the rule, but with its application. For the
determination of the market value of land, which is that sum of
money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy and an
owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received therefore, is beyond doubt difficult. The
test is logically and legally correct, but it cannot be applied to land
with the accuracy with which it can be applied to stocks, bonds,
and personal property generally. Still, it is this test which
admittedly must be applied, even when the value of the land and
the damges are found in separate sums.
It is a very difficult matter to limit the scope of the inquiry as to
what the market value of condemned property is. The market
value of a piece of land is attained by a consideration of all those
facts which make it commercial valuable. Whether evidence
considered by those whose duty it is to appraise the land is of that
nature is often a very difficult matter to decide. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in a carefully worded statement, marks
out the scope of the inquiry as follows:
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes,
the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of
property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must
be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely
with reference to the uses to which it is at that time applied, but
with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted; that is to
say, what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses? . . . As
a general thing, we should say that the compensation to the
owner is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the
property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or
wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected
in the immediate future. (98 U.S. 403; 25 L. ed., 206.)
This passage is quoted with approval in the late case of St. Louis
I. M. & S. R. Co. vs. Theodore Maxfield Co. (94 Ark., 135; 26
L.R.A. (N. S.), 111; 126 S. W., 83) — a very well considered case.
The supreme court of Missouri has also formulated an
exceedingly clear statement of the matter in the Stock Yards case
(120 Mo., 541):
The market value of the property means its actual value,
independent of the location of plaintiff's road thereon, that is, the
fair value of the property as between one who wants to purchase
and one who wants to sell it; not what could be obtained for it in
peculiar circumstances when greater than its fair price could be
obtained; not its speculative value; not the value obtained through
the necessities of another. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be
limited to that price which the property would bring when forced
off at auction under the hammer. The question is, if the defendant
wanted to sell its property, what could be obtained for it upon the
market from the parties who wanted to buy and would give its full
value. (Approved in Met. Street Ry. Co. vs. Walsh, 197 Mo., 392,
418; 94 S. W., 860.)
These views are practically in accord with Lewis on Eminent
Domain (2d ed.), paragraph 478, who state the rule as follows:
The market value of property is the price which it will bring when it
is offered for sale by one who desires, but is not obliged to sell it,
and is brought by one who is under no necessity of having it. In
estimating its value all the capabilities of the property, and all the
uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted, are to
be considered, and not merely the condition is it an at the time
and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. It is not a
question of the value of the property to the owner. Nor can the
damages be enhanced by his unwillingness to sell. On the other
hand, the damages cannot be measured by the value of the
property to the party condemning it, nor by its need of the
particular property. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surrounding, its improvements and capabilities, may be
shown and considered in estimating its value. (Approved in
Seaboard Air Line vs. Chamblin, 108 Va., 42.
In the practical application of this doctrine, the courts have been
obliged to reject various kinds of evidence which the partisan zeal
of the one side has attempted to introduce in order to swell the
measure of damages, and to approve evidence which the other
side has attempted to discredit in order to reduce the amount to
be realized. Three such questions present themselves in this
case.
First, testimony as to mere offers for the property desired or for
contiguous property is not admissible. Upon this point we quote
from the case of Keller vs. Paine (34 Hun, 167):
Its value depends upon too many circumstances. If evidence of
offers is to be received it will be important to know whether the
offer was made in good faith, by a man of good judgment,
acquainted with the value of the article and of sufficient ability to
pay; also whether the offer was cash, for credit, in exchange, and
whether made with reference to the market value of the article; or
to supply a particular need or to gratify a fancy. Private offers can
be multiplied to any extent for the purposes of a cause, and the
bad faith in which they were made would be difficult to prove. The
reception of evidence of private offers to sell or purchase stands
upon an entirely different footing from evidence of actual sales
between individuals or by public auction, and also upon a different
footing from bids made at auction sales. The reception of this
class of evidence would multiply the issues upon questions of
damages to an extent not to be tolerated by court aiming to
practically administer justice between litigants. (As quoted with
approval in Yellowstone Park R. R. Co. vs. Bridger Coal Co., 34
Mont., 545.)
In the present case, the defendant Estrada testified that upon
learning that the property which was the subject of the present
litigation was to be condemned, he offered to pay a real estate
agent P15 per square meter for a piece of land situated in the
locality with relatively similar commercial location. This was
improper evidence and should not have been considered by the
commissioners. (See also Sherlock vs. Chicago B & Q. R. Co.,
130 Ill., 403; 22 N. E., 844; Winnisimmet Co. vs. Grueby, 111
Mass., 543; Montclair Ry Co. vs. Benson, 36 N. J. L., 557.)
The second point raised by the evidence taken in the present
case is the admission of testimony relative to real estate
transaction in the vicinity of the land desired. The rule which
admits such evidence meets with universal approval, but with
certain reservations.
In Aledo Terminal Ry. Co. vs. Butler (246 Ill., 406; 92 N. E., 909)
the court said:
Evidence of voluntary sales of other lands in the vicinity and
similarly situated is admissible in evidence to aid in estimating the
value of the tract sought to be condemned, but the value of such
testimony depends upon the similarity of the land to that in
question and the time when such sales were made and the
distance such lands are from those the value of which is the
subject of inquiry.
The supreme court of Massachusetts, in Fourth National Bank vs.
Com. (212 Mass., 66; 98 N.E., 86), affirms the rule as follows:
It long has been settled, that in the assessment of damages
where lands are acquired by eminent domain evidence is
admissible of the price received from sale of land similar in
character, and situated in the vicinity, if the transactions are not
so remote in point of time that a fair comparison practically is
impossible.
In Hewitt vs. Price (204 Mo., 31) it was said:
It is sufficient to say upon this proposition that the law is well
settled in this State upon that subject, and while the value of
selling price of similar property may be taken into consideration in
determining the value of the piece of property in litigation, it is
equally true that the location and character of such property
should be similar and the sales of such other property should at
least be reasonably near in point of time to the at which the
inquiry of the value of the property in dispute is directed.
In Laing vs. United New Jersey R. R. & C. Co. (54 N. J. L., 576;
33 Am. St. Rep., 682; 25 A., 409) it was said:
Generally in this and other States evidence of sale of land in the
neighborhood is competent on an inquiry as to the value of land,
and if the purchases or sales were made by the party against
whom the evidence was offered it might stand as an admission.
But such testimony is received only upon the idea that there is
substantial similarity between the properties. The practice does
not extend, and the rule should not be applied, to cases where the
conditions are so dissimilar as not easily to admit of reasonable
comparison, and much must be left to the discretion of the trial
judge in the determination of the preliminary question conditions
are fairly comparable.
In an early case, and which will be referred to again upon another
question, the supreme court of Illinois stated the rule as follows:
The theory upon which evidence of sale of other similar property
in the neighborhood at about the same time, is held to be
admissible is that it tends to show the fair market value of the
property sought to be condemned. And it cannot be doubted that
such sales, when made in a free and open market, where a fair
opportunity for competition has existed, become material and
often very important factors in determining the value of the
particular property in question. (Peoria Gas Light Co. vs. Peoria
Term. Ry. Co., 146 Ill., 372; 21 L. R. A., 373; 34 N. E., 550.)
Even in those States where direct evidence of particular sales is
not allowed, such questions may be directed to witnesses on
cross-examination to test their credibility. This is the position
taken by the supreme court of Pennsylvania in the late cases of
Rea vs. Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. (229 Pa., 106) and Brown vs.
City of Scranton (231 Pa., 593; 80 A., 113). See also Oregon R. &
N. Co. vs. Eastlack (54 Ore., 196; 102 Pac., 1011) where this
somewhat technical differences is set forth.
Evidence of other sales is competent if the character of such
parcels as sites for business purposes, dwellings, or for whatever
other use which enhances the pecuniary value of the condemned
land is sufficiently similar to the latter that it may be reasonably
assumed that the price of the condemned land would be
approximately near the price brought by the parcels sold. The
value of such evidence, of course, diminishes as the differences
between the property sold and the condemned land increase. The
property must be in the immediate neighborhood, that is, in the
zone of commercial activity with which the condemned property is
identified, and the sales must be sufficiently coeval with the date
of the condemnation proceedings as to exclude general increases
or decreases in property values due to changed commercial
conditions in the vicinity. No two estates are ever exactly alike,
and as the differences between parcels sold and the land
condemned must necessarily be taken into consideration in
comparing values, we think it much better that those differences
should be shown as part of the evidence of such sales, as is the
practice in Iowa. (Town of Cherokee vs. S. C. & I. F. Town Lot
and Land Co., 52 Iowa, 279, 3 N. W., 42.) And where these
differences are so great that the sales in question can form no
reliable standard for comparison, such evidence should not be
admitted. (Presbrey vs. Old Colony & Newport R. Co., 103 Mass.,
1.)
The testimony as to the sale of a parcel of land on the opposite
side of the stereo from the condemned land at P6 per square
meter we think was properly admitted, and should have been
given much greater weight by the commissioners and the court
below. This was a sale in the open market, just one month prior to
the time of the hearing before the commissioners. It was located
on the same street, Calle Herran, and on the same estero. The
differences between the two parcels as to location was that the
condemned property also had a frontage on Calle Looban and
was on the same side of the estero and immediately in front of the
market site. It is true that the condemned land had improvements
upon it while the parcel was vacant land. But it is also true that the
values of these improvements were estimated as separate and
distinct items, and the value of the land was estimated without
regard to the improvements upon it. A sale of vacant land is
evidence of the value of neighboring land. (O'Malley vs. Com.,
182 Mass., 196; 65 N.E., 30.) Basing their estimate of the value of
the condemned land upon the price obtained for the parcel
mentioned, and estimating the more favored location of the
condemned land as being worth 60 per cent more than the land
on the opposite side of the estero, Sellner and Brias arrived at the
conclusion that P10 per square meter (a difference of more than
66 per cent) was a fair price for the land condemned. These
witnesses were professional real estate agents, both had been
active in the vicinity at about the time they testified before the
commissioners, and were therefore peculiarly qualified to
appraise the land in question. We are inclined to agree with the
opinion expressed in the case of I. I. & M. R. Co. vs. Humiston
(208 Ill., 100; 69 N. E., 880), where it is said:
The fact of salaries is not always the only factor in determining the
weight of the testimony of a witness as to value. A witness may, in
forming his opinion, consider the uses and capabilities of the
property, as well as the prices at which like property in the
neighborhood has been sold. He may also base his opinion of
value upon his knowledge or observation of the growth and
development of towns and cities, a general knowledge of trade
and business, rental value, the interests which the land would pay
upon an investment, its productiveness, ease of cultivation, its
situation in a particular community, and other elements.
These parcels were in the same neighborhood and their
respective locations and surroundings were, with the differences
above named, practically the same. The price which the parcel
sold by Brias brought was therefore of great importance as a
basis for estimating the value of the condemned land.
The next question of evidence, and the most important to this
case, is the admissibility of evidence showing prices paid for
neighboring land under eminent domain proceedings. Is this class
of evidence admissible? The authorities almost with one accord
reply emphatically, No. The rule is so universal that it seems
sufficient to quote from only one or two authorities. Lewis on
Eminent Domain (par. 447) says:
What the party condemning has paid for other property is
incompetent. Such sales are not a fair criterion of value, for the
reason that they are in the nature of a compromise. . . . The fear
of one party or the other to take the risk of legal; proceedings
ordinarily results in the one party paying more or the other party
taking less than is considered to be the fair market value of the
property. For these reasons, such sales would not seem to be
competent evidence of value in any case, whether in a
proceeding by the same condemning party or otherwise.
In the case of Peoria Gas Light Co. vs. Peoria Term. Ry Co. (146
Ill., 372), from which we quoted above sustaining the rule that
sales of property in the vicinity are admissible as evidence, it was
said
But it seems very clear that to have that tendency, they (sales of
adjacent land) must have been made under circumstances where
they are not compulsory, and where the vendor is not compelled
to sell at all events, but is at liberty to invite competition among
those desiring to become purchasers. Accordingly among the
various decisions in this and other States to which our attention
has been called or which our own researches have discovered,
we find none in which the price paid at a forced or compulsory
sale has been admitted as competent evidence of value.
This case is particularly valuable for its review of the authorities
upon this point. Other late cases sustaining the rule are: U.S. vs.
Beaty (198 Fed. Rep., 284); City of San Luis Obispo vs.
Brizzolara (100 Cal., 434; 34 P. 1083); C.& W. I. R. R. Co. vs.
Heidenreich (254 Ill., 231; 98 N.E., 567); Howe vs. Howard (158
Mass., 278); Seaboard Air Line vs. Chamblin (108 Va., 42); O'Day
vs.Meyers (147 Wis., 549; 133 N.W., 605).
It is to be observed that this rule excluding evidence of prices
obtained for neighboring land under eminent domain proceedings
is in the nature of an exception to the rule that sales of such land
may be offered in evidence, and that, speaking briefly, the
underlying reason is that they are not prices obtained "by one who
desires but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who is
under no necessity for having it."
The objection of the plaintiff to the introduction of evidence
showing that Clarke had obtained for his land condemned by the
city on 1908 was well taken. The testimony of Estrada, based, as
he himself admits (see except of his testimony above), upon that
transaction, was valueless, and the commissioners and the lower
court erred in issuing it as a basis for estimating the value of the
condemned land.
But, carrying this discussion perhaps one step further than is
really necessary, we desire to say that even were evidence of the
Clarke transaction admissible in the present case, the use made
of the facts of that case by the witness Estrada, the
commissioners, and the court itself, was clearly erroneous. As
was stated above, the apparent price of P19.85 for the land taken
by the city was in reality made up of P6.50 per square meter for
the land itself and consequential damages to the remaining
portion of Clarke's and at the rate of P4.50 per square meter.
The damage or injury to the remainder of the land on account of
the construction of the railroad is in effect the actual taking of that
much of the remainder of the land, for the diminished market
value of which the owner is entitled to full compensation. (St.
Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. vs. Theodore Maxfield Co., 94 Ark., 135;
26 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1111; 126 S. W., 83.)
The value of the property taken and the damages to the
remainder of the property are two distinct and separate things.
(Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co. vs. Morere, 116 La., 997; 41 So., 236.)
There were no consequential damages to the defendant in the
present case for the reason that his entire holding was taken. The
market value of the land taken from Clarke did not include the
consequential damages to the remainder. The deed of transfer
(Exhibit 1) was obviously ambiguous when it stated "that in
consideration of the sum of P7,002.05 which the city of Manila
has offered to pay me for the said parcel of land for a sewer
pumping station." This sum included the market value of the land
taken and something more — the consequential damages to
1,045.82 square meters of land remaining at P4.50 per square
meter. The deed so read merely for convenience and brevity. It
was written for the purpose or transferring the land taken and was
not intended to be a record of the expropriation proceedings
which culminated in its execution. It was satisfactorily proven in
the present case that the figures shown in the deed were made
up in the manner we have already described, and manifestly
P19,85 is merely a fictitious value for the land taken, far beyond
its true value.
We have now eliminated the testimony of the defendant Estrada
of his offer to pay P15 per square meter for other land as well
situated as that condemned; and all evidence of the Clarke
transaction in 1908. This leaves as the only evidence of record as
to the value of the condemned land the testimony of Sellner and
Brias, based upon the sale of an adjacent parcel of land, which
evidence we have approved as being relevant, and the testimony
of Mr. Powell to the effect that the land was appraised for taxation
at P6 per square meter, which was also relevant.
The next question which it is necessary to consider is the view of
the premises made by the commissioners. What is the purpose of
this view? An exhaustive search of the authorities has been made
upon this point, and we have come to the conclusion that some of
the statements made in the earlier decisions upon the subject are
not sound law.
They view the premises, and are supposed to exercise their own
judgment to some extent, irrespective of evidence. (Virginia and
Truckee R. Co. vs. Henry, 8 Nev., 165.)
The testimony of witnesses as to value . . . although entitled to
due consideration, is not controlling. (City of St. Louis vs. Lanigan,
97 Mo., 175; 10 S. W., 475.)
They are to be guided largely by their own judgment as they view
the premises. (City of Kingston vs. Terry, 53 N. Y. S., 652.)
They may go and view the premises and upon the knowledge
thus acquired base their award. (Stevens vs. Railroad Co., 8 N. Y.
S., 707.)
That the commissioners had a right to act upon information
derived in part from a personal view of the premises cannot be
questioned. (In re certain lands in the Twelfth Ward, 68 N. Y. S.,
965.)
They are not bound by the testimony of their of these experts, and
may act upon their own personal view. (In re opening Trinity Ave.,
71 N. Y. S., 24.)
Doubtless, in a proceeding of this kind, the commissioners may
act upon their own judgment, disregarding oral testimony.
(Waterford E. Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Reed, 94 N. Y. S.,
551.)
All of these statements, while made in cases where there was a
conflict of evidence, and wherein the commissioners or jury found
damages within the estimates made by witnesses, if taken at their
face value would allow commissioners or special juries to assess
damages at any sum they pleased. The true rule, as laid down in
the more recent cases is that the view of the premises is made for
the purpose of better enabling the appraisers to understand the
evidence presented by the parties, and giving it its proper weight.
The supreme court of Colorado is substance supports this
principle inDenver Co. vs. Howe (49 Colo., 256;112 P., 779):
The jury viewed the premises and were better able to judge of the
number of acres in each, as well as other conditions affecting the
land. The facts ascertained by the view of the premises are not in
the record, whether they were regarded as so much additional
evidence, or were used to better understand and apply the
evidence adduced at the trial. Keeping in view the evidence
relating to the special value of the building site, the value of
improvements and of the ground, it will be found that the verdict is
within and supported by the values as testified to, and these
values, as fixed by the several witnesses, represented to each the
market value, as conceded by appellants. The verdict is
supported by the evidence of market value and on that ground
would have to be sustained if the matter complained of in the
instruction had been entirely omitted.
In a clear statement of the rule, the supreme court of
Pennsylvania says (Gorgas vs. Railroad Co., 144 Pa., 1;22 A.,
715): "A view may sometimes be of the highest importance,
where there is a conflict of testimony. It may enable the jurors to
see on which side the truth lies. And if the witnesses on the one
side of the other have testified to a state of facts which exists only
in their imagination, as to the location of the property, the manner
in which it is cut by the road, the character of the improvements,
or any other physical fact bearing upon the case, they surely
cannot be expected to ignore the evidence of their senses, and
give weight to testimony which their view shows to be false. . . .
The true rule, in such cases, is believed to be that the jury in
estimating the damages shall consider the testimony as given by
the witnesses, in connection with the facts as they appear upon
the view; and upon the whole case, as thus presented, ascertain
the difference between the market value of the property
immediately before and immediately after the land was taken.
This difference is the proper measure of the damages.
In Close vs. Samm (27 Iowa, 503) it was said: "The question then
arises as to the purpose and intent of this statute. It seems to us
that it was to enable the jury, by the view of the premises or place,
to better understand and comprehended the testimony of the
witnesses respecting the same, and thereby the more intelligently
to apply the testimony to the issues on trial before them, and not
to make them silent witnesses in the case, burdened with
testimony unknown to both parties, and in respect to which no
opportunity for cross-examination or correction of error, if any,
could be afforded either party. If they are thus permitted to include
their personal examination, how could a court ever properly set
side their verdict as being against the evidence, or even refuse to
set aside without knowing the facts ascertained by such personal
examination by the jury? It is a general rule, certainly, if not
universal, that the jury must base their verdict upon the evidence
delivered to them in open court, and they may not take into
consideration facts known to them personally, but outside of the
evidence produced before them in court. If a party would avail
himself of the facts known to a juror, he must have him sworn and
examined as other witnesses." (Approved in the late case of
Guinn vs. Railway Co., 131 Iowa, 680; 109 N. W., 209.)
The doctrine finds favor in Kansas. In C. K. & W. R. Co. vs.
Mouriquand (45 Kan., 170), the court approved of the practice of
instructing the jury that their view of the premises was to be sued
in determining the value of conflicting testimony, saying: "Had the
jury disregarded all the sworn evidence, and returned a verdict
upon their own view of the premises, then it might be said that the
evidence which the jurors acquired from making the view had
been elevated to the character of exclusive and predominating
evidence. This is not allowable. The evidence of the witnesses
introduced in the court on the part of the landowner supports fully
the verdict. If the verdict was not supported by substantial
testimony given by witnesses sworn upon the trial, we would set
aside, but as the jury only took into consideration the result of
their view of the premises, in connection with the sworn evidence
produced before the to connection with the sworn evidence
produced before them, to determine between conflicting evidence,
the instruction was not so erroneous as to require a new trial."
A very clear statement of it is made by Dyer, J., charging a jury, in
Laflin vs. Chicago W. & N. R. Co. (33 Fed. Rep., 415): "You have
been permitted to view the premises in question. The object of
this view was to acquaint you with the physical situation,
condition, and surroundings of the premises, and to enable you
better to understand the evidence on the trial. The knowledge
which you acquired by the view may be used by you in
determining the weight of conflicting testimony respecting value
and damage, but no farther. Your final conclusion must rest on
the evidence here adduced."
In Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. vs. Peyton (124 Ga., 746; 52 S. E.,
803; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.), 333) it was said: "A jury cannot be left to
roam without any evidence in the ascertainment and assessment
of damages. The damages which the law allows to be assessed
in favor of landowners whose property has been taken or
damaged under the right of eminent domain are purely
compensatory. The land actually appropriated by the telegraph
company amounted to only a fraction of an acre; and while it
appeared that the construction and maintenance of the telegraph
line would cause consequential damages to the plaintiff, no proof
was offered from which any fair and reasonable estimate of the
amount of damages thereby sustained could be made. The jury
should have been supplied with the data necessary in arriving at
such an estimate in the absence of this essential proof, a verdict
many times in excess of the highest proved value of the land
actually taken must necessarily be deemed excessive."
The question has often been up in the State of Illinois, and the
rule has been clearly stated there in number of cases. In Sexton
vs. Union Stock Yard Co. (200 Ill., 244;65 N. E., 638), a leading
case, it was said: "The evidence consisted most largely of
opinions of values entertained by the different witnesses. Their
judgment varied widely and their opinions were likewise variant.
The amount allowed, though much less than the estimates of the
witnesses produced in appellant's behalf, is larger than that of the
witnesses produced by the appellate company. We cannot know
the effect which was produced on the minds of the jurors by the
actual inspection of the premises. The rule in such cases as not to
disturb a verdict, if it is within the range of the testimony, unless
we can clearly see that injustice has been done and that passion
and prejudice influenced the action of the jury."
In the very recent case of South Park Comrs. vs. Ayer (245 Ill.,
402; 92 N. E., 274) it was said: "The jury view the premises, and
the law is well settled in this State that in a condemnation
proceeding, where the jury have viewed the premises and where
the evidence is conflicting, and where the amount is within the
range of value as testified to on the trial, and does not appear to
have been the result of prejudice, passion, undue influence, or
other improper cause, the verdict will not be disturbed. (Citing
cases.) It is clear the amount fixed by the jury in this case was
well within the range of the evidence, which was conflicting, and
the verdict should not be set aside unless it appears it was
brought about by some improper ruling of the court upon the trial."
The rule is also stated in Lanquist vs. City of Chicago (200 Ill., 69;
65 N. E., 681); in I. I. & M. R. Co. vs. Humiston (208 Ill., 100; 69
N. E., 880); and in G. & S. R. R. R. Co. vs. Herman (206 Ill., 34;
69 N. E., 36).
In New York, where the question has doubtless been raised more
often than anywhere else, the late cases illustrate the rule
perhaps the most clearly
The appellate division, supreme court, In re Titus Street in City of
New York (123 N. Y. S., 10018), where it appeared that the city's
witnesses testified that the property was worth $9,531 and the
commissioners awarded $2,000 less said: "We do not think this is
meeting the requirements of the law; we do not believe that it is
within the province of the commissioners to arbitrarily set up their
own opinion against that of the witnesses called by the city, and to
award damages largely below the figure at which the moving
party is committed, without something appearing in the record to
justify such action. When a party comes into court and makes an
admission against his interest, no court or judicial tribunal is
justified in assuming that the admission is not true, without at
least pointing out the reason for discrediting it; it carries within the
presumption of truth, and this presumption is not to be overcome
by the mere fact that the commissioners might themselves have
reached a different conclusion upon the viewing of the premises. .
. . This view of the commissioners, it seems to us, is for the
purpose of enabling the commissioners to give proper weight and
effect to the evidence before them, and it might justify them in
giving larger damages than some of the witnesses thought
proper; or even less than some of them declared to be sustained.
But where the evidence produced by the moving party in a
proceeding for taking property for public purposes fixes a sum,
without any disagreement in the testimony on that side, we are of
the opinion that the cases do not justify a holding that the
commissioners are authorized to ignore such testimony and to
substitute their own opinion in such manner as to preclude the
supreme court from reviewing the determination. That is not in
harmony with that due process of law which is always demanded
where rights of property are involved, and would make it possible
for a corrupt commission to entirely disregard the rights of the
individual to the undisturbed enjoyment of his property or its
equivalent."
From these authorizes, and keeping in mind the local law on the
subject, we think the correct rule to be that, if the testimony of
value and damages is conflicting, the commissioners may resort
to their knowledge of the elements which affect the assessment
and which were obtained from a view of the premises, in order to
determine the relative weight of conflicting testimony, but their
award must be supported by the evidence adduced at their
hearings and made of record or it cannot stand; or, in other
words, the view is intended solely for the purposes of better
understanding the evidence submitted. To allow the
commissioners to make up their judgment on their own individual
knowledge of disputed facts material to the case, or upon their
private opinions, would be most dangerous and unjust. It would
deprive the losing party of the right of cross-examination and the
benefit of all the tests of credibility which the law affords. It would
make each commissioners the absolute judge of the accuracy
and value of his own knowledge or opinions and compel the court
to affirm the report on the facts when all of such facts were not
before it. The evidence of such knowledge or of the grounds of
such opinions could not be preserved on a bill of exceptions or
questioned upon appeal.
It those cases where the testimony as to value and damages is
conflicting, the commissioners should always set forth in full their
reasons for accepting the testimony of certain witnesses and
rejecting that of others, especially in those cases where a view of
the premises has been made.
The commissioners, being disinterested landowners of the
province, selected by the court for their ability to arrive at a
judicious decision in the assessment of damages, their report is
entitled to greater weight than that of an ordinary trier of facts. A
mere numerical superiority of the witnesses on the one side or the
other should not be sufficient to overturn the decision arrived at by
the commissioners, as such witnesses are not required to be
either landowners on judicious and disinterested parties, as are
the commissioners. The weight to be given to the testimony of a
witness might be considerable or it might be almost negligible,
according to his standing in the community and his ability and
experience in real estate values. But where experts fixed the
value of the property, the lowest estimate being $5,533 and the
highest $16,000, and the commissioners allowed only $750, the
court held that the award was inadequate. (In re Metropolitan El.
Ry. Co., 27 N. Y. S., 756.) And where a lessee of a building was
allowed damages in an extravagant sum for his unexpired lease,
when compared with the allowance made to the owner of the
property, the award was set aside. (In reManhattan Loop No. 1,
135 N. Y. S., 153). In Palmer vs. Harris Country (29 Tex. Civ.
App., 340, 69S. W., 229) the court said
It may be that jury were influenced by the idea that it might not
have been necessary to use all of the tract sought to be
condemned for the construction of the ditch, but the proceeding
was to condemn the entire tract, and so far as presented by the
record the value of the land might be so affected by the
construction of the ditch as to destroy its use by the appellant for
any purpose. . . . The verdict is so manifestly against the great
preponderance of the evidence that we deem it our duty to set it
aside.
Calor Oil & Gas Co. vs. Withers (141 Ky., 489; 133 S. W., 210)
was an action to condemn a strip of land 27 feet wide and 434
feet long for a pipe line, the said strip lying wholly within a railroad
right of way. The commissioners appointed to assess the
damages fixed them at $16.51. Upon appeal, the damages were
assessed at $750, which was held aside. In Mutual Union
Telegraph Co. vs. Katkamp (103 Ill., 420) it appeared that
telegraph poles were to be set along the line of a railroad right
way, 1 foot from such right of way line, so that there would be
eleven poles on defendant's land. The defendant himself testified
that his land was worth $60 per acre, and that the damage done
would be about $10 per pole. Two other witnesses testified that
$10 per pole would be the amount of defendant's damage. Of
three witnesses for the plaintiff, one testified that the damage
would be 50 cents and two that it would be $1 per pole. As only a
very small fraction of an acre of defendant's land would be taken,
a verdict of $38.50 was held to be manifestly against the weight of
evidence and the judgment was reversed.
The report of the commissioners has also been set a side
because a wrong principle of assessing the damages was used.
Thus, in Waterford E. Light, Heat & Power Co. vs. Reed (94 N. Y.
S., 551), the award was set aside because counsel for the plaintiff
had presented to the commissioners that the plaintiff was only
acquiring the right of flowage in respect to the property in question
and that the defendants, by reason of the execution of a deed,
had lost all but a nominal interest in the question of damages,
both of which theories were untrue, and which resulted in only
nominal damages being awarded to the defendants. In the matter
of Gilroy (85 Hun, 424; 32 N. Y. S., 891) it appeared that the
commissioners erroneously refused to take into consideration the
fact that the property was available for use in connection with the
water supply of the city of New York, in estimating the value of the
property, and the report was for that reason set aside as allowing
insufficient damages. No allowances having been made for
consequential damages, the report of the commissioners was set
aside. (Williamson vs. Read, 106 Va., 453; 56 S. E., 174.) And
where a deed was so construed as embracing more land than it
actually did embrace, resulting in excessive damages being
awarded, the report was set aside. (Morris & Essex R. Co. vs.
Bonnell, 34 N. J. L., 474.) The report has also been set aside for
refusal to consider competent evidence. (State vs. Shuffield &
Thompsonville Bridge Co., 82 Conn., 460; 74 A., 775.)
We come now to a consideration of the amount fixed upon by this
court of P10 per square meter for the condemned lane. We have
already referred to the testimony of the two real estate agents,
Brias and Sellner, which was based upon a sale of similarly
situated land made only thirty days previous to the date of the
hearing; and the assessment of the property for taxation, at P6
per square meter. This was the evidence upon which the
dissenting commissioner predicated his appraisement of the land,
arriving at the same figure as did this Supreme Court of P10 per
square meter. There is a considerable difference between this
valuation and P25 per square meter, as fixed by Estrada, or of the
price fixed by the majority report of the commissioners of P20 per
square meter. It is to be noted that no witnesses other than
Estrada were called who could confirm the higher valuation or
even testify to an intermediate price. The price of P10 per square
meter is 66 per cent greater than that obtained for land on the
opposite side of the estero, and this difference would seem amply
sufficient to compensate for the more favored location of the
condemned land. That P10 per square meter is a just
compensation is shown by a great preponderance of the
evidence.
"Compensation" means an equivalent for the value of the land
(property) taken. Anything beyond that is more and anything short
of that is less than compensation. To compensate is to render
something which is equal to that taken or received. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation;" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. "Just compensation," therefore, as used in section 246 of
the Code of Civil Procedure , means a fair and full equivalent for
the loss sustained."
The exercise of the power being necessary for the public good,
and all property being held subject to its exercise when, and as
the public good requires it, it would be unjust to the public that it
should be required to pay the owner more than a fair indemnity for
such loss. To arrive at this fair indemnity, the interests of the
public and of the owner and all the circumstance of the particular
appropriation should be taken into consideration. (2 Lewis on Em.
Do., § 562.)
The compensation must be just to the public as well as to the
owners. (Searl vs. School District, 133 U.S., 553; 33 L. ed., 740.)
Section 244 of our code says that:
The commissioners shall assess the value of property taken and
used, and shall also assess the consequential damages to the
property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages
the consequential benefits to be derived by the owners.
"To assess" is to perform a judicial act. The commissioners'
power is limited to assessing the value and to determining the
amount of the damages. There it stops; they can go no further.
The value and damages awarded must be a just compensation
and no more and no less. But in fixing these amounts, the
commissioners are not to act ad libitum. They are to discharge the
trust reposed in them according to well established rules and form
their judgment upon correct legal principles. To deny this is to
place them where no one else in this country is placed: Above the
law and beyond accountability.
This court, after an examination of the evidence, found that the
awards as fixed by the majority of the commissioners and the trial
court were grossly excessive; that a just compensation for the
land taken was P10 per square meter, and, in a short opinion,
rendered judgment accordingly. It was insisted that to so decide
this case would be an conflict with former adjudicated cases by
this court. It now becomes necessary to review these cases.
In City of Manila vs. Tuason, et al. (R. G. No. 3367), decided
March 23, 1907 (unreported), the court of First Instance modified
the report of the commissioners as to some to the items and
confirmed it as to others. On appeal, the Supreme Court
remanded the cause, apparently for the reason that the evidence
taken by the commissioners and the lower court was not before it,
and perhaps also because the commissioners adopted a wrong
principle of assessing damages.
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Fabie (17 Phil. Rep., 206) the majority
report of the commissioners appraised the land at P56,337.18,
while a dissenting commissioner estimated it at P27,415.92. The
Court of First Instance, after taking additional evidence upon the
consequential benefits to the remainder of defendant's land by the
construction of the railroad, and also as to the rental value of
various pieces of land in the locality, fixed the value of the land at
the sum estimated by the dissenting commissioner. The
defendants appealed to this court. This court remarked that the
only evidence tending to support the majority report of the
commissioners consisted of deeds of transfer of real estate
between parties in that community showing the prices paid by the
vendees in such conveyances. It was held that without its being
shown that such transfer had been made in the ordinary course of
business and competition, and that the prices therein stated were
not fictitious, such deeds were incompetent as evidence of the
value of the condemned land. As to the action of the court in fixing
the price of the land at P27,415.92, the court said:
Conceding, without deciding, that he also had the right to
formulate an opinion his own as to the value of the land in
question, nevertheless, if he formulate such an opinion, he must
be base it upon competent evidence. The difficulty with the case
is that it affirmatively appears from the record on appeal that there
is an entire absence of competent evidence to support the finding
either of the commissioners or of the court, even if the court had a
right to make a finding of his own at all under the circumstances.
In Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General (22 Phil. Rep., 192)
the only question raised was the value of certain improvements
on the condemned portion of an hacienda, such improvements
consisting mainly of plants and trees and belonging to a lessee of
the premises. The total damages claimed were P24,126.50. The
majority report of the commission allowed P19,478, which amount
was reduced by the Court of First Instance to P16,778. The
plaintiff company, upon appeal to this court, alleged that the
damages allowed were grossly excessive and that the amount
allowed by the commissioners should have been reduced by at
least P17,000; while the defendant urged that the damages as
shown by the record were much greater than those allowed,
either by the commissioners or by the court.
The only ground upon which the plaintiff company bases its
contention that the valuations are excessive is the minority report
of one of the commissioners. The values assigned to some of the
improvements may be excessive but we are not prepared to say
that such is the case. Certainly there is no evidence in the record
which would justify us in holding these values to be grossly
excessive. The commissioners in their report go into rather minute
detail as to the reasons for the conclusions reached and the
valuations fixed for the various items included therein. There was
sufficient evidence before the commissioners to support the
valuations fixed by them except only those later modified by the
court below. The trial court was of opinion that the price of P2
each which was fixed for the orange trees (naranjitos) was
excessive, and this was reduced to P1.50 for each tree; this on
the ground that the evidence discloses that these trees were
comparatively young at the time of the expropriation, and that the
value fixed by the majority report of the commissioners was that
of full-grown or nearly full-grown trees. We are of opinion that this
reduction was just and reasonable. Aside from the evidence taken
into consideration by the trial judge we find no evidence in the
record in support of the contention of the railroad plaintiff that the
valuations fixed in the majority report of the commissioners and
by the trial court are grossly excessive, and plaintiff company
having wholly failed to offer evidence in support of its allegations
in this regard when the opportunity so to do was provided in
accordance with law, it has no standing in this court to demand a
new trial based on its unsupported allegations of grossly
excessive valuation of the property by the commissioners and the
court below.
This court affirmed the findings of damages made by the trial
court with the exception of an item for damages caused by fire to
improvements on lands adjoining those condemned, which was
held not to be a proper matter to be considered in condemnation
proceedings. The court here approved of the action of the Court
of First Instance in reducing the amount of damages fixed by the
commissioners as to the value of the young orange trees on the
strength of the evidence of record.
In Manila Railroad Company vs. Caligsihan (R.G. No. 7932),
decided March 25, 1913 (unreported), it appears that the lower
court approved in toto the report of the commissioners. On
appeal, this Supreme Court reversed the lower court and
remanded the case with orders to appoint new commissioners,
saying:
Under the evidence in this case the award is excessive. Section
246 of the Code of Civil Procedure giving to the court the power to
"make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the party
the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law,
and to the defendant just compensation for the land so take", we
exercise that right in this case for the purpose of preventing the
defendants from obtaining that which would be more than "just
compensation" under all the evidence of the case.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with
instructions to the lower court to appoint a new commission and to
proceed from that point de novo.
We will know examine the case (Philippine Railway Co. vs. Solon,
13 Phil. Rep., 34) relied upon to support the proposition that the
courts should not interfere with the report of the commissioners to
correct the amount of damages except in cases of gross error,
showing prejudice or corruption.
In that case the property belonging to the appellant which the
company sought to appropriate was his interest as tenant in a
tract of land belonging to the Government, together with a house
standing thereon and other property belonging to him. He asked
that he be awarded for all the property taken P19,398.42. The
commissioners allowed him P10,745.25. At the hearing had upon
the report, the court reduced this amount and allowed the
appellant P9,637.75. The commissioners took a large amount of
evidence relative to the amount of damages. The testimony was
conflicting as to the value of the house, two witnesses fixing it at
over P12,000; another at over P14,000.00; one at P8,750;
another at P6,250; and another at P7,050.95. The commissioners
fixed the value of the house alone at P9,500, and the court at
P8,792.50. This court said:
Nor do we decide, whether, in a case where the damages
awarded by the commissioners are grossly excessive or grossly
insufficient, the court can, upon the same evidence presented
before the commissioners, itself change the award. We restrict
ourselves to deciding the precise question presented by this case,
in which it is apparent that, in the opinion of the court below, the
damages were not grossly excessive, for its own allowance was
only P10,000 less than the amount allowed by the
commissioners, and the question is whether in such a case the
court can substitute its own opinion upon the evidence presented
before the commissioners for the opinion which the
commissioners themselves formed, not only from the evidence
but also from a view of the premises which by law they were
required to make.
Referring to the manner in which the trial court arrived at its
valuation of the various items, including the house, this court said:
Without considering the correctness of the rule adopted by the
court for determining the value of the property, it is sufficient to
say that the evidence before the commissioners as to the value of
the property taken was contradictory and that their award was not
palpably excessive or inadequate. Under such circumstances, we
are of the opinion of the court had no right to interfere with it.
From the foregoing it is clear that (1) the testimony was
conflicting; (2) that the award as allowed by the commissioners
was well within the amounts fixed by the witnesses; (3) that the
award was not grossly excessive. That it was not grossly
excessive is shown by the difference between the amount fixed
by the commissioners and that fixed by the court, this difference
being P1,117.50, a reduction of a little over 10 per cent.
From the above review of the cases, it will be seen that this court
has not only not decided that the courts cannot interfere with the
report of the commissioners unless prejudice or fraud has been
shown, but the decisions tend to show the contrary; that is, an
award which is grossly excessive or grossly insufficient cannot
stand, although there be nothing which even tends to indicate
prejudice or fraud on the part of the commissioners. The case at
bar is the first one wherein the court changed the award and
rendered a final judgment upon the record. Had the court the
power to thus dispose of the case?
Section 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
"Upon the filing of such report in court, the court shall, upon
hearing, accept the same and render judgment in accordance
therewith; or for cause shown, it may recommit the report to the
commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set aside the
report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part, and may make such final order
and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential
to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant
just compensation for the land so taken; and the judgment shall
require payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next
section before the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and
appropriate it to the public use."
From this section it clearly appears that the report of the
commissioners is not final. The judgment of the court is necessary
to give to the proceedings. Nor is the report of the commissioners
conclusive, under any circumstance, so that the judgment of the
court is a mere detail or formality requisite to the proceedings.
The judgment of the court is rendered after a consideration of the
commissioners' report and the exceptions thereto submitted upon
the hearing of the report. By this judgment the court may accept
the commissioners' report unreservedly; it may return the report
for additional facts or it may set the report aside and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it in
part, and "make such final order and judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights
under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the
land so taken." Any one of these methods of disposing of the
report is available to and may be adopted by the court according
as they are deemed suited to secure to the plaintiff the necessary
property and to the defendant just compensation therefor. But can
the latter method produce a different result in reference to any
part of the report from that recommended by the commissioners?
The purpose of this discussion is solely to determine this
question.
Section 246 expressly authorizes the court to "accept the report in
part and reject it in part." If this phrase stood alone, it might be
said that the court is only empowered to accept as a whole certain
parts of the report and reject as a whole other parts. That is, if the
commissioners fixed the value of the land taken at P5,000, the
improvements at P1,000, and the consequential damages at
P500, the court could accept the report in full as to any one item
and reject it as to any other item, but could not accept or reject a
part of the report in such a way as to change any one of the
amounts. But the court is also empowered "to make such final
order and judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the
defendant just compensation for the land so taken." The court is
here expressly authorizes to issue such orders and render such
judgment as will produce these results. If individual items which
make up the total amount of the award in the commissioners'
report could only be accepted or rejected in their entirety, it would
be necessary to return to the case, so far as the rejected portions
of the report were concerned, for further consideration before the
same or new commissioners, and the court could not make a
"final order and judgment" in the cause until the rejected portions
of the report had been re-reported to it. Thus, in order to give the
italicized quotation from section 246 any meaning at all, it is
obvious that the court may, in its discretion, correct the
commissioners' report in any manner deemed suitable to the
occasion so that final judgment may be rendered and thus end
the litigation. The "final order and judgment" are reviewable by
this court by means of a bill of exceptions in the same way as any
ordinary action. Section 496 provides that the Supreme Court
may, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirm, reverse, or
modify any final judgment, order, or decree of the Court of First
Instance, and section 497, as amended by Act No. 1596 ,
provides that if the excepting party filed a motion in the Court of
First Instance for a new trial upon the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to justify the decision and the judge overruled said
motion and due exception was taken to his ruling, the Supreme
Court may review the evidence and make such findings upon the
facts by a preponderance of the evidence and render such final
judgment as justice and equity may require. So it is clear from
these provisions that this court, in those cases where the right of
eminent domain has been exercised and where the provisions of
the above section have been complied with, may examine the
testimony and decide the case by a preponderance of the
evidence; or, in other words, retry the case upon the merits and
render such order or judgment as justice and equity may require.
The result is that, in our opinion, there is ample authority in the
statute to authorize the courts to change or modify the report of
the commissioners by increasing or decreasing the amount of the
award, if the facts of the case will justify such change or
modification.
The question now arises, when may the court, with propriety,
overrule the award of the commissioners in whole or in part and
substitute its own valuation of the condemned property? From a
mere reading of section 246 and the remarks just made, it should
be clear that the court is permitted to act upon the commissioners'
report in one of several ways, at its own discretion. The whole
duty of the court in considering the commissioners' report is to
satisfy itself that just compensation will be made to the defendant
by its final judgment in the matter, and in order to fulfill its duty in
this respect the court will be obliged to exercise its discretion in
dealing with the report as the particular circumstances of the case
may require. But generally speaking, when the commissioners'
report cannot with justice be approved by the court, one of three
or four circumstances will usually present itself, each of which has
for its antidote one of the methods of dealing with the report
placed at the disposal of the court by section 246. Thus, if it be
successfully established that the commissioners refused to hear
competent evidence, then all the evidence in the case would not
be before the court; the court could not, with reason, attempt to
either approve or change the report, as it stood, for the reason
that all the evidence of the case would not be before it; and the
remedy in this case would be to "recommit the report to the
commissioners for further report of facts." Again, if improper
conduct, fraud, or prejudice be charged against the
commissioners, and this charge be sustained, it would be safer to
set aside the award thus vitiated and "appoint new
commissioners" who could render a report not tainted by these
things. But it is to be observed again that this discussion is
confined to a case were no competent evidence was refused by
the commissioners and no suspicion rests upon the motives of the
commissioners in making the award. When the only error of the
commissioners is that they have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them; or that they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of the evidence; or that they have used an
improper rule of assessment in arriving at the amount of the
award, then, in such a case, if the evidence be clear and
convincing, the court should be able, by the use of those correct
legal principles which govern the case, to determine upon the
amount which should be awarded without remanding the cause.
When the matter stands in this light, it becomes the duty of the
court to make "final order and judgment" in which the proper
award will be made and thus end the litigation between the
parties.
In Louisiana, where the procedural law on this point is similar to
our own, the supreme court has used its powers in this respect
quite frequently. And in this connection, we think it proper to quote
from a case which, in some respects, is similar to the one at bar:
On the question of the value of the land, 8.34 acres, the
commissioners have allowed $2,500 or $300 per acre. The
defendant has put in the record the testimony of witnesses
claimed to support the allowance. Without disregarding this
testimony, it is sufficient to say that the opinions of the witnesses
do not seem to be based on any fact calculated to show the value
of the land. . . . On the other hand the plaintiff has placed before
us the titles of defendant of recent date showing the price paid by
him (the defendant) for the entire body of land of which the 8
acres are a part; the acts of sale of land in the same
neighborhood, and of the same quality; the assessment of
defendant's property, and other testimony on this issue of value. .
. . Giving all possible weight, or rather restricting the testimony of
the plaintiff's witnesses to its due influence and giving, we think,
necessary effect to the acts by which defendant purchased, the
acts of sale of other land, the assessment of value, with due
allowance for underassessment, and the other testimony of
record, we reach the conclusion that the award gives two-thirds
more than the value of the land. We fix the value of the land at
$833.33. (Morgan's Louisiana & Texas R. R. Co. vs. Barton, 51
La. Ann., 1338.)
See also T. & P. R. R. Co. vs. Southern Develop. Co. (52 La.
Ann., 53), where the court held that appraisement made by the
jury too low and after discussing the evidence, increased the
amount of the award accordingly. A similar case is Abney vs.
Railroad Company (105 La., 446). See also T. & P. R. R. Co. vs.
Wilson (108 La., 1; 32 So., 173); and Louisiana Western R. Co.
vs.Crossman's Heirs (111 La., 611; 35 So., 784), where the points
is touched upon.
In Missouri the statute (1 Mo. Ann. Stat., § 1268) directs that "the
court shall make such order therein as right and justice may
require, and may order a new appraisement, upon good cause
shown." Owing to a constitutional restriction, this provision has
been construed to apply only to damages and benefits resulting to
landowners in consequence of proposed improvements, the cash
value of property expropriated being an issue triable, at the
instance of either party, by a jury subsequent to the findings of the
commissioners. Subject to this restriction, however, it has been
held that the above provisions of law gives the court the right to
increase or decrees the amount awarded by the commissioners.
In the late case of Tarkio Drainage District vs. Richardson (237
Mo., 49) the court presents a lengthy review of its decisions on
this subject.
We are clearly of the opinion that our holding on this branch of the
case is supported not only by reason but by the interpretation of
similar provisions of law in other jurisdictions, so far as we have
had the opportunity to examine the question.
This opinion will be substitute for the short opinion rendered in the
cause near the close of last term
EPZA VS DULAY
Facts:
The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is
where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authorityin Cebu
(EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio
Development Corporation (San Antonio, forbrevity), in which
these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were
expropriated to the governmentwithout them reaching the
agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay
then issued an order forthe appointment of the commissioners to
determine the just compensation. It was later found out that
thepayment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per
square meter, which was objected to by the lattercontending that
under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and
according to the fair marketvalue declared by the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever
is lower.Such objection and the subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the
reception
of the commissioner‗s report. EPZA then filed this petition for
certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent
from further hearing the case.
Issue:
Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining
just compensation in PD 1533 isunconstitutional.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just
compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional.The method of
ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible
encroachment to judicial prerogatives. Ittends to render the courts
inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it
for financialdetermination. The valuation in the decree may only
serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the
court‗s own judgment as to what amount should be
awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of
just compensation is a judicial function. Theexecutive department
or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that
the private party may not be taken for public use without
justcompensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court‗s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from
looking into the justness of the decreed
compensation.
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY vs.HON.
CEFERINO E. DULAY
FACTS:Under Proclamation No. 1811, four parcel of land with
anaggregate area of 22,328 sqm owned and registered in
thename of private individuals were included for theestablishment
of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA). The EPZAoffered to purchase the land
from the private owners inaccordance wit the valuation set forth in
Section 22 of PD464. Failure to agreed regarding the sale, EPZA
filed withthe Court of First Instance of Cebu to expropriate the
landpursuant to PD No. 66(empowers the petitioner to acquire
bycondemnation proceedings any property for theestablishment
of export processing zones, in relation toProclamation No. 1811,
for the purpose of establishing theMactan Export Processing
Zone)The judge authorized PEZA to to take immediate
possessionof the premises. As per decision of the judge, EPZA
shouldpay the private owners a just compensation for
theproperties and order certain persons as commissioners
toascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated.Three commissioners
submitted their consolidated report atP 15 per sqm as the fair and
reasonable value of justcompensation.EPZA filed for Motion for
Reconsideration for the court order and Objection to
Commissioner¶s Report on the grounds thatPD No 1533 has
superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of the Court
on the ascertainment of justcompensation; and such
compensation should not exceedthe maximum stated in set by
PD 1533. The trial courtdenied the petition. The case is for
certiorari and mandamus.Grounds is excess for sjurisdiction and
with grave abuse of the discretion of the judge.ISSUE:The
question raised in this petition is whether or notPresidential
Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 haverepealed and
superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of theRevised Rules of
Court, such that in determining the justcompensation of property
in an expropriation case, the onlybasis should be its market value
as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower.HELD:The court still have the power and
authority to determine justcompensation, independent of what is
stated by the decreeand to this effect, to appoint commissioners
for suchpurpose.The trial court correctly stated the valuation in
the decreemay only serve as a guiding principle or one of the
factors indetermining just compensation but it may not substitute
thecourt's own judgment as to what amount should be
awardedand how to arrive at such amount.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminentdomain
cases is a judicial function.
The executivedepartment or the legislature may make the
initialdeterminations but when a party claims
a violation of theguarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property maynot be taken for public use without just
compensation, nostatute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its owndetermination shag prevail over the court's findings.
Muchless can the courts be precluded from looking into
the"just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
Elimination of the court's discretion, under PD No. 1533, toappoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is
unconstitutional and void
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, vs.HON.
CEFERINO E. DULAY,
FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines,
issuedProclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of
the public domainsituated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of
Mactan, Cebu for the establishmentof an export processing zone
by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority(EPZA).Not all the
reserved area, however, was public land. The
proclamationincluded, among others, four (4) parcels of owned
and registered in the name of the San Antponio Development
COrporation. EPZA, therefore, offered topurchase the parcels of
land in acccordance with the valuation set forth inSection 92,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties
failed toreach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property.EPZA then filed with Court of First Instance a complaint
for expropriation,through which, a writ of possession authorizing
the petitioner to take immediatepossession of the premises was
issued.At the pre-trial conference, parties have agreed that the
only issue to beresolved is the just compensation for the
properties. Hearing on the merits wasthen set. Thereafter, the
court issued an orders, declaring EPZA as having thelawful right
to take the properties sought to be condemned upon the
paymentof just compensation to be determined as of the filing of
the complaint andappointing commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the justcompensation for the properties sought
to be expropriated. The consolidated report of the three
commissioners recommended theamount of P15.00 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable value of justcompensation for
the properties.EPZA filed an Objection to Commissioner's Report
on the grounds thatP.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8
of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court onthe ascertainment of just
compensation through commissioners; and that thecompensation
must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533
The trial court denied the motion, as a result of which, the
petitioner fliedthis present petition enjoining the trial court from
enforcing the order and fromfurther proceeding with the hearing of
the expropriation case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the there is still a need to appoint commissioners
evenafter the effectivity of P.D. No. 1533 which already provided
for a mode indetermining just compensation.
HELD:
Yes. The Court declares the provision of the P.D. 1533 on just
compensationunconstitutional and void as the method of
ascertaining just compensationunder the said decree constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicialprerogatives. It tends to
render the Court inutile on a matter which, under theConstitution,
is reserved to it for final determination. Thus, although in an
expropriation proceeding, the court technicallywould still have the
power to determine the just compensation for the
property,following the applicable decree, its task would be
relegated to simply stating thelower value of the property as
declared either by the owner or the assessor. Thestrict application
of the decree during proceedings would be nothing short of amere
formality or charade as the court has only to choose between
thevaluation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice
is always limitedto the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise
its discretion orindependence in determining what is just or fair.
The trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree
may onlyserve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
determining justcompensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to whatamount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount. A return to theearlier well-established
doctrine is more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary
should live up to its mission "by vitalizing and not
denigratingconstitutional rights." The basic unfairness of the
decree is readily apparent. Just compensation means the value of
the property at the time of thetaking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained.In this particular case, the tax
declarations presented by EPZA as basisfor just compensation
were made by the city assessor long before martial law,when land
was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of
propertieswere stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their
true market value. Theprivate respondent was not even the owner
of the properties at the time. To pegthe value of the lots on the
basis of documents which are out of date and atprices below the
acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary
andconfiscatory
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations
made byassessors since they had the opportunity to protest is
illusory. Theoverwhelming mass of land owners accept
unquestioningly what is found in thetax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them. Theydo not even
look at, much less analyze, the statements.It is violative of due
process to deny to the owner the opportunity toprove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. The
determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is
a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature
may make theinitial determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in theBill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for pubhc use without justcompensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
owndetermination shag prevail over the court's findings.
In view of the foregoing, P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the
court'sdiscretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, was therefore held unconstitutional and void
REPUBLIC vs. LIM
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu City forthe purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. The
said lots were registered in the name of Gervasia and Eulalia
Denzon. The Republic deposited P9,500 in the PNB then took
possession of the lots. Thereafter, onMay 1940, the CFI rendered
its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of
P4,062.10 as justcompensation. The Denzons appealled to the
CA but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment
wasmade on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for thetwo lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter." On September 6, 1961, Lt.
Cabal rejected the claim but expressedwillingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.For failure of
the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the
Denzons· successors-in-interest,Valdehueza and Panerio, filed
with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with
damages against the Republicand AFP officers in possession of
the property.On November 1961, Titles of the said lots were
issued in the names of Valdehueza and Panerio with
theannotation "subject to the priority of the National Airports
Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and939
upon previous payment of a reasonable market value".On July
1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza
and Panerio, holding that they are theowners and have retained
their right as such over lots because of the Republic·s failure to
pay the amount of P4,062.10,adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land
titles, they were orderedto execute a deed of sale in favor of the
Republic.They appealed the CFI·s decision to the SC. The latter
held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registeredowners of
Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC still ruled that theyare not
entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand
the payment of their fair market value.Meanwhile, in 1964,
Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim
herein respondent, assecurity for their loans. For their failure to
pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. The lottitle was issued in his name.On 1992, respondent
Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC against the
petitioners herein.On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor
of Lim, declaring that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of
the lotwith all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to
possession. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In
itsDecision dated September 18, 2003, it sustained the RTC
Decision saying: ´...
This is contrary to the rules of fair play becausethe concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot beconsidered "
just"...µPetitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC a petition
for review alleging that they remain as the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite
its failure to pay respondent·spredecessors-in-interest the just
compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI
rendered as early asMay 14, 1940
HELD:
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of hisprivate property without due
process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element
of due process is thatthere must be just compensation whenever
private property is taken for public use. 7Accordingly, Section 9,
Article III,of our Constitution mandates: " Private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation." The
Republicdisregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and
refused to pay respondent·s predecessors-in-interest the
justcompensation for Lots 932 and 939.The Court of Appeals is
correct in saying that Republic·s delay is contrary to the rules of
fair play. In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the
expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation,
ithas been held that if the compensation is not paid in a
reasonable time , the party may be treated as a trespasser ab
initio. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza , this Court
mandated the Republic to pay respondent·s predecessors-in-
interest the sum of P16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of
the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it did not complyand
allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court·s
mandate. It is tantamount to confiscation of privateproperty. While
it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of
government, and the government maytake them whenever the
necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however from
the taking of privateproperty by the government under the power
of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to
compensate theowner for his loss.There is a recognized rule that
title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to
theexpropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. So, how could the Republic acquire ownership
over Lot932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation,
required by law, for more than 50 years? Clearly, without
fullpayment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title
from the landowner to the expropriator.SC ruled in earlier cases
that expropriation of lands consists of two stages.
First is concerned with thedetermination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety
of its exercise.The second is concerned with the determination by
the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to
betaken." It is only upon the completion of these two stages that
expropriation is said to have been completed In Republic v.
Salem Investment Corporation, we ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just compensation." Thus,here, the
failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest for a period of 57 years renderedthe expropriation
process incomplete.Thus, SC ruled that the special circumstances
prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover possession
of the expropriated lot from the Republic.While the prevailing
doctrine is that "the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the privatelandowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed
to pay justcompensation within five (5) years fr om the finality
of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, theowners
concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. After all, it is the duty of thegovernment, whenever it
takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate
the payment of justcompensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of
Appeals, we defined just compensation as not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but
also the payment of the property within a reasonable time.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just."
UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)
Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil Aeronautics Board
where there are no army or navy regulations to the contrary.
This is a case of first impression. The problem presented is
whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and
navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes. The Court of
Claims held that there was a taking and entered judgment for
respondent, one judge dissenting. 60 F.Supp. 751. The case is
here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted becuase
of the importance of the question presented.
Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and
also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising
chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is
2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their
house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the
property-which is 100 feet wide and 1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1
safe glide angle1 approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority2
passes over this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the
house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above the highest
tree. 3 The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a
lease executed in May, 1942, for a term commencing June 1,
1942 and ending June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals
until June 30, 1967, or six [328 U.S. 256, 259] months after the
end of the national emergency, whichever is the earlier.
Various aircraft of the United States use this airport-bombers,
transports and fighters. The direction of the prevailing wind
determines when a particular runway is used. The north-west-
southeast runway in question is used about four per cent of the
time in taking off and about seven per cent of the time in landing.
Since the United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-
motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its
fighter planes have frequently passed over respondents' land
buildings in considerable numbers and rather close together.
They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the
tops of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as
to blow the old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the
glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of
the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As
many as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by
flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that
manner was about 150. Production also fell off. The result was
the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken
farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the
family has become nervous and frightened. Although there have
been no airplane accidents on respondents' property, there have
been several accidents near the airport and close to respondents'
place. These are the essential facts found by the Court of Claims.
On the basis of these facts, it found that respondents' property
had depreciated in value. It held that the United States had taken
an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the
value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was
$2,000. [328 U.S. 256, 260] I. The United States relies on the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49
U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49 U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et
seq. Under those statutes the United States has 'complete and
exclusive national sovereignty in the air space' over this country.
49 U.S.C. 176(a), 49 U.S.C.A. 176(a). They grant any citizen of
the United States 'a public right of freedom of transit in air
commerce4 through the navigable air space of the United States.'
49 U.S.C. 403, 49 U.S.C.A. 403. And 'navigable air space' is
defined as 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C. 180, 49
U.S.C.A. 180. And it is provided that 'such navigable airspace
shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and
foreign air navigation.' Id. It is, therefore, argued that since these
flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had
been prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of
travel through the airspace. The United States concludes that
when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any
physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there has
been no taking of property. It says that at most there was merely
incidental damage occurring as a consequence of authorized air
navigation. It also argues that the landowner does not own
superadjacent airspace which he has not subjected to possession
by the erection of structures or other occupancy. Moreover, it is
argued that even if the United States took airspace owned by
respondents, no compensable damage was shown. Any damages
are said to be merely consequential for which no compensation
may be obtained under the Fifth Amendment.
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land
extended to the periphery of the universe-Cujus[328 U.S. 256,
261] est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. 5 But that doctrine has
no place in the modern world. The ai is a public highway, as
Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private
claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously
interfere with their control and development in the public interest,
and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public
has a just claim.
But that general principle does not control the present case. For
the United States conceded on oral argument that if the flights
over respondents' property rendered it uninhabitable, there would
be a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. It is the
owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the
value of the property taken. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 ,
63 S.Ct. 276, 147 A.L. R. 55. Market value fairly determined is the
normal measure of the recovery. Id. And that value may reflect
the use to which the land could readily be converted, as well as
the existing use. United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 ,
63 S.Ct. 1047, 1053, and cases cited. If, by reason of the
frequency and altitude of the flights, respondents could not use
this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. 6 It would
be as complete as if the United States had entered upon the
surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it.
We agree that in those circumstances there would be a taking.
Though it would be only an easement of flight [328 U.S. 256,
262] which was taken, that easement, if permanent and not
merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee
interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and
control over the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never
touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this
day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The
owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say, his
beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be a
case of incidental damages arising from a legalized nuisance
such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal
Co., 233 U.S. 546 , 34 S.Ct. 654, L.R.A.1915A, 887. In that case
property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied
recovery for damages resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke
and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains. In the
supposed case the line of flight is over the land. And the land is
appropriated as directly and completely as if it were used for the
runways themselves.
There is no material difference between the supposed case and
the present one, except that here enjoyment and use of the land
are not completely destroyed. But that does not seem to us to be
controlling. The path of glide for airplanes might reduce a valuable
factory site to grazing land, an orchard to a vegetable patch, a
residential section to a wheat field. Some value would remain. But
the use of the airspace immediately above the land would limit the
utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value. 7 That was
the philosophy of Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. [328
U.S. 256, 263] United States, 260 U.S. 327 , 43 S.Ct. 135. In
that case the petition alleged that the United States erected a fort
on nearby land, established a battery and a fire control station
there, and fired guns over petitioner's land. The Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, reversed the Court of Claims which
dismissed the petition on a demurrer, olding that 'the specific facts
set forth would warrant a finding that a servitude has been
imposed.' 8 260 U.S. at page 330, 43 S.Ct. at page 137. And see
Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245, 140 A.L.R.
1352. Cf. United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, D.C., 55 F.Supp.
461.
The fact that the path of glide taken by the planes was that
approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority does not change the
result. The navigable airspace which Congress has placed in the
public domain is 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of
flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C.
180, 49 U.S.C.A. 180. If that agency prescribed 83 feet as the
minimum safe altitude, then we would have presented the
question of the validity of the regulation. But nothing of the sort
has been done. The path of glide governs the method of
operating- of landing or taking off. The altitude required for that
operation is not the minimum safe altitude of flight which is the
downward reach of the navigable airspace. The minimum
prescribed by the authority is 500 feet during the day and 1000
feet at night for air carriers (Civil Air Regulations, Pt. 61, 61.7400,
61.7401, Code Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., Tit. 14, ch. 1) and from 300
to 1000 feet for [328 U.S. 256, 264] other aircraft depending on
the type of plane and the character of the terrain. Id., Pt. 60,
60.350-60.3505, Fed.Reg.Cum.Supp., supra. Hence, the flights in
question were not within the navigable airspace which Congress
placed within the public domain. If any airspace needed for
landing or taking off were included, flights which were so close to
the land as to render it uninhabitable would be immune. But the
United States concedes, as we have said, that in that event there
would be a taking. Thus, it is apparent that the path of glide is not
the minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the
statute. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has, of course, the power
to prescribe air traffic rules. But Congress has defined navigable
airspace only in terms of one of them-the minimum safe altitudes
of flight.
We have said that the airspace is a public highway. Yet it is
obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land,
he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the
enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be
erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be
run. The principle is recognized when the law gives a remedy in
case overhanging structures are erected on adjoining land.9 The
landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground
as the can occupy or use in connection with the land. See Hinman
v. Pacific Air Transport, 9 Cir., 84 F.2d 755. The fact that he does
not occupy it in a physical sense-by the erection of buildings and
the like-is not material. As we have said, the flight of airplanes,
which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an
appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry
upon it. We would not doub that if the United States erected [328
U.S. 256, 265] an elevated railway over respondents' land at the
precise altitude where its planes now fly, there would be a partial
taking, even though none of the supports of the structure rested
on the land. 10 The reason is that there would be an intrusion so
immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full
enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it. While
the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that stratum of
airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense, he does use
it in somewhat the same sense that space left between buildings
for the purpose of light and air is used. The superadjacent
airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous
invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We
think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a
claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category as
invasions of the surface. 11
In this case, as in Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United
States, supra, the damages were not merely consequential. They
were the product of a direct invasion of respondents' do- [328
U.S. 256, 266] main. As stated in United States v. Cress, 243
U.S. 316, 328 , 37 S.Ct. 380, 385, '... it is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as
the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it
is a taking.'
We said in United States v. Powelson, supra, 319 U.S. at page
279, 63 S.Ct. at page 1054, that while the meaning of 'property'
as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal question, 'it will
normally obtain its content by reference to local law.' If we look to
North Carolina law, we reach the same result. Sovereignty in the
airspace rests in the State 'except where granted to and assumed
by the United States.' Gen.Stats. 1943, 63-11. The flight of aircraft
is lawful 'unless at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then
existing use to which the land or water, or the space over the land
or water, is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be
imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land
or water beneath.' Id., 63-13. Subject to that right of flight,
'ownership of the space above the lands and waters of this State
is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface
beneath.' Id. 63-12. Our holding that there was an invasion of
respondents' property is thus not inconsistent with the local law
governing a landowner's claim to the immediate reaches of the
superadjacent airspace.
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the
inconveniences which it causes are normally not compensable
under the Fifth Amendment. The airspace, apart from the
immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.
We need not determine at this time what those precise limits are.
Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low
and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land. We need not speculate on that
phase of the present case. For the findings of the Court [328 U.S.
256, 267] of Claims plainly establish that there was a diminution
in value of the property and that the frequent, low-level flights
were the direct and immediate cause. We agree with the Court of
Claims that a servitude has been imposed upon the land.
II. By 145(1) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. 250(1), 28 U.S.C.A .
250(1), the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to hear and determine
'All claims (except for pensions) founded upon the Constitution of
the United States or ... upon any contract, express or implied, with
the Government of the United States.'
We need not decide whether repeated trespasses might give rise
to an implied contract. Cf. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v.
United States, supra. If there is a taking, the claim is 'founded
upon the Constitution' and within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims to hear and determine. See Hollister v. Benedict &
Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67 , 5 S.Ct. 717, 721; Hurley v.
Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 , 52 S.Ct. 267, 269; Yearsley v. W. A.
Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 , 60 S.Ct. 413, 415. Thus,
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in this case is clear.
III. The Court of Claims held, as we have noted, that an easement
was taken. But the findings of fact contain no precise description
as to its nature. It is not described in terms of frequency of flight,
permissible altitude, or type of airplane. Nor is there a finding as
to whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent. Yet
an accurate description of the property taken is essential, since
that interest vests in the United States. United States v. Cress,
supra, 243 U.S. 328, 329 , 37 S.Ct. 385, 386, and cases cited. It
is true that the Court of Claims stated in its opinion that the
easement taken was permanent. But the deficiency in findings
cannot be rectified by statements in the opinion. United States v.
Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 , 206 S., 57 S.Ct. 159, 161,
162; United States v. Seminole Nation, 299 U.S. 417, 422 , 57
S.Ct. 283, 287. Findings of fact on every 'material issue' are a
statutory [328 U.S. 256, 268] requirement. 53 Stat. 752, 28
U.S.C. 288, 28 U.S.C.A. 288. The importance of findings of fact
based on evidence is emphasized here by the Court of Claims'
treatment of the nature of the easement. It stated in its opinion
that the easement was permanent because the United States 'no
doubt intended to make some sort of arrangement whereby it
could use the airport for its military planes whenever it had
occasion to do so.' (60 F. Supp. 758.) That sounds more like
conjecture rather than a conclusion from evidence; and if so, it
would not be a proper foundation for liability of the United States.
We do not stop to examine the evidence to determine whether it
would support such a finding, if made. For that is not our function.
United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, supra, 299 U.S. at page 206, 57
S.Ct. at page 162.
Since on this record it is not clear whether the easement taken is
a permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature for us to
consider whether the amount of the award made by the Court of
Claims was proper.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court
of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in
conformity with this opin on.
REVERSED.
Mr. Justice JACKSON took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.
The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'be
taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holds
today that the Government has 'taken' respondents' property by
repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents' land
at a height of eighty-three feet where the light and noise from
these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their chickens
to be killed. Since the effect of the Court's decision is [328 U.S.
256, 269] to limit, by the imposition of relatively absolute
Constitutional barriers, possible future adjustments through
legislation and regulation which might become necessary with the
growth of air transportation, and since in my view the Constitution
does not contain such barriers, I dissent.
The following is a brief statement of the background and of the
events that the Court's opinion terms a 'taking' within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment: Since 1928 there has been an airfield
some eight miles from Greensboro, North Carolina. In April, 1942,
this airport was taken over by the Greensboro-High Point
Municipal Airport Authority and it has since then operated as a
municipal airport. In 1942 the Government, by contract, obtained
the right to use the field 'concurrently, jointly, and in common' with
other users. Years before, in 1934, respondents had bought their
property, located more than one-third of a mile from the airport.
Private planes from the airport flew over their land and farm
buildings from 1934 to 1942 and are still doing so. But though
these planes disturbed respondents to some extent, Army
bombers, which started to fly over the land in 1942 at a height of
eighty-three feet, disturbed them more because they were larger,
came over more frequently, made a louder noise, and at night a
greater glare was caused by their lights. This noise and glare
disturbed respondents' sleep, frightened them, and made them
nervous. The noise and light also frightened respondents'
chickens so much that many of them flew against buildings and
were killed.
The Court's opinion seems to indicate that the mere flying of
planes through the column of air directly above respondents' land
does not constitute a 'taking'. Consequently, it appears to be
noise and glare, to the extent and under the circumstances shown
here, which make the government a seizer of private property. But
the allegation[328 U.S. 256, 270] of noise and glare resulting in
damages, constitutes at best an action in tort where there might
be recovery if the noise and light constituted a nuisance, a
violation of a statute,1 or were the result of negligence. 2 But the
Government has not consented to be sued in the Court of Claims
except in actions based on express or implied contract. And there
is no implied contract here, unless by reason of the noise and
glare caused by the bombers the Government can be said to
have 'taken' respondents' property in a Constitutional sense. The
concept of taking property as used in the Constitution has
heretofore never been given so sweeping a meaning. The Court's
opinion presents no case where a man who makes noise or
shines light onto his neighbor's property has been ejected from
that property for wrongfully taking possession of it. Nor would
anyone take seriously a claim that noisy automobiles passing on
a highway are taking wrongful possession of the homes located
thereon, or that a city elevated train which greatly interferes with
the sleep of those who live next to it wrongfully takes their
property. Even the one case in this Court which in considering the
sufficiency of a complaint gave the most elastic meaning to the
phrase 'private property be taken' as used in the Fifth
Amendment, did not go so far. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel
Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. [328 U.S. 256, 271] 327, 43 S.Ct.
135. I am not willing, nor do I think the Constitution and the
decisions authorize me to extend that phrase so as to guarantee
an absolute Constitutional right to relief not subject to legislative
change, which is based on averments that at best show mere
torts committed by Government agents while flying over land. The
future adjustment of the rights and remedies of property owners,
which might be found necessary because of the flight of planes at
safe altitudes, should, especially in view of the imminent
expansion of air navigation, be left where I think the Constitution
left it, with Congress.
Nor do I reach a different conclusion because of the fact that the
particular circumstance which under the Court's opinion makes
the tort here absolutely actionable, is the passing of planes
through a column of air at an elevation of eighty-three feet directly
over respondents' property. It is inconceivable to me that the
Constitution guarantees that the airspace of this Nation needed
for air navigation, is owned by the particular persons who happen
to own the land beneath to the same degree as they own the
surface below. 3 No rigid Constitutional rule, in my judgment,
commands that the air must be considered as marked off into
separate compartments by imaginary metes and bounds in order
to synchronize air ownership with land ownership. I think that the
Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control all
navigable airspace. Congress has already acted under that
power. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that
'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256,
272] air space (over) the United States.' This was done under
the assumption that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
gave Congress the same plenary power to control navigable
airspace as its plenary power over navigable waters. H. Rep. No.
572, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10; H. Rep. No. 1162, 69th Cong.,
1st Sess., p. 14; United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S.
386 , 65 S.Ct. 803. To make sure that the airspace used for air
navigation would remain free, Congress further declared that
'navigable airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of
interstate and foreign air navigation,' and finally stated
emphatically that there exists 'a public right of freedom of transit
... through the navigable airspace of the United States.' Congress
thus declared that the air is free, not subject to private ownership,
and not subject to delimitation by the courts. Congress and those
acting under its authority were the only ones who had power to
control and regulate the flight of planes. 'Navigable air-space' was
defined as 'airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight
prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 49 U.S.C. 180, 49
U.S.C.A. 180. Thus, Congress has given the Civil Aeronautics
Authority exclusive power to determine what is navigable airspace
subject to its exclusive control. This power derives specifically
from the Section which authorizes the Authority to prescribe 'air
traffic rules governing the flight of, and for the navigation,
protection, and identification of, aircraft, including rules as to safe
altitudes of flight and rules for the prevention of collisions between
aircraft, and between aircraft and land or water vehicles.' 49
U.S.C.A. 551. Here there was no showing that the bombers flying
over respondents' land violated any rule or regulation of the Civil
Aeronautics Authority. Yet, unless we hold the Act
unconstitutional, at least such a showing would be necessary
before the courts could act without interfering with the exclusive
authority which Congress gave to the administrative agency. Not
even a [328 U.S. 256, 273] showing that the Authority has not
acted at all would be sufficient. For in that event, were the courts
to have any authority to act in this case at all, they should stay
their hand till the Authority has acted.
The broad provisions of the Congressional statute cannot properly
be circumscribed by making a distinction as the Court's opinion
does between rules of safe altitude of flight while on the level of
cross-country flight and rules of safe altitude during landing and
taking off. First, such a distinction can not be maintained from the
practical standpoint. It is unlikely that Congress intended that the
Authority prescribe safe altitudes for planes making cross-country
flights, while at the same time it left the more hazardous landing
and take-off operations unregulated. The legislative history,
moreover, clearly shows that the Authority's power to prescribe air
traffic rules includes the power to make rules governing landing
and take-off. Nor is the Court justified in ignoring that history by
labeling rules of safe altitude while on the level of cross-country
flight as rules prescribing the safe altitude proper and rules
governing take-off and landing as rules of operation. For the
Conference Report explicitly states that such distinctions were
purposely eliminated from the original House Bill in order that the
Section on air traffic rules 'might be given the broadest
construction by the ... ( Civil Aeronautics Authority) ... and the
courts.' 4 In construing the statute narrowly the Court [328 U.S.
256, 274] thwarts the intent of Congress. A proper broad
construction, such as Congress commanded, would not permit
the Court to decide what it has today without declaring the Act of
Congress unconstitutional. I think the Act given the broad
construction intended is constitutional.
No greater confusion could be brought about in the coming age of
air transportation than that which would result were courts by
Constitutional interpretation to hamper Congress in its efforts to
keep the air free. Old concepts of private ownership of land
should not be introduced into the field of air regulation. I have no
doubt that Congress will, if not handicapped by judicial
interpretations of the Constitution, preserve the freedom of the air,
and at the same time, satisfy the just claims of aggrieved persons.
The noise of newer, larger, and more powerful planes may grow
louder and louder and disturb people more and more. But the
solution of the problems precipitated by these technological
advances and new ways of living cannot come about through the
application of rigid Constitutional restraints formulated and
enforced by the courts. What adjustments may have to be made,
only the future can reveal. It seems certain, however, [328 U.S.
256, 275] the courts do not possess the techniques or the
personnel to consider and act upon the complex combinations of
factors entering into the problems. The contribution of courts must
be made through the awarding of damages for injuries suffered
from the flying of planes, or by the granting of injunctions to
prohibit their flying. When these two simple remedial devices are
elevated to a Constitutional level under the Fifth Amendment, as
the Court today seems to have done, they can stand as obstacles
to better adapted techniques that might be offered by experienced
experts and accepted by Congress. Today's opinion is, I fear, an
opening wedge for an unwarranted judicial interference with the
power of Congress to develop solutions for new and vital and
national problems. In my opinion this case should be reversed on
the ground that there has been no 'taking' in the Constitutional
sense.
Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi
FACTS:
1 July 1947 - Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Philippine Air
Force) occupied the land situated in Floridablanca, Pampanga of
Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial administratrix of the
estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi since by virtue of a contract
of lease.
30 June 1956 - Before the expiration of the contract of lease, the
Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused,
intending to subdivide the lots for sale to the general public; filed
civil case for ejectment of AFP.
26 June 1959– In view of the difficulty for the army to vacate the
premises due to permanent installations and other facilities, AFP
filed expropriation proceedings and was placed in possession of
the lands on 10 August 1959.
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that
the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands, according to
the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was
not more than P2,000 per hectare (P.20/sqm), or a total market
value of P259,669.10 when AFP first had the ―taking‖ of the said
property by virtue of the special lease agreement. Respondents
allege that their lands are residential with a fair market value of
not less than P15/sqm.
The trial court rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous
recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square
meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just
compensation
ISSUE:
1. WON the ―taking‖ of the properties under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the action
2. WON the P10/sqm is fair and just compensation.
HELD:
1. The "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
occupy the property as lessee. Elements B & E were
not present when Republic entered the properties in
1947.
Elements/Requisites of ―taking‖ of property for purposes of
eminent domain:
A. Expropriator must enter a private property.
B. Entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period.
C. Entry into the property should be under warrant or
color of legal authority.
D. Property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected.
E. Utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
2. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
―just compensation‖ is to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint.
This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought
to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing
of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on
10 August 1959.
The ―taking‖ of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid should not be paid
based on 1947 fair market value amount.
Basic guidelines in determining the value of the land to be
expropriated:
Same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of
property between private parties.
Estimated by reference to the use for which the
property is suitable, having regard to the existing
business or wants of the community, or such as may
be reasonably expected in the immediate future.
In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has
the right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most
in the market.
We have arrived at the conclusion that the price of P10/sqm is
quite high. The price of P5/sqm would be a fair valuation and
would constitute a just compensation. We considered the
resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the
province of Pampanga informing, that in the year 1959 the lands
could be sold for from P2.50- P4/sqm, and the Court arrived at a
happy medium between the price as recommended by the
commissioners and approved by the court, and the price
advocated by the Republic.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI
Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi
on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate
the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the
republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in
question.
Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as
of 1947 or 1959
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the ―taking‖ should not be
reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be
determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that
year.
The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a
private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary
period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the
property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the
property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under
Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, ―just compensation‖ is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation
should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on
August 10, 1959. The ―taking‖ of the Castelvi property for the
purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint
for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention
of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise
to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease
made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in
the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court,
however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the
adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or
deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay
arises from law independent of contract
CIR v. Central Luzon Drug Corp.
Facts: Central Luzon Drug Corp. (―CLDC‖) is a domestic
corporation primarily engaged in retailing of medicines and other
pharmaceutical products. From January to December
1996, CLDC granted 20% sales discount to qualified senior
citizens on their purchases of medicines pursuant to RA 7432 and
its IRR. For the said period, the amount allegedly representing the
20% sales discount granted by CLDC to qualified senior
citizens amounted to P904,769. CLDC filed its Annual Income
Tax Return for taxable year 1996 declaring therein that it incurred
net losses. It later filed with the CIR a claim for tax refund/credit in
the amount of P904,769. Unable to obtain affirmative response
from CIR, CLDC elevated its claim to the CTA.
The CTA initially ruled against CLDC. It held that if no tax has
been paid to the government, erroneously or illegally, or if no
amount is due and collectible from the taxpayer, tax refund or tax
credit is unavailing. CLDC lodged a MR wherein the CTA ordered
the CIR to issue a Tax Credit Certificate in favor of CLDC. It held
that tax refunds or credits do not exclusively pertain to illegally
collected or erroneously paid taxes as they may be other
circumstances where a refund is warranted.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the CTA resolution ordering the
CIR to issue a tax credit certificate in favor of CLDC. It reasoned
that RA 7432 required neither a tax liability nor a payment
of taxes by private establishments prior to the availment of a tax
credit. Moreover, such credit is not tantamount to an unintended
benefit from the law, but rather a just compensation for the taking
of private property for public use.
Issues:
(1) Whether CLDC, despite incurring a net loss, may still claim the
20% sales discount as a tax credit.
(2) What is the nature of the tax credit granted to the
establishments.
Held: (Please read the original for a more detailed discussion on
the tax issues)
(1) YES. Although the term is not specifically defined in the Tax
Code, tax credit generally refers to an amount that is subtracted
directly from one‘s total tax liability. It is an allowance against the
tax itself or a deduction from what is owed‖ by a taxpayer to the
government. Examples of tax credits are withheld taxes,
payments of estimated tax, and investment tax credits.
While a tax liability is essential to the availment or use of any tax
credit, prior tax payments are not. On the contrary, for the
existence or grant solely of such credit, neither a tax liability nor a
prior tax payment is needed. The Tax Code is in factfull
of provisions granting or allowing tax credits, even though no
taxes have been previously paid. The 20% discount required by
the law to be given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not merely a
tax deduction from the gross income or gross sale of the
establishment concerned. A tax credit is used by a private
establishment only AFTER the tax has been computed; a tax
deduction, BEFORE the tax is computed. RA 7432
unconditionally grants a tax credit to all covered entities. Thus, the
provisions of the revenue regulation that withdraw or modify such
grant are void. Basic is the rule that administrative regulations
cannot amend or revoke the law.
(2) The revenue regulation of RA 7432 is unconstitutional insofar
as it denies the exercise by the State of its power of eminent
domain. The privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does not come
directly from the State, but rather from the private establishments
concerned. Accordingly, the tax credit benefit granted to these
establishments can be deemed as their JUST
COMPENSATION for private property taken by the State for
public use.
The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional
notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public
convenience. The discount privilege to which our senior citizens
are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to
which these citizens belong. The discounts given would have
entered the coffers and formed part of the gross sales of the
private establishments concerned, were it not for RA 7432. The
permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced subsidy
corresponding to the taking of private property for public use or
benefit. As a result of the 20% discount imposed by RA
7432, CLDC becomes entitled to a just compensation. This term
refers not only to the issuance of a tax credit certificate indicating
the correct amount of the discounts given, but also to the
promptness in its release. When not done within a reasonable
time from the grant of the discounts it cannot be considered
as just compensation. In effect, CLDC is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of its revenues
while awaiting actual receipt, through the tax credit certificate, of
the equivalent amount it needs to cope with the reduction in its
revenues.
The taxation power can also be used as an implement for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Tax measures are
but enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal
sanctions and clearly imposed for a public purpose. In recent
years, the power to tax has indeed become a most effective tool
to realize social justice, public welfare, and the equitable
distribution of wealth. Social justice cannot be invoked to trample
on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution are
also entitled to protection. It is not intended to take away rights
from a person and give them to another. For this reason, just
compensation for income that is taken away from CLDC becomes
necessary. It is in the tax credit that our legislators find support to
realize social justice, and no administrative body can alter that
fact.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, petitioner vs. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG
CORPORATION, respondent G.R. No. 148512, June 26, 2006,
Just like the first case herein discussed, this case delves
on the 20% discount granted to senior citizens. The respondent
filed a claim for refund on the unutilized portion for the discount
which it claimed as a tax credit. The CTA ruled that the tax credit
benefit is only to the extent of respondent‘s tax liability during the
year, hence the claim for refund is not allowed. The CA modified
that decision and ruled that the unutilized portion can be carried
over to the next taxable period if there is no current tax liability.
This ruling by the CA was affirmed by the SC.
In bringing the case to the SC, the CIR maintains that the
discount should only be allowed as a deduction from gross
income and not a reduction from the tax liability. The law (R.A.
No. 7432) provides that the discount is available as a tax credit.
However, the implementing regulations (RR No. 2-94) treat it as a
deduction from gross income following the customary treatment of
a sales discount. On this apparent conflict between the law and its
implementing rules, the SC said that when the law says that the
cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that
the amount – when claimed – shall be treated as reduction from
any tax liability. The law cannot be amended by a mere
regulation. The administrative agencies issuing these regulations
may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law they
administer. In fact, a regulation that operates to create a rule out
of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity. (CIR vs. Vda.
De Prieto, 109 Phil. 592)
The SC also touched on the nature of the benefit granted
to the establishment selling to senior citizens. It emphasized that
―the tax credit benefit granted to the establishment can be
deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by
the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior
citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the
private establishments concerned. To deprive the taxpayer of
their right to apply the tax credit against future tax liability will be
to deny them the just compensation for the property taken
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio
Facts: Malate Tourist Development Corp. (―MTDC‖) is engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department
of Tourism as a hotel. The City Council enacted an Ordinance
prohibiting the establishment or operation of businesses providing
certain forms of entertainment in the Ermita-Malate area. MTDC is
seeking that the Ordinance be declared unconstitutional, insofar
as it includes motels and inns among its prohibited
establishments.
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly
included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels
and inns such as MTDC‘s Victoria Court considering that these
were not establishments for amusement or entertainment and
they were not services or facilities for entertainment, nor did they
use women as tools for entertainment, and neither did they
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants or adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community.
Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance is unconstitutional.
Held: UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The police power of the City
Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate
to constitutional limitations. The enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional
and repugnant to general laws.
Among others,[1] it violates Art. III, §9 which states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as
it substantially divests MTDC of the beneficial use of its
property. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of
property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes
beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the
property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of
the private property rights of individuals.
Art. III, §9 is the most important protection of property rights in the
Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the
government to take property. It ensures that the government does
not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. If the
government takes away a person‘s property to benefit society,
then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee
is to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.
There are 2 types of taking that can be identified. A ―possessory‖
taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically
occupies property. A ―regulatory‖ taking occurs when the
government‘s regulation leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of the property. The issue of when regulation
constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each
case. A restriction on use of property may also constitute a
taking if not reasonably necessary to effect a substantial public
purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the ―prohibited‖
establishments 3 months from its approval within which to:
(1) wind up business operations or (2) to transfer to any place
outside of the Ermita-Malate area or (3) convert said businesses
to other kinds of business allowable within the area.
Option (1) amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically
confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an ―allowed‖ business, the structure which housed
the previous business will be left unused. Suppose he transfers,
he will likewise leave the entire establishment idle. Consideration
must be given to the substantial amount of money invested to
build the edifices which the owner reasonably expects to be
returned within a period of time. It is apparent that the Ordinance
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a
manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
Options (2) and (3) are confiscatory as well. The penalty of
permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations is also
equivalent to a ―taking‖ of private property. Option (2) qualifies as
a taking without just compensation with an additional burden
imposed on the owner to build another establishment solely from
his coffers. Not only is this impractical, it is unreasonable, onerous
and oppressive. Option (3) is just as ridiculous. How
may MTDC convert a motel into a restaurant or a coffee shop, art
gallery or music lounge without essentially destroying its
property? This is a taking of private property without due process
of law, nay, even without compensation.
OSG v. Ayala Land
G.R. No. 177056, 18 September 2009
Facts: Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain
and operate shopping malls in Metro Manila. SM Prime
constructs, operates, and leases out buildings for commercial
use. Ayala Land et al. have parking facilities for all kinds of motor
vehicles. Ayala Land, Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the
construction of their own parking facilities. Shangri-la is renting its
parking facilities. They also expend for the maintenance of
their parking facilities. They provide security to protect the
vehicles parked and maintain order within the area. In turn, they
collect parking fees from the persons making use of their facilities,
regardless of whether said persons are mall patrons or not. The
parking ticket issued contain the stipulation that they shall not be
responsible for any loss or damage to the vehicles parked in their‘
parking facilities.
The Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice
and Human Rights (―Committees‖) conducted a joint investigation.
The Committees issued a Report finding that the collection of
parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to the National Building
Code and the Consumer Act of the Philippines. The Committees,
among others, recommended that the Office of the Solicitor
General (―OSG‖) should institute the necessary action to enjoin
the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal
provisions of the National Building Code. The OSG should
likewise study how refund can be exacted from mall owners who
continue to collect parking fees.
Petitions for Declaratory Relief were filed. According to the Makati
RTC, the Building Code and its IRR do not impose that parking
spaces shall be provided by the mall owners free of charge.
Absent such directive, Ayala Land et al. are under no obligation to
provide them for free. To compel Ayala Land et al. to provide
parking for free can be considered as an unlawful taking of
property without just compensation.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision and declared that
the National Building Code and the IRR were clear.
The provisions were only intended to control the occupancy or
congestion of areas and structures. In the absence of any express
and clear provision of law, Ayala Land et al. could not be obliged
and expected to provide parking slots free of charge.
Issue: Whether or not Ayala Land et al. may be compelled to
provide free parking.
Held: NO. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of §102 of
the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State[2] but
totally ignores the second part of said provision.[3] §102 is not an
all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials in the name of life,
health, property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the
regulatory power of said officials to ensuring that the minimum
standards and requirements for all buildings and structures, as set
forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.
In City of Ozamis v. Lumapas, the SC authorized the collection by
the City of minimal fees for the parking of vehicles along the
streets: so why then should the Court now preclude Ayala Land et
al. from collecting from the public a fee for the use of the mall
parking facilities? Undoubtedly, they also incur expenses in the
maintenance and operation of the mall parking facilities, such as
electric consumption, compensation for parking attendants and
security, and upkeep of the physical structures.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking
police power to justify the regulation by the State of privately
owned parking facilities, including the collection of parking fees. In
totally prohibiting them from collecting parking fees, the State
would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. Police power
does not involve the taking or confiscation of property, with the
exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting
peace and order and of promoting the general welfare.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for
public use, the State is exercising another of its inherent
powers, eminent domain. This enables the State to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner. A regulation that deprives any person
of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and
entitles him to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so
slight as to permit the regulation to be justified under the police
power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably restricts
the right to use business property for business purposes amounts
to a taking of private property, and the owner may recover
therefor.
Although in the present case, title to the parking facilities remain
with Ayala Land et al., the prohibition against their collection of
parking fees from the public is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only
requiring them to devote a portion of the latter‘s properties for use
as parking spaces, but is also mandating that they give the public
access to said parking spaces for free. Such is already an
excessive intrusion into their property rights.Not only are they
being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as
they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or
even just recovering therefrom the expenses for the maintenance
and operation of the required parking facilities.
Heirs of Ardona vs Reyes
Facts The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the
CFI of Cebu City for the expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land
situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City for the
development intointegrated resort complexes of selected and
well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value. The
PTA will construct a sports complex, club house, golf course,
playground and picnic area on said land.An electric power grid will
also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage
system.Complimentary support facilities (malls, coffee shops, etc)
will also be created. The defendants alleged that the taking is
allegedly not impressed with public use under theConstitution.
Also, assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use
cannot be paramount to thedetermination of the land as a land
reform area; that limiting the amount of compensation by
legislativefiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land
is under the land reform program, it is the Courtof Agrarian
Relations and not the Court of First Instance, that has jurisdiction
over the expropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority
having deposited with the PNB, an amount equivalent to 10% of
the value of the properties pursuant to PD1533, the lower court
issued separate orders authorizing PTA totake immediate
possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of
possession.
Issue:WON the public use requirement has been complied with
Held:YesRatio: There are three provisions of the Constitution
which directly provide for the exercise of the powerof eminent
domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article
XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense
andupon payment of just compensation to transfer to public
ownership, utilities and other private enterprisesto be operated by
the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the Batasang
Pambansa mayauthorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided intosmall lots and
conveyed at cost to deserving citizens. While not directly
mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment
of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and
agrarianreforms which allow the exercise of police power together
with the power of eminent domain in theimplementation of
constitutional objectives are even more far reaching insofar as
taxing of privateproperty is concerned. We cite all the above
provisions on the power to expropriate because of thepetitioners'
insistence on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision.
The thrust of all constitutionalprovisions on expropriation is in the
opposite direction.As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining
Co. v. Samus categorized the restrictive view aswholly erroneous
and based on a misconception of fundamentals. The petitioners
look for the word"tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably the
search would be in vain. To freeze specific programs liketourism
into express constitutional provisions would make the Constitution
more prolix than a bulky codeand require of the framers a
prescience beyond Delphic proportions. In said case, this Court
emphasizedthat the power of eminent domain is inseparable from
sovereignty being essential to the existence of theState and
inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. The only
purpose of the provision in theBill of Rights is to provide some
form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a grant of
authority . The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and
declare that "public use" means literallyuse by the public and that
"public use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public
benefit", or "publicwelfare" and much less "public convenience."
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, theircontention
which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public
welfare orientation is undulyrestrictive and outmoded. Second, no
less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that
thepower of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion
and development of Philippine tourism. The restrictive view of
public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes
the scope of government activities and public concerns and which
possesses big and correctly located public lands thatobviate the
need to take private property for public purposes. Neither
circumstance applies to thePhilippines. We have never been a
laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public
land or limited governmentresources.There can be no doubt that
expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of
roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric powerplants, markets
and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office
buildings, and flood control systems is valid. However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here
aselsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear
cases of "use by the public" has beendiscarded.In the Philippines,
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized the
statutory and judicial trend as follows: "The taking to be valid must
be for public use. There was a time when it was feltthat a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
project is undertaken must befor the public to enjoy, as in the
case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable.
It is notany more. As long as the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain comes intoplay. As just noted,
the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is publicuse. One is the expropriation of lands to
be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals.
Theother is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to thegovernment. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for thegeneral welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use." The petitioners' contention that the
promotion of tourism is not "public use" because
privateconcessioners would be allowed to maintain various
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. insidethe tourist
complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus firms,
taxicab fleets, roadsiderestaurants, and other private businesses
using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least
bitthe public character of expropriations for roads and streets. The
lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on
expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose.
Airports and pierscatering exclusively to private airlines and
shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of
private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed areais later sold to private
homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service
companies, and otherprivate concerns. The petitioners have also
failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately accorded
toformulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The rule
in Berman v. Parker (supra) of deferenceto legislative policy even
if such policy might mean taking from one private person and
conferring onanother private person applies as well as in the
Philippines. An examination of the language in the 1919cases of
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila and Visayan
Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier cited,shows that from the very start
of constitutional government in our country judicial deference to
legislativepolicy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain
proceedings. The expressions of national policy arefound in the
revised charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, PD
564.(Disregard of Land Reform Nature) According to them,
assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, theproperties
subject of expropriation may not be taken for the purposes
intended since they are within thecoverage of "operation land
transfer" under the land reform program; that the agrarian reform
programoccupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other
State policies like those relating to the healthand physical well-
being of the people; and that property already taken for public use
may not be taken foranother public use. The petitioners, however,
have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a
land reformarea and that the affected persons have emancipation
patents and certificates of land transfer. The records show that
the area being developed into a tourism complex consists of more
than 808hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the land
reform program. The portion being expropriated is282 hectares of
hilly and unproductive land where even subsistence farming of
crops other than rice andcorn can hardly survive. And of the 282
disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters - less than
onehectare - is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40
defendants, only two have emancipationpatents for the less than
one hectare of land affected.(Non Impairment Clause) The non-
impairment clause has never been a barrier to the exercise of
policepower and likewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault
v. Springs "parties by entering into contractsmay not estop the
legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good." The
applicable doctrine isexpressed in Arce v. Genato which involved
the expropriation of land for a public plaza. The issue of
prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since
the necessity for the taking has notbeen previously established,
the issuance of the orders authorizing the PTA to take immediate
possessionof the premises, as well as the corresponding writs of
possession was premature.Under Presidential Decree No. 42, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government,
itsagency or instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation
proceedings is authorized to take immediatepossession, control
and disposition of the property and the improvements, with power
of demolition,notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before
the court, upon deposit with the Philippine NationalBank of an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property
expropriated. The issue of immediatepossession has been settled
in Arce v. Genato. In answer to the issue: ". . . condemnation or
expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one that is quasi-in-
rem, wherein the fact that the owner of the property ismade a
party is not essentially indispensable insofar at least as it
concerns the immediate taking of possession of the property and
the preliminary determination of its value, including the amount to
bedeposited."Makasiar: It appearing that the petitioners are not
tenants of the parcels of land in question and thereforedo not fall
within the purview of the Land Reform Code, the petition should
be dismissed on that scorealone. There is no need to decide
whether the power of the PTA to expropriate the land in question
predicated onthe police power of the State shall take precedence
over the social justice guarantee in favor of tenantsand the
landless. The welfare of the landless and small land owners
should prevail over the right of the PTAto expropriate the lands
just to develop tourism industry, which benefit the wealthy only.
Such a positionwould increase the disenchanted citizens and
drive them to dissidence. The government is institutedprimarily for
the welfare of the governed and there are more poor people in
this country than the rich. Thetourism industry is not essential to
the existence of the government, but the citizens are, and their
right tolive in dignity should take precedence over the
development of the tourism industry
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes
Facts: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City for theexpropriation of some
282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangay Alubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA¶sexpress authority ³to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land withinand without the tourist zones´ for the purposes
indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter
(PD564). The heirs of Juancho Ardona et. Al, ) filed their
oppositions, and had a common allegation in that the taking
isallegedly not impressed with public use under the Constitution;
alleging that there is no specific constitutional provision
authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes;
that assuming that PTA has such power,the intended use cannot
be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform
area; that limiting the amountof compensation by legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the
land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not
the Court of First Instance (CFI), that has jurisdiction over
theexpropriation cases. The Philippine Tourism Authority having
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, CebuCity Branch, an
amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1533,the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the
premises and directingthe issuance of writs of possession. The
Heirs of Ardona, et. al. then filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminaryinjunction before the Supreme Court
.Issue: Whether the expropriation of parcels of land for the
purpose of constructing a sports complex by thePhilippine
Tourism Authority be considered taking for ³public use.´
Held: The states power of eminent domain extends to the
expropriation of land for tourism purposes although thisspecific
objective is not expressed in the constitution. The policy
objectives of the framers can be expressed only ingeneral terms
such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony publicinterest, and general
welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these objectives
vary from time to time andaccording to place. To freeze specific
programs like tourism into express provisions would make the
constitutionmore prolix than bulky code and require of the framers
a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention
in the constitution of agrarian reform and transfer of utilities and
other private enterprises to publicownership merely underscores
the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by this
programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the
power of eminent domain for the purposes like tourism and other
development program
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
Facts: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as
the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of
which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by
President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners
contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due
process and equal protection since by their mere passage their
properties were automatically expropriated and they were
immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof
without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The
government on the other hand contends that the power of
eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature
or the President through his law-making powers exercises this
power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation
and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature
and the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures
adopted and the powers given to the NHA. The Tambunting
subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly
expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a
hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation is
instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing
of the decree.
No deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for
any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the
owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the
decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared
beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared
unconstitutional. Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar
now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. LTA that
the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be
taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly
recognized, leaving only as a judicial question whether in the
exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the
victim of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such
singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to
whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due
process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees
of the Constitution.
G.R. No. L-31814 January 31, 1973 RAYMUNDO Z.
FAMILARA vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., GREGORIO
ARANETA, INC., CITY ENGINEER PANTALEON TABORA OF
QUEZON CITY, ALL THE JUDGES PRESIDING OVER THE
VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE
AND CITY COURTS OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
An original action by the barrio captain of Barrio Tatalon, in his
own behalf and in representation of 1,500 "bona-fide" occupants
of the Tatalon Estate in Quezon City, to enjoin the respondent
Corporations, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Gregorio Araneta,
Inc., "from bulldozing and fencing any portion" of the Tatalon
Estate "and/or from selling" any of the lots therein, "and/or from
filing ejectment cases" against the "bona-fide" occupants of the
estate, the respondent City Engineer Quezon City from issuing
"building and fencing permits" to purchasers of lots within the
Tatalon Estate, and respondent City Sheriff of the same city from
"implementing writs of execution" or "orders of demolition" issued
against that occupants of the estate. The petitioner also seeks for
the issuance of an order to compel the presiding judges of the
Courts of First Instance and Courts of Quezon City to dismiss the
cases of accion publiciana or for ejectment filed by said
Corporation again the aforesaid occupants. This action is
predicated on the averment that on November 10, 1960, the Land
Tenure Administration was directed by the Executive Secretary to
initiate proceedings for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate.
Reliance is thus placed by petitioner upon the provisions of
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616. There is no averment
however in the petition that any expropriation proceedings has in
fact been actually instituted before the courts. In view of recent
developments, since the submission of this case, the parties were
required on November 24, 1972, to comment whether or not in
their view, the case has been rendered moot. In the comment of
respondent Gregorio Araneta, Inc. said party stated that, while a
"preliminary conference" has been held between the People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation and the respondent, on the
unsold lots within the Tatalon Estate, which may still be acquired
by the government for distribution to the bona-fide occupants
thereof pursuant to Republic Act No. 2616, said party "cannot
determine the outcome of the announced desire of the
Government to acquire said property pursuant to said law."
In the absence of any proceeding for expropriation instituted
before the courts, petitioner has clearly no cause of action. It is
true that Republic Act No. 2616, insofar as it expropriated
singularly a particular private property, had survived the challenge
of being discriminatory, and was declared free from constitutional
infirmity. 1 Nevertheless, this Court has also ruled that Section 4 2
thereof, which places a restraint upon the exercise and enjoyment
by the owner of certain rights over its property, is justifiable only if
the government takes possession of the land and is in a position
to make a coetaneous payment of just compensation to its owner.
3 There could not be any other way by which the validity of the
provision may be sustained. Definitely, to hold that the mere
declaration of an intention to expropriate, without instituting the
corresponding proceeding therefor before the courts, with
assurance of just compensation, would already preclude the
exercise by the owner of his rights of ownership over the land, or
bar the enforcement of any final ejectment order that the owner
may have obtained against any intruder into the land, is to
sanction an act which is indeed confiscatory and therefore
offensive to the Constitution. For it must be realized that in a
condemnation case, it is from the condemnor's taking possession
of the property that the owner is deprived of the benefits of
ownership, 4 such as possession, management and disposition
thereof. Before that time, the proprietary right of the owner over
his property must be recognized.
Actually, there should no longer be any doubt, on this matter. In a
series of cases previously passed upon by this Court, involving
the same private respondents and property, and occasioned by
the congressional approval of the same Republic Act No. 2616, it
was definitively ruled that until the proceedings for condemnation
have been fully instituted and possession of the property is taken
over by the condemnor, the enforcement of final decrees of
eviction may not be lawfully suspended. 5 Thus:
... the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit
of tenants can not, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the
condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment
or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and
executory judgments of ejectment have been obtained against the
occupants of the property. (Tuason and Co. Inc. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, L-18128, Dec. 26, 1961).
As heretofore adverted to nothing has been presented in the case
at bar, to show that an action for expropriation of the lots allegedly
occupied by the 1,500 persons named in Annex "A" of the petition
has actually been instituted and is being pursued by the
government, nor is there proof that the supposed appropriated
amount of P10,000,000.00, for the purchase of the Tatalon Estate
by the government, has been duly certified as available for that
purpose. Under such circumstances no valid ground has really
been established to restrict respondents' exercise of their
dominical rights over their property.
In view of the conclusion thus arrived at, We find it unnecessary
to pass upon the other issues raised by the respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs.
Footnotes
1 J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-
21064, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
2 "SEC. 4. After the expropriation proceedings mentioned in
section two of this Act shall have been initiated and during the
pendency of the same, no ejectment proceedings shall be
instituted or prosecuted against the present occupant of any lot in
said Tatalon Estate, and no ejectment proceedings already
commenced shall be continued, and such lot or any portion
thereof shall not be sold by the owners of said estate to any
person other than the present occupant without the consent of the
latter given in a public instrument."