secs 15 - 19

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/secs-15-19 1/15

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Art. III, Secs. 15 – 19)Lambda Epsi!" #i – $%O&E' C!ee ! La*

Section 15 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall NOT be suspended EXCEPT in cases ofinvasion or

rebellion when the public safety requires it.

1. Suspension of the privilege: seat and limits of the power under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. (p. 46!

Villavicencio v. Lukban (1919)

Its essentialobject and purpose “is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint asdistinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is

illegal.”

It was “devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful

restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further

rights of the parties are left untouched by decision of the writ, whose principal purpose is

to set the individual at liberty .”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

It isdefined as awrit directed to the persondetaining another,commanding him to produce the body of the

prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention,to do,submit to,

andreceive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.

Tan Me Nio v. Collector of Customs (1916)

From the very nature of the writ, a prime requisite for its availability isactual deprivation of personal liberty.

Caunca v. Salazar

Liberty may belost NOT by physical compulsion ALONE:“Freedom may be lost due to external and

moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an

imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if N! blindly obeyed, to any other

psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered

exercise of the will.

"f the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of

another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of #ustice A$ %&'( A$ the

individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress of physical coercion.”

PRIOR to the Philippine Bill, the legislative branch of the Philippine government enjoyedabsolute power

over the suspension of the writ.

Power toset at liberty any person arrested in pursuance to military orders wasdenied to all courts of

the Islands.

First Phil. Bill both guaranteed the right to writ and set limit to its availability.

Barcelon v. Baker (1905)

Facts: This was a petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus in favor of Felix Barcelon against 2 Constabulary

officers. The former was being detained in Batangas where the privilege of writ of habeas corpus had been

suspended by Governor-General by authority of Phil. Commission. The suspension was predicated on existence

of open insurrection in Cavite and Batangas. The existence of such disorder, however, was denied by petitioner.

Held: The SC in DENYING the petition, declared that “the conclusion set forth in the said resolutionand the said executive order, as to the fact that there existed in the )rovince of 'avite

and *atangas open insurrection against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion

entirely within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the +overnment,

after an investigation of the facts” and that “one branch of the &$ +overnment in the )hil."slands had N right to interfere of inquire into, for the purpose of N&"F-"N+ the same,

the discretionary acts of another independent department of the +ovt.”

17

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



Issue: Reviewability of the joint executive-legislative decision regarding the existence of factual situation, which

would warrant suspension.

Following strictly thedoctrine of separation of powers, theSC REFUSED to interfere with action of

political departments.

Phil. Autonomy Act

Change was made. TheGovernor-General was given authority to suspend the writwithout the joint action of

legislature and conversely, legislature was deprived of its role in the suspension of the writ. Thus, the law stood

until the adoption of1935 Constitution.

2 Provisions on the suspension of writ of habeas corpus in 1935 Constitution

1. Bill of Rights - guaranteed theavailability of the writ and set theground for suspension.

2. Executive Department - setgrounds for suspension and specified theseat of the power to suspend

Since the power to suspend belongs to the EXECUTIVE, it is the Executive who must at least initially

decide whether the ground for suspension exist.

2 OVERRULED cases: Whether the action of Executive should be subject to judicial review

Barcelon v. Baker(1905)NO. The validity of action taken by Governor General was a political question NOT subject to judicial review.

Montenegro v. Castañeda (1952)

NO. President Quirino suspended the privilege in 1950.SC reiterated the rule the question was political.

The case which OVERRULED “Barcelon” and “Montenegro”

Lansang v. Garcia (1971)

President Marcos suspended the privilege in 1971. SC said that for the validity of suspension of privilege, 2

CONDITIONS must concur:

1. There isinvasion, insurrection, rebellion, or imminent danger thereof;

2.That public safety requires the suspension.

Issue: The Presidential Proclamation stated that there was an actual state of rebellion and that “public safety

requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of

people and preserve the authority of State.” Was this finding made by President subject to judicial review?

Held: YES. But it UPHELD the validity of suspension.

The court was“unanimous in the conviction that it had the authority to inquire into the

existence of factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.”

SC OVERRULEDBarcelon case arguing thatBarcelon had relied chiefly onMartin v. Mott which invoked NOT the

power to suspend the privilege BUT the much broader power to call the militia.

The suspension inBarcelon was the act of “the American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of theSovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly be equated with that of the President of the

Philippines dealing with the freedom of Filipino people,in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom all

government authority emanates.”

Having disposed ofBarcelon, the Court also added that it had thereby disposed ofMontenegro v. Castañeda, which

“was based mainly upon the *arcelon case, and, hence, 'ANN! have more weight than the same.”

Since the power to suspend the privilege was surrounded byconstitutional limitations “li/e limitations andrestrictions imposed by Fundamental aw upon legislative department, adherence thereto and

compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.”

18

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



What are theses “proper bounds” on the power of courts?

Court first gavegeneral answer that its power was“merely to chec/ 0 N! to supplant 0 the

1xecutive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond constitutional limits of

his #urisdiction, NOT to exercise power vested in him or to determine wisdom of his

act.”

More specifically,the Court said that its power was NOT “even comparable with its power overcivil or criminal cases elevated thereto by appeal 2 in which cases the appellate

court has all the powers of the court of origin,” nor to its power over quasi-judicial

administrative decision where the Court is limited to asking whether “there is some evidentiary basis”

for the administrative finding.

Instead,the Courtaccepted the Solicitor General’s suggestion that it “go no further than to

satisfy itself N! that the )residents decision is correct and that public safety

was endangered by the rebellion and #ustified the suspension of the writ, *&! that in

suspending the writ, the )resident did N! act arbitrarily .”

“3e entertain 2 No doubts about the existence of a si4able group of men who have publiclyrisen in arms2 engaged in rebellion against the +overnment of the )hilippines.”

Baker v. Carr (1962)

Three faces of political question doctrine, each representing a way of approaching constitutional law problems:

1. Textual approach - “What does the letter of the constitution say?”

2. Functional approach - “Are we capable of resolving the problem posed?”

3. Prudential or political approach - “Whether there are overriding considerations which prevent the Court

from entering the thicket.”

In arriving at a “ political question” conclusion, SC had done so on a combination ofall three approaches.

1. Textual : When the law grants discretionary authority to a person to be exercised upon his opinion of

certain facts, he alone is judge of the existence of those facts.

2. Functional : The executive and legislative departments have the machinery for verifying the existence of

those facts whereas the courts do NOT.

3. Prudential : Interference by the courts in the decision can result in tying the hands of those charged with

maintaining order.

Montenegro v. Castañeda isnot doctrinally significant because it merely accepted and applied doctrine of

Barcelon.

Lansang v. Garcia, in reversingBarcelon, also took thetextual approach BUT arrived at an opposite

conclusion: Lansang concluded that discretion indeed had been granted to the Executive, but NOT

absolute discretion. However, aware of the inconveniences that a narrow textual approach could entail,

Lansang limited the review function of the Court to a very prudentially narrowtest of arbitrariness.

Padilla-Garcia v. Enrile (1983)

FoundBarcelon’s textual conclusion preferable and judged the test of arbitrariness inLansang both functionally

and prudentially naïve.

Factors which make Padilla’s textual approach stronger than the Barcelon arguments:

19

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



A.1973 Constitution had a textually broader source of constitutional power in that it made “imminent

danger” of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion sufficient ground for suspension of the privilege,

WHEREAS, thePhilippine Bill of 1902 didnot use the phrase “imminent danger”.

B.Barcelon involved the power delegated to acolonial governmentinferior in status to the power of a duly

elected President of an independent Republic.

". #ffe$t of the suspension of the privilege under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions (p.477!

Function of writ of habeas corpus – is to achieve immediate determination of the

legality of a detention.

Effect of suspension of privilege of writ – prevent courts, temporarily, from enquiring into the

legality of detention.

WON a person accused of an offense covered by the suspension is entitled release on bail

Nava v. Gatmaitan (1951)

J. Tuason – held the view that the suspension does NOT affect theright to bail argued thus:

“All persons detained for investigation by the Executive department are under

executive control. "t is where the Constitution tells the court to /eep their handsoff &N1$$ the cause of the detention be for an offense other than rebellion or

insurrection, which is another matter.

"f and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps

out. !he detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a #udicial concern.

!hereupon the corresponding court assumes its role and the #udicial process ta/es its

course to the exclusion of executive or the legislative departments. (enceforward,

the accused is entitled to demand all the constitutional safeguards and privileges

essential to due process.”

[Note:President Marcos himself accepted this argument based onwaiver: “%he disposal of the &od' of a$$used as

an' law'er will inform 'ou is now within the powers of the )%C of Ce&u and *+% within the powers of ,resident.-] – this

pronouncement appliesmutatis mutandis toPadilla andMorales.

Padilla-Garcia v. Enrile (1983)

Main opinion:“$uspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus %&$! carry with it the

suspension of right to bail, if governments campaign to suppress rebellion is to be

enhanced and rendered effective.”

Morales v. Enrile (1983)

Main opinion: “*ut because the privilege of writ of habeas corpus remains suspended 5withrespect to persons at present detained as well as others who may hereafter be similarly

detained for crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to

commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance

of or on occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith the natural

consequence is that the 6"+(! ! *A" for commission of anyone of said offenses is also

$&$)1N717. !o hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of suspension.”

3. Changes made &' the 197 Constitution (p.45!

Article VII Section 18

President may suspend privilege for NOT more than 60 days.

Congress is given power to REVOKE suspension andPresident may NOT set aside revocation.

Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may also EXTEND the suspension.

20

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



SC, upon initiative ofany citizen, may review the “sufficiency of factual basis” of suspension and

“must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from filing”. Citizen need NOT be taxpayer.

Scope of review power of SC in Lansang:“go N further than to satisfy itself N! that the

)residents decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and

#ustified the suspension of writ, but that in suspending the writ, the )resident did N! act

arbitrarily .”

Scope of review power of SC - NOW: power to determineexecutive arbitrariness in the manner of arriving at the

suspension AND “the sufficiency of the FA'!&A basis” of suspension. Court is empowered to determine

whetherin fact actual invasion and rebellion exists and whether public safety requires the suspension.

197 Constitutiondrops “insurrection” as ground for suspension.

Phrase “imminent danger” was fraught with possibilities of abuse. Limit grounds for suspension of

privilege to ACTUAL invasion and ACTUAL rebellion “when public safety requires it”.Article VII Section 18:

%he president shall &e the $ommander in $hief of all armed for$es of the ,hilippines and whenever it &e$omes ne$essar' he ma' $all su$harmed for$es to prevent or suppress lawless violen$e invasion or re&ellion.-

Scope ofsuspension severely limited by

Article VII Section 18: %he suspension of the privilege of the writ shall appl' +*/0 to

persons udi$iall' $harged for re&ellion or offenses inherent in or dire$tl' $onne$ted with invasion.-

1. The suspension can only validly affect “ persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses

inherent in or directly connected with invasion”.

2. Invasion itself is NOT a crime; but crimes may arise during invasion –Title I Book II of RPC.

3. Person, to lose privilege must be “JUDICIALLY CHARGED”. It isnot enough that a complaint is

under investigation by fiscal or that a charge has been filed before the fiscal’s office; it is

necessary that criminal charge has been filed IN COURT.

4. Section 18 adds: “2uring the suspension of the privilege of the writ an' person thus arrested or detained shall &e udi$iall'

$harged within 3 days otherwise he shall &e released.”

General purpose of requiring a judicial charge: “… to prevent a situation similar to past regime when

innocent persons were arrested, detained and confined in prison sometimes for 1 month, 1 year, or evenmore, without any criminal charge filed against them who oftentimes did NOT even understand why

they had been arrested or detained.”

“Suspension of privilege will NOT apply until they are placed in custody of a JUDICIAL officer… to

preserve life of detained person.”

SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE DOESNOT SUSPENDRIGHT TO BAIL!

Section 16 All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-

judicial, or administrative bodies.

1. Speed' disposition of $ases (p. 49!

“Justice delayed is justice denied.”

First introduced as Section 16, Article IV of 1973 Constitution.

Covers period BEFORE, DURING, and AFTER trial.

Applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.

“SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES”

Its concept, like “speedy trial” is arelative term and must be a flexible concept. It is consistent withreasonable

delay.

21

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



Factors to consider:

1. Length of delay

2. Reason for the delay

3. Assertion of right or failure to assert it

4. Prejudice caused by the delay

Padua v. Ericta (1988)“!he desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should N!, if possible, result in

precipitate loss of a partys right to present evidence and either in plaintiffs being non0

suited or the defendants being pronounced liable under an ex parte #udgment.”

Harmful speed

Magat v. CA(1982)

Accused was charged at4:30 p.m. and by11:35 the next morning he already had his due process – and a

conviction!

UnderMartial Law decree, crimes against tourists had to be disposed of by courts within24 hours.SC said it

wasenough that the accused had ample opportunity to confer with counsel during cross-examination and after

the prosecution had rested its case the night before.

Section 17No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

1. Selfin$rimination (p. 49!

Whether or not Spanish law in the Philippines allowed self-incrimination

US v. Navarro(1904)

Majority: YES.

J. Mapa: NO.

Justification of guarantee: “IT was established on grounds of public policy andhumanity: Of POLICY, because, if

the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit perjury;

and of HUMANITY, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.”

US v. Tan Teng (1912)

“Themain purpose of the provision … is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before the trial, or

upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confession or declarations implicating them in the commission

of a crime.”

(provision on duress however has been place together with the rules on custodial investigation in Section 12)

US v. Junio (1910)

Under the right against self-incrimination, the accused may NOT be compelled to take the witness stand.

Note: Amere witness who is NOT an accused, in order to avail himself of his right, must await theincriminatingquestion; the ACCUSED, however, mayrefuse to be a witness altogether. Recent jurisprudence has extended this

right of accused to respondents inadministrative investigations partaking of the nature of a criminal proceeding

or analogous to acriminal proceeding.

Cabal v. Kapunan (1962)

The proceeding for forfeiture of property under Anti-Graft Law was deemedcriminal and respondent was

accorded the right to refuse to take the witness stand.

Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners (1969)

22

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



Respondent in anadministrative investigation for immorality and malpractice wasaccorded a similar right since

the revocation of his license, as a medical practitioner could even be a more serious deprivation than forfeiture

of property.

The guaranty does NOT prohibit every form of preliminary investigation.

People v. Badilla (1926)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION “is often the only means of discovering the persons who may bereasonably charged with a crime so as to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or

information. "n one form or another, similar investigations are permitted under all systems

of procedure.”

Gonzales v. Secretary of Labor (1954)

Nor does the guarantee prohibit a party litigant from using his adversary as a witness when the case is NOT a

criminal case where the intendedwitness is the accused himself.

Thetime to raise the privilege ( for persons other than the accused) is when anincriminating question is asked.

To violate this right, it is NOT necessary that a categorical admission of a specific offense be sought.

Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg (1953)“'hief 8ustice %arshall explained that usually a crime or a criminal act may contain two or

more elements and that a question would have a tendency to incriminate, even if it tends to

elicit only one of said elements.”

Fernando v. Maglanoc (1954)

The right thus includes a “right to refuse to testify to a fact which would be a necessary lin!

in a chain of evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a witness.”

What is prohibited is use of PHYSICAL or MORAL compulsion to extort communication from the witness, NOT an

inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.

US v. Tan Teng (1912)

Substance emitting from the body of defendant was received as evidence in a prosecution for acts of

lasciviousness.

People v. Tranca(1994)

Subjection to ultra-violet examination is allowed.

People v. Gamboa (1991)

So is paraffin test.

US v. Ong Siu Hong (1917)

Morphine forced out of the mouth of accused was received.

People v. Otadora (1950)

An order by judge for the witness to put on a pair of pants for size was allowed.

Villaflor v. Summers (1920)

“Kernel of privilege” was the prohibition of “testimonial compulsion,” the Court was even willing tocompel a

woman accused of adultery to submit to the indignity of beingtested for pregnancy. This harsh rule was justified

by J. Malcolm: “N rule is intended to be so rigid as to embarrass the administration of

#ustice in its endeavor to ascertain the truth.”

23

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



SC added: “3e must enforce constitutional provision 2 undeterred by merely sentimental

influences.” The only proviso imposed was that “torture or force should be avoided.”

Rule on permissibility of requiring a witness to write in order to furnish a sample of his HANDWRITING

Beltran v. Samson (1929)

Since witnesses in a preliminary investigation are protected by the prohibition, they may NOT be compelled to

take a dictation in order to compare their handwriting with that found in a supposedly falsified document.

“… writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is NOT a purely

mechanical act because it requires the application ofintelligence andattention…

… there is similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to

furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for inboth cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence

against himself.

… here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,evidence which does

NOT exist…”

Note: When a personvoluntarily answers an incriminating question, he is deemed to havewaived his right. After

accused has pleaded guilty, for the purpose of ascertaining the proper penalty to be imposed or for any other

legal purposes, the courtmay properly ask such questions as are necessary to that end.

US v. Binayoh (1916)

By this plea of guilty, he is deemed to havewaived his right “to the extent, at least of N! allowinghim subsequently to claim error by reason of such questions or answers thereto2”

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)

If the witness has insisted that the transaction which is the subject of investigation was completelylegal, there

isNO basis upon which to sustain the claim that to reveal the name of a party to the transaction might be

incriminating. Besides, it is thecourts whichdetermine whether or not a question is in fact incriminating.

Isabela Sugar Co. v. Macadaeg (1953)

An invariable answer of “I do NOT remember” isequivalent torefusal to answer and does NOT constitute waiver.

Bermudez v. Castillo

It was contended that since the witness had denied that the documents in question were in herhandwriting, she

should be deemed to havewaived her right by such denial and could therefore be required to produce a sample

of her handwriting.

MAJORITY, however, believed that mere denial, which discloses nothing, does NOT constitute waiver.Laurel, in

his concurrence, added that since there was authority to support both positions: “!he provisions should be

construed with utmost liberality in favor of right of individual intended to be secured.”

The privilege can be rendered meaningless if silence of witness may be used against him.

US v. Lim Buanco (1909)

Refusal of an accused to be a witness or of a witness to answer should in NO manner be used against them.

US v. Sarikala (1918)

This rule does NOT prohibit anunfavorable inference form failure of one party to produce evidence that is inhis

control.

24

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



". 2o$uments and re$ords (p. 495!

Phil. jurisprudence prior toStonehill v. Diokno (1967) had linked the inadmissibility of illegally

obtained evidence with theself-incrimination clause.

Boyd v. US

“Acompulsory production of private books and papers of the owner… iscompelling him to be a witness againsthimself, within the meaning of 5th Amendment.”

SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE COVERS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

Bache & Co. v. Ruiz (1971)

Unlike the search and seizure clause which protectsboth natural persons and corporations…

US v. White (1944)

… the privilege against self-incrimination “is a personal one, applyingonly to natural individuals.”

Hale v. Henkel(1906)

A corporation may be compelled to submit to thevisitorial powers of the state even if this results indisclosure ofcriminal acts of corporation.

Wilson v. US

Acorporate officer may NOT prevent the production of corporate papers on the ground that they may incriminate

him personally, (for in such a situation it would NOT be a case the officer incriminating himself but he

corporation incriminating him.)

Self-incrimination clause protects private papers of a natural individual, is NOT without exception.

Shapiro v. US (1948)

The case arose out of a prosecution for violation of regulations made under the Emergency Price Control Act of

1942. When defendant’s records, which he was required to keep by the Office of Price Administration, were

ordered produced, defendant claimed protection by the constitutional privilege.

The high tribunal RULED that “the privilege which exists as to private papers 'ANN! be

maintained in relation to 5records re"uired by law to be !ept in order that there may be

suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental

regulation and the enforcement of restrictions validly established#”

US v. Sullivan (1927)

Court REJECTED a taxpayer’s claim that the requirement of anincome tax return was incriminating because the

completed return would show his criminal gains and a blank return would invite the curiosity of investigators.

Kimpo v. Sandiganbayan (1995)

Court ACCEPTED inofficial forms which an accountable public officer was required to keep.

Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board (1965)

In more recent cases, however, theUS-SC has struck down certain registration requirements that presented real

and appreciable risk ofself-incrimination. These involved statutes directed at inherently suspect groups in areas

permeated by criminal statutes, a circumstance which laid thesubjects open to real risk of self-incrimination.

Section 18 (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall

have been duly convicted.

25

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



1. reedom of politi$al &elief (p. 497!

Section 18(1) was authored byCommissioner Jose Nolledo.

IT does NOT add anything substantive to due process clause, nor to the guarantee of freedom of

speech, press, and expression in Section 4.

". nvoluntar' servitude (p. 497!

“Slavery” was ‘devoid of historical significance in our country.’

Rubi v. Provincial Board (1919)“$lavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, )1NA+1, all denote 5a

condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another#

Hodges v. US (1906)

It has been applied toany servitude in factinvoluntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have

been disguised.”

In re Brooks (1901)

The first case oninvoluntary servitude involved an American soldier who had been given an absolute discharge

from the Army and who subsequently entered into a work contract with the Army. Refusing to perform the

service promised, he was detained for deportation.

Upon petition for release on a writ of habeas corpus,SC said:“2 "nasmuch as a private person whocontracts obligations of this sort toward the Army 'ANN!, by any law2 be compelled to

fulfill them by imprisonment and deportation from his place of residence, we deem it wholly

improper to sustain such means of compulsion which are N! #ustified either by law or by

contract.”

US v. Cabanag

While the constitutional prohibition operated to nullify agreements violative of it, suppletory legislation was

required to give the prohibition penal effect..

De los Reyes v. Alojado (1910)

“Domestic services are always to be remunerated, and NO agreement may subsist in law in which it is stipulatedthat any domestic service shall beabsolutely gratuitous, UNLESS it be admitted thatslavery may be established

in this country through acovenant entered into between interested parties.”

Kaisahan v. Gotamco Sawmills (1948)

Section 19 of Commonwealth Act 103, which authorized a judicial return-to-work order in labor disputes, was

challenged as being in contravention of the Constitution.

TheCourt rebuffed the challenge and argued:“An employee entering into a contract of employment

after said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those

prescribed in said section 9:2.!he voluntariness of the employees entering into it or not ;

with such implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing2”

[Whether employees who entered into contracts prior to Commonwealth Act 103 could have been made subject to return-to- work orders? No answer.]

Sarmiento v. Tuico (1988)

A person who refuses to follow a return to work order, while he can be dismissed from his job, CANNOT be

imprisoned for so doing.

Aclaracion v. Gatmaitan (1975)

Court concluded that a former court stenographer may becompelled under pain ofcontempt to transcribe

stenographic notes he had failed to attend towhile still in service. Such compulsion is NOT the “condition of

26

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



enforced, compulsory service” referred to by the Constitution. And the former stenographer did reluctantly

agree to do the transcription during his spare time.

J. Fernando in concurrence: The matter could becometricky should a stenographerstubbornly refuse to obey and

the court insist on keeping him in jail. The detention could then become punitive and could give rise to theissue

of involuntary servitude.

Section 19 (1)Excessive fines shall NOT be imposed, NORcruel, degrading orinhuman punishment inflicted.Neither shalldeath penalty be imposed,unless, forcompelling reasons involvingheinous crimes, theCongress

hereafter provides for it. Anydeath penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, ordegrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee, or the

use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

1. Cruel degrading or inhuman punishment e8$essive fines. (p. 51!

1935 Constitution: “Excessive fines shall NOT be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”

1973 Constitution: “cruelor unusual punishment.”

Const’l. limit must be reckoned on basis of nature and mode of punishment measured in terms of physical pain

Legarda v. Valdez(1902)

“CRUEL and UNUSUAL” embodied an inseparable pair:“!o be prohibited by this provision the

punishment must N! N- be unusual *&! it must also be cruel. !here is N reason why

unusual punishments, which were N! cruel, should have been prohibited. "f that had been

done it would have been impossible to change the punishments that existed when the

'onstitution was adopted. A law which changes a penalty so as to ma/e it less severe would

be unconstitutional if the new penalty were an unusual one.”

“)unishments are CRUEL when they involve torture or a lingering death< but the punishment of

death is N! cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the 'onstitution. "t implies

there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishments of

life.”

Represented the next step in understanding of phrase

Weems v. US

Weems was convicted of falsification of an official and public document and was sentenced to 15 years ofcadena

temporal together with the accessory penalties of civil interdiction, perpetual absolute disqualification, and

subjection to surveillance during life.

CADENA, in the SC’s translation of the Spanish code, meant“… labor for the benet of the state. They shall

always carry chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrist; they shall be employed at hard and painful labor,and shall receive N assistance whatsoever from without the institution!

The penalty, the Court said, “has N fellow in American legislation. "t is cruel in its excess ofimprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. "t is unusual in

character. "ts punishments come under the condemnation of the *ill of 6ights, both on

account of their degree and /ind2”

US v. Pico(1911)“!here is N!("N+ in the decision in that case which would justify the inference that the

court was of the opinion that imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for life or for long

term of years followed by the life surveillance of discharged convict, is to be regarded as

cruel and unusual punishment when prescribed for such crimes as treason, parricide,

assassination, and other heinous offenses, or even for less grave offenses when they are

mar/ed by attendant circumstances which, in the sound discretion of legislature, justify and

necessitate the imposition of extraordinary harsh penalties to secure their repression.”

27

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



A penalty may be declared unconstitutional on the basissolely ofglaring disproportion between

punishment andcrime.

People v. Estoista (1953)

An “excessive” penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with recommendation for executive

clemency.Tuason said: “!he constitutionality of an act of legislature is N! to be #udged inthe light of exceptional cases.”

SC: “!o come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,”“wholly disproportionate to the nature of offense as to shoc/ the moral sense of the

community.”

". &olition of death penalt'. (p. 57!

Automatic review of capital cases found in Article X, Sec. 5(2)1973 Constitution was an implicit affirmation that

capital punishment was NOT PER SE constitutionally objectionable.

The matter should be left to legislative discretion.

Furman v. Giorgia (1972)

US-SC ruled thatdeath penalty as it existed in Georgia was UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Only Justices Brennan and Marshall considered death penalty unconstitutional per se.

Brennan’s 4 Basic Principles for judging severe punishment:

1. A punishment must NOT be so severe as to bedegrading to the dignity of human beings.

2. It must NOT be appliedarbitrarily.

3. It must NOT be unacceptable tocontemporary society.

4.It must NOT beexcessive, i.e., it must serve a penal purpose more effectively than a less severe

punishment would.

He said that a punishment may be deemed cruel and unusual for any of4 reasons:

1. There are certain punishments, whichinherently involve so much pain, and suffering that civilizedpeople CANNOT tolerate them,e.g., the rack, the thumbscrew, torture.

2. There areunusual punishments in the sense of being previously unknown for a given offense.

3. A penalty may be cruel and unusual because it isexcessive and serves NO legislative purpose.

4. Finally, a punishment that is NOT excessive and possessing a legislative purpose may nevertheless be

INVALID if popular sentiment abhors it.

Commissioner Bernas summed up thereasons which persuaded the Bill of Rights Committee to propose the

abolition of capital punishment:

1. Capital punishment is inhuman because its imposition, even if NOT carried out,traumatizes NOT ONLY

the convict but also the members of his family;

2. There is NO solid evidence to show that thedeath penalty has served aseffective deterrent against the

commission of serious offenses; hence, life must NOT be destroyed just on the mere hope that

extinguishing life will save other lives;3. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is justtoo presumptuous for any human;

4. The fact that the death penalty is an old institution should NOT be allowed to become an obstacle to

reviewing it becausehuman life is more valuable than institutions designed to save human life.

The people through initiative and referendum may reimpose death penalty. Congress may

reimpose it “for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes”.

The phrase “shall be reduced” is NOT a description of some future act but a command that is

immediately effective.

28

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



When the death penalty CANNOT be imposed because of the constitutional ban, what becomes of the 3 grades into

which a penalty is divided where the maximum penalty is death?

People v. Guevara (1987)

The Court resolved the problem saying that the penalty isreduced to 2 grades only.

3. Custodial $ruelties and inadeuate penal fa$ilities. (p. 59!

Sec. 19(1) : speaks of punishment which, if embodied in a penal law, render theentire law invalid.

Sec. 19(2) : concerns itself NOT with the validity of a penal law BUT with themanner of treating prisoners

in detention.

Commissioner Maambong:“2 shoc/ing to the conscience of reasonably civili4ed people. ife,safety and health of human beings are at sta/e2 Facilities of the penitentiary should be

brought up to a level of constitutional tolerability%.”

The provision embodiesconstitutionalauthorization for theCommission of Human Rights to take action in

accordance with Article XIII, Section 18.

Parallel with Article III, Section 12(4), there is a command addressed to Congress to pass whatever civil or penallegislation might be required for the subject.

Section 20 No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

1. mprisonment for de&t. (p.511!

First extended to the Phil. byPhil. Bill of 1902.

Tan Cong v. Stewart (1907)

“What is DEBT?

InWebster+s I"ter"ati!"a $icti!"ar “debt” is defined as “that which is due from one person to another, whether

money, goods, or services; that which one person is bound to pay to another, or to perform for his benefit; thing owed;obligation; liability.”

Ina*, it is “an action to recover a certain specific sum of money alleged to be due.”

-!/ier, in his law dictionary, defines it as “aterm used in bookkeeping to express the left-hand page of the ledger of

an account to which are carried all of the articles supplied or amounts paid on the subject of an account or which arecharged to that account; the balance of an account where it shows that something remains due to the party keeping theaccount.”

-ac0 , in his law dictionary, defines debt as “a sum of money due by a certain and express agreement” or as “a sum of

money due by a contract.”

TheSC ! Ii"!is … in defining the meaning of the word “debt” as used in the constitution said: “hat any

liability to pay money growing out of a contract, express or implied, constitute a debt within the meaning of this provision of the constitution.”

Fist case which may be classed as one on imprisonment for debt., which actually pre-dated Phil. Bill.

In re Prautch (1902) AtISSUE was the application of Article 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure to a contractual litigation. This article

authorized the arrest of a defendant in certain types of civil cases. The article was challenged NOT as

authorizing imprisonment of debt BUT as authorizing impairment of obligation of contract.

HELD: “… right to imprison for debt is NOT part of contract .. If theright to imprison for debt is NOT part of

contract,the converse of proposition is also true, that theright to exemption from imprisonment for debt does NOT

from part of contract …”

29

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



“Such statutes are regarded as penal rather than remedial. They are enacted to prevent fraud in the making of

contracts, or to prevent the subsequent fraudulent conduct of parties with reference to their obligation and are

properly invoked as punishment for dishonesty.”

What the provision does NOT prohibit

Ramirez v. Orozco (1916)

Ramirez had requested Santos to pay themunicipal treasurer the sum ofP16 owed by him for unpaid cedulas on

the promise to render personal service to Santos in payment for the sum. Once in possession of his cedulas,

Ramirezrefused to render the promised service. Prosecuted underSection 1 of Act No 2098 of Phil. Legislature,

which described a certain form ofestafa, Ramirez wasconvicted andimprisoned.

Upon demand for release on ahabeas corpus petition, theCourt answered that the incarceration was NEITHER

imprisonment for debt NOR involuntary servitude BUT merely a penalty forcrime of estafa.

In re Tamboco(1917)

The obligation incurred by debtor was to pay anordinary contractual obligation. Guardianship proceeding,

moreover, was civil in nature. The COURT did NOT allow enforcement of civil obligation by an order of

imprisonment.

Freeman v. US (1910)

Freeman, having been convicted of embezzlement, was ordered to refund the amount embezzled or suffer

subsidiary imprisonment. Answering the objection that such subsidiary imprisonment amounted to prohibited

imprisonment for debt The Court said:”$tatutes relieving from imprisonment for debt were N!intended to ta/e away right to enforce criminal statutes and punish wrongful embe44lement or

conversions of money2. the money payment was part of punishment, and was N! imposed as an

imprisonment for nonpayment of debt regardless of the criminal offense committed 2”

NO person may beimprisoned for debt in virtue of an order in acivil proceeding, either as asubstitute for

satisfaction of a debt or as ameans of compelling satisfaction; BUT a person may beimprisoned a s a

penalty for acrime arising from acontractual debt and imposed in a propercriminal proceeding.

Ajeno v. Judge Inserto (1976)

Thus, the conversion of a criminal fine into a prison term does NOT violate the provision because in such a case

imprisonment is imposed for a monetary obligation arising NOTex contractu BUTex delicto.

Whether the constitutional prohibition applies to fraudulent debts.

Ganaway v. Quillen (1922)

The case was acivil case and atissue was Article 412 of Code of Civil Procedure already litigated and upheld inIn

re Prautch. Art. 412 reads thus:

“A defendant may be arrested in the following cases=

9. "n an action for the recovery of money or damages on a cause of action arising upon

contract, express or implied, when the defendant is about to depart from the )hil.

"slands with intent to defraud his creditors.

>. "n an action for money or property embe&&led in the course of his employment or for

willfully violating his duty .

?. "n an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly detained , when

the property or any part thereof has been concealed, removed, or disposed of to

prevent its being found or ta/en by the officer.

@. 3hen the defendant has been guilty of fraud in contracting a debt or incurring the

obligation upon which the action is brought< or in concealing or disposing of the

property for the ta/ing, detention or conversion of which the action is brought.

. 3hen the defendant has removed or disposed of his property or is about to do so,

with intent to defraud his creditors.”

30

8/12/2019 secs 15 - 19



2 important observations made by SC:

1. Code of Civil Procedure took effect on October 1, 1901, that is, prior to the enactment of Phil. Bill 1902;

". Constitution of Phil., unlike some States in American Union makesNO exception in cases of fraud. The

prohibition in Phil. Bill, reproduced in Jones Law, is that ‘NO person shall be imprisoned for debt.’

1973 Constitution copied1935 provision. So has the1987 Constitution. And jurisprudence onthe subject has NOT changed. Delegate Laurel, insisted on the retention of existing ABSOLUTE

prohibition as explained inGanaway v. Quillen.

". *onpa'ment of poll ta8 (p. 517!

POLL TAX or a CEDULA TAX

- is acapitation tax imposed onall persons of acertain age. At present, it is tax one pays forresidence

certificate, which serves as personal identification instrument.

- “NOT progressive” and “antiquated”

*Prior to1935 Constitution, imprisonment for nonpayment of poll tax was AUTHORIZED under Revised

Administrative Code.

People v. Linsangan (1935)

The ONLY case on poll tax so far,held that under the1935 Constitution, NOconviction could be based on such

provision of Administrative Code.

* Article V Section 1 of Phil. Constitution when it prohibits the imposition of “literacy, property, or other substantive

requirement” on exercise ofright of suffrage can be read as a prohibition of poll tax imposed as prerequisite for

voting. This prohibition first appeared in Article IV, Section 1 of 1973 Constitution and has been carried into the

1987 Constitution.

31

secs 15 - 19

Documents