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Emerging Market Corporate Bonds An Evolving Asset Class

ASSET MANAGEMENT

Source: Credit Suisse. Data as at 31.07.2017

Market size of emerging marketcorporate universe has surpassed US high yield

Attractive yield pickupversus developed markets

1.11: Sharpe ratio of emerging market corporate bonds since 31.12.2010

Emerging market share of world GDP in PPP terms expected to exceed 60% by 2020

Emerging market universe offers broad exposure to corporates from over 50 countries

2/20Credit Suisse Asset Management | Emerging Market Corporate Bonds

An introduction to emerging market corporate bondsEmerging markets have come a long way over the past 20 years, undergoing major economic and structural changes. Their growing importance is reflected in their increasing share of global GDP. However, the general perception of emerging markets still lags the economic importance and fundamental devel-opments these markets have seen.

According to the International Monetary Fund, emerging markets will continue to increase their share of global GDP in the coming years. And with developed markets’ relatively high debt to GDP levels and lower growth rates, investors with little or no allocation to emerging markets need to reconsider their posi-tions.

At the same time as economic developments, there have been major strides in the financial markets – nowhere more so than in emerging market corporate bonds. Rapid growth and growing investor acceptance has seen emerging market corporate bonds turn into a distinct and diverse asset class filled with broad and attractive opportunities.

In this paper, we take a look at the history of emerging markets and the development of their debt markets. We analyze how the bond markets have changed, from a sovereign debt led one to one where corporate bonds are now at the forefront. We also examine in detail the changing risk/return profile of corporate bonds and their correlation to other asset classes.

We hope this brochure provides an interesting introduction to the exciting opportunities that can be found in emerging market corporate bonds.

Foreword

Contents

Foreword 3

Emerging Markets – a Brief History 4

Emerging Market Debt 5

Emerging Market Corporate Bonds – an Attractive Composition 7

Risk/Return Figures 11

Fundamentals 16

Case Studies 17

Why Invest? 19

Contacts 19


Emerging Markets – a Brief History

The term “emerging markets” was initially coined by Antoine van Agtmael in 1981 when he was working as an economist at the International Financial Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank.1 In the early 1980s these countries where usually referred to as “developing” or “third world” – a term with negative connotations for many people. By contrast, “emerging markets” was thought to create a positive and more aspirational image. Since the term was first used, many of these countries have undergone significant economic development and it is clear that today the term’s usefulness to group these countries together is limited. Fundamental differences between emerging markets can be far ranging, from net commodity importers to exporters and current account deficits to surpluses. There is no single definition of what qualifies a country as an emerging market. For investors it therefore becomes vital to understand which single country exposures underlying indices have.

Learning from crisesIn the 1990s, as they opened their markets to the outside world, emerging markets were hit by several crises. The most notable were the Mexican (1994), Asian (1997), Russian (1998) and Argentine (2001) crises.

In general there are three vulnerabilities that can trigger a crisis:2 1) A significantly misaligned exchange rate2) Balance sheet problems in the form of nonperforming loans 3) Balance sheet problems in the form of mismatched exposures

(maturity and/or currency)

The abovementioned crises were triggered by at least one of these factors. One advantage was the lasting impact they had on many emerging countries, particularly in the way they managed their exchange rates, current account balances, foreign exchange reserves and foreign currency denominated debt. As a result, they are now much better placed to manage adverse economic conditions and capital outflows.

Riding the globalization waveThe sharp rise in globalization and world trade since the start of the 1990s increased the importance of emerging economies for the Western world and global GDP growth, with world export volumes almost tripling since then. The rising importance of emerging economies is reflected in their increasing share of world GDP. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) shows that emerging and developing economies’ share of GDP (based on purchasing power parity) surpassed 50% for the first time in 2008, as can be seen in Figure 1. 2016 data already shows this having increased to 58% – a trend that the IMF expects to con-tinue. This increase reflects the overall higher GDP growth rates of these economies relative to their developed counterparts.

In our opinion, the general perception of emerging markets still lags their economic importance and the fundamental develop-ments seen in these markets over the last 20 years. GDP share itself is of course not the perfect indicator of what an ideal al-location to emerging markets should be. Nevertheless, investors with a relatively low allocation to emerging markets should at least question if this stance is still justified.

Lessons learnt from past crises have left emerging markets much better placed to manage adverse conditions and economic shocks. At the same time, globalization and world trade has increased the importance of these markets to the point that investors can no longer ignore them.

Figure 1: Disparity in share of GDP set to grow further

1 Kynge and Wheatley, 2015.2 Dornbusch, 2001.

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. Data as at 30.04.2017

303540455055606570

1980 1988 1996 2004 2012 2020

Disparity in share of GDP (PPP measure) set to grow further

Advanced economiesEmerging market and developing economies


Emerging Market Debt

In the 1970s there was no market for emerging market debt (EMD), with mainly multinational banks in the US and Europe being active lenders to developing countries, particularly to Latin America. EMD as a trading market began shortly after the Latin American debt crisis in 1982, when Mexico was unable to service its debt to US commercial banks and other creditors. Other coun-tries soon followed, with the four largest (Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina) owing commercial banks USD 176 billion – ap-proximately 74% of the total outstanding LDC (less developed country) debt market.3 Smaller commercial banks in particular wanted to sell their nonperforming LDC loans to reduce exposure and this started a small secondary market for LDC debt.

The Brady PlanA key development for EMD was the Brady Plan in 1989-90, which allowed countries to restructure their debt. Subjected to a “haircut” (i.e. lower interest rate or face value), loans were converted into more tradable instruments (Brady bonds) with the principal amount usually collateralized by specially issued US Treasury 30-year zero-coupon bonds. This let commercial banks reduce the debt on their balance sheet and allowed sovereign risk to be diversified away from banks. The newly created Brady bonds had larger issue sizes, improving liquidity and trading in the sec-ondary market. The plan was also successful in initiating economic reforms in many countries, leading to their subsequent access to international capital markets. While trading in Brady bonds made up over 60% of EMD trading in 1994, most of these bonds have

since been exchanged or bought back.4 The issuance of Brady bonds also led to the launch of USD-denominated emerging market sovereign indices in the early 1990s (JP Morgan EMBI), with emerging market local and corporate indices following in the early 2000s.

From sovereign to corporateInitially, sovereign EMD was predominately a USD-denominated market as international investors did not want to take on emerging market currency risk. However, as fundamentals and credit rat-ings improved, more and more countries were able to issue local currency denominated debt. An analysis by Moody’s shows that between 2000 and 2014, local currency sovereign debt outstand-ing grew on average by 14.4% each year compared to an annual growth rate of 2.3% for foreign currency debt.5 This allowed coun-tries to reduce their foreign currency denominated debt, one of the key vulnerabilities during previous crises. Additionally, countries were also able to reduce maturity mismatches.

Today, the market for local currency denominated sovereign EMD is much bigger than for USD-denominated sovereign EMD. Figure 2 takes a closer look at EMD denominated in US dollars or euros. We can see that the amount of outstanding corporate bonds surpassed sovereign bonds in 2008. The size of investment grade rated corporate EMD market is now larger than the entire hard currency sovereign EMD market.

3 Wellons, 1987.4 Trade Association for the Emerging Markets, 2015.5 Moody’s Investor Services, 2015.

Dec 98 Dec 00 Dec 02 Dec 04 Dec 06 Dec 08 Dec 10 Dec 12 Dec 14 Dec 16

USD/EUR denominated EMD has seen substantial growth

In U

SD

bn

EM corporates EM IG corporates EM HY corporates EM sovereigns

0200400600800

1,0001,2001,4001,600

Figure 2: USD-/EUR-denominated EMD has seen substantial growth

Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Data as at 31.07.2017


6 J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, 2017.The shown yield to maturity is calculated as of 31.07.2017 and does not take into account costs, changes in the portfolio, market fluctuations and potential defaults. The yield to maturity is an indication only and is subject to change.

Figure 3: USD-/EUR-denominated EMD growth relative to other markets

Dec 98 Dec 02 Dec 06 Dec 10 Dec 14

In U

SD

bn

EM corporates

EM sovereigns

EM corporates and sovereigns

US IG

US HY

EU IG

EU HY

USD/EUR denominated EMD growth relative to other markets

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500


Figure 4: Characteristics of key emerging market indices6

GBI-EM GD EMBI GD CEMBI BD

Yield to maturity 6.09% 5.32% 5.04%

Duration 5.06 6.76 4.85

Rating (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch)

Baa2 / BBB / BBB

Ba1 / BB+ / BB+

Baa3 / BBB– / BBB–

Currency risk EM exposure USD only USD only

Number of issuers

18 146 572

Number of instruments

217 616 1253

Number of countries

18 66 52

GBI-EM GD: JP Morgan Government Bond Index – Emerging Market Global DiversifiedEMBI GD: JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index Global DiversifiedCEMBI BD: JP Morgan Corporate Emerging Markets Bond Index Broad Diversified

Source: JP Morgan. Data as at 31.07.2017

The last decade has seen the corporate EMD market grow by 17% per year. To put this into perspective, it is now larger in size than the US high yield market, while outstanding corporate and sovereign EMD combined also surpasses the EUR investment grade universe.

US dollars or local currency?Today, the most important choice for investors when investing in emerging markets is to choose between USD-denominated and local currency denominated debt. Local currency debt has a very different risk profile as its volatility tends to be substantially higher due to the currency exposure. Within USD-denominated bonds, most institutional investors have historically allocated their exposure to sovereign indices. While this clearly made sense from a histori-cal perspective given the size of the USD-denominated sovereign bond market, the strong growth in USD-denominated corporate EMD, coupled with emerging market governments’ preference to issue local debt is changing the landscape. The USD-denominated corporate EMD market now exceeds its sovereign equivalent.

More than just a nicheThe substantial growth for corporate EMD has only been made possible by the improving fundamentals and better ratings of many emerging economies since the start of this millennium. The increased interest and confidence of international investors to invest in emerging markets has helped transform corporate EMD from a niche into a mature, diverse and stand-alone asset class, allowing investors to diversify existing traditional fixed income allocations and offering additional opportunities for investors that only hold sovereign EMD. A robust corporate bond market is in the interest of emerging economies as it helps reduce reliance on bank financing and leads to improved diversification of funding sources.

The corporate EMD market has been transformed from a niche into a mature, diverse and stand-alone asset class.”

“


Emerging Market Corporate Bonds – an Attractive Composition

Corporate bonds offer an exciting and potentially lucrative way to gain access to emerging markets. Maturity of the asset class and improved diversification has significantly helped reduce risks, while regulatory developments and an increased focus on investors have also been positive factors.

Market development and characteristicsEmerging market debt was only formally introduced in this mil-lennium. The basis for today’s most widely followed index was introduced in November 2007 when JP Morgan launched its Corporate Emerging Markets Bond Index (CEMBI) series. Histori-cal data and statistics for these indices date back to December 2001. As can be seen from the charts that follow, the composition has changed substantially since its launch, reflecting the growth and development of the asset class. The following tables show the different characteristics of the JP Morgan CEMBI Diversified at launch compared to the JP Morgan CEMBI Broad Diversi-fied today. The latter is now the most widely used index to track corporate EMD. The substantial improvement in diversification is of particular note.

Region and country allocationThe regional allocation has changed, particularly with regard to the Middle East and Africa, as initially only corporates from Israel and Egypt were in the index. The Middle East and Africa now represent 17.2% and 6.5% respectively, while allocations to other regions, particularly Europe, are lower.

Country diversification has also increased significantly, with 54 (up from 16) countries now represented in the index. In 2007, the top five countries made up almost 70% of the index compared to just below 30% today. The top five countries have stayed the same with the exception of Singapore, which has been replaced by China. In fact, corporates from China currently have the highest allocation, reflecting the strong economic growth of the country.

Sector allocationAs with countries, the sector allocation has also become more diverse, with 12 sectors now represented (up from 7), mainly due to a reduction in the exposure to industrials. Like many indices in developed markets, the financial sector makes up the largest share of the index, while natural resources (particularly oil & gas and metals & mining) is also well represented, reflecting the natu-ral resources richness of many emerging economies. Commodity prices are therefore an important driver for overall credit spread movements of emerging market corporates. The sovereign and quasi-sovereign (only if 100% owned by the government) sectors are not part of the corporate index.

Rating allocationThe current average rating of the JP Morgan CEMBI BD Index is at the low investment grade range with a rating of Baa3 / BBB– / BBB– (Moody’s/S&P/Fitch). It is worth highlighting that the emerging market corporate universe is rated higher than the emerging market sovereign universe, which is one notch lower with all three rating agencies (Ba1 / BB+ / BB+). This reflects the fact that it is often more difficult for corporates to issue bonds out of countries with weaker fundamentals and thus lower ratings.

In terms of rating quality, the allocation to investment grade rated bonds has decreased from 84.6% to just below 60%, reflect-ing the strong growth of the asset class and investors’ increased confidence in corporate EMD, allowing more noninvestment grade rated corporates to issue debt. In recent years, the downgrades of sovereign ratings from Russia and Brazil to noninvestment grade has also led to the downgrade of many corporates to noninvest-ment grade. For companies that are partly owned by the govern-ment or have a domestic focus, the sovereign rating provides a rating ceiling and thus they have been assigned a noninvestment grade rating.


Figure 5: The corporate emerging market bond universe has undergone significant change

Source: JP Morgan. Data as at 31.07.2017

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

Asia

Europe

Latin America

Middle East

Africa

JPM CEMBI Diversified – 31.10.2007

Regional allocation

JPM CEMBI Broad Diversified – 31.07.2017

0% 10% 20% 30% 40%

Financial

Industrial

TMT

Oil & gas

Metals & mining

Utilities

Consumer

Real estate

Transport

Infrastructure

Diversified

Pulp & paper



Sector allocation

0% 5% 10% 15% 20%

Russia

Hong Kong

Brazil

Singapore

Mexico

China


Top five countries (China replaces Singapore)


Rating allocation

AAA = 0.1% AA = 3.3% A = 17.9%

BBB = 37.5% BB = 20.9% B =13.5%

CCC = 2.0% NR = 4.8%

The corporate EMD universe is well diversified by region, country and sector, reflecting the growth and development of the asset class.”

“


Figure 6: Emerging and developed market ratings converging

Emerging markets (Top 10 JPM CEMBI countries, ex. UAE as no data available)

Country 2001 2017

China BBB AA–

Brazil BB– BB

Russia B+ BB+

Mexico BB+ BBB+

Hong Kong A+ AAA

India BB BBB–

Turkey B1 Ba1

Korea BBB+ AA

Colombia BB BBB

Chile A– A+

Developed countries

Country 2001 2017

Canada AA+ AAA

France AAA AA

Italy AA BBB–

Germany AAA AAA

Japan AA A+

UK AAA AA

USA AAA AA+

Portugal AA BB+

Ireland AAA A+

Spain AA+ BBB+

Sources: Credit Suisse, Bloomberg, S&P, Moody’s. Data as at 31.07.2017

Quasi-sovereign bonds

Quasi-sovereign bonds play an important role within the emerging market universe. While there’s no unique definition, most market participants define a bond as “quasi-sovereign” if the government owns more than 50% of its equity. In contrast to developed markets, there are several major companies in emerging economies that are still majority owned by the government. Often these companies are of strategic importance to the government and fall in the oil & gas, metals & mining, utilities and financial sectors.

The debt of quasi-sovereign issuers is not explicitly guaranteed by the government, but there is an “implicit” guarantee, with investors expecting government support if needed. The level and likelihood of government support needs to be assessed and taken into account on a case by case basis when investing in quasi-sovereign bonds. Additionally, investors should also consider the stand-alone credit quality of the company.

In general, quasi-sovereign bonds benefit from a “Change of Control” clause. This means investors are protected if government ownership falls below 50%, as they have the right to put the bonds back to the company.

From an index perspective, JP Morgan includes bonds from corporates that are 100% owned by the government (e.g. Pemex) in the sovereign universe, while all other quasi-sovereign bonds with less than 100% government ownership (e.g. Petrobras) are part of the corporate bond indices.


Risks within emerging markets While asset class growth and improved diversification reduces overall risk, there are still specific emerging market related risks investors need to consider. In particular, political stability and the regulatory and institutional framework of emerging economies lag behind developed markets. Within emerging markets differences can be very large and investors need to assess if the risk premium offered is large enough.

A main focus should be on the regulatory and supervisory framework that offers investor protection.7 Corporate governance issues are also an important consideration as companies are often important actors in the economy and politics. As such, many emerging market companies still benefit from implicit government support or a majority ownership due to their strategic importance. This is most pro-nounced in the natural resources sector, with governments holding majority stakes in companies such as Gazprom and Petrobras. The relatively large number of companies with government involvement is a distinct difference to the universe of developed market corporate bonds and offers additional support in times of distress.

To assess the risk of defaults in emerging market corporates relative to developed market corporates, we can look at historical default rates in the high yield market. There is some misconception about default rates in emerging market corporates as people believe they are more likely to default. However, as Figure 7 shows, there is no indication that they have structurally higher default rates, rather they are in line with their developed market counterparts. An important

point to make is that, as opposed to Europe and the US, bonds from emerging market countries do not form a homogeneous unit. The large number of countries ensures that they will be at different points on the economic cycle at any given point. This is positive for emerging market default rates overall, given they tend to follow the economic cycle.

Some critics make the point that emerging markets are just a commodity play. While commodity prices are certainly important for many emerging market economies, there are also several that are less dependent on commodity exports (e.g. India) or are actually net commodity importers (e.g. Turkey). An analysis of the JP Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Index (emerging market sovereign bonds in US dollars) shows that 49% of the index is classified as commodity exporters, while importers account for 30% of the index.8

In terms of recovery rates, there have been notable regional differ-ences. In particular, Latin America has experienced lower recovery rates, while Emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa has been broadly in line with the US and Europe. Asia has actually experi-enced the highest recovery rates. Ultimately, recovery rates strongly depend on which industry the defaults happen in and so a simple comparison of regional recovery rates should only serve as a rough indication. As an example, recovery rates in the utility sector can be expected to be higher than in some other sectors (e.g. telecom, technology) as utility companies benefit from hard assets that have longevity and revenue producing capacity.

7 International Organization of Securities Commissions in Collaboration with the World Bank Group, 2011.8 J.P. Morgan Securities LLC – Global Index Research, 2017.

Figure 7: Emerging market default rates broadly in line with developed markets

Figure 8: Asia leads the way in recovery rates

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

BofA-ML US HY EU HY EM HY

Emerging market default rates broadly in line with developed markets

Dec 99 Dec 03 Dec 07 Dec 11 Dec 150 10 20 30 40 50

LatAm

EMEA

Asia

US

EU

Senior unsecured recovery, 2009 to present

Asia leads the way in recovery rates

Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, based on price one month after default. Data as at 31.07.2017


Historical characteristics and risk/return figures provide some insight into the behavior of different asset classes but, as every disclaimer notes, they are not indicative of future performance. The time period chosen can have a significant impact on the figures. In the case of emerging market corporate bonds, where the asset class has experienced such rapid growth, it makes inter-preting long-term historical figures even more difficult as today’s universe is so different. As such, the following figures show both, a long-term analysis and a shorter-dated one.

The long-term analysis starts at the end of 2002, when data for the JP Morgan local currency bond index first becomes available. This period therefore covers almost 15 years and also includes the global financial crisis of 2008. The short-term analysis starts at the end of 2010 and covers almost seven years. There were two reasons to choose this particular date. Firstly, emerging market corporate bonds as an asset class matured at this stage with a size of over USD 500 bn. Secondly, both the negative effect of the global financial crisis and the rebound effect are excluded. In 2008, the JP Morgan CEMBI Broad Diversified Index lost 15.9%, but this was more than offset in the following two years with gains of 34.9% and 13.1% respectively.

JPM EMBI GD

JPM EMBI GD IG

JPM CEMBI BD

JPM CEMBI BD IG JPM GBI

BoA ML US HY

BoA ML US Corporate

S&P 500

MSCI World

MSCI EM

Long-term risk/return

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

2.5% 7.5% 12.5% 17.5% 22.5%

Ann

ualiz

ed r

etur

n

Annualized volatility

EM GD (in USD) JPM EMBI GD

JPM EMBI GD IGJPM CEMBI BD

JPM CEMBI BD IG

JPM GBI-EM GD

BoA ML US HY

BoA ML US Corporate

S&P 500

MSCI World

MSCI EM

Short-term risk/return

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

2.5% 7.5% 12.5% 17.5%

Ann

ualiz

ed r

etur

n


Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse. Data as at 31.07.2017Historical performance indications and financial market scenarios are not reliable indicators of current or future performance.

Figure 9: Analysis of long- and short-term risk/return

Risk/Return Figures


Figure 9: Analysis of long- and short-term risk/return (cont.)

Long-term characteristics

Period: 31.12.2002– 31.07.2017

EM Corp. EM Corp. IG

EM Sov. EM Sov. IG EM Local US HY US Corp. IG

Equities: World

Equities: US

Equities: EM

Statistics

Annualized return

7.28% 6.37% 8.85% 6.71% 7.53% 9.01% 5.40% 9.15% 9.56% 12.36%

Max. return (monthly)

6.15% 6.42% 7.46% 8.16% 9.84% 11.47% 5.55% 11.32% 10.93% 17.14%

Min. return (monthly)

–17.44% –14.56% –16.03% –11.91% –14.07% –16.30% –7.38% –18.93% –16.80% –27.35%

Sharpe ratio 0.78 0.78 0.92 0.75 0.52 0.84 0.74 0.54 0.61 0.51


7.60% 6.43% 8.18% 7.21% 11.83% 9.18% 5.54% 14.55% 13.39% 21.63%

Downside risk 10.29% 7.98% 9.43% 7.31% 9.64% 10.06% 5.12% 12.81% 11.54% 17.87%

% Periods up 73.14% 69.14% 72.00% 70.86% 64.57% 72.57% 66.29% 63.43% 68.00% 60.00%

% Periods down 26.86% 30.86% 28.00% 29.14% 35.43% 27.43% 33.71% 36.57% 32.00% 40.00%

Max. drawdown

Max. drawdown (in %)

–24.30% –19.99% –21.81% –16.54% –29.32% –33.23% –16.07% –53.65% –50.95% –61.44%

Length (in months)

5 5 5 5 32 18 8 16 16 16

Recovery (in months)

9 8 8 7 20 9 8 50 37 101

Peak 30.05.08 30.05.08 30.05.08 30.05.08 30.04.13 31.05.07 29.02.08 31.10.07 31.10.07 31.10.07

Valley 31.10.08 31.10.08 31.10.08 31.10.08 31.12.15 28.11.08 31.10.08 27.02.09 27.02.09 27.02.09

Short-term characteristics

Period: 31.12.2010– 31.07.2017


EM Sov. EM Sov. IG EM Local US HY US Corp. IG

Equities: World

Equities: US

Equities: EM

Statistics

Annualized return

5.73% 5.43% 6.69% 5.63% 0.56% 7.19% 5.08% 9.55% 13.17% 1.69%

Max. return (monthly)

4.82% 3.02% 4.40% 3.99% 9.06% 5.96% 2.81% 10.37% 10.93% 13.26%

Min. return (monthly)

–5.23% –3.57% –4.91% –4.71% –9.83% –4.01% –2.76% –8.60% –7.03% –14.56%

Sharpe ratio 1.11 1.32 1.02 0.87 0.03 1.16 1.23 0.79 1.19 0.09


4.97% 3.95% 6.39% 6.26% 11.91% 6.02% 3.96% 11.87% 10.90% 17.22%

Downside risk 4.41% 3.58% 4.95% 5.11% 8.73% 3.85% 2.80% 8.67% 7.18% 12.32%

% Periods up 72.15% 74.68% 68.35% 70.89% 58.23% 70.89% 65.82% 64.56% 69.62% 53.16%

% Periods down 27.85% 25.32% 31.65% 29.11% 41.77% 29.11% 34.18% 35.44% 30.38% 46.84%

Max. drawdown

Max. drawdown (in %)

–6.29% –6.03% –9.58% –10.94% –29.32% –9.83% –4.98% –19.43% –16.26% –29.45%

Length (in months)

2 4 4 4 32 8 2 5 5 58

Recovery (in months)

5 8 9 12 20 5 10 15 5 16

Peak 29.07.11 30.04.13 30.04.13 30.04.13 30.04.13 29.05.15 30.04.13 29.04.11 29.04.11 29.04.11

Valley 30.09.11 30.08.13 30.08.13 30.08.13 31.12.15 29.01.16 28.06.13 30.09.11 30.09.11 29.02.16

Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse. Data as at 31.07.2017Historical performance indications and financial market scenarios are not reliable indicators of current or future performance.

For table legend, please see page 15.


Emerging market corporate bondsEmerging market corporate bonds have shown solid absolute returns over both the long and short term, with annualized returns of 7.28% and 5.73% respectively. The same holds true for only investment grade rated emerging market corporate bonds, with annualized returns of 6.37% and 5.43% respectively. The Sharpe ratio improves for both indices due to the lower volatility for the short-term period as the impact of the financial crisis is omitted.

One argument we make for emerging market corporate bonds is that the asset class has become much broader and better diversified. This should have a positive effect on market volatility as unsystematic (company specific) risk should be reduced through better diversification. If we exclude the impact of the global financial crisis and analyze the volatility figures since inception (31.12.2001) of the corporate indices until the end of 2007, the annualized volatility for emerging market corporates and invest-ment grade emerging market corporates is 5.04% and 4.97%. If we compare these figures with the short-term period, we see that the volatility for emerging market corporates is only margin-ally lower at 4.97% while the volatility for investment grade rated bonds is over 100 bps lower at 3.95%. While the very similar fig-ures on the emerging market corporate bonds do not point toward a lower volatility due to better diversification, the comparison is not like for like because the allocation to more volatile high yield bonds is much higher today. The emerging market corporate investment grade indices are therefore a better indicator.

Testing whether the variance of the short-term period is lower than the variance before the financial crisis, we see that the null hypotheses that the variances of both periods are equal can be rejected at a 97.5% confidence level. This suggests that the evolvement and broadening of the asset class did have a signifi-cant effect in lowering volatility.

Emerging market corporate bonds versus sovereign bondsComparing historical figures for emerging market corporate versus sovereign bonds provides some interesting insights. First, looking at risk-adjusted returns in the form of the Sharpe ratio, sovereign bonds have a higher ratio for the entire period, while corporate bonds (particularly investment grade) are the winner over the short term. Volatility is in general lower for corporate bonds, which should not be surprising given the considerably higher duration of emerging market sovereign versus corporate bonds, as well as the slightly lower average credit quality.

From an investment perspective, the short-term figures strongly suggest that by looking only at sovereign EMD, investors miss in-teresting risk-adjusted opportunities in the corporate EMD market. Given the relative market size and growth trends, we believe that an emerging market corporate solution including emerging market sovereign/quasi-sovereign bonds offers investors the best op-portunity set to get USD-denominated emerging market exposure. With regard to emerging market sovereign debt in local currency, the historic volatility figures of almost 12% clearly show the dif-ferent nature of this asset class compared to USD-denominated emerging market debt.

Emerging market corporate bonds versus US credit indicesComparing emerging market corporates versus US credit indices, we again argue that the significant growth of the asset class means the more recent period provides a better basis for com-parison. The US high yield market has experienced the highest volatility, followed by emerging market corporate bonds, while the volatility for emerging market and US investment grade corporates is practically the same. This is in line with the respective credit risk in these indices. While the US investment grade index does have


a better rating quality overall, it also has a duration that is about two years longer, thus offsetting the lower volatility implied by the better rating quality. During the period investment grade indices provided the highest Sharpe ratio (emerging market investment grade: 1.32, US investment grade: 1.23), with US high yield (1.16) and emerging market corporate bonds (1.11) slightly below these levels. These figures all suggest that emerging market corporates have a similar risk profile to other credit markets and should be considered within an overall credit allocation.

Correlation among asset classesFrom a portfolio construction perspective, correlation between the different asset classes is a key measure to assess diversification benefits. As can be seen from the correlation matrix, emerging market corporate bonds have the highest correlation with emerg-ing market sovereign indices. This should not be surprising given the similar country universe of both indices. From the perspec-tive of credit investors, correlations with US credit indices are of particular interest. Emerging market corporate bonds do have a relatively high correlation with US credit indices over the long term, as well as the more recent period. One reason for this is that both indices only invest in USD-denominated debt, i.e. both have the US Treasury curve as their underlying interest rate risk.

The relative credit spread movement is the main differentiation. As can be seen from the rolling correlation charts in Figure 10, the correlation between emerging market and US investment grade corporate bonds has been relatively high and stable over time. In contrast, the correlation between emerging market corporates and US high yield has increased over time. This is in line with the increased share of high yield within the emerging market corporate universe over time.

If we look at the local currency emerging market index, we find a lower correlation with US credit indices than for emerging market corporates. This reflects the additional currency risk as well as the different underlying interest rate risk. Nonetheless, a correlation coefficient above 0.60 versus US high yield is still relatively high. It is also an indication of the sensitivity to risky assets both of these asset classes have. As can be seen from the rolling correlation charts, the relationship of local currency emerging market bonds with US high yield is much less stable than for emerging market corporate bonds, particularly from a 12-month perspective.

The relatively high correlation with US corporate bonds suggest that emerging market corporate bonds can serve as a comple-ment for US credit only investors to increase their opportunity set and overall yield. The high correlation with USD-denominated emerging market sovereign debt also implies that investors that only focus on this asset class are at risk of missing other attrac-tive opportunities within the emerging market universe. By adding corporate EMD, investors can benefit from a credit spread pickup relative to sovereign EMD, and thereby increase the overall yield.

Corporate EMD can serve as a complement for US credit only investors to increase their opportunity set and overall yield.”

“


Figure 10: Analysis of long- and short-term correlations

Long-term correlation matrix

Correlation monthly returns

31.12.2002–31.07.2017


EM Sov.

EM Sov. IG

EM Local US HY US Corp. IG Equities: World

Equities: US

Equities: EM

EM Corp. 1.00

EM Corp. IG 0.98 1.00

EM Sov. 0.92 0.92 1.00

EM Sov. IG 0.87 0.90 0.95 1.00

EM Local 0.71 0.66 0.79 0.74 1.00

US HY 0.78 0.69 0.76 0.65 0.65 1.00

US Corp. IG 0.83 0.88 0.81 0.86 0.57 0.62 1.00

Equities: World 0.63 0.53 0.61 0.50 0.70 0.75 0.38 1.00

Equities: US 0.56 0.46 0.54 0.43 0.60 0.71 0.31 0.97 1.00

Equities: EM 0.65 0.56 0.67 0.55 0.79 0.72 0.42 0.86 0.77 1.00

Short-term correlation matrix

Correlation monthly returns

31.12.2010–31.07.2017


EM Sov.

EM Sov. IG

EM Local US HY US Corp. IG Equities: World

Equities: US

Equities: EM

EM Corp. 1.00

EM Corp. IG 0.94 1.00

EM Sov. 0.91 0.95 1.00

EM Sov. IG 0.84 0.94 0.96 1.00

EM Local 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.78 1.00

US HY 0.86 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.68 1.00

US Corp. IG 0.69 0.83 0.73 0.80 0.58 0.58 1.00

Equities: World 0.71 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.65 0.80 0.27 1.00

Equities: US 0.63 0.46 0.48 0.39 0.53 0.74 0.19 0.96 1.00

Equities: EM 0.83 0.71 0.72 0.61 0.85 0.78 0.44 0.80 0.71 1.00

Rolling 12-month correlation Rolling 36-month correlation

0.00.20.40.60.81.01.2

Dec 03 Dec 05 Dec 09 Dec 11 Dec 13 Dec 15Dec 07 Dec 05 Dec 07 Dec 09 Dec 11 Dec 13 Dec 15

0,00.20.40.60.81,01.2

JPM CEMBI BD IG/BoA ML US CorporateJPM CEMBI BD/BoA ML US HY JPM GBI-EM GD (in USD)/BoA ML US HY

Sources: Bloomberg, JP Morgan, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse. Data as at 31.07.2017

Legend for figures 9 and 10

Table Legend

EM Corp. JP Morgan CEMBI Broad DiversifiedEM Corp. IG JP Morgan CEMBI Broad Diversified Investment GradeEM Sov. JP Morgan EMBI Global DiversifiedEM Sov. IG JP Morgan EMBI Global Diversified Investment GradeEM Local JP Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified (unhedged in USD)US HY BoA ML US High YieldUS Corp. IG BoA ML US CorporateEquities: World MSCI World Gross Total Return USDEquities: US S&P 500 Total ReturnEquities: EM MSCI Emerging Markets Gross Total Return USD


Historical leverageWhile there are several figures and ratios one can look at to assess nonfinancial companies, one of the most important ones for bond-holders is leverage. Rating agencies often define threshold levels that a company needs to observe to maintain their rating. Gross leverage assesses total balance sheet debt relative to EBITDA, a rough measure of cash earnings available to service debt. So a gross leverage figure of 3 means that the debt is three times as large as the EBITDA generated over the last 12 months. The net leverage figure adjusts the debt stock for the available cash, i.e. net leverage ratios will be lower than gross leverage ratios (assuming a positive cash balance).

In Figure 11, we can see the historical development of net lever-age figures for emerging market and US corporates. As previously mentioned, when comparing historical figures one needs to verify whether the universe has changed over time. We know this is the case for emerging market corporates, so current net leverage figures are not easily comparable to 2008. However, looking at more recent figures, net leverage seems to have started increasing since 2012 until it peaked in the second quarter of 2016. In its Global Financial Stability Report (October 2015) the IMF associates the increase in emerging market corporate leverage closely with favorable global conditions. At the same time, the relative roles of firm- and country-specific factors as drivers of leverage have declined.

Leverage per rating bucketGiven that net leverage for US companies has also increased, we need to look at leverage ratios within the same rating buckets. This gives a better basis to compare emerging market and US corpo-rates. As Figure 12 shows, within the same rating buckets emerging market corporates generally have a lower net leverage ratio relative to US corporates.

The attractiveness of any investment depends on the compensa-tion for the risk taken. For corporate bond investors this is the credit spread, i.e. the additional risk premium above US Treasury bonds. If we look at credit spreads relative to net leverage ratios we get a measure called spread per turn of net leverage. This shows how much credit spread we get for each unit of net leverage. As an example, BBB rated bonds have a credit spread of 201 basis points (bps) with a net leverage of 2.3×. This gives a spread per turn of leverage of 87 bps (201 divided by 2.3). The analysis shows that

the compensation for emerging markets is much higher per unit of net leverage compared to the US. As previously discussed, there are some additional risks when investing in emerging market bonds, particularly with regard to corporate governance and the political/institutional environment.

An investor focusing only on European credit names will be vulner-able to political and/or economic developments within this specific region and can enhance his country diversification by having some allocation to emerging market credits. As Figure 12 shows, particu-larly in the BBB and BB area, the credit spread paid per unit of net leverage is almost double for emerging market relative to US credits.

Figure 12: EMD investors are well rewarded for risk

Figure 11: Global conditions have boosted net leverage ratios

A

BBB

BB

B

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

A

BBB

BB

B

0.0× 0.5× 1.0× 1.5× 2.0× 2.5× 3.0× 3.5× 4.0× 4.5×

Net leverage (×)

US EM

Spread per turn of net leverage (bp/×)

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.0

Global EM net leverage (×)

US net leverage (×)

Mar 08 Mar 10 Mar 12 Mar 14 Mar 16


Fundamentals

Compensation for emerging market credit per unit of net leverage is much higher compared to the US.”

“


0

50

100

150

200

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Oct 16 Jan 17 Apr 17 Jul 17

Relative spread (rhs)

Z-spread Equate Petrochemical vs Dow Chemical

Equate 4.25% 03.11.2026

Dow 3.5% 01.10.2024

Understanding the opportunities in emerging markets: Equate Petrochemicalversus Dow ChemicalThe following example helps illustrate the relative credit spread pickup emerging credits can offer over developed markets. In this example, we compare the credit spread premium of Equate Petrochemical Co KSC, from Kuwait, with the US blue-chip Dow Chemical Company. Equate is a global producer of petrochemi-cals and the world’s second-largest producer of Ethylene Glycol (EG). The company has industrial complexes in Kuwait, North America and Europe, which annually produce over 5 million tons of Ethylene, EG, Polyethylene (PE) and Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET). In contrast, Dow Chemical is a much larger (EBITDA about ten times larger) and more diversified chemicals company. If we compare the credit metrics, we see that Equate has a lower net leverage and a better interest coverage. Both companies are rated Baa2 by Moody’s while S&P rates Equate one notch better than Dow Chemical.

In short, the two companies operate in the same industry and have broadly the same ratings. The interesting part is the owner-ship structure of Equate Petrochemical, which is a joint venture between Dow Chemical and the Kuwaiti government, with each having a 42.5% stake. Although Dow has announced an inten-tion to reduce this shareholding, the company intends to keep a material shareholding in the business. Additionally, for the Kuwait government (AA-rated), Equate has strategic importance as it is the country’s largest non-oil exporter (60% of non-oil exports).9 As can be seen from Figure 13, the credit spread offered on the Equate bond is substantially larger than for Dow Chemical bonds.

To compare spread differentials properly, we need to take into ac-count the longer maturity of the Equate bond. If we take a longer-dated Dow Chemical bond (7.375% 29), we can see that these two additional years should be worth around 30 bps resulting in an adjusted z-spread of 108 bps, so still almost 60 bps below the Equate bond.

Furthermore, looking at the spread differential, since the Equate bond was newly issued in October 2016, we can see a spread pickup of over 100 bps. This example illustrates well why we believe emerging market credit offers interesting opportunities to enhance the opportunity set and potential returns for developed market credit investors.

Figure 13: Equate Petrochemical vs Dow Chemical – a worked example

Sources: company reports, Bloomberg. Data as at 11.08.2017

9 J.P. Morgan CEEMEA Credit Research.

Key metrics 31.12.2016USD m

Equate Petrochemical

Dow Chemical

EBITDA 1,176 11,244

EBITDA margin 33.1% 15.8%

Net debt/EBITDA 2.4× 3.1×

Interest coverage 12.0× 8.8×

Rating (Moody’s/S&P/Fitch) Baa2/BBB+/NA Baa2/BBB/BBB

Bond characteristics Equate Petrochemical

Dow Chemical

Maturity 03.11.2026 01.10.2024

Coupon 4.25% 3.5%

YTM 3.77% 2.76%

Duration 7.52 6.03

z-Spread 166 bp 78 bp

Sources: company reports, Bloomberg. Data as at 11.08.2017

Case Studies


Opportunities in a sovereign crisisOne interesting feature about corporate EMD relative to sovereign EMD is the fact that many of these companies operate globally, en-suring a better diversified revenue stream, and one that can mitigate the impact of a domestic economic slowdown. In times of a sover-eign crisis, the spreads on corporates from these countries widen in sympathy. Some of this can be explained by the rising uncertainty, deteriorating country fundamentals and the risk of a corporate rating downgrade on the back of a sovereign rating downgrade.

However, for some companies this spread widening looks out of context relative to their credit fundamentals and this can create opportunities. In particular, companies that generate revenues in US dollars but have at least part of their cost in local currency can benefit from the currency depreciation that usually happens during a crisis. This is well illustrated in the following example.

The case of BraskemBraskem, a Brazilian petrochemical company, is the largest producer of thermoplastic resins in the Americas and the largest producer of polypropylene (PP) in the US. Its production focuses on polyeth-ylene (PE), PP and polyvinylchloride (PVC) resins, in addition to basic chemical inputs. Braskem’s units are present in Brazil, the US, Mexico and Germany, and it has 16 regional offices in other countries. The company is owned by Odebrecht and Petrobras, both of which have been involved in the Brazilian corruption scandal (Lava Jato). Braskem was also investigated by the US Department of Justice (DoJ) in March 2016 for alleged corruption practices in con-nection with Petrobras contracts. In December 2016 the company pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a fine.

While these events affected credit spreads, looking at Brazilian corporate and sovereign bonds as a whole, the political crisis and impeachment of president Dilma Rousseff was the main driver. As Figure 14 shows, Braskem credit spreads reached wides of almost 800 bps in September 2015, well before the DoJ allega-tions. This also coincides with the wides on five-year CDS spreads on Brazilian sovereigns as well as the weakest level in the US dollar/Brazilian real.

The weakest market point was about one month after the impeachment trial started and well before Rousseff was formally impeached in April 2016. Once the market expected the impeach-ment to happen and started to “look through” it, focus shifted to potential economic reforms and Brazil was one of the best-performing markets in 2016. This was no different for Braskem bonds.

Looking at its credit metrics throughout the crisis, the company’s global exposure meant it benefited from the significant deprecia-tion in the Brazilian real. In 2015, when the Brazilian real lost almost 50% versus the US dollar, its EBITDA margin increased from 12.2% to 19.4% while net leverage fell to the lowest level since 2007. It fell further to below 2× at the end of 2016. This again shows that credit spreads are significantly affected during a sovereign crisis and this often creates attractive opportunities, par-ticularly in globally focused companies that are not as dependent on the domestic economy and may benefit from a depreciating currency. S&P left the rating of Braskem at BBB– while down-grading Brazil from BBB– to BB+ in September 2015.

Figure 14: Braskem bonds driven by political landscape rather than fundamentals

0123456

2013 2014 2015 20160

200

400

600

800

Braskem – interest coverage

Braskem – net leverage (rhs)

Jan 13 Jan 14 Jan 15 Jan 16 Jan 17

BRASKM 5.375 05.02.2022 REGS Corp

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.5

Source: Bloomberg. Data as at 31.07.2017

The impact on credit spreads from a sovereign crisis can create opportunities, particularly in companies that are not domestically focused.”

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We believe all investors should consider emerging market corpo-rate bonds as part of their fixed income asset allocation. As shown in this paper, the landscape has changed significantly over recent years. The asset class has matured and many emerging markets are no longer emerging – they have emerged. By ignoring emerg-ing market corporate bonds, we believe investors will miss a broad and attractive opportunity set within their portfolio. This is true for investors who only have a sovereign emerging market allocation (either in US dollars or local currency) as well as developed market credit investors.

The fundamental development and importance of emerging mar-kets has been substantial and today many countries that still fall into the emerging market category no longer fit the initial crite-ria. The asset class itself has grown considerably and has been transformed into a much better diversified universe. A reflection of this is the significantly lower volatility for investment grade rated emerging market corporate bonds compared to earlier years, as well as attractive risk-adjusted returns in recent years.

While investing in emerging markets does have additional risks relative to developed markets, particularly with regard to corporate governance and its institutional framework, emerging market cor-porates do offer a higher credit spread to reflect this. This is even more pronounced if we adjust for the often lower net leverage of emerging market corporates relative to developed market corpo-rates in the same rating category. Additionally, many emerging market corporates still benefit from partial government ownership and thus an implicit government support.

Our solutionsAt Credit Suisse, we can offer investors a broad exposure to dif-ferent emerging market corporate bond strategies, with a focus on hard currencies. Focusing on global emerging markets, Asia and China, the strategies have strong track records against both the benchmark and peer group. Our 14 strong and highly experienced investment management team, based in Zurich, Singapore and Hong Kong, follow a disciplined investment process that combines top-down and bottom-up analysis to deliver portfolios that are well diversified across regions, countries and sectors.

Why Invest?

Gonzalo Borja

Head of Emerging Markets Fixed Income+41 44 332 12 53 [email protected]

Christian Dimita

Head of Client Portfolio Management+41 44 334 61 [email protected]

Andreas Fischer

Andreas Fischer (MSc, CFA) is a senior portfolio manager for emerging markets and a member of the Emerging Markets Strategy Group.+41 44 334 78 [email protected]

Do you have any questions?

Please get in touch. We will be delighted to help.

ContactsAbout the author


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The information provided herein constitutes marketing material. It is not investment advice or otherwise based on a consideration of the personal circum-stances of the address nor is it the result of objective or independent research. The information provided herein is not legally binding and it does not consti-tute an offer or invitation to enter into any type of financial transaction. The information provided herein was produced by Credit Suisse Group AG and/or its affiliates (hereafter “CS”) with the greatest of care and to the best of its knowledge and belief. The information and views expressed herein are those of CS at the time of writing and are subject to change at any time without notice. They are derived from sources believed to be reliable. CS provides no guarantee with regard to the content and completeness of the information and does not accept any liability for losses that might arise from making use of the informa-tion. If nothing is indicated to the contrary, all figures are unaudited. The information provided herein is for the exclusive use of the recipient. Neither this information nor any copy thereof may be sent, taken into or distributed in the United States or to any U. S. person (within the meaning of Regulation S under the US Securities Act of 1933, as amended). It may not be reproduced, neither in part nor in full, without the written permission of CS. Investments in for-eign currencies involve the additional risk that the foreign currency might lose value against the investor’s reference currency. Investment principal on bonds can be eroded depending on sale price, market price or changes in redemption amounts. Care is required when investing in such instruments. Emerging market investments usually result in higher risks such as political, economic, credit, exchange rate, market liquidity, legal, settlement, market, shareholder and creditor risks. Emerging markets are located in countries that possess one or more of the following characteristics: a certain degree of political instabil-ity, relatively unpredictable financial markets and economic growth patterns, a financial market that is still at the development stage or a weak economy. Copyright © 2017 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP AG and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.

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Emerging market corporate bonds have become a stand-alone asset class that provides a diversified and attractive opportunity set for fixed income investors.”

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