attack and defence in radio and communication warfare akib sayyed [email protected]

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Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed [email protected]

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Page 1: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare

Akib Sayyed

[email protected]

Page 2: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

(electronic)Communication

• Used by most of population in world

• Used by Law Enforcement ,Defence in every mission

• Plays most important role at time of WAR

• We are blind without communication

Page 3: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

What are we looking at

• Radio Communication– Communication Jamming– Anti Jamming Communication– Locating Signal Source– Smart Radio Grid

• Core Network– What's there is core network?– Disrupting Core Network

• Threat of Imported Telco Equipments

Page 4: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Radio Communication

• Its Communication using electro magnetic waves through atmosphere or free space.

• Information is sent over radio waves using changing property of these waves such as pulse , phase , amplitude , frequency

• Consist of transmitter and receiver (TRX)

Page 5: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Types of Radio Frequency (Short Version)

• Very high frequency

– VHF

– 30–300 MHz

– 10 m – 1 m

• Ultra high frequency

– UHF

– 300–3000 MHz

– 1 m – 100 mm

• Super high frequency

– SHF

– 3–30 GHz

– 100 mm – 10 mm

Page 6: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Usages

• VHF– FM ,Television ,Amateur radio , Aircraft

Communication

• UHF– Television ,Microwave ,Mobile

Communication ,GPS ,Bluetooth

• SHF– Radio astronomy, microwave devices/communications,

wireless LAN, most modern radars

Page 7: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

How data is sent via Radio Waves

Page 8: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Different Ways to Send Receive Radio Waves

• Commercial Radios– Cellphones – Walky Talkie

• SDR – Blade RF– HackRF– USRP Series

• Signal Generators• Spectrum Analyzer

Page 9: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

How to block /Protect Signals

• It is not possible to stop one from sending or receiving signals

• Best way is jam , scramble , encrypt ,Hopping

Page 10: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Jamming

VS

Overlapping signals with more power so that signal becomes garbage

Page 11: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Scrambling

VS

Transposing or inverting signals making it unintelligible for receiver without descrambler

Performed in Analog Domain

Page 12: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

EncryptionDigital Domain

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VS

Page 13: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Hopping

Page 14: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Protecting Signals

• Should have following qualities

– Low Probability of Detection

– Low Probability of Intercept

– Low Probability of Exploitation

Page 15: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Low probability of Detection

• Goal is to hide signal somehow such that unintended receiver has difficulty to determine that signal even present

Page 16: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Low probability of Intercept

• If signal is not LPD type then unintended receiver can receive it

• So to reduce probability of intercept one can use frequency hopping

• Due to frequency one cannot easily receive signal which is hopping on different frequency unless he knows pattern of hopping

Page 17: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Low Probability of Exploitation

• In case signal is not LPD/LPI or attacker finds out way to receive signal properly then getting meaningful information from that signal should be difficult

• Encryption is example of LPE

Page 18: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Electronic warfare

• Activities taken to accomplish the intercept or denial of communication

• 3 main components

– Electronic attack(EA)

– Electronic support(ES)

– Electronic protect(EP)

Page 19: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Electronic Attack (EA)

• Using active signals to deny communication system from actively exchanging information

• It could be– Jamming

• Transmit noise on those freq– Deception

• Send wrong information to mislead – Directed energy

• Similar to jamming but goal is to permanently harm or destroy equipment

Page 20: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Electronic Support (ES)

• Supporting function for EA

• Its more like spectrum sensing and find signal with specific characteristics

• Cause if jamming is being performed on non utilized frequency then time and energy is wasted

Page 21: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Electronic Protect (EP)

• Protecting friendly communication from EA and ES attacks

• In case both are using same frequency then one should transmit signals towards target and away from friendly units

Page 22: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

AntiJam Communication

• Communication with ability to fight jamming of communication system

• Type of Anti Jamming signals

– Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum

– Frequency-Hopping Spread Spectrum

– Time-Hopping Spread Spectrum

Page 23: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum

• Technique involves spreading signal across a wider bandwidth and entire bandwidth is occupied instantly

• Due wider band, energy present at particular frequency is low

• Causing less probability of detection as unintended receiver mistake it as noise

Page 24: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum

• Based on concept of hopping

• Occupies single channel at given instant

• Bandwidth about be from +-10khz to +-200khz

• Signal hops in predefined hopping sequence called hop set

• 2 types

– SFHSS (Slow Frequency Hopping SS)

– FFHSS (Fast Frequency Hopping SS)

Page 25: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Time Hopping Spread Spectrum

• TH changes time of transmission randomly causing receive noise most of time

• Best example is PTT used by military and law enforcement

Page 26: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

SDR Connections for DEMO

Page 27: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Demo of Anti Jam Signals

Page 28: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Jamming Anti-Jam Signals

• Partial Dwell Jamming of FHSS Systems

• Noise Jamming

• Tone Jamming

• Pulse Jamming

• Follower Jamming

• Smart Jamming

Page 29: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Partial Dwell Jamming of FHSS

• Portion of Signal is jammed

• There is finite amount of time to insert jam signal if detect energy belongs to correct signal to jam

• One cannot jam whole spectrum but partial is possible

Page 30: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Noise Jamming

• Carrier Signal is modulates with Noise Waveform

• Main aim is to insert noise at receiver end

• Types

– Broadband Noise Jamming (Entire Spectrum)

– Partial Band Noise Jamming (Partial Spectrum)

Page 31: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Tone Jamming

• Continuous Tone is generated on spectrum in narrowband

• Could be single or multiple

• In case of multiple tones power is distributed among all tones

• Type

– Single Tone

– Multiple Tones

Page 32: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Pulse Jamming

• Similar to Partial Band Noise jamming

• Its partial band noise jamming with no continuous transmission

• Have low avg power than some of other jamming technique

Page 33: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Follower Jamming

• Follow hopping path and predict hopping sequence

• Once predicted jam next possible hopping channel

• Jamming could be in tones or modulated tones

• AKA responsive jamming , repeater jamming ,repeat back jamming

Page 34: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Smart Jamming

• Block the food supply • Means only block part which is important for

sync

• As most of sync channel are not spread or hopping (e.g. GSM FCCH or C0)

• One can simply jam main sync source

Page 35: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

SDR Connections for DEMO

Page 36: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Demo of Jamming Signals

Page 37: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Smart Radio Grid

• For whom ?

• Why we need this?

• Applications

• SDR arch

Page 38: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

For Whom?

• Metro Cities

• Air Port

• Borders

Page 39: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Why We need this?

• Signal generators are easy to get and use• Imagine case:– Airport security radios are jammed– Terrorist using satellite phone to communicate in

Metro Cities– Law enforcement radio are picking up misleading

signals

• Tracking such case is nearly impossible in real time (at least in India)

Page 40: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Applications

• Detect Jamming Signals

• Find Illegal Transmitters

– Fake cell towers

– Illegal broadcast stations

• Locate signalling source

• Smart Jamming

• Intercept Communication

Page 41: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

SDR Arch

Page 42: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Core Network

• Traditional Telecom Protocol

• Less scrutinized for security flaws for both protocol and implementation

• Uses custom distro using collecting bits and pieces

Page 43: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Awareness in Telco Security

• Telcos are testing there network for security flaws lately

• Awareness is taking place in telco people as only gentlemen network is now open to all

• But vendors co-operations is lacking due to contracts and money

Page 44: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Threat of imported equipments

• Recently researchers found

– Hidden commands in equipments

– Some default password

– Trojan horse embedded which sends data back to device manufacturer

Page 45: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Steps Taken by Indian Government

• Setup Telecom Equipment Testing Lab

• Which will

– Test equipments for protocol implementation flaw and for security flaws

– Certify equipment

• Pilot lab was setup in banglore under Prof. N. Balakrishnan

Page 46: Attack and Defence in Radio and Communication Warfare Akib Sayyed akibsayyed@gmail.com

Questions

?