FROM COBRA TO THE SEINE, AUGUST 1944: A MICROCOSM OF THE OPERATIONAL

ART

BY

.

Major Scott B. Cottrell

Erg i neer

School of Advanced Military Studies

U.S. Army Corm and and General Staff College W.

Fort Leavermc-rth, Kansas %

9 May 1986

Approved for public release; distri but in is unl irmi ted

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FROM COBRA TO THE SEINE, AUGUST 1944: A MICROCOSM OF THE OPERATIONAL ART

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COTTRE LL, SCOTT .. MAJ. US ARMY13a TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE COUNTMONOGRAPH FRM1O1986. MAY 09 5 4 "

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP OPERATIONAL ART, OPERATIONS, W'd II OPERATIONS,

CENTER OF GRAVITY, CULMINATING POINT, MANEUVER,MORTAIN, ARGENTAN-FALAIJE

19. AfKTBACT AC~ntioue on, rees fncary and idendlIfb blocknnmbe r1 s u y atremp s 0bo prov e exua example of the concepts and

terms of the operational art as demonstrated by the Allies in France duringAugust 1944. The action from Operation COBRA to the Seine River crossings isfirst described, highlighting key terms. These are then discussed, defined,sketched, mapped and redefined where appropriate, in an effort to present amore complete understanding of the terms and concepts on which ALB and FM100-5 are built.The following terms are addressed: Theater Strategic Objectives, Sequenced

Activities, Branches and Sequels, Center of Gravity, Culminating Point, Linesof Operation and Operational Maneuver. The study reveals at least two areaswhere, perhaps, FM 100-5 needs more thought. These are center of gravity anddefensive culminating point

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.- .................. ....................... ................ .... ..

FROM COBRA TO THE SEINE, AUGUST 1944: A MICROCOSM OF THE OPERATIONAL

ART ".,,. .- %.p

,J .. ..- .,

BY .J .

Major Scott B. Cot trell

Erg i neer .. *

Scho:ol of Advanced Military Studies

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas -. i

- .. , '. -

9 May 1986

Approved fc-r public release; distributior is urlimited

DTICNOV 1 3 1986 , .

86-3598

- S -¢. a- -°aA .

School of Advarced Military Studies

Morograph Approval

Name of Student: MAJ Scott B. CottrellTitle of Monograph: From COBRA to the Seine, August 1944: A Microccsnm

of the Operational Art

Approved by:%a * .%'

------------------------ Monograph Director(LTC Kenneth G. Carlson, MPA)

4• ~\- \, .\a'

Director, School -,f(COL Richard Hart Sinnreich, MA) Advanced Military

St ud i es

Directocr. Graduate ...

(Dr. Philip J. Brookes, PhD) Degree Programs

Accepted this ----- day of

% %a

%- V -4

.. :- .-

Arxwx

ABSTRACT

FROM COBRA TO THE SEINE, AUGUST 1944: A MICROCOSM OF THE

OPERATIONAL ART, by Major Scott B. Cottrell, USA, 54 pages.

'This study s-_attenmpt;to provide a contextual example cfmany of the concepts and terms of the operational art asdemonstrated by the Allies in France during August 1944. The actiorfrom Operation COBRA to the Seine River crossings is firstdescribed, highlighting key operational concepts and terms. Thenthese concepts are discussed, defined, sketched, rnaoped andredefined where appropriate, all in an effort to present a morecomplete ,.derstandirig of the terms and c:ncepts on which AirLardBattle and FM 100-5 are built.

4...

The following terms and corncepts are addressed: TheaterStrategic Objectives, Sequenced Activities, Branches and Sequels,Center of Gravity, Culrlinating Point, Decisive Terrain, Lines ofIperation, and Operational 4aneuver. The study reveals at least twoareas where perhaps FM 100-5 needs more thought. These are center ofgravity arid defensive culminating point.

.- .

* . At~L

A _ .s "'

' .

Li!

1* ::

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

:ON

PAGE

SECTION I Ir trioduct iior "

SECTION II Backgrourd for the August 1944 Allied Operations

SECTION III Allied Operations, 1-26 August 1944

SECTION IV Discussion of Operational Concepts ard Terms 1-

A. General "-

B. Center -:f Gravity 14

C. Culni atirg P,int 17

D. Decisive Terrain 70

E. Lines o-.f Operation 2. "

F. Operat ionial Maneuver

SECTION V Conclusion

CHARTS, MAPS, and SKETCHES 9

ENDNOTES

B IBL I OGRAPHY 54.

t- e. e. mr

.. ' %#.

*. 5%~

-+'.' '.',.- ',.','..,'-,-+. .-. .. . '.,'.- -.-,",- f_+• .,,-.,. . . . . • , .-. . . °+. . - . . . . . .• °. ,l ° , ". "+% " - ° % °° + % % • o ". • + • " • "o

- ° .-- "- '- . " % % ". - ° .' .. . " % • % % - - . . " •

I Inrt roductiorn

The Arraly' s capstone manual, FM 100-5, Operat ions ( 1982) and its F

revision FM 100-5, Operations (May 1986), put forth many operational

concepts and terrms which apparently are riot yet fully appreciated ..

nor understoo:d by commnranders at allI levels. Definit io:ns for, term~s ""-

such as "center of gravity" and "culminating point" car, give the

4.

reader a general idea of the rmeaning of a conrcept o-r term but thneir .--

precise rmeaning rmay be interpreted differently by different reader-s. :

Without a coramon und~erstanding .of these terrms, conrfusion rMray reicr,.n'

as officers try to talk to each other in ters they really don't

understand. Examples can help pin down the meanig g cof these terms

and concepts, but when taken out of context they can be misleading.

For those whot like visual aids, naps and sketches ar e ap greate

assistance but are insufficient by themrselves to crpletely explgve ti

a concept. How theer are these operational terms and c bncepts th

accurately and precisely tansmitted to the Arrly's officer crdeps .

Preferably, all Aroy fficers w d read detailed acc ounts

various historical battles celppled with accurate ad precise tem

definitions from reliable surces t,:, get a god grasp of these !,

operational concepts. Clausewit would be carried in every briefcae"

. and fo:und .on every nightstand. Regrettab~ly, that won't happen. Lac,( .

,:,f tirme and other, circurmstances will prevent it. Plernaps a .''

historical survey of riajo-r oper-ations highlighting the parts that ?.-illustrate these concepts, cCupE m with defiitins, mraps, ar

discAssion would better, serve the officer po:pulation r as a wh , le. T, " "

that end, the operat ions f the Allies i to France durig Alegte st 1ex9 r4-

appear to deHo nstrate mary of the key operatiornal trS ad concets

pr,:hulsgated by the latest revisio f FM 100-5 arid pre:cvide a

suitable cntext fr their study. These peratios irclue the

post-COBRA exploitatio, the taking o~f Brittany, the Mo,rtaincounterattack, the Argeltas-Falaise pocket, and the race to, rhe

Se ine Ri ver.osl.

his.:Therefore, this paper will use the scenari, of the Allied ha

perat iors in France during August 1944 t,-o discuss and clari1y ir a 0

cptextual drnner rmany key ofperat ieal terms and c-r,Cepts used inr F:_

100-5 Operations. The ,ethed to be used is as :First tecorertacth rgrarFlis.oc-, rd h rc-t h/'. ."*". , , Seine. ', River',, . . ,., :,. ,... .-.. ,'.' "..-- .. .'. - .. ,.. .... - ... .-.-v v ,-. , ., - .

paper will describe the events and decisions that led up to and

immediately preceded August 1944. Next, the actions o:f the Allies

from 1-26 August 1944 will be described, referring to but riot

defining key operational concepts and terms such as, center of

gravity, culmirating point, linies of operation, decisive terrain,

operational maneuver, and others. Third, the operational concepts

and terms which the scerario highlights will then be defined,

discussed, sketched, and redefined where appropriate. Finally, the

conclusion will reiterate sore of the key points arid discuss the

,-,peratioral art in more general terms.

II Background for the August 1944 Allied Operations

On 12 February 1944 the Combined Chiefs o:,f Staff of the USA ard

the UK issued the following directive to GEN Eisenhower:

Task: You will enter the continient :f Europe,and, in c:njunction with the other UnitedNations, undertake operations aimed at the heartof Germany ard the destruction of her armedforces. T e date for entering the coritinerit isthe month of May 1944. After adequate channelports have been secured, exploitation will bedirected to securing an area that willfacilitate bo, th ground and air, operationsagainst the enerily.

The advent of that mission directive set into rotion the everts

which led to the 6 June 1944 invasion of Normandy within the

OVERLORD plan. During June, as Montgnmery pressed toward Caer witin.

Dempsey's 2nd British Army against stiff oppositi:i, B radley's 1-t

US Army cleared the upper Cotentin perinsula and on 2,7 June took the

port of Cherbourga (see map 1, p34).

DiAririg the m-,rith of July, the Gerrmans put up terrific

resistance against continual pressure from the Allies' attempts C:,

breaN out of the Cotentin peninsula and their No,rrnardy beachheaos. 6

Fortunately for the Allies, Montgomery's attempts t,-, break out,

ending with operation GOODWOOD, 18-20? July, had the effect of

drawing most o-if the enemy arrmor in the area toward Cir,, leavirig the

Americans in the western sector facing orly infartr,y divisicrs. -

However, a combinat ion of these infantry d ivisions and iJc.rrlardy' s

compartmental i zed hedgerow terrain had already held the Aericans -..

such that or, D+48, they had advanced only to where they had hoped t:

- - .. -'° .' *

be o:n D+5.* Or; 2j July, Bradley's 1st Army, spearheaded by MG

Collins' VII Corps, launched operation COB'RA. Originally intended

to be a limited objective advance, this operation resulted in the

breakout at St. Lo. Coll1ins took advan~tage oif disorganiZed German

resistance caused by PA1lied carpet bom~birng arid inserted his arm,-r d

divisions into the fray to exploit success. MG Middletonr's VIII

Corps on Co:llins' right soon joined the explo-itation, arid by 31

July, the left flank of the Germnr defensive 1lire was rupt ured witri

US forces as far soutth as Avrariches. The corner into Brit tany had

been turned. The A1llies had bro:kern out o::f the confines of their-

No:.rriaridy beachhead arid the Cotent in peninsula (see map f, p35).

The mission direct ive g ivern Eisernhower was broad arid imprecise.

However, embedded in it were sever-al implied tasks which became part

of OVERLORD's general OlAt line .:f sequenced act ivit ies fcor- the

upcoming campaign. In general, after, seizing a lodgfient, the AP1 1 1 E:C

were to build it up, break. *:uit of the beachhead, take the Brittaniy

ports for logist ics purposes arid advance to the Seinre where they

W.:'uld pau.se to regroup prior to entering Germiany.' Because OVERLORD

was fir-st arid forerix:.st a logistically drivern plan, the advance to'the Seine was planned apparent ly as a broad push, advancing

according to pre-plariried phase lines with a schedu~led arrival Circa

D + 1 C. By 1 Au~gust 1944, the Pllies had succeeded ini ccriipletiig tne

f~irt 3phases of their operat io-ns arid were now ready to t urn we'imt

into: Brittany to seiz:e its po-rts.

III Allied Operations, 1-26 August 1944

Operat ion OVERLORD started with Eisenhower as the Su~preme

P1llied Commainirder-, Mont goriery as the Gro-und Fo-rce C.:,rmarnder, arc 1

Armny Gr-oup (AG) Commriander, with two subord irate a ri es, Deripse,'

.n~d Bri t ish Armiy arid BradlIey'Is I1st US Army (see cha_-rt 1, p2-3). Dy 1

August, the nu'mber of d ivisions arid supplies had built up to-- thte'

point that two rnew ar-mies arid another army group were formed. LTG

E'rad iey becamie the Commander, 12 PG effect ive 1 Pugust 1944, Wi t.I

the 1st US Prmy under LTG Ho--dges arid the 3rd US Ptrii under- LTG

Pat t or. Mont gomriery irema ined the C. 1 G C.-mander wi1tltGNDmsy

a rid Br it i sh Pr'miy arid GEN Crer-ar-' s 1st Caniac lan ir'rii -see cm-Irt

e ic ii

I.-i. -. . 1 I_ I-

U %l i i I~-. ". -'

:%°

p30). Because the Allies had not progressed as far as planned by 1

August, Eisenhower postponed his planned assurmlption of Gr,:und Force

commland and left Montgorery in "temporary operational control."

reality, Montgomery had authority to coordirate and settle boundar-y

disputes between army grojups. ..

On 1 August 1944, Patton assumed commarnard of 3rd Arriiy,

controlling initially only the VIII Corps. Immediately Patton

jumped to his task, sending two arrmored divisions and two infantry

divisions exploiting west into Brittany against limited resistarce

and with Free French assistance. This was in con so n rance with

Montgomery's intentions of clearing everything west o.f the Orne

River prior to driving toward the Seine. g This was also in line with

the original OVERLORD plan of seizing Bretor, ports. Though Pat to:. n

reached Brest and L'Orient on 7 August 1944, Brest did not

capitulate until 19 September and L'Orient held out urtil tne end cf

the war. "I Fortunately for the Allies, their upcomling rapid advance "'

eastward opened other prts for them, making the Eret,r ports

superfluous (see map 3, p36).

While VIII Corps was sweeping west in Brittany, bo=,th Bradley

and Patton were concerred about Patton's flank. Each stat ioned a

division in Fougeres to cover, the Brittany acticn. When Patton

learned of his abundance .:f Forces, he gave those two divisicnis ar, c

one other to MG Haislip's newly for-med XV Co:rps. With Bradley' s

approval or 3. August, these two infantry and ore armor-ed divi i "n

moved east and southeast, spreading out like a fan and reaching the

line of Mayenne-Laval-Chateau Goritier by 6 August. SiFnutari eo u'.y,

another new corps, MG Walker's XX Corps received the rission to

guard the right flank of operation OVERLORD ( and 3rd US Armv) bv..

heading toward Nantes and Angers on the Loire River" Imap 3, p3

Not only were Bradley and Pattorn nw thinking more o, fens ve 1 .

but so was Montgrmery. On 4 August, OVERLORD received its first

raj:r facelift (sketch 1, p41). Noting the crurmblirg Germar.

resistance in front Of Patton's 3rd Army arid to sorne extent Hdges'

1st Arnmy, Mont gomery developed a plan for enveloping German Arnmy

Group B under Kluge (see chart 3, p31). Crerar' s Ist Canadi ar Army-

was to attack south toward Falaise not later than 8 August arid tmer'

4

-. 'S

1%

swing east toward Rouen~ on the Seine. Demipsey' s anid British Army

was to attack southeast toward Argertari while Ho--dge' s 1st US Armay

drove due east. With three armies pressing in or, the 7th Germian

Army arid the Fifth Panzer Army of Armiy Group B, Patton' 5 _-rd US A rmrly

wo:uld then strike southeast arnd east, outrunrring the Germans to the

Se ine. The intent then was apparert ly for Patton to cut do--wn the

west side of the Seine towards the Channel. These maneuvers were

fr'.intended to force Army Group B back. against the lower Seine where

Alie bomibing hdtaken oat mary bridges arid the width of the Seiize

prohibited others. The Paris-Orleans gap was to be blocked with-

airborne urits'a. Or 6 August Patton asked for perrilissicri to

ct-nt irue east with XV Corps toward 7th German Army headquarters inr

LeMans. Bradley approved, ostersibly because of d is-:rqari zed Germril:,

resist ance. 1

During late July arid the first few days of August, Hitler

decided to counterattack toward Avrarichies with the idea of

reestablishing the No:rmardy defense arid bottling the Allies back UD

in the Cotent in peninsula. It would have the added beniefit of

cutting off those American divisions which were already south o-f

Avranches. "I This counterat tack., coderiamed LUTTICH--, h-ld beern plarnac

when the Germaans were only 3 kmi from Avrariches but was rio--t laurchad __

Uantil1 they were 33 km away arid the Americans already streariiirg VwQS I

into Brittany arid southeast to--war-d LeMais. 12- Perhaps the Ger-rar,,z

were already past their defensive culminating poinit.

Due to ULTRA intercepts, Eisenhower arid Bradlicy wer-e we iI

aware *:f LUTTICH. Because o-f this arid Eiserihower's aszu- a rn c L

ao',()0) tons of supply per day by airlift, Bradley allowed Patton.r to:

continue heading east, leaving minimal fo_-rces ini theC vicity Y

Mortain, the proposed point of perietrat ion fo:r LU7TICH. '

At midnight o-ri 6/7 August, the Ge -riiars launrched their-

counterattack force, the XLVI I Panzer Cortps, towards Mo_-rtai r.

Co:mmanded by vor Furick, the XLVII Corps co:rs 1st ad .:rf oa:r paizer,

divisions (P-_ Div) arid the remnants of a Panzer Greriad ~er,Divisio. -ri17 Standing in, their, path was the 3Cith lrna tr D iv is i;:r

(ID) of Collins' VII Corps, 1st Armiy. Hit ler, hac :,iiialiv

envisaged LUTTICH as a big offenisive ofseverail c:,rcs t.: r e s ra1

-J'7 d

a.' ' ' . . ' P%-P ,,.,. - -' ~ " 4- , . . .

.1.

-4: the defense, while his theater coriiriander, von Kluge, saw it as a

limited counterattack to restore a defensive l ine long enough toZr

allow the Germans to withdraw back to the Seine. IS Rather than ar,

operational offensive, it appeared to be a tactical counterattaci,

with operational corsequences.4 W

The positions of the US and German corps and divisions at the

time of the counterattack are shown on Map 4, p- 7 . Th,-,,gh the

counterattack achieved some rapid tactical success, it event ually

failed because of the poor synchronization o:f German assets, the

stubborn resistance of the 3Q ID and the rapid shafting o-,f units

within and to VII Corps. At midnight, the ard SS Pz Div str-uc.i o n

the south on both sides :,f Mortain without an arti I lery p-rep,

pushing the 30 ID back as they went. They failed, nowvec, to.

Hill 317 just east of Mortain which remained the pr-,per-.t of the

2-l2o Irf Br, 30 ID. -o

From that vantage point, artillery spotters called d-,wr oeadlv,./

accurate fire on most German ccl i.ns, forcirig them tO sl, w up a

disperse. Though completely cut off from the 30 ID, the men of tre

2-120 manned their positions from 7-12 August when they were

relieved by the 25 ID. They had beer, a "thorn. in the flesh" of tre4.'%

German counterattack; -2 a linch pin which held, ailowirq Collirs t:

fight the defensive battle for Mortain while Patto, c,,rducted

operational maneuvers in the German rear. Hill 217 was decisive

t erra i r.

The 2nd SS Piz Div reached almost to St.Hilaire by ro.on or 7

August, within 15 Pm of Avranches. North of Mortair, the 12ind !-z

Div, the main effort of the counterattack, got started late in the

rmcrrni rg. After, obtaining initial surprise, the peretr-at c, oris rc.rti-,

of town were stopped by heavy artillery fire, the ffortuitot.s

appearance of :'nd Armored Division (-) (AD) on the way to, the fEr:,rtt "

,:f VII Corps, and the wise positionin g of Combat Co-,rmard B, (CCE? cF

2 AD. The 116 P'z Div never attacked. The 1st SS Pz Div was the.v-.

counterattack' s reserve force, ready to exp, it success.

Urfzrtunately for the Germans, von Furck cm-,rmitted it benird ti-e .

Pz Div rorth of Mortain, instead of reinfo-,rcing the success of the

2nd SS Pz Div near St.Hilaire."- After helping B ID north of %

-. 4

. ',.. . . .• . ,....... ...... . . -,- ... _,..... ........ ..........-.... -... . ..- ,, .m

%

Mortain, the 2 AD(-) swung south of Mortain to plug a gap in VII

Corps' lines along with the 35 ID. The "R AD(-) was chopped to VII

Corps from XIX Corps, the 35 ID from 3rd Army.• " Allied air, in the %

form of rocket firing British Typho:rs and Arerican Thunderbolts, V.

had a field day in the destruct ion of German c,,lurains.- al

By noon on 7 August, the counterattack had apparently stalled.

The Germans pulled their tanks off the roads, put up camouflage

nets, defended their positions and waited for reinforcerients.- '.zBradley spoke with Hodges :n the m:rning of 8 August and found himrl

holding his grcund. - The attack had spent its momrenturi arid

apparently reached its offensive culmrinating point. For the next

four days, Collins woluld fight a combirnatior, offense/deferise in t r,e C

vicinity of M,:rtain. While the I ID tried to maintain c,,ntact with

XV Corps :f Patton's Army, the 30 ID, 4 ID, and CCB, 3 AD deferice2-

near Mortain and the 9 ID, 35 ID, and 2 AD(-) attacked into the

flanks of the penetratin. - By 12 August Mortain was cleared arid

VII Corps began preparing to resume the offensive and assist in the

Battle of the Argentan-Falaise Pocket. A

In early August as Patton headed Haislip's XV C,rps east twarc -

Laval, Patton mentioned to him that he should not be surprisec if ne

were suddenly turned north into the rear of the 7th Gernian Army. ri

That turn, occurred on 8 August. While waiting for LUTTICr t-

kick off, Bradley and Patton conferred, deciding to stop the 8 t-,

2nd French AD arid 35 ID ir the St.Hilaire vicinity, just ri, ca e.

The rest :,f 3rd Army sped east. By 9 August, Pat t:r,'s XV C:,ros "

in LeMans while LUTTICH had apparertly culminated. The I.: AG G- -

estimated that the four plus divisions in the Germnan c,-.irterntta PI

could muster only 25C) tanks at mst, a little ri:,e tnar, ne .,

one panzer division. That infornatior, plus Br'aclev' : belie" tr zA.

the Germans had moved their "center, of gravity" to, far west, e,?c

him to propose a shorter envelopment than Moritgorery's trap agair,.s . .

the Seine (sketch 2, p42). Bradley, with EiserhcLwer at his i.

called Montgom.rery to discuss the new plan. Esserit~ -A! l. &'-adle,

prop,:sed -urning XV Corps north at LeManis through Aierc :, a'

German supply base arid or to Argentar. Montg,:,riier-/' :,oe'at

TOTALIZE, with the Canadians attacking s,,,t t,:.3':h -a. :

* 7

- .. . --

August seemed to f it this plan, except that rather, than tur-ning east

towar-d Ro'uen after, reaching Falaise, they would co:nt irue soiuth to

close the gap at Argentari. 1 1 Mctgcrery agr-eed to adapt his planis t o

Bradley's and the Battle of the Argertan-Falaise pocket began to

unfold while the Battle of Mortain was still ragirg.-3,

The propo:sed 1 irk-u.p po:int of the two: army grouIIps (Bradley's l-

AG and Montgomery' s 21 AG) was in Ar-gentan, some few mi les north o--f

the AG boundary. Montgomer-y allowed that deviat ion because he felt

Patton could get there in t ime to: seize vital German escape

riou~tes.--31 Or 10 Augu.st Patton kicked off his mianeuver, into. the

German rear- with XV Corps heading north fr-orii LeMans towar-d Al1e r-. I: ril

Pt that po:int Patton realiZed the develo:ping theater- strategic

objectivye, The purpose of this -operat ion is to s urrund arid

destr-oy the German Ar-my west of the Seire. 31 To: the Ger-mans, this

posed a ser-ious thr-eat. To them, the comrbined wareuvers of Pattc'r,

and the Canadian's TOTALIZE seemed co'ordinated. The loss of Allercors

on 10 August increased their- apprehensi.:n. 3

Hit ler- had been pressur-ing von Klu~ge to r-enew his counterattack

at Mortain with Eberbach as a r-eplacement for- vonr Funick. But the

combined effects oif TOTALIZE, stiffening pressure at lortamii aria

Patto-n' 5 cuit north pre-emipted a renewal. Instead of attacking west.

pressure in the Germrian rear- caused them to try to c,:outrrat tacit

So:utheast into XV Corps' flank.- I

Sormet ime between 10 August arnd XV Corp' s Arrival ini the

vicinity of Argertan c*:r 12/13 August, this effort ceased to be ani

*:perat iorial mrieuver, arid became part of the Battle of

Argentan-Falaise (see map 5, p38). On 13 August, Hamslip actually

pu-shed past Argertan but Bradley quickly called him back for fear- cf

runtrning into the Canadijans who were push ing dorwn fr'c',ril the riortih.

Mont goriery had previously passed Bradley the order ril:t to al low- an..'

of XV Corps north of Argentarj.Or So while Patton sat at Argentari or;

13 August the Canadians wer-e still niorth of Falaise pushing souI~th

Agairst stiff resistance. 37 The -Erid Brit ish Army Co:riti ruled to pu.s

southeast arid 1st US Ar-my pushed east at the rnose o-f the peretrat i.:'r-

with V arid XIX Corps. VII Corps cut northeast, clo-sing a gap th.3t

had existed between 1st Army arid 3rd Army's XV Cp.aThe Allies3

% % % %

S

were attacking the Gerrians from three different direct ions,

operating on exterior lines of operation in their concentric attack.

Meanwhile, German elements were streaming east to escape the %shrinking pocket.

As Patton stewed because his XV Corps had to hold the shoulder

at Argentan, the Canadians continued to have difficulties closing

the pocket. Montgomery inexplicably failed to strengthen the

TOTALIZE operation but rather beefed up the 2nd British Arrily which

had the effect of pushing Germans out of the pocket rather than

closing it." On 14 August, Bradley, feeling that most of the

German Army had escaped the trap, allowed Patton to head east tc, -arc

Dreux with two divisions and XV Corps headquarters. The three

divisions remaining at Argentarn became the elements of the new V

Corps when that headquarters assumed control after being pinched out

of line elsewhere.-°

On 16 August, while the Canadians struggled so,,uth of Falaise to..

close the pocket, a vicious German counterattack struck V Corps at

Argentan. Bradley and Montgomery realized that significant numbers

of Germans rerained in the pocket and were trying to get o'ut. 41

Accordingly, Montgomery designated a new link-up at Charib,-is,

allowing the Americans to move northeast. By 19 August, US unitsand Polish elements cf Ist Canadian Armiy linked tenuo, usly at

Charnbois. Between 20-21 August another German co.unterattac!b brJ!--

out some elements at Chambois before the pocket was firnally c1,_cSU

for good or 21 Auglst."2 While Patton was streamiing east, 1st Ar,y,

1st Canadian and 2nd British Armiies were cleaning c:ut the p,-cIet.'

On I August M:ntgomery told Bradley that iF the

Argentan-Falaise trap failed he was to continue again with the .Ider-

envelopment to the Seine. ' Bradley was therefor-e ,,l wing

Montgomery's intent when he allowed Patton t., send Haislip's XV

Corps with the 5AD and 79ID east toward Dreux on 14 August. P at tor

moved his XX and XII Corps east at the same time. - '

This continuation of the pursuit was vintage Patton. His

philosophy for, a turning rmovement which met stiff opp1s1 t ir, wa t, -

break off part of the force and send it further to the rear for" a

wider envelopment.*r XV Corps' move to Dreux was exactly tnat.

9

; " "P' ' -'" . . . . . . . ....... "4 # ' .-""- "°"'. . . . .""". ... . ". . . . . . . . . . . .

Furthermocre, XX arid XII Corps' pu.rsuit east o:ver- a broad front was

in step with Patton's realization that ".. .mass was not the critical

asset -for success in pursuit; speed was". 47

While 2nd Brit ish, 1st Canadian, arid 1st US Armies were closirig

and moicpping up the Argentar-Falaise po:cket, a second arid wider Z

envelopmiernt in accordance with Montgoriiery' s original scheme was

occurring simultarneo:usly as Patton raced toward the Seine. At th~s

point a third, even larger envelo:pment had also just begun. Or 15

August elements of LTG Patch' s 7th US Army hit the beaches rear-

Marsei lies and Toulon in southern France as part of operation

DRAGOON '"I(map 6, p3g).

DRAGOON was developed as a comnplimtertary attack. to for-m part of

gigantic double ernvelopmenit with OVERLORD. Lack of larding craFtIforced its p':stpsorement. However-, it was to serve other, purposes

too, such as gett irg more American divisions into the war, sooner',

linking up with the French Forces of the Interior,, opening mior~e

badly reeded ports such as Marseilles anid finally, assisting in .

covering the southern flank. of the Normandy o::perat ions.4 The fall1

of Orleans to XII Corps On 16 Au.gust cormbirned with the DRAGOON

landings forced the German High Command to give u~p southwest

France.2511 y the t ime 7th US Army 1lirked with 37rd US Army in ceritrae~l

France on 11 September, over half the German forces in South arc

southwest Frarce had escaped.251 As with Argertan-Fala i se, thme

gigantic OVERLORD-DRAGOON ervelopmient had trou-able sealing the t r'ap

and destroying the enemy.%

As DRAGOON pushed rort h, Patton wasted no t ime in push inrg h is

troops eastward. XV Corps pul led out of Argenitan on 15 August and

too:k Dreux on 16 August, the samie day that XII Corps lunrder, its new

co-rImarder-, MG Eddy. took Orleans. On 18 Atjgust, Walker'S AX Cor-CS

took. Chartres arid the Paris-Orleanis gap was closed. Als,: or 13

August, 1st Army's XIX Corp was pi nched out of act ion near the nio~n

% of the Argertan-Falaise pocket arid sent east to extend the ft.:nit

farther to the right. This filled the gap between V Co:rps clcz.r- N

the po~cket arid XV Corps heading toward the Seine.

After taking Dreu.x, XV Corps was again headed east by -rad ley.

r-eaching Mart es-Gass i curt :ri the Se ine by 18 Augus~t. itell1i gence

1 C:)

V--e.,

sources estirmated that some 75000 troops and 25C) German tanks were -.

still west of the Seine. Bradley therefore proposed to:. Mortg,_miery

that they truck sorme British divisions around to Mantes-Gassicourt

and let them attack north down the west side ,-of the Seine, cutting

behind the remnants of 7th German Army and 5th Parzer Army. .t

Montgomery declined the offer but allowed as how Bradley should try

the maneuver with a proposed link up at Elbeuf. - Meanwhile, on 19

August Eisenho-,wer, ordered exploitat-ion beyond the Seine =-'(sketch 3.

p43).

On the night of 19 August, 79 ID from XV Corps crossed the

Seine at Marites-Gassicourt and established a bridgehead. They a! -"

attacked elements of Army Group B' s headquarters. The next day, 5

AD of XV Corps and recently arrived XIX Corps of 1st US Army

attacked north toward Elbeuf with the missior of destroying German

units still west of the Seine. Concurrently, the British and

Canadians were swinging east and northeast toward the Seine. XIX

Corps entered Elbeuf on 25 August and linked up with Canadian units

there on 26 August, closing yet ano-,ther pocket. UnfOrtuinately, fromr "

Elbeuf to the Channel thousands of Germans again escaped in any

improvised fashion they could n(map 7, p40).

Simultaneous with the Elbeuf operation, Patton's XX and XII

Corps drove east in accordance with Eisenhower's 19 August directive

to exploit beyond the Seine. (Fortunately, the Allies' abundance cfz '-'

forces and the disorganized state .:f German defenses w:uld allow--

these divergent lines of operation). Moving as much as 11C.) kmi per

day, MG Eddy's XII Corps reached Troyes o:n 25 August arid established

a bridgehead across the Seine. North of that Walker's XX Corps

established three bridgeheads that same day 01(map 7, p40). The

entry of 2nd French AD into Paris ,-rn 25 August was almcst

anticlimactic for the Allies who continued their o-perations orr the

.:'6th with Patton heading toward the Meuse River.

IV Discuss ion of Operational C-,nncepts and Terms

A. General (Theater Strategic Objectives, Sequenced Actvities,

Branches and Sequels)

August 1944 was orne of the rm:st startlingly s!ccezsaful mo:nths ..

i..-S..

ir the annals of American military history. The Allies gained the

initiative on 25 July with the breakout at St. Lo (COBRA) ard never

lost it. Hitler's counterattack at Mortair (LUTTICH) was a vain

attempt to regain the initiative, but it failed because ':f the

determination of the American soldiers at Mortain and the will of

the generals who c:ntirued with the envelopment at that tiriie. - ' .

Patton's cut north at LeMans with XV Corps, Montgcmery's Canadian

operation TOTALIZE, the DRAGOON landings, XIX and XV Corps' cut

north toward Elbeuf, and finally Patton's crossing of the Seine ard

continuatior to the Meuse kept the Germans off balance. They

continually reeled under the successive blows struck by the Al1ies

that seemed almost Providentially sequenced.

Was this then operational art at its finest? One must conclude

that these major operations were successful even though tactical .1is

errors such as short bombings and the failure to riove arry group..-"".

boundaries were frequently made. However, the Allies did have an

overall campaign plan, such as it was, starting with the rission

directive given to Eisenhower. That plan evolved over time arid

became more distinct in terms of commander's intent, with input fr-,m "-Bradley, Montgomery and Eisenhower. Montgomery's decision to

envelop the Germans and pin them against the Seine and Eisenhcwer's .

directive to pursue beyond the Seine are indicative. Though perhaps

riot well thought out initially, (i.e.,taking Brittany ports which

became useless due to the rapid advance east), the carpaigr plan as

it evolved provided a framework or outline for stringing together

tactical successes (arid failures) leading to the strategic objective

of destroying Army Groi:up B. The plan guided tactical acticrs (-zee

chart 4-relationships of the operational art, p32).

According to FM 1-5, a good plan takes irit, corsider'atiC,r,

branches and sequels. Branches are "...optiors fo:,r changing

dispositions, orientation, or direct ion of moveriert". -- They are

frequently expressed as cointirigency plans to a campaign plan, which

help the cormander, anticipate enemy act iors :or responses and plar,

for them in advance. ° Sequels are plans for, future battles

following a preceding battle or effort. Sequels anticipate anc plar,

for future act ions after success, defeat or stalemate.6" The Allies

712

%7 5- *

demonstrated the use of bran~ches arid sequels to a 1limiited degree

* during August. Bradley arnd Patton at least mental ly formulated a

branch when they held up a few divisions near, St.Hilaire in case the %

expected German counterattack had unexpected success. Pat ton

already had the genesis of a branch when he told MG Haislip in early

August to be prepared to cut north into the flank. arid rear of the

7th German Army n~ear Argenitan. B~ooth of these instances show that

the Allies' anticipation of likely enem~y actions which would effect

their, plans enabled them to react successfully. The Allies

developed sequels too-plans for future operat ions. Or, 11 August,

Montgomery told Bradley to co:nt inue with the larger, enveloprient t,'

the Seine if the planned Argentan-Falaise trap failed. This was '

Montgomery's planned sequel for a failure or defeat. Arid, in fact,

this sequel was implemiernted when Bradley had Patton break off mo'st

of XV Corps and head toward Dreux on 14/15 August. E iseriho-wer

developed a sequel for su~ccess when he ordered exploitat ion beyond

the Seine on 19 August. This led directly to Pattor,'s rapid advance

and seizure of the Seine bridges south of Paris arid the subsequent

cont inucous pursuit towards the Meuse River later, in~ the month.

These examples of branches and sequels do riot pretend to

demonstrate fully developed contingency plants n:r, plans for f.t 'rs

operat ions but rather 11llustrate the co:ncept of branches arid seq 1-e s

with which successful operat ionial commanders (art ists) miust deal.

F-M 100-5 Onerat ions describes operat ional art as ".... the

employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater

of war or theater of operations through the design, organizat ion and

conduct of campaigns arid majo-r ioperat ions'." - It consists O:f

sequencing tactical events to lead to theater- strategic objecti,.es

or intermediate object ives. Operat ionial art is the 1link. betweenr

strategic object ives arid tact ical events. Witho~ut some so-rt --f

logical sequence leading to a planned cozriclusionr which attains one' S

goals, tact ical even~ts, evert successes, may just be randomu events

that do rioit produce the desired result.r--- Clausewitz saw this

connect ion when he stated that, "Strategy (read operat ional art, is

the use of engagements (tact ical events) for the purpose of war-

(attaining strategic go:as) . - The central quest iors o-f the

13

operational art are:','

..

1) What military conditions must be produced to achieve the

strategic goal (the ends)?

2) What sequence of events, if successfully arranged, will most

likely result in the desired military condition (the ways)?

3) How should resources be applied to produce that sequence of % .

events (the means)?.. 1

The ends mentioned above are the goals and objectives of a J

campaign or major :perat ion, expressed in terms of military

conditions. An example might be to have a corps in possession of a

river system within 20 days, effectively cutting off supplies to ar,

opposirng army. The ways are the plans or campaign plan; the

sequencing. The means are the resources and smaller sub-events Asesa

to prosecute the plan, such as divisions, corps or close-air

support.

Given the definitioni of operational art and its central

questions, were the Allied operations across France in August 13 +

good example? The answer must be yes. The rilissi,:r dir,'ective giver:

Eisenhower established the theater strategic object ies. The Al-ies

followed the pre-ordained but evolving sequence ,f ldgaert,

build-up, breakout, pursuit into Brittany, DRAGOON, arc attempted

trap of German Army Gro:up B against the Seire. T ey applied their-

resources in a manner prescribed by their, plan. Yes, there wer.e

problems and the objectives were not clearly focused whern they

started, but eventually they settled or the goal of destroying Arriv '

Group B, and planned accord ingly.

B. Center ,:f Gravity (sketch 4, p 4 4 )

According to FM 100-5, the essence of :,per-at i:cra I ar't 1 5 itm "

... identification of the enemy's oper'at ral certer :.f gr ' it/ an-d

the concentration :if superior combat power against that p,: nt t

achieve decisive success. *& This is in c,:,r,cer-t w la isewit:' s

assertion that the first step in campaign plarning is to, deterrnl e

the enemy's centers :f gravity and trace them bacw t.:. a single -:ne

if possible. The second step is to plan the cricertratl,,n :,f y,:,, r,

forces o-,n that point.

14

L

fA.,2%'

According to Clausewitz, the center of gravity is the "...hub

of all power and moverment, on which everything depends" arid is

developed by the characteristics of your enemy.1 The FM also

recognizes this and refers to Clausewitz quite often. However, where

the FM alludes to multiple centers of gravity in an opponent, such

as critical fighting units and command and control facilities,

Clausewitz felt that at a given level of war (tactical, ,=,peratic, nal

or strategic), centers of gravity could be reduced to a single

center of gravity. If two distinct centers of gravity are present at

a given level, one might be facing more than one opponent; ri-ot an,

alliance, but two distinct opponents with their own agendas for

fighting.a In that case, if one center of gravity is k.nocked out

the other may continue without regard to that lo-ss. In an alliance,

the loss of one member can drastically change the resoluti:r of the

remaining members. Clausewitz understood that in an allied army, the

alliance itself could very well be the center of gravity. 7 0 His

assertion that it is the "hub" is really m:re applicable to the .

strategic realm. The center of gravity of Germany in WW II may have

been Hitler. Frederick the Great's center o_-f gravity was his arr.y.

The USSR's ciurrent center- of gravity co:uld be the Pol it buro:, whi le

NATO's center of gravity may be the alliance itself, or its most .'.

influential member, the US. Though this center :-f gravity miay fall r

within the purview of the operational artist, and in fact drive h1s

campaign plan to a strategic objective, within that campaign are

major operations, each with their o, wn center of gravity.

In essernce, Clausewitz felt that in most cases, the opposing

army's center of gravity was the bulk of his cormbat forces. T,-,day,

due to the increase in number, size and sophist ication of weap,:rry,

and the different methcods of applying cominbat force, (e. g. air-power,

naval gunfire, long-range artillery, armor, and irmproved corimarid arid

control) this might be better referred to as the "bulk of his comrlbat

power". This combat power is corIprised of leadership, maneuver.

firepower, and protectio:n.7 1 Clausewitz felt that a rmajor battle was

the collision between two centers of gravity, and that the more

forces concentrated in ,-ne, the more effective it would be. T,:"-

Clausewitz, "...battle was the true center o-f gravity of the war,",

415

and ". .. destruction of the enemy forces the overriding principle ofwar 7a•- . ..

Bradley understood this when :n 8 August he realized that

because of the LUTTICH counterattack the Germans had moved their

*center of gravity" too far west, making therm vulnerable. To whori -r,

what was Bradley referring? He might have been referring to the bulk

of the 7th German Army and elements of 5th Pz Army then well west of .. -

the Orne River. Perhaps he was referring tc, the counterattack force

itself, the XLVII Panzer Corps with less than 250 tanks. Whichever,

he was obviously referring to a large combat formation, one that he

and Mortgomery tried to destroy, first at Argentan-Falaise and then

at Elbeuf. Bradley's (and Clausewitz's) concept of center cf

gravity had a slightly different slant to it than the ore in FM

1C0-5. At the operational level, theirs usually dealt with the

prepondErance c:f the enerly's array or combat forces (combat power in .

today's terms).

The FM discusses many different things that may be considered a

center of gravity, such as a large force, a boundary, a commarnd and

control center or a logistics facility. 7 Here, either the terra,"center of gravity" 'is incorrect (perhaps use "source of cohesion'

or "glue") or scre of the examples given are not really centers cf

gravity, but merely methods o:f attack or weaknesses leading to a

center ,:'f gravity. Attacking down a boiundary is riot attacking a

center of gravity. It may divide a center o:f gravity in two, riaiein-

it easier, t':, defeat, but it is riot the center of gravity. Taking

out a command and control facility is not necessarily destrcoying a

center ':f gravity. It may leave the center of gravity blind arid

stumbling, making it easier to defeat, but it is riot always a center

of gravity or the bulk 'of coribat po,wer. .- -

Combat power consists of leadership, maneuver, firep, wer, and 7

protection. The destruction of a WW II German corps headquarters

would probably riot have destroyed that corps' center of gravity

because cf the decentralized leadership style and rissiori-order

spirit fo,'stered in the German Army. The subcordinate d ivislons would

have c':ntinued with their missions as they supposed their

headquarters wanted. The center of gravity :f a German army was down ..4-

. °° - . * .. . , . ,*. .* 5... . . . .. .. .. . . . .

0% ." "- [

I2'

in its cormbat forces. Or, the other hand, the destruction of a WW II

Soviet corps or army headquarters could have had ruinous effects cn

an operation due to the Soviet style of centralized crtrol. In that

case, a command and control facility could have housed the bulk ,f

the combat power and be considered a center cf gravity.

Clausewitz never finished revising On War and made a point cf

the fact that his center of gravity was a fuzzy crcept.-4 He used

it both as "glue", when he called it the hub of all power, and as

the bulk of the enemy's ar-my when he used it in its clearest

analogy. The concept is still fuzzy today because we mix center cf

gravity with methods of attack and "sources ,f cchesir" cr " g ue

In today's terms, perhaps one could consider the center ,-,f gravity

as the bulk of an army's combat power, where comibat power is made up

of leadership, maneuver, firepower-, and protecticr,. One cf these

will be central or key; thus the prime s,-,urce of combat pcwer car

ns-,mally be traced back to a single center ,:,f gravity, though there

may be a myriad of ways to attack it.

I

C. Culminating Point (sketch 5, p45)

In early August, when Hitler decided to counterattack toward

Avranches, the German Arrily had already beer pushed passed its

defensive culminating point. What does that mean' Surprisr ngy, s r..Y

100-5 is silent or this point, but Clausewitz is rc c. He statec

that the defensive point of culmination "...will necessarily be

reached when the defender must make up his mind and act, wher, te

advantages of waiting have been completely exhausted" arid "...tne

effect of the general losses to which the defender has ccritinuallyv

exposed himself are finally catching up with him'."

When ':n the defense, time normally favors the defender as the

attacker stretches his lines thin and partisan gr,:ups attack his

lines ,:,f communication. However, in Norrrandy, time was rurirg .:ut

for Germany. The eastern front tied dowr too rrany :f its troos ar.

the Allies were getting close to turning the c,-rner into Erittary,

thus breaking o'ut of the Ccotentin peninsula and irit,- the rear -IF

Arnmy Gr,:up B. The time f,r LUTTICH was just prior t , l:sing

Avranches (or immediately after losing it) when the Germans were

17

-"s .°%-

. . . . - . . - W' I - - - - - . .- _- _ :.

still close erough pcssibly t,:, succeed. Instead, they attacked at

ridnight ,-,n 6/7 August when they were to: far away from Avranches

and without enough force. In the words of an AMSP Seminar Leader,

the defensive culminating point is "Old Milwaukee Time", i. e. "It

just doesn't get any better than this". As l ong as the Germans

held the Allies in the Cotentin, they produced significant

casualties while grudgingly giving ground. However, ,-,nce the Allies

got past Avranches in significant number and widened the gap between

Avraniches and the Germans, it was to:, late.

When LUTTICH finally was launched on 6/7 August with the

objective of cutting off the twelve divisions that had passed

through the gap and reestablishing a defensive line, it struck withn

less than five divisions in lieu of the planned two or three tank --

corps. It became a tactical coiunterattack with operational designs

and consequences. As a result, LUTTICH reached its :ffensive

culminating point in less than a day.

What is an offensive culminating point; how does c, ne see it

coming and why is it so impo-rtant? FM 100-5 describes it as, ".a

point where the strength of the attacker ro longer significantl .

exceeds that of the defender and beyond which contirued operatir,:s

risk overextension, counterattack and defeat". The FM continues, % 11

"...at that point, the attacker either halts or goes on, riskinr.

beco:ming weaker than the defender".- These definitions are der-lved

fr_-rii Clausewitz, but he went on to say m-,re simply, it is the

point where remaining strength is just enough to, maintain a

defense". -

Why is this co,'ncept important) Because the goal of attack is

to reach o-ne's '-bjective prior t,:, one's culminatirg point while

goal of the defense is to bring on the enemy's culminatir as ear-ly

as possible, recognize it as such and counterattack.. Reaching

one's objective before culminating implies that one should be able

to determine a cullinatirig point in advance. If so,, there rmlust be -

several indicators .:f an impending culmiinating point. Both

Clausewitz and the FM agree that there are. The key may be

reco, gnit ir of the crontri buttcrs t,:, the culmin at ion.

Perhaps the biggest c:rtribut, cr tc' culrminatirg is what the

18 .I ...

% % " .- - % % % " % - - . - - -. - . . . . . . . ....., . "- "%" . ". " "% °% " , -•. -. - - • . ,- '

I 7-

opposing force does. Whereas a virtually u.ri',ppcsed attack into, a

distant country might eventually culminate due to overextended

supply lines and partisan activity, the action of the o:'pposirng armly

can certainly hasten culmination. Weather and terrain car, certainrly

contribute, such as the advent of winter snow and ice or the change

from rolling steppes to urban sprawl. Subjective factors such as

troop morale may also contribute.

Contributors must be kept in maind when planning an attack or a

defense. During actual operations, one should keep eyes open for'

factors that indicate approaching culmination. This is importart to

the attacker to insure he does not go past his culminatirg pcoint

Without either stopping or slowing for a build-up, or without

realizing the risks he takes in proceeding. Sorimetimes it rmay be

worth the risk to leap past one's culrnirat ing point to pursue a

routed enemy, if that pursuit logically leads to a theater strategic

or intermediate objective. It is important to the defender to

realize when his opponent is approaching his culminating point ir, -.

order to prepare his counterattack, unsheathing his "flashing sword

of vengeance". 01 Indicators of an impending culminatirng pcint might

be increased battle losses, more POW's, less ground lost/day,

maintenance problems, increased desertions, shortages in fuel, etc.

When planning an offensive, especially at the operationral

level, it is important to estirmate where the offersive culiirati,

point may be. If it is beyond the objective, well and goo-d, but if

it is short of it, then one must plan for an operati, nal pause ,r

halt short of or at the culminating point (permitting the

maintenance of a successful defense) while strength is rebuilt. .. is

then requires phasing :f operations. The Allies had plarnec an

operational pause at the Seine, but due t: their overwhelming

superiority and key :perational maneiuver, they were able t-, accept -t

the risk, seizing br-idgeheads on the Seine and c,:rt in uring thepursuit without a pause. It is difficult in advarn ce to pin diwn a

culiinating point on a map and say that the Army or Ar-ry Group wi 2 I

culminate there, thus requiring a pause. However, the cornarder

must be able to at least estimate when and where he will culminate

e" and plan accordingly. This might be expressed as, "We will plan a

19.

- -- A - _ .....

9P%

'"" two day Pause 10-14 days after D-Day, in the vicinity cof 100-120C- Prn .l

" ." .

S north of the Doe River". In other words, the cumntn pon

might be expressed irn term~s of ranges,i

A tactical offensive culmtinating point is very ,-,ften_ quickly .

reached because of the speed at which things o::ccur at the tactical ".

level and the relatively small distances covered. Hc,.,Yever, the

concept is still useful. In planning a tactical offense, relative '

.- ,

comdbat power, terrain and weather become key factors contributirng t

a culminating point, whereas overextended LOC's might be less

important. Indicators of a tactical culmiating pint for the-

attacker or defender ight be slackening fire, decreased vehicular

traffic, and relaxed pressure on the front lines. .:et

The Allies recognized the advent of LUTTICH's cul ination roi 7

August when they saw Pan e units pulling off the roads, installing .

caMOuflage nets and digging in. Tactically, the Germas wereprobably just at their culminating point, for their ground

against the forces of VII Corps fcr two or three days.

Operationally, when VII Corps was strengthened by the attachments o:

35 ID and 2 AD-), XLVII Panzer Corps culd not hld its irord ad N

ultimately had to yield.

D. Decisive Terrain (sketch 6, p46) ..

FM1o5dfnskey terrain as a feature, lo_-cality o=r area .which gives a distinct advantage to the side that controls it.

Decisive terrain is described as terrain which m~ust be Seized o~rheld to accomplish the mission. Furthermore, the crl thder should

designate decisive terrain as such prior to: the conduct .:if the

mission, if at all po=ssible. " Basically, if c, ne carn lose the

terrain and still accom~plish the rmission, it is rio-t decisive -terrain•.

aaShortly after IDf VII Corps moved irto Mrt.in

Au.guAst, MG Collins told MG Huebner, Comrmnand er of I ID, to, insure hetook Hill 317; it appeared to donate the entire area. Huebrter cf

• .4-'.

r l im e ly t ha d t y l a d . "r a ta e -. In - C l - ".. - " " .

D.t decisive terrain (.-.hskec 6,orint pro46)heLTT

desuneattdcisivelterraih a.-Iis such protrivy the cUT ifntecpt

Y. 7 ..

and information about LUTTICH, he could see the ccr,diticns were ripe

for a German counterattack.) Hill 317 and its occupants played a

major and decisive role in stopping LUTTICH. Although other factors

certainly contributed to slowing the counterattack, the dominart

position afforded by Hill 317 allowed the artillery forward

observers of the 2-120 to see the entire c.unterattack area, 25 kmi

east to Do.mfront and 32 km west to Avranches. They could see all

columns of the 2nd SS Pz Div in the vicinity of Mortain, which was

LUTTICH's only bit of success. The artillery fire called down from .-i :

Hill 317 was so devastating that the Germans themselves described

the hill as a "thorn in the flesh".

-% So Hill 317 was tactically decisive terrain. Without it 30 ID

could not havL held close to Mortain and VII Corps would have had to

take actions other than it did. But was it ', peratinrally decisive?

Operationally key terrain is normally thought of features like r-a

cr rail nets, Mountain ranges or river systems. Operati,-nally

decisive terrain might be a rail net running laterally behind

friendly lines allowing rapid shifting of forces to counterattack ,r,

reinforce success. If an operation depends on the ter-rain for

success and will fail without it, then it is decisive. In the case

of Hill 317, a strong argument can be riade that it was operati,,r, a I "

as well as tactically decisive. Had Hill 317 r,'t held, not only

would VII Corps have been put in ar untenable posit, n but s,: wc,*!d

have Patton's 3rd Army, at least in Bradley's rmlind. Bradley allowed

Patton to proceed because he knew that Collins had p.: sitxc, red his 4

ID and CCB, 3 AD in good locati,-,ns to blurt a court erat tack and that -

2 AD(-) was unco:,mmitted and headed in Collins' directi,-,r." ,

Additionally, Bradley had the foresight to meet witn Patter, to S t.ic

the 35 ID near St. Hilaire just in case. Had Hill 317 fallen, St.

Hilaire might have faller prior to the 35 ID s arrival arid Bradley

might have stopped Patton altogether. Operationally decisive terrain "--

is then that terrain which must be seized or, retained if proposed

operational maneuvers are to be conducted. %

E. Lines of Operation (sketch 7, p47)

FM 100)-5 defines iines ,-f operat i or as "... directioral -

-- r Pe

orientatiorn of a force in relat ion to the enemy". These 1lines

connect the base or bases o:f operation with the o:bjective. Normially

a campaign or major coperationr will have a single line of operation,

ii""S

though multiple lines are not uncommon. A single line of operatior

is easier to coordinate arid best used when reso, urces are short.

Multiple lines are best used from a position of strength, forcing

the enemy to disperse and making him even weaker. Multiple lines are

more difficult to coordinate." When the Allies landed at N,:,rmardy

they were operating on a single line of operation; straight ahead tc,

establish a beachhead, although there were certainly rultiple routes

within that line leading fr:,m the base of operation in southern

d'e England to Omaha, Utah, Gold, Sword and Juno beaches. By mid-August,

they were operating on multiple lines, with Montgomery's 21 AG

driving south towards Falaise and Bradley's 12 AG driving east, 4 P

northeast and north with 1st Army and XV Corps, and further east

with the rest of 3rd Army. The Allies had the attendant problems of

synchronization.

A related historical concept is that of irterior and exterior : -r

:'- lines. Interior lines diverge from a central point and are usually

used by the weaker force to shift forces laterally between separate

parts of the enemy. When on interior lines, one's force is usually

closer to a part of the enemy than the latter- is to its other

" parts.10 Baron de Jomini, a contemporary of Clausewit=, first

. promoted the idea of operating on interior lir,es and the inherent . :

advantage of central position. + Jackson operated o:n interior l ines

4 during his Shenando-ah campaign. The Germans operated or interir-

lines during August as the Allies enveloped arid trapped them.

Operating on interior lines often mears shifting a single

concentrated force fromi one location to another, using a single lne

of operation. On a larger scale, although Germany had interior .

position in WW II, it f:,ught on multiple lines of operation against

the Russians in the east arid the Allies in the west.

Exterior lines converge on the enemy from more than one

direction. This usually requires a stronger force and offers the

opportunity to encircle and destroy an opposirng force. a The Allies

were operating -,n exterior lines during the Battle of the

Argentan-Falaise pocket and again during the Elbeuf ,operati n. Or a

larger scale, they were Operating or exterior lines when the DRAGOON

forces attacked north from Marseilles, while the OVERLORD forces

were attacking east toward the Seine. By their very nature, exterior

lines imply multiple lines of operation, yielding the concomitant

difficulties of coordination.

Clausewitz saw this relationship between single and multiple

lines of operation and interior and exterior lines of operation. He

expressed it as two pairs of opposites. The first pair was:

outflanking the erermy (exterior lines) or operating on interior

lines. The second pair was then either: concentratirg forces (single

line of operation; forces are often concentrated on interior lines)

or extending them river numerous posts (multiple lines of operatior;

forces on exterior lines always use this in some fashion)." m In

other words, interior lines may yield single or multiple lines of

operation but the chances of outflanking an enemy are nil. Exterior

lines always yield multiple lines of operation and potential

synchronization problems, but they also offer the opportunity to

outflank the enemy. *1When planning a campaign or major operatir, one m.st take into,

consideration probable lines of operation and relative strengths. A .

plan requiring a significantly inferior force to, divide itself arid

attempt to attack the enemy from two: directions (exterior and

multiple lines) should be suspect. However, lines of operation must

not be overemphasized. Jackson arid Lee divided their forces in the

face of Hooker's Overwhelming numerical superiority at

Chancellorsville, falling on the Union flank to cause griev:,us

damage. On the other hand, during the Battle of the Argentan-Falaise

pocket, the Allies, or, exterior lines from a position of strength,

reaped only a partial victory (thousands of Germans escaped the

pocket) due to lack of coordination and fierce German breakout

measures. Lines ,:,f operatior, are a way of describing one's posit icrl

and orientation in relation to the enemy, inherent ir which are

certain advantages and disadvantages. 77

*l'.

F. Operational Maneuver (sketch 8, p 4 8 )

S.'3

{ 5.

Closely related to lines of operation is the concept of .

maneuver. This is the actual movement of forces over those lines of

operation. Clausewitz defined maneuver as "...a play of balanced

forces whose aim is to bring ab:ut favorable c:rditions for success

. and then to use them to gain an advantage over the enemy. ' " The FM

is very close to Clausewitz when it calls maneuver the "...movemer, t

of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional

advantage. "°1

According to the FM, operational maneuver "...seeks a decisive

impact on the conduct of a campaign (or major operatic,). It

attempts to gain advantage of position before battle and to, exploit

tactical successes to achieve operational results. "'- The

distinction between maneuver and operational r aneuver is n,:t totally

clear.

The Allied operatiors of late July and August 1944 give several

"*-, examples of operational maneuver. COBRA, launched on 25 July, was

- initially tactical in nature as the Allies sought limited objectives

in attempting to penetrate the German defensive lines. But the

effects of the Allied carpet bombing so disrupted and disorganized

the front line German units and command and control that MG Collins

was able to expand the effort into an operational maneuver. In this

case, firepower permitted the maneuver. By inserting his armored

formations into the gap created by the bombing and his first echeln

infantry divisions, Collins was able tc get deep behind German

lines, making positions on their left flank untenable. Collins'

maneuver set up the next planned tactical events, the taking cf the

Brittany ports. It also:, set up much more. It allowed Pattori's 3rd

*.. Army to escape the Cotentin Peninsula, int:, the soft rear of 7th

German Army, disruptirig command and control and lcgistics facilities

as they went. Ir sore respects, 3rd Army resembled an Operational

Maneuver Group :f the modern Soviet Army.

When the Germans counterattacked at miidnight 6/7 August,

Haislip's XV Corps did not stcp to help in the Battle cf Mortain.

*. Instead Bradley and Patton took advantage of the situation presented

and turned Haislip ncrth into the flank and rear of the 7th German

Army. XV Corps' maneuver transcended the current battle at Mortain,

.=14

J"

and instead set up the c:nditions for the next battle, that of the

Argentan-Falaise pocket. It was the link between Mortain ard

Argentan-Falaise. One of the evolving theater strategic

intermediate objectives at that time was the destruction of the 7th

Army. XV Corp's move north set up the conditions that wo, uld have

permitted firepower to exploit the maneuver to do just that, had it

been properly coordinated.

When the DRAGOON landings occurred on 15 Augu.tst they were the

beginnings o:'f a large scale operational maneuver in conjunctionr with

the continuing eastward thrust of the OVERLORD forces. The

threatened envel:,pment of 1st and 19th German Armies in south and

southwest France by the giant double pincer caused their evacuation.

This maneuver was not in itself concerned with the actions at

Falaise or Argentar, but looked beyond that battle to the eritrapment

and destruction of two German armies. Unfortunately, although it

caused the German's withdrawal, a large portion of those arrmlies

escaped. One must be careful here. Clausewitz disdained the use Of

maneuver for maneuver's sake. He felt that eventually one rust

close with and destroy the opposing army. Even though the DRAGOON

landings put much of the Ist and 19th German Armies in unsound

positions and they withdrew toward the Seine without a fight, the

SAllies still had to be prepared to close with and engage the erery.

. Part of 19th Army held the way open while much of the rest of it ar, d

*. the 1st Arrny escaped in August and early September.

On 14 August, Bradley gave Patt:rn permission t:. break. off part. of XV Corps from the engagement at Argentan and send it towards

Dreux. This was the beginning of an:ther operational maneuver as

Haislip's XV Corps began setting the stage for the next battle at

Elbeu.f while the Battle of Argentan-Falaise still raged. This

maneuver resulted in the cornbination of XIX arid XV Corps cutting

north behind the escaping Germans near the Seine while the British

and Canadians pressed in on them from the west.

Even while the action was developing near Elbeuf, another

operational maneuver occurred as Patton sent XX and XII Corps

streaming east, seizing four bridgeheads or the Seine s,:uth cf Paris

on -5 August. This maneuver looked well bey:nd the unfolded and

25

"... . . . . . . . .. -*. . . .* . .. . - * * . .

*- - -"T -. ._.-k V_ W T. -I-

unfolding battles of Mortain, Argentan-Falaise and Elbeuf and sought

to allow the cortinued pursuit across the Seine. It set Ip further

pursuit.

A quick glance at what some call operatioral maneuver wo-uld

lead one to believe that its essence lies in attacking an opponent's

flank or rear. Not so! Had Collins merely rolled up the flank of the

XLVII Panzer Corps during the LUTTICH counterattack, that would have

been merely a tactical maneuver for it considered only the irmediata

engagement. Haislip's flanking movement ard cut north to Argentar

looked beyond the Battle of Mortain ard set the stage for the next

battle, that of Argentan-Falaise. It was the direct link between ..-

the two. "Streaming deep" with no purpose is rot operational

maneuver either. A raid deep in enermly territory, even if conducted

by large forces, avails nothing if it does not lead to the next

battle or event in the sequence of events that leads to the

strategic objective.

What then is operational maneuver? Where operational art is

the link between tactics and strategy, operational maneuver is the

vehicle which the operational artist rides from tactical events to

strategic objectives. Operational maneuvers transcend current

battles, looking beyond them to the next sequenced activity.

Operational maneuver links tactical events and sets thermi up in th-,e

sequence that leads to the theater strategic objective or"i

intermediate object ive.

V Conclusions

As mentioned earlier, the Allied operations in France durir,

1-26 August 1944 provide a good contextual example .f the

operational art. In a paper of this length it would be impossible

adequately to note and discuss all the concepts and terms relevant J.

to the operatioznal art as ,-,utlined in FM 100-5. Nevertheless, the o

Allied operations provide good examples o:f several key concepts and

terms integral to the operational art to include: theater strategic

objectives, sequenced activities, branches and sequels, center of .7

gravity, culrinating point, decisive terrain, lines of operation and " 4

,perationial maneuver.

.p *.*. ~p.............' %V'~ *.*\N** , ................................................................................................................

..'

Two notes of caution: first, during the operations of August

1944, the Allies had virtual air supremacy. Much of what they were

able to accomplish was greatly assisted by this fact. Sec,-rnd, the

organization of the US armies, corps, divisions, regiments and '4

armored combat commands was such that they were inherently flexible.

The corps had virtually no logistical responsibilites, whereas the

armies pushed supplies forward through the divisions to the

regiments and combat coarnads who in turn were responsible for final

delivery. This allowed rapid shifting of urits between headquarters

and rapid shifts in missions and directions.,4 Neither ,of these two

conditions are likely t,- exist if war, were to, break out in Europe

anytime soon. August 1944 operations are used to demrnstrate arid

clarify operatiorial concepts and terms, not to illustrate "how t: d,,

it next time". However, there are some obvious lessons.

The discussi,-,n of these concepts indicates that perhaps

defiritions as used in FM 100-5, Operations are not always complete.

Both Clausewitz and the FM are a little fuzzy on the concept ,f

center of gravity. Clausewitz used it to mean either the "glue",

cohesion or "hub" (source cf all power) in one sense, but then also

used it to mean the bulk of the enemy's forces in another. The FM

generally supports Clausewitz's concept of the "hub", i.e. the

cohesion or "glue" around which everything revolves, but

unfcortunately then mixes methods of attack into the concept (i. e.

bl:iundaries, command and cor trol facilities, etc. ). This ccncept

needs refinement. A center- of gravity is the point at which the

bulk of corimbat power is most concentrated. There is usually ore

center of gravity though there may be several ways to affect it.

The Allied ,:peratiions in August 1944 dermnstrated both the

concept ,:,f defensive point of culmiination'r and the culmiriating point

of an attack. Clausewit- discussed both of these concepts in Or,

War, yet the FM is silent on the matter :f defensive culminating

" points. This key concept deserves irclusi-n.

As the FM states concerning decisive terrain, often a battle ,:r

major operati-,n will have n',ne. At the tactical level, Hill 317 was

a good example ,f decisive terrain. It is conceivable that it was

-. operaticnally decisive also. However, whet, one tnirk.s of cperatonal -._-7

.

° 'F

terrain, one normally thinks of large features such as mountain

ranges, river systems or vast rail networks.

The Allied operations provide excellent examples of lines .:f

operations, both the current concept of single and multiple lines

and the historical concept of interior and exterior lines.

Surprisingly, the FM does not discuss the interrelationship of the

current and historical concepts of lines of operation. Though

related, the concepts are different, a fact Clausewitz apparently

understood. The FM is quick to point out that the importance cf

lines of operation should not be overstressed.

The FM provides a fair definition :f operational raneuver, but

until one sees it on the ground (or in this case reads about it with

maps and sketches) one might not have the complete picture. The

Allied operations frorm 25 July to 26 August provide five examples of

operational raneuver, demonstrating how it appears and what purpcse

it serves.

What then is the :perational art? The FM gives some very good

definitions, already stated. Realizing that both the Allies and the

Germans practiced operational art during August 1944 to varying

degrees, a look at just those operations in iso-,lation might create

the following definition:

The planning for and execution of the movementof large armed forces to and between tacticalevents and the sequercirg of those events tolead logically to a theater strategic orinterme iate strategic objective.

As with all definitions, this one lacks perfection. The best

definition will always reside with the understanding of the concepts

involved through diligent historical study, ore which is very

di'fficult to put into wo:rds. Just as a construct ior superintendent

sequences the activities of various subcontractors when building a _-

large edifice, while fighting off the effects of union strikes and

weather, so does the operational artist superintend his campaigr or

major operation. - If this paper helps the American Army officer

understand the nature and corrporents o:if this task, it has fully

served its purpose.

28 aI.; --.**.'

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ENDNOTES

I Forrest C. Pogie, The Suprermie Command (Washington, D.C. :Officeof the Chief of Mi itary History, 1954), p.53.

2 Vincent J. Espositoz,, The best Point Atlas :f American Wars. %Vol. II: 1900-1953(New Yo, k-Fraeger Publishers, 1972),map 5k.A

3 Ibid., maps 50,51.

4 Ibid., map 52.

5 Ibid., map 53.

6 Omar N. Bradle A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt andCompany, 1951), p. 65.

7 Ibid., p. 352.

8 Ibid., pp. 362-365.

9 Mart in Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit (Washingtori, D.C.Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961), p.454.

10 Bradley, p. 366.

11 Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhwer's Lieutenants (Blooimington,Ind. : Indiana University Press, 1981), pp. 1879,790.

12 Esposito, map 54.

13 Weigley, p. 190.

14 Bradley, pp. 369,370.15 Staff Group 9D, M,-,rtain-Auqust 1944: The Great Defensive

Battle, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC Battle Analysis, 1g 5, p. 14.

16 Richard Rohmer, Patton's Gap (New York: Beaufort Books,Inc.,1981), p. 179. 4

17 Blumenson, p. 461.

18 Bradley, p. 371.

19 Blumenson, p. 459.

20 J. Lawton Collins Lightning Joe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana StateUniversity Press, 19793, pp.T51,

21 Ibid., p. 255.

22 Weigley, pp. 196-198.

23 Collins, p. 253.

24 Weigley, p. 198.

25 Blumenson, p. 475.

26 Bradley, p. 374.

27 Collins, p. 253. ..

28 Weigley, p. 192.

29 Ibid. , pp. 195, 199.

30 Rohmer, p. 180.

50

=.- -. -,., . .-. .-, " -. ... ..-.,. - ,--. . ..-..[..-, ,.-, -. - -. - , . , .,-. .. - -, ..-. -.. , , .-. ..-. ,. .. ..• ,- .. .. . , -.. '...-

* 31 Weigley, p. 199. A

32 Ibid.

33 Blumenson, pp. 484,485.

34 Ibid., pp. 483,484. -'

35 Weigley, p. 206.

36 Rohmer, pp. 226, 227.

37 Weigley, p. 204.

38 Blumenson, p. 510.

39 Bradley, p. 377.

40 Weigley, pp. 209,211.

41 Blumenson, p. 205.

42 Ibid., p. 541.

43 Collins, p. 258.

44 Esposito, map 55.

45 Ibid.

46 MAJ George A. Higgins The Operational Tenets of Generals HeinzGuderian and Georqe S. Patton, Jr. (MMAS Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth,Kansas, 1985), p. 107.

47 Ibid., p. 118.

48 Esposito, map 57.

49 Weigley, pp. 218,219.

50 Blumenson, pp. 566,567.

51 Esposito, maps 56, 57.

- 52 Ibid., map 55.

* 53 Elbridge Colby, The First A-my in Eur-oe (Washington, D.C.: USGovernment Printing Office, 1,69), pp. 8..di.

54 Weigley, p. 241. .*

55 Esposito, map 55.

56 Weigley, pp. 242,243,246.

.0 57 Ibid.,p. 247.

58 Ibid., p. 197.

59 US Army, FM 100-5, Operations (1986), p. 31.

60 FM 100-5, p. 140.

61 Ibid.

62 US Army, Briefing Slides, "AirLand Battle", USACGSC(SAMS), Ft.

Leavenworth, Kansas, (1985), comments, slide 6.

63 Ibid., comments, slides 7,8.

64 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and Translated by Michael'-,' Howard and Peter Paret, (Prirceifon, New Jersey: Princeton University

51 ",*.

v i-I

- °-. -.. . - . * *'

Press, 1976), p. 177.

65 Briefing Slides, slide 9. "W

66 FM 100-5, p. 10. _

67 Clausewitz, p. 619. o .

68 Ibid., pp. 595,596.

69 Ibid., pp. 487,597.

70 Ibid., p. 486.

71 FM 100-5, pp. 12,13.

72 Ibid., pp. 248,258,485,489.

73 FM 100-5, pp. 179, 180.

74 Clausewitz, p. 486.

75 Ibid., p. 383.

76 LTC Kenneth Carlson, Classroom discussions, Seminar 1,CGSC(SAMS), Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1985-March 1986.

77 FM 100-5, pp. 109,181,182.

78 Clausewitz, p. 528.

79 FM 100-5, p. 181.

80 Clausewitz, p. 370.

81 FM 100-5, p. 80.

82 Collins, p. 250.

83 Weigley, p. 196.

84 Ibid., p. 197.

85 FM 100-5, p. 180.

86 Ibid., p. C-3.

87 Baron de Jomini The Art of War, Translated by CPT G.H. Mendelland LT W.P. Crai hill, (Westport, Corin.: Greenwood Press,Publishers, 1862?, p. 93.

88 FM 100-5, p. 181.

89 Clausewitz, p. 541.

90 Ibid.

91 Briefing Slides, slide 46.

92 FM 100-5, p. 12.

93 Esposito, map 57.

94 MAJ Glenn M. Harried, The Principles of Tactical Orqani~ati.:.riand Their Impact on Force Design in the US Arrmy, (iIMAS Mon'ograph,FT. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985), pp.

95 MAJ Marion Cain, Discussions during NATOEX-86, CGSC(SAMS), Ft.Leavenworth, Kansas, 19-28 February 1986.

96 Information for this chart came from several sources includingBreakout and Pursuit by Martin Blumenson and Soldier's Story by Oriar .

52

...

.

Brad Iey.

97 Ibid.

98 Information for this chart came from Breakout and Pursuit byMartin Blumenson.

99 Information on this chart was developed during classroom""discussions headed by LTC Kenneth Carlson, Seminar 1, CGSC(SAMS), .',

July 1985-March 1986.

100 Esposito, map 50.

101 Ibid., map 53.

102 Ibid., map 54.

103 Ibid., map 56.

104 Ibid., map 55.

* .'.

53g-

* b. '"

. ....-.

W~ a_P e4

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit. Washingtorn, D.C.: Office of

the Chief of Military History, 1961.

Bradley, Omar N. A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Ho-lt andCompany, 1951.

Clausewitz, Karl von. On War. Edited and Translated by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeto'rn University

Press, 1976.

Colby Elbridge. The First Army in Europe. Washington, D.C.: US

bovernment Printing Office, 1969.

Collins, J. Lawton. L'ghtnin Joe. Baton Rouge: Louisiana StateUniversity Press,19793..-

Esposito Vincent J. The West Point At las of American Wars, Vol. I:1906-1953. New York: Praeger Publishers, I

Jomini, Baron de. The Art of War. Translated by CPT G.H. Mendell andLT W.P. Craighill. Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, Publishers,

1862.

Pogue Forrest C. The Supreme Command. Washington, D.C. : Office ofthe Chief of Military History, 1954.

Rohmer, Richard. Patton's Gag. New York: Beaufort Books, Inc.,1981.

Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower's Lieutenants. Bloo:,mington, Ind.Indiana University Press, 1981.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

US Army. Briefing Slides, "AirLand Battle". USACGSC(SAMS). Ft.Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985.

US Army. Field Manual 100-5. Operations. Washington, D.C. : USGovernment Printing Office, May 1986.

THESES, STUDIES AND OTHER PAPERS

Harned, Glenn M. MAJ. The Principles of Tactical Organization andTheir Impact on ForceDesign in the US Army. Ft. Leavenworth,Rans as: MMAS Monograph, 1985.

Higgins, George A. MAJ. The Operational Tenets of Generals Heinz"Guderian and George S. Patton, Jr. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas:

MMAS ThesTs-,-985. ..

Staff Group 9D. Mortain-August 1944: The Great Defensive Batle. Ft.Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC Battle Analysis, 1985.

MISCELLANEOUS

Cain, Marion MAJ. Discussions during NATOEX-86, CGSC(SAMS). Ft.Leavenworth, Kansas, 19-28 February 1986. L "

Carlson, Kenneth LTC. Classroom discussions Semirar 1, CGSC(SAMS).Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1985-March 1986.

J* .4 '

54 4".4.