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Background Statement for SEMI Draft Document XXXX
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International
3081 Zanker Road
San Jose, CA 95134-2127
Phone: 408.943.6900, Fax: 408.943.7943
Letter (Yellow) BallotLetter (Yellow) BallotLetter (Yellow) BallotInformational (Blue) Ballothb kDocument Under DevelopmenthghghLetter (Yellow) Ballot1000ALetter Ballot5761A
DRAFT
Document Number: 5761A
Date: 5/18/2016
LETTER BALLOT
Informational (Blue) Ballot1000AInformational (Blue) Ballotjn l
Background Statement for SEMI Draft Document 5761A
NEW STANDARD: SAFETY GUIDELINE FOR USE OF ENERGETIC MATERIALS IN SEMICONDUCTOR R&D AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
Notice: This background statement is not part of the balloted item. It is provided solely to assist the recipient in reaching an informed decision based on the rationale of the activity that preceded the creation of this Document.
Notice: Recipients of this Document are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patented technology or copyrighted items of which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation. In this context, patented technology is defined as technology for which a patent has issued or has been applied for. In the latter case, only publicly available information on the contents of the patent application is to be provided.
The ballot results are scheduled to be reviewed and adjudicated at the meetings indicated in the table below. Check www.semi.org/standards under Calendar of Events for the latest update.
Background
Many processes used in manufacturing semiconductors require reactive chemistry; some of the process chemicals used are energetic materials, that is, they are hazardously exothermic, pyrophoric, or water reactive. Using some process chemicals (not only those just described) can produce byproducts that are energetic materials. Control mechanisms are in place to mitigate the risks of such materials. However, new and emerging materials, some with unknown properties, are continuously being introduced into research and manufacturing. As incidents involving energetic materials occur, the focus on hazards identification and control is a continuing priority.
SEMATECH formed an Energetics Working Group in 2012 to improve understanding methods that decrease the risk of using energetic materials in research and development and in high volume manufacturing. The working group included representatives from SEMATECH member companies, equipment suppliers, material suppliers, and industry consultants. SEMATECH published a compilation of methods in January 2013.
In early 2013, SEMATECH began meeting with representatives from the SEMI Standards EHS Technical Committee and representatives from the World Semiconductor Council, to acquaint them with this work and to receive inputs from a broader spectrum of stakeholders. These meetings resulted in second revision of the SEMATECH publication, which is currently available on the SEMATECH public website.
The SEMI MESSC and EHS Committee meetings at SEMICON West in July 2014 approved establishment of a Task Force to begin work on a SEMI Safety Guideline associated with energetic materials, based initially on the SEMATECH publication. Task Force meetings began in August 2014, and significant additional technical input was received.
The first ballot proposing a Safety Guideline for Use of Energetic Materials in Semiconductor R&D and Manufacturing Processes failed approximately one year ago.
Since then, the Task Force has reviewed and addressed all of the responses to the first ballot. This ballot is the product of that work.
If you have questions or concerns you would like to discuss before submitting your ballot, please contact the Task Force Leaders:
Andy McIntyre
Steve Trammell
As this is a Technical Ballot, you must submit your formal response to SEMI in the prescribed manner.
If you Reject or submit Comments on this ballot, please send a soft copy of your response to the Task Force Leaders.
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International
3081 Zanker Road
San Jose, CA 95134-2127
Phone: 408.943.6900, Fax: 408.943.7943
Letter (Yellow) BallotLetter (Yellow) BallotLetter (Yellow) BallotInformational (Blue) Ballothb kDocument Under DevelopmenthghghLetter (Yellow) Ballot1000ALetter Ballot5761ALetter (Yellow) BallotLetter (Yellow) BallotLetter (Yellow) BallotInformational (Blue) Ballothb kDocument Under DevelopmenthghghLetter (Yellow) Ballot1000ALetter Ballot5761
DRAFT
Document Number: 5761A
Date: 5/18/2016
LETTER BALLOT
Informational (Blue) Ballot1000AInformational (Blue) Ballotjn l
This is a Draft Document of the SEMI International Standards program. No material on this page is to be construed as an official or adopted Standard or Safety Guideline. Permission is granted to reproduce and/or distribute this document, in whole or in part, only within the scope of SEMI International Standards committee (document development) activity. All other reproduction and/or distribution without the prior written consent of SEMI is prohibited.
Page 2Doc. 5761A SEMI
Review and Adjudication Information
Task Force Review
Committee Adjudication
Group:
Energetic Materials EHS TF
EHS NA TC Chapter
Date:
SEMICON West 2016 Meetings
Wednesday, July 13, 2016 (tentative)
SEMICON West 2016 Meetings
Thursday, July 14, 2016
Time & Timezone:
12:30 PM to 2:00 PM PDT (tentative)
US Pacific Time
9:00 AM to 6:00 PM PDT
US Pacific Time
Location:
San Francisco Marriott Marquis Hotel
780 Mission Street
San Francisco Marriott Marquis Hotel
780 Mission Street
City, State/Country:
San Francisco, California 94103 USA
San Francisco, California 94103 USA
Leader(s):
Steve Trammell (EORM)
Andy McIntyre (EORM)
Chris Evanston (Salus)
Sean Larsen (Lam Research)
Bert Planting (ASML)
Standards Staff:
Kevin Nguyen (SEMI NA)
408.943.7997
Kevin Nguyen (SEMI NA)
408.943.7997
Safety Checklist for SEMI Draft Document #5761A
NEW STANDARD: SAFETY GUIDELINE FOR USE OF ENERGETIC MATERIALS IN SEMICONDUCTOR R&D AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
Developing/Revising Body
Name/Type:
Energetic Materials EHS Task Force
Technical Committee:
EHS
Region:
NA
Leadership
Position
Last
First
Affiliation
Leader
McIntyre
Andy
BSI EHS Services and Solutions (formerly EORM)
Leader
Trammell
Steve
SEMATECH and BSI EHS Services and Solutions (formerly EORM)
Author/Editor*
Sklar
Eric
Safety Guru
Checklist Author*
Sklar
Eric
Safety Guru
* Only necessary if different from leaders
Documents, Conflicts, and Consideration
Safety related codes, standards, and practices used in developing the safety guideline, and the manner in which each item was considered by the technical committee
# and Title
Manner of Consideration
Known inconsistencies between the safety guideline and any other safety related codes, standards, and practices cited in the safety guideline
# and Title
Inconsistency with This Safety Guideline
Other conflicts with known codes, standards, and practices or with commonly accepted safety and health principles to the extent practical
# and Title
Nature of Conflict with This Safety Guideline
Participants and Contributors
Last
First
Affiliation
Barsky
Joe
TUV Rheinland
Belk
Bill
DECON Environmental Services
Bishline
Lacy
Texas Instruments
Breder
Paul
ESTEC Solutions
Brody
Steven
Product EHS Consulting
Brown
Amy
Factory Mutual
Bae
Eunseok
SK Hynix
Choi
Joyce
Nordson
Connor
Paul
Dow
Crane
Lauren
KLA Tencor
Cuthbert
Andrew
Western Digital
DAgostino
Mark
Applied Materials
Evanston
Chris
Salus Engineering
Fessler
Mark
Tokyo Electron
Filipp
Nick
BSI EHS Services and Solutions (formerly EORM)
Francis
Terry
Consultant
Faust
Bruce
TUV SUD America
Gardiner
Robin
Matheson
Gordon
Mike
Edwards
Graves
Rene
Texas Instruments
Greenberg
Cliff
Nikon Precision
Hambleton
Scott
Applied Materials
Hamilton
Jeff
Tokyo Electron
Jeong
Yeyoung
Samsung
Jumper
Steve
Applied Materials
Karl
Edward
Applied Materials
Kozlowski
Paul
IBM Yorktown
Kwong
Hsi-An
SEMATECH
Larsen
Sean
Lam Research
Madhavan
Bindu
Air Products
Martin
Kevin
Intel
McDaid
Raymond
GLOBALFOUNDRIES
McIntyre
Andy
BSI EHS Services and Solutions (formerly EORM)
McNair
Andrea
Tokyo Electron
Meyer
Josef
Aixtron
Miller
Phil
Dow Chemical
Mills
Ken
ESTEC Solutions
Moody
Doug
Wafertech
Nambu
Mitsuju
Tokyo Electron
Ngai
Eugene
Chemically Speaking LLC
Olander
Karl
Entegris
Pearlstein
Ronald
Air Products
Planting
Bert
ASML
Pochon
Stephan
TUV Rheinland NA
Powell
Doug
Independent
Rao
Madhukar
Air Products
Rivera
Kalysha
Tokyo Electron
Schwab
Paul
Texas Instruments
Sharfstein
Susan
CNSE
Sleiman
Samir
Brooks Automation
Steidl
Thomas
Air Products
Suydan
Thom
Koetter Fire Protection
Swydam
Thom
Koetter Fire Protection
Tieckelmann
Robert
SEMATECH
Timlin
Ernie
GlobalFoundries
Trammell
Steve
BSI EHS Services and Solutions (formerly EORM)
Trio
Paul
SEMI
Visty
John
Salus Engineering
Wilders
Mike
Edwards
Wyman
Matt
Koetter Fire Protection
Zhang
Shasha
CNSE
The content requirements of this checklist are documented in Section 15.2 of the Regulations Governing SEMI Standards Committees.
SEMI Draft Document 5761A
NEW STANDARD: SAFETY GUIDELINE FOR USE OF ENERGETIC MATERIALS IN SEMICONDUCTOR R&D AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES
Contents1 Purpose22 Scope23 Limitations24 Referenced Standards and Documents35 Terminology46 Safety Philosophy167 General Provisions168 Hazard Analyses179 Information to be provided by energetic process chemical suppliers1810 Criteria for Containers used in the Delivery of Liquid and Vapor Energetic Process Chemicals1911 Facility Receiving, Inspection, Storage, Transport and Emergency Response for Remote and On-Equipment Delivery Containers User Criteria2012 Remote Liquid and Vapor Delivery Systems Supplier Criteria2113 Remote Liquid and Vapor Delivery Systems - User Criteria2214 Container Delivery Systems within Equipment Equipment Supplier Criteria2315 Gas Box and Process Chamber Equipment Supplier Criteria2616 Post Process Chamber Through Vacuum Pump / Abatement System Design and Operational Criteria2717 Equipment/Parts Cleaning and Waste Generation Criteria3618 Control of Hazardous Energy3719 Related Documents38APPENDIX 1 MATERIAL CHARACTERIZATION FORM40RELATED INFORMATION 1 Chemical Data41RELATED INFORMATION 2 Example Planning Process For Opening Energetic Materials Paths65FiguresFigure 1 Examples of Containers6Figure 2 Determination whether a Byproduct is Energetic7Figure 3 Determination whether a Process Chemical is Energetic8Figure 4 Determination whether a Material is Hazardously Exothermic9Figure 5 Determination whether a Material is Pyrophoric12Figure 6 Determination whether a Material is Water Reactive15Figure 7 Example Vacuum Pump System Designed for Energetic Process (See Table 1 for the key.)28
1. Purpose
0. This Safety Guideline is intended as a minimum set of safety criteria for the procurement, storage, handling, and use of energetic materials in semiconductor R&D and manufacturing processes in all phases of use, from process chemical supply through abatement.
0. This Safety Guideline is intended to be industry best practices as of its publication date. All or portions of this document may be referenced as expectations or specifications, as part of the equipment and materials procurement process.
Scope
0. The scope of this document is energetic materials, as defined in 5.2.18 .
0. This Safety Guideline specifies the testing and criteria for determining whether a material is an energetic material in the context of this Safety Guideline.
0. This Safety Guideline also describes the minimum characterization data to be provided at the time the energetic material is to be tested in research and development, pilot line or high volume semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
0. This Safety Guideline provides safety design criteria for process chemical supply, process, and post-process equipment for semiconductor processes using energetic materials.
0. This Safety Guideline provides industry-specific criteria, and refers to some of the many international codes, regulations, standards, and specifications that should be considered when designing semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
NOTICE: SEMI Standards and Safety Guidelines do not purport to address all safety issues associated with their use. It is the responsibility of the users of the documents to establish appropriate safety and health practices, and determine the applicability of regulatory or other limitations prior to use.
Limitations
0. This Safety Guideline is intended for use by suppliers and users as a reference for EHS considerations. It is not intended to be used to verify compliance with regulatory requirements.
0. It is not the philosophy of this Safety Guideline to provide all of the EHS design criteria that may be applied to semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
0. This Safety Guideline was developed as a supplement, primarily addressing energetic material reaction hazards, to other SEMI Standards documents. The reader should consult those documents, including SEMI S2 and S6, for guidance for managing the safety, health, and other hazards associated with energetic materials.
0. In some cases, references to standards have been incorporated into this Safety Guideline. These references do not imply applicability of the entire standards, but only of the sections referenced.
0. This Safety Guideline is not intended to apply to facilities or operations of energetic material manufacturers or distributors, or to the transportation of energetic materials beyond the boundary of any facility.
0. Materials within the Scope of SEMI S18 are not subject to this document, regardless of whether they conform to the definition of energetic materials.
0. Aqueous process chemicals and their aqueous byproducts are not within the scope of this document.
This document, especially 16, was developed for closed processing equipment, such as MOCVD, ALD, and epitaxy equipment. Some of the risk controls may be applicable to open processing equipment, such as aqueous cleaning equipment that use energetic process chemicals or generate energetic byproducts, but the criteria of this document are not directly applicable to open processing equipment.
Referenced Standards and Documents
0. SEMI Standards and Safety Guidelines
SEMI F6 Guide for Secondary Containment of Hazardous Gas Piping Systems
SEMI F66 Specification for Port Marking and Symbol of Stainless Steel Vessels for Liquid Chemicals
SEMI F96 Specification for Port Configuration on Canisters to Contain Liquid CVD Precursors
SEMI F107 Guide for Process Equipment Adapter Plates
SEMI S1 Safety Guideline for Equipment Safety Labels
SEMI S2 Environmental, Health, and Safety Guideline for Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S3 Safety Guideline for Process Liquid Heating Systems
SEMI S4 Safety Guideline for the Separation of Chemical Cylinders Contained in Dispensing Cabinets
SEMI S5 Safety Guideline for Sizing and Identifying Flow Limiting Devices for Gas Cylinder Valves
SEMI S6 EHS Guideline for Exhaust Ventilation of Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S8 Safety Guideline for Ergonomics Engineering of Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S10 Safety Guideline for Risk Assessment and Risk Evaluation Process
SEMI S12 Environmental, Health, and Safety Guideline for Manufacturing Equipment Decontamination
SEMI S14 Safety Guidelines for Fire Risk Assessment and Mitigation for Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S18 Environmental, Health, and Safety Guideline for Flammable Silicon Compounds
SEMI S21 Safety Guideline for Worker Protection
SEMI S22 Safety Guideline for the Electrical Design of Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S23 Guide for Conservation of Energy, Utilities and Materials Used by Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S24 Safety Guideline for Multi-Employer Work Areas
SEMI S26 Environmental, Health, and Safety Guideline for FPD Manufacturing System
SEMI S28 Safety Guideline for Robots and Load Ports Intended for Use in Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment
SEMI S29 Guide for Fluorinated Greenhouse Gas (F-GHG) Emission Characterization and Reduction
0. ASTM[footnoteRef:1] [1: American Society for Testing and Materials, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959, USA; Telephone: 610.832.9585, Fax: 610.832.9555, http://www.astm.org]
ASTM F739 Standard Test Method for Permeation of Liquids and Gasses through Protective Clothing Materials under Conditions of Continuous Contact
ASTM F903 - 10 Standard Test Method for Resistance of Materials Used in Protective Clothing to Penetration by Liquids
ASTM F2302-08 Standard Performance Specification for Heat and Flame Resistant Clothing
0. Factory Mutual[footnoteRef:2] [2: Factory Mutual. http://www.fmglobal.com/]
FM Global Property Loss Prevention Sheet 7-59 Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment
Factory Mutual Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment
0. International Code Council[footnoteRef:3] [3: International Code Council, 11711 W 85th Street, Lenexa, KS 66214, [F] (913) 888-4526, http://www.iccsafe.org/contact-icc/.]
International Fire Code
0. NFPA[footnoteRef:4] [4: National Fire Protection Association, 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269, USA; Telephone: 617.770.3000, Fax: 617.770.0700, http://www.nfpa.org]
NFPA 704 Standard System for the Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response
0. United Nations[footnoteRef:5] [5: http://www.unece.org/?id=6928]
UN Transport of Dangerous Goods Manual of Tests and Criteria
NOTICE: Unless otherwise indicated, all documents cited shall be the latest published versions.
Terminology
0. Abbreviations and Acronyms
AEV additional exhaust ventilation [SEMI S18]
AIT autoignition temperature [SEMI S3]
ALD atomic layer deposition [SEMI F57]
ARC accelerating rate calorimetry
ATL accredited testing laboratory [SEMI S2]
DSC differential scanning calorimetry [SEMI F40]
EHS environmental, health, and safety
EMO emergency off [SEMI S17, S21, S26, S28]
GHS Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals
HPM hazardous production material
HSSD high sensitivity smoke detector
IPD instantaneous power density
MOCVD metal organic chemical vapor deposition [SEMI F51]
PEV primary exhaust ventilation [SEMI S6, S18]
PPE personal protective equipment [SEMI S12, S19, S21, S24, S26]
SDS safety data sheet
UN_TDG_MTC United Nations Transport of Dangerous Goods Manual of Tests and Criteria
UV/IR ultraviolet/infrared
0. Definitions
abatement system a system used to modify the effluent from a process in order to reduce emissions of hazardous materials.
accelerating rate calorimetry (ARC) an analytical technique in which the temperature and pressure changes of a sample are measured adiabatically as the temperature is raised at a controlled rate.
acceptable risk a risk of Low or Very Low, as defined by SEMI S10 or SEMI S14.
accredited testing laboratory (ATL) an independent organization dedicated to the testing of components, devices or systems; that is recognized by a governmental or regulatory body as competent to perform evaluations based on established safety standards. [SEMI S2]
additional exhaust ventilation (AEV) airflow that is not present during normal operation but is provided to extract substances of concern during maintenance or in the case of an abnormal release from primary containment. [SEMI S18]
aqueous comprised of water or materials dissolved or suspended in water.
autoignition temperature (AIT) the temperature at which a solid in contact with air, or a liquid or gas (including a vapor) mixed with air, ignites without contacting a surface of higher temperature or there being an explicit source of ignition, such as a spark or flame. [SEMI S3]
baseline the operating conditions, including process chemistry, for which the equipment was designed and manufactured.
byproduct a material, other than the one the process is intended to produce, that is formed during a process.
cleanroom a room in which the concentration of airborne particles is controlled to specific limits. [SEMI S2, S26]
closed processing equipment equipment in which the process and chemical handling take place inside of components the interiors of which are not in communication with ambient air. Components inside the ventilated enclosures may include sealed mixing or measurement vessels and holding tanks, enclosed plumbing, and process chambers. In this type of equipment it is not normal operation for the inside of the ventilated enclosure or the secondary containment to be exposed to chemicals. [SEMI S6]
combustible material a combustible material is any material that does propagate flame (beyond the ignition zone with or without the continued application of the ignition source) and does not meet the definition in this section for non-combustible material. See also the definition for non-combustible material. [SEMI S2, S26]
container an assembly consisting of at least:
a vessel in which a material is stored and may be transported and from which it may be transferred to another container or to equipment,
fittings for fluid connections, and
one or more valves permitting isolation of each of its connections.
A container may include additional valves, means of purging, or sensors. There are many configurations that conform to this definition; Figure 1 contains examples of containers that conform to the criteria of this document. (See 10 .)
Examples of Containers
Containers are also called: canisters, cylinders, drums, tanks, and ampoules. Ampoule is traditionally used to refer to containers inside process equipment.
For some of the containers within the scope of this Safety Guideline, SEMI F96 specifies the connectors and port locations, and SEMI F66 specifies the port marking,
control of hazardous energy the practice by which personnel are protected from unexpected starting and release of hazardous energy during maintenance and service.
Control of hazardous energy is addressed in 18 .
degradation (of PPE) mechanism of deterioration of a material due to chemical reaction with a substance.
differential scanning calorimetry(DSC) analytical technique in which the heat flow in or out of a sample is measured as the temperature is raised at a controlled rate.
energetic byproduct a byproduct found, by evaluation in accordance with Figure 2, to be energetic.
Determination whether a Byproduct is Energetic
energetic material a material that is either an energetic process chemical or an energetic byproduct.
energetic materials path the places through which energetic materials pass or in which they are stored, accumulated or used. This includes energetic process chemical containers, piping, process chambers, exhaust lines, vacuum pumps, and abatement equipment.
energetic process chemical a process chemical found, by evaluation in accordance with Figure 3, to be energetic.
Determination whether a Process Chemical is Energetic
energetic process chemical supplier party that provides one or more energetic process chemicals directly to another party. An energetic process chemical supplier may be a manufacturer, a distributor, or a representative.
equipment a specific piece of machinery, apparatus, process module, or device used to execute an operation. The term equipment does not apply to any product (e.g., substrates, semiconductors) that may be damaged as a result of equipment failure. [SEMI S2, S26]
equipment supplier party who provides equipment to and communicates directly with the user. An equipment supplier may be a manufacturer, an equipment distributor, or an equipment representative. [SEMI S24]
flammable gas any gas that forms an ignitable mixture in air at 20C (68F) and 101.3 kPa (14.7 psia). [SEMI S2, S4, S26]
flammable liquid a liquid having a flash point below 37.8C (100F). [SEMI S2, S3, S6, S14, S26]
flash point the minimum temperature at which a liquid gives off sufficient vapor to form an ignitable mixture with air near the surface of the liquid, or within the test vessel used. [SEMI S2, S3, S26]
flow limiting device a device that will reduce maximum flow rate under full flow conditions. [SEMI S5, S18]
foreline vacuum line leading from process chamber to vacuum pump inlet.
harm physical injury or damage to health of people, or damage to equipment, buildings, or environment. [SEMI S1, S2, S10, S26]
hazard condition that has the potential to cause harm. [SEMI S1, S2, S10, S26]
hazardous production material (HPM) a solid, liquid, or gas associated with semiconductor manufacturing that has a degree-of-hazard rating of 3 or 4 in health, flammability, instability, or water reactivity in accordance with NFPA 704 and that is used directly in research, laboratory, or production processes that have as their end product materials that are not hazardous (NFPA 1 - 2015, Fire Code)
hazardously exothermic, adj. found, by evaluation in accordance with Figure 4, to be hazardously exothermic.
Determination whether a Material is Hazardously Exothermic
hood a shaped inlet designed to capture contaminated air and conduct it into an exhaust duct system. [SEMI S2, S26]
incompatible as applied to materials, describes materials that, when combined, may react violently or in an uncontrolled manner, releasing hazardous materials or energy that may create a hazardous condition.
instantaneous power density (IPD) the rate at which energy is released by the self-reaction of a unit volume of a material. It is the product of the enthalpy of self-reaction and the self-reaction rate.
interlock a mechanical, electrical or other type of device or system, the purpose of which is to prevent or interrupt the operation of specified machine elements under specified conditions. [SEMI S3, S28]
likelihood the expected frequency with which harm will occur. Usually expressed as a rate (e.g., events per year, per product, or per substrate processed). [SEMI S2, S10, S26]
local exhaust ventilation local exhaust ventilation systems operate on the principle of capturing a contaminant at or near its source and moving the contaminant to the external environment, usually through an air cleaning or a destructive device. It is not to be confused with laminar flow ventilation. Synonyms: LEV, local exhaust, main exhaust, extraction system, module exhaust, individual exhaust. [SEMI S2, S26]
maintenance planned or unplanned activities intended to keep equipment in good working order. See also the definition for service. [SEMI S2, S6, S8, S10, S12]
mass balance a qualitative, and where possible, quantitative, specification of mass flow of input and output streams (including chemicals, gases, water, de-ionized water, compressed air, nitrogen, and byproducts), in sufficient detail to determine the effluent characteristics and potential treatment options. [SEMI S2, S26]
material a solid, liquid, or gas or a combination of two or more of them. This includes solutions, mixtures, and colloids.
non-combustible material a material that, in the form in which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not ignite, burn, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when subjected to fire or heat. Typical non-combustible materials are metals, ceramics, and silica materials (e.g., glass and quartz). See also the definition for combustible material. [SEMI S2, S26]
open processing equipment equipment in which at least some of the process and chemical handling take place inside of components the interiors of which are in communication with ambient air. In equipment of this type, such areas of the primary containment are ventilated. [SEMI S6]
operator a person who interacts with the equipment only to the degree necessary for the equipment to perform its intended function. [SEMI S2, S21, S22, S28]
penetration (of PPE) movement of a chemical through pores or imperfections in a material or an item without a change of state. Chemical penetration can occur through voids and imperfections in closures, seams, interfaces and materials.
Penetration does not require a change of state; solid chemicals move through voids in the materials as solids, liquids as liquids and gases as gases. Penetration is a distinctly different mechanism from permeation.
permeation (of PPE) movement of chemicals through materials or items without passing through voids or imperfections. Permeation includes:
absorption into the contact surface,
diffusion of the absorbed molecules through the material or item, and
desorption from the opposite surface.
personal protective equipment (PPE) equipment and clothing worn to reduce potential for personal injury from hazards associated with the task to be performed (e.g., chemical gloves, respirators, safety glasses, etc.). In the context of this document, cleanroom attire (e.g., gloves, smocks, booties, hoods) is not considered personal protective equipment. [SEMI S8]
primary exhaust ventilation (PEV) airflow that, in normal operation, extracts substances of concern from the equipment. [SEMI S6, S18]
process chemical a material that participates in a chemical or physical reaction on the surface of a substrate as part of a manufacturing process.
purge (v) use a nonreactive fluid to remove air, process chemicals, or byproducts from fluid handling components. The fluid is one that neither reacts undesirably with any material foreseen to be in the components nor contaminates the components.
pyrophoric, adj. found, by evaluation in accordance with Figure 5, to be pyrophoric.
Determination whether a Material is Pyrophoric
GHS defines a pyrophoric liquid as a liquid that ignites within 5 min when added to an inert carrier and exposed to air, or it ignites or chars a filter paper on contact with air within 5 min. GHS defines a pyrophoric solid as a solid that ignites within 5 min when added to an inert carrier and exposed to air. The OSHA (Hazard Communication Standard) defines pyrophoric gas as a material in the gaseous state that will ignite spontaneously in air at a temperature of 130 degrees F (54.4 degrees C) or below. GHS does not address pyrophoric gases. Neither the GHS nor OSHA definitions is used in this Safety Guideline; they are provided here only for convenience.
remote liquid delivery system Equipment that includes a liquid material (or mixture of liquids or a solution of solid in solvent) in a storage container and transfers it from the storage container to a point-of-use container. A motive force is applied to the liquid to allow the location of the storage container to be far from the point of use container.
risk the expected magnitude of losses from a hazard, expressed in terms of severity and likelihood.[ SEMI S2, S10, S14, S22, S26]
safe state a condition in which the equipment does not present any unacceptable risk to itself or to personnel. It does not allow hazardous production materials to flow. An acceptable safe state is determined by the designer of the equipment and is based on the hazards in the design. [SEMI S18]
safety critical part discrete device or component, such as used in a power or safety circuit, whose proper operation is necessary to the safe performance of the system or circuit. [SEMI S2, S26]
safety data sheet (SDS) document that describes a materials properties and hazards and provides appropriate safety precautions and protective measures for handling, storing, and transporting it.
The specific requirements are stated in regulations. In most jurisdictions of interest, the regulations are consistent with the UN Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS). GHS is available at http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/ghs/ghs_rev00/00files_e.html
Safety data sheet has replaced the term materials safety data sheet.
salvage pressure receptacle a pressure receptacle with a water capacity not exceeding 1000 liters into which are placed damaged, defective, leaking, or non-conforming pressure receptacle(s) for the purpose of transport, e.g., for recovery or disposal.
secondary exhaust ventilation (SEV) airflow that, in normal operation of the equipment, does not extract substances of concern, but operates continuously to extract substances of concern should they be released from their primary containment due to failure or to maintenance or service operations. [SEMI S6, S18]
service unplanned activities intended to return equipment that has failed to good working order. See also the definition for maintenance. [SEMI S2, S6, S12, S22, S28]
severity the extent of potential credible harm. [SEMI S2, S10, S26]
supplier an equipment supplier or an energetic process chemical supplier.
tertiary exhaust ventilation (TEV) airflow, outside enclosures that have secondary exhaust ventilation, that operates continuously to extract substances of concern should they be released from their secondary containment due to failure or to maintenance or service operations.
testing measurements or observations used to validate and document conformance to designated criteria.
transfill fill a container by transferring a material to it from another container.
unacceptable risk a risk of Medium, High, or Very High as defined by SEMI S10 or SEMI S14. [SEMI S18]
user party that acquires equipment for the purpose of using it to manufacture semiconductors. See also the definition for supplier. [SEMI S2, F107]
vacuum pump exhaust line piping leading from vacuum pump outlet to an abatement device inlet, bypass connection or facility exhaust.
vapor delivery system Equipment that includes a container of liquid or solid material and transfers it as a gas from the container to the point of use. The motive force may be a result of the materials vapor pressure (which can be controlled by heating and cooling) or via a matrix (aka carrier) gas. A vapor delivery system may be close to or far from the point of use.
water reactive, adj. found, by evaluation in accordance with Figure 6, to be water reactive.
Determination whether a Material is Water Reactive
Safety Philosophy
0. A primary objective of this Safety Guideline is to eliminate or control hazards that include the use of energetic materials during R&D and manufacturing processes. As such, energetic materials should be used:
under conditions which will maintain the customary levels of employee safety, potential for fire or explosion, impact on the environment, and negative facility-related events, such as business interruption due to contamination and
such that the quantity of any energetic material online and in use via on- board or remotely delivered method(s) is limited to the smallest amount necessary for effective production.
0. In order to meet this objective, equipment and energetic process chemical suppliers and users should ensure that:
The order of precedence for resolving identified hazards is as follows:
1. Design to eliminate hazards
Use of the safest materials suitable to the application
Incorporate safety devices
Provide warning devices
Provide hazard alerts
Develop administrative procedures and training
Use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
A combination of these approaches may be needed.
Designs meet
Regulatory requirements
Industry standards
This Safety Guideline
Good engineering and manufacturing practices
A hazard analysis (See 8 .) is performed to identify and evaluate hazards. The hazard analysis should be initiated both early in the equipment design phase as part of the module S2 evaluation and in the overall equipment (supply module, processing equipment, waste treatment equipment) phase. The latter, integrated hazards analysis should include appropriate representatives from the material delivery system, process equipment, vacuum pump and abatement equipment suppliers and be updated as the design matures.
Users should validate the safe installation of research, pilot line and high volume manufacturing equipment to ensure applicable EHS regulations and best industry practices are satisfied prior to equipment start-up.
Users should maintain a management of change (MoC) program that includes guidance on how to evaluate existing processes for the addition of new chemistries or new use of chemistries by R&D and high volume manufacturing business groups.
General Provisions
The equipment must comply with laws and regulations that are in effect at the location of use. This may be the direct responsibility of the equipment producer/importer or the workplace owner, depending on the regulation. All equipment requiring certification or approval by government agencies must have this certification or approval as required by regulations.
0. The supplier(s) should maintain an equipment/product safety program that identifies and eliminates hazards or controls risks in accordance with the order of preference (see Safety Philosophy).
0. Each user should maintain an equipment safety program that ensures that equipment is used, maintained, and serviced in accordance with supplier criteria.
0. The supplier(s) should provide the users designated representative with bulletins that describe safety related upgrades or newly identified significant hazards associated with the equipment or materials. This should be done on an ongoing basis as needed.
0. Each user should ensure that equipment suppliers have the correct current name and contact information to which this information is to be provided.
0. Model-specific tools and accessories necessary to operate, maintain, and service equipment safely should be provided with the equipment or specified by the equipment supplier.
0. Means of performing control of hazardous energy to protect personnel during maintenance and service should be provided for all energetic material sources. (See 18 .)
0. All equipment maintenance tasks should have specific procedures developed by the user or provided by the equipment supplier to minimize the risk of exposure to any hazardous energies.
0. As energetic materials have several hazardous properties, a PPE assessment should be conducted and, based on the PPE assessment, personnel should be instructed to follow the PPE requirements when working with energetic materials.
Some jurisdictions require particular certification and maintenance logging of certain PPE.
0. A means of evacuation and purging should be provided for all piping and equipment containing energetic materials.
0. Operators, maintenance personnel, and service personnel should be trained in the tasks they are intended to perform.
Hazard Analyses
0. There are multiple hazards analyses that should be completed to ensure the energetic materials can be safely used within the facility.
0. Standalone Hazard Analyses Standalone hazard analyses by the material delivery system equipment supplier, the process equipment supplier, the vacuum pump equipment supplier and the abatement system equipment supplier on their respective systems in accordance with SEMI S2 need to have been completed. These should be complete or at least be well underway prior to the users integrated hazard analysis.
If two or more of the above suppliers (e.g., material delivery system equipment supplier and the process equipment supplier) are collaborating on process chemistry application(s) related to the users procurement expectations, then those suppliers should complete, jointly, a hazard analysis on their combined equipment in accordance with SEMI S2 at the earliest point feasible and prior to the users scheduled integrated hazard analysis.
These hazard analyses may need to be revised when an energetic material is added to the design or use of a piece of equipment.
0. Integrated Hazard Analysis The user should initiate an integrated hazard analysis to identify and evaluate hazards associated with the complete energetic materials path. This integrated hazard analysis should be initiated as early as feasible and include appropriate representatives from the energetic process chemical supplier, material delivery system, process equipment, vacuum pump and abatement equipment suppliers, and the users staff.
As hazards may differ with different energetic materials and combinations and configurations of supply, processing and waste treatment modules, this hazards analysis should be performed for each equipment use, installation, or configuration. An integrated hazard analysis for a particular use, installation, or configuration may be prepared by modifying the integrated hazard analysis of a predecessor or similar equipment use, installation, or configuration.
0. The integrated hazard analysis should consider and document, as a minimum:
the physical, chemical, and toxicological properties of the energetic material to be processed,
the potential process by products and their physical, chemical, and toxicological properties and the locations of deposits,
the application or process at the maximum flow setpoints for the equipment, which are typically higher than the targeted process recipe values,
the hazards associated with each task,
the anticipated failure modes,
an analysis of interconnection hazards, based on proposed piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) and piping layout,
the anticipated level of expertise of exposed personnel and their frequency of exposure,
the frequency and complexity (e.g., number of steps, required expertise) of operating, servicing and maintenance tasks,
identification of safety critical parts,
PPE requirements, and
ranking, in accordance with SEMI S10 Safety Guideline for Risk Assessment and Risk Evaluation Process, of the risks identified in the integrated hazard analysis.
Information to be Provided by Energetic Process Chemical Suppliers
0. Energetic process chemical suppliers should provide the information described in this Section, at the time negotiated with the user.
0. Classifications A determination of pyrophoric, water reactive, and hazardously exothermic classifications in accordance with the definitions and empirical tests specified in 5 and including:
The objective test data and calculations on which the determinations were based. For determinations which were not based on objective data, the rationales used and the basis for considering the persons making the determination qualified to do so.
The completed Material Characterization Form provided in Appendix 1.
Stoichiometry and thermodynamics of reaction with water and with oxygen, including any byproducts which are flammable or otherwise hazardous
Calorimetry results that show the time evolution of heat under defined reaction conditions
A video illustrating the salient properties and reaction of the energetic process chemical with air, water, and any other materials deemed appropriate should be provided to users by the chemical supplier. The video should clearly illustrate, to the end user and to those who do maintenance or service, the vigor and hazards a release could create. This information should be such that first responders (to leaks or spills) and those mentioned above can be trained, appropriate PPE provided, and safe work practices (including emergency response) determined. The video should be provided as an .avi or .mp4 file or through a publicly accessible web link to such a video and should show:
the contact of material with moisture in air under controlled conditions,
the reaction of material with water moistened cleanroom compatible absorbent wipe, and
the contact of material with liquid water (in an inert environment if reaction with air would obscure visibility) under controlled conditions.
0. Byproduct Information The chemical identity of known and anticipated products and byproducts, based on users process conditions (such as a baseline recipe) , if they are provided. The information should include:
states of matter,
difficulty of removal of byproducts, and
any safety determinations made from byproduct quantitative or predictive model evaluation(s) or during the integrated process hazard analysis conducted as described in 8 .
0. PPE Recommendations (considering permeation, penetration, degradation, and fire) on proper PPE to support on site receipt, transportation and installation and deinstallation activities, some of which occur in cleanrooms.
The criterion of protection from permeation, penetration, degradation and fire pertains to the PPE ensemble (the complete set of items of PPE to be used for a task), rather than each item, because it is not always possible to obtain a single item that has all of the needed protective properties. For example, some PPE ensembles include two pairs of gloves: an outer pair to provide mechanical protection (both for the worker and for the inner gloves) and an inner pair to provide chemical protection for the worker.
The test methods that may be useful in determining the suitability of PPE include:
ASTM Standard F739, Standard Test Method for Permeation of Liquids and Gasses through Protective Clothing Materials under Conditions of Continuous Contact.
ASTM F903 - 10, Standard Test Method for Resistance of Materials Used in Protective Clothing to Penetration by Liquids
ASTM F2302-08, Standard Performance Specification for Heat and Flame Resistant Clothing.
0. Additional information, as agreed by the user and supplier.
Criteria for Containers used in the Delivery of Liquid and Vapor Energetic Process Chemicals
0. Design Suppliers of liquid and vapor energetic process chemicals should provide such materials in a container conforming to the following criteria.
Valves
Valve configurations of containers should provide the capability for control of hazardous energy. (See 18 .)
The risk of valve failure should be at an acceptable level, such as using two (one pneumatic and one manual) valves on each line or using single valves of high enough reliability and with an appropriate actuator assembly. High enough reliability means reliability such that the risk is acceptable.
Containers should include normally closed, pneumatically operated shutoff valves. These valves may also be used for process control, but are not intended to be used for high cycle counts, such as pulsing for ALD.
Normally closed, pneumatically-operated valves can be interfaced with the process equipment EMO and interlock systems and with facility life safety systems.
In the case of flame or high temperature, the polymeric pneumatic control lines are expected to melt, allowing the valve to close. Electrically operated valves might conflict with the electrical classification of the space in which the valves are located.
A single hybrid valve (i.e., a valve with both pneumatic and manual actuators or with a pneumatic actuator and a manual means of disabling that actuator and positively (i.e., not by a spring mechanism) closing the valve that meets all three of the criteria in 10.1.1 and that can be closed manually and locked whether or not there is a pneumatic signal opening the valve, may be used.
Connections Remote source container input and output connections should conform to SEMI F66 and F96.
Level Indication Containers should be equipped with a means of level indication such as by pressure, visual, ultrasonic or weight. These means should be located on the container or on the equipment in which the container is intended to be placed, depending on the means.
0. Emergency Containment Energetic process chemical suppliers should have salvage pressure receptacles (also known as emergency containment cylinders) meeting the requirements of at least anticipated ground transportation regulations applicable to their customers locations available to users for use in an emergency. Users should ensure a sufficient number of salvage pressure receptacles will be available in the emergency time frames they desire.
National hazardous material or Dangerous Goods regulations typically govern land, air and sea transportation within national boundaries. Similar standards are commonly adopted by air and sea transportation service providers for international transportation segments. Transportation service providers may also exercise their own discretion in accepting any cargo for transportation. It is recommended that suppliers and users consult with hazardous materials transportation experts familiar with their regions and desired transportation modes to understand what detailed criteria might apply to the transportation of salvage pressure receptacles.
0. Inspection, Handling and Transport Procedures for Remote and On-Equipment Delivery Containers Written procedures should be prepared by the energetic process chemical supplier for the safe delivery, receipt and return of remote and on-equipment sources to and from a user facility. The procedures should include the following information:
Chemical and physical hazards
Inspection protocol (visual, leak detection method, local exhaust ventilation, other) for receipt of new and return of used sources
PPE requirements that provide guidance on chemical resistance, fire resistance and have appropriate manual dexterity properties
Storage requirements
Guidance on safe intra-facility transport
National or regional shipping requirements
Emergency actions and procedures specific to the chemical and physical hazards present in order to manage a leaking source container
Facility Receiving, Inspection, Storage, Transport, and Emergency Response for Remote and On-Equipment Delivery Containers User Criteria
0. Inspection, Emergency, and Shipping Procedures
Written inspection procedures should be prepared based on energetic process chemical supplier information. The procedures should include:
chemical and physical hazards,
inspection protocol (visual, leak detection method, local exhaust ventilation, other) for receipt of new and return of used sources,
PPE requirements that provide guidance on chemical resistance, fire resistance and have appropriate manual dexterity properties,
storage requirements, and
guidance on safe intra-facility transport.
Written emergency procedures specific to the chemical and physical hazards present in order to manage a leaking remote or on-equipment source should be prepared that include the following information:
monitoring (detection type [e.g., chlorine, inorganic acids]),
notification,
personal protection,
fire response,
containment, and
other special equipment as required.
Written shipping procedures should be prepared based on supplier input and on the users determination of legal requirements for transportation of returned vessels.
0. Emergency Response Team The user should ensure that trained emergency responders (internal or local fire department) with appropriate PPE and equipment are available to respond to an energetic material emergency.
0. On Site Storage The user should establish appropriate on-site storage location(s). Factors to be considered include:
siting guidance,
ensuring appropriate IFC classification for storage rooms located within an existing occupancy such as a shipping/receiving building,
providing rated cabinets such as FM approved flammable liquid storage cabinets or equivalent,
if cold storage is required, ensuring intrinsically safe and one hour fire ratings,
installing leak detection such as flame and smoke detection and ensuring detectors are on a preventive maintenance program and interface with the facility life safety monitoring system,
fire suppression in the form of rated fire extinguishers, and
labeling per NFPA requirements.
0. Emergency Response Handling Location The user should establish appropriate emergency handling locations. Factors to be considered include:
general siting guidance that ensures appropriate distances from production/storage areas, personnel exposures and building HVAC intakes,
installation of a dedicated non-combustible station for managing leaking vessels that is supported by local exhaust ventilation,
adequate fire suppression to support ERT actions such as Class D fire extinguishers, sand, etc., and
ERT response kit that contains response equipment unique to the expected chemical and physical hazards.
Remote Liquid and Vapor Delivery Systems Supplier Criteria
0. Quantity Limitations Based on complete material characterization information, the user and energetic process chemical supplier should discuss the quantities proposed such that International Fire Code requirements are being met.
0. Chemical Delivery Cabinets should be:
constructed of not less than 2.5 mm (0.097 inches, 12 gage) steel
self-closing and self-latching doors
equipped with a non-combustible access port (self-closing and latching) for inspection of and access to the distribution manifold. This is not the same door used to change containers. The access port should be sized and located to allow its use for such tasks as container connection and hazardous energy isolation. The access port is typically of much less area than the door used to change containers, so that a higher linear air velocity is maintained when the access port is opened than when the door is opened.
0. Ventilation Remote delivery systems should be equipped with the following:
Secondary exhaust ventilation that demonstrates effective (that is, meeting the criteria of SEMI S2 and S6) capture and containment of the energetic material and associated combustion byproducts from reaction with air from the remote source within the delivery cabinet.
The intention is that secondary exhaust ventilation prevents contamination outside the cabinet by the products of reaction with air inside the cabinet.
A pressure gauge for visual indication and interfacing with, or a flow switch for interfacing with safety interlocks conforming to SEMI S2.
0. Fire and Smoke Detection The remote cabinet equipment supplier should provide fire and smoke detection that includes a combination of:
A high sensitivity smoke detection (HSSD)
If available, an ATL approved optical flame sensor that will respond to the flame signature of the energetic material proposed for use. If a UV/IR sensor is not commercially available specific to the energetic material being used, the equipment supplier should consider adding redundant HSSD to the equipment.
0. Fire Suppression Based on the integrated hazard analysis in accordance with SEMI S14, the equipment supplier should consult with a recognized fire suppression expert to ensure an appropriate fire suppression design is provided. Examples of fire suppression approaches for energetic materials include inerting of the cabinet in accordance with FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment and adsorption technologies
0. Other Safety Criteria Additional safety criteria should include:
Cabinet spill containment
Liquid leak detection
Over delivery control to the process equipment
EMO
Provide grounding capabilities for the remote cabinet and container
Seismic bracing guidance
Purging capability of manifold and delivery line(s)
Ensure that the purge gas(es) are separated to reduce the potential for contamination and accidents due to cross contamination via the purge line.
Means of control of hazardous energy (See 18 .)
Procedures
Means of control of hazardous energy (See 18 .)
Purging of manifold and delivery line
Maintenance access
Sufficient space to allow for safe change out of containers per SEMI S8 requirements
Emergency (safe) venting and control of process chemistry
Labeling per ANSI requirements
PPE for container change out and other maintenance activities (consider chemical resistance, fire resistance, manual dexterity and cleanroom compatibility)
Remote Liquid and Vapor Delivery Systems - User Criteria
0. Location The user should ensure that the remote delivery system is located in an area that meets the applicable local fire code requirements
0. Quantity Limitations Based on complete material characterization information, the user and energetic process chemical supplier should discuss the quantities proposed such that the International Fire Code and applicable local fire code requirements are being met.
0. Delivery Lines
The material delivery lines should:
contain only welded connections or have secondary containment and
be provided with mechanical protection.
If double wall contained delivery lines to the wall of the equipment gas box are required for further mechanical protection or risk control, the user should:
Ensure that the annular space is managed (open to cabinet, pressure monitoring etc.)
Have written procedures developed to address how energetic material will be moved from the annular space to the remote material delivery cabinet or abatement system exhaust.
0. Fire Suppression Based on the integrated hazard analysis in accordance with SEMI S14, the user should consult with a recognized fire suppression expert to ensure an appropriate fire suppression design is provided. Examples of fire suppression approaches for energetic materials include inerting of the cabinet in accordance with FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels, and Equipment and adsorption technologies.
0. Other Safety Criteria Additional safety criteria include:
Provide grounding for the distribution cabinet and container
A documented preventive maintenance (PM) procedure for all critical safety related components
Ensure that the purge gas(es) are separated to reduce the potential for contamination and accidents due to cross contamination via the purge line.
Labeling per ANSI A13.1
Means of control of hazardous energy (See 18 .).
A safe work permit process for opening energetic process material delivery lines upstream of a process chamber should be implemented.
RELATED INFORMATION 2 contains a sample planning process for opening an energetic materials path.
A PPE station for remote source change out and other maintenance activities
An ERT spill response supply cabinet
A telephone proximate to, but outside of, the storage location
If deemed appropriate to minimize contamination impact, a tertiary exhaust capability outside the delivery system enclosure should be provided to remove material and combustion byproducts foreseen to escape the cabinet.
0. Other Safety Related Considerations The Supplier and User should discuss the need for heat tracing or other method(s) to reduce condensation in the distribution line(s)
Container Delivery Systems within Equipment Equipment Supplier Criteria
0. Enclosures:
Enclosures that house energetic materials should be constructed of not less than 2.5 mm (0.097 in, 12 gage) steel ,
Enclosures should be provided with self-latching, self-closing doors. Mechanisms that hold the door open may be included provided a method to release the hold-open door is installed in accordance with local regulatory requirement.. Hold-open mechanisms should be connected to the safety interlocks system which will release the doors if any of the following occurs:
Smoke or fire,
energetic process chemical (or other hazardous material) release within the enclosure, or
no one is at the open door for more than a predetermined delay time of not more than 30 seconds.
The hold-open mechanism is permitted, so that the person working in the enclosure does not need to hold the door open with a body part or some external object. The safety interlocks on the hold-open mechanism are to ensure that the door is closed immediately if fire or hazardous material release is detected in the enclosure and after no more than 30 seconds if the person is not at the door. The time delay between the person leaving and releasing the hold-open mechanism is provided so that the person can step away briefly, such as to put an empty container on a transportation cart and retrieve a full container from the cart, without having to re-open the door. Having doors open increases the risks of injury or damage to nearby personnel, other equipment and the facility, so it is desirable to have the doors closed when there is no person doing work that requires the doors to be open.
Enclosure doors should be self-latching.
The means of applying manual opening force to the door and the force required to open the door should conform to the relevant criteria in SEMI S8 for a one-handed task.
There is more than one way to meet the criteria for self-latching. For example, having a self-latching latch with a means of disengagement, so that a person can, with one hand, disengage the latch and pull the door open.
Enclosures may be equipped with a fire rated (one hour equivalency), self-closing and self-latching access port(s) for inspection/access to each containers distribution manifold. The access port should be sized and located to allow its use for such tasks as container connection and hazardous energy isolation. The access port is typically of much less area than the door used to change containers, so that a higher linear air velocity is maintained when the access port is opened than when the door is opened.
0. Quantity Limitations Based on complete material characterization information, the user and equipment supplier should discuss the quantities proposed such that International Fire Code requirements are being met.
0. Valves
On board containers should be equipped with automatic source valve shutoff.
Containers should include normally closed, pneumatically operated automatic shutoff valves that allow for interface with the process equipment EMO and interlock systems and facility life safety systems. These valves may also be used for process control, but are not intended to be used for high cycle counts, such as pulsing for ALD.
Pneumatically operated valves are used so that, in case of flame or high temperature, the polymeric operating air line will melt, allowing the valve to close. Also, the use of electrically operated valves may conflict with electrical classification of the space in which the valves are located.
The automatic shutoff valve should be tied into the process equipment interlock system and allow it to be connected to the facility life safety systems
Means of, and procedures for, control of hazardous energy should be provided (See 18 .)
A single hybrid valve (i.e., a valve with both pneumatic and manual actuators or with a pneumatic actuator and a manual means of disabling that actuator and positively (i.e., not by a spring mechanism) closing the valve) that meets all three of the criteria in 10.1.1 and that can be closed manually and locked whether or not there is a pneumatic signal opening the valve may be used (instead of separate pneumatic and manual valves).
The risk of valve failure should be mitigated by any reliable means, such as using two (one pneumatic and one manual) valves on each line or using single valves of high enough reliability and with an appropriate actuator assembly. High enough reliability means reliability such that the risk is acceptable.
Input and output connections should conform to SEMI F96 Specification for Port Configuration on Canisters to Contain Liquid CVD Precursors.
0. Ventilation The cabinets should be equipped with the following:
Secondary exhaust ventilation that demonstrates effective (that is, meeting the criteria of SEMI S2 and S6) capture and containment of the energetic material and associated combustion byproducts from reaction with air from the source within the delivery cabinet.
A pressure gauge with visual indication or a flow switch that interfaces with the equipments SEMI S2-conforming safety interlocks.
0. Fire and Smoke Detection The remote cabinet equipment supplier should provide, in conjunction with the user, fire and smoke detection as determined, by evaluation according to SEMI S14, to be necessary. The detection equipment should include both:
A high sensitivity smoke detection (HSSD)
If available, an ATL approved optical flame sensor that will respond to the flame signature of the energetic material proposed for use. If a UV/IR sensor is not commercially available specific to the energetic material being used, the user and equipment supplier should determine if a redundant HSSD is needed.
EXCEPTION: The user of the equipment may, at its option, provide fire and smoke detection. If the user does that, the equipment supplier is relieved of the burden of conformance to 14.5 .
Over-temperature controls Over-temperature controls should be provided for heated baths and heating jackets. The overtemperature controls sensor, control circuit, and means of removing power should be independent of the means of temperature control used to maintain the desired temperature. See SEMI S3 for safety guidelines regarding heating of heat transfer fluids and external heating of vessels.
EXCEPTION: The process and overtemperature controls may have common elements, only if all of the common failure modes result in removal of power from the heaters.
Use of a non-aqueous heat transfer fluid can mitigate, if necessary, the risk of reaction of a water reactive energetic material and a heat transfer fluid.
Overfill controls Overfill controls should be provided for containers in transfill systems. The overfill controls sensor, control circuit, and means of stopping flow should be independent of the means of flow control used to maintain the desired level.
EXCEPTION: The process and overfill controls may have common elements, only if all of the common failure modes result in stopping flow to the container.
How full a container is may be determined by weighing, ultrasonic level detection, or another, suitable method. The sensor may be of the same technology as the sensor used for process control, or of a different technology.
The overfill controls should be interlocked such that when activated, the delivery of energetic process chemical to the transfill container is stopped. The level at which the overfill control is activated should be selected such that the addition of the material that flows in the time it takes the overfill control to interrupt flow and of the material in the piping between the flow control device the overfill control closes and the container does not cause the level to exceed the capacity of the container or cause liquid to enter container tubing that is intended to end above the liquid level.
For example, for a transfilled container with these characteristics:
Liquid reaches the vapor tube when more than 1.4 L of liquid is in the container.
The maximum flow rate of liquid fill is 1 liter/minute.
The overfill control closes its valve no more than 15 seconds after liquid reaches the selected level. (The 15 seconds includes the response time of the sensor, the signal processing time, and the time it takes the valve to close.)
There is 0.1 L of liquid between that valve and the container.
the amount of liquid in the container after the overfill control is activated is the amount that activates the control plus the amount that flows during the interlock response time (15 seconds 1 liter/minute = 0.25 L) plus the amount between the valve and the container (0.1 L). As liquid reaches the vapor tube when the container has 1.4 L in it, the maximum permissible amount at which the overfill control activates is: 1.4 L (0.25 L + 0.1 L) = 1.05L.
Labels
Piping Direction of flow arrows and content labels should be affixed at connection endpoints to all pipes and tubes and visible to personnel during maintenance operations. If a line passes through an enclosure boundary, a direction of flow arrow and content label should be placed inside the enclosure near the boundary.
Each normal point of connection, such as a connections to a container, should be labeled as to its purpose (e.g. inlet, outlet, vent, etc.).
Containers should be labeled to identify their contents..
Alternatively, for piping and containers within enclosures, a diagram identifying
the direction of flow in each piping segment,
each normal point of connection, and
contents of each segment of piping and each container
should be affixed to an accessible, easily read location within the enclosure, such as the inside of the enclosure door.
Purging
Delivery systems, including lines and manifolds should be designed with purging capability, to ensure all liquids and/or gasses can be completely purged. The design characteristics that require attention include:
dead legs (portions of the energetic materials path that have no significant flow),
points that are lower than the points immediately upstream and downstream of them, and
points that are colder than other points in the same energetic materials path.
Procedures should be developed to identify purging requirements for liquid and gas delivery lines specifically, to ensure all materials have been removed prior to maintenance.
Other safety criteria
Maintenance and service access sufficient space to allow for safe change out of containers should be provided per SEMI S8 requirements
Cabinet spill containment Refer to SEMI S2
Liquid leak detection Refer to SEMI S2
EMO Refer to SEMI S2
Seismic bracing guidance Refer to SEMI S2
Alarm output criteria Alarm outputs from all safety and detection devices should be provided to allow for connection to equipment or chemical delivery shut down and the capability to interface with facility alarm systems.
Alarm outputs that are used as part of safety interlocks between subsystems or modules should be designed to meet the safety interlock criteria of SEMI S2 or S22 and be specified how to connect to them in the system manuals. Dry contacts indicating the module ready status are a common method for addressing this.
Alarm outputs to provide status of fire and gas monitoring devices to the facility monitoring system are required at many facilities. The format of these outputs will need to be agreed by the user and supplier(s).
Gas Box and Process Chamber Equipment Supplier Criteria
The gas box should be equipped with appropriate safety related features that include:
Ventilation, validated in accordance with SEMI S6.
Energetic Material Detection
Flame and Smoke Detection
Tool access or interlocked enclosure
The process chamber should be equipped with appropriate safety related interlocks that include:
Overpressure controls
Over temperature controls
Prevention of accidental mixing of incompatible materials
0. Safety Related Control Interface Interface with safety related controls and devices supporting a remote delivery cabinet, vacuum pump and abatement system should be provided
0. Maintenance procedures should be provided that include:
Chamber purging
Chamber cleaning
Post Process Chamber Through Vacuum Pump / Abatement System Design and Operational Criteria
0. Byproduct Characterization
Based on supplier baseline process recipes and mass balance analysis, suppliers (material, process equipment, vacuum pump and abatement) should include, in documents provided to the users, byproduct characterization data and recommended controls for minimizing byproduct deposition downstream of the process chamber prior to entering the users exhaust system (post vacuum pump/abatement system).
Users should, based on their process recipe and mass balance analysis, provide, to the abatement equipment suppliers, byproduct characterization data and recommended controls for minimizing by products deposition downstream of the process chamber prior to entering the users exhaust system (post vacuum pump/abatement system).
0. Foreline and Vacuum Pump Exhaust Line Design Forelines and vacuum pump exhaust lines may be accessible or may be all welded from the process equipment to the vacuum pump. Lines should be designed to manage risks and for maintainability.
Example Vacuum Pump System Designed for Energetic Process (See Table 1 for the key.)
Vacuum Pump and Abatement Design Best Safety Practices
Component
Recommended BestPractice
1. Foreline
100 mm, 316L stainless steel. Avoid horizontal sections and low points. Lagging and heating to 150C maximum is optional (see comments).
2. Foreline trap
Not fitted
3 .Foreline valve
Fit a suitable valve above the pump.
4. Foreline side port
Fit a side port with valve to allow nitrogen purge.
5. Foreline nitrogen purge
Fit a regulated nitrogen purge to the foreline side port downstream of the foreline valve.
6. Valved port
Fit a valved port to allow connection of external pump or instrumentation.
7. Pump
Pump designed to minimize accumulation
8. Pump Power
Pump powered independently of the equipment
9. Silencer
If a pump fitted with a silencer is to be used, then the silencer is best placed outside the pump frame.
10. Exhaust purge
An additional nitrogen purge should be fitted to the exhaust. Provide exhaust purge to ensure nitrogen blanket over by-product residues in the event of the pump stopping.
11. Check valve
A check valve should be fitted.
12. Exhaust system containment
Consider whether the exhaust system components should be fitted with enclosures.
13. Exhaust heating
The vacuum pump exhaust line should be heated and insulated.
14. Exhaust components
Fixed line or reinforced flexible pipelines should be used with trapped O-rings.
15. Abatement by- pass
Fit a by-pass line around the abatement unit.
16. Chamber over- pressure line
The chamber overpressure line should be plumbed directly to an abatement inlet.
17. Abatement
Abatement equipment should be designed and operated to ensure effective destruction of process gases and byproducts.
Forelines and vacuum pump exhaust lines should be designed to minimize condensation and build-up of byproducts by
Ensuring that long horizontal runs are minimized
Provided with as few bends as practicable and with a maximum angle of 45 degrees in any bend.
Avoiding low spots in both the foreline and the pump vacuum pump exhaust line where possible.
Where strategies for mitigation of byproduct build-up (See 16.4.) have been adopted, review the likely materials that will be trapped or generated, potential reactions between the these materials and other process steps (e.g., chamber clean), and how any such trap or reactor can be safely maintained.
Selection of the foreline surface finish should include an evaluation of the raw material and the byproducts from the process to ensure compatibility of the foreline.
The use of a 316L stainless steel foreline or a foreline that has an internal coating may be necessary to achieve acceptable performance.
Forelines and vacuum pump exhaust lines should be designed avoiding dead volumes (volumes that cannot be purged)
An effective isolation method to prevent air exposure to process byproducts during maintenance on pumps and other exhaust system components should be provided.
Fitting a foreline isolation valve (component #3 in Figure 7) will allow the pump to be kept running whilst pressure control valve maintenance is being carried out. In addition it allows purging a failed pump, without over-pressurizing the foreline.
The fittings downstream of the foreline isolation valve should be designed to tolerate some over pressure, to allow for purging and leak checking.
The most common foreline isolation valve type is a gate valve, though some equipment suppliers favor a ball valve.
The isolation valve should, in the event of appropriate trouble conditions or loss of power to the process equipment or pump, default to the closed position. A manual valve that requires the operator to stand next to the energetic materials path whilst the valve is opened should not be used. The user should work with the process equipment and pump manufacturers to ensure that no equipment safety controls or devices will be overridden or bypassed. Based on the risk assessment, it may be necessary to monitor the valve position.
A foreline purge port should be installed to allow inert purging of all exhaust system components prior to maintenance (component #4 in Figure 7).
The foreline purge port should be fitted with an inert gas supply regulated to approximately 15 kPa (2 psig) (< 35 kPa (5psig)) to avoid over-pressurizing components) to enable the purging of a failed pump (component #5 in Figure 7). The flow should be restricted to 5 slm. The valve control should be arranged such that the nitrogen flow starts whenever the foreline valve closes (and stops when it opens). The pump equipment supplier and user should determine if the user requires a flow of nitrogen diluent above the pump equipment suppliers specification. If there is one foreline valve, this port should be downstream of the foreline valve. If there are two foreline valves, this port should be between them.
A valved foreline port should be installed to allow connecting an external pump to give an alternative method of purging if the pump has failed (component #6 in Figure 7). Such a port also allows the fitting of a pressure gauge, residual gas analyzer and helium leak tester.
A vacuum pump exhaust line (post process) pump purge should be installed to provide additional dilution. (component #10 in Figure 7). This should be a continuous purge that remains on even if the pump stops. This will ensure a continuous nitrogen blanket over any byproduct. The nitrogen should be regulated to a low pressure (< 5 psig) to avoid over- pressurizing the foreline if there is an exhaust blockage and the pump stops. A nitrogen flow of 25 slm is suggested. If a pump with a silencer is being used then this purge is best fitted between the pump and silencer. The nitrogen flow levels may be limited by the abatement system chosen.
Consideration should also be given to purging of the foreline from the process equipment to ensure adequate dilution, or purging, or both. In the event of downstream equipment failure, the process equipment should isolate the process chamber and provide an automated flow of nitrogen to the foreline. This will blanket any energetic materials in the foreline and help reduce any air ingress. The nitrogen flow should stop when atmospheric pressure is reached to avoid over-pressurizing the foreline.
A check valve should be fitted downstream of the pump (component #11 in Figure 7). The check valve will reduce the possibility of moist air in the exhaust being sucked back when the pump is stopped. It should be removed only if a fast acting valve is fitted to prevent this suck-back..
All post pump bellows (component #14 in Figure 7) should be reinforced unless they are within an exhausted cabinet
Trapped o-rings should be used on all exhaust joints capable of withstanding pressures above atmospheric pressure.
Forelines and vacuum pump exhaust lines should not be manifolded to support multiple process chambers exhaust prior to abatement.
Vacuum pump exhaust lines should be provided with an abatement bypass capability. An abatement bypass line (item #15 on Figure 7) allows the pump to continue running whenever the abatement unit is being maintained.
Abatement bypasses should be designed such that unreacted process emissions do not create an unsafe condition. Consider whether the by-pass line should be heated to avoid condensable materials creating bypass blockage.
When in by-pass mode, the design should ensure that unabated gases are handled in a safe manner. There are three general approaches to this:
Interruption of processing when the abatement equipment is bypassed
Dilution of process emissions with a gas with which those emissions will not react
Use of a backup abatement means.
The selection of a means of handling process emissions during bypass should account for mixing of incompatibles, materials of construction and appropriate dilution of byproducts.
If the means used while the abatement equipment is in the by-pass mode does not meet the performance criteria for abatement, the time the process is allowed to operate with the abatement equipment bypassed should be limited.
Ampoule vent, chamber bypass, chamber vent, chamber overpressure paths, etc. should be routed by the most appropriate means to the facility system. Whether the evacuation path goes to pre-pump foreline, post pump exhaust, abatement input, or separate abatement system from process chamber, etc. should be determined by a hazard analysis.
Connecting the chamber overpressure line to a chamber vacuum pump exhaust line exposes the overpressure line to solids exhausted from the chamber which could result in blockage and chamber explosion.
Criteria applicable to only non-welded energetic materials path
Limiting sections to 1.2 m (4 ft) or less in length to allow for ease of replacement or removal
Ensuring that all fittings are leak checked before processing begins and after service and maintenance activities.
Criteria applicable to only welded energetic materials path If a solid welded foreline is used to reduce the potential for leaking joints, consideration should be taken as to a method for cleaning the pipe. This pipe cleaning method may include a Y type connection to allow for isolation and cleaning access.
0. Mitigation of Byproduct Buildup
Equipment suppliers should recommend minimum intervals for inspection, cleaning, or replacement of piping, pumps, and abatement equipment.
One or more of the following options should be considered by the supplier(s) based on their knowledge of expected chemistries and reaction byproducts
Particle filtration
Traps (e.g. cold traps, solid or liquid traps) traps (component #2 in Figure 7) may prevent energetic materials from building up in the energetic materials path downstream of the trap; however the accumulation of these materials in the trap could be a hazard in itself. Traps should not be used unless there is a clear understanding by the user of which materials are likely to be trapped, of how to maintain the trap safely, and of interactions between trapped materials and other process or maintenance steps (e.g. chamber cleans and potential air exposure during chamber pump downs following chamber maintenance).
Heated nitrogen
In-situ reaction (plasma, heat, air, water, chemistry). As with traps above, if an in-situ reactor is to be used there should be a clear understanding of the likely reaction products and their interaction with other process steps (including chamber cleans), and also the safety of any associated maintenance procedures.
External heat blanket on foreline or vacuum pump exhaust line (components #1 and 13 in Figure 7), or both. (If heating is used, the maximum and minimum temperature should match the process equipment suppliers requirements to prevent thermal hazards and minimize condensation. Ensure that o-rings are rated for the chemistry and compatible with the heating temperature. If a pump with a silencer is used, the silencer should also be heated and insulated.)
Appropriate process and safety monitoring of one of more mitigation strategies should be included by the equipment supplier. For example, heat blankets should have over-temperature controls. It may be appropriate, based on risk, for them to be monitored for correct operations, such as loss of heating.
0. Vacuum Pumps (component #8 in Figure 7) For processes using energetic materials, hazardous byproducts are expected to be present throughout the vacuum system and are known to be corrosive, flammable or reactive. Byproducts should be treated as reactive and thus removed from the vacuum pump exhaust line before restarting the equipment. Pump purge requirements should be understood and verified prior to process startup. Restarting a pump or opening a line at vacuum after air exposure inside the line can result in a violent reaction. The quantity of by- product can be controlled if the best known method for installation is followed and regular preventive maintenance intervals are maintained. In addition such installation will reduce the risk of exposing the remaining byproduct to air or moisture. Particular care is required when carrying out any invasive maintenance on the energetic materials path to avoid exposing byproducts.
Some beneficial features to minimize accumulation of process byproduct material are:
Temperature control capabilities (A hotter pump may be beneficial to minimize accumulation of byproduct material. However, for some processes and materials, high temperature may cause decomposition or other reactions.)
Minimal dead volumes (volumes that cannot be purged), including in vacuum pumps
Minimal gas path
Purge capabilities (Although some pumps have warnings and alarms that show if the purge gas flow drops below set levels, these may be monitored by software and designed primarily for indication and they should not be used for safety purposes. In these cases where the purge gas flow to the pump is integral to ensuring equipment safety, it is essential that the user fit an external flow switch that is linked to the equipment or gas supply system to cut off process chemi